
ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Doctrine of Auspicious Invocation

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Doctrine of Auspicious Invocation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The logic of auspicious invocation



Opening and purpose

Invocation, completion, and learned practice

Challenges

Buddhist and Mīmāṃsā arguments

Causality and eligibility

Subsidiary acts, obstacles, and apūrva

Gangeśa's determination

Obstacle-destruction rather than direct completion

Scope of learned conduct

The word "auspiciousness" and its authority

The source works through objections before establishing its own doctrine.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

A work begins with an invocation

The opening homage depicts the Lord as endowed with eternal cognition, desire, and effort.

Gangeśa presents the work after study of Nyāya and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā.

The title imagines philosophical reflection as a jewel that dispels ignorance.

The question is the result of invoking auspiciousness before an undertaking.

KEY INSIGHT

The invocation becomes an object of epistemological and causal analysis.

SOURCE TOPIC · Auspicious Invocation; Preliminary Connections; Justification of the Title

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Buddhist challenge: causality unproved

A completed work does not always follow an invocation.

The example of an inattentive Udayana tests supposed invariable concomitance.

An invocation in a previous birth cannot simply be assumed as an observed cause.

Appealing to the practice of learned persons does not by itself settle causality.

KEY INSIGHT

A result sometimes occurring without the proposed cause challenges its alleged necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: The Causality of Auspicious Invocation Is Unproved

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā appeals to revelation

Mīmāṃsakas infer scriptural authority from the regular practice of cultivated people.

They treat invocation as a means to the completion desired by the author.

An unseen invocation from a former birth is proposed to answer apparent exceptions.

The discussion distinguishes scriptural prescription from directly observed causal sequence.

KEY INSIGHT

The issue is not merely what is customary, but how its efficacy is established.

SOURCE TOPIC · Revelation Is the Authority

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can invocation be a subsidiary act?

Objection

- A supersensible Vedic act cannot aid a worldly undertaking.
- Composition has worldly causes such as practical effort.
- The carpenter analogy challenges unseen operations.

Reply

- The objection applies particularly to an operation such as apūrva.
- Destruction or absence of an obstacle can assist worldly activity.
- An absent obstacle needs no act of destruction.

The distinction turns on the operation through which a subsidiary could work.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Obstacle-absence is not direct completion

People perform invocation both when an obstacle is certain and when it is suspected.

The desired operation is an unobstructed undertaking.

The text asks whether an unseen potency must be postulated when ordinary causes suffice.

The case of uncertain obstruction also raises the question of eligibility.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing an impediment and producing the completed work are different causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Operation Is the Absence of Obstacles

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Who is eligible to perform it?

Eligibility is not defined by a known, actually present obstacle.

The agent knows the desire to bring the undertaking to completion.

A suspected obstruction can justify a preventive action.

The medicine-and-suspected-poison analogy illustrates acting under uncertainty.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire for unobstructed completion can motivate invocation without certainty of danger.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Desire for Completion Qualifies the Eligible Person

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Occasional rites and the sphya example

An occasional sacrifice depends on knowledge that its special occasion has arisen.

Uncertain adhesion of grains to the sphya does not establish the principal rite.

Invocation at the start of a desired undertaking has a different structure.

The analogy probes when a subsidiary may precede a principal action.

KEY INSIGHT

The eligibility condition of one ritual cannot be applied indiscriminately to another.

SOURCE TOPIC · Sphyāśleṣeṣṭi Adhikaraṇa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

Is a book a principal act?

An objection notes that no Vedic injunction orders the composition of a book.

It asks how invocation can be a subsidiary without a principal Vedic injunction.

The reply distinguishes Vedic subsidiaries producing apūrva from this context.

Learned practice can support invocation alongside a worldly undertaking.

KEY INSIGHT

The structure of subsidiary causality is examined without treating composition as a Vedic sacrifice.

SOURCE TOPIC · Auspicious Invocation Is a Subsidiary Act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

The old Mīmāṃsā position

The absence of obstacles may already be secured by the causal complex.

The Mīmāṃsā account attempts to preserve the authority of the injunction.

It relates performance to the practitioner’s knowledge and suspicion of obstruction.

Its aim is to explain why an invocation remains meaningful despite apparent exceptions.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of prescription must explain both observance and cases of non-observance.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Conclusion of the Ancient Mīmāṃsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Completion is not an invariant effect

A work may be finished without performing auspicious invocation.

A work can also remain unfinished despite invocation.

Explanations appealing to another birth are scrutinized rather than accepted automatically.

Gangeśa denies that invocation directly produces the completed composition.

KEY INSIGHT

The crucial double irregularity blocks identification of completion as the immediate result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The proposed unseen potency: apūrva

Some Mīmāṃsakas regard invocation as a principal act producing an unseen potency.

This potency is said to bring the undertaking to completion.

The text tests the claim against work left incomplete after the rite.

The role of ordinary causal means remains decisive in the rebuttal.

KEY INSIGHT

The unseen cannot be introduced merely to restate an outcome that does not follow invariably.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Partial Mīmāṃsā View; Its Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative arguments are examined

The text considers invocation as a means when all ordinary causes are already present.

It tests whether delayed results require an unseen supplementary cause.

The appeal to merit carried over from an earlier birth does not remove irregularity.

A weaker reading of the injunction is also examined and rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa separates what an injunction promises from what the evidence supports.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View; Refutation of the Next Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other teachers: an enduring absence

An alternative account treats a relational absence of obstacles as the operation.

It asks whether non-production of future obstacles is secured through unseen potency.

The critique distinguishes prior absence, non-production, and destruction.

An absence already present through other causes cannot always be an effect of invocation.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every kind of absence can function as the operative result of an act.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of Other Teachers; Refutation of the Other View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

Gangeśa's decisive doctrine

Auspiciousness is compared to expiation in its obstacle-destroying result.

Its immediate result is not the completion of a text or other undertaking.

The work is completed through its own operative causes when obstacles are absent.

The invocation is motivated by the wish for an unobstructed undertaking.

KEY INSIGHT

The resulting doctrine identifies obstacle-destruction, not direct completion, as the relevant effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · Gangeśa's Doctrine: Auspiciousness Causes the Destruction of Obstacles

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

Why invoke when no obstacle is known?

Suspicion of an obstacle is distinct from knowledge of an actual impediment.

Invocation may therefore be performed at the beginning of a desired act.

It does not follow that an absent obstacle must always be destroyed.

Regular learned practice is considered in relation to the relevant injunction.

KEY INSIGHT

Preventive observance and the causal effect of a rite must be distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · Auspiciousness Destroys Obstacles

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

What counts as auspiciousness?

- Not every praiseworthy act is covered by a single simple definition.
- The text examines praise, obeisance, and acts believed to destroy obstacles.
- It discusses the auspicious use of the syllables oṃ and atha.
- The significance of the term is linked to injunction and conventional usage.

KEY INSIGHT

A term can have several uses without every use naming the same ritual operation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Nature of Auspiciousness; The Word “Auspiciousness” Has Many Meanings

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF AUSPICIOUS INVOCATION

Learned conduct and the authority of scripture

The text asks how to identify a learned person whose practice is evidentially relevant.

Acceptance of the Veda and the absence of scriptural prohibition are examined.

Appeals to figures such as Manu raise questions about inferred authority.

The closing debate rejects assumptions that only omniscient agents can be sources of learned practice.

KEY INSIGHT

Practice, authority, and the identification of a trustworthy tradition require separate arguments.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Nature of a Learned Person; Conclusion of the Discussion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The resulting philosophical distinction

Proposed result

Direct completion of the undertaking.

Counterexample

Completion may occur without invocation, or fail despite it.

Determinate result

Destruction of obstacles when relevant.

Ordinary causality


The work itself is finished by its own operative causes.

The dispute is a lesson in testing causal claims, not a simple endorsement of ritual practice.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Epistemic Validity

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.


Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Epistemic Validity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Two inquiries that must remain distinct



The English translation explicitly treats both knowing validity and producing validity.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Why examine epistemic validity?

The chapter follows the debate on auspicious invocation.

It examines the epistemic standing of cognition itself.

A Mādhyamika Buddhist objection challenges claims to knowledge of real categories.

The schools disagree about whether valid cognition certifies itself.

KEY INSIGHT

Before using cognition as evidence, the theory asks how its authority is established.

SOURCE TOPIC · Statement of Purpose; Objection of the Mādhyamika Buddhists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā: intrinsic apprehension

The Mīmāṃsā account takes validity to be known from the cognitive causal aggregate.

Invalidity, by contrast, may require an extrinsic condition or later discovery.

The passage sets out several distinct objections and replies.

The issue is whether first cognition already carries the apprehension of its correctness.

KEY INSIGHT

Intrinsic validity is a thesis about how validity is apprehended, not merely confidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Five Forms of Controversy; Mīmāṃsā Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

The first cognition and its object

- Discussion distinguishes a cognition from its object and qualification.
- A new cognition can later be the subject of verification or doubt.
- The theory tests whether the causal aggregate alone supplies knowledge of validity.
- Difficulties arise over how a special qualification enters the known content.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical form of cognition matters to the argument over intrinsic certification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Validity Is Known from the Causal Aggregate; Mīmāṃsā Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Intrinsic or extrinsic apprehension?

Mīmāṃsā proposal

- The same cognitive causal aggregate yields cognition and its validity.
- The view aims to prevent a demand for an infinite chain of verification.
- Invalidity is typically explained through some additional factor.

Naiyāyika reply

- Validity is known by another means, often through inference.
- Unfamiliar cognitions can remain doubtful as to correctness.
- The success or defeat of activity matters to verification.

The central conflict concerns jñapti: the ascertainment of validity.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why genuine doubt matters

The Naiyāyika points to uncertainty over novel or unhabituated cognition.

Doubt is not made impossible merely by the occurrence of a cognition.

Examples involving sensory defects test attempts to explain away doubt.

A sublating cognition can later reveal an earlier cognition as erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

The possibility of doubt challenges automatic ascertainment of validity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Doctrine; Refutations of the Mīmāṃsā Account

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Doubt about object and cognition

Questions of whether an object exists connect to doubt about a cognition's validity.

The discussion tests competing accounts of the source of uncertainty.

Udayana's replies are examined alongside the views attributed to Mīmāṃsā authors.

The text moves from intuitive doubt to formally stated objections.

KEY INSIGHT

One cannot simply infer certitude about an object from the occurrence of a mental event.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt About the Object; Udayanācārya's Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Inference as a mode of verification

- Traditionalist and Navya-Naiyāyika proposals formulate inferences of validity.
- The inference requires a reason whose probative character can be defended.
- The text also treats the ascertainment of invalidity.
- Affirmative and purely negative inferential patterns are compared.

KEY INSIGHT

A test of validity must itself be logically well-formed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Knowledge of Validity Through Inference; Determination of Invalidity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood and complicated examples

Alternative accounts consider objecthood as a separate entity or relation.

The fire-capable-of-burning discussion tests what the cognitive object is.

A valid inferential reason must avoid both overextension and underextension.

The account examines the status of qualifiers in determining cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Technical debates over objects and qualifiers clarify the reach of epistemic inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objecthood as a Separate Entity; Apprehension of Fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The regress objection

The Prābhākara objection warns that verifying a cognition by another cognition invites regress.

The Naiyāyika replies examine the logical structure of the inferential members.

Habituated reflexive awareness is distinguished from first or unfamiliar apprehension.

The discussion refuses to collapse the validity of an inference into uncritical self-certainty.

KEY INSIGHT

An apparent infinite regress must be answered without abandoning standards of inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Prābhākara Objection of Infinite Regress

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

From apprehension to production

The text now asks how validity originates, not only how it is recognized.

The Naiyāyika view treats validity as extrinsically produced.

A new dispute concerns causes that contribute positively to truth.

The arguments refer to the inferential reasoning of the author of the Kusumāñjali.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of certification does not by itself specify the cause of valid cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Theory of the Production of Validity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit as a positive cause

The established doctrine presents a merit as a producer of valid cognition.

This is tested against cases of inference and the other means of knowledge.

The causes of valid and invalid cognition need not be the same.

The text scrutinizes whether the thesis is vulnerable to an extraneous condition.

KEY INSIGHT

Validity is not treated merely as the absence of whatever causes error.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doctrine: Validity Is Produced by a Merit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Why not simply “absence of defect”?

- A Mīmāṃsaka argues that the non-occurrence of defects might suffice.
- The Naiyāyika response insists on causally relevant positive merits.
- Absence of merit is not itself made the sole cause of invalidity.
- Counterarguments address the relation between defect, merit, and causal aggregate.

KEY INSIGHT

The absence of an obstacle and the presence of an epistemic cause are distinct.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of Merit Is Not a Cause; Absence of Defect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Merits differ among kinds of knowing

- The merits operative in perception need not coincide with those in inference.
- Correct sense-object contact and appropriately known pervasion are discussed among causes.
- The text resists postulating one recurrent merit identical in every valid cognition.
- Each means of knowledge has its own suitable conditions.

KEY INSIGHT

A general theory of validity can allow different causal mechanisms across pramāṇas.

SOURCE TOPIC · Merits Are Specific, Not Recurrent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Correct speech from imperfect speakers

The text asks how an utterance by a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot may convey truth.

Some traditionalist replies invoke God’s correct cognition.

Naiyāyika alternatives consider semantic fitness and its correct apprehension.

The speaker’s own true understanding is not always necessary for a hearer’s true cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The epistemic status of a sentence cannot be reduced to the moral status of its speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mistaken Person, Deceiver, or Parrot; Traditionalists’ Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF EPISTEMIC VALIDITY

Semantic fitness and intention

A sentence may be fit or unfit to convey a coherent relation among meanings.

The debate separates correct cognition of semantic fitness from speakers' intentions.

The Veda is treated as a special case in the discussion of verbal validity.

The claim that intention alone is a merit is explicitly rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

A cause of true verbal cognition must be distinguished from speaker psychology.

SOURCE TOPIC · Semantic Fitness; Correct Cognition of Sentence Meaning; Intention Is Not a Merit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Prābhākara alternative

- Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas defend validity as intrinsically produced and apprehended.
- Further proposals identify veridicality with a cognitive relation or non-apprehension.
- The discussion tests these proposals against doubt in an unhabituated state.
- It also explores how erroneous cognition gives rise to action.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara thesis is reconstructed in several versions before refutation.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Prābhākara View; Alternative Prābhākara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The concluding refutation

- The text compares accounts of cognition, sublation, and action.
- Partial Mīmāṃsaka and Neo-Prābhākara theories undergo separate objections.
- Gangeśa rejects defining validity as a mere non-apprehension of a nonexistent difference.
- He associates cognitive validity with the power to generate unwavering activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The final evaluation retains the practical difference between reliable and erroneous knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Prābhākara View; Gangeśa's Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two axes of the argument

Jñapti: being known

- Is validity apprehended intrinsically or by another cognition?
- Can first cognition be doubted?
- How do inference and sublation ascertain status?

Utpatti: being produced

- Does the cognitive aggregate itself yield validity?
- Which positive merits or defects are causally operative?
- How do these causes differ across means of knowledge?

The translation treats apprehension and production as separate problems.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the inquiry establishes

Validity is disputable

The mere arrival of cognition does not end inquiry.

Inference matters

A proposed test needs defensible logical form.

Causal specificity

Merits and defects operate differently across pramāṇas.

Verbal cognition


Fitness, the speaker, and the sentence are analyzed separately.

Epistemic authority is established by argument, not by the bare appearance of certainty.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of the Definition of a Means of Knowledge

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of the Definition of a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From failed definitions to a siddhānta

I — **The definiendum**
What is valid cognition, pramā?

II — **Too-broad definitions**
Validity as a universal or mere experience

III — **Counterexamples**
Illusion, objecthood, and partial correctness

IV — **Established account**
A mode present in its actual object

V — **Further refinements**
Indeterminate cognition and relations

Each proposed definition is tested against its possible application to cognition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can validity be a universal?

The preliminary debate asks what qualifies cognition as valid.

Validity cannot simply be a universal recurrent in every cognition.

The nature of partially correct erroneous cognition causes difficulty.

The proposed definition must avoid both underextension and overextension.

KEY INSIGHT

A useful definition must distinguish true and erroneous cognition, including mixed cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Discussion of the Definition of Pramā

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why illusion creates special problems

An erroneous cognition can contain a component that corresponds to reality.

The possibility of local validity within an error is examined.

A simple universal of valid-cognitionhood would be too inflexible.

The text tests whether validity and its absence could reside in one cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The shell-silver problem is a test case for the architecture of valid knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Invalid Cognition Valid in a Particular Component

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Coexistence of validity and invalidity

The discussion invokes conjunction and its absence as a proposed analogy.

The analogy raises the notion of non-pervasive occurrence.

A cognition cannot be classified merely by transferring a physical ontological model.

The argument seeks a relation between property, qualificand, and object.

KEY INSIGHT

The structure of predication becomes essential to the definition of cognitive truth.

SOURCE TOPIC · Validity and Its Absence Cannot Be Non-Pervasively Occurrent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rejecting overly simple accounts

The Prābhākara definition based on apprehending the previously unknown is considered.

An experience conforming to its object does not by itself settle the issue.

An unsubrated experience is also tested as a candidate.

The criticism is directed at definitions unable to handle qualified cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither novelty nor mere non-sublation supplies an adequate complete definition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Prābhākara View; Veridical Experience

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualifiers and the object of knowledge

The argument asks whether a cognition makes a property its mode.

Objecthood has a specialized relation to the mode and to the qualificand.

Collective cognition tests definitions formulated only for single subjects.

A false qualification cannot become true merely through the co-presence of another object.

KEY INSIGHT

The known object and the property predicated of it must fit each other.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objecthood Is a Special Mode of Qualification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Difficulties of the “co-located mode”

- One proposal locates validity where a cognitive mode shares a locus with objecthood.
- Illusions can defeat a definition that specifies co-location too broadly.
- Alternative formulations in terms of counterpositive and absence are scrutinized.
- Cases of collective cognition expose underextension of overly narrow definitions.

KEY INSIGHT

The definition must track *which* property exists in *which* object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Experience Whose Mode Is Co-Located with Objecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The objection of a single objecthood

The text considers a shell apprehended as silver.

The relation between the demonstrative “this,” the shell, and silverness is disputed.

Treating the cognition as having only one undifferentiated objecthood causes difficulty.

The final prima facie formulations are rejected or qualified.

KEY INSIGHT

A mistaken qualifier cannot be ignored by appealing to the truth of another component.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Single Objecthood Is Not Admissible; Prima Facie Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established definition of pramā

The established view describes valid cognition as experiencing a property where it actually exists.

The qualifier must belong to the relevant qualificand.

Cognition of an entity in a locus where it does not exist is invalid.

The contrast clarifies why the shell-silver experience is erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

Valid cognition represents an actually possessed feature of its object.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Definition of Pramā

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Indeterminate cognition and divine knowledge

The treatment distinguishes determinate cognition in qualifier–qualificand form.

Indeterminate cognition receives special attention in the classification.

God’s cognition is discussed as determinate, without every property being apprehended.

The treatment avoids forcing all cases into the same simple schema.

KEY INSIGHT

The final definition is situated within a detailed typology of cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Indeterminate Cognition Is Excluded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Presence, absence, and non-pervasive properties

A single substrate can have conjunction in one part and lack it elsewhere.

The text tests how cognition of such positive and negative states is classified.

Cowhood and other properties furnish contrasting examples.

The established definition must account for relational and negative cognition too.

KEY INSIGHT

Truth conditions are sensitive to the relevant locus and its qualifying relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Validity of Cognition of Non-Pervasively Occurrent Presence and Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative teachers and object relations

Other teachers equate validity with experienceness or propose refined definitions.

The objections revisit true components of an otherwise mistaken cognition.

The relation of object to cognition is analyzed without multiplying entities unnecessarily.

Relational and collective cognitions are considered in the conclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate joins epistemology to the ontology of objects and their properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of Others; Alternative Definitions; The Relation Is Itself the Nature of Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

False and true qualified cognition

Erroneous

- The predicated property does not belong to the presented object.
- A shell is taken to have silverness.
- True subsidiary content does not eliminate the erroneous qualification.

Valid

- The predicated property exists in the relevant object.
- The cognitive mode and its actual substrate correspond.
- A reliable definition explains the qualifier–qualificand relation.

The decisive difference concerns the actual locus of the qualifying property.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A definition tested by hard cases

The candidate

A universal, novel experience, or non-sublation.

The counterexamples

Illusion, partial correctness, and collective cognition.

The decisive criterion

An actually possessed property in the object of cognition.

The further problem


How perception, absence, and relational objects are represented.

The discussion shows Navya-Nyāya definition-making as disciplined counterexample testing.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Doctrine of Invalid Cognition or Illusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Doctrine of Invalid Cognition or Illusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The dispute over invalid cognition



Initial challenge

Can a cognition ever be invalid?

Prābhākara proposal

Activity without apprehending difference

Naiyāyika case

Illusory qualified cognition as the cause

Tests and refinements

Doubt, withdrawal, recognition and sublation

Determination

Defective cognition and mislocated qualifier

The translated text calls this the Theory of Misapprehension.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

Is every cognition veridical?

The opening objection denies that invalid cognition has any established example.

The formula for valid cognition is questioned: why insist that a qualifier belong to its qualificand?

The shell perceived as silver supplies the disputed case.

The debate must explain action directed to an object that is not the desired silver.

KEY INSIGHT

The existence of illusion must be argued for; it is not simply assumed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: Invalid Cognition Is Not Admissible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The inference and its missing example

One attempted inference connects action motivated by desire for silver with a cognition having silverness as its mode.

The objection challenges the alleged pervasion and its example.

Activity is directed toward the shell, not toward real silver.

Unestablished objecthood and extraneous conditions make the inference vulnerable.

KEY INSIGHT

The counterexample tests whether the proposed reason actually proves illusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Defect of Lacking an Example in the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

The Naiyāyika establishes invalid cognition

The action arising from desire for silver is traced to a qualified cognition of its intended object.

In the mistaken case, the shell becomes the qualificand while silverness is the cognitive mode.

The reasoning aims to establish more than simultaneous awareness of shell and silver.

It identifies a specific erroneous qualification that motivates action.

KEY INSIGHT

Misapprehension is a qualified cognition, not mere juxtaposition of two ideas.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika Establishment of Invalid Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What causes mistaken activity?

