ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

PART I · THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

Examination of the Doctrine of Momentary Existence

Original Sanskrit work: Udayanācārya · Translation in the edition: Gajendra Thakur

A presentation of the English text of the translated work

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 001–002

Successive steps in the argument

001 **Verse of Praise**

Salutations to the Supreme Being, foremost among the ancient teachers, lord of all worlds, and creator. … His sovereignty over the worlds fashioned by him belongs to his very nature. Having created the worlds, he sustains their existence, teaches their beings the correct use of words, and for their welfare establishes injunctions…

002 **The Subject for Examination and the Purpose of This Inquiry**

Every person in this world naturally seeks freedom from suffering. … The reality of suffering is established by everyone's experience, and suffering is by its very nature adverse and unbearable. Even when a suffering being does not understand the means of removing it, that being continues to search for such a means. Ultimately, on…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 003–004

Successive steps in the argument

003

Doctrines Opposed to the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika View of the Nature of the Self

The principal views opposed to the reality of the self are these: everything endures for only a single moment; nothing apart from consciousness is real; there is no distinction between qualities and the thing qualified by them; and the entity called the self is never perceived or experienced.

004

Establishing Universal Momentariness by Inference and Refuting It Because Invariable Concomitance Is Unproved

Of the four doctrines stated above, the first cannot be accepted because it has no established proof. … It may be said: “Whatever is real is momentary; for example, a pot is momentary; and words and other things whose momentariness is disputed are real.”…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 005–006

Successive steps in the argument

005 **A Proof Offered for Invariable Concomitance and Its Detailed Examination**

Should it be maintained that mutually contradictory properties—capacity and incapacity for production—are found together in what appears to be one object; that from this coexistence a difference of objects is inferred; and that this difference in turn establishes the stated invariable concomitance? No. The coexistence of mutually…

006 **A Difference between Exclusions Cannot Be Based on Each Excluding What the Other Excludes**

The alleged difference between two exclusions cannot arise from each exclusion excluding what is excluded by the other—for example, as cowness and horseness respectively exclude non-cows and non-horses. … If the two exclusions were mutually opposed in this way, then whenever one were present in the subject, the other would…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 007–008

Successive steps in the argument

007 **Partial Mutual Inclusion and Partial Mutual Exclusion Are Impossible among Exclusions**

Nor can the stated difference arise because each exclusion includes some of the things excluded by the other and excludes others, as in the relation between treeness and aśoka-treeness. … These exclusions cannot be accepted as mutually pervading and pervaded. If they were, a capable object could be proved non-productive, or a…

008 **A Difference between Exclusions Cannot Arise from Different Adventitious Qualities**

Nor does this difference arise from different adventitious qualities, as production and impermanence are treated as distinct properties. No such distinct adventitious property is available here. Could the words themselves be such adventitious properties? No. If that were so, synonymous words could not exist.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 009–010

Successive steps in the argument

009

Differences of Cognition Cannot Make Exclusions Different

Nor is there a cognitive difference among exclusions. … If merely having separate cognitions of exclusions made them different, then even the single exclusion of incapacity would differ from itself, because there may be many cognitions of that one exclusion. If it is maintained that differences among cognitions, determined by…

010

Examination of the View that Capacity Is Fitness to Produce

Capacity is not the second alternative stated above, namely fitness to produce. … If capacity is fitness to produce, is it the aggregate of auxiliary causes, or an individual property residing in a particular object? The first alternative is unacceptable. It would involve proving again what has already been established, and the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 011–012

Successive steps in the argument

011 Three Possible Forms of the Capacity Residing in a Causal Object

Capacity as a distinctive feature of a causal object may be understood in three ways. … In the case of a seed as the cause of a sprout, this capacity may be: first, seedhood, whose positive and negative concomitance with its effect, the sprout, is known; second, a particular species within the universal property called seedhood…

012 The First Form of Capacity Is Unacceptable

The first form is untenable. Seeds possessing seedhood yet failing to produce sprouts are directly established. Even you Buddhists have no doubt about the reality of such things.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 013–014

Successive steps in the argument

013 Detailed Refutation of the Second Form of Capacity

The second form is also untenable. … We do not accept, even in a productive cause, the presence of the special property that is supposed to produce the effect immediately; therefore, the example given in the inference lacks the reason. What discerning person would accept the reality of something not established by reasoning at…

014 A New Proof Proposed for the Stated Property and Its Refutation

Very well, let us examine the matter in this way. … The very production of the effect proves that the cause is immediately productive. If the object had a nature of producing only after delay, its effect would never arise. No, this conclusion is improper. If a delayed cause never produced its effect, it would not be productive…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 015–016

Successive steps in the argument

015 Refutation of the Third Form of Capacity

The third form also creates a contradiction and is therefore untenable. … To remain without an effect because the auxiliary causes are absent, and yet to be related to or followed by the effect while those auxiliaries remain absent, are mutually contradictory. What genuinely follows from this consideration, and should be accepted…

016 A New Reason Proposed for the Inference and Its Refutation

The preceding refutation also disposes of the possible claim that the proper reason in the inference is being the subject of the word “capable.” For even a seed called capable is sometimes seen not to produce its effect, the sprout. … It may be objected that the use of the word “capable” for a non-productive seed is not primary…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 017–018

Successive steps in the argument

017 A Question Concerning the Nature of an Object

The question then is this: after so much discussion, what is the conclusion concerning an object's nature? … Production must occur either after delay or immediately; there is no third alternative. The answer is: no. When exposing a defect in the opponent's view, the first stage of criticism requires only showing that, because the…

018 Clarification of the Meanings of Delay and Non-Delay

What does "no delay in production" mean? … Does an object produce its effect immediately after it itself arises, or immediately after it is joined by its auxiliary causes? Similarly, what does "delay in production" mean? Does it remain non-productive until the auxiliary causes become available, or does it remain altogether…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 019–020

Successive steps in the argument

019 Agreement on This Point and Its Justification

Even you Buddhists have no doubt about this, because it is established by proof and the contrary view is contradictory. … To understand this: if an object that is non-productive in the absence of auxiliary causes failed to produce its effect even when the auxiliaries were present, an object of that nature would be altogether…

020 Conclusion

If the second alternative stated above is intended, immediate production is the object's nature. If the third is intended, delayed production is its nature. Thus neither alternative is excluded.

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Successive steps in the argument

021 Proposal of the View that Only a Productive Cause Becomes Joined with Auxiliary Causes

It may be asked: how is it determined that an object presently non-productive alone remains without auxiliaries, while an object presently productive alone becomes joined with auxiliaries after arising; or might the situation be the reverse? … In reply we ask: is there or is there not some special feature in a seed kept in a…

022 Three Possible Forms of Doubt and the Conclusions Drawn from Them

The doubt may have three forms. … First: whether the cause will produce the effect even after being joined with auxiliary causes. Second: whether it will produce the effect even in the absence of auxiliary causes. Third: it is certain that the effect will arise when the causal complex is available, but there is doubt about when…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 023–024

Successive steps in the argument

023 Reply to the Question That Not All Causal Objects Are Alike

Are auxiliary causes available only to a capable cause? … If so, does this mean that they never combine with an incapable cause, or that even after such combination an incapable cause does not produce the effect? The first is not true. Earth, water, heat, and air are seen to combine even with an incapable piece of stone. The…

024 The Satirical Consequence of the Stated Possibility

Very well, let it be so; what defect is there? … The answer is that such an event has never been observed. It may be said that, although it has not been observed, it can still be doubted. But just as one doubts that a cause may remain non-productive despite the presence of auxiliaries, one may equally doubt that an effect may…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 025–026

Successive steps in the argument

025 **Introduction to a Detailed Examination of the Proof Opposing the Assumption of Immediate Productivity**

Let the following consideration be offered in support of the imagined property of immediate productivity. … We do not doubt that auxiliaries combine with the principal cause, because we have already accepted that seed, soil, and the rest become productive…

026 **Objections to the Property Called Immediate Productivity**

The real doubt is whether, once the principal cause and auxiliary causes have assembled, production of the effect should be regarded as determined by a special property called “immediate productivity” residing in the principal cause. … But there is no ground for such doubt. If the effect is produced by the known group of causes…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 027–028

Successive steps in the argument

027 Explanation of the First and Second Objections

From the moment a pot is produced until it is destroyed by the blow of a heavy staff, it is seen to possess no property other than pothood relevant to the point at issue. … Yet, by successively combining with different auxiliary causes, it produces innumerable similar and dissimilar effects. If this fully explains the manifold…

028 Explanation of the Fourth Objection

Regarding the property called immediate productivity, one may ask: does it pervade all rice grains, or does it exclude rice? … If it pervades all rice, why is rice kept in a granary not immediately productive? If it excludes rice, how can productive rice be immediately productive? Similarly, one may ask: does ricehood pervade all…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 029–030

Successive steps in the argument

029 Counter-Reply to the Preceding Objection and the Answer

May it not be said that neither inclusion nor exclusion described above obtains? … No; there is no third alternative apart from inclusion and exclusion. Could partial inclusion and exclusion not coherently apply to different individuals? No. On that assumption, the mutual opposition between belonging and not belonging to the same…

030 Detailed Explanation of the Preceding Objection

If the specific universal of an object deviated from that object, then for the same reason aśoka-hood would deviate from treeness and an aśoka would cease to be a tree. … If this were accepted, inferences using essential nature as the reason would become meaningless. It may be objected that the contrary conclusion of an inference…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 031–032

Successive steps in the argument

031 Explanation of the Fifth Objection

A particular property of a cause determines a particular property of the effect. … If seedhood did not determine sprouthood residing in the effect called a sprout, the sprout could arise from things other than a seed. It may be asked: how could a property distinctive of a seed reside in something different from a seed? But it may…

032 Conclusion of the Preceding Discussion

If an object of a certain nature determines the positive and negative concomitance of another object of a certain nature with itself, then the first object, by its own nature, produces the second in that second object's own nature. … Particular instances of the determining entity determine the production of particular instances of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 033–034

Successive steps in the argument

033 Inferential Proof of the Preceding Conclusion

What proves this group of conclusions? … The answer is the positive and negative concomitance that determines causal relation. Yet, if you Buddhists are not satisfied without a formally stated inference, hear it as well: “Whatever is unnecessary for a sprout does not possess the nature of a seed, as in the case of a piece of…

034 Inferential Proof against the Contrary Inference

What proof opposes the contrary proposition that an object may possess seedhood while being unnecessary for a sprout? … The answer has already been given. If this were accepted, the rule that only an object belonging to the seed-kind causes a sprout would become accidental. It may be objected that the seedhood of a seed is…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 035–036

Successive steps in the argument

035 **Analysis of the Preceding Proof**

That the effecthood of a sprout is necessarily determined by a definite universal cannot be causeless; otherwise the rule would apply to all things. Nor is this determination produced by something other than the seed, because no other thing is found that determines only the production of the sprout.

036 **Conclusion**

This causally determined nature of the sprout is excluded from every substrate devoid of the probandum. … Thus, by establishing a term pervaded by the pervading property, only this is established: the form of the sprout is determined by the seed. In this way the invariable concomitance between sprout-nature and determination by…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 037–038

Successive steps in the argument

037 An Alternative Proof of the Conclusion That Seedhood Determines Sprouthood

Set the sprout aside for the moment. … The question is whether “being an object of seed-nature” determines any effect. If not, a seed cannot possess that nature, because as a seed it would be incapable of any meaningful activity. Then seed-nature, or seedhood, which is established by perception, would be called unreal, while a…

038 Reply to the Objection That a Seed Joined with Auxiliary Causes Produces Its Effect

It may be objected that, after the causal object has arisen, when the auxiliaries necessary for producing a particular thing assemble around it, it determines only the production of that thing. … Very well, but then we ask: does this production occur because of the imagined special property or because of seedhood? If because of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 039–040

Successive steps in the argument

039 The Inferential Form of the Preceding Reply

This may be proved as follows: “Whatever is incapable, in a definite form, of any meaningful activity does not possess that form; for example, a seed is incapable of activity in the form of an elephant and therefore does not possess elephant-nature.” Auxiliary things such as rice are incapable of any meaningful activity in the form…

040 Objection That the Seed-Nature of All Seeds Cannot Be Denied, and the Reply

Is not the seed-nature of all seeds, including ineffective ones, established by perception, so that its denial is impossible? … Yes. Then, to establish the preceding point, accept this negative inference: “Whatever possesses a certain form is capable of some meaningful activity in that form, as is the immediately productive thing…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 041–042

Successive steps in the argument

041 A Brief Question and Its Answer

It is therefore certain that there is some effect for which the seed, precisely as a seed, is necessary. … Could the cognition of a seed produced by every seed itself be such a distinctive effect? What is improper in this assumption? The answer is that a yogin's cognition of a seed may arise even without a seed. Nor is ordinary…

042 A Second Brief Question and Its Answer

This discussion itself proves that even a capable cause remains non-productive in the absence of auxiliaries. … Can some other unseen effect be supposed to be related to every seed? If so, it cannot be an effect inhering in the seed, because a subtle entity cannot be the inherent cause of a gross effect. Nor can the effect be…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 043–044

Successive steps in the argument

043 A Satirical Statement of the Conclusion

If the preceding view were true, the so-called “immediate productivity” alleged to determine production would have no known positive and negative concomitance with the effect, while what does possess such known concomitance would not be accepted as determining it. Every visible effect would be held to arise from an object’s…

044 The Negative Form of the Preceding Argument

The preceding argument may also be stated thus: “The seed under dispute, because it is not joined with auxiliary causes, is deprived of its effect, the sprout and the like; for it possesses the universal nature of seedhood, which is the object of a determinate cognition of causality toward its effect, the sprout. What is not…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 045–046

Successive steps in the argument

045 A Brief Doubt and Its Resolution

Can it not be doubted here whether the absence of the reason in the example is due to the absence of the probandum, or to the cause's lacking even an indirect capacity for production? … Would this doubt not also render doubtful the negative concomitance between absence of the probandum and absence of the reason? No. This doubt has…

046 Proposal of the Argument That One and the Same Individual Thing Cannot Be Both Productive and Non-Productive

Then let the argument be stated thus. … It does not matter if mutually contradictory qualities do not coexist. Let seedhood itself determine causality; let the object become productive by nature when joined with auxiliaries; and let its non-productivity in…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 047–048

Successive steps in the argument

047 Different Kinds of Opposition and Their Examples

Opposition may be of three kinds. … First, two properties mutually exclude one another, as eternality and non-eternality do. Second, in certain substrates each property indicates the absence of the other, as coldness and heat do. Third, two properties are merely different from one another, as the properties of “bearing a staff”…

048 Refutation of the First Form of Opposition

The first form is not applicable. … Absolute non-productivity of an object is not established, because as long as an object exists it continues to produce something or other. Productivity and non-productivity qualified by a definite object or time are indeed known to be mutually opposed, but they are not seen to coexist in the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 049–050

Successive steps in the argument

049 Refutation of the Second Form of Opposition

The second form is also inapplicable. … No production or non-production is known apart from the affirmation and denial of production. In reality, production and non-production are simply the presence and absence of auxiliary causes; these are otherwise called “operation” or “instrumentality.” Alternatively, they are the presence…

050 Can Different Magnitudes Reside in One Substance at Different Times?

If the preceding claim is accepted, may different magnitudes likewise be regarded as non-opposed, so that they may inhere in one substance at different times? … Here too it might be said that one magnitude excludes another only while it is present, not at another time. Answer: no. Because contrary proof is available, difference of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 051–052

Successive steps in the argument

051 **Objection Concerning the Opposition Involved in the Coexistence of Capacity and Incapacity**

In the present context as well, let contrary proof be accepted to establish the opposition involved in the coexistence of productivity and non-productivity. … The negative inferences have already been given. Answer: no. Those inferences concerned capacity and incapacity and have already been refuted. Other inferences concerning…

052 **Refutation of the Suggestion That a Momentary Object Can Be Productive at All Times**

Can a momentary object, which remains for only one moment and is destroyed as soon as it arises, not produce its effect at all times? … Just as a sense organ, though located in one place, produces cognition in the self, or the stroke of a bow on an instrument occurs in one place while sound arises in space, so the nature of a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 053–054

Successive steps in the argument

053 **Conclusion and a Counter-Argument against Momentariness**

The time of an effect is its own time, but the time of a cause includes both its own time and the time of its effect. … Some causes do not persist until the effect is produced, while others remain even after the causal complex has ceased. Thus the usage concerning the cause's priority is relative to the time at which the effect is…

054 **Refutation of the Alternative That a Separate Cause Must Be Posited for Every Production in a Different Place**

Suppose a separate causal object is posited for every productive operation occurring in a different place; what inconsistency follows? … Answer: if so, each of these alleged different causes must again be regarded as different in turn. For example, the seed…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 055–056

Successive steps in the argument

055 Possible Defects in the Opponent's Reasoning

Then some defect must be admitted in these inferences concerning production and non-production at different places. … But if there is a defect, what is the probandum of these inferences? Is it capacity, incapacity, difference arising from the coexistence of two opposed properties, or the opposition between productivity and…

056 Refutation of the First Alternative

The first alternative is untenable. … If a causal object is capable of production in every place, it should produce everywhere; if it is incapable, it should produce nowhere. It may be objected that although causes have the same nature everywhere, they have acquired from their own causes the distinctive feature of producing the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 057–058

Successive steps in the argument

057 **Refutation of the Second Alternative**

The second alternative is also untenable. … If an object were regarded as unitary even though opposed properties were directly seen to coexist in it, the practice of distinguishing objects would become causeless. Moreover, the reason called “opposition,” having thus deviated from the probandum, could not infer difference even…

058 **Refutation of the Third Alternative**

The third alternative is likewise untenable. … If the defining mark of opposition is present in a substrate or object, even a thousand contrary proofs cannot remove that opposition. If no such mark exists, the nature of opposition must be examined. Opposition consists in two things within one substrate excluding one another in…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 059–060

Successive steps in the argument

059 **Proposal of a Second Pair of Inferences to Establish the Coexistence of Opposed Properties**

Thus, even if the conditional inferences are admitted, they do not establish the coexistence of opposed properties. … But may the following affirmative inference be accepted: “Whatever produces a particular effect at any time necessarily produces it throughout its entire period of existence, just as a sound-wave that is not…

060 **Objection That the Inferences Are Defective**

Under the first alternative—that these inferences concern a class of objects—both are vitiated by a deviating reason, because there is no invariable concomitance between reason and probandum. … Under the second—that they concern one particular individual—both are vitiated by an inconclusive reason. For a cause’s complete failure…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 061–062

Successive steps in the argument

061 Refutation of Another Pair of Inferences

The preceding refutation also defeats another pair of inferences of this kind: “Whatever is productive is something newly arisen, like motion which produces separation as soon as it arises. … And whatever is not productive immediately upon arising is never productive, like a piece of stone with respect to a sprout.” Like the…

062 Refutation of the Third Explanation of Incompatibility

The third alternative is also incorrect. On that assumption, artificiality and impermanence and the like would have to be regarded as mutually opposed merely because they are different from each other.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 063–064

Successive steps in the argument

063 Objection That the Aggregation of Auxiliary Causes Is Incompatible

Let it then be admitted that a cause's conjunction and non-conjunction with the same auxiliary cause are mutually incompatible. … No, this too cannot be accepted; no rational alternative account of such incompatibility is possible. To clarify, the possible alternatives are these: the auxiliary cause and its absence, as mutually…

064 Refutation of the Various Forms of Incompatibility

The first form is untenable, because we do not accept that one positive entity is the negation of another positive entity. … The second is also untenable, because we reject the doctrine that an effect exists eternally. The third is incorrect, because only an object's prior absence and posterior absence are not regarded as…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 065–066

Successive steps in the argument

065 Objection Based on the Non-Pervasive Occurrence of Aggregation and Its Refutation

It may be said that Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika philosophers regard “aggregation” as a property caused by the conjunction of auxiliary causes, different from them, and occurring non-pervasively; then one object, though existing at one place and time, may fail to occur in some of its parts. On the other hand, if aggregation is non-different from…

066 Reply to the View That a Conjoined Object Differs from the Separate Objects

Can the inconsistency concerning atoms just stated not be removed by some other means, such as accepting different determinants of conjunction and non-conjunction? … It can; but what is that means? It is the acceptance of different determinants. Inconsistency would arise if an atom conjoined with another atom in a certain…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 067–068

Successive steps in the argument

067 A Special Defect in Negative Invariable Concomitance Based on Unreal Terms

An additional defect in establishing negative invariable concomitance is that there is no valid proof for accepting the reality of subject, reason, and example. … No means of valid cognition can have an unreal object; if it could, its object would no longer be unreal. But if an unreal object cannot become the subject of any…

068 A Negative Answer to the First Question and an Affirmative Answer to the Second

The answer to the first question is no. … Even if the Buddhist position contains a thousand self-contradictions, no valid perception or inference can establish the reality of an enduring object, its failure to produce successively or simultaneously, or the reality of the hare's horn used as an example in the inference. If such…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 069–070

Successive steps in the argument

069 Reply to the Objection That the Opponent Did Not Remain Silent on This Matter

But although you, the opponent, knew that discourse about unreal objects is impossible, you did not remain silent; you expressly denied that discourse about unreal objects is possible. … What is the answer? Yes, this is true. But just as you Buddhists discuss unreal objects in order to prevent acceptance of a view contrary to your…

070 Refutation of the Third Alternative

Regarding the third alternative, the Buddhist should be asked: who established the rule that irrational conduct or assertion must necessarily be accepted? … Is it because such usage is firmly established? No; irrationality and firm establishment cannot coexist. Can such usage somehow become established through ignorance or error?…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 071–072

Successive steps in the argument

071 The Refutation Continued

In the other two forms of debate called jalpa and vitaṇḍā, the Buddhist's opponent need only examine the proof for the Buddhist's claims; in these forms of debate the opponent is not concerned to present a position of his own. … He therefore cannot be charged with self-contradiction in his statements. The Buddhist cannot answer…

072 Discourse about Unreal Objects Is Self-Contradictory

If merely accepting such discourse could remove self-contradiction, it might be accepted; but it cannot. The statements "An unreal object is not the subject of any kind of discourse" and "It is the subject of negative discourse" are not mutually consistent.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 073–074

Successive steps in the argument

073 Objection to the Preceding View and Its Answer

But where would the self-contradiction remain if unreal objects were held to be beyond the reach only of affirmative statement or practice? … No, this solution is impossible. One would then ask: “Is there or is there not something said to lie wholly beyond both affirmative and negative discourse?” Either possible answer to this…

074 Reply to the Objection That Negative Discourse about an Unreal Object Is Proper

If an unreal object can be the subject of negative discourse, why can it not be the subject of affirmative discourse? … A rational basis for discourse is equally absent in both cases. But is the absence of the power of speech in the son of a barren woman not established by his insentience, even though his power of speech cannot be…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 075–076

Successive steps in the argument

075 **Reply to the Objection That Properties May Be Imputed to an Unreal Object**

The mere denial of non-sonhood has no capacity to produce an action or cognition. … If it contains within itself no effective and recognizable property, how can it serve as the reason in an inference? Very well; precisely the same criticism applies when “insentience” is made the reason. Can it be said that among negative entities…

076 **Refutation of the View That a False Cognition of the Absence of Speech-Power Is Possible in an Unreal Object**

Is it not possible to have merely an illusory cognition of the absence of speech-power, separated from any real object, so that the cognition “The son of a barren woman is a speaker” may arise? Yes, it is possible; but then who can deny an equally illusory…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 077–078

Successive steps in the argument

077 Another Subsidiary Objection and Its Refutation

Is the absence of all capacity in an unreal object not established by its inability to produce either successively or simultaneously? … No. Even if this incapacity of the unreal object were established, the reasoning would not stop there; through intervening inferences it would advance and then circle back to the same incapacity.…

078 An Example of the Disorder Produced by Irrational Statements

If Devadatta has not been seen, no one can ask without shamelessness whether he is fair or dark. … Even if someone asks such a question, and a listener answers “He is not fair” without determining who the referent of the pronoun “he” is, another person may equally say, “He is not dark.” Nothing would be known from such statements…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 079–080

Successive steps in the argument

079 **Examination and Refutation of the Objection That Discourse Is Determined Merely by Cognition**

Is it only that which is unknowable that cannot become the subject of a statement or discourse? … Cognitions of things such as a tortoise's hair—although false—certainly occur. A cognition in the form of a tortoise's hair cannot arise without apprehending some particular object. Nor is there a rule that only what is validly…

080 **Account and Examination of What Regulates Word-Meaning**

The principle regulating or determining the meaning of a word is either linguistic convention or the word's own natural power. … The first alternative is unacceptable in the case of the expression "hare's horn," simply because the object with which the convention is supposed to be established is utterly unknowable. If knowledge of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 081–082

Successive steps in the argument

081 **Examination and Refutation of the View That Latent Impressions Regulate Word-Meaning**

Do certain extraordinary latent impressions regulate the meaning of words? … If so, one must ask: is the latent impression alone the cause of cognition of an unreal object, or does something else cooperate with it? The first alternative is impossible; otherwise, because the impression remains continuously present, cognitions of a…

082 **Refutation of the View That a Conventional Relation between the Expression "Hare's Horn" and an Unreal Object Can Be Known**

It cannot be known that expressions such as "hare's horn" are conventionally connected with unreal objects. … To make this clear: the hearer does not know the cognition of the person who establishes the conventional meaning of the expression "hare's horn"…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 083–084

Successive steps in the argument

083 Refutation of the View That Convention Can Be Known by Some Other Means

Nor can it be said that when a speaker uses the expression “hare’s horn,” the convention becomes known as the meaning intended by the speaker, since the speaker could not have used the expression without some intention. … Knowledge of convention in this form is of no use for comprehending a sentence. If it were useful, then on…

084 Refutation of the View That Word-Meaning Is Known through Individual Latent Impressions

Would it not be proper to suppose that every person who knows the meaning of “hare’s horn” receives a presentation of the unreal object through a distinct latent impression of his own and thereby understands the relation between the expression and the unreal object? No. The speaker and hearer would then be unable to communicate with…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 085–086

Successive steps in the argument

085 **Conclusion of the Preceding Arguments**

For these reasons, cognition of such things as a hare's horn cannot be cognition of an unreal object. … If it were, nothing would exist to produce that cognition. Further, if each person apprehended a different meaning of "hare's horn" through his own latent impression, his cognition of the unreal object, like the dream of a mute…

086 **Examination of the Nature of Negation or Absence**

Let us clarify: what is this absence? … Is it the non-presence of an object in something different from itself—as a pot is different from the floor and therefore is not on the floor while it exists elsewhere? Or is an object's absence non-different from its substrate? According to the first of these two accounts, the absence in a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 087–088

Successive steps in the argument

087 **Refutation of the Second Account of Absence**

Nor is the alleged non-difference between a hare's horn and the absence of successive and simultaneous productivity a real thing, because it is not known through any valid cognition. … But is the absence of a pot not also validly known? It is. The absence of a pot is validly known as an entity whose nature differs from all things…

088 **Refutation of the Objection That Absence Can Be a Subject of Discourse without Valid Cognition**

A Buddhist may say that absences of familiar things can become subjects of discourse even without being validly known. … In his view, a pot is validly established as an object whose nature is the negation of its own absence or exclusion; a pot is never known as identical with its absence. For this very reason, the absence of a pot…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 089–090

Successive steps in the argument

089 **Refutation of the Objection That Positive and Negative Entities Are Mutual Exclusions**

Can it be said that a pot and the absence of a pot are such that the affirmation of one is the negation of the other? … No. If the absence of a pot, like the pot itself, is not regarded as an entity validly established, the doctrine that objects possess determinate natures cannot be applied to anything. Only after an object has…

090 **Proof That Both an Object and Its Negation Must Be Validly Established**

Is it not validly known that a pot has the form of excluding its own absence? … On your own view this cannot be so, because Buddhists do not accept the reality of absence; therefore a positive object cannot have the form of negating its own absence. In fact, valid cognition establishes a pot as composite or atomic. If the absence…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 091–092

Successive steps in the argument

091 **Refutation of the Objection That Imagined Qualifications of a Reason Are Sufficient for Inference**

Suppose merely imagined presence of the required qualifications in a reason were sufficient for inference. … Then imagined absence of reality and momentariness in the unreal object discussed above would equally fulfil the purpose of inference. No, this is…

092 **Negative Invariable Concomitance Is Not Established through Imagined Qualifications**

In both preceding inferences, the real presence of the respective reason in the subject and its real absence in the counter-instance are unavailable. … How, then, could the reason be valid? The opponent replies that these are meaningless statements. It cannot be maintained that, without any regulator, imagination supplies the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 093–094

Successive steps in the argument

093 **Examination of a New Proof of Momentariness Based on the Necessity of Destruction**

Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction establish that destruction is causeless, and let its causelessness establish momentariness. … No, this is impossible. None of the various accounts of the necessity of destruction can be rationally defended. This necessity may be understood in the following forms: destruction is…

094 **Justification Offered for the Non-Difference of Destruction and the Destroyed Object, and Its Refutation**

Is an object's incapacity to produce an effect at another time its very non-existence, and is this nothing other than its nature as incapable with reference to that other time? … No. Incapacity at another time or moment is itself momentariness. Thus the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 095–096

Successive steps in the argument

095 **The Refutation Continued**

If an object's non-existence at another place and time is its own very nature, this would amount to saying that the object is present at that place and time. … Alternatively, if the object's absence is not present at another place and time in the same way that the object itself is not present there, the result would again be that…

096 **Refutation of the First of the Two Latter Alternatives**

Under the first alternative, the object would be non-existent even at its own time, because even then it is admitted to be incapable of producing an effect belonging to another time. … Is it not that, because it is incapable of producing an effect of another time, the object is unreal with respect to that effect? But what magic…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 097–098

Successive steps in the argument

097 Refutation of the Second Alternative

Under the second alternative, if incapacity resides at a time different from the object's time, how can it be non-different from the object? … If it resides at the time when the object occurs, the object would be non-existent at its own time and existent at another, because the incapacity does not reside at that other time. It is…

098 Refutation of the Second Explanation of the Necessity of Non-Existence

To Dharmakīrti's statement, "There is no non-existence or destruction different from an existent object," one may add the qualification "determinate," supplied by Prajñākara, and formulate the view that an object with a determinate nature has no non-existence distinct from itself. But this is merely another expression of the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 099–100

Successive steps in the argument

099 Refutation of the First Alternative Concerning Non-Existence

Let the first alternative be accepted, then. … One must ask: is this the negation of the very nature of the object's absence, or is the nature of its absence explained through negation of the object's existence? If the first, the object whose absence is negated becomes eternal. If the second, the negation or absence of the object…

100 Refutation of the Third Explanation of the Necessity of Destruction

Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction be identified with its being an effect of its counter-positive. … No. If "being an effect" means "being an effect of this as well," it contradicts necessity. If it means "being the effect of this alone," it is unestablished. Can the statement mean that whatever an object produces…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 101–102