Prābhākara

- The desired silver is remembered independently.
- The difference between shell and silver is not apprehended.
- An additional invalid silver-cognition is judged unnecessary.

Naiyāyika

- Action requires an object represented under a desired qualification.
- “This shell is silver” is a single qualified cognition.
- Erroneous qualification can cause uncorroborated action.

The parties disagree over positive misidentification versus an unapprehended difference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

Doubt is not successive ignorance

- Doubt such as “post or person?” concerns one substrate with incompatible remembered alternatives.
- Mere serial failure to notice differences is insufficient to constitute doubt.
- The account must explain why mutually opposed alternatives are considered together.
- The discussion tests whether the Prābhākara analysis can capture the structure of doubt.

KEY INSIGHT

The phenomenology of doubt resists reduction to disconnected omissions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Use of the Word “Doubt” Without Invalid Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Withdrawal supplies a parallel test

The text asks what makes a person withdraw from an undesired object.

Non-apprehension of difference from remembered undesired shell is offered as an account.

A negative cognition such as “not shell” cannot be used without analyzing its object.

Symmetrical accounts of approach and withdrawal produce competing consequences.

KEY INSIGHT

Any theory of mistaken approach must also explain avoidance coherently.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Cause of Withdrawal Through Non-Apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

Can error have an empty qualificand?

- A partial Mīmāṃsaka objection examines what remains after a later cognition cancels a mistake.
- If invalid cognition has no actual qualificand, its object becomes difficult to specify.
- The difference between sublating and sublated cognitions must be established.
- Appeal to a real shell and remembered silver does not alone settle the relation between them.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute turns on how an erroneous predication can be represented.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Partial Mīmāṃsaka View; Further Difficulties

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The prima facie theory reaches its limit

The preliminary account treats the shell–silver case as failure to grasp a difference.

It challenges the claim that silverness functions as a genuinely sublated qualifier.

The inference from activity remains contested.

The text then moves explicitly to its decisive theory of invalid qualified cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The pūrvapakṣa is not the final judgment of the translated text.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion of the Prima Facie Theory of Non-Apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The decisive view: qualified cognition

Ordinary successful activity is admitted to be caused by cognition of the desired object.

The siddhānta explains unsuccessful activity through a qualified cognition of the object immediately present.

The shell is apprehended under the inappropriate mode of silverness.

The same broad causal form covers successful and mistaken object-directed action.

KEY INSIGHT

A false qualification, rather than mere absence of discrimination, explains the error.

SOURCE TOPIC · Decisive View: Invalid Cognition Is Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Parsimony against the difference theory

- The opposing explanation adds memory of silver and non-apprehension of its difference from the shell.
- The Naiyāyika questions the need for these additional conditions as causes of action.
- The account of qualified cognition is supported by the relation between cognition and activity.
- Uncorroborated action cannot be established from non-apprehension of difference alone.

KEY INSIGHT

Causal economy supports the qualified-cognition account where evidence permits.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection; Uncorroborated Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Contrary responses test the proposal

- Collective cognitions describing an object as both shell and silver present a difficult case.
- If mere unapprehended differences cause action, approach and withdrawal may be predicted together.
- The defenders of non-apprehension propose qualifications involving remembered objects.
- The text rejects accounts that multiply selective difference conditions without an adequate basis.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposed actions provide a counterexample to overly broad causal explanations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Activity Is Not Established; Refutation of Activity and Withdrawal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Neo-Prābhākara amendment

An alternative account appeals to differing intensities of desire to recollect brightness.

Brightness is associated more closely with the desired silver than with the shell.

This is invoked to explain action in the mistaken case.

The subsequent argument again questions whether this complexity is required.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute is about sufficiency and economy of competing causal mechanisms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another Proposal of the Neo-Prābhākara

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

What exactly does cognition cause?

Mīmāṃsaka and Naiyāyika positions distinguish corroborated from uncorroborated activity.

The Naiyāyika holds that cognition generates action toward the object it represents.

Cognition of an object under a desired mode can direct effort even if the qualification is false.

Positive and negative concomitance are invoked to test the causal claim.

KEY INSIGHT

The truth of the representation and its capacity to motivate action are distinct.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Mīmāṃsaka Objection; The Naiyāyika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Against alternative absence conditions

Some proposals locate activity in an absence of counterpositiveness to desired or undesired objects.

Others posit a remembered property, or selective non-apprehension of differences.

The text tests these proposals against verbal illusion and conflicting responses.

It returns to the explanatory role of the qualified cognition “This shell is silver.”

KEY INSIGHT

A refined vocabulary of absence cannot replace evidence of the actual cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Counterpositiveness; Another View; Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

“This is silver” counts as one cognition

The comparison with recognition is used to defend unified cognition with remembered content.

An impression can participate in cognition without converting the whole into mere memory.

Sense contact with the presented shell need not amount to contact with real silver.

The claim that an illusion must be multiple cognitions is rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

One episode of cognition can be false through its qualification, despite mixed causal inputs.

SOURCE TOPIC · “This Is Silver” Is One Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

Illusion and a defective sense faculty

A sensory defect can be part of the causal conditions of silver-illusion.

The claim that all defective causes fail to produce effects is challenged as an unsupported generalization.

In later reflection one may report, “I knew the shell as silver.”

That report differs from “I knew the shell and I knew silver.”

KEY INSIGHT

Misapprehension is a structured false predication arising through a causal process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Illusion Is False Cognition; Perception Causes Misapprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

What does a later correction sublate?

The text examines the rule relating sublating and sublated cognitions.

A later cognition is not automatically stronger in every possible causal arrangement.

A sound cognition can overturn the specific false qualification previously entertained.

The already completed act and the historical occurrence of cognition are not themselves erased.

KEY INSIGHT

Sublation corrects an erroneous representation, not the fact that it occurred.

SOURCE TOPIC · Explanation of the Rule Governing Sublating and Sublated Cognitions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

Validity can still be trusted

- Admitting invalid cognitions does not imply universal skepticism.
- The criteria of confidence in validity are referred back to the earlier Theory of Validity.
- Later differentiation and corroborating cognition can remove distrust.
- The text also rejects needlessly complicated rival accounts of confidence.

KEY INSIGHT

The possibility of error is compatible with a theory of warranted confidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Confidence in Cognitive Validity; A Third View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two formulations of illusion

Developed Naiyāyika account

- The shell and silver are existing entities.
- The false cognition locates silverness where that property is absent.
- Error consists in the misplaced qualifier.

Earlier Naiyāyika account

- An unreal relation or identity can figure in misapprehension.
- Existing qualifier and qualificand may be adventitiously combined.
- The account is distinguished from Buddhist apprehension of the wholly unreal.

The translation preserves distinctions within Nyāya rather than collapsing them.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF INVALID COGNITION OR ILLUSION

The final characterization of error

A defect is identified by its causal contribution to illusory cognition.

"This shell is silver" may concern real shell and real silver yet still be false.

Silverness does not belong to the shell, the relevant substrate of the cognition.

The argument closes by reasserting the reality of qualified invalid cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

False cognition places a property in a locus that does not possess it.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Defect Causes Illusion; The Earlier Naiyāyika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The theory of misapprehension

The contested case

The shell falsely presented as silver.

The key alternative

Non-apprehension of difference as the cause.

The preferred analysis

Qualified cognition with a misplaced property.

The epistemic consequence


Correction and confidence remain intelligible.

The chapter ends by defending the reality and causal force of invalid cognition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of the Definition of Perception

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of the Definition of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

How perception is distinguished

I

Four pramāṇas

Perception, inference, comparison, testimony

II

Rejected formula

Sense–object contact is not the entire definition

III

Directness

The proposed mark of perceptual cognition

IV

Special cases

Produced cognition, recognition, recurrence

V

Closing tests

What counts as an instrument or a cause?

The inquiry separates the nature of perception from its usual causal origin.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Four kinds of valid cognition

The translated text enumerates perception, inference, comparison and verbal cognition.

Their respective means are perceptual, inferential, comparative and verbal.

Other cognitive instruments are assigned under these types according to their natures.

This taxonomy introduces the specialized problem of defining perceptual cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The classification concerns modes of valid cognition and the instruments producing them.

SOURCE TOPIC · Four Kinds of Valid Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Why sense–object contact is insufficient

- The proposed formula “veridical cognition produced by sense–object contact” is challenged.
- It risks overextension to some cases involving mind and self.
- It risks underextension to divine perception, which is not produced by such contact.
- The range of conjunction and other relations complicates a single contact-based condition.

KEY INSIGHT

An everyday causal route to perception is not automatically its universal definition.

SOURCE TOPIC · “Cognition Produced by Sense-Object Contact” Is Not the Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Directness as the proposed mark

The opposing view offers directness as the definition of perceptual cognition.

Reflexive awareness may take the form “I know this object directly.”

The universal of directness is argued to be manifested in sense-generated cognition.

Its manifestation need not depend upon one regularly recurring manifestor.

KEY INSIGHT

Directness is examined as an epistemic property rather than reduced to eye-contact.

SOURCE TOPIC · Directness Is the Definition of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Produced perception needs qualification

The discussion distinguishes produced or ordinary perception from other direct cognition.

Yogically generated cognition and extraordinary universal-characteristic presentation are treated separately.

Alternative formulations specify the relation between the cognized object and the sense.

The text tests each formulation for inappropriate inclusion or exclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

The scope of "ordinary" perception differs from directness considered generally.

SOURCE TOPIC · Produced Directness Is the Definition of Produced Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Sense-facultyhood and the mind

One proposal defines sense-facultyhood through conjunction with mind that causes cognition but not memory.

Body, breath, and self are excluded when their mental conjunction produces memory.

A further proposal distinguishes a sense faculty by the type of quality it supports.

Mind functions differently in memory or inference than in sense-produced perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Identifying a faculty requires a causal distinction, not just a list of organs.

SOURCE TOPIC · Sense-Facultyhood as Being a Substrate of Mental Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

Is another cognition the instrument?

A Naiyāyika formula defines perception as cognition whose instrument is not another cognition.

A prior cognition of a qualifier can cause later qualified perception without serving as its instrument.

The difference between a cause and an instrumental operation is decisive.

Recognition and the recurrence of qualified cognition serve as counterexamples.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes contributing causes from the pramāṇa operating as instrument.

SOURCE TOPIC · Perception as Cognition Whose Cause Is Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Recognition: perception or memory?

Prābhākara / partial Mīmāṃsaka

- Direct cognition is taken as perceptual.
- Recognition includes previously known “thatness.”
- Its components are analyzed through direct and indirect presentation.

Naiyāyika reply

- Recognition is a single cognition of “this is that.”
- Impression or memory may contribute causally.
- Recognition cannot be partitioned simply into unrelated cognitions.

The example tests the boundary between present sensory appearance and prior acquaintance.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

A difficulty for defining direct cognition

- The Prābhākara formulation denies that directness is a universal with a regular manifestor.
- Perception of similarity, duality and recognition challenges definitions based solely on independence from prior determinate knowledge.
- The Naiyāyika questions inconsistent treatment of the “thisness” and “thatness” components.
- The distinction between objects of one cognition and constituent cognitions is central.

KEY INSIGHT

A correct definition must survive the difficult cases of recognition and relational awareness.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Prābhākara View; Refutation of the Prābhākara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

The staff-bearer counterexample

- Cognition of a staff as qualifier can cause perceptual cognition of a staff-bearer.
- A definition excluding cognition caused by any preceding cognition wrongly omits this perception.
- Repeated qualified perception creates similar problems.
- The text also limits the causal work of mental impressions primarily to memory.

KEY INSIGHT

One prior cognition can help produce another perceptual cognition without destroying perceptuality.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Prima Facie Definition; Gangeśa's Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

The closing determination

The closing argument rejects defining perception merely as cognition not directly produced by another cognition.

Recognition and recurrent cognition expose the inadequacy of that test.

Perception of qualified objects remains perceptual despite prior qualifier-cognition.

The translated section closes without turning these objection-driven alternatives into one indiscriminate definition.

KEY INSIGHT

Classification depends on a disciplined account of directness, sense and instrumentality.

SOURCE TOPIC · Gangeśa's Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF THE DEFINITION OF PERCEPTION

The boundary of perception

Basic taxonomy

Four accepted kinds of valid cognition.

Rejected shortcuts

Simple contact and no-prior-cognition tests.

Central distinctions

Directness, produced perception and instruments.

Hard examples


Recognition, recurrence and the staff-bearer.

The definition is refined through counterexamples rather than everyday intuition alone.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Contact: Six Kinds of Apprehensive Relation

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.


Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Contact: Six Kinds of Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The architecture of perceptual contact



The six relations are introduced through questions about which objects can be perceived.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF CONTACT: SIX KINDS OF APPREHENSIVE RELATION

Six relations in the opening taxonomy

Perception of a substance arises through conjunction between sense and object.

A quality or action inhering in that substance is perceived through conjunction-cum-inherence.

A universal inhering in a quality calls for a further mediated relation.

The complete taxonomy also includes inherence and relations used for absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The perceived category determines which kind of apprehensive relation must be analyzed.

SOURCE TOPIC · B. The Theory of Contact: Six Kinds of Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why contact with a large part is disputed

- The preliminary view treats conjunction with a substantial, rather than minute, part as causally necessary.
- Perception of whole objects despite tiny atomic components motivates the proposal.
- The argument risks regress when each recognized large part requires another delimiting part.
- The text compares this with contact specifically involving what the sense can apprehend.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant contact cannot be identified only by the physical size of a part.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View That Conjunction Delimited by a Major Part Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conjunction with the apprehensible object

The reply rejects the large-part rule as too broad for self, dust particles and their parts.

The decisive condition is conjunction with an object apprehensible by that particular sense.

This accounts for perceptions not conforming to the whole-and-large-part model.

Sense-specific apprehensibility helps determine the effective contact.

KEY INSIGHT

Apprehensibility is relative to the cognitive instrument rather than only to magnitude.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction with What Is Apprehensible by That Sense Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conjunction-cum-inherence

A quality may inhere in a substance that is conjoined with a sense faculty.

The argument separates the perception of the substance from the perception of its quality.

Inherence in the conjoined substrate is required to explain the latter.

Conjunction and inherence jointly structure the mediated apprehensive relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Seeing an object and seeing its color involve related but not identical contact conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction-Cum-Inherence Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why a further mediated contact is needed

- Universals such as blueness are apprehended through colors present in conjoined substances.
- The text debates whether conjunction and inherence may be analyzed jointly or as a mediated relation.
- The more complex contact reaches what inheres in a quality that itself inheres in a conjoined object.
- The universals colorness and tasteness are defended through recurrent cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Perception of a universal requires accounting for layered relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction-Cum-Inherence-in-the-Inherent Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Color and the sensory organ

An objection asks why the eye's own color is not perceived under a broad account of color-apprehension.

The debate examines manifestation, luminous senses, and qualities of different elements.

Perceived recurrence of colors supports discussion of the universal colorness.

Differences between individual blue, yellow and red colors are also defended.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of color perception must distinguish universals, individuals, and sense-faculty conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That the Color of a Sense Faculty Would Also Be Apprehensible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF CONTACT: SIX KINDS OF APPREHENSIVE RELATION

Are individual colors really distinct?

A preliminary suggestion treats recurrently recognized black color as one individual.

The reply points to comparative cognition such as “this is bluer than that.”

The fired pot illustrates the destruction of one color and production of another.

Color-difference is not reducible to mere changes of the perceiving subject.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative and transformational cases test how sameness and difference are represented.

SOURCE TOPIC · Further Objection That Individual Colors Are One

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How should sound be apprehended?

Prima facie concern

- Sound inheres in pervasive space.
- If simple inherence sufficed, all sounds might be heard.
- An alternative invokes sound’s fitness for each hearer.

Naiyāyika reply

- The ear-opening delimits the effective auditory relation.
- Sound inhering in the suitably delimited space is perceived.
- A pervasive relation need not imply perception everywhere.

The ear’s delimiting role restricts the operative relation without denying space’s pervasiveness.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sound and the instrument of hearing

The vīṇā-delimited space is proposed as the instrument because sound appears to arise there.

The Naiyāyika instead identifies space delimited by the ear as the auditory sense.

The instrument must operate in relation to the hearer's body.

"Sound is in the vīṇā" names a secondary substrate, not the immediate auditory sense.

KEY INSIGHT

Location of sound production must be distinguished from the instrument of hearing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Space Delimited by the Vīṇā; The Naiyāyika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many sounds at once

An objection predicts simultaneous apprehension of innumerable sounds in ear-delimited space.

The reply allows loud sounds to inhibit the apprehension of soft sounds.

Equally prominent sounds may be apprehended together.

Failure to distinguish them can arise through strong similarity, not only non-perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Auditory selectivity has to be explained within the proposed contact relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of Simultaneous Perception of Many Sounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF CONTACT: SIX KINDS OF APPREHENSIVE RELATION

The propagation of sound

The source describes successive sound-production spreading outward like waves.

The initial sound acts in conjunction with gross air and produces subsequent sound.

Softness and loudness vary with the intervening causal conditions.

An alternative invokes production in ten directions like a kadamba sphere.

KEY INSIGHT

The model analyzes perception through a causal series, not instantaneous hearing at a distance.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Manner of Sound Production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The kadamba-sphere alternative

A question asks how one aggregate can cause several sound effects in different directions.

Different air currents or distinct prior absences are proposed as contributing conditions.

Causal diversity can be established even when many other factors are alike.

The proposal is evaluated against examples of colors and other qualities.

KEY INSIGHT

Distinct effects may require distinct cooperating conditions within a broader causal aggregate.

SOURCE TOPIC · Support for the Kadamba-Sphere Model

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prior absence and the conclusion

Prior absence of an effect is discussed as a general part of its cause.

A causal aggregate produces a further effect only when its cooperating conditions are present.

The text rejects the idea that every sound-perception requires a newly invented relation.

The existence of recurrent soundness is defended alongside other universals.

KEY INSIGHT

The end of the section joins perceptual contact to a wider theory of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion: Prior Absence and Inherence-in-the-Inherent Are Causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Contact and perceptible kinds

Direct relation

Conjunction for perceiving substances.

Mediated relation

Inherence and layered qualities/universals.

Auditory case

Ear-delimited space and sound.

Causal account


Sound-series and prior absence.

The contact taxonomy is a theory of how different kinds of objects become perceptible.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Inherence: Inherence Is an Apprehensive Relation

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Inherence: Inherence Is an Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The dispute about samavāya



Pūrvapakṣa

Is inherence established at all?

Competing accounts

Qualifierhood, knownness, identity

Siddhānta

Inference to a distinct qualifier-relation

Further challenges

Difference-and-non-difference and absence

Determination

Inherence and qualifierhood in perception

Samavāya is tested through quality, action, universal and absence.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why inherence itself is contested

The prima facie view denies that inherence has yet been independently established.

If a relation is unproved, it cannot simply be asserted as the apprehensive relation.

“The cloth is white” raises a question about whether the relation of color to cloth is cognized.

The status of a qualified cognition is therefore central.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate concerns the reality and perceptual role of the qualifier-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View—Inherence Is Not an Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The original objection: an unproved relation

The initial passage tests whether relation is an additional object of awareness.

A sensory relation cannot be established solely by restating the qualified cognition.

Doubts about qualities, universals and their substrata are brought forward.

Cases of cloth and color supply the recurrent example.

KEY INSIGHT

One must justify the relation that connects qualifier and qualificand.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View—Inherence Is Not an Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualifierhood as an alternative

The Bhāṭṭa discussion considers a self-linking relation of qualifierhood.

Relations such as soundness-to-sound and color-to-substance are used to test the account.

An argument from perceptibility supports some connection with a sense organ.

The issue is whether this connection requires the separate relation called inherence.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate distinguishes the fact of qualification from a specific ontological relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Bhāṭṭa View—Qualifierhood, That Is, the Self-Linking Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Guru School and transformation

A view about colors in different parts of a fired pot is challenged.

The discussion tests whether color can be both eternal and successively produced or destroyed.

Contrasting color states in one whole object matter for the proposed relation.

The refutation prepares the way for an inference to inherence.

KEY INSIGHT

Successive qualities challenge accounts that cannot differentiate substance from its modes.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Guru School

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The siddhāntin infers inherence

The argument appeals to qualified cognitions of qualities, actions and universals.

Such cognitions take the qualifier-relation as object, as in awareness of a man carrying a staff.

The proposed relation is distinguishable from the related thing.

The inference is sharpened by further Navya-Nyāya qualifications.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualified awareness can support an inference to a real connecting relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Siddhāntin's Reply—Inherence Can Be Inferred

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A Navya-Nyāya formulation

The refined inference specifies a qualified cognition involving a positive entity.

It argues for a qualifier-relation distinct from the related object.

The wording aims to avoid counterexamples based on additional objects or qualifiers.

Examples of qualities, actions and universals motivate the refinement.

KEY INSIGHT

Precise delimitation is used to protect an inference from overextension.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Navya-Nyāya Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does qualifiedness alone suffice?

An objection proposes qualifiedness as a recurring apprehensive relation.

Conjunction and inherence have different roles and cannot automatically be replaced by one label.

Perception of absence complicates the proposed replacement.

The discussion asks which relation actually accounts for the qualified perceptual result.

KEY INSIGHT

An abstract relation of qualification may not explain every perceptual type.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualifiedness Is Not an Apprehensive Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

One inherence and differing qualities

An objection asks how a pot possesses color while air lacks it if inherence is one.

The reply distinguishes the particular objects and relations involved.

The arrangement of presence and absence must be preserved.

The same issue recurs in a proposed relation called knownness.

KEY INSIGHT

Difference in predication cannot be dissolved by asserting a single undifferentiated link.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Arrangement of Possessing and Lacking Color; Refutation of Knownness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Quality and possessor: are they identical?

Identity proposal

- The relation of color to a pot is treated as selfhood or identity.
- “This pot is blue” appears to support direct unity.
- No separate inherence would be required.

Reply against identity

- “White cloth” is not redundant as “pot-jar” might be.
- Touch of a cloth does not thereby disclose whiteness.
- Quality and possessor therefore remain distinguishable.

The analysis of ordinary predication supplies a test for strict identity.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Mādhva middle position

The Mādhva proposal treats quality and possessor as difference-and-non-difference.

It seeks to avoid the redundancy generated by simple identity.

Experiences such as “white color is in the pot” and “the pot is white” are invoked.

The siddhāntin subsequently examines its treatment of localized presence and absence.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed compromise must still handle the logic of distinct qualities.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mādhva View—The Relation Is Difference-and-Non-difference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The answer to difference-and-non-difference

Different parts or aspects can delimit the presence or absence of a relation.