Successive steps in the argument

101 Refutation of the Two Latter Alternatives

The first alternative is certainly untenable. … Auxiliary causes also differ from the principal cause; then they too would have to be regarded as the destruction of the principal cause. Further, if absence of the cause is merely an unreal absence, how could a real effect possess it as a quality? And if absence of the cause is…

102 Refutation of the First and Second Alternatives

Of the three alternatives stated above, the first is untenable. … When the effect, such as cloth, is produced, auxiliary causes such as the loom are still seen to be present. Can it be said that this loom and the rest differ from the loom that existed before the cloth was produced? No; what proves such a difference? The opponent…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 103–104

Successive steps in the argument

103 Objection to the Preceding View and Its Answer

If the unravelled threads are themselves the destruction of the cloth, how can they inhere in the cloth according to Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, or be non-different from the cloth according to Buddhism? … The cloth was regarded as the destruction of the threads because it was their effect, and the threads produced when the cloth is destroyed…

104 The Reply Continued

Destruction regarded as non-different from thread either generically excludes or opposes other threads, or it does not. … If it does, how can it remain a thread while opposing other members of its own kind? The generic nature of a blue object opposes what is non-blue, but it is not itself an instance of another non-blue object. If…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 105–106

Successive steps in the argument

105 **Another Objection and Reply Concerning the Relation between Destruction and Its Counter-Positive**

Could it not be as follows? … According to the opponent, destruction or absence is regarded as different from its counter-positive; nevertheless, one cloth, though devoid of another cloth, retains the nature of cloth, or an absence opposed to one pot may…

106 **Another Objection and Its Answer**

If absence is different from its counter-positive, it may be asked whether a pot is present together with its prior and posterior absences in its two halves. … These absences are accepted as present in the halves; therefore, if absence is different from its counter-positive, the pot too may coexist with them. If the pot is present…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 107–108

Successive steps in the argument

107 Objection to the Preceding Answer and the Reply

If absence is regarded as different from its counter-positive, should a pot not continue to exist even while its destruction is present, since the two are different and the existence of one should not prevent the existence of the other? … Is this not the defect in the view? If “the pot continues to exist” means only that its…

108 Refutation of the Final Explanation of Necessity

The preceding refutation also defeats the possible objection that if destruction requires causes other than its counter-positive, the production or assemblage of those causes may be obstructed, so that destruction might never arise and an object might never be destroyed. If such a possibility exists, then when a pot is destroyed its…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 109–110

Successive steps in the argument

109 Statement and Rational Confirmation of the Defects in the Buddhist Inferences

What is defective in the inferences advanced above by both Buddhist and non-Buddhist? … In the first inference the reason is inconclusive with respect to the probandum, because its invariable concomitance with the probandum is determined by the condition “positivity.” Every known example of the probandum “unproduced” is a positive…

110 Positive Proof of the Persistence of Objects

How is the persistence of objects established? … On the basis of recognition and the impossibility that universals are momentary. It may be objected that the definition of recognition also applies to recognition of cognitions that change at every moment; such recognition of cognition is false, and therefore recognition concerning…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 111–112

Successive steps in the argument

111 Objection to the Preceding Proof and the Answer

In a steady yet spreading lamp-flame carefully observed, no coexistence of incompatible qualities appears; yet is not mere difference, opposed to recognition, a property of the flame? … Yes; but on what valid basis is it concluded that the flame is not one object? The basis is knowledge of the rule that exhaustion of fuel causes a…

112 Objection to the Answer and Its Resolution

What can be said of the person who refuses to pay a hundred coins for fear that his head will be cut off, yet readily pays five groups of twenty each! … Could there not also be in so-called valid recognition a coexistence of incompatible properties that is not readily visible? If this is admitted as possible, we ask: in the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 113–114

Successive steps in the argument

113 Refutation of the Possible Forms of Doubt

Of the alternatives stated above, the first is untenable; it has already been refuted in the refutation of the view that capacity and incapacity and the like cannot coexist. … The second alternative is also untenable, because directly perceived properties known together are not known to be mutually incompatible. The possibility of…

114 Justification of the Preceding Inference

No one can doubt the validity of the invariable concomitance between reason and probandum in this inference. … The reason in the subject—namely, absence of the coexistence of incompatible properties in real objects—has already been established. That real objects cannot be momentary is established by the fact that knowledge of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 115–116

Successive steps in the argument

115 Examination of the Nature of the Common Form of Objects

There are three views concerning the common form of objects: it is an imagined entity; it is a common generic form; or it is an eternal entity. … The first view is unacceptable. It cannot be maintained on the basis of experience, because no experience apprehends an object's imagined character. If it did, the action prompted by…

116 Objection in Favour of Cognition of Exclusion and Its Refutation

It may be objected that although there is no reflexive cognition "I know exclusion," cognition of the excluding object itself is cognition of exclusion. … Cognition of a qualified object is impossible without cognition of the qualifier. Just as, in the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika view, although there is no reflexive cognition "I know the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 117–118

Successive steps in the argument

117 The Reply Continued

Conceptual cognition of a cow is not in the form “This object is exclusion of non-cows,” but “This is a cow.” If, even without the reflexive cognition “I apprehend the exclusion of things different from a cow,” conceptual cognition nevertheless apprehends exclusion, no one can deny that it is cognition of exclusion. Otherwise, a…

118 Another Objection and Its Reply

If only exclusion of non-cows is regarded as the object in common cognition of a cow, the preceding defect will be removed; otherwise, because one cow differs from another cow, it would count as a “non-cow” and would also be negated by exclusion. … No. If exclusion or negation of a pot is not negated by the stated exclusion, the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 119–120

Successive steps in the argument

119 Refutation of the View That a Universal Is Exclusion of Others

Is exclusion itself the universal, distinct from other exclusions, while the positive object is the counter-positive of the exclusion that constitutes its nature? … No. If a universal is imaginary, how can it constitute the nature of a real positive object? If it is the nature of a real object, it cannot be imaginary. Further, if…

120 Examination and Refutation of Jñānaśrī's View That Exclusion Is a Secondary Object of Cognition

Then let this argument be presented: no doctrine can disregard the evidence of experience. … Who would dare deny that a positive real object appears in cognition? But while the positive object appears, negative exclusion also appears in cognition as its secondary component. If this were not so, a positive property could not…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 121–122

Successive steps in the argument

121 Objection to the Preceding View and Its Answer

Can cognition apprehend exclusion without apprehending the excluded object? … Cognition of exclusion depends upon cognition of what is excluded. It may be replied: let exclusion of buffaloes and the like by cowness be the qualificand, and let the exclusion residing in the cow be the qualifier; then no positive object will enter…

122 Another Objection and Its Answer

Then let an unreal positive object be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition. … No, this view is self-contradictory. A positive object is “something,” while an unreal object is “nothing”; how can the two be one? If unreality is attributed to a positive object because it excludes other objects, then a real momentary…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 123–124

Successive steps in the argument

123 Another Objection to the Preceding Answer and Its Resolution

Is positive or real discourse applied to unreal universals because their difference from real particulars is not known? … No. This would be possible only if a particular sometimes appeared stripped of its positive real nature, or if an unreal object appeared freed from its negative nature. Neither occurs. If both real and unreal…

124 Justification for the Appearance of a Real Common Form in Conceptual Cognition

The object of conceptual cognition is a form common to many things. … An unreal object cannot be such. Being mere absence, an unreal object cannot by nature be present in one and the same form at different times and places. The stated commonality cannot be imaginary either, because imagination is momentary and cannot last beyond a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 125–126

Successive steps in the argument

125 The View That Cognition of Similarity Is Explained by Ignorance of Difference

Could it be that the different unreal objects of conceptual cognition are not apprehended as mutually different, so that there is not spatiotemporal similarity among them but merely cognition of non-difference, and that this accounts for cognition of similarity? No. Unreal objects possess no real difference. If they possessed real…

126 Examination of the Inferential Proof of the Theory of Apoha

The theory of apoha is not established by any syllogism or inference either; no valid inference of the required kind exists. … Could the following inference not be formulated: “Whatever is the object of cognition through affirmation and negation, or is not destroyed whether or not its material cause is destroyed, has the form of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 127–128

Successive steps in the argument

127 Further Examination of the Inference Establishing Apoha

Taking the direct meaning of the phrase “a property common to both existence and non-existence,” what is this property? … It cannot be “having the nature of both,” because existence and non-existence are mutually incompatible. Nor is it “being a property of both positive and negative entities,” for we do not regard a universal…

128 Review of the Entire Discussion

Affirmative and negative verbs used with a subject in a sentence respectively state the presence and absence in that subject of some property other than the universal; or, if that presence or absence has already been stated by another means, they indicate its necessity. Both kinds of verb are therefore meaningful. Even when a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 129–130

Successive steps in the argument

129 Objection to Jñānaśrī's Inference and the Reply

Jñānaśrī, who calls himself an expert, presents an inference in which cognition of a universal is the subject: "If a cognition appears as related to both the existence and non-existence of an object, it is not a cognition of that object, just as cognition of a cow is not cognition of a horse." This inference is vitiated by confusion…

130 Refutation of the Third Definition of the Reason

If the reason is "producing a desire concerning the existence or non-existence of the object," it becomes excessively narrow and confined to the subject alone. … The cognition of a cow used as the example produces no desire concerning the existence or non-existence of a horse; therefore, if for this reason it is not cognition of a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 131–132

Successive steps in the argument

131 Refutation of the Fourth Definition of the Reason

Is the reason non-apprehension of the object's existence and non-existence? … No. If the object's existence and non-existence are non-different from the object itself, cognition cannot fail to apprehend the object. The Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika position does not accept that cognition of a cow fails to apprehend the cow, and in the Buddhist…

132 Objection to the Preceding Refutation and the Answer

The objection is that such a rule does exist: "A cognition that does not apprehend the qualities inhering in an object does not apprehend the object either." For example, cognition of a cow and the word "cow" neither apprehend nor denote the qualities of a horse, and therefore neither apprehend nor denote the horse. Cognition of a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 133–134

Successive steps in the argument

133 The Answer Continued

The earlier objection—that if capacity and its result were respectively uniform, the object would either be known with all its qualities or not known at all—would be appropriate only if cognition of all the object's qualities depended solely on the object itself, solely on cognition of the object, or solely on the causal complex…

134 Implicit Refutation of a Possible Buddhist Argument

The preceding criticism refutes another possible argument, a crooked method like twisting one's waist to touch one's ear. … The argument is this: if, because the object and its qualities are distinct, inferential or verbal cognition of an object does not necessarily entail inferential or verbal cognition of its qualities, the same…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 135–136

Successive steps in the argument

135 Objection to the Preceding Answer

The objection is this: if inferential reasons, words, and objects of the senses were of the same nature like the objects of the right and left eyes, the forms of cognition produced by these means would not differ. … But they do differ. In verbal and inferential cognition, an object does not appear in the same form as in perceptual…

136 Answer to the Objection

This reply too is defective. … The stated invariable concomitance deviates in mutually opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth: one side of the cloth is painted and the other unpainted, and the two sides are apprehended by different cognitions. A blue cloth as it appears in a person's cognition at one time does not for that…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 137–138

Successive steps in the argument

137 A Question and Its Answer

How, then, does the distinction between clear and unclear cognition arise concerning an individual that is the substrate of a universal and the like? … Answer: no such intrinsic distinction really arises. The more of an object's qualities are apprehended, the clearer its cognition is considered; the fewer are apprehended, the less…

138 A New Form of the Preceding Question and Its Answer

It may be objected that cognition of increasingly distant objects has not been established as related to real objects; therefore those cognitions too fall within the subject of the earlier inference intended to prove that indirect cognition does not apprehend real objects. But this view is contradicted by the reflexive perceptual…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 139–140

Successive steps in the argument

139 Justification of the Answer

If objects known as distant and increasingly distant are not identical, which among them is the real and determinate object of the different cognitions? … Is the thing actually apprehended itself the real object? Yes; but this apprehension never occurs by suppressing the qualities under which the object appeared in earlier…

140 Objection Based on the Criterion of Successful Activity and the Answer

Among many cognitions, should only that cognition be regarded as valid which prompts successful activity concerning the object? … No. If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not rejected, how is it to be determined toward which particular object among the different objects known successively the successful activity was…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 141–142

Successive steps in the argument

141 Examination of the Answer That Directness and Indirectness Are Not Properties of the Object of Cognition

No. … Indirectness and directness are not properties including the object of cognition. Properties of cognition are of two kinds: first, properties determined by the object; second, distinct generic properties such as “being perceptual,” “being…

142 Refutation of the Second Proof of the Theory of Apoha

The second reason advanced for apoha was: “Whatever grounds uniform discourse concerning objects wholly different by nature has the form of exclusion of others.” This reason suffers from doubtful invariable concomitance. … A positive property too can explain and ground uniform discourse. The facts are these: uniform discourse is…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 143–144

Successive steps in the argument

143 Examination of Another Defence of the Theory of Apoha

The concept of apoha or exclusion does not generate motivation toward action either. … If it did, a person would know one object yet act toward a wholly different object, producing inconsistency between cognition and action. Can this inconsistency be removed by complex conceptual cognition? Then what is this complex conceptual…

144 Refutation of the First and Second Alternatives

The first alternative is untenable. … According to Buddhism, the real particular does not appear in conceptual cognition. The second is also untenable. A real object is a particular individual; verbal and other conceptual cognitions have no relation to it. A particular individual is not the object of linguistic convention. Thus…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 145–146

Successive steps in the argument

145 Refutation of the Third Alternative

The third alternative is untenable. … There would then be no necessary correspondence between motivation toward action and verbal cognition concerning the object of action, because failure to apprehend the difference between unreal exclusion and a real object is everywhere available as a cause. In complex conceptual cognition of a…

146 Refutation of the Fourth Alternative

The fourth alternative is also untenable. … If conceptual cognition produced by a natural disposition motivates toward a real object, then non-conceptual cognition of a yellow object produced by a disposition similar to that producing non-conceptual cognition of a blue object should motivate toward the blue object. It may be…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 147–148

Successive steps in the argument

147 A Defence of the Fourth Alternative and Its Refutation

Does the necessary correspondence between conceptual cognition and subsequent action arise because conceptual cognition possesses the instrumentality of non-conceptual cognition? … Then what does “possessing instrumentality” mean? It cannot mean “having the same object as non-conceptual cognition,” because conceptual cognition…

148 Another Defence and Its Refutation

Nor can the truth of non-conceptual cognition be superimposed upon conceptual cognition. … If this truth does not necessarily include the object of cognition, the necessary identity of object between conceptual cognition and motivation toward action cannot be explained. If truth includes the ultimately real object, conceptual…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 149–150

Successive steps in the argument

149 **A Third Defence and Its Refutation**

This instrumentality cannot be failure to apprehend the difference of conceptual cognition either from itself or from non-conceptual cognition. … Conceptual cognition is self-aware as cognition; therefore its distinctive nature cannot be confused with the nature of non-conceptual cognition. The object of conceptual cognition is…

150 **Examination of Jñānaśrī's Account of the Causality of Conceptual Cognition in Relation to Action**

Do some conceptual cognitions by their very nature motivate action toward a real object that is not even their object? … Who is responsible for the strange nature they have received from their causes? If so, we ask: does cognition produce motivation toward…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 151–152

Successive steps in the argument

151 Defence and Refutation of the View That a Concept Can Lead to Action

Can a concept motivate action toward a real object unrelated to itself in the same way that the capacity of a cause produces an effect not yet arisen? … Yes; but the causality of a cause's capacity must still be rigidly restricted to objects possessing a particular generic nature. Otherwise cognition of a flame would motivate…

152 Objection to the Answer and Its Refutation

Does conceptual cognition whose form determines burning capacity cause action toward real fire, while a generic or accidental property such as cognitionhood determines the cognition's causality? … No. If so, cognition directed toward the shine of a cluster of diamonds resembling fire would not motivate action toward it, because…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 153–154

Successive steps in the argument

153 **Refutation of Jñānaśrī's View That Identity of Form between the Object of Cognition and the Object of Action Is the Regulator**

The preceding refutation also defeats the view that identity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object toward which action is directed regulates the relation between cognition and the real object. For action is also directed…

154 **Denial of Identity of Form between Cognition and Its Object**

In a doctrine accepting the reality of the external world, the required identity of form between cognition and its object is impossible, because the respective causal complexes of cognition and object are wholly different. … If their causal complexes were the same, only one of two things—insentience or consciousness—would exist in…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 155–156

Successive steps in the argument

155 Another Objection to the Preceding View

If blueness or some other quality is the generic mark of cognition of blue, how can it attach to the object of cognition rather than to cognition? … If it is a quality of the object, how can it qualify cognition? Nearly the entire discussion of this issue has already occurred in connection with the defect of intermixture of…

156 Examination of the Alternative That Cognition Apprehends Its Own Form

Then cognition should motivate action toward its own form, which is known as qualifying cognition together with itself, because cognition is self-aware. … A person turns toward that form and ultimately reaches the real object, just as one who turns toward the glitter of a stone ultimately reaches the stone. No. This is not a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 157–158

Successive steps in the argument

157 Another Objection to the Sautrāntika View

On the doctrine that the form alone is the object, there is no valid proof establishing the reality of an external object not apprehended by cognition. … If the appearance of different forms at different times in separate cognitions is treated as a reason proving external reality, that reason deviates; an epileptic sees forms that…

158 Examination of the Proof from Successful Activity

Even successful activity offered as proof of an external real object, if known, is itself constituted by a particular form; external reality is not established by it. … Just as the unreal hair-like form appearing to an epileptic has no external object, so a form of successful activity produced by some extraordinary latent…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 159–160

Successive steps in the argument

159 **Examination of the Vaibhāṣika View That a Real Object Is the Object of Conceptual Cognition**

Then let the external particular real object itself be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition. … Although the object in its own form is not the subject of any linguistic convention and is therefore ineffable, it may acquire a common form through an indirect relation of excluding others and thereby become definitely…

160 **Criticism of the First Proposed Meaning of "Non-Cow"**

If the first meaning is accepted, another cow different from one particular cow cannot be known or spoken of as a cow, because by being different from the first cow it does not exclude non-cows. … Moreover, on this meaning a non-cow too would be known as a cow; a horse, which is a non-cow, excludes buffaloes, elephants, and all…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 161–162

Successive steps in the argument

161 **Criticism of the Second Meaning of "Non-Cow"**

If the second meaning of "non-cow" is accepted, exclusion of non-cows will mean exclusion of what lacks the property qualifying a cow. But such exclusion is identical with an object endowed with cowness.

162 **An Objection by Dharmakīrti and Its Answer**

Then let individual objects that appear similar be regarded as the common form of all individuals of that class, without troubling to establish exclusion of others as the common form. … But this is impossible, because there is no identity of form. Their identity is not real, because different individuals possess mutually…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 163–164

Successive steps in the argument

163 Examination of Dharmakīrti’s View of Universals

Then let the argument be this: different particular real objects are endowed with the capacity to produce cognition of their similarity. … Objects possessing this capacity—if the similarity concerns cows—are called “cows,” while objects lacking it are called “non-cows.” Individuals receive this capacity from their respective…

164 Refutation of the Preceding View

If uniform discourse can be explained from individuals wholly different from one another without any auxiliary cause, discourse of difference can equally be explained from a single identical object. … In both views the imagination of a natural capacity in individuals is alike. But if so, cognition of identity will either never…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 165–166

Successive steps in the argument

165 Resolution of the Infinite Regress

If only one object produces discourse of identity, how is discourse of difference concerning different universals to be explained? … The answer is: in the same way as discourse of difference concerning the one moon. Is that discourse not false? Yes; let discourse of difference among universals also be false. In both cases…

166 Another Proof of Universals

Suppose we do not infer the identity and difference of the objects producing cognitions of similarity and dissimilarity. … Even so, the knowledge that one cognition is true and another erroneous is possible only if one kind of cause produces true cognition and another kind produces false cognition. A specific kind of effect…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 167–168

Successive steps in the argument

167 The View That Apoha Is Established on the Basis of Proof against Universals

Then let apoha be regarded as established because there is proof against the reality of universals. … No. If uniform discourse cannot be explained otherwise, how can there be proof against universals and the like? Otherwise a reason such as identity or essential nature, necessarily established by decisive proof opposing the…

168 Presentation of Possible Proofs against Universals

There is no powerful proof against the reality of universals. If there were, it would oppose either the universal itself or cognition of the universal. A proof opposing the universal would consist either in ignorance of its nature or in knowing the universal as endowed with mutually incompatible properties.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 169–170

Successive steps in the argument

169 Refutation of the First Alternative

The first alternative is untenable because it cannot be established. … We have begun an inquiry into the form of similarity among known objects, not into a form unknown or unapprehended; therefore the universal cannot be regarded as unknown. Can it be said that we deny cognition of the universal only in perception, not in…

170 Objection to the Preceding Reply

Even without cognition of a linguistic convention, does the latent impression of knowing that convention produce cognition of the universal? … If so, one must ask whether the latent impression of knowing a general convention produces cognition of the universal in the absence of one and the same designated object, or in its…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 171–172

Successive steps in the argument

171 Answer to the Preceding Objection

Can the other side not raise the same objection: the Buddhist's critic sees no common nature among the wholly different things stated above, yet sees one among individuals possessing dewlaps? Yes, he can; but the usage based on knowledge of a general linguistic convention cannot be denied.

172 Objection to the Answer and Its Resolution

Even so, at most this will establish that conceptual cognition takes a universal as its object; how is it established that non-conceptual cognition apprehends a universal? … Answer: conceptual cognition takes a real object as its object, and the object of non-conceptual cognition is identical with that of conceptual cognition. How…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 173–174

Successive steps in the argument

173 A Question and Its Answer

If a universal exists, why is it not seen as present in the empty space between two individuals? Because the cause of the universal's appearance—the individual—is absent between the two individuals.

174 Another Question and Its Answer

Just as jujube fruits placed in a vessel are seen as different from the vessel, why is a universal not seen as different from the individuals that are its substrates? … If "being seen as different" means being seen in a different place, the universal is not seen in this way because its place is the same as that of the individuals….

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 175–176

Successive steps in the argument

175 **Consideration of the Second Alternative Stated Earlier**

The second alternative stated above is also not opposed to the universal. … All objections connected with it can be removed in the same manner as objections against the reality of a whole object. But how can a universal be related to an individual not yet born? It neither leaves its present substrate and travels to the later…

176 **The Discussion of the Relation between Universal and Individual Continued**

It may be objected that the individual merely reveals the universal; the universal does not inhere in the individual. … Therefore discourse of the universal's inherence in an individual is secondary. If the universal exists in the place before the individual is produced, space would be endowed with the universal. Very well; if so…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 177–178

Successive steps in the argument

177 **Examination and Criticism of Dharmakīrti's Objection**

Let us clarify Dharmakīrti's irrelevant objection. … It is first said that a universal neither goes toward individuals nor withdraws from them; then the possibility is raised whether the universal inheres in the place that will be occupied by a future individual. What relation is there between these two statements? If the…

178 **The Criticism Continued**

When the future individual does not yet exist, what does it mean to say "The universal is not there"? … It means only that the universal is not related to the non-existent individual. Yes, this is precisely the meaning. But how does the universal become related to the individual after the latter is produced? Answer: the individual…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 179–180

Successive steps in the argument

179 Objection Based on the Qualifier–Qualified Relation between Universal and Individual

Even after this explanation, if universal and the individual possessing it are wholly different, how can they coexist? … Answer: etymologically, “coexistence” means relation to the same substrate. How this opposes different objects, I do not understand. But if so, would cow and horse also be called coexistent? No; this is a…

180 Another Objection and Answer

Even so, there must be some distinction among different objects: some coexist and others do not; this distinction requires a clear account. … Yes, there is a distinction, and it is determined by the natures of the objects. Therefore only some objects are related to certain others, not all objects to all. If so, may the similar…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 181–182

Successive steps in the argument

181 **Refutation of Proofs Opposing Cognition of Universals**

There is no epistemological obstacle to cognition of a universal. … Denial of the form of universal-cognition is contradicted by experience. Denial that this cognition has any cause is refuted by its very occurrence. Denial that its object is one thing is refuted by the fact that no coexistence of incompatible properties appears…

182 **Defence of the Sense-Produced and Perceptual Character of Conceptual Cognition of Universals**

If cognition of a universal, though perceptual, were not sense-produced, non-conceptual cognition too would cease to be sense-produced. … If the perceptual character of cognition depended on its following a non-conceptual cognition of its object, the imagination of a beloved by a love-stricken person would count as perception….

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 183–184

Successive steps in the argument

183 Refutation of the Purpose Alleged for Accepting the Theory of Apoha

Then let the theory of apoha be accepted to achieve some particular purpose. … Its highest purpose is surely to establish the indescribability of all objects. When the entire net of conceptual constructions is removed, the mind reaches a profound and pure state of complete tranquillity. Very well; but who will believe this…

184 The Refutation Continued

No conscious person can be instructed that scripture teaches nothing. … The very sentence denying the validity of verbal statements is itself a verbal statement; the self-contradiction in the Buddhist utterance is therefore clear. If words are used to affirm and deny things, the real particular, not being the object of general…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 185–186

Successive steps in the argument

185 **Objection to the Refutation and Its Answer**

If the verse expressing this dilemma is recited before you with the word changed, you cannot even take refuge in silence as we can. … If we opposed discourse concerning the unreal subject, probandum, or reason in your inference, we would fall into self-contradiction; but because we have no interest in this game, we can remain…

186 **The Purpose of Debate in the Non-Buddhist Position**

If scripture opposed truth, the practices of persons seeking heavenly happiness and liberation would be groundless. Therefore only our doctrine leads to the supreme goal.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 187–187

Successive steps in the argument

187 **Criticism of Jñānaśrī's View and Conclusion**

From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding Jñānaśrī's questions and answers. … Jñānaśrī formulates the question "What is the meaning of a word?" in three forms: "What does a word reveal?", "What cognition does a word produce?", and "To what does a word actually refer?" The answer to the first is…

End of this sequence

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CONCLUSION · PART I

At the close of this division

Criticism of Jñānaśrī's View and Conclusion

From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding Jñānaśrī's questions and answers. … Jñānaśrī formulates the question "What is the meaning of a word?" in three forms: "What does a word reveal?", "What cognition does a word produce?", and "To what does a word actually refer?" The answer to the first is "exclusion of others"; to the second, "a real particular that excludes others"; and to the third, "nothing." These successive answers cannot stand. The first answer gives a false account of linguistic convention, because exclusion of other objects is never the object of verbal cognition. The second gives a false account of the nature of motivation…

END OF PART I · ENGLISH TEXT

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ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

PART II · THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

Examination of the Doctrine Denying External Reality

Original Sanskrit work: Udayanācārya · Translation in the edition: Gajendra Thakur

A presentation of the English text of the translated work

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THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Reading route through the source

001–026	Introduction to the Subject of Debate
027–053	Defence of Generic Similarity between the Object and Cognition
054–079	Refutation of All the Examples Given in the Inferences
080–106	A New Objection to the Reality of a Whole Based on the Denial of Atoms, and Its Refutation
107–132	A Minor Objection and Its Resolution

Ranges follow the original sequence of topics; they do not imply equal argumentative length.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 001–002

Successive steps in the argument

001

Introduction to the Subject of Debate

When the Vijñānavādin maintains that nothing exists outside consciousness, what room remains for the existence of the self? … Very well; let the Vijñānavādin be asked whether his meaning is that the two components of a cognitive state—the knowable object and the knowing consciousness—are ultimately real but mutually non-different…

002

Statement of the Defects in the Vijñānavādin's Inference

Whatever reason is advanced to prove the probandum of the first of the three inferences—necessary co-appearance, cognitionhood, luminosity, or anything else—is plainly defective.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 003–004

Successive steps in the argument

003

Explanation of the Defect

The admission in the preceding inference that cognitions having mutually incompatible forms such as blue and white arise gives birth to a monster that destroys those very cognitions.

004

Further Explanation of the Defect

If the stated cognitions apprehend mutually incompatible objects, how can one cognition, while remaining one, be non-different from many objects? If it does not apprehend them, how does it possess their forms? Self-aware cognition cannot remain unconscious of the form of its own object.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 005–006

Successive steps in the argument

005 Ratnakīrti's Answer and Its Refutation

It may be objected that difficulty arises only when mutually incompatible properties appear together in external objects; if, despite such appearance, external objects were regarded as non-different, the successful activities arising from them and the movements toward them would intermingle, and no distinction among external objects…

006 A Satirical Reply to the Preceding Answer

Dear brother! … Does this mean that just as creatures that are natural enemies, such as snake and mongoose, abandon their innate hostility when they approach the hermitage of a peaceful sage, so mutually opposed objects such as blue and white abandon their natural opposition when apprehended by cognition? Or do they retain their…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 007–008

Successive steps in the argument

007 Refutation of the Two Alternatives

The first alternative is untenable. … If objects whose presence and absence are respectively pervaded by the absence and presence of the other are not regarded as mutually opposed, all opposition would disappear from the world. The answer “Nothing is wrong; let it be so” is improper. The opposed nature of objects cannot be…

008 Objection to the Refutation and the Answer

It may be said that the distinct successful activities of external objects were presented as the basis of their opposition; this rule applies only to external objects, not to cognition or consciousness. … Therefore cognition need not be different even when its objects differ. But this reasoning is not rational. If apparent…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 009–010

Successive steps in the argument

009 **Objection to the Refutation and Its Refutation**

Where is the rule that different objects cannot appear in one cognition? … Different objects certainly can appear in one cognition. No; our meaning in saying that "the appearances of different objects do not overlap" is not this. We mean only that blue itself does not appear as yellow, and yellow itself does not appear as blue….

010 **Justification of the Refutation**

If this were not so, knowledge and ignorance too would not remain mutually opposed. … For example, that which is said to be "not known" is known, since we can say, "This known horse and so forth is not known"; ignorance would thereby become manifest. Do knowledge and ignorance not appear respectively in the forms of ignorance and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 011–012

Successive steps in the argument

011 Refutation of an Earlier View

The foregoing refutation also disposes of the Buddhists' earlier assertion that there is no differentiation within cognition. The cognition of distinct forms as distinct forms is precisely the differentiation of cognition.

012 Another Refutation of the Objection

If all externally real things are momentary, then by the time a person who cognizes two external objects such as blue and yellow together tries to know their mutual difference, both will already have perished. … How, then, can that same person know the objects and their difference successively? There is no certainty that another…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 013–014

Successive steps in the argument

013 Refutation of the Objection that Pure Cognition Is Undifferentiated

Then cognition's uniform luminosity may remove its multiplicity or differentiation, while the manifest coexistence within it of incompatible properties may remove its unity. … But what effect can these negations have upon the purely luminous nature of the cognition of blue, yellow, and the like, which is supposedly devoid of both…

014 Refutation of the Objection that the Appearance of Incompatible Properties in Cognition Is Illusory

The argument for the non-differentiation of cognition would then be this: only the real coexistence of incompatible properties appearing in something determines its differentiation, whereas here their appearance is merely illusory. Very well. If so, it has…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 015–016

Successive steps in the argument

015 Objection that Difference Is Unreal, and Reply

Is not the mere unreal difference that appears in conceptual cognition but not in non-conceptual cognition sufficient for the practical usage of difference? No. Such difference cannot remain immune from the objections concerning its reality or unreality and its appearance or non-appearance in cognition.