A tree may lack monkey-conjunction in one part despite such conjunction elsewhere.

The pot's black and red color relations are analyzed analogously.

The text rejects the mixed identity thesis as unnecessary for these observations.

KEY INSIGHT

Localized absence can be explained without making a quality identical to its possessor.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Doctrine of Difference-and-Non-difference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can qualifierhood replace inherence?

A further proposal takes qualifierhood of a sense-related object as the apprehensive relation.

Its attraction is to avoid positing extra relations for each perceptual kind.

The challenge is whether it predicts perception of absences in inaccessible substrates.

The absence of waterhood in an atom provides a test case.

KEY INSIGHT

An economical general formula is unacceptable if it implies impossible perceptions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Proposal—Qualifierhood Alone Is the Apprehender

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence and the sense faculty

The prima facie objection emphasizes absence-cognition concerning an atom.

The reply limits absence perception to cases in which the alleged presence would be incompatible with non-apprehension.

Hence a sense faculty does not perceive every absence in whatever it relates to.

This qualification safeguards the proposed account against overextension.

KEY INSIGHT

Absence perception has epistemic preconditions beyond a bare relation to a sense organ.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualifierhood of an Object Related to a Sense Organ; Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF INHERENCE: INHERENCE IS AN APPREHENSIVE RELATION

Could absence itself inhere?

One objection proposes inherence as the apprehensive relation for absence.

The siddhāntin examines what follows if an absence resides by inherence.

Destruction of the substrate and the status of prior absence create difficulties.

The final account differentiates the relations appropriate to positive entities and absences.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of inherence must not collapse the ontology of absence into that of positive qualities.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection—Inherence Is the Relation of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The section’s determination

A relation of qualifierhood is considered for the apprehension of absence.

The discussion distinguishes destruction, prior absence and positive-entity causation.

The reality of inherence for the perception of qualities and universals is retained.

The concluding passage closes the Theory of Inherence within the Perception Section.

KEY INSIGHT

Inherence is argued for, but its function is not indiscriminately extended to every negative cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Siddhāntin’s Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the inherence discussion resolves

Starting difficulty

Whether a separate relation is perceptually warranted.

Rival proposals

Qualifierhood, identity and difference/non-difference.

Central defense

Inference from qualified cognition.

Boundary test


The distinct case of perceiving absence.

The text defends the explanatory work of inherence while preserving relation-specific limits.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory That Non-apprehension Is Not a Means of Knowledge

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.


Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory That Non-apprehension Is Not a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The status of knowing an absence



Pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta must be read as competing positions, not a single view.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY THAT NON-APPREHENSION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: an independent means

The Bhāṭṭas argue that the senses apprehend positive entities, but not absences.

An eligible, unperceived counterpositive is the condition for knowing its absence.

The locus may be seen, yet the alleged absence is not an object of sensory contact.

Non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) is proposed as a distinct pramāṇa.

KEY INSIGHT

Not seeing a possible pot is treated as more than seeing the empty ground.

SOURCE TOPIC · Bhāṭṭa View—Non-apprehension Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY THAT NON-APPREHENSION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Why the positive-object analogy fails

The Bhāṭṭa rejects the idea that knowing positive things equally depends on not apprehending their absences.

Sense organs are independently established as causes of positive perception.

Closed eyes cannot know a pot merely through a supposed absence of pot-absence.

The same independent causal basis is disputed for negative cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument seeks an asymmetry between knowing a present thing and knowing its absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Bhāṭṭa View—Non-apprehension Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does the eye cognize absence?

Bhāṭṭa

- A sense organ operates on its related positive locus.
- No sensory apprehensive relation is established with absence itself.
- Non-apprehension supplies the negative cognition.

Naiyāyika

- The immediacy of “There is no pot here” points toward perception.
- Qualifierhood is considered as the sense–absence relation.
- An extra means of knowledge is not needed if sensory causation suffices.

Both sides accept ordinary negative experience; they dispute its instrument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does the sensory operation accomplish?

Seeing the ground may be a sensory operation without proving that seeing causes awareness of its absence.

One cannot infer the sense organ's causal status from an operation already defined by that status.

The Bhāṭṭa objects that relationless senses cannot grasp absence.

Otherwise one generic self-linking relation threatens to replace the six differentiated contacts.

KEY INSIGHT

The circularity of attributing causal power is a central objection.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Sense Organ Is Not the Means of Knowledge of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Vedāntin challenge to qualifierhood

For color, sense–object relations continue to do work beyond apprehending the supporting object.

For absence, the Vedāntin says the sense organ ceases after showing the locus.

If absence is perceptible only because of qualifierhood, while qualifierhood is posited because absence is perceptible, mutual dependence follows.

The issue concerns whether the relation is independently established.

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory relation must not be justified solely by the claim it is used to prove.

SOURCE TOPIC · Vedāntin View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY THAT NON-APPREHENSION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Can light or sight be the missing cause?

- Light can render an eligible counterpositive visible without itself revealing absence.
- The argument distinguishes a condition for the possibility of seeing from the direct instrument of negative awareness.
- If a general self-linking relation were enough, other perceptual relations would be dispensable.
- Examples involving blindness and color sharpen the causal question.

KEY INSIGHT

Illumination of a possible object is not automatically perception of its nonexistence.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Visual Sense Organ Is Not a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence in air: a problem of invisible loci

Air is not visually apprehended as an ordinary colored body.

The absence of color in air therefore challenges a simple eye-based account.

The Vedāntin treats “Air is colorless” as inferential rather than directly seen.

This example separates some negative knowledge from ordinary visual perception.

KEY INSIGHT

One must classify each cognition by its actual causal process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Awareness of Absence of Color and the Like Has Non-apprehension as Its Inferential Mark

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Naiyāyika: immediacy as evidence

The Naiyāyika reasons that cognition of the missing pot on visible ground has immediate character.

The relation of qualifierhood, a self-linking relation, is offered to account for such awareness.

A remembered report about someone absent in a temple may instead support inference.

The two examples caution against treating every cognition of absence identically.

KEY INSIGHT

Immediate ground-based absence and reported past absence need not share one instrument.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection—Cognition of Absence Is Produced by a Sense Organ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Bhāṭṭa counters the inference from immediacy

- The Bhāṭṭa regards cognition of absence as mediate, unlike a current affirmative perception.
- Known and unknown causes do not by themselves define the division between pramāṇas.
- Verbal knowledge and inference are produced through known but different causal structures.
- The classification turns on which distinctive instrument generates the cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Calling a judgment "immediate" cannot substitute for an account of its cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of the Bhāṭṭa View—Cognition of Absence Is Mediate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Kusumāñjali-based objection

One objection assigns cognition of external absence to mind assisted by positive cognition.

The Bhāṭṭa challenges the added restriction to a positive supporting cognition.

The inability of the eye to relate directly to an absence is pressed again.

The analogy from knowing a counterpositive to knowing its absence is rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

Producing cognition of the pot and cognition of pot-absence are different causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection of the Author of the Kusumāñjali

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A mixed cognition: locus and absence

- A sentence such as “There is no pot on the ground” represents a positive locus qualified by an absence.
- The debate asks whether senses, non-apprehension, or their combination yields it.
- Defective cognition of absence is possible when the counterpositive is actually present.
- A proposal to disqualify non-apprehension merely because it lacks an “operation” is challenged.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualified negative cognition must be explained without losing either locus or negation.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Sense Organ Produces Cognition Qualified by Absence; Non-apprehension Produces Cognition of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika rejects non-apprehension

The established reply denies that seeing the locus is invariably an auxiliary cause for a separate non-apprehension.

Past absences can be known without current sensory apprehension of their loci.

A negative judgment need not have an unobserved fifth instrument.

Examples about colorless air question whether non-apprehension explains more than established means do.

KEY INSIGHT

Anupalabdhi is not independently established as a pramāṇa on the Naiyāyika account.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika Refutation of Non-apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY THAT NON-APPREHENSION IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE

Why mere failure to notice is no inferential mark

- Absence of visible behavior does not demonstrate absence of an entity.
- Dreaming, indifference and inability to speak furnish possible deviations.
- Unknown non-apprehension cannot function as an ascertained logical mark.
- The proposed sign must have proven pervasion, not mere habitual association.

KEY INSIGHT

A missing observation is not invariably evidence that the object is missing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-apprehension Is Not an Inferential Mark

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence may be inferred by another mark

A recollected house may be remembered without a particular person in it.

The qualified absence of recollection can, under specified conditions, support inference.

This does not establish a separate instrument called non-apprehension.

Knowledge of past absence is distinguished from perceiving an absent object now.

KEY INSIGHT

The ability to infer an absence does not vindicate non-apprehension as an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence May Be Inferred, but Non-apprehension Is Not the Inferential Mark

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The remembered house and Maitra

A speaker remembers a visit to a house and is asked whether Maitra was there.

The Bhāṭṭa says he can know Maitra was absent without previously noticing that absence.

The Naiyāyika argues that unknown non-apprehension of a distant eligible person is implausible.

Making a known non-apprehension depend on another produces an infinite regress.

KEY INSIGHT

Memory-based retrospective absence does not decide the case for a new pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Repetition Concerning Non-apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified non-recollection and doubt

Simple lack of recollection coexists with doubt or even with a contrary belief.

Therefore bare non-recollection cannot reliably establish the absence of Maitra.

The Naiyāyika restricts the inferential mark to non-recollection of an eligible person under suitable circumstances.

An inferential explanation remains possible without an independent non-apprehension.

KEY INSIGHT

Eligibility distinguishes evidential non-recollection from mere forgetting.

SOURCE TOPIC · Awareness of Absence Is Possible Through an Inferential Mark

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two routes to negative knowledge

Immediate absence

- A present, perceptible locus is examined.
- The eligible pot is not there.
- The Naiyāyika counts its absence-cognition as perception.

Past or hidden absence

- A known house is recalled later.
- A qualified failure of recollection serves as a sign.
- The absence of Maitra is established through inference.

The determination allows inference of absence without accepting non-apprehension as a separate means.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conclusion: perceptual absence

The Naiyāyika concludes that direct cognition of absence is perceptual.

Qualifierhood belonging to a sensory-related object is the relevant apprehensive relation.

Where absence is not directly perceptible, an established inferential mark may support a judgment.

The section explicitly ends by denying non-apprehension the status of a distinct means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The positive perception of absence does not require an additional fifth pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Cognition of Absence Is Perceptual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the dispute establishes

Question

Is non-apprehension an independent way of knowing?

Bhāṭṭa case

Absences lack direct sensory apprehensive relations.

Naiyāyika case

Immediate absences are perceptual; some others are inferred.

Result


A distinctive anupalabdhi-pramāṇa is not established.

This is the conclusion of the translated source's argument, not a consensus of all schools.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Absence—Prima Facie Positions

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Absence—Prima Facie Positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Is absence a separate reality?

I

Mīmāṃsaka opening

Absence is an empty locus, not a new entity.

II

Earlier Nyāya objection

Negative cognition distinguishes locus and absence.

III

Prābhākara defense

Difference in the cognition or locus suffices.

IV

Formal difficulties

Recurrence, causality and absencehood.

V

Prima facie resolution

Absence construed as the nature of empty locus.

The closing position here is explicitly preliminary; the Naiyāyika conclusion follows in the next section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Mīmāṃsaka identity proposal

An empty ground and the absence of a pot are said not to be two independent realities.

The absence is identified with the positive nature of the locus lacking the counterpositive.

On that account, a special relation of qualifierhood to an additional absence is unnecessary.

Existing sensory relations could explain cognition of the empty ground.

KEY INSIGHT

The question is ontological: what is the alleged object of negative cognition?

SOURCE TOPIC · Mīmāṃsaka Prima Facie View—Absence Is Positive in Nature

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier Nyāya: negative experience has content

"There is no pot on this ground" differs from mere cognition of ground.

The same ground can later possess a pot and yield affirmative cognition.

Treating ground and absence as identical threatens the experienced relation between a locus and what it contains.

Earlier Naiyāyikas argue for absence as an additional entity.

KEY INSIGHT

The negative predication presents something more specific than ground alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Reply of the Earlier Naiyāyikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The ground and its missing pot

Identity view

- Empty ground itself is the absence of the pot.
- One object suffices to explain the relevant cognition.
- No additional absence–locus relation is needed.

Additional-entity view

- The ground is a locus of pot-absence.
- “No pot here” is not the same as “ground here.”
- A qualified cognition calls for a distinct negative qualifier.

The locus–absence distinction is tested against both language and experience.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

A difficulty: which particular ground?

- The Mīmāṃsaka asks what specifically makes one ground the locus of one pot-absence.
- The ground alone cannot explain why a pot-bearing ground lacks the same absence.
- Ground qualified by absence risks circularity if absence is what must first be established.
- The earlier reply permits a non-recurrent particular locus qualified by its absence.

KEY INSIGHT

An absent pot must be excluded from just the relevant locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Particular Entity Is the Locus of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

Absence and the before/after contrast

Before destruction, the ground may possess the pot; after destruction it possesses the pot’s absence.

The ground can remain while the positive object changes.

The negative cognition presents a container–contained configuration.

The discussion rejects the claim that absence is just another name for the unchanged ground.

KEY INSIGHT

Temporal transition helps distinguish a locus from the absence located in it.

SOURCE TOPIC · Existence and Perceptibility of an Additional Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

The problem of merely seeing ground

Cognition of ground alone can occur even when a pot is present.

A cognition that omits the pot need not be a cognition that the pot is absent.

Reference to the counterpositive is essential to the negative claim.

The source tests whether differing sensory conditions rescue the identity account.

KEY INSIGHT

Ignoring a present object is not evidence that it is absent.

SOURCE TOPIC · Existence and Perceptibility of an Additional Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The negative judgment “is not”

The phrase “There is no pot on the ground” explicitly concerns absence of that pot.

Merely failing to apprehend the pot does not supply this content by itself.

If absence were cognition of empty ground, destroying the cognition would implausibly destroy absence.

The earlier Naiyāyika treats the negative cognition as evidence of a distinct absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Absence is not reducible to a temporary episode of noticing the locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Negative Cognition “Is Not” Is Proof of an Additional Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara reply: difference of cognitions

The Prābhākara distinguishes cognition of ground without a pot from cognition of ground with a pot.

An apparent absence-illusion is, on this proposal, an illusion about the ground's nature.

No additional absence-entity need be postulated to explain linguistic usage.

The difference in cognitive objects or modes bears the explanatory burden.

KEY INSIGHT

The prima facie account redirects ontology to the structure of ground-cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prābhākara View—Cognition of the Ground Itself Is Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

Is absence distinct from its locus?

The objector asks for a relation differentiating absence from the empty ground.

The Prābhākara claims an additional difference would invite self-dependence or regress.

Cognition of prior absence remains possible even when a pot is present now.

The temporal case challenges a simple rule based only on not currently seeing the pot.

KEY INSIGHT

Absence cannot be identified with present non-observation alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · It Is Impossible to Accept a Separate Particularity of Absence and Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

Different causes can yield different cognitions

The Prābhākara contends that cognitive differences do not always require distinct external objects.

The causal conditions of successive cognitions may differ.

Empty ground versus pot-possessing ground may generate different negative and positive usage.

Even Nyāya must explain the same ground's changing condition over time.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests whether cognitive differentiation entails ontological multiplication.

SOURCE TOPIC · Difference of Causal Conditions Produces Difference of Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

Doubt and illusion remain difficult cases

One may wonder whether a pot is on the ground or mistakenly judge that it is absent.

A defective causal condition may explain why an ordinary distinction is not ascertained.

The recurrence of the word “absence” across many empty places demands a general account.

The Prābhākara turns this demand against the Nyāya theory of multiple distinct absences.

KEY INSIGHT

A viable position must distinguish error, doubt, and recurrent negative speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · Difference of Causal Conditions Produces Difference of Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—PRIMA FACIE POSITIONS

Can “absencehood” be defined?

- The preliminary argument disputes a single universal running through all varieties of absence.
- Defining absence through opposition to presence can presuppose what is being defined.
- Defining it through difference or non-coexistence raises self-dependence and overextension problems.
- The objections target a distinct absence-category lacking a non-circular characteristic.

KEY INSIGHT

A philosophical category must support a workable account of what unifies its members.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Proper Definition of Absencehood Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Recurrent negative usage as a test

"No pot" can be asserted of many different places and times.

The Mīmāṃsaka asks whether an additional absence has better grounds for such recurrence than diverse empty loci.

The text distinguishes positive presence from the supposed timeless absence of one thing.

If a pot were eternally absent everywhere, current pot-presence would become contradictory.

KEY INSIGHT

Recurrence and temporal change constrain both competing ontologies.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Proper Definition of Absencehood Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Prābhākara closing defense

- Cognition of the empty locus is proposed as both what is known as absence and the means of knowing it.
- Cognition of the counterpositive is required, on this view, for the use of "pot-absence," not to generate absence itself.
- The analogy with a measuring unit distinguishes recognition of a dimension from saying how long it is.
- The final reply denies that merely losing a ground-cognition restores a destroyed pot.

KEY INSIGHT

The position preserves separate roles for a negative experience and explicit negative expression.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of the Prābhākara Prima Facie Position

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Limit cases: destruction and liberation

The discussion tests whether a broken dam requires a human witness to a resulting absence.

It considers the end of error as related to liberation.

The Prābhākara replies in terms of cognitions and their continuity.

These examples expose what follows from identifying absence with an episode of awareness.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument extends beyond pots to causal and soteriological consequences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of the Prābhākara Prima Facie Position

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Status at the end of the preliminary debate

Prābhākara proposal

- Absence is the special nature of an empty locus.
- Ground-cognition can be the negative experience.
- Counterpositive knowledge informs specific usage.

Unresolved Nyāya challenge

- The negative predicate seems distinct from the locus.
- Cognition of the counterpositive appears within negative experience.
- Negative recurrence needs an ontological explanation.

The next presentation gives the translated text's Naiyāyika determination.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the pūrvapakṣa has achieved

Starting thesis

No distinct absence beyond the empty locus.

Main challenge

Negative cognition seems to have its own object.

Principal replies

Cognitive differences, causal differences, and usage.

Status


A preliminary position, not Gangeśa's concluding doctrine.

The section explicitly closes as the prima facie account.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Absence—Naiyāyika Conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Absence—Naiyāyika Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Naiyāyika determination of absence



Counterpositive

A particular absence is absence *of* something.

Negative experience

The empty locus does not exhaust the content.

Recurrent varieties

Mutual, absolute, prior and posterior absence.

Counterexamples

Ground-cognition, temporal conjunction, potsherds.

Apprehensive relation

Qualifierhood or the self-linking relation.

The final determination answers the previous section’s Prābhākara preliminary theory.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Every absence has its counterpositive

The experience “This is not a pot” presents a particular absence determined by the pot.

“This is not cloth” involves a different counterpositive.

Cognition of ground alone does not require or present any such counterpositive.

Therefore cognition of a negative object cannot simply be cognition of the empty locus.

KEY INSIGHT

The counterpositive individuates the negative content.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Conclusion—An Additional Absence Determined by a Counterpositive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why naming the counterpositive matters

The Mīmāṃsaka confines knowledge of a pot to later verbal usage about pot-absence.

The Naiyāyika says the pot itself figures in the apprehension as the counterpositive of absence.

Speech about absence follows knowledge of that absence.

An extra cognition of the pot at the moment of utterance is not independently established.

KEY INSIGHT

Negative cognition already has determinate relational content before speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Conclusion—An Additional Absence Determined by a Counterpositive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Comparison with shortness and length

The dimension of a thing can be known without knowing its measured length.

Calling it short or long requires a specified measure or comparison.

This dependence does not make length identical with its measuring unit.

Similarly, negative cognition depends on a known counterpositive without collapsing into that counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational knowledge may require an independently known point of reference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Examples of Shortness, Length, and Similarity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The gavaya and the familiar cow

The cognition “A gavaya is like a cow” depends on cognition of a cow.

Seeing an unfamiliar gavaya alone does not yield that determinate similarity judgment.

The comparison supports the dependence of absence-cognition upon its counterpositive.

The argument preserves the distinction between reference conditions and the object known.

KEY INSIGHT

Knowledge of a counterpositive is not an abnormal burden placed on negative cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Examples of Shortness, Length, and Similarity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—NAIYĀYIKA CONCLUSION

The ground does not mean its absence

The sentence “There is absence of a pot on the ground” treats ground as locus, not as the absence.

No ordinary cognition identifies the ground itself as “pot-absence.”

The analogous affirmative sentence “There is a pot on the ground” distinguishes pot and ground.

The Naiyāyika invokes the parallel structure of positive and negative predication.

KEY INSIGHT

A locus is not thereby identical with what is predicated of it.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ground Is Not the Basis of the Expression “Absence of a Pot”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The circularity of a verbal definition

If ground counts as absence merely because one calls it “pot-absence,” the usage requires its own prior basis.

If the object is so called only after it is already recognized as absence, the explanation is circular.

The claim that counterpositiveness emerges only when one speaks incurs a related dependence.

The final view takes absence as an additional object of cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Linguistic application cannot alone create the negative object it purports to identify.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ground Is Not the Basis of the Expression “Absence of a Pot”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—NAIYĀYIKA CONCLUSION

Why “ground instead of pot-ground” fails

The Prābhākara might take difference between an empty-ground cognition and a pot-ground cognition as absence.

But absent cognition of pot-possession can occur through a defect even when the pot is present.

That would yield contradictory presence and absence in one place.

The distinction itself may presuppose prior awareness of actual absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Failure to register possession of a pot is not yet knowledge of pot-absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of Ground Distinct from Cognition of Pot-possessing Ground Is Not Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—NAIYĀYIKA CONCLUSION

The role of the faulty sense organ

An ocular defect may prevent a present pot from being apprehended.

The defective ground-cognition need not imply that the pot has ceased to exist.

Identity theories struggle if their negative cognition is defined by the failure of pot-cognition.

The Naiyāyika identifies absence as distinct from the cognition that may misrepresent it.

KEY INSIGHT

Ontology and cognition must be kept separate to explain errors about absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of Ground Distinct from Cognition of Pot-possessing Ground Is Not Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Four kinds of absence

Mutual absence: being distinct from another positive entity, as a pot is not cloth.

Absolute absence: nonexistence of an entity in a locus across relevant times.

Destruction: posterior absence of a pot after its destruction.

Prior absence: the absence of a pot before its production.

KEY INSIGHT

The different kinds are unified as absences while preserving distinct temporal and relational structures.

SOURCE TOPIC · Impossibility of Recurrent Usage Concerning Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the four kinds aid recurrence

The same negative expression can apply in several loci under the relevant absence-type.

One pot-destruction can explain negative statements of the pot among its parts after destruction.

Prior absence has a different time-orientation from destruction.

The Naiyāyika account explains recurrent usage by recognized kinds of additional absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Negative discourse is more structured than a list of unrelated empty grounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Impossibility of Recurrent Usage Concerning Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can time itself be the absence?

Temporal-conjunction proposal

- A ground is connected to the present moment.
- The statement “There is no pot here now” mentions time.
- A special temporal conjunction is proposed as the negative entity.

Naiyāyika answer

- Time and ground qualify the locus of the absence.
- Neither is the absent pot’s counterpositive.
- The negative judgment requires an absence determined by the pot.

The time at which an absence occurs is not identical to the absence.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The objection from potsherds and destruction

> If a special configuration of parts and times replaces absence, why not also replace the pot?

> After a hammer-blow, the parts may remain while the pot has been destroyed.

> The blow produces the destruction, not the ground or earlier cognition of ground.

> The destruction is determined by the destroyed pot, unlike the hammer itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The cause of destruction, its substrate, and the resulting absence are distinct.

SOURCE TOPIC · Potsherds and the Like Would Become Causes of Usage Concerning a Pot

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF ABSENCE—NAIYĀYIKA CONCLUSION

The relation connecting absence and locus

The final objection asks how an absence can qualify ground without a distinct connecting relation.

Adding a new relation for each relation risks regress.

The source accepts the fitness of absence and locus to yield a qualified cognition as a self-linking relation.

This is called qualifierhood, distinct from conjunction or inherence.

KEY INSIGHT

The self-linking relation accounts for negative predication without an infinite series of links.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualifierhood, That Is, a Self-Linking Relation, Is the Apprehensive Relation of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why there is no overextension

An absence located at a crossroads does not qualify a distant ground that actually bears a pot.

A bare claim that both entities are self-related would produce a false cognition.

The relevant pair must be fit to generate that specific qualified negative cognition.

The self-linking relation is accepted only with the proper object and locus.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualifierhood does not license arbitrary placement of absences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualifierhood, That Is, a Self-Linking Relation, Is the Apprehensive Relation of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika conclusion

Ontological claim

Absence is an additional real entity.

Cognitive claim

It is experienced as determined by a counterpositive.

Classification

Mutual, absolute, prior and posterior absence.

Apprehension


Its relation to a locus is qualifierhood / self-linking relation.

The determination answers the pūrvapakṣa without conflating absence and its empty ground.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of the Causes of Perception —Sense–Object Contact

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of the Causes of Perception—Sense–Object Contact

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

What makes a perception occur?

I

Sense–object relation

The kind of contact required for an object.

II

Light and visible color

Whether illumination joins the eye or object.

III

Manifestness

The conditions that make qualities perceptible.

IV

Apparent counterexamples

Submerged light and a roasting potsherd.

V

Magnitude

A further causal condition of substance-perception.

This unit follows the source through the sense–object-contact division, not the later air or gold debates.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Contact alone is not the whole story

- Six specific apprehensive relations are retained as causes of different kinds of perception.
- Visual perception additionally depends on appropriately situated light and perceptibility.
- The argument distinguishes a sense organ's relation to an object from the conditions revealing it.
- Each proposed cause must pass positive and negative concomitance tests.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of seeing requires a causal combination, not just an object in front of an eye.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Theory of Sense–Object Contact

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why light must reach the object

A viewer can be in a bright place yet fail to see a pot in darkness.

A pot illuminated in darkness may be seen from the viewer’s position.

Thus light’s conjunction with the object, not merely with the eye, matters.

The claim is defended through contrasting cases of illumination.

KEY INSIGHT

Illuminating the perceiver and illuminating the perceived object have different effects.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction of Object and Light Is a Cause of Visual Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partly illuminated pot

An objection asks whether an entire pot would be seen when only its hidden side receives light.

The relation between a whole and its facing parts complicates the light-contact rule.

Proposals appeal to contact delimited by the part facing the eye.

The text compares such restrictions with needlessly multiplying causal specifications.

KEY INSIGHT

A causal rule must explain partial visibility without excessive complications.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction of Object and Light Is a Cause of Visual Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Positive and negative concomitance

The presence of light on the object regularly accompanies successful visual apprehension.

Removing this illumination may prevent perception despite proximity of the eye.

Claims about contact with just one part are tested for overextension.

The source favors light–object conjunction supported by these contrasts.

KEY INSIGHT

Causal status is established by observed variation, not by labels alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction of Object and Light Is a Cause of Visual Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Manifest color as a revealing cause

Color of illuminating light is discussed as a cause of an object's being revealed.

A rival proposal makes manifest color merely a delimiter of firehood.

The reply argues that neither suggested causal delimitation displaces the other on the available evidence.

Both light and its manifest color are treated as causally relevant.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes a cause from a property that merely restricts another cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Manifest Color Is a Cause of Illumination

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which properties make light effective?

Restricted-fire account

- Firehood delimits the causal role of light.
- Manifest color may be merely a marker.
- One causal condition is supposed sufficient.

Reply in the text

- Light and manifest color both show concomitance.
- No deciding factor eliminates either condition.
- Visual manifestation needs a more precise account.

The debate is an analysis of causal delimitation, not modern optics.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The eye’s own color: an objection

- A tradition-knower asks whether color of the eye should also count as a revealer.
- The discussion compares colored light with nearby bodies that remain imperceptible.
- A fragrant mass of air or hot vapor can be present without ordinary visual apprehension.
- These cases distinguish the existence of a thing from its visible manifestation.

KEY INSIGHT

Proximity and causal presence do not guarantee perceptual visibility.

SOURCE TOPIC · View of the Tradition-Knower—The Color of the Eye Is Also a Revealer

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Manifestness and the qualities

The text compares visible color with touch, smell and other quality-perceptions.

A universal manifestness common to all qualities is questioned.

A property can be manifest to one sense while its substrate is not visible.

Different perceptual pathways require differentiated causes.

KEY INSIGHT

Perceptibility of a quality need not imply perceptibility of its bearer.

SOURCE TOPIC · View of the Tradition-Knower—The Color of the Eye Is Also a Revealer

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees and classes of manifest color

The siddhāntin discusses degrees of whiteness and related manifested colors.

One universal is argued not to vary in degree across its individual instances.

Distinct manifested forms or more specific universals offer candidate explanations.

The analysis tests the economy of proposing a causal class for each visible shade.

KEY INSIGHT

Refining manifestness requires care about universals and their extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Complex Absence of Non-manifestness Is a Cause of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can the absence of non-manifestness suffice?

A complex negative condition is proposed in place of a single positive manifestness.

The text examines whether classes nested under colorhood explain visual apprehension.

Giving every shade its own causal universal risks unnecessary multiplication.

The relation between ordinary colorhood and special manifest qualities remains decisive.

KEY INSIGHT

The theory balances causal precision with philosophical parsimony.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Complex Absence of Non-manifestness Is a Cause of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An inhibitor does not merely mean invisibility

Objections cite sunlight in water and fire in a heated potsherd.

A simple rule about manifest color seems to predict visible fires in these cases.

The reply notes that submerged light may be experienced without appearing as a separate object.

The particular fire of a roasting potsherd can have non-manifest color and intense touch.

KEY INSIGHT

An apparent counterexample must be analyzed through its actual causal conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inhibitors of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Curd, milk and material continuity

The source rejects an objection based on treating curd as produced by separate curd-atoms alongside milk.

Curd is explained as arising through the destruction of milk and transformation of its material conditions.

This example is used to guard the proposed causal role of manifest color.

The discussion concerns kinds of causes, not an empirical laboratory experiment.

KEY INSIGHT

Material-cause examples test whether a proposed perceptual cause is dispensable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inhibitors of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Magnitude also regulates substance-perception

Manifest color and appropriate magnitude are considered causes of perceiving a substance.

The case of cotton and other aggregations tests quantity and compactness.

Simply possessing many constituent substances is not equivalent to having the relevant magnitude.

The source favors magnitude as the regulator of substance-perception.

KEY INSIGHT

An object's visibility depends partly on its spatial magnitude, not mere plurality of parts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Magnitude Is Also a Cause of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sight, touch and the same fire

An objection notes differences in manifest color and manifest touch in fire.

Recognition such as “the fire I saw is what I am touching” supports one object with both qualities.

Differences of efficient causes explain why qualities may appear under different conditions.

This does not defeat the causal role of manifest color and magnitude.

KEY INSIGHT

Cross-modal recognition is used to test the proposed list of perceptual conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Magnitude Is Also a Cause of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The causal framework so far

Apprehensive relation

Specific sense–object contacts remain relevant.

Illumination

Light must be appropriately conjoined with the object.

Visibility

Manifest color is a further revealing cause.

Substance-perception


Appropriate magnitude regulates perceptual success.

The following source sections separately examine air and the fiery status of gold.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

B. The Theory of Perception of Air

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · B. The Theory of Perception of Air

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Can air itself be touched?



The rival positions concern cognition of the *substance* air, not whether touch is experienced.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Prima facie: the case for perceiving air

- The objector takes air as a substance of magnitude possessing manifest touch.
- Analogy: a pot is perceptible when the appropriate quality and magnitude are present.
- Manifest color is argued not to be necessary for perception by the tactile sense.
- The experience “The air is blowing” is treated as immediate tactile awareness.

KEY INSIGHT

The objector seeks a genuine perception of air, not merely a touch followed by inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View—Air Is Perceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Why “air is cold” seems immediate

The cognition “The air is cold” can arise even when touch is not separately identified as a reason.

“There is touch in air” would differ from directly experiencing air as cold.

Blindness to an object does not by itself prevent the skin from apprehending it.

A cloth on the back may be touched without knowing its number or magnitude.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument uses ordinary qualified experience against the inference-only account.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View—Air Is Perceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

What causes tactile perception of substance?

Objector: manifest touch

- The skin may apprehend touch together with its supporting substance.
- A colored appearance is unnecessary for contact by skin.
- Air is compared with a pot known by touch.

Siddhāntin: manifest color

- Perception of a substance needs manifest color with magnitude.
- The proposed general causal rules otherwise yield unwanted cases.
- Air is not an externally perceived substance.

The issue is the causal regulator of substance-perception, not the occurrence of tactile feeling.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

The first siddhānta: air is imperceptible

- The siddhāntin treats manifest color together with magnitude as a cause.
- A general appeal to any special quality of an external sense would overextend.
- Examples include a yellow ocular substance, bitter taste, and fragrance carried by air.
- The possibility of a relevant cause cannot be abandoned without an adequate defeater.

KEY INSIGHT

Perception of a quality does not entail direct perception of every proposed substrate.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Air Is Imperceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Reply: touch can be a different regulator

- The objector rejects a single rule requiring manifest color in every sense modality.
- Sunrays and vapor test claims about the visibility and touchability of substances.
- The objector allows manifest color for visual perception and manifest touch for tactile perception.
- A common causal class involving the manifest quality of a given sense is proposed.

KEY INSIGHT

A sense-specific causal analysis is advanced against the single color-based rule.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Rejoinder—Possession of Manifest Touch Is Sufficient

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Rays, smoke, and the economy of causes

- Conjunction and disjunction of colored rays may be inferred from their changing positions.
- Subtle smoke and vapor raise difficulties for simple sensory classifications.
- A proposal involving many special qualities is challenged as unnecessarily complex.
- The rejoinder stresses differentiating sight-based and touch-based perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Economy of causal conditions is contested across different classes of substance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Rejoinder—Possession of Manifest Touch Is Sufficient

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

“I touch”: a subsequent experiential test

The source distinguishes production of color from mere status as a perceptible substance.

The eye need not apprehend touch, nor the skin color, to know a pot.

A later cognition “I am touching” is invoked with reference to air as with a pot.

The objector consequently retains air among tactile perceptibles.

KEY INSIGHT

The later self-report is used as evidence for the objector, not accepted as final proof.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Experience “I Touch” Is Valid with Respect to Air

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

The manifest-touch rule tested

A visible sunray may have manifest color but be imperceptible to touch.

For tactile perception, the objector makes manifest touch necessary, not color.

Touch and its manifestation are considered causes in the tactile case.

A universal of manifestness is treated as a delimiter rather than a separate cause.

KEY INSIGHT

One manifestation cannot automatically substitute for another sense's conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Manifest Touch Alone Regulates Tactile Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Modern Naiyāyikas: air is not perceived

> Manifest touch by itself would predict knowledge of hot vapor and its number or magnitude.

> Yet the number of hot vapor is not known like the number of a pot touched by hand.

> Manifest color alone also predicts unwanted perceptibility of moonbeams or yellow ocular matter.

> The modern position requires differentiated causal conditions and denies air-perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Perception of air fails tests drawn from the attributes a substance-perception should reveal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Modern View—Air Is Imperceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Why visible vapor does not settle the matter

A visible subtle vapor need not make its duality, magnitude, or motion evident.

A conch that appears yellow is explained by ocular yellowness rather than a yellow ocular substance.

Dispersed parts of a color-bearing object complicate a simple visibility rule.

The source labels this the “modern view” rather than the original objector’s view.

KEY INSIGHT

Phenomenal color and perception of the color-bearing substance are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · Modern View—Air Is Imperceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

The tradition-knower's argument

Movements of a flock of birds are inferred from changes of its perceptible location.

If visible rays lacked the relevant perceptible conditions, the needed conjunctions would be unknown.

Similar difficulties would arise for inferring movement of moon and stars.

The tradition-knower defends manifest color's indispensability and denies direct air-perception.

KEY INSIGHT

An account of air must remain consistent with inference from visible spatial change.

SOURCE TOPIC · View of the Tradition-Knower—Air Is Imperceptible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

How can an inferable air appear cold?

The objection presses the ordinary cognition “The air is cold.”

Cold touch cannot straightforwardly qualify air if air is not directly apprehended.

The proposed reply superimposes felt cold from another substrate onto inferred air.

The analysis invokes a sensory defect and a mental stage in the erroneous attribution.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified everyday judgment may be reconstructed as inference plus superimposition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Explanation of the Cognition “The Air Is Cold”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Reconstructing “the air is blowing”

An impact on the body is inferred from pleasure or pain caused by it.

From the impact, a swift stream bearing touch is inferred.

From that stream, the blowing motion of air is inferred.

The text denies this inference to someone unaware of the mediating sequence.

KEY INSIGHT

The source gives an explicit inferential chain rather than positing invisible tactile perception.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of “The Air Is Blowing” and “Cold Air Is Blowing”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

The complex judgment “cold air is blowing”

- The air may be remembered as qualified by cold touch.
- Blowing motion is then inferred in that already qualified subject.
- The result can be a single qualified inference without simultaneous perception of both qualifiers.
- Manifest color remains an extraneous condition against the attempted proof of perceptible air.

KEY INSIGHT

The inference-only account explains how multiple qualifiers may enter one judgment.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of “The Air Is Blowing” and “Cold Air Is Blowing”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

Why the self is different from air

Self (ātman)

- Recognition: “I who saw the pot am touching it.”
- The same “I” is presented directly across sense modalities.
- Such recognition does not require a chain of self-inferences.

Air (vāyu)

- Continuously moving air is not reidentified as the same individual.
- “Air previously behind is now ahead” is treated inferentially.
- Colorless air is likened to imperceptible ether.

The self is concluded perceptible, while air is inferred and not externally perceived.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

B. THE THEORY OF PERCEPTION OF AIR

The determination in the source

Starting point

Air seems perceptible because its touch is experienced.

Counterargument

Touch alone does not establish perception of the air-substance.

Reconstruction

Coldness and motion may be reported through inference or error.

Conclusion


Air is not externally perceived; the self remains perceptible.

This is the Naiyāyika conclusion of the translated chapter, not a claim of physical science.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

C. The Theory That Gold Is Fiery

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.


Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · C. The Theory That Gold Is Fiery

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

How does the text classify gold?



“Gold is fiery” records the chapter’s philosophical classification, not modern chemical analysis.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Gold as a challenge to manifest touch

On the hypothesis that manifest touch causes perception of substances, fiery gold causes trouble.

The discussion says the touch of fiery gold is non-manifest, as is touch in a ray.

Its proper color is described as overwhelmed by supporting yellow color.

The perceptibility or imperceptibility of gold therefore tests causal accounts of the senses.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument turns on classical qualities and perceptual conditions, not elemental chemistry.

SOURCE TOPIC · If Possession of Manifest Touch Is Accepted as the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

When one color overwhelms another

Overwhelming is defined as relation to a stronger color of the same kind.

Gold’s real color may be hidden by yellow even when yellow itself is unseen in darkness.

A visible substance requires perception of its relevant color.

The text distinguishes gold’s color from the radiance of ordinary fire.

KEY INSIGHT

The perceived yellow surface and the alleged fiery substrate receive separate accounts.

SOURCE TOPIC · If Possession of Manifest Touch Is Accepted as the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Why gold is compared with fire

Ordinary fire

- Radiance may illuminate the fire and surrounding objects.
- Parts not affected by an overwhelming color remain relevant.
- Whiteness, color, and luminosity are distinguished.

Gold

- The supporting yellow can overwhelm the supposed fiery color.
- Gold does not emit the same radiance described for fire.
- Its classification needs inference rather than ordinary appearance.

The reply refuses to transfer every perceptual trait of visible fire to gold.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Gold is argued not to be earthy

Gold keeps its yellow appearance despite prolonged contact with intense fire.

On the argument, an earthy body should undergo heterogeneous change of color.

An opposed liquid substance can inhibit that change in relevant examples.

The counterfactual about an earthy gold under fire supports denying earthhood.

KEY INSIGHT

Persistence of color under heat supplies a proposed inferential discriminator.

SOURCE TOPIC · Gold Is Not Earthy but Fiery

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Forms of the inference for gold

The subject is yellow gold conjoined with intense fire.

The reason invokes the absence of the expected heterogeneous change of yellow color.

An opposed liquid substance is posited as inhibiting that change.

The comparison is with yellow cloth protected by water while exposed to fire.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential form depends on precisely delimiting the heating and inhibiting conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Form of the Inference Establishing the Fiery Nature of Gold

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Why water is not the proposed inner liquid

The inferred inhibiting fluid associated with gold is denied to be water.

Water is characterized as naturally fluid; gold's fluidity is treated as adventitious.

Non-manifest fluidity is rejected as an inhibitor in the relevant example.

Fire itself normally causes change of color rather than preventing it.

KEY INSIGHT

The inference distinguishes natural fluidity from fluidity acquired under special conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Form of the Inference Establishing the Fiery Nature of Gold

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Udayana: molten fire has a limited inhibitory power

An objection asks why molten gold would not also protect a cloth from color change.

The reply restricts the inhibitory condition to gold under specified causal support.

Ordinary solid gold lacks an independently established inhibiting support.

Concomitance is asserted only for the closely delimited molten-gold case.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inhibitor must be located and qualified, rather than universalized without proof.

SOURCE TOPIC · View of Udayanācārya—Molten Fire Inhibits Change of Color

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Modern position: neither earth nor water

Modern Naiyāyikas infer a fiery nature for colored, molten gold whose fluidity survives fire.

Gold is said to lack water's natural fluidity and viscosity.

A ghee-in-water example motivates a restriction about an opposed liquid.

The earthy-gold inference from adventitious fluidity is judged weaker than its rival.

KEY INSIGHT

The disagreement is assessed through competing reasons and counterinstances.

SOURCE TOPIC · Modern View—Gold Is Not Water

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

The “natural fluidity” question

One line of objection treats earthhood as a delimiter for adventitious fluidity.

The reply notes that not every earthy pot becomes fluid.

A recurrent subordinate property common to ghee, lac, and other cases is disputed.

The text also records a view treating “yellow gold is molten” as a defeated illusion.

KEY INSIGHT

The relation between ordinary experience and an inferred ontological classification is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · Fire Has No Natural Fluidity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Other Naiyāyikas accept produced fluidity

An alternative view insists that heat really produces fluidity in fiery gold.

Molten fire then inhibits the factor that would destroy that fluidity.

The reasoning compares gold with protected fluidity in ghee in boiling water.

The text provides both affirmative and negative formulations of the argument.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated chapter preserves rival Naiyāyika refinements rather than one uniform explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another View—Fluidity Is Produced in Gold

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Why the reason need not be inconclusive

The uncommon reason is evaluated alongside special observation and favorable reasoning.

The earthy-gold alternative is said to lack comparable favorable reasoning.

If gold were earthy, intense fire would be expected to destroy its fluidity.

The fiery account is defended by the claimed absence of an equally strong defeater.

KEY INSIGHT

Inferential force depends on a reason together with its restrictions and possible counter-reasons.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another View—Fluidity Is Produced in Gold

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Further inferential establishment

Other teachers formulate an inference using universals associated with fire and fluidity.

The proposal first establishes a molten form of fire under a qualified absence argument.

A later inference places fiery nature in disputed molten gold.

The section tests whether “occurring in a locus of fluidity” becomes an extraneous condition.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument uses Navya-Nyāya qualification of pervasion and subjecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Final Establishment of the Fiery Nature of Gold

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Removing a proposed extraneous condition

An objection proposes that occurrence in ordinary fire is an upādhi-like extra condition.

The reply contends that the stronger argument for molten fiery gold defeats the negative case.

Competing earth and fire inferences are acknowledged rather than ignored.

The favored inference is the one said to withstand contrary reasoning.

KEY INSIGHT

A defeater can overturn an apparent negative instance without eliminating all disputes.

SOURCE TOPIC · Removal of the Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Destruction of gold versus destruction by fire

An objection notes that ever-stronger heat may destroy a particular gold substrate.

The reply distinguishes fluidity destroyed with the substrate from fluidity destroyed by fire-contact.

New fluidity may arise in gold although the former state ceases.

The reason is restricted to the absence of destruction attributable to fire-conjunction.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal specification of "undestroyed fluidity" is narrower than bare permanence.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Reason Is Not Unestablished

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Negative and affirmative-negative inferences

The source argues from gold-atoms whose fluidity survives intense fire-contact.

If their fluidity were destroyed as in ghee, later gold would be non-fluid.