016 Defence of the Objection and Its Refutation

Is it only a nonexistent or unreal and unknown difference that is apprehended? … Yes; but the meaning of the word "apprehension" must be clarified. Does it mean "being the cause of practical activity concerning the apprehended object"? No. If practical activity is something different from cognition, then, being itself unreal…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 017–018

Successive steps in the argument

017 Objection to the Refutation

Are the differences among external objects not themselves non-different from the form of the cognition that apprehends them, just as the external objects themselves are held to be cognitive in nature? … If difference is definitely unreal, how can it be the form of a real cognition? And if difference is non-different from the form…

018 Defence of the Foregoing Objection and Its Refutation

Is the object of variegated cognition only a single variegated form, which falsely appears as many because it excludes many other forms? … If exclusion is different from cognition, cognition cannot apprehend it; if it is non-different, the exclusions cannot be many. If there is only one exclusion, how can it generate even the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 019–020

Successive steps in the argument

019 Examination and Refutation of Ratnakīrti's View of Variegated Cognition

The argument would then be as follows: just as something different from an object may falsely appear as that very object, an object does not abandon its own nature even when it appears in a form different from itself. … Therefore, a cognition that is intrinsically one may assume the different forms of its objects and appear in…

020 Consideration of the Alleged Defect in an Object Different from Cognition Being Its Object

What, after all, is the defect in an object different from cognition being known by cognition? … There is none. But on this view the knowable–knower relation between two different things, object and cognition, cannot be determined by a process initiated by either one, because no such regular process exists. Nor can the relation be…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 021–022

Successive steps in the argument

021 Objection to the Reply and Rejoinder

Should we, on the basis of the object's illuminated nature, merely deny the difference between cognition and its object without affirming their identity? No. The negation of difference is itself the positive affirmation of identity.

022 Objection that Variegated Cognition Is Neither Different nor Non-Different, and Reply

Then let variegated cognition be devoid of both difference and non-difference. … If its form is different from cognition, cognition cannot illuminate it. If it is non-different, then, because cognition is one, its form too will be one; there will then be no variegation in a cognition that apprehends blue, yellow, and the like…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 023–024

Successive steps in the argument

023 Refutation of the Objection that Variegatedness Transcends All Determination

Then variegated cognition would be devoid of all four mutually opposed properties—difference, identity, absence of difference, and absence of identity. … “The variegated” is indeed a wondrous entity: cognition is real although neither one nor many. Let us take this miracle to be the meaning of the word “variegated.” Very well; if…

024 Another Refutation of the Objection

If cognition is truly devoid of all four properties, that is merely another way of saying that these properties, though different from cognition, are either known or unknown. … It is incorrect to call them unknown, for they are being known through these very words. If they are admitted to be known, they are known without…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 025–026

Successive steps in the argument

025 **Examination of the View that an Object Is Non-Different from Cognition Because It Is Illuminated**

The argument for identity would then be this: we admit that neither the internal agent in the form of cognition nor the external object fulfils the definition of knowability; nevertheless, the illumination of blue, yellow, and the like cannot be denied, and…

026 **Refutation of the Second Alternative Stated at the Beginning**

The foregoing denial of the knowability of an external object also refutes the second of the initial alternatives. … Merely admitting generic similarity between an object and cognition does not satisfy the definition of knowability, because the undesirable consequence remains that, if cognition and object are generically similar…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 027–028

Successive steps in the argument

027

Defence of Generic Similarity between the Object and Cognition

If an external object is regarded as dissimilar to its cognition, does it never satisfy the definition of knowability, whereas if generic similarity is admitted their material cause will regularly be the same, so that cognitions having the forms of blue, yellow, and so forth, though mutually distinct, may be established as knowing…

028

Consideration of the Third Initial Alternative

Then let the third alternative—that the known object is unreal—be accepted as correct. … It is impossible to define the knowable as either different from or non-different from cognition; and if the knowable cannot be defined, one cannot even rely upon the capacity of the causal complex to determine the cognitive relation. Inquiry…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 029–030

Successive steps in the argument

029 Refutation of the First Alternative Above

The first alternative is unacceptable. … The existence of an object manifestly perceived cannot be denied merely because its definition has not been settled. The uncertainty of a definition may also arise from the complexity or subtlety of what is to be defined. If knowable external objects were not actually known, it would be…

030 Refutation of the Second Alternative

The second alternative is also unacceptable. … The impossibility of defining the knowable would establish its unreality only if the impossibility of definition were invariably connected with unreality itself. But if definition is impossible whether the knowable is real or unreal, why are you especially attached to unreality? If it…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 031–032

Successive steps in the argument

031 **Formulation and Refutation of Another Definition of Knowability**

Let the definition of knowability then be “being the object of practical activity produced by cognition.” Very well, let us accept this. … But how is it determined that one particular practical activity is produced by one particular cognition and not by another? If it is held that a particular causal complex produces only a…

032 **The Extreme Proposal and Its Refutation**

Let the world then be regarded as wholly inconceivable, because it is knowable as neither different from nor identical with cognition. … Very well; does this mean the denial of all true knowledge concerning the world, or does it lead to nihilism? The first alternative is impossible. The denial of all true knowledge is itself a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 033–034

Successive steps in the argument

033 Defence and Refutation of the Extreme Proposal Above

Nor can it be said that this Buddhist exercise of thought merely produces an unregulated activity, for no satisfaction is obtained by tasting the emptiness of space; an inquiry whose supposed result is absolute nothingness yields no fulfilment. … Nor does it free one from suffering: one feels no warmth by embracing a nonexistent…

034 Conclusion of the Discussion

The Buddhist strategy of debate resembles the well-known inference of a young monkey. … Hearing of the prowess of Hanumān, son of the Wind, it was fired by rivalry and made a mighty leap to cross the ocean. After jumping some distance it fell into the sea and declared, “This ocean is surely boundless; no one can cross it; the tale…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 035–036

Successive steps in the argument

035 **Examination and Refutation of the Second Alternative Above**

Let emptiness then be the state of supreme peace and bliss. … No. If emptiness has not been established, how can it be said that the world has dissolved into emptiness? It is easy to make such an irresponsible assertion on any occasion. If emptiness is established by a proof different from itself, that proof too must be admitted…

036 **Exposition of the Vedāntic View**

The Vedāntin now presents his own view, to which the Buddhist position appears close. … The ultimate reality, being self-established, is of the nature of experience. Because the world is unreal and empty, reality is not delimited by any temporal boundary and is therefore eternal. For the same reason it is unrestricted by spatial…

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Successive steps in the argument

037 Statement of the Logical Conclusion

For the reasons already stated—setting aside the Vedāntic discussion of emptiness—the reality of both conceptual and non-conceptual experience must be admitted; consequently, the acceptance of an object distinct from experience is unavoidable. … Once the object is established, there must be some definition or determinant of…

038 Defence of the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika Account of the Cognitive Relation

The question may be asked: what is the effect of this cognitive relation? … The answer is: outwardly, it initiates practical activity concerning the relation between cognition and its object; inwardly, it manifests cognition. If it is further asked why cognition is such as to induce practical activity, the answer is that the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 039–040

Successive steps in the argument

039 **Objection to the Defence and Its Refutation**

If the cause–effect relation too is suspended because of the foregoing objections, that would be extreme rashness. … Things would then be either eternal or wholly nonexistent. If the cognitive relation is also removed, either cognition will exist continuously or there will be no cognition at all; one of these two will become the…

040 **Refutation of the Sāṃkhya and Related Views Concerning the Substrate of the Cognitive Relation**

The true situation is this. … In the Buddhist view, the cognitive relation cannot qualify both cognition and its object. Permanent, whether real or unreal, objects also appear in cognition; if the relation were a property of both, cognition too would have to be regarded as permanent. Therefore, it is proper to regard cognition…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 041–042

Successive steps in the argument

041 Objection to the Refutation and Reply

Do unreal, externally imagined objects such as blue and yellow themselves appear as qualifying cognition? … No. What does “unreal” mean: absent at the time and place of cognition; utterly devoid of every characteristic; or merely of the nature of a particular exclusion? Under the first alternative, although the object is unreal…

042 Objection to the Reply and Rejoinder

Do blue and the like not qualify cognition precisely in their unreal form? Very well; then in what other form do they qualify it? In the forms of blue, yellow, and the like? If so, these forms are different from unreal blue and yellow; being different, they will be real. If they are not different, they too cannot qualify cognition.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 043–044

Successive steps in the argument

043 Objection to the Rejoinder and Reply

An objection may be raised: impelled by certain extraordinary latent impressions, an unreal object appears in cognition and qualifies it. … Let this possibility be admitted. There is no doubt about the causal efficacy of an unreal appearance; the doubt is how an unreal object devoid of form and characteristics can itself become a…

044 Brief Statement of the Conclusion

For this reason, no cognitive relation is possible unless the mutual differences among knowable objects and their difference from cognition are admitted. … If these differences are denied, the powerful Vedāntic position must be accepted. Otherwise, the world must be admitted as real and irrefutable. In neither case is there any…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 045–046

Successive steps in the argument

045 Explanation of the Self-Contradictory Character of the Buddhist View

With regard to the inquiry that is held to ground the view that the world is unreal, inexplicable by rational examination, or indeterminate by proof, one may ask: what, after all, is this inquiry, and what is its nature? … The answer may be that a proof supported by a negative reductio is the proper object of rational inquiry. But…

046 Defence and Refutation of Buddhist Inquiry

The Buddhist may say that a syllogism establishing irrationality may itself accord with common reason; the irrationality thereby established would then escape the defect stated above. … Yes; but the soundness of the auxiliary causal complex of the proof must likewise accord with the rules of common reason. Once those rules are…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 047–048

Successive steps in the argument

047 The Purpose of a Syllogism

The purpose of a syllogism, or of any of its members, is establishment and refutation. … Establishment is accomplished by a reason possessing the five characteristics that secure the invariable concomitance between reason and probandum and the presence of the reason in the subject. For example, “A continuous column of smoke is…

048 Conclusion of the Foregoing Discussion

Such are the established general rules and practices. … If the Buddhists proceeded by the proper method of proof, their doctrine could never arise at all. In negative theses such as “Nothing exists,” “Nothing is real,” “Nothing is an agent,” “Nothing is rational,” “Nothing is the object of anything,” “There is no philosophy,” and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 049–050

Successive steps in the argument

049 Objection to the Foregoing Conclusion and Its Refutation

The Buddhists may say, “We accept all these undesirable conclusions.” No; mere acceptance does not remove self-contradiction. … If nothing exists, how can the meaning of the thesis be known, when the thesis itself is included among the things it negates? If the thesis is not included among the things negated, how is it rational?…

050 Defence of the Objection and Its Refutation

Can the foregoing defect not be removed by restricting the negation in the thesis with the qualifier “in reality”? … Perhaps; but what is this “reality”? Is it rational inquiry, or a transcendence of ordinary practice? The first alternative has already been refuted. If inquiry itself, being in the form of the thesis, is real, the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 051–052

Successive steps in the argument

051 Further Development of the Foregoing Refutation

In these theses, whether the counterpositive of the negation is real or unreal, contradiction follows. … If it is real, it cannot be wholly negated; if it is unreal, its negation is impossible because the counterpositive does not exist. Is mere general cognition of the thing denied sufficient for its negation, without requiring…

052 Completion of the Refutation

The foregoing sublation through invalid cognition has not been properly defended either. … What is “false cognition”? Is it a spontaneously arisen perception, or merely some undesirable consequence? If the first, the Buddhist must admit perception to be true; and since there is no perception that negates the world, the doctrine…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 053–054

Successive steps in the argument

053 **Refutation of the Reasons in Negation-Oriented Inferences**

The foregoing refutation also disposes of the various reasons employed in many negation-oriented inferences. … Those inferences and their reasons are as follows: “Nothing exists, because it is known, like the snake appearing in a rope”; “Nothing is true, because it is cognition, like the illusory cognition of a snake in a rope”…

054 **Refutation of All the Examples Given in the Inferences**

Because of the foregoing criticism, the examples given in these inferences also become unacceptable. … They are: a snake appearing in a rope, dream cognition, a hare’s horn, a face reflected in a mirror, cutting when there is nothing to be cut, drying fire and wetting water, and so forth. The very grounds by which we know the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 055–056

Successive steps in the argument

055 The Buddhist Argument Refuting the Reality of a Whole

Let there then be a debate in which the Buddhist and his opponent point out defects in each other's views. … Very well; let us see how such a debate proceeds. To refute the opponent's view, the Buddhist may argue as follows: "What is called real cannot be gross in size, because then incompatible properties would not be absent from…

056 Explanation of the Defects in the Foregoing Arguments

Just as, of the two mutually contradictory arguments "Smoke is not absent from this mountain, because then fire would be absent" and "There is no fire on this mountain, because then it would appear as possessing fire," both cannot be true together and one must therefore be defective, so too the mutually contradictory arguments here…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 057–058

Successive steps in the argument

057 Objection to the Reality of Difference

The foregoing argument stated that if a whole is many, difference would be established as the very nature of the thing. … Against this, the Buddhists say that the reality of difference cannot be established at all. What, after all, is this difference? Is it the thing's own nature, the mutual absence of the things, or a property…

058 Objection to the Critique of Difference

Does this mean that cognition of difference never occurs? … Or does cognition of difference occur but is eternal? Or is it momentary but causeless? Or is it caused but objectless? Or does it have an object, but one that can be sublated? The first alternative is self-contradictory in every respect and deserves no answer. The second…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 059–060

Successive steps in the argument

059 Defence of the First Account of Difference

If the object of cognition of difference is one of the three alternatives above, and if a property distinct from the object that is the substrate of difference is regarded as the nature of difference, we need not accept an infinite series of another property of that property and yet another property of that one. But there is no need…

060 Defence of the Second Account of Difference

If the object of cognition of difference is mutual absence, the defect of depending upon itself may be raised here as well. … But that defect would oppose the arising of cognition of difference, whereas such cognition is actually observed to arise. It must therefore be admitted that the cause producing it is something different…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 061–062

Successive steps in the argument

061 Defence of the Third Account of Difference

If a thing's own nature is regarded as the object of cognition of difference, the co-referential use of the word "different" with the word denoting the thing may be abandoned as grammatically unnatural. … But this linguistic difficulty provides no reason to abandon the reality of difference. Is the co-referential use of the word…

062 The Final View Concerning Difference

Although all three conceptions of difference have been defended, what is the final truth? … The answer is that all three forms are valid according to the nature of the thing. For example, in the cognition "The cloth is different from the pot," the cloth appears not to be the same as the pot, appears in a form other than the pot…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 063–064

Successive steps in the argument

063 Defence of the Seventh Thesis

The seventh thesis above is wholly acceptable. The denial of all-pervasiveness in a whole produces cognition of its limited extension; moreover, all-pervasiveness is invariably connected with immobility.