A negative inference excludes earthiness; a further form establishes fiery nature.

The cause assigned to gold is a special kind of atom under this classical account.

KEY INSIGHT

The example shifts from observed molten gold to a posited atomic substrate.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative and Affirmative-Negative Inferences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

A dissent preserved in the text

Fiery-gold conclusion

- Gold's yellow color survives intense fire.
- It differs from ordinary water and earth.
- A carefully delimited inference assigns a fiery nature.

Partial theorist

- Yellowness is used to challenge the fiery classification.
- Some pervasions alleged for fire also fail in gold.
- Gold is proposed as a further substance distinct from all three.

The independent-substance position is explicitly a partial view, not the chapter's sole determination.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Why the dissent rejects the threefold choice

The partial theorist compares the fiery-gold inference with an invalid inference that air is earthy.

Color, smell, and fluidity are not straightforward species-identifiers in all cases.

Gold is said to violate rules claimed for visible or illuminating fire.

This leads to the rival proposal of gold as an additional independent substance.

KEY INSIGHT

An apparent classification can fail if its intended universal concomitance has counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · Partial View—Gold Is a Distinct Substance Different from Earth, Water, and Fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

C. THE THEORY THAT GOLD IS FIERY

Conclusion: what has been demonstrated?

Main thesis

A qualified classical inference aims to establish gold as fiery.

Disputed evidence

Manifest color, intense heat, and the persistence of fluidity.

Internal variation

Udayana, modern authors, and other Naiyāyikas differ.

Recorded dissent


A partial theorist classifies gold as an additional substance.

This faithfully reports the philosophical controversy in the English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of the Atomicity of Mind

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of the Atomicity of Mind

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Why must mind have a size?

I

The sixth sense

Inner qualities require an internal organ.

II

Mīmāṃsaka position

Mind as eternal and all-pervasive.

III

Naiyāyika conclusion

One atomic mind regulates sense-conjunction.

IV

Hard counterexamples

Songs, several senses, and coordinated action.

V

Final defence

Rapid succession and the unity of a single mind.

Mind here denotes manas, a sense organ of inner cognition in the classical argument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mind is the sixth sense organ

Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort are not perceived through the five external senses.

Yet awareness of these special qualities of the self is produced perception.

The source therefore establishes a distinct sixth sense organ: manas.

The skin is not made the cause of perceptions whose objects are not tactile qualities.

KEY INSIGHT

Both disputants accept mind as a sense organ; they contest its magnitude.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mind as the Sixth Sense Organ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two competing ontologies of mind

Mīmāṃsaka

- Mind is an eternal, partless, touchless substance.
- It is inferred to be all-pervasive like the self.
- Efficient conditions, not restricted size, govern effects.

Naiyāyika

- Mind is atomic and conjoins with one sense organ at a time.
- Successive conjunction explains the observed order of cognitions.
- An indivisible sequence prevents genuinely simultaneous many-sense awareness.

The dispute centers on how one inner organ coordinates distinct sensory episodes.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Mīmāṃsaka’s all-pervasive mind

- Mind is described as eternal, partless, and devoid of touch.
- Its conjunction with self functions in the production of cognition.
- An eternal, non-producing substance is compared with the all-pervasive self.
- The opponent argues that restricted magnitude is not required by this inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The prima facie thesis combines the sixth-sense role with all-pervasiveness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mīmāṃsaka View—Mind Is All-pervasive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A dispute about special kinds of qualities

Pleasure and related states are special, non-eternal qualities of the self.

An objection infers subordinate universals under qualityhood for those states.

The reply cites the status of sound and possible extra conditions as problems.

Body–self conjunction remains a candidate cause of pleasure and pain.

KEY INSIGHT

The issue of mind's size is entangled with the classification and causation of qualities.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection Concerning Subordinate Universals in Pleasure and the Like

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can an all-pervasive cause have a local effect?

The Naiyāyika asks why pleasure occurs in a restricted region if mind is everywhere.

The Mīmāṃsaka distinguishes several meanings of "spatial restriction."

A local effect can be explained through its complete causal conditions.

All-pervasiveness of one cause need not mean that its effect appears everywhere.

KEY INSIGHT

The objector separates causal pervasion from the spatial distribution of an effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · Atomicity of Mind Is Not Required for Spatial Restriction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Efficient causes select where pleasure occurs

Sandalwood is offered as an efficient cause of a localized pleasurable experience.

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka debate whether mind-conjunction adds spatial restriction.

The all-pervasive account assigns the restriction to the full causal complex.

A non-inhering cause is not by itself claimed sufficient for any local effect.

KEY INSIGHT

Causation must be attributed to the relevant complex, not only one pervasive condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Non-inhering Cause Depends upon an Efficient Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Several pleasures and pains at once?

A person may experience sandalwood, fire, or wounds at different bodily locations.

The Mīmāṃsaka proposes multiple particular pleasures and pains at the same time.

Differing efficient causes are said to delimit their respective effects.

Such simultaneity would not refute an all-pervasive mind on that account.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent uses localized concurrent experiences to defend a pervasive manas.

SOURCE TOPIC · Simultaneous Production of Many Pleasures and Pains in One Self

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The prima facie conclusion

Mind is again described as an all-pervasive, eternal, touchless sense organ.

The sequence of ordinary cognitions is attributed to interest, concentration, and other causes.

Merit, demerit, and purpose may also regulate experience.

Eating, watching a dance, hearing music, and smelling fragrance test simultaneity.

KEY INSIGHT

The text records direct-experience objections before moving to Gangeśa's determination.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion of the Prima Facie View; Possibility of Many Cognitions at One Time

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does prior absence explain the effect?

A proposed cause is the prior absence of pleasure, pain, or another produced quality.

The Mīmāṃsaka doubts its causal status when other factors already explain production.

Efficient causes are again used to delimit the effect's location.

Additional bodily adjuncts are challenged as unnecessary within the pervasive-mind model.

KEY INSIGHT

The apparent regularity of a negative condition is insufficient to show its independent causal work.

SOURCE TOPIC · View Concerning the Causal Status of Prior Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika conclusion: an atomic mind

Several sense organs may be in contact with objects, but only one cognition occurs at a time.

The missing condition in the inactive senses is conjunction with mind.

Mind successively assists the senses and cannot conjoin with all at once.

Its atomicity is inferred from this ordered production of perception.

KEY INSIGHT

A single minute regulator is assigned to the succession of sensory acts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Mind Is Atomic

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why desire alone cannot sequence perception

An unwanted sound or sight can be perceived without a desire to know it.

Someone seeking a pot may nevertheless perceive cloth.

Desire directs effort and attention toward a relevant sense organ.

It is not, by itself, the direct cause of the desired perceptual cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The real causal gate remains contact between atomic mind and the appropriate sense.

SOURCE TOPIC · Desire to Know Is Not a Direct Cause of Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit and demerit do not replace mind

The opponent appeals to unseen moral factors for cognitive delay.

The Naiyāyika rejects unseen merit or demerit as the sole regulator of sequence.

Desired and undesired cognitions alike occur successively.

The causal role of mind would otherwise be lost despite intact sensory conditions.

KEY INSIGHT

The account is explicitly a theory of perceptual causation, not only of volition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Merit and Demerit Are Not the Sole Regulators of Sequence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

“Simultaneous” is rapid succession

The mind forms one particular conjunction with one sense organ at a time.

Other sensory conjunctions are absent at that precise instant.

Hearing a song while watching a dance can therefore be a rapid series.

Very brief temporal intervals may not be separately recognized in experience.

KEY INSIGHT

Perceived simultaneity does not establish strict moment-by-moment simultaneity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Particular Conjunction with Mind and Cognition of Many Objects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many sounds and one ear

Several sounds can reside in one auditory field at once.

Mind contacts the ear successively as delimited by particular sounds.

Attention to one song makes it distinct from surrounding noise.

Clear cognition of each sound requires its own delimited causal complex.

KEY INSIGHT

One sensory organ receiving several stimuli does not make one simultaneous cognition of each.

SOURCE TOPIC · Delimiters in Conjunction of Sense Organ and Mind

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The challenge of twenty songs

The Mīmāṃsaka imagines twenty songs sung together under full desire to hear them.

The opponent claims all conditions could then be present for all twenty cognitions.

A proposed reply distinguishes clearly heard sounds from indifferent noise.

The debate asks what desire and concentration actually do when sounds compete.

KEY INSIGHT

The counterexample forces a more discriminating causal role for selective attention.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Objection of Twenty Songs; Proposal of Cognition of Indifference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Selective attention has a conditional role

Desire and concentration are not universal causes of every perceptual cognition.

When many sounds coexist, they help select one clear particular sound.

General noise may be apprehended without distinct phonetic features.

A wanted sound's special universal is clearly apprehended through attention.

KEY INSIGHT

Attention matters especially under competition; it is not an unrestricted condition of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Determinate Causal Status of Desire to Know and Concentration

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Capacity of hearing versus actuality

Some teachers restrict the ear to a collective cognition of noise.

The Naiyāyika instead allows that the ear is capable of individual sounds.

Atomic mind conjoins successively in the ear as delimited by each sound.

Separate completed causal complexes produce clear perceptions one after another.

KEY INSIGHT

Capacity of a sense is distinct from simultaneous execution of all its possible cognitions.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Ear Is Capable of Apprehending Many Sounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The five-sense objection and a single mind

Color, taste, smell, touch and sound may appear to be known together.

Extremely short successive intervals can present an appearance of simultaneity.

Positing five minds would disrupt the unity of memory, desire, effort and self-experience.

The conclusion accepts one atomic mind per self.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither a misleading temporal appearance nor a plurality of minds is required.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Objection of Five Cognitions; The Alternative of Five Minds Is Rejected

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Twenty bodily actions: the final challenge

The opponent asks how fingers, eyes and limbs can act together in dance.

The reply distinguishes one atomic mind from multiple bodily efforts and actions.

Efforts qualified by the body and its parts can support many concurrent movements.

The source explicitly allows twenty actions without twenty simultaneous cognitions.

KEY INSIGHT

Simultaneous actions are compatible with a sequential regulator of sense-cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection from Simultaneous Actions of Bodily Parts; Reply—Twenty Actions Can Be Simultaneous

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established role of manas

Internal perception

Mind apprehends pleasure, pain, and other special self-qualities.

Dimension

The Naiyāyika concludes that mind is atomic.

Sequence

Its successive conjunction regulates distinct cognitions.

Counterexamples


Noise, five senses, and coordinated action receive separate replies.

The theory ends by preserving perception of inner qualities within the definition of perception.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Subsequent Cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments and their objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

How do we know that we know?



The section distinguishes a first object-cognition from cognition of that cognition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The first-cognition objection

A first perceptual cognition is exemplified by “This is a pot.”

The Mīmāṃsaka argues it is already known in producing reference to itself.

Requiring a further mental cognition is called an unnecessary postulate.

Later cognition may still be admitted for past, future, and another person’s cognitions.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute is whether every present first cognition requires another cognition to be revealed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mīmāṃsaka Objection—Cognition Itself Causes Usage Concerning Itself

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

Self-objectivity as the power of usage

Ordinary communicative usage follows cognition of its subject.

The Mīmāṃsaka claims the first cognition can be its own object.

A special power to produce usage concerning itself is postulated.

Self-objectivity is said to avoid the need for a separate second cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal grounds self-reference in cognition's special capacity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition Has Itself as Its Object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

A “special nature” of cognition

A challenge asks how the same cognition can be both object and knowledge of itself.

The reply assigns self-objectivity to cognition’s distinctive nature.

It invokes familiar but hard-to-define qualities, such as the sweetness of sugar.

The special nature is argued not to depend on another object-relation.

KEY INSIGHT

This is the Mīmāṃsaka defence, not the chapter’s established Naiyāyika position.

SOURCE TOPIC · Self-objectivity Is a Special Nature of Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

Self-luminosity without a second act

The simple first cognition is claimed to generate its own usage as cognition.

A second mental cognition would be unnecessary for that particular use.

Collective cognition of pot and cloth is used to analyze several referents.

The shell-silver illusion tests how a mistaken cognition can motivate behavior.

KEY INSIGHT

The rival theory connects illumination with the power to produce usage and activity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Self-objectivity Is Self-luminosity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

Tripartite perception

A further account says every “I know this” simultaneously presents three aspects.

The knower is represented as agent; cognition as act; the object as its object.

On this proposal cognition illuminates itself and its subject together.

It is offered against the need for a later mental apprehension.

KEY INSIGHT

The threefold form is the view under examination, not automatically the final conclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Theory of Tripartite Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What illuminates a first cognition?

Mīmāṃsaka

- The original cognition is self-luminous.
- Its power of self-usage can replace a second cognition.
- Any later revealing act threatens a regress.

Naiyāyika

- A first cognition has an external object.
- A subsequent mental cognition can take that cognition as object.
- Only cognitions with appropriate causes need be apprehended later.

The two positions assign different objects and causal roles to successive acts.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

The regress objection

The opponent argues that each cognition known by another requires still another.

Past and future cognitions test an appeal to currently present knownness.

The meaning of “mental perception” is challenged for first cognitions.

The alleged regress is a principal argument for self-luminosity.

KEY INSIGHT

Accepting a later cognition does not by itself require every member of a series to be known.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inconsistency of Being Illuminated by Another

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can a first cognition be mentally perceived?

An inference compares the first cognition to pleasure as a quality of the self.

The opponent challenges it with counter-inferences and circularity claims.

Eye-produced cognition does not itself become an object of the eye.

The debate shifts to the appropriate mental contact of a cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant sense organ must be specified before calling a cognition perceptible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Fault in the Inference of Mental Perceptuality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika rejects automatic self-luminosity

A first object-cognition and cognition of that cognition are distinct acts.

Cognitionhood alone does not establish that a first cognition is self-objective.

The conditions for contact with the mental sense differ from external sense-contact.

The text explicitly refutes the opponent’s unqualified self-luminosity.

KEY INSIGHT

A source’s ability to produce activity does not prove self-illumination.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Refutation of Self-luminosity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

Cognition does not grasp itself as its object

In “This is a pot,” the object of the first perception is the pot.

The first cognition is not in the relevant sense-contact with itself.

A following mental perception can take that earlier cognition as its object.

The source thus rejects self-objecthood for ordinary first cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The first and subsequent cognitions have different intentional objects.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition Is Not Its Own Object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference establishing subsequent cognition

The first sense-produced cognition does not produce its own objecthood.

It is not the relevant sense-contact that would make itself its object.

Mental contact can instead make the first cognition available to a later cognition.

The source formulates explicit inferences supporting this distinction.

KEY INSIGHT

The second act has a positive causal explanation, not merely a denial of the first act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why every first cognition is not noticed

Knownness or knowability need not appear in every cognition as soon as it occurs.

A later mental cognition arises when the required causal complex is present.

Rival attention to pleasure, other objects, or another cognition can inhibit it.

Therefore not every cognition must generate an accompanying second cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Selective subsequent awareness prevents the proposed theory from overgenerating cognitions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

What becomes the mental object?

The eye does not perceive its own visual cognition by direct ocular contact.

A mental cognition, however, can take the first visual cognition as an object.

The source invokes knownness and mental contact to explain this new relation.

The analogy with divine knowledge is presented within a separate special case.

KEY INSIGHT

The locus and mode of contact determine whether a cognition itself is perceptible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Remaining Reply Concerning the Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How the infinite regress is blocked

One subsequent cognition may apprehend the first without itself being apprehended.

A stronger present perceptual cause can inhibit a still further mental cognition.

The series is not required to continue indefinitely for usage or memory.

The cognition “I know this pot” need not encode hundreds of reflective acts.

KEY INSIGHT

A causal stop condition suffices; global self-luminosity is not established.

SOURCE TOPIC · Remaining Reply Concerning the Inference Establishing Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

Necessary knowability does not entail luminosity

The opponent appeals to the required knowability of every cognition.

The reply denies the alleged universal relation that every cognition is actually perceptual.

A cause can be present while its effect is prevented by an inhibitor.

No special entity named self-luminosity is needed to explain the later cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Possible knowability and actual revealedness are not equivalent.

SOURCE TOPIC · Necessary Knowability Is Not the Cause of Self-luminosity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Dependence of the simple first cognition

An object-cognition may depend on sensory contact while not referring to itself.

The source rejects simultaneously calling one act dependent and independent in the same role.

Subsequent cognition is specified by its object, the first cognition.

The first cognition need not contain a self-referential chain of all later cognitions.

KEY INSIGHT

Different acts of cognition cannot be collapsed merely to avoid a second mental event.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Simple First Cognition Is Not Independent of a Second Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Capacity for speech is not self-objecthood

The ability to produce a report about a cognition does not prove cognition is its own object.

Treating that ability as the source of self-objecthood risks mutual dependence.

Shell-silver cognition produces activity even when it is invalid.

An erroneous act need not cease to be causal merely because its content is false.

KEY INSIGHT

Practical efficacy and cognitive validity are distinct questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Capacity for Usage Concerning Itself Is Not Self-objecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Guru-school analogy examined

An analogy with compound words aims to explain how cognition includes itself in a complex act.

The Naiyāyika denies that the first cognition forms an impression of itself.

A first cognition produces an impression and activity about its external object.

Subsequent cognition supplies usage and impression concerning the first cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The later cognition accounts for reflexive content without adding it to all initial perceptions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Capacity for Usage Concerning Itself Is Not Self-objecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

“I know that this is a pot”

The objection asks how a second qualified cognition can possess an earlier cognition as qualificand.

The reply places the qualified cognition before the destruction of the first one.

A gross present tense is perceived, not an indivisible instant.

A cognition serving as qualifier is thus available to the second mental cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The temporal sequence of cause, qualificand, and second cognition is explicitly analyzed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Justification of Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative structure of qualification

An alternative places cognitionhood and cognition within different layers of qualification.

One proposed later timing is rejected because its cause would then be absent.

The qualifierhood of cognitionhood occurs in cognition, and cognition in the self.

The argument is about where the qualificatory structure appears.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualified reflexive awareness requires a carefully specified qualifier–qualificand relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Explanation of Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBSEQUENT COGNITION

The twofold final account

- The first cognition is the object of a qualified subsequent cognition, not indeterminate cognition.
- The full causal complex gives rise to later awareness of that earlier cognition.
- The concluding description calls this subsequent cognition both determinate and indeterminate in different respects.
- The mixed image is compared in the source with Narasiṃha.

KEY INSIGHT

The final view accepts subsequent cognition without making every first cognition self-luminous.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion of the Theory of Subsequent Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the chapter establishes

First event

An object-cognition such as “This is a pot.”

Disputed thesis

Mīmāṃsaka self-objecthood and tripartite luminosity.

Naiyāyika result

A later mental cognition can know the first cognition.

Qualification


Its form and occurrence depend on specified causal conditions.

The source closes with a twofold description of the subsequent mental cognition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Indeterminate Cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Indeterminate Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

What makes a cognition indeterminate?



Initial distinction

Nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception.

Causal dispute

Does qualified cognition need cognition of its qualifier?

The first cow

First apprehension of cowness and the memory objection.

Relations and absence

Which perceptions remain intrinsically qualified?

Qualifiers and indicators

How a property delimits the intended object.

The text does not simply equate “indeterminate” with the absence of any object.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF INDETERMINATE COGNITION

Two forms of perceptual awareness

Indeterminate cognition does not apprehend a qualifier–qualificand relation.

Determinate cognition includes an object under a qualifying mode.

The source contrasts perception free of name or universal relations with qualified awareness.

The initial problem is whether an indeterminate cognition can be established at all.

KEY INSIGHT

A definition alone is not evidence that its proposed kind of cognition exists.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Indeterminate Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Challenge: how could we know it exists?

- Indeterminate cognition is described as supersensible, not directly self-perceived.
- Outward behavior is explained by determinate cognition, so it does not prove a distinct prior state.
- Reports of newly understanding a difference can reflect changes in knowledge of qualifiers.
- The objector demands a non-circular ground for positing indeterminate cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Epistemic access to an alleged cognitive stage is itself under examination.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Indeterminate Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference from qualified cognition

- Proposed inference: “This is a cow” depends on cognition of a qualifier.
- The stated reason is that this is a qualified cognition, like inference.
- The qualifier in the example is cowness; its causal apprehension is disputed.
- The inference aims to explain how a qualified result can first arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument moves from the form of a cognitive effect to its antecedent cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualified Cognition Is Produced by Cognition of a Qualifier

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Must every qualified awareness have prior qualifier-knowledge?

Objection: different causal complexes

- Perception involves appropriate sense–object contact.
- Inference employs subject-propertyhood; verbal cognition employs linguistic capacity.
- Comparison employs similarity, not one uniform prior event.

Reply: cognition of a qualifier in general

- The probandum, remembered word meaning, and similarity function as qualifiers.
- Different means have their own full causal complexes.
- The general cause need not be identical in every particular instance.

The dispute concerns a general causal type, not one identical episode for all pramāṇas.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Fire on the mountain: causal specificity

Cognition of fire alone does not automatically yield “The mountain has fire.”

The objector demands cognition of the delimiter of fire’s qualifier-status.

The reply accepts a cognition with the relevant delimiter as qualifier.

The complete causal complex prevents indiscriminate production of inferences.

KEY INSIGHT

General qualification is defended while preserving particular inferential conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection That Cognition of a Qualifier Is Not a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the proposed proof already established?

If recollection already produces qualified perception, the causal thesis proves what is known.

If a contemporaneous qualifier-cognition is required, inference can occur from recollection instead.

If specifically perceptual qualifier-knowledge is required, recognition becomes a counterexample.

The objection asks the proponent to fix the intended scope of the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

A defensible probandum must not collapse into triviality or into deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That the Inference Is Unestablished

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Whiteness and the regress objection

- A perception of a white thing may be analyzed through whiteness already recollected.
- General-characteristic contact is raised as an alternative to a new indeterminate event.
- A wholly unqualified cognition of whiteness is challenged as never separately experienced.
- This puts pressure on any inference that claims to establish an inaccessible preliminary cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The status of qualifier-knowledge is tested against familiar sensory examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That the Inference Is Unestablished

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The first qualified cognition after waking

An initial qualified awareness seems unable to depend on prior waking recollection of its qualifier.

The proponent posits an indeterminate apprehension to awaken a relevant impression.

If the fully qualified cognition itself performs that awakening, regress threatens.

The issue is the origin of the first determinate cognition in a sequence.