064 Partial Acceptance of the Eighth Thesis

The eighth thesis is acceptable with the qualification “in some contexts.” A property is predicated of one substrate precisely because it is not predicated of another, and in this sense it is not all-pervasive. … But can it be said that the property is nowhere predicable? No. There is no basis of invariable concomitance for such…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 065–066

Successive steps in the argument

065 Objection to the Foregoing and Its Refutation

But how can a thing that is by nature affirmable also be negatable? … The answer is that what is opposed to affirmability is a negative property, not being the object or counterpositive of a negation. But how is the negation of an existent thing possible? There is no defect in admitting it. Would this not make existence and…

066 Another Objection to the Reality of a Whole and Its Refutation

Let the reality of a whole then be refuted by the objection based upon the simultaneous presence of mutually opposed properties such as knowledge and ignorance. … No; opposition is not established here. The fact is that there is no experience in which an object known by a particular person at a particular place and time remains…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 067–068

Successive steps in the argument

067 A Second Objection to the Reality of a Whole and Its Refutation

The same answer also resolves the alleged contradiction that one part of a whole is covered while another is uncovered. … Yet the question remains: when some of its parts are covered, why does the entire grossly extended whole not appear exactly as it does when no part is covered? The answer is that such a possibility cannot be…

068 A Third Objection to the Reality of a Whole and Its Refutation

Since the coexistence of mutually opposed properties in a whole has been shown to be unestablished, the simultaneous presence of motion and rest in that same object is also unestablished. … When, because of a difference in causal conditions, motion arises only in certain particular parts of the entire object, the whole as a whole…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 069–070

Successive steps in the argument

069 Objection to the Foregoing Answer and Its Refutation

This same answer refutes the following argument: if the palm moves, the atoms constituting the palm also move. … Consequently, those atoms will become separated from the stationary arm and its atoms. Then, according to the rule that whatever acquires conjunction or disjunction from something also acquires conjunction or…

070 Minor Objections to the Foregoing View and Their Refutation

Or rather, the fact is that when the support in which a stationary object appears to be located moves, that object too is experienced as if moving—as in the case of a face seen in a mirror or the moon reflected in water. … When the mirror or water moves, the stationary face or moon appears to move. Let us therefore abandon this…

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Successive steps in the argument

071 Objection to the Foregoing and Its Refutation

Then limbs such as the hand and the body, though mutually conjoined, should be capable of existing unconjoined, because the body remains at rest even when the hand moves. … No. The Buddhists themselves do not accept the concomitance that, of two mutually conjoined things, the movement of one while the other remains at rest…

072 Objection to the Refutation and Its Refutation

But is not the presence and absence of red colour in different parts of a whole opposed to its unity? … No. In such a situation the cognition “The entire object is red” is illusory; such a whole is not in fact red. Then will the presence in different parts of conjunction with the substance that produces red colour and the absence…

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Successive steps in the argument

073 **Objection to the Foregoing Conclusion and Its Refutation**

Let the elimination of all things then be accepted as proper, so that absolute emptiness may be established. … But a thing can be eliminated or rejected only when some property is established in it that is necessarily incompatible with every real thing. If a thing possesses a property that excludes unreal things, that very fact…

074 **Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Refutation**

Can it not be held that, just as recognition of phonemes is explained by taking the universal property of sound as its real object, so a cognition that appears to have conjunction as its object may be explained without accepting the reality of conjunction or its objecthood, and then the unreality of conjunction may be established…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 075–076

Successive steps in the argument

075 Another Objection to the Reality of a Whole and Its Refutation

Let the contradiction then be that the same object is both situated and not situated in a place. … No; this does not satisfy the definition of contradiction. When an object's conjunction with one place is admitted, its conjunction with another place is denied; here "not being in that place" means being situated in another place….

076 Refutation of Another Objection Above

This same answer refutes the objection concerning how a whole resides in its parts. The existence of a whole in its parts is exactly like the existence of one atom among other atoms, or its conjunction with them.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 077–078

Successive steps in the argument

077 The Next Objection

Let the contradiction then consist in the coexistence of different colours in a multicoloured object. … Such an object cannot have one colour, because then it would not be multicoloured. Nor can its colours be many, because many colours cannot reside by inherence in the same whole—if the substrate is one, the dependent colours too…

078 Refutation of the Objection

If the foregoing contradiction rests upon the assumption that multicolouredness is an aggregate of many colours, or that many mutually opposed properties are present in a single colour, so that multicolour cannot be one, we have no objection to the reasoning. But we do not hold such an assumption. Multicolouredness is not…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 079–080

Successive steps in the argument

079 Objection to the Foregoing and Its Refutation

If multicolouredness is a special property, why does multicolouredness appear when many objects of different colours are assembled together, although no new whole composed of differently coloured parts has arisen there? … The answer is that if “multicoloured” means one object produced from parts of different colours, a collection…

080 A New Objection to the Reality of a Whole Based on the Denial of Atoms, and Its Refutation

Let the whole then be abandoned because the atoms from which it would be composed do not themselves exist. … The question is this: when one atom is conjoined with many other atoms, does it join them through some of its parts or in its entirety? There is no third alternative. The first is impossible because an atom is partless; if…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 081–082

Successive steps in the argument

081 Refutation of the Objection

No; this objection is improper. … The conjunction of atoms is exactly analogous to the relation of cognition to its objects. One may ask: does a cognition that apprehends real or unreal objects, or assumes their forms, do so in its entirety or through some of its parts? The first alternative is impossible. If cognition wholly…

082 Defence of the Objection and Its Refutation

Let the answer then be this. … “Whole” means everything without leaving anything over, while “part” means a portion of some complete thing or collection. Cognition is not an aggregate but a unitary entity. How, then, can the question of partial or total apprehension by cognition be raised? And how can the assertion that cognition…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 083–084

Successive steps in the argument

083 Refutation of an Earlier Objection to the Reality of a Whole

This answer also refutes the alleged contradiction of being and not being in the same place. … For example, it may be held that a perception having the form of blue excludes the forms of yellow and the rest, because the presence of the yellow form is connected with the absence of the blue form, which is held to be denied by…

084 Refutation of Objections against Atoms

Thus, merely by establishing that one atom can be conjoined with many other atoms, all objections based on the alleged impossibility of one atom being conjoined with six atoms situated in the six directions, the necessity of assigning different places to atoms, the casting of shadows upon atoms, and so forth are refuted.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 085–086

Successive steps in the argument

085 Continuation of the Refutation

The other reasons offered to establish the non-atomicity of atoms are refuted by whichever proof establishes either the reality or the non-establishment of atoms.

086 Another Minor Objection and Its Refutation

It is wholly impossible for space to enter the interior of an atom.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 087–088

Successive steps in the argument

087 General Refutation of All the Foregoing Objections

The two terms occurring in the subject-statements of all these inferences are mutually contradictory. … For example, in the subject-statement “The atom possesses parts,” the word “atom” itself means a partless entity. Moreover, since the probandum is absent from the subject, the inference also suffers from the defect of a subject…

088 Objection to the Refutation and Its Refutation

Let atoms then be regarded as destructible. … No. No proof establishes their destructibility. Every reason offered to establish that atoms possess parts generates the defect of an infinite series of parts. Thus the atom is a curious entity, like the demon named Raktabīja, who tears open the belly of the demoness of logic and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 089–090

Successive steps in the argument

089 Defence of the First Objection and Its Refutation

Can a reductio not proceed on the basis of an imagined subject and an imagined concomitance? … No. If affirmation, negation, and the like are based only on imagined notions, the very meaning of real affirmation and negation disappears. And if customary practice is to be followed in this matter, the original statement that “a whole…

090 Continuation of the Refutation

Otherwise—that is, if even nonstandard and defective arguments are regarded as acceptable—all the foregoing arguments against atoms will apply to cognition as well. … Cognition too may be established as possessing parts on the ground that it can be related to six objects at once. But how will cognition’s conjunction, determinate…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 091–092

Successive steps in the argument

091 Consideration of the Madhyamaka View

Another disputant—the Mādhyamika—closes his eyes to escape danger and says, “Then consciousness too must disappear.” When even the mention of reason, probandum, subject, and the rest has been abandoned, what can be said about this assertion? … Can there not be an illusory mention of them? There can—provided at least the full…

092 Refutation of the Madhyamaka View

Experience establishes that whatever is not clearly sublated is regarded as real. … It must therefore be admitted that what is accompanied by the property of reality, or what is real, cannot be sublated. Why, then, should the reality of what is accompanied by sublation, or what is sublated, not be denied? If that can be done, the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 093–094

Successive steps in the argument

093 **Refutation of Another Objection**

This answer also refutes the assertion that nothing is real because the cause–effect relation cannot be established. … Whether the Buddhist attempt to refute the cause–effect relation succeeds or fails, that relation cannot be denied. If the attempt succeeds, a cause–effect relation between the attempt and the established…

094 **Objection to the Refutation and Its Refutation**

Let the objection then be this. … Although all the foregoing criticisms of the whole have proved fruitless, non-cognition of the whole may still constitute a powerful objection. In the place where a whole is supposed to exist, I perceive no entity different from the collection of atoms. But this is merely the resentful outcry of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 095–096

Successive steps in the argument

095 **Refutation of the Objection that Cognition of Grossness Is False**

Can it not be said that the cognition “The whole is one object” is conceptual and therefore false? … No. This cognition apprehends its object with extreme clarity. Should it be said that the clarity of this cognition depends only upon a condition? No. If a non-conceptual cognition having the same object is the basis of this…

096 **Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Refutation**

Can atoms themselves not be gross? … No; then they would cease to be atoms. Can a collection of atoms be gross? No. The Buddhist does not admit a unitary aggregate entity based upon the collected things. If such an entity is accepted, what defect is there in accepting a whole? Can atoms in their collected state themselves appear…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 097–098

Successive steps in the argument

097 Another Defence of Cognition of Unity among Atoms and Its Refutation

Can cognition of the unity of a gross object not be explained by the superimposition of unity upon the atoms constituting its parts? … That is, if its several parts each appear as one, the whole too will appear as one. No; this is impossible. No one superimposes unity upon the countless atoms constituting the different limbs of…

098 Continuation of the Refutation

Moreover, if there is in reality no single whole, one must hold that the millions of atoms constituting the whole or its parts appear as one only because the unity of a single atom is superimposed upon them. … In that case the object of superimposition would appear only as atoms, not as a gross object. Can the appearance of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 099–100

Successive steps in the argument

099 A Brief Question and Its Answer

If this is so, how can the ordinary cognition of grossness and unity in a collection of objects from which no single whole has arisen be explained? … The answer is that the nature of a substance occupying a space equal to the dimensions of the collection is superimposed upon that collection, because such a substance occupies a…

100 Indirect Refutation of a Possible Contrary View

The foregoing refutation of the arguments against the whole also refutes the view that the grossness appearing in an object is only the object of conceptual cognition and is therefore unreal. Such grossness must be one of three kinds: an utterly unreal entity, an imagination constructed by cognition, or a real thing.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 101–102

Successive steps in the argument

101 Refutation of the Claim that Invisible Atoms Cannot Become Perceptible

When every atom is invisible, how can their collection be visible? … A mere aggregation of invisible things does not make them visible. Should it be said that the object produced at each moment from invisible atoms and destroyed the next moment is of a special kind and is therefore apprehensible by the senses? No. You might as…

102 Continuation of the Refutation

Or let momentary causation be accepted. … Even so, we have already rejected the reality of the special property called immediate efficacy in momentary things, because accepting such a property produces the defect of universals overlapping one another. Therefore, if atoms possess no such special property, there will be no…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 103–104

Successive steps in the argument

103 Further Development of the Refutation that Grossness Determines Perceptibility

Suppose that special property exists. … Even then, the property determining perceptibility by the senses must be grossness alone. Otherwise, an atom that is not gross but possesses the special property of immediate efficacy would become visible. The necessary visibility of whatever is distinct from the non-gross establishes only…

104 Objection to the Foregoing Refutation

Can multiplicity itself not be grossness and its absence minuteness? … No. On that view, many atoms scattered over a vast tract of land would also become visible. If it is further required for grossness that there be no interval between two atoms, even this condition will not be fulfilled in the present case, because according to…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 105–106

Successive steps in the argument

105 Another Objection to the Reality of a Whole and Its Refutation

Let a gross object lasting only one moment then be admitted. … No; this is impossible. On the doctrine of momentariness, parts and whole cannot be perceived at the same time. Since the parts are the material cause of the whole, they must exist one moment before it; consequently, as soon as the whole arises, the parts will have…

106 Logical Conclusion

Thus the proof establishing the grossness of a whole also refutes momentariness, just as a proof of one thesis may simultaneously establish another thesis already presupposed by it. That is, grossness necessarily entails the non-momentariness of a gross object.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 107–108

Successive steps in the argument

107 A Minor Objection and Its Resolution

This conclusion also disposes of the following inference intended to establish that a whole is partless: “Whatever is real is partless, like cognition; disputed objects such as pots are real.” The invariable concomitance between reason and probandum is not established, because the denial of the proposed universal rule is not…

108 Continuation of the Resolution

But consciousness is by nature partless and self-aware, whereas whether pots and the like possess parts is presently under dispute. … How, then, can the inference establishing possession of parts be valid, and how can both inferences be rejected by the same answer? No. Groundless reasoning can be directed against consciousness as…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 109–110

Successive steps in the argument

109 Further Development of the Resolution

Moreover, is the foregoing proof establishing the partlessness of a gross object a positive inference or a conditional reductio in the form of reversal of the consequence? … The first alternative is impossible. If the words “pot and the like” in the inference signify qualities such as colour or entities such as atoms and those are…

110 Objection to the Resolution and Its Answer

Can the pots and the like known in ordinary experience not be made the subject of an inference of partlessness, just as a mountain is made the subject of an inference of fire without first determining whether fire exists there? … Otherwise, since it remains unknown whether the mountain is a real transformation of Brahman or merely…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 111–112

Successive steps in the argument

111 Another Objection to the Resolution and Its Refutation

If the atoms are called “the pot” and made the subject in the foregoing inference, how can the defect of re-establishing what is already established be avoided? … Does this defect not disappear for a person who doubts the partlessness of atoms? No. No one doubts the partlessness of atoms. Could the inference not be useful for…

112 Refutation of the Second Alternative Above: the Conditional Reductio in the Form of Reversal of the Consequence

The foregoing thesis cannot be a reductio or conditional inference either, because its conclusion does not terminate in a form opposed to the statement initially accepted. … For example: “If the pot were real, it would be partless; but it is not partless…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 113–114

Successive steps in the argument

113 Demand for Inferential Proof of a Whole and Its Refutation

But what is the inferential proof of a whole? … When asking this question, do you intend to say that inference is superior to perception? If so, what is the inferential proof of the self-awareness of cognition that you accept? The demand is therefore groundless. Nevertheless, the following inference with an essential nature as its…

114 A General Objection to the Reality of External Objects and Its Refutation

Let there then always be doubt concerning the reality of external objects, because it is impossible to distinguish truth from falsehood. … No. This impossibility cannot arise from everything being true, because the answer to the question now to be asked refutes that assumption. The question is: is the ordinary cognition “I…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 115–116

Successive steps in the argument

115 Objection to the Foregoing Refutation

Could calling the statement “I understood this incorrectly” an erroneous cognition be nothing more than uttering a meaningless cluster of words? … No. If no cognition lay behind this statement, there would be no disagreement concerning the nature of erroneous cognition. Learned people do not dispute merely about words; nor is it…

116 Support for the Possibility of Conceptual Erroneous Cognition

Cognition of one object cannot impel a person toward another object; otherwise the object of cognition and the object of activity would be different. … That is, unless one thing is understood as another, activity toward the first cannot arise. Nor can it be said that cognition of one thing produces activity toward the first thing…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 117–118

Successive steps in the argument

117 Alternative Explanation of Ignorance of Difference and Its Resolution

If it is said that in “ignorance of difference,” difference is primary and ignorance secondary, cognition of real silver could not impel a person toward silver, because the presented object and the silver appearing in the cognition of silver are not mutually different. The other consequences of this view may be considered in the…

118 Objection to the Foregoing Resolution and Its Refutation

It may be asked: just as, in the case of activity, ignorance of difference from both desired and undesired objects is present, so before illusion arises both kinds of ignorance are present; why, then, do cognition of difference and cognition of identity not arise at once? The answer is that ignorance alone is not sufficient to…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 119–120

Successive steps in the argument

119 Refutation of the Second Alternative that All Cognition Is False

Nor is the distinction between truth and falsehood impossible because all cognition is false. … If the cognition "Such-and-such cognition is false" is true, then not all cognition is false. If this cognition is not true, its object—the cognition said to be false—will not in fact be false; consequently, at least one true cognition…

120 Explanation of How the Veridicality of Cognition Is Known, and Defence of Extrinsic Validity

It will now be clarified whether the veridicality of cognition is known by that cognition itself or by an instrument different from it. … Under the first alternative, the veridicality of a cognition would be known either by that same cognition or by a second cognition that knows it. Of these, the first sub-alternative is…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 121–122

Successive steps in the argument

121 First Objection to the Doctrine of Self-Validity

In the original quotation, does the word indicating “arising” mean birth, or the awareness of cognition, which is expressed elsewhere by the word “knowledge”? … If it means “birth,” the assertion would mean that cognition of an object arises only when cognition of that cognition arises. Consequently, every cognition would have to…

122 Second Objection to the Doctrine of Self-Validity

If the second meaning of the word, “knowledge,” is accepted, the defect of re-establishing what is already established arises: what is not known is not known—this is obvious. … But then, if cognition itself is not known, will its object not remain unknown as well? No. The cognition that knows the object is not a cognition of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 123–124

Successive steps in the argument

123 Continuation of the Refutation

The example of cutting that has been offered cannot by itself satisfy us. … The inference "One cognition is not the object of another cognition, because it is an action of the same class as the other cognition; no action of one class is the object of another action of the same class, just as one act of cutting is not the object of…

124 Refutation of the View that Veridicality Is Known through Reflective Cognition

The veridicality of cognition is not known through reflective cognition—or through an inference based upon the known object—because this means cannot distinguish veridicality from non-veridicality. … It is not the case that only veridical cognition is known as veridical; erroneous cognition too is understood as veridical. If…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 125–126

Successive steps in the argument

125 Continuation of the Refutation

Suppose that a second cognition taking the first cognition as its object happens to manifest its veridicality. … Even so, because there is no certainty about such manifestation, it cannot produce the firm conviction that the first cognition is not different from veridicality. We require precisely such firm conviction, because it…

126 Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Answer

Let cognition of cognition and the like merely produce an appearance of veridicality without confirming it. … But if it cannot guide action with certainty, what use is such appearance? In fact, cognition of cognition cannot even produce an appearance of veridicality. If the property whose presence in the known object determines…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 127–128

Successive steps in the argument

127 Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Refutation

But will the inferential determination of a cognition's veridicality not also generate an infinite regress? … No. The earlier cognition on the basis of whose similarity the veridicality of a new cognition is determined is already known as veridical; its veridicality need not be established again, so no infinite regress arises on…

128 Why the Duality of Truth and Falsehood Does Not Occur in Reflective Cognition: Question and Answer

It may be asked: how is it itself determined that the reflective cognition concerning a cognition's veridicality apprehends only veridicality, and not non-veridicality, as the qualifier of its substantive? If this is not determined, an infinite regress…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 129–130

Successive steps in the argument

129 Further Elaboration of the Answer

The foregoing concomitances are also supported by reductio arguments in the form of reversal of the consequence. … For example: “If cognition of the subject or substantive were false, it would either be objectless or have a false object; but this is unacceptable.” “If reflective cognition were non-veridical, it would not even…

130 Logical Conclusion

Once the distinction between true and false cognition has thus been established, the assertion that there is no difference between the states of consciousness in dream and waking comes to an end. … The doctrine of the appearance of nonexistent objects and the doctrine of pure objectless consciousness have already been refuted….

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 131–132

Successive steps in the argument

131 Explanation of the Difference between Waking and Dream

Even so, it may be asked how these two states are to be distinguished. … The answer is: in the manner in which they are distinguished in ordinary practice. If it is further asked what their definitions are, the answer is this. Dream is the state in which some accidental coherence appears among internal events, but no continuity is…

132 Final Conclusion

Therefore, the world is certainly real. … Yet seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically neglected the world's reality because reflection upon the world appears to be of no special use to them. If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality? The answer is that if the world is abruptly…

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CONCLUSION · PART II

At the close of this division

Final Conclusion

Therefore, the world is certainly real. Yet seekers impatient for liberation have enthusiastically neglected the world's reality because reflection upon the world appears to be of no special use to them. If so, why do logicians take such interest in defending the world's reality? The answer is that if the world is abruptly denied without understanding its relevance to liberation, defective reasoning may produce profound confusion concerning all the sources of knowledge. Consequently, even a subtle-minded and logically inclined person, acting with such haste, may fail to reach the truth.

END OF PART II · ENGLISH TEXT

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ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

SECTION III · THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

Debate on the Difference between Qualities and Their Substantial Substrate

Original Sanskrit work: Udayanācārya · Translation in the edition: Gajendra Thakur

A presentation of the English text of the translated work

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THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Reading route through the source

001–005 Section 3 — Debate on the Difference between Qualities and Their Substantial Substrate

006–010 Refutation of the Third Ground: Production of One and the Same Effect

011–015 Another Objection and Its Refutation

Ranges follow the original sequence of topics; they do not imply equal argumentative length.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 001–002

Successive steps in the argument

001 **Section 3 — Debate on the Difference between Qualities and Their Substantial Substrate**

Let there then be no self, because qualities and their substrate are mutually identical; consequently, only momentary cognitions will remain in the world. … No. In reply we say that the same object is certainly recognized through the distinct experiences of seeing and touching. The question now is whether the object of this…

002 **Refutation of the View that a Single Quality such as Colour or Touch Is the Object of Recognition**

The first alternative is unacceptable. … It is not the case that whatever is colour is also touch. Nor is colour apprehended by the sense of touch; otherwise a blind person would also experience colour. Nor can it be said that one and the same thing appears…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 003–004

Successive steps in the argument

003 **Consideration of the Second among the Five Alternatives Above**

The second alternative is also unacceptable. What is the basis of the proposed aggregate: coexistence, simultaneity, production of one and the same effect, or production from one and the same cause?

004 **Refutation of the First of the Four Grounds for the Second Alternative: a Common Substrate**

If the aggregate is grounded in a common substrate, it cannot be because the qualities have a common material cause, for each quality has its own distinct material cause—colour is caused by colour, touch by touch, and so on. … If one common material cause of all is admitted, that will be substance itself; with the admission of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 005–006

Successive steps in the argument

005

Refutation of the Second Ground: Simultaneity

Since colour, touch, and the like are not apprehended by a single sense, their mere presence at the same time cannot make them an aggregate either. … There is no valid reason for this. If simultaneity alone were sufficient, a donkey and a camel present at the same time would also become one aggregate. It cannot be said that…

006

Refutation of the Third Ground: Production of One and the Same Effect

For the reason already stated—namely, that each quality has a distinct material cause—the qualities cannot be made into an aggregate on the ground that they produce one and the same effect; no unitary effect is produced by the qualities. … It is improper to say that the pot as an aggregate of qualities such as colour and touch…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 007–008

Successive steps in the argument

007 **Refutation of the Fourth Ground: Having One and the Same Cause**

For the same reason, the qualities cannot form an aggregate on the ground of having one cause. If qualities are regarded as connected without any basis, this usage would extend even to things that cannot be connected with one another.

008 **Acceptance of the Third Original Alternative**

There is no dispute concerning the third alternative.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 009–010

Successive steps in the argument

009 **Refutation of the Fourth and Fifth Alternatives**

The fourth alternative too is unacceptable. … It may be maintained either on the basis of Vijñānavāda or by saying that cognition of unity is false like the illusion of seeing two moons. If the first alternative is accepted, why grant special favour to the qualities and regard them as real? According to Vijñānavāda, cognition of…

010 **Objection to the Proof of Identity between Qualities and Their Substrate, and Its Refutation**

But does not the proof that qualities and their substrate are identical oppose the reality of substance? … It does; but what is that proof? Is it that qualities and substrate necessarily appear together? No. Their necessary co-appearance is not established. For example, in the cognition of a white conch, the conch is cognized even…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 011–012

Successive steps in the argument

011 Another Objection and Its Refutation

Nor can unequal strength of co-cognitions be the ground for the identity of quality and substrate, because the reason overextends. … For example, the faint whiteness of a pot is seen together with the intense whiteness of light, yet the two are distinct. Are they not identical because they occupy different places? No. If…

012 Another Refutation

If a substrate and the quality residing in it were identical, how could one and the same object appear clear when seen from nearby and indistinct when seen from afar? … Does the same object arise qualified simultaneously by clarity and indistinctness in relation to observers situated at different distances? No; one thing cannot…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 013–014

Successive steps in the argument

013 Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and a Partial Answer

Can this specific object-directedness of cognition be regarded as produced by a preceding non-conceptual cognition having the same object? … It can; but non-conceptual cognition does not take the place of its object as an object. If it does take the place as its object, the place itself will be an object of cognition. For…

014 Another Refutation of the Objection

Moreover, there is no reason why conceptual cognition should not arise concerning every object supposedly apprehended by non-conceptual cognition. … Some cause is required to explain why what was known non-conceptually is not apprehended conceptually. Is the cause the failure of a desire for such cognition to arise after the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 015–015

Successive steps in the argument

015

A Minor Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Answer

If non-conceptual cognition of an object together with all its properties is possible even without conceptual cognition of them, why not suppose that every person knows everything at all times non-conceptually, though not conceptually? … If, because of a defect, an object is mistaken for its opposite or for something different…

End of this sequence

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At the close of this division

A Minor Objection to the Foregoing Refutation and Its Answer

If non-conceptual cognition of an object together with all its properties is possible even without conceptual cognition of them, why not suppose that every person knows everything at all times non-conceptually, though not conceptually? … If, because of a defect, an object is mistaken for its opposite or for something different from itself, is its real nature not known conceptually? No. If conceptual cognition were inconsistent with the non-conceptual cognition preceding it, no conceptual cognition would be trustworthy. Yet in the case of a distant object, even in the absence of any opposed non-conceptual cognition, the conjunction or disjunction of its front part with…

END OF SECTION III · ENGLISH TEXT

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ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA

SECTION IV · THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT

The Doctrine that the Self Is Not Known; Proof of the Self's Unreality and Its Refutation

Original Sanskrit work: Udayanācārya · Translation in the edition: Gajendra Thakur

A presentation of the English text of the translated work

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THE STRUCTURE OF THE ARGUMENT

Reading route through the source

001–016	Section 4 — The Doctrine that the Self Is Not Known; Proof of the Self's Unreality and Its Refutation
017–032	Refutation of the Third among the Foregoing Alternatives
033–048	Objection that Knowledge of Invariable Concomitance Is Impossible, and Its Answer
049–064	The Meaning of "Greatness"

Ranges follow the original sequence of topics; they do not imply equal argumentative length.

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 001–002

Successive steps in the argument

001 **Section 4 — The Doctrine that the Self Is Not Known; Proof of the Self's Unreality and Its Refutation**

Let there be no self, because the self is not known. … No. Total non-cognition of the self is itself doubtful, and failure to be known by a particular person applies even to knowable things. Can this defect in the proof be removed by adding the…

002 **Proof of the Reality of the Self and Its Defence**

But what is the proof of the self's existence? … Certainly perception. The awareness "I exist" is the direct experience of every living being. This awareness can be neither objectless nor doubtful in its object, because it is not produced by words and is not sublated by any opposing cognition. Nor is it produced by a reason in an…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 003–004

Successive steps in the argument

003 **Conclusion of the Proof**

For this reason, the pointless supposition that cognition arises from a supernatural beginningless tendency must be abandoned, and some external cause or ground of self-cognition must be admitted. … This ground may be the statement of a trustworthy or untrustworthy person, a valid or invalid reason, or veridical or illusory…

004 **Objection that the Self Is Unreal Because It Is Not Known by the External Senses, and Its Refutation**

The fact that the self is not known by the external senses does not make self-cognition groundless or objectless. … If it did, cognition of intellect or consciousness would also become groundless and objectless. If the self-awareness of consciousness is the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 005–006

Successive steps in the argument

005

Refutation of the Objection that the Body May Be the Object of Self-Cognition

Can the body be the object of self-cognition? … No. If the body, senses, intellect, or their aggregate, without any qualification, were the object of self-cognition, any person's body, senses, and so forth could become the object of anyone's self-cognition; anyone could regard any body as his own. If it is said that self-cognition…

006

Refutation of the Objection that Consciousness Is the Self

But is self-experience not veridical with respect to consciousness? … No. Consciousness is experienced as an activity, and the agent of the activity is experienced as wholly distinct from it. Just as in the experience "I cut," so in the experience "I know," the agent is experienced as the cause of the action. Do blue, yellow, and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 007–008

Successive steps in the argument

007 Inferential Proof of the Self

But what inference establishes the existence of the self? … The answer is recognition. Yet it has not been established that recognition of a permanent self is veridical; if it is false, it opposes the unity of the self, and if mere ordinary recognition is taken as the reason, the reason deviates because recognition of the unity of…

008 Objection to the Proof and Its Answer

Could ignorance of the difference among the objects of recognition be added to the definition previously given, and that itself be taken as a new definition of the material cause–effect relation? … The difference between the teacher's and pupil's cognitions is known. No. In the present case there is no ignorance of the differences…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 009–010

Successive steps in the argument

009 Refutation of Another Possible Objection

The foregoing objections refute both definitions of the two kinds of material-cause relation—one definition is held to apply to the members of a continuous series, the other to discontinuous transformation. … The first is defined as being the object of a non-illusory cognition of unity based upon similarity among the related…

010 Further Development of the Refutation

Concerning the second kind of material causation, it may now be asked: how is it determined that a piece of charcoal or ash is a transformation of the original wood? … Why can it not be a transformation of fire? The answer may be that wood becomes charcoal only after coming into contact with fire. But it is equally possible that…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 011–012

Successive steps in the argument

011 Another Definition of Material Causation and Its Refutation

Can the capacity to be recognized as one and the same thing define material causation? … Then the nature of this capacity must first be understood. Is it some special power of the cognitions? If so, it cannot be confined to one particular individual and regarded as differing from individual to individual. If one individual is…

012 Objection to the Final Statement and Its Refutation

Can cognitions within a particular stream possess a distinctive property absent from other streams? … No; no such property is known. We perceive no generic difference whatsoever between the streams of cognition of teacher and pupil. Could a difference exist while remaining invisible, so that the foregoing reason is not sublated?…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 013–014

Successive steps in the argument

013 Another Explanation of Recognition and Its Refutation

Let it then be admitted that recognition is determined by some particular auxiliary cause. … Very well; we call this alleged special cause the agent. It may be asked, however, on what special ground this agent is regarded as one entity rather than a stream of auxiliary causes. The answer would be that an object produced by one…

014 Further Development and Defence of a New Objection to the First Explanation of Recognition

Alternatively, even if a cause–effect relation exists, that relation alone does not determine recognition. … To make this clear, we ask: does the omniscient Buddha recognize his cognitions as produced by one and the same agent or not? If he does, that very fact establishes both the unity of the agent of recognition and its…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 015–016

Successive steps in the argument

015 **Consideration and Refutation of the Objection that Recognition Arises from Ignorance of Store-Consciousness**

Let the explanation then be that ignorance of the several store-consciousnesses causes recognition. … No. On this view store-consciousness would either be wholly different from the object-directed cognitions associated with I-consciousness, or it would be…

016 **Refutation of the Second Alternative Above**

The second alternative is also untenable. … If accepted, ignorance of difference concerning this second kind of cognition would relate either to its own nature or to the nature of its object. If it relates to the cognition's own nature, it will either be confined to the first I-consciousness alone or include the object-directed…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 017–018