KEY INSIGHT

Explaining the first occurrence makes causal circularity especially visible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cause of the First Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How impressions become awakened

The reply denies a single fixed awakener for every retained impression.

Similarity, unseen merit, and mental reflection are given as possible awakeners.

A particular qualifier-cognition need not always activate an impression.

Repeated practice and later recollection can be explained without a universal awakener.

KEY INSIGHT

The source preserves a plural account of the causal conditions of memory.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cause of the First Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can “qualified cognition” be defined without circularity?

If indeterminate cognition is the excluded example, its existence must already be established.

Defining qualification as simply apprehending two objects proves too broad.

Making apprehension of qualifierhood essential can create another regress.

The proposed inferential proof risks depending on what it is meant to establish.

KEY INSIGHT

A technical definition cannot presuppose the cognition it is introduced to prove.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection to the Definition of Qualified Cognitionhood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood is not qualifierhood

- The objector distinguishes an object's being cognized from its functioning as qualifier.
- In "This is a cow," cowness appears without needing cowness qualified by another cowness.
- A third sort of perceptual cognition is rejected as an unproved multiplication.
- Showing that sight produces cognition does not by itself establish the indeterminate kind.

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects an easy slide from sense-causation to a distinct nirvikalpaka episode.

SOURCE TOPIC · Remaining Objection to the Definition of Qualified Cognitionhood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The first “This is a cow”

The siddhāntin treats first-time apprehension of cowness as perceptual.

Because prior recollection of cowness is absent, its qualification lacks full determinateness.

The first cognition is therefore indeterminate in one respect, not without a cow-object.

The account distinguishes experiencing cowness from recollecting it as a known qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

Indeterminateness here concerns an aspect of the first encounter, not an empty cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The First Perception “This Is a Cow” Is Indeterminate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The previous-birth memory objection

A child’s behavior may suggest impressions from a preceding birth.

The objection proposes that cowness too might be recollected from such impressions.

The reply asks for a specific awakener of that impression.

Sense-contact is held to favor present perception over recollection when its causes are complete.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply chooses direct first perception over an unsupported recollection of cowness.

SOURCE TOPIC · The First Perception “This Is a Cow” Is Indeterminate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cowness cannot qualify itself

A cognition cannot be its own producer and produced effect.

If cowness appeared as “cowness qualified by cowness,” another qualifier would be required.

Insisting every qualifier carry a further qualifier creates an infinite regress.

At some level a qualifying aspect must simply be apprehended without a further qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The termination of regress motivates an indeterminate aspect within perceptual knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualification by Cowness Does Not Appear in the Cognition “This Is a Cow”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why a qualification can be useful

A qualifying restriction can remove non-establishment of an inferential reason.

Another restriction can prevent deviation toward an unwanted negative instance.

“Staff-bearing man” shows how a relation distinguishes an object from rivals.

“This is a cow” distinguishes what has cowness from things lacking it.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification does inferential and discriminative work rather than decorating a judgment.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Qualification Is Proving and Useful

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An early cow cognition: two respects

Indeterminate aspect

- Cowness is newly perceived, not retrieved as a familiar qualifier.
- There is no infinite series of cowness qualifying cowness.
- The cognition is perceptual in its first emergence.

Determinate aspect

- A cow is presented as differing from non-cows.
- The object has cowness as its discriminating mode.
- Its relation to cowness can function in qualified cognition.

A single act can be characterized differently according to the aspect under examination.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence does not admit indeterminate cognition

To cognize absence, the counterpositive and its locus must be cognized.

“There is no pot on the ground” already has a relevant relational structure.

“The ground possesses absence of a pot” is explicitly qualified by locus and absence.

Absence is apprehended by appropriate relation to its locus, not by bare unqualified awareness.

KEY INSIGHT

The requirement of counterpositive and locus blocks a nirvikalpaka cognition of absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · There Is No Indeterminate Cognition of Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two modes: principal qualifier and indicator

The staff of a staff-bearing man functions as a principal qualifier.

A crow marking a particular house can function as an incidental indicator.

The distinction is not equivalent to physical presence versus absence.

Kuru lineage, an ascetic's hair, and a crow mark different identifying contexts.

KEY INSIGHT

A linguistic marker may help locate an object without qualifying it in the same sense.

SOURCE TOPIC · Modes Are of Two Kinds—Qualifiers and Incidental Indicators

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why “excluder” is not enough

- Both qualifiers and incidental indicators may distinguish one object from others.
- Matted hair and crow-marking can exclude alternatives while remaining incidental.
- Matching grammatical case endings do not settle which role a feature plays.
- Objecthood and exclusion must be tied to the intended relation of cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal role of an expression is not fixed by grammar or exclusion alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Qualifier Is Not Merely an Excluder

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The crow-marked house and the Ganges bank

- The crow-marked house is identified through a feature that may later disappear.
- The expressed crow-relation can guide cognition toward Devadatta's particular house.
- "A village on the Ganges" involves a relevant bank, not the entire river current.
- The source invokes secondary signification to explain reference through indicators.

KEY INSIGHT

A sign can direct us to its intended object without being the principal qualifying property.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Incidental Indicator Must Be an Object of Qualified Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Direct relation cannot decide everything

Śivāditya Miśra associates direct relation with qualification and a chain with indication.

Blue color and lotus illustrate his proposed direct relation.

But an attribute of a handsome moving cow may be incidental despite direct relation.

A crystal appearing red can involve an indirect relation while redness qualifies it.

KEY INSIGHT

Counterexamples defeat a definition based solely on direct versus mediated connection.

SOURCE TOPIC · View of Śivāditya Miśra—A Direct Relatum Is the Qualifier

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gangeśa's reply: delimiting the locus

- A principal qualifier delimits the knowable object's status as locus of exclusion.
- In "staff-bearing man," the staff-bearing relation supplies that delimitation.
- In "crow-marked house," the relevant house can be identified without the crow.
- The crow therefore remains an incidental indicator rather than the principal qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualifierhood is assigned by a specific delimiting function, not by incidental association.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Reply—A Qualifier Delimits the Locushood of Exclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Udayana and alternative definitions

- Udayana examines an excluder co-located with the exclusion that identifies the object.
- The closing alternatives also appeal to the relevant relatum of an intended relation.
- “Bring the staff-bearing man” and “Devadatta’s crow-marked house” test these forms.
- The chapter ends with multiple technical formulations of qualifier and incidental indicator.

KEY INSIGHT

The source keeps several precise formulations rather than replacing them with one slogan.

SOURCE TOPIC · Support from Udayanācārya; Conclusion—Alternative Definitions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What indeterminate cognition explains

The difficulty

A first qualifier cannot always come from recollection.

The response

A first perception can be indeterminate in one aspect.

The limit

Absence is apprehended through a qualified relation.

The refinement


Qualifierhood depends on the relevant delimiting role.

End of the source chapter on indeterminate cognition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · PRATYAKṢA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Determinate Cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 1 · Pratyakṣa-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Determinate Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From recognition to the status of memory



Qualified perception

“This is a cow” includes a real universal.

Recognition

“This cow is that same cow.”

The indexicals

What are “thisness” and “thatness”?

Recollection

Impressions and the object of memory.

Determination

The source’s closing challenge to memory’s validity.

The final passage explicitly marks the end of the Perception Section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Determinate cognition and universals

"This is a cow" is qualified perception, with cowness as a real universal.

The sense organ's contact with the object produces this perceptual cognition.

Recognition can add identity with a previously experienced individual.

An impression can assist recognition without displacing sensory causality.

KEY INSIGHT

A determinate presentation may be both perceptual and informed by memory.

SOURCE TOPIC · Determinate Cognition as Perception and Recognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF DETERMINATE COGNITION

Can “this” and “that” occur in one cognition?

The objector claims “this” is immediate while “that” is mediated.

Combining them seems to confer contrary temporal or epistemic characters.

The reply denies that recognition is thereby divided into two cognitions.

Because it arises through a sense organ, recognition can be accepted as immediate.

KEY INSIGHT

Mixed present recognition and remembered identity need not form contradictory acts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Determinate Cognition Is One Cognition and Includes Recognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Recognition: the alleged contradiction

Objection

- “This” belongs to present, immediate apprehension.
- “That” seems supplied from past mediated awareness.
- One cognition allegedly cannot possess both forms.

Naiyāyika reply

- Memory supplies a relevant qualifier of the same object.
- Sense contact makes the recognizing cognition immediate.
- One thing can stand in relations to distinct times and places.

The response distinguishes a single cognition from the routes by which its aspects are supplied.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Thatness is not just a past-time label

Recognition can concern an object known as itself even across temporal references.

A past-tensed inference about a visible jar need not produce “that jar” usage.

Merely belonging to the past is insufficient to explain recognized identity.

The source subjects several simple definitions of “thatness” to counterexamples.

KEY INSIGHT

Indexical reference in recognition must be explained more exactly than by a time label.

SOURCE TOPIC · The “Thatness” Is Not Merely a Description of Past Time

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rejected: object of an earlier experience

One proposal defines “that” as whatever was known in a previous cognition.

Yet inference may establish past experience without producing “this is that” recognition.

Doubt and contrary cognition about “thatness” may remain.

Requiring another cognition to establish former experience threatens extra dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

Past-experienced-objecthood alone does not fix the pronoun “that.”

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View That Being the Object of Past Experience Is Thatness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rejected: possession of a past property

A second proposal defines thatness through a past property of the object.

But a presently cognized property may later become past without being recognized then as “that.”

Present experience does not present the property as already past.

Inference of an earlier property would over-generate the pronoun “that.”

KEY INSIGHT

The temporal status of a property is not identical with its role in recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View That Thatness Is Qualification by a Past Property

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rejected: thisness as a unique property

A distinctive property of an object may also be established by inference.

Yet inferential discovery of that property does not itself license “this” usage.

The word’s denotatum cannot be restricted to objects of one pramāṇa alone.

The account considers, and rejects, thisness as mere direct-perception objecthood.

KEY INSIGHT

A simple unique-property theory fails to explain the use of the demonstrative “this.”

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View That Thisness Is a Quality Occurring Only in This Object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rejected: independent thisness and thatness

Some scholars make thisness and thatness indivisible superimposed adjuncts.

On their account a memory-impression transforms thisness into thatness.

The source asks how such an unexperienced transformation could be remembered.

An economical account recalls the object as the very same object.

KEY INSIGHT

Recognized identity need not require a newly posited pair of irreducible adjuncts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Thatness and Thisness Are Not Indivisible Adjuncts

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why one cow can be “this” and “that”

The direct encounter and later recollection refer to one and the same object.

The remembered aspect motivates “that,” while perception motivates “this.”

The difference concerns the temporal manner of presentation, not two separate cows.

The impression assists the later recognition of identity.

KEY INSIGHT

Object identity remains stable while cognitive presentation changes.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika Reply—Use of the Pronoun “That” in Memory

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gangeśa’s conclusion about thatness

- The decisive account ties thatness to pastness of a property qualifying the object.
- Memory can present that qualification even if it was not separately noticed before.
- The original “This is a pot” need not recur as an identically worded memory.
- One and the same object can underwrite differing remembered and present forms.

KEY INSIGHT

Sameness of the object does not entail sameness in cognitive form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Thatness Is Pastness; Nature of Memory

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why an impression matters

An impression is the extraordinary causal condition of the later recollection.

The text distinguishes memory from direct experience through that causal route.

Its validity is linked indirectly to the source experience rather than newly established truth.

The discussion expressly denies memory the standing of a separate means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Memory's causal origin and its epistemic status must be assessed separately.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Thatness Is Pastness; Nature of Memory

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The alternate challenge: memory presents the now

An alternative thesis says memory presents its object together with presentness.

A pot once black and now red illustrates mistaken current predication.

An agent who seeks fire ordinarily needs a cognition of present, not merely past, fire.

The reasoning asks whether an impression can support present-tense content.

KEY INSIGHT

A recollected object can be mispresented as now possessing an earlier property.

SOURCE TOPIC · Erroneous Memory Takes Presentness as Its Object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Final argument: memory is erroneous

The concluding account treats a remembered object as presented under presentness.

The cognition “That pot is in the house” can guide unhesitating activity.

Presentness qualifies the recollective aggregate, not each constituent separately.

On this analysis, memory is called erroneous rather than a fresh pramāṇa.

KEY INSIGHT

This is the conclusion as given in the translated passage, including its nonstandard sharpness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Memory Is Merely Erroneous

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why earlier existence does not prove present truth

- The claim “it was once black” cannot vindicate “this is black” after the pot turns red.
- The memory’s content must be judged by the qualification it actually presents.
- Merely locating a property at an earlier time does not remove current misqualification.
- The passage closes by questioning the alleged veridicality of memory.

KEY INSIGHT

Temporal qualification determines whether a remembered judgment can count as true.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion—Memory Is Merely Erroneous

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

End of the Perception Section

Perception

Qualified cognition may include real universals.

Recognition

One present object is known as the formerly experienced one.

Thatness

The source derives its force from pastness and impression.

Memory


The final passage challenges memory as veridical cognition.

The DOCX explicitly ends the Perception Section here and begins Inference next.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Exposition of Inferential Cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Exposition of Inferential Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

A new pramāṇa: the inferential route

I

Transition

Inference follows the exposition of perception.

II

Definition

The reason, subject-propertyhood, and pervasion.

III

Skeptical challenge

Could smoke deviate from fire?

IV

Refutation

The invalidity claim undermines itself.

V

Requirement

Cognition of pervasion is indispensable.

This opening unit is short in the source; its slides keep the argument's actual scale.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

From perception to inference

The work explicitly begins inference after completing perception.

Inferential cognition is produced by knowledge of a reason in a subject.

That reason must be cognized as qualified by pervasion or invariable concomitance.

The relevant extraordinary cause is called the means of inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Inference requires more than a merely noticed mark: it needs the appropriate known linkage.

SOURCE TOPIC · Exposition of Inferential Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

Reason, pervasion, and reflection

The source distinguishes the reason from its role in inferential reflection.

A reason must be known as a property belonging to the subject.

Knowledge of the reason’s pervasion by the probandum assists the inference.

The text promises later detail on the means of inference as subsumptive reflection.

KEY INSIGHT

Subsumption connects the observed reason with an invariable probandum relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Exposition of Inferential Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

The skeptic’s smoke–fire challenge

- A skeptic doubts whether every instance of smoke must be accompanied by fire.
- The possibility of overlooked extraneous conditions, such as air or mind, is raised.
- Repeatedly finding smoke with fire may still leave doubt about deviation elsewhere.
- Speech about mountain-fire could be possibility rather than verified inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Observational repetition alone does not silence the skeptical question about vyāpti.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That Inference Is Not a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is inference a valid means of knowledge?

Prima facie objection

- A mediate judgment can arise from an unproven generalization.
- Unobserved conditioning factors may defeat the proposed concomitance.
- Apparent certainty can reflect a misleading appearance of proof.

Reply

- The attempt to prove invalidity itself uses inference.
- A declaration about another person’s doubt is not self-evident perception.
- Denying all inference also threatens the assessment of perception’s validity.

The reply turns the skeptic’s epistemic claim back upon its own grounds.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

Why universal invalidity is self-defeating

The claim that inference resembles error depends on drawing an inference.

The opponent’s doubt or error is not directly accessible as the listener’s own perception.

If all inference is invalid, the invalidity argument cannot establish its conclusion.

If inference has validity, the blanket denial is contradicted.

KEY INSIGHT

A global rejection of inferential warrant cannot use that very warrant unchecked.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Perception too needs assessment

The reply says that validity of perception itself must be established by inference.

If its validity were automatically known from causes, doubt about perception could not arise.

The opponent therefore cannot preserve perception while rejecting inference altogether.

The pramāṇas are examined with attention to mutual epistemic dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

The chapter refuses a sharp exemption for perception from all inferential verification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

The necessary cognition of pervasion

The probandum must be known to pervade the inferential reason.

Such knowledge functions as an efficient cause of inferential cognition.

The text points forward to a separate inquiry into how pervasion is apprehended.

This transition introduces the detailed following chapter on vyāpti.

KEY INSIGHT

The next chapter is motivated by a precise causal requirement within inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Proof of Cognition of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

EXPOSITION OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION

What the opening establishes

Object

Inferential cognition of a probandum in a subject.

Reason

The subject possesses the known inferential mark.

Link

Pervasion connects the mark with what is inferred.

Question ahead


What counts as pervasion and how can it be known?

The source closes this exposition before opening the Discussion of Pervasion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Discussion of Pervasion (Vyāptivāda)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded exposition of the arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Discussion of Pervasion (Vyāptivāda)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Vyāpti: a definition under pressure



Five candidates

Failure in purely affirmative inference.

Further alternatives

Siṃha, Vyāghra, and special absence.

Co-location proposals

Against several forms of common-locus relation.

Extraneous conditions

The teacher's proposal and its difficulties.

Rival theories

Līlāvatī, natural relation, and twofold pervasion.

This is the prima facie discussion; the definitive definition begins in the following source chapter.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why define pervasion?

Inferential cognition requires knowledge that the probandum pervades the reason.

The discussion asks what makes that pervasion an invariable relation.

Pervasion is not simply the assertion that a reason does not deviate.

A technical definition must survive purely affirmative examples and specific loci.

KEY INSIGHT

The chapter works by exposing where proposed criteria fail.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Mere Non-deviation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Five proposed definitions: I–II

First: the reason does not occur in a locus lacking the probandum.

Second: the reason does not occur in a locus of such absence distinct from a probandum-locus.

Both rest on characterizing absence of the probandum in a relevant locus.

Their scope is tested against purely affirmative inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The source regards these as candidates, not adopted conclusions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Five Definitions of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Five proposed definitions: III–V

Third: the reason has a locus distinct from the locus of a relevant mutual absence.

Fourth: it is the counterpositive of an absence in every locus lacking the probandum.

Fifth: the reason does not occur in a place distinct from the probandum-locus.

None provides a general account when the probandum is purely affirmative.

KEY INSIGHT

Definitions framed through negative loci are vulnerable where those loci cannot be supplied.

SOURCE TOPIC · Five Definitions of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The purely affirmative counterexample

> “This is nameable because it is knowable” has a purely affirmative probandum.

> An absence of nameability of the required kind cannot supply every negative definition.

> The five definitions therefore under-extend even though the inference is intended as valid.

> The result closes the first set of proposed definitions.

KEY INSIGHT

A genuine inferential linkage must cover the affirmative case, not only a familiar smoke–fire pattern.

SOURCE TOPIC · Five Definitions of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Siṃha and Vyāghra: two alternatives

One formulation excludes the reason from the locus of absence of reason–probandum co-location.

Another excludes it from a locus of their non-co-location.

Both finally rely on non-occurrence outside a specified probandum locus.

The source says they fail for purely affirmative cases and distinct fire–smoke loci.

KEY INSIGHT

Relabeling absence and co-location does not automatically solve under-extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definitions of Pervasion Stated by Siṃha and Vyāghra

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sauṇḍada's special-absence proposal

A proposed repair invokes an absence with counterpositiveness delimited through another locus.

The test case remains nameability inferred from knowability in a jar.

The proposal aims to block the alleged deviation of knowability from nameability.

It distinguishes the locus of an absence from the property delimiting its counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

The strategy is to refine the relational type of absence rather than abandon absence entirely.

SOURCE TOPIC · Section on an Absence Determining Counterpositiveness Delimited by a Property Occurring in a Different Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the special absence is rejected

- The reply denies that a property absent from the counterpositive can delimit counterpositiveness.
- Cognition of an absence requires a properly qualified cognition of its counterpositive.
- Otherwise a bare indeterminate object would yield unwarranted absence-cognition.
- “No hare’s horn” is analyzed as absence of a horn in a hare, not as an arbitrary absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The semantics of counterpositive, delimitation, and locus constrain negative knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Absence Whose Counterpositiveness Is Delimited by a Property Occurring in a Different Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common-locus proposal

Another candidate ties pervasion to co-location of reason and probandum.

It adds a condition about absence of their co-location in an appropriate locus.

Ether and purely affirmative nameability test the proposed exception.

The reply says the account still fails for knowability and some smoke–fire cases.

KEY INSIGHT

A co-located pair does not by itself yield an invariant pervader–pervaded relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Further Prima Facie Definitions of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Fire on the mountain; smoke in the kitchen

A mountain-fire is distinct from the fire associated with kitchen-smoke.

A proposed definition using absolute absence in the reason’s locus then becomes too restrictive.

The same issue reaches other non-pervasive properties such as conjunction.

The source tests the difference between a universal fire condition and an individual fire.

KEY INSIGHT

Reason and probandum must not be reduced to the same individual at each instance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Co-location with the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mutual absence and divided loci

A tree's lower part can lack the monkey-contact possessed by another part.

A tree can thus support qualified positive and negative relational claims.

The proposed mutual-absence-based definition does not capture the desired pervasion.

The criticism also scrutinizes the semantic relation conveyed by the technical compound.

KEY INSIGHT

Partial, spatially delimited relations resist a simple mutual-absence test.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Residing in What Possesses the Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A further failure of co-location

The last co-location proposal invokes absence of co-location across properties of reason-loci.

A purely affirmative probandum such as knowability defeats the general rule.

In mixed affirmative–negative settings, fire and its absences expose further failure.

Even smoke in a sound mountain–fire inference would fall outside the definition.

KEY INSIGHT

No definition is adequate if it excludes a standard inference of fire from smoke.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Co-location with the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The teacher’s extraneous-condition proposal

- Pervasion is proposed as a co-location free from an extraneous condition (*upādhi*).
- An extraneous condition pervades the probandum without pervading the reason.
- This is meant to distinguish proper pervasion from a misleading conditional linkage.
- The passage turns to delicate issues of counterpositiveness and locushood.

KEY INSIGHT

Upādhi supplies a causal-logical restriction, but its exact delimitation needs testing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is a Relation Free from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Counterpositive is a technical relation

- Counterpositiveness is not just the impossibility of two things coexisting.
- Cowhood and horsehood illustrate why simple incompatibility is insufficient.
- Counterpositiveness and locushood have distinct relations to their correlates.
- The source also mentions treating counterpositiveness through absence of an absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The refined ontology of absence is indispensable to the proposed pervasion definition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is a Relation Free from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why unrestricted freedom from upādhi fails

An asserted absence of extraneous condition cannot simply be ascribed to smoke in general.

The objection distinguishes properties pervading the general and particular probandum.

Jarhood and knowability challenge an overly broad distribution of the rule.

The response resists treating different loci as if they proved one identical absence.

KEY INSIGHT

A purported general criterion cannot be secured merely by shifting between particular and generic loci.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is a Relation Free from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Wet fuel as a counterexample

The reverse inference “Fire implies smoke” is defective without further conditions.

Conjunction with wet fuel is invoked in the source as a proposed extraneous condition.

Alternative definitions may incorrectly classify the condition as harmless.

The kitchen example shows how special cases can distort a general criterion.

KEY INSIGHT

The text rejects formulations that would validate an inference attended by an upādhi.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is a Relation Free from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Līlāvatī: “complete relation” is inadequate

A total relation of every reason to every probandum cannot hold for individual fires.

A particular fire on a mountain is not the fire in each smoky kitchen.

Even “co-location with every probandum” faces a heated-iron counterexample.

Defining pervasion by all properties sharing a locus is also unworkable.

KEY INSIGHT

Pervasion is not complete co-presence of all individual tokens.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of the Author of the Līlāvatī: Pervasion Is Not a Relation of Totality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Natural relation: two competing meanings

The commentator’s account describes pervasion as a natural reason–probandum relation.

Naturalness might mean production from the nature of the reason.

Or it might mean dependence on that nature.

The translated critique argues under-extension under one reading and over-extension under the other.

KEY INSIGHT

A slogan about “natural relation” leaves the delimiting condition ambiguous.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Commentator’s View: Pervasion Is Not a Natural Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why mere relation cannot be vyāpti

- Co-location exists even for a deviant reason, such as existence in a problematic inference.
- Generic awareness of relation does not suffice to cause inferential cognition.
- Nor does mere co-location license ordinary use of the technical word “pervasion.”
- The discussion separates the object of definition from the basis of its application.

KEY INSIGHT

An unqualified relation is too indiscriminate to do inference’s work.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Mere Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Some thinkers propose two kinds of pervasion

Purely affirmative inference

- Pervasion is a relation to a purely affirmative probandum.
- No negative locus is required in this case.
- Its causal role is assigned to a specific kind of inference.

Inference with a negative probandum

- Pervasion is non-occurrence in a locus distinct from the probandum.
- A different causal type is assigned to this case.
- The view keeps the special causal complex of each inference.

This is a reported rival account and is subjected to refutation in the next passage.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the two-kind theory

Smoke in a kitchen differs in locus from fire on the mountain.

That fact defeats non-occurrence outside the given locus of the probandum.

Restricting the rule to every locus of fire creates further counterexamples.

The view depends on reasonhood and probandumhood that the definition is supposed to establish.

KEY INSIGHT

The dual scheme still fails to isolate the universal logical linkage.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View of Some Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The problem of self-dependence

- The proposed definition needs “reason” and “probandum” to be identified in advance.
- Yet these logical roles themselves depend on whether pervasion has been established.
- Defining pervasion through roles defined by pervasion creates self-dependence.
- The concluding objection asks how a learner could evaluate definitions without grasping the linkage.

KEY INSIGHT

A stable definition must avoid presupposing the very inferential relation under investigation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View of Some Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Where the chapter actually stops

This unit ends with the *prima facie* account of pervasion.

The various candidate definitions have been tested and rejected or qualified.

No fully final definition is declared at the end of this unit.

The next DOCX heading is “The Definitive Definition of Pervasion.”

KEY INSIGHT

The boundary between pūrvapakṣa and the subsequent siddhānta is preserved.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Prima Facie Account of Pervasion is concluded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From failed definitions to the next chapter

Five definitions

Negative-locus versions miss purely affirmative inference.

Alternative absences

Special counterpositive relations also face objections.

Co-location

Token-level common occurrence is insufficient.

Upādhi and rivals


Proposals are evaluated, not yet universally accepted.

The following presentation must treat the definitive definition separately.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Definitive Definition of Pervasion (Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Text-grounded exposition of the arguments, challenges, replies, and conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Definitive Definition of Pervasion (Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From invariable relation to a defensible definition

I

Definitive lakṣaṇa

Co-location and restrictions on counterpositiveness.

II

General and particular

Universal firehood versus particular fires.

III

Testing special forms

Mutual absence and apparent counterexamples.

IV

Extraneous conditions

Freedom from upādhi and asymmetric concomitance.

V

Delimitors

Relatedness, smokehood, and the four reasons.

The chapter first states a siddhānta and then tests several technically distinct restatements.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established definition (section 16)

Gaṅgeśa begins from the co-location of the reason (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya).

A restriction prevents a spurious absolute absence, occurring with the reason, from negating the probandum.

The definition invokes a delimiter of counterpositiveness, not simple empirical coexistence.

The source immediately marks this as the definitive definition of pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

Pervasion is an invariable connection specified so that apparent negative instances are correctly excluded.

SOURCE TOPIC · Siddhānta-lakṣaṇa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The role of absolute absence

An absolute absence has a counterpositive: what would be present if the absence were removed.

The technical definition specifies which counterpositiveness is delimited by which property.

The mere absence of a particular fire is not automatically absence of fire in general.

In a valid smoke–fire case, the relevant general absence of fire is not established at the smoke-locus.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between a particular absence and universal absence protects legitimate inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definitive Definition of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Particular fire versus firehood

A particular fire

- A particular fire may be absent where another particular fire occurs.
- Such absence is delimited by that individual fire.
- It need not disprove a relation involving firehood.

Fire in general

- Firehood delimits the universal positive property.
- “No fire at all” is distinct from “not this fire.”
- Smoke does not occupy a locus established as fireless in general.

The generic and the particular must not be interchanged in the counterpositive.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the color-in-air example matters

Suppose the absences of every familiar particular color in air have been ascertained.

That does not entail an already established absence of color in general.

The questions “Is there color in air?” and “Is air a locus of color?” may still arise.

The same logical gap appears between particular fire-absences and firehood-absence.

KEY INSIGHT

A finite inventory of absent instances does not itself settle the absence of a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Pervasion in General

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The special pervasion of a particular reason

An alternative definition relates a particular reason to a particular probandum in its own locus.

The particular probandum is not counterpositive to its absolute absence within that same reason-locus.

The account also reformulates the condition using the mutual absence of loci.

This is termed viśeṣa-vyāpti: pervasion indexed to particular reason and probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

The special definition asks: exactly which pervasion belongs to which reason?

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion of a Particular Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Smoke and fire in different loci

A particular fire in a kitchen is not the particular fire on a smoky mountain.

An absence of the mountain-fire at the kitchen need not erase firehood.

One particular smoke and a spatially remote particular fire do not pervade one another.

The source requires co-location for the pervasion of the intended particulars.

KEY INSIGHT

Cross-locus similarity must not be mistaken for the pervasion of two particular individuals.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion of a Particular Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How general pervasion survives

- An opponent worries that the special definition loses the general pervasion of smoke by fire.
- The reply links the respective particular relations to the general terms smoke and fire.
- The general claim is thus not abandoned when the individual relation is distinguished.
- The source also discusses simultaneous arising and perishing as a case of mutual pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

A particular-level account need not make generic inference impossible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion of a Particular Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Counterexample: existence and conjunction

Consider: “This possesses conjunction because it exists.”

Existence may occur in action, while conjunction does not.

The absence of conjunction occurs where the reason existence is found.

This tests whether the first special definition is over-extended.

KEY INSIGHT

The definition must reject a reason whose occurrence reaches beyond the proposed probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Justification of the Special Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refining the absence condition

To handle the existence–conjunction counterexample, the absolute-absence clause is further qualified.

The discussion focuses on the delimitor of absence of co-location with its counterpositive.

In action, conjunction and its absence illustrate the need for precisely delimited occurrence.

The refinement is internal to the special definition, not a new empirical generalization.

KEY INSIGHT

Navya-Nyāya refines the type of absence, rather than merely adding exceptions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Justification of the Special Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The monkey and the tree

The text tests the proposal: “This tree has conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree.”

The locus of conjunction with a monkey can be related non-pervasively.

A cognition of identity with that locus—or absence of difference—can still be veridical.

The bahuvrīhi compound need not silently assume a known relation of pervaded and pervader.

KEY INSIGHT

A definition of pervasion must not contain the very pervasion it is meant to define.

SOURCE TOPIC · Justification of the Special Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Preventing circular definition

The term for the probandum can signify a real cognized relation, not an already cognized pervadingness.

Otherwise a definition of pervasion would presuppose pervasion.

The source defends the word “itself” in the special formulation.

Its subject is precisely the non-common pervasion of a particular individual reason.

KEY INSIGHT

The technical grammar of the definition matters to avoiding petitio principii.

SOURCE TOPIC · Justification of the Special Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apparent absence of fire and lake

An opponent proposes two cognitions: no fire and no lake in a smoke-locus; and the locus of neither.

These appear to threaten definitions using absolute and mutual absence.

The reply rejects the proposed complex absences as formulated.

Even if allowed, their counterpositives would be the lake or fiery lake, not fire as alleged.

KEY INSIGHT

The type and counterpositive of a complex absence cannot be inferred from surface wording.

SOURCE TOPIC · Removal of Inapplicability

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Revising the teacher’s definition: upādhi

Gaṅgeśa reconsiders an earlier teacher’s formulation of pervasion.

Pervasion may be redescribed as the reason’s freedom from an extraneous condition (upādhi).

The revision uses the co-location of reason and probandum and a suitably delimited absence.

The problem is not whether an auxiliary condition exists, but whether it vitiates the connection.

KEY INSIGHT

Freedom from an extraneous condition becomes a disciplined alternative characterization.

SOURCE TOPIC · Revision of the Teacher’s Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conditional fire-to-smoke inference

- Compare “The mountain has smoke because it has fire” with smoke-to-fire inference.
- Fire can occur without smoke: the example does not establish an unrestricted vyāpti.
- Conjunction with wet fuel functions in the text as an extraneous condition.
- The alleged reason must be tested for deviation outside the additional condition.

KEY INSIGHT

The converse of a valid smoke–fire pervasion need not be valid.

SOURCE TOPIC · Revision of the Teacher’s Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An alternative formulation of freedom

The reason is described as avoiding co-location with certain absolute absences.

The counterpositive conditions are specified relative to an absence connected with the probandum.

The fire-to-smoke example again makes clear why wet-fuel conjunction matters.

This reformulation concerns a precise logical relation, not simply saying “no exception.”

KEY INSIGHT

The target is the relation of the reason to the probandum under an appropriate limiter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Definition of Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion as a delimiting relatedness

Another definition identifies pervasion with relatedness to a particular probandum.

In smoke-to-fire inference, smokehood delimits the relevant co-location with fire.

In fire-to-smoke inference, firehood does not delimit such an invariable relation.

Fire can also relate to smokeless instances, so the broader inference fails.

KEY INSIGHT

The delimitor, not bare co-occurrence, explains the asymmetry of good inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of the Form of the Delimitor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Not every shared property is a delimitor

Over-pervasive properties such as knowability or conjunction are not delimiting conditions of smoke–fire pervasion.

For fire linked to wet fuel, the specially qualified reason may support a smoke relation.

This does not license a relation from firehood in general to smoke.

The technical term “delimitor” identifies the property underwriting the intended relatedness.

KEY INSIGHT

Relevant specificity matters: arbitrary properties cannot make a deviant reason pervaded.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of the Form of the Delimitor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The second relatedness formulation

An alternative says the reason's nature is delimited by what delimits co-location with the probandum.

In "smoke, therefore fire," smokehood delimits the co-location.

In "fire, therefore smoke," wet-fuel conjunction—not firehood—is the needed restriction.

The source again distinguishes an unrestricted reason from its qualified form.

KEY INSIGHT

Pervasion can be stated through the property that fixes the scope of the relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Delimited by the Delimitor of Co-location

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Four reasons: Prābhākara proposals

- The subsequent catuṣṭaya offers four linked propositions concerning extraneous conditions.
- It compares a property delimiting reasonhood with one delimiting the relation to the probandum.
- Examples include cowhood from horsehood and the status of a coextensive qualification.
- Its central question is how an additional condition renders a deviating reason non-indicative.

KEY INSIGHT

The section exposes how different definitions of upādhi can disagree on the same case.

SOURCE TOPIC · Four Reasons (Ata Eva Catuṣṭaya)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What makes an extraneous condition vitiating?

One proposal identifies an upādhi as pervading the probandum without pervading the reason.

Another tries to locate it in a qualification coextensive with the intended relation.

The final discussion rejects calling every merely related or purposeless property an upādhi.

A condition's epistemic harm lies in its capacity to make deviation known.

KEY INSIGHT

Upādhi is not a label for any extra property; it is tied to the defeasibility of the reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Four Reasons (Ata Eva Catuṣṭaya)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What this definitive account establishes

Core relation

Pervasion involves qualified co-location of reason and probandum.

Logical precision

Absence, counterpositive and delimitor must be specified.

Particular and general

A particular connection need not negate generic inference.

Upādhi test


The reason must withstand the charge of deviation.

The chapter closes the discussion of pervasion by testing the definitions against difficult examples.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Means of Apprehending Pervasion (Vyāptigrahopāya)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Text-grounded exposition of the arguments, challenges, replies, and conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Means of Apprehending Pervasion (Vyāptigrahopāya)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

How do we come to know vyāpti?

I

Prābhākara objections

Why repetition and impressions are challenged.

II

Rival methods

Tarka, universal-contact, and absence of upādhi.

III

Single observation

The Prābhākara conclusion and its difficulties.

IV

Naiyāyika refutation

Why doubt about deviation is decisive.

V

Siddhānta

Concomitance plus absence of cognition of deviation.

The question is acquisition of justified pervasion-knowledge, not just the definition of pervasion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Problem: the cognitive route to pervasion

Inference requires cognition of an invariable relation between reason and probandum.

The section asks which process can yield such cognition.

The Prābhākara interlocutor initially doubts that repeated observations provide a causal unity.

The debate distinguishes the observation of co-presence from certainty of non-deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

Many observed coincidences do not automatically show necessary concomitance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View: Repeated Observation Is Not a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara objection to repetition

- Each observation of reason and probandum is a distinct, momentary event.
- No single moment contains the whole past series as a unified observation.
- The objector denies that simply multiplying observations explains cognition of pervasion.
- This is an argument about the causal power of repetitive perception.

KEY INSIGHT

An accumulation of perceptions still needs an account of how it makes an invariable relation known.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation Is Not a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can an impression unite observations?

A proposed reply uses an impression formed by repeated observations and aided by sense perception.

Recognition and recollection do involve impressions of earlier objects.

The objector argues that such impressions cannot by themselves establish a relation among distinct objects.

The jar–cloth example warns against indiscriminately transferring a memory impression.

KEY INSIGHT

Impressions explain memory, but a separate argument is needed to establish general concomitance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation Is Not a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three definitions of “repeated observation”

Repeated observation might mean seeing the same reason–probandum pair in many places.

Or it may mean seeing many reasons together with many probanda.

Or it may mean many encounters with the same reason and probandum.

The text challenges whether any such formula specifies what is sufficient to know vyāpti.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither the number nor the distribution of observations alone settles the epistemic issue.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation of a Relation Cannot Be Defined

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earth and iron scratching: difficult example

The source considers inference of earthhood from being scratchable with iron.

Even hundreds of observed co-occurrences may not establish the required pervasion.

The example tests the gap between frequent association and a necessary relation.

It undercuts simplistic induction by counting cases.

KEY INSIGHT

Repetition is not sufficient if the inferential connection remains defective.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation of a Relation Cannot Be Defined

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Hypothetical reasoning plus repetition

Naiyāyika proposal

- Repeat observation of a reason alongside its probandum.
- Use hypothetical reasoning (tarka) to reject a supposed deviation.
- Then ascertain pervasion.

Prābhākara response

- If tarka does the crucial work, what does repetition contribute?
- A skilled thinker may reason at an initial joint observation.
- If tarka already depends on vyāpti, regress threatens.

The objection presses on both redundancy and infinite regress.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The infant and the problem of regress

- A newborn infant’s suckling and avoidance behavior is introduced as an inferential example.
- The proposed point is that some inferences occur without explicit hypothetical reasoning.
- The Prābhākaras continue to question whether tarka can create pervasion-knowledge.
- The section asks whether tarka has a universal or merely occasional role.

KEY INSIGHT

An explanation of first inference cannot rely on endless prior inferential steps.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation Assisted by Hypothetical Reasoning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Generic-character contact as a proposal

The Naiyāyika appeals to generic-character contact for comprehending many instances.

A universal can be cognized beyond one encountered individual.

This seems to provide a route from particular observation toward general pervasion.

The Prābhākara interlocutor resists importing a special contact when universal cognition suffices.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute concerns whether generality requires a distinct kind of perceptual contact.

SOURCE TOPIC · Generic-Character Contact Is Not a Means

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The crow-and-palm coincidence

A reason and probandum may appear together by accidental co-presence.

Further sightings do not necessarily remove doubt that the co-occurrence is accidental.

A second or third instance need not be a decisive epistemic threshold.

The case distinguishes observed succession from justified invariance.

KEY INSIGHT

The problem of coincidence remains even if observations multiply.

SOURCE TOPIC · Generic-Character Contact Is Not a Means

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Upādhi: removing a hidden condition

The Naiyāyika may require knowledge that an apparent concomitance lacks an extraneous condition.

A jar or other co-present object might be suspected of providing the missing condition.

Repeated observation may reveal that it does not pervade the probandum.

The Prābhākara asks whether this can be established without a further inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Knowledge of freedom from upādhi is not automatically available from a single scene.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation and Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The regress in knowing absence of upādhi

An imperceptible extraneous condition cannot be ruled out by sight alone.

If ruling it out depends on inference, that inference requires its own known pervasion.

Requiring prior inference to establish every upādhi-absence threatens infinite regress.

This is why the Prābhākara rejects that criterion as an independent cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The precondition for knowing pervasion must not presuppose new pervasion-knowledge endlessly.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation and Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Repetition without a fixed number

The debate considers cases where further joint observation removes doubt.

Only as much observation as produces the relevant clarification could be needed.

Neither a fixed count nor an uninterrupted succession is required on this proposal.

The Prābhākara nevertheless disputes that repetition always removes deviation-doubt.

KEY INSIGHT

Observation is evaluated by its epistemic work, not a numerical rule.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repeated Observation and Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara conclusion: one encounter

The interlocutor denies that either senses or impressions generated by repetition supply the missing cause.

By exclusion, the first joint observation is proposed as the means of apprehending pervasion.

The claim is not that all later doubt disappears automatically.

It depends on a particular account of absence and qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position assigns decisive causal priority to the initial joint perception.

SOURCE TOPIC · Single Observation Is the Means

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of upādhi as locus alone

The Prābhākara construes absence of an extraneous condition as no separate entity beyond its locus.

The reason smoke can itself serve as the locus qualified by that absence.

An eye or another sense grasps the locus at the first observation.

The proponent denies that the counterpositive upādhi must be known first.

KEY INSIGHT

The ontological reduction of absence supports the one-observation thesis.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of an Extraneous Condition Is the Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does this license impossible pervasions?

An objection compares inference of fire from smoke with inference of fire from a donkey in a smoke-locus.

The Prābhākara replies that the causal complex of pervasion is not present for the donkey.

Cognition of the locus alone can support appropriate usage only with the proper conditions.

The argument distinguishes a real pervaded reason from arbitrary co-located entities.

KEY INSIGHT

A merely nearby object cannot become a universal inferential sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of an Extraneous Condition Is the Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Doubt after initial knowledge

Objection: if pervasion is settled at first sight, later doubt should be impossible.

Reply: one may subsequently suspect an unrecognized extraneous condition.

Alternatively, doubt can concern the validity of one's earlier cognition.

The text compares later doubt about a jar with doubt about an earlier perception of that jar.

KEY INSIGHT

A claim to first apprehension does not imply the impossibility of later error-detection.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt Concerning Pervasion Is Possible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial Mīmāṃsaka definition

One proposal treats pervasion as co-location with a probandum not negated at the reason-locus.

A parallel proposal uses mutual absence of the relevant probandum-locus.

Kitchen smoke and fire provide the apparent perceptual model.

The objection is that such a model may secure only particular, not general, pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

General inference of firehood cannot rest solely on an unrelated particular fire.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Is Not Merely Special Co-location

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Naiyāyika reply to first-observation thesis

Prābhākara claim

- A single joint observation reveals the absence of an upādhi.
- Pervasion is that absence qualified by the locus.
- No later independent cause is needed.

Naiyāyika answer

- Upādhi requires a technically appropriate counterpositive.
- Doubt about deviation can block ascertainment.
- One observation of general co-presence cannot guarantee non-deviation.

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes a positive observation from the removal of negative doubt.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why upādhi-absence alone is not vyāpti

- The absent condition cannot always be cognized without cognition of the relevant counterpositive.
- A qualified cognition requires acquaintance with its qualifier within the causal complex.
- Where the condition is unknown, merely postulating its absence does not explain inference.
- The source rejects treating absence-of-upādhi alone as the object of pervasion-knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The validity of inference cannot be rescued by an unrecognized missing condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of an Extraneous Condition Cannot Be Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

First observation cannot close the question

A first general observation need not establish the required particular concomitance.

Apprehension of co-presence may leave doubt concerning deviation.

That doubt is not equivalent to a two-sided doubt about a different proposition.

The established account makes cognition of deviation and doubts about it relevant obstacles.

KEY INSIGHT

A genuine inference-grounding vyāpti requires more than momentary co-presence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion Cannot Be Apprehended Through the First Observation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Mīmāṃsaka challenge revisited

The interlocutor argues that repeated observation only multiplies grounds for doubt.

Hypothetical reasoning allegedly presupposes pervasion and generates infinite regress.

The opponent asks what remains as a non-circular epistemic route.

The section then turns explicitly from pūrvapakṣa to the established conclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

The siddhānta must answer the causal problem without assuming what it is meant to establish.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mīmāṃsaka View; Prima Facie Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion: vyāptigrahopāya

The decisive means is observation of the concomitance of reason and probandum.

It must be accompanied by the absence of cognition of deviation.

“Cognition of deviation” includes both determination and doubt about deviation.

The absence of that interfering cognition can be secured in different ways.