Successive steps in the argument

017 Refutation of the Third among the Foregoing Alternatives

The third alternative too is incoherent. … The real object of I-consciousness has already been established. Even if I-consciousness were regarded as objectless, it would not help establish the ignorance of difference required for recognition. It has already been stated that false superimposition of identity or erroneous cognition…

018 Further Development of Another Proof of the Unity of the Agent

Alternatively, one may ask: on your view, does a former experience produce its later memory, or does a latent impression produced by the experience do so? … If the impression does, is it invisible or directly established? If invisible, is there one impression persisting until memory arises, or a stream of momentary members? If…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 019–020

Successive steps in the argument

019 Objection to the Foregoing and Its Refutation

Can it be held that, just as seed produced from rice again produces only rice seed, so a cognition of blue produced from cognition of yellow may generate memory of the yellow object, and in this manner causation between cognition and memory remains regulated? No. For example, if of two pigeons, one blue-grey and the other white, the…

020 Refutation of the Final Alternative Above

Even if cognition is regarded as formless, it is certainly clear with respect to all its objects. … Things with respect to which cognition is not clear are not its objects at all. If indistinct things too are regarded as objects of cognition, the distinction between object and non-object becomes indeterminate. The coexistence of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 021–022

Successive steps in the argument

021 Objection to the Foregoing View and Its Refutation

The foregoing analysis also explains the delayed fruition of merit and demerit, or the much later production of results by the impressions generated from them, because within one permanent substrate the impression and its remote result are linked through intervening causal relations. On this basis the Buddhist concomitance that each…

022 Proposal of a Rejoinder and Its Refutation

Nor can the Buddhist view admit a permanent and invisible impression. … If such an impression is cognitive in nature, it cannot be invisible, because Buddhists regard all cognition as self-luminous. If it is different from cognition, cognition cannot be its material cause. If the impression is regarded as a distinct stream of…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 023–024

Successive steps in the argument

023 Objection to the Foregoing Conclusion and Its Answer

Does the qualification above not apply to the body because the body itself is conscious? … No. The body is not conscious because it is a body, has a determinate shape, is a material entity, and possesses qualities such as colour, smell, and taste. Nor can the arrangement or organization of the five great elements be conscious…

024 Reductio in Support of the Foregoing Conclusion

The following reductios support the foregoing conclusion. … If the self had a beginning, its first initiation of action could never occur. If it had an end, its existence could not persist despite being beginningless. If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities. If it were not all-pervasive, fire, air, and the like…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 025–026

Successive steps in the argument

025 **Objection to the Necessity of Self-Knowledge and Its Rejoinder**

Let the objection then be this: even though the self has been established as real, it should still be abandoned. … A person who possesses awareness of selfhood becomes attached to what benefits him and averse or hostile toward what harms him. Attachment and aversion are the roots of bondage in saṃsāra. One who has no cognition of…

026 **A Second Objection to the Necessity of Self-Knowledge and Its Refutation**

But even apart from the foregoing, should the self not be abandoned like the senses and the rest, because it is the basis of suffering? … Yes; in the form in which it is the basis of suffering, it should certainly be abandoned. The self qualified by limiting adjuncts produces suffering. But why should the self not be abandoned…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 027–028

Successive steps in the argument

027

Proof of Discriminative Knowledge of Self and Non-Self

Both inference and scripture prove that discriminative knowledge of self and non-self is necessary. … For one who mistakes the non-self for the self, the body becomes the beginning and end of existence. Attached to the body, he intensely craves all the things of the world that provide bodily pleasure and hates unpleasant things….

028

Scriptural Proof of the Foregoing View

The essence of scripture is contained in the Upaniṣadic statement cited above and in other statements saying that neither good nor evil touches the disembodied entity. … But is scripture not unreliable because statements concerning the unreality of the world are false, distinct doctrines mutually contradict one another, and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 029–030

Successive steps in the argument

029 Proof of the Authority of Scripture

What proves the authority of scripture? Its being the instruction of a trustworthy being. Is this fact not unestablished? No. The reality of a trustworthy being who is the creator of the world is established by inference. The inference is: “This world, whose production is disputed, has an agent, because it is an effect.”

030 Objection to the Inference Establishing God and Its Answer

Is not the reason in that inference, “being an effect,” opposed to a special kind of effecthood—namely, being produced by an embodied agent? … The presence of the reason in the subject, the world, indicates that the creator is eternal and omniscient, whereas the concomitance between effecthood and agency indicates creation by an…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 031–032

Successive steps in the argument

031 Second Objection to the Inference Establishing God and Its Refutation

Let the present inference then be defective because a counter-inference is possible: “The world has no agent, because it is not produced by an embodied being.” No. … There is no such defect, because the qualification “by an embodied being” added to the reason is superfluous and serves no purpose. Therefore, the qualified reason is…

032 Third Objection to the Inference Establishing God and Its Rejoinder

Let this inference then be rejected through certain reductios. … For example: “If there were no body, there would be no intellect, which is a partial effect of the body. But if an eternal intellect does not require a body, then eternal effort will likewise require neither intellect nor desire. Consequently, the divine agent of the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 033–034

Successive steps in the argument

033 Objection that Knowledge of Invariable Concomitance Is Impossible, and Its Answer

Adopting the manner of a Buddhist logician, the opponent proudly declares: even after the presence of the reason in similar instances and its absence from dissimilar instances have been observed hundreds of times, the reason is still found to deviate from the probandum; and even if no deviation has been observed in the definition of…

034 Answer to the Objection

All this is irresponsible babble. … A rational resolution of all three alternatives is possible. The fact is that one property can stand in four kinds of relation to another property: it may be opposed to it, over-pervasive of it, coextensive with it, or pervaded by it. A fifth possibility does not exist. Opposition and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 035–036

Successive steps in the argument

035 **Refutation of the View that Creation by an Embodied Agent Is a Condition**

"Being produced by an embodied agent" cannot be a condition in the inference above, because it does not pervade the probandum "possessing an agent." In saying that an agent depends upon a body to produce something, the body is regarded as assisting creation by serving as the support of the self. But the body is not a universally…

036 **Refutation of the Second Objection to Invariable Concomitance**

Regarding the second objection, open your ears, abandon meaningless talk, and hear our answer. … First you must be asked whether, when the causes of a pot—the staff, wheel, and the like—remain inactive, there is or is not a visible or invisible conscious director invariably connected with the distinct operations of the pot's…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 037–038

Successive steps in the argument

037 Refutation of the Third Objection to Invariable Concomitance

Regarding the third objection too, close the eyes clouded by envy and hear our rational statement. … In this world no effect can arise apart from the cycle of various kinds of causal factors, and this cycle is determined by a conscious agent. If it were not, the definitions of the distinct causal factors could not be fixed at all….

038 Objection to the Foregoing View and Its Answer

The Buddhist objects that the foregoing analysis of the distinct causal factors is merely the opponent's own doctrine. … On his view, whatever conscious or unconscious thing stands in positive and negative concomitance with an effect is called its cause. Sometimes conscious and unconscious causes jointly produce an effect; in that…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 039–040

Successive steps in the argument

039 **Refutation of the First and Second among the Three Alternatives Above**

The first of these alternatives is unacceptable. … If the very nature of the staff and the like made them dependent, a loom and other things different from a staff would become independent causes. If a loom is regarded as dependent because of loomhood, the staff and the like would become independent. Nor can the dependence of a…

040 **The Nature of the Invariable Concomitance Required for Inference**

What, then, is invariable concomitance? … A natural relation. What does “natural” mean? Absence of a condition. What is a condition? A cause different from the reason that determines the presence of the probandum. What is its definition? Pervading the probandum without being pervaded by the reason. How is it determined whether a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 041–042

Successive steps in the argument

041 An Objection and Its Answer

The Buddhist, weakened by our argument, now turns it against us: in the same manner in which God's existence is established, a hare's horn too can be established. … The negation supplied by perception is confined only to perceptible things. The property of possessing a horn cannot be denied of a hare merely because a hare's horn…

042 Objection to the Foregoing Answer and Its Answer

If manifestation of a universal property requires a particular configuration of its substrate, God's cognition cannot be eternal, because cognitionhood appears only when some transformation occurs in the senses and the like. … No. Cognitionhood neither negates nor implies eternality. Just as barrenness negates motherhood…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 043–044

Successive steps in the argument

043 Minor Objections

Now hear certain subsidiary objections. … If God alone is the creator, the world would not possess manifold forms and would be produced continuously. If God depends upon unseen merit to make the world, the admission of God is unnecessary; unseen merit alone could produce the world. If God acts for his own benefit, he ceases to be…

044 Answers to the Foregoing Objections

If, within the cycle of causes, one cause is first accepted and all the others are discarded as unnecessary, ultimately every cause becomes unnecessary. … It may be said that what is established as a cause through positive and negative concomitance is not unnecessary. Very well; then a cause established by inference is not…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 045–046

Successive steps in the argument

045 Refutation of the View that God Is Not Omniscient

There is no dispute that the being who produces dyads also knows invisible atoms and knows all six kinds of real entities, from the triads produced from atoms up to the living being's enjoyment of diverse objects. … All these constitute the material causes of the world. The nature of a material cause cannot be known unless both…

046 A Question and Its Answer

How can the creator of the world be bodiless? … Because no visible body of his is perceived. If an invisible body is admitted and it possesses parts and determinate shape, he could not generate a frog inside solid stone without breaking the stone. Nor can his body be minute like an atom. An atom contains no empty interior and…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 047–048

Successive steps in the argument

047 Establishing the Authority of Scripture

Suppose there is an omniscient creator; how can he also be a teacher? … The answer is that, besides being a capable speaker, he is wholly devoted to the welfare of others. One who discerns good and evil and is benevolent will certainly show the ignorant the proper path, provided his speech, articulation, and the like are…

048 Proof of God's Omniscience

The medical science composed by God is not unauthoritative, because the truth of its statements is frequently established by direct observation. … When an injunction occasionally fails, the failure is accidental and due to a defect in the causal complex of the prescribed procedure. When the appropriate causes are assembled, the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 049–050

Successive steps in the argument

049 The Meaning of "Greatness"

If the word "great" means "trustworthy," the reason in the inference of the omniscient author of the Veda will be doubtful in the subject, because the trustworthiness of Manu and others may be questioned. … If it means "numerous," the reason deviates because works composed by Buddha and others are not regarded as the compositions…

050 Objection to the Foregoing View and Its Answer

The objection is this: let grammar and the like be sciences whose teachings are universally accepted and which preserve the purity of the Veda. … But why should grammar be regarded as preserving only the Veda? It may equally be said to preserve the teachings of Buddha, liberator of the world. No. Grammarians do not hold such a…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 051–052

Successive steps in the argument

051 Further Elaboration of the Answer

Just as a new grammar or medical science opposed to earlier grammar or medicine is blameworthy and is therefore not accepted by learned people, so no new treatise on dharma composed in the present age would be accepted. … Even if someone supported it out of partiality, not everyone would be deceived. If a present treatise on…

052 Conclusion: Scriptural Authority Is Supported by a Beginningless Tradition

For the foregoing reason, specialists may accept the authority of the present Veda in three ways: first, there may have existed before it a continuous succession of earlier Vedas whose authority was accepted by earlier learned people; second, the succession of earlier and present Vedas may be beginningless and eternal like the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 053–054

Successive steps in the argument

053 Refutation of the First Two Alternatives Above

The first alternative is unacceptable, because a succession of distinct Vedas existing at different times has never been observed. … The continuity of the present Veda is easily explained by each pupil's recitation depending upon the identical recitation of his teacher; there is no ground for positing different Vedas at different…

054 Objection to the Foregoing View and Its Refutation

The objection is this: a future dissolution may be inferred in the manner stated above, but how can it be inferred that a dissolution occurred in the past? … Because creation must necessarily follow every dissolution. If creation did not occur, the previous actions of living beings would remain fruitless. Without creation of the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 055–056

Successive steps in the argument

055 A Question and Its Answer

A question may arise: at the beginning of creation, why should sages such as Manu accept the authority of the Veda? … The answer is that, as in the case of medical science, they are assured of the Veda by regarding it as the instruction of a trustworthy person. How does this confidence arise? Through perception; these sages can…

056 A Second Question and Its Answer

Suppose that the God-initiated Vedic tradition depends on the Veda of a previous creation, or that the sage Kapila himself is the bearer of the Vedic tradition. … The first view belongs to the theistic Mīmāṃsakas, the second to the followers of Kapila. But why would the Lord of the universe need a previous Veda? Not in order to…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 057–058

Successive steps in the argument

057 An Objection and Its Answer

Why, then, do followers of the Veda not honour the works of persons such as the Buddha? … Do not think that such works are rejected merely because they were composed by persons who accepted the truth of doctrines opposed to the Veda; for Vedic adherents also honour the works of Jinendra and Jagadīndra, although they too were…

058 A Question and Its Detailed Answer

Yet what is the basis of the external doctrines? … It is not easy to suppose that so vast a mass of texts was composed merely to deceive people, nor is it easy to suppose that the whole world could be deceived. Grant that they have some basis; why concern ourselves with it? Nevertheless, if there is special curiosity, hear the…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 059–060

Successive steps in the argument

059

A Question and Its Answer

How is the final point—the removal of doubt concerning the authority of the historical portions of the Veda—established? … It is established by the fact that endorsement by eminent persons, divine authorship inferred from that endorsement, or the absence of human defects—the grounds of authority—are equally present in both the…

060

An Examination of the Nature of Liberation

What, then, is liberation? … The absolute cessation of suffering from the very nature of the self. What is this absoluteness? It is being qualified by the absence of every entity whose nature is suffering. How is the absence of all suffering possible? When all the causes of suffering have been destroyed. But does a human being not…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 061–062

Successive steps in the argument

061 Refutation of the View That Pleasure Is Eternal

The statement that pleasure is eternal is not true, because the non-apprehension of what ought to be apprehended contradicts it. … Can scripture serve as its proof? No. If non-apprehension defeats the assertion, scriptural testimony cannot stand. Otherwise, even a scriptural statement that a stone floats would have to be accepted…

062 A Question and Its Answer

The question now arises: is the self self-luminous by its own nature or not? … The answer is this: if you have faith, ask the Upaniṣads; if you are impartial, ask your own experience; and if you follow the path of reasoning, determine that the self is not identical with the pleasure and cognition produced by contact between sense…

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SOURCE ARGUMENT · 063–064

Successive steps in the argument

063 Conclusion

Therefore, having acquired knowledge of the self from scripture and having established through well-ordered reasoning, by refuting rival doctrines, that the self is wholly distinct from all rejectable adjuncts such as body, mind, senses, and objects, the practitioner who has acquired such spiritual wealth as faith, control of mind…

064 Concluding Verses

For people terrified and disoriented by the dense darkness spread across the abandoned territories of many rival doctrines, Udayana, their guide, removed the obstructions by means of reasoning, common understanding, and scriptural testimony, and opened the road to liberation for them. I shall not be pleased by the praise of a person…

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At the close of this division

Concluding Verses

For people terrified and disoriented by the dense darkness spread across the abandoned territories of many rival doctrines, Udayana, their guide, removed the obstructions by means of reasoning, common understanding, and scriptural testimony, and opened the road to liberation for them. I shall not be pleased by the praise of a person who is unqualified to understand the merits of this work. How can a painter's glory be increased if a crowd of blind people praises a painting? Let people criticize this work only by pointing out its defects. Learned persons are certainly pleased when their attention is drawn to factual errors they have committed unknowingly.

END OF ĀTMATATTVAVIVEKA · ENGLISH TEXT

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