KEY INSIGHT

Concomitance plus no cognition of deviation is Gaṅgeśa’s stated conclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion on Means of Apprehending Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tarka removes some, not all, doubts

- Doubt about deviation may originate from suspected extraneous conditions.
- It can also follow observation of a common relation without particular ascertainment.
- Hypothetical reasoning sometimes removes doubt by refuting the contrary alternative.
- In other cases the complete causal situation prevents doubt from arising at all.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka assists when needed; it is not a universal prerequisite for apprehending pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion on Means of Apprehending Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Avoiding infinite regress in the siddhānta

An objection says tarka depends on known pervasion, which would require further tarka.

Reply: hypothetical reasoning operates only while doubt about deviation persists.

When no doubt arises because the contrary would contradict what is already known, vyāpti may be cognized without tarka.

Thus no endless chain of hypothetical reasoning is required.

KEY INSIGHT

The actual obstacle is doubt about deviation, not the absence of a compulsory tarka event.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion on Means of Apprehending Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion-knowledge: the final sequence

Observation

See the reason and probandum in concomitance.

Critical condition

No cognition or doubt of deviation obstructs.

Optional assistance

Tarka can remove a remaining contrary suspicion.

Result


Vyāpti becomes available as the ground of inference.

This section concludes with a conditional causal account, not a fixed count of observations.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Hypothetical Reasoning (Tarka)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Text-grounded exposition of the arguments, challenges, replies, and conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Hypothetical Reasoning (Tarka)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Tarka in the theory of inference



The issue

Can a hypothetical contradiction remove doubt?

Mīmāṃsaka objections

Hypothetical reasoning seems ineffective or circular.

Naiyāyika response

Regularity, action, and non-deviation.

Regress debates

Earlier teachers and beginningless causality.

Conclusion

Tarka assists by overcoming doubt about deviation.

The text does not treat tarka as an autonomous pramāṇa.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why tarka is considered

The preceding account links pervasion-knowledge to the absence of doubt about deviation.

Tarka is introduced as an aid in removing that doubt.

The basic problem is whether a supposition leading to an unacceptable consequence can help establish non-deviation.

Its role is auxiliary to the means that actually cognizes pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka can clear an obstacle to pervasion-knowledge without independently proving the probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Introduction to Hypothetical Reasoning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The unproduced smoke scenario

> Suppose smoke comes neither from something connected with fire nor from something unconnected with fire.

> Then it would remain wholly unproduced.

> The Mīmāṃsaka critic argues that the hypothetical supposition leaves competing causal doubts.

> Therefore its epistemic assistance is questioned.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed reductio must explain why the relevant doubt is actually removed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That Hypothetical Reasoning Does Not Assist

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three lingering causal doubts

One might doubt production from a present moment without fire.

Or production from an earlier moment without fire.

Or even production without any cause.

The objector says these alternatives could persist despite the proposed hypothetical reasoning.

KEY INSIGHT

The critic challenges whether tarka yields a determinate causal relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That Hypothetical Reasoning Does Not Assist

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Practical action against radical doubt

Knowing normal causal regularity, people use fire to produce smoke.

They use food to obtain satisfaction and words to convey meanings.

The objector says a continuing baseless doubt would undermine these practices.

This introduces action as evidence relevant to knowledge of regularity.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute moves from formal possibility to the coherence of ordinary successful activity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection That Hypothetical Reasoning Does Not Assist

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Naiyāyika reply: regularity blocks doubt

The Naiyāyikas deny that every detail of a complete causal complex must be immediately present.

Knowledge that fire causes smoke can coexist with absent ancillary conditions.

Cognition of regularity obstructs doubt about deviation.

Conversely, where deviation-doubt persists, secure cognition of invariance does not arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The decisive opposition is between established regularity and a live suspicion of deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier teachers: action and ascertainment

The text cites the practical use of fire as inconsistent with stable doubt that fire produces smoke.

A genuine, action-blocking doubt is distinct from a merely uttered possibility.

The relation of an obstructing cognition to an obstructed cognition is part of the explanation.

The critique rejects the need for additional endless rules governing action.

KEY INSIGHT

Action illustrates the cognitive force of established causal regularity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Mīmāṃsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is repeated observation the cause?

Direct-cause hypothesis

- Repeated observations by themselves yield cognition of pervasion.
- An impression may be treated as an extra independent instrument.
- This risks overstatement of the causal role of repetition.

Naiyāyika clarification

- Repetition contributes to the conditions for tarka.
- Tarka helps dispel doubt about deviation.
- Observation and unobstructed cognition ground vyāpti.

Repeated observation may be an indirect cause through tarka, not a direct pramāṇa.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Repeated observation and tarka

The source states that hypothetical reasoning depends upon repeated observation of concomitance.

Repeated observation is not itself the direct producer of pervasion-knowledge.

Its impression can assist the formation of hypothetical reasoning.

That impression does not become an independent means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal sequence distinguishes training, supposition and direct apprehension.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika View: Repeated Observation Produces Tarka

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Veridical and erroneous hypothetical reasoning

A critic notes that seeming non-deviation and favorable supposition may accompany a deviant reason.

The response distinguishes veridical from erroneous hypothetical reasoning.

Correct tarka can support correct cognition of pervasion; mistaken tarka can support mistake.

The analogy is perception of a qualifier yielding accurate or false qualified cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka can be causally effective without being infallible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Naiyāyika View: Repeated Observation Produces Tarka

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The regress challenge

If every piece of tarka needs prior cognition of pervasion, an endless series threatens.

The question is how the first relevant tarka can operate.

Different teachers offer routes through recollection or established causal relations.

The text carefully examines whether the proposed escape actually ends the regress.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every invoked earlier knowledge eliminates circularity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of Infinite Regress

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier teachers: recollected pervasion

One proposed distinction is between reasoning based on direct experience and reasoning based on recollection.

Recollection-based tarka is said not to require a second tarka.

The explanation appeals to impressions and prior-birth recollection of causal relations.

This is recorded as a teacher’s view, not silently asserted as uncontested fact.

KEY INSIGHT

The memory proposal is one attempted terminus for the chain of reasons.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of Infinite Regress: Earlier Teachers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Beginningless causal relations: another view

Some teachers propose tarka grounded in causal relations established from beginningless time.

Such standing relations are supposed to make further tarka unnecessary.

The rebuttal asks by what pramāṇa those relations were established.

If only an inference establishes them, the regress is not dissolved.

KEY INSIGHT

Calling a premise "beginningless" does not establish its epistemic warrant.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of Infinite Regress: Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can impossibility itself end the regress?

A related proposal appeals to the impossibility of knowing pervasion without tarka.

The response observes that this impossibility-claim needs a basis in inference or cognition.

If it uses the same structure under dispute, circularity returns.

Several variants of the claim are rejected for retaining the regress.

KEY INSIGHT

An assertion of impossibility cannot be used as a free-standing first premise.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of Infinite Regress: Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Partial adherent: freedom from upādhi

One proposed chain has tarka remove doubt, then cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition arise.

That cognition, together with tarka, is said to yield pervasion-knowledge.

Gaṅgeśa denies that tarka is an independent means of knowledge.

And cognition of pervasion can arise where no prior doubt, hence no tarka, occurs.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka is neither a universal extra pramāṇa nor a necessary companion to every cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Partial Adherent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can perception cooperate with tarka?

If perception first cognizes pervasion after tarka removes a doubt, perception remains the relevant pramāṇa.

The partial adherent tries to give tarka a further independent causal role.

The objection is that this adds an unnecessary step and may renew regress.

The source tests cases where pervasion is known without deviation-doubt.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing a defeater does not automatically create a new independent source of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Partial Adherent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Another proposal: cognize upādhi-absence

Some teachers propose that perceptible upādhi-absence is directly known.

Imperceptible upādhi-absence would be inferred from other relations.

The proposal equates known freedom from upādhi with pervasion.

The rebuttal finds that the inferential route presupposes pervasion and risks regress.

KEY INSIGHT

Freedom from hidden conditions cannot be established by a new inference at every turn.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Cognition of Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial Mīmāṃsaka denial of tarka

An interlocutor says mere observation of concomitance suffices, with no direct or indirect tarka-assistance.

Gaṅgeśa rejects this unconditional claim.

A suspected extraneous condition can undermine the relevance of an apparent reason.

The argument requires distinguishing a merely distinct thing from a genuine vitiating upādhi.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every difference is an upādhi, but a live deviation-objection matters to inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Partial Mīmāṃsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What tarka actually assists

Where a reason appears with a probandum but deviation remains in doubt, inferential support is obstructed.

Hypothetical reasoning can remove that doubt by exposing an unacceptable consequence.

Where doubt never arises, tarka need not occur.

The source concludes by defending tarka's role as an assistance to apprehending pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka's causal work is conditional and negative: it neutralizes obstructive doubt.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion That Tarka Assists Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A precise place for tarka

Not a pramāṇa

It does not independently produce valid knowledge.

Why it enters

Doubt about the reason’s deviation obstructs pervasion.

When useful

A hypothetical contradiction dispels the live suspicion.


When unnecessary

Pervasion can be cognized without tarka if no doubt remains.

The inference account is stronger when assistance and direct cognition are kept separate.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Common Character of Pervasion (Vyāptyanugama)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Text-grounded exposition of the arguments, challenges, replies, and conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Common Character of Pervasion (Vyāptyanugama)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

What is shared across forms of vyāpti?

I

Scope and economy

Is one common nature required for all forms?

II

Extraneous condition

Why upādhi-freedom is not an independent cause.

III

Deviation

What cognition actually obstructs inferential certainty.

IV

Non-deviation

A technically qualified positive relation.

V

Close

This portion concludes the inquiry into pervasion.

The source distinguishes the pervasion itself from cognition of a defect that defeats inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A common character: anugama

The chapter opens by recognizing different formulations of pervasion.

It invokes an economy argument about which kind of pervasion-knowledge produces inferential cognition.

The text discusses one form involving mutual absence.

It denies that lack of one unifying feature among all formulations must itself be fatal.

KEY INSIGHT

The question is which common cognitive feature does actual inferential work.

SOURCE TOPIC · Introduction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

COMMON CHARACTER OF PERVASION (VYĀPTYANUGAMA)

Vaiśeṣika proposal: freedom from upādhi

The Vaiśeṣikas attribute an important causal role to absence of extraneous conditions.

They connect that absence to cognition of pervasion involving mutual absence.

The proposed general cause is cognition of freedom from upādhi.

Gaṅgeśa then tests whether this introduces a second defect for the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

A purportedly separate condition must do work not already performed by deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mere Non-deviation, Not Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does upādhi create an additional defect?

If an upādhi alone made a reason useless or unestablished, it would behave like a further pseudo-reason.

The text questions this multiplication of inferential defects.

A cognition about a qualifying condition need not itself obstruct pervasion-knowledge.

The example of wet-fuel conjunction shows why the actual affected relation matters.

KEY INSIGHT

The epistemic impact of upādhi is mediated by the possibility of deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mere Non-deviation, Not Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conjunction with wet fuel: a caution

- Conjunction with wet fuel can figure in an upādhi test concerning fire and smoke.
- The section warns against transferring that association to every smoke–fire inference.
- A property may be linked to a probandum without directly defeating an unrelated valid reason.
- Over-extension results if every known condition is treated as an independent obstruction.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant issue is whether the reason can occur without its intended probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mere Non-deviation, Not Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established causal difference

Cognition of deviation is the defect that obstructs inferential cognition.

Absence of cognition of deviation allows cognition of pervasion.

Knowledge that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not a separate universal cause.

The source describes non-deviation itself as pervasion in the concluding analysis.

KEY INSIGHT

The crucial epistemic condition is the absence of known or suspected deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mere Non-deviation, Not Freedom from an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A missing condition versus a missing counterinstance

Freedom from upādhi

- Focuses on whether a special condition vitiates the proposed reason.
- A condition can be technically relevant only in a specified relation.
- Its cognition is not automatically a new causal source.

Non-deviation

- Focuses on the reason’s not occurring without the probandum.
- Cognition or doubt of deviation is the actual obstructor.
- Its absence makes pervasion-knowledge possible.

The chapter prefers direct analysis of deviation over multiplying independent inferential defects.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defining deviation accurately

Deviation is the reason's occurrence in a locus where the probandum is absent.

This is not simply the same as a poorly specified absence of non-deviation.

Purely affirmative inferences raise difficulties for negative formulations.

The text therefore gives a more exact positive description of non-deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

A negative relation must be formulated so it also handles kevalānvayin cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Co-location with a Probandum That Is the Counterpositive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

COMMON CHARACTER OF PERVASION (VYĀPTYANUGAMA)

Non-deviation in the reason’s locus

- The reason must be co-located with the probandum in the relevant sense.
- The probandum must not be the counterpositive of an absolute absence established in that same locus.
- This specifies a relation of co-location without illicitly deriving it from any one absent instance.
- The account resists treating deviation and non-deviation as simple mutual absences.

KEY INSIGHT

The counterpositive-and-absence analysis explains the exact scope of “non-deviation.”

SOURCE TOPIC · Co-location with a Probandum That Is the Counterpositive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The purely affirmative limit case

In a purely affirmative inference, a probandum-absence is not available in the ordinary negative way.

A definition that requires merely absence of deviation becomes inadequate.

Co-location qualified by the proper absence relation is offered instead.

This is why the chapter maintains a positive relational characterization.

KEY INSIGHT

Definitions of vyāpti must survive both affirmative and negative inferential forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Co-location with a Probandum That Is the Counterpositive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How the section concludes

The source closes the exposition of the common character of pervasion.

It also explicitly marks the means of apprehending pervasion as concluded.

The succeeding topic in the English text concerns comprehensive cognition through generic-character contact.

This batch stops at the verified boundary without importing the next chapter.

KEY INSIGHT

The conceptual transition is from the common character of vyāpti to related modes of cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Common Character of Pervasion: Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Results of the pervasion inquiry

Defect

Cognition of deviation undermines inference.

No independent extra cause

Upādhi-freedom is not a universal separate generator.

Scope

Non-deviation must survive purely affirmative cases.

Technical account


Relevant co-location and absence are precisely delimited.

Vyāptyanugama closes the connected discussion of pervasion and its apprehension.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Comprehensive Cognition through a Relation Qualified by Generic Character (Sāmānyalakṣaṇā)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded account of arguments, objections, refutations, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Comprehensive Cognition through a Relation Qualified by Generic Character (Sāmānyalakṣaṇā)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

How can a universal relation reach unseen cases?

I

Naiyāyika proposal

Generic-character contact ranges over instances beyond the senses.

II

Mīmāṃsaka objection

Known pervasion and its recollection are sufficient.

III

Hard cases

Indeterminate cognition, knowability, and doubt.

IV

Established conclusion

Generic-character contact explains doubt about deviation.

V

Final rejoinders

The Līlāvatī author and Gaṅgeśa's response.

The translation marks the objections as pūrvapakṣa before the established conclusion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

COMPREHENSIVE COGNITION THROUGH A RELATION QUALIFIED BY GENERIC CHARACTER (SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆĀ)

The Naiyāyika’s comprehensive relation

- The observed kitchen smoke and fire are not every possible instance of smoke and fire.
- Universals such as smokehood and firehood are invoked to reach other instances.
- The proposed relation is qualified by the generic characters of both reason and probandum.
- Without such a relation, past and future particulars lack direct sensory access.

KEY INSIGHT

The issue is the reach of cognition beyond the currently contacted individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika Proposal

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Comprehensive Cognition through Generic Character

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

COMPREHENSIVE COGNITION THROUGH A RELATION QUALIFIED BY GENERIC CHARACTER (SĀMĀNYALAKṢAṆĀ)

A universal is not one individual

A sense organ directly contacts individual smoke and fire in a present scene.

It does not physically contact every smoke and fire from every place or time.

The Naiyāyika postulates a comprehensive relation qualified by the universals.

This relation is offered as the cause of cognition encompassing otherwise unseen instances.

KEY INSIGHT

Generic-character contact extends cognition without claiming bodily contact with all individuals.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika Proposal

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Comprehensive Cognition through Generic Character

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā: memory of an already known pervasion

Pervasion is first perceived in nearby smoke such as that of a kitchen or altar.

The cognition has smokehood-delimited smoke and firehood-delimited fire as its terms.

That pervasion is later recalled when smoke is found on a mountain.

The remembered relation qualifies the cognition that smoke belongs to the subject.

KEY INSIGHT

Recollection and recognition of the subject-property are proposed instead of special generic contact.

SOURCE TOPIC · Generic-Character Contact Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The alternative sequence of inference

First: cognize the pervasion of smoke by fire in an accessible case.

Second: recollect the pervasion at the occasion of a new subject.

Third: know that the mountain bears smoke characterized by the remembered pervasion.

Finally: infer fire on the mountain from this qualified cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The opposing account disputes the need to survey all individual smokes and fires.

SOURCE TOPIC · Generic-Character Contact Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Analogy with verbal cognition

The source compares inferential cognition with hearing the word “cow.”

Knowledge and memory of the word’s denotative power help cognition of a new individual.

Sentence meaning additionally relies on semantic fitness, expectancy, and proximity.

The Mīmāṃsaka asks why the same generic character cannot support inference by ordinary remembrance.

KEY INSIGHT

The analogy is offered by the objector, not conceded as a full proof.

SOURCE TOPIC · Generic-Character Contact Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Must every particular be known?

Naiyāyika motivation

- General pervasion must reach unseen smokes.
- It invokes a relation qualified by smokehood and firehood.
- Otherwise remote cases may escape the range of inquiry.

Mīmāṃsaka reply

- The current mountain smoke suffices for the present inference.
- Its qualification by remembered pervasion yields the desired result.
- There is no need to cognize every individual.

The opposed accounts posit different cognitive resources for a single inferential judgment.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika counter-objection

- “This mountain possesses fire” is a qualified cognition of the mountain as bearing fire.
- The Naiyāyika invokes the universal firehood in explaining this qualification.
- A parallel proposal could invoke smokehood for cognition of the mountain smoke.
- The translation tests whether such a requirement wrongly validates fire-to-smoke inference.

KEY INSIGHT

A theory of universal qualification must not invert an asymmetric pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Counter-objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified versus indeterminate cognition

The Mīmāṃsaka denies a separately evidenced indeterminate cognition of cow and animal.

"This animal is a cow" already has a structured qualifier–qualificand form.

The staff-bearing person similarly illustrates a qualified judgment.

Unqualified cognition of the bare terms is not shown to be its independent causal prerequisite.

KEY INSIGHT

A disputed form of cognition cannot simply be assumed to explain qualified cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Rejection of the Counter-objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowability and the spectre of omniscience

- Consider inferring absence of conjunction with a monkey from knowability.
- If all instances had to be comprehended, the knower could seem omniscient.
- The text also examines uncertainty whether another cognition has jarhood as its object.
- These examples challenge the proposed breadth of generic-character knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent presses against overextension of what comprehensive cognition reveals.

SOURCE TOPIC · Rejection of the Counter-objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion: distant cases make doubt possible

Known kitchen instances alone cannot cover smokes of past, future, and distant places.

Yet one can doubt whether such smokes deviate from fire.

The text argues that this doubt requires cognitive access to the general range at issue.

Generic-character contact provides that access while pervasion remains unascertained.

KEY INSIGHT

Gaṅgeśa accepts comprehensive contact as needed to make meaningful deviation-doubt possible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion: Generic-Character Contact Must Be Accepted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why apprehension and certainty differ

Generic-character contact supplies awareness of individuals under common properties.

It does not automatically establish the pervasion of all those instances.

Doubt about departure from fire remains possible for unexamined smoke.

The thesis therefore does not equate universal scope with universal certainty.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of a range and ascertainment of a relation across that range are different claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Comprehensive Cognition through Generic Character

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Līlāvatī author’s argument from desire

- A person desires future pleasure or another act of cooking, not one already achieved.
- The unaccomplished future object is not available to ordinary current perception.
- The Līlāvatī author takes this desire to support generic contact with future cases.
- Universals such as pleasurehood and cookinghood would organize the desired range.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument from practical desire is presented as a supporting proposal by another teacher.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of the Author of the Līlāvatī

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the desire argument is rejected

- An already cognized object can prompt effort directed at an unaccomplished part.
- The correspondence among cognition, desire, and effort needs proper qualifiers and qualificands.
- Simply sharing an object does not make cognition of a jar cause desire for a cloth.
- Gaṅgeśa rejects the proposed argument as unnecessarily multiplying causal relations.

KEY INSIGHT

Generic contact may be accepted without relying on the Līlāvatī author's justification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View of the Author of the Līlāvatī

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gaṅgeśa resolves the doubt objection

- Generic-character contact does not entail omniscience.
- Knowing jarhood does not settle whether jarhood is the object of a particular cognition.
- The doubt concerns how the object is cognized, not ignorance of the universal itself.
- Thus the objection involving another person’s cognition does not overturn generic contact.

KEY INSIGHT

Access to an object does not remove every higher-order doubt about a cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Gaṅgeśa’s Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Result: comprehensive contact retained

Proposal

The universals extend cognition beyond directly perceived instances.

Objection

Remembered pervasion may seem sufficient for local inference.

Main reply

Doubt over unobserved deviations needs cognition of a general range.

Qualification


Generic contact neither establishes omniscience nor eliminates all doubt.

The chapter concludes for the Naiyāyika doctrine while rejecting a separate desire-based argument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of the Extraneous Condition (Upādhivāda) — Part I

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded account of arguments, objections, refutations, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Theory of the Extraneous Condition (Upādhivāda) — Part I

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

An upādhi can invalidate an apparent inference



Initial definition

Pervades the probandum but not the reason.

Counterexamples

Color, wet fuel, vegetable cooking, subject-otherness.

Competing definitions

Udayana, asymmetrical pervasion, and the Ratnakośa.

Gaṅgeśa's thesis

An extraneous condition reveals deviation of the reason.

Open objection

What makes a condition a genuine logical defect?

The source develops the theory by testing successive definitions, not by declaring every auxiliary condition an upādhi.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The basic definition of upādhi

An extraneous condition pervades the intended probandum.

It does not pervade the intended reason or inferential mark.

Its identification can reveal the reason's deviation from the probandum.

Recognition of freedom from upādhi is not itself the necessary cause of apprehending vyāpti.

KEY INSIGHT

The defect is logical asymmetry between the alleged reason and the required condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of an Extraneous Condition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

No simple circle of causal dependence

One might say knowledge of freedom from upādhi causes knowledge of pervasion.

One might then say knowledge of pervasion causes knowledge of upādhi-freedom.

The translation explicitly rejects the first claim as a universal causal rule.

It therefore denies this apparent mutual-dependence objection at the outset.

KEY INSIGHT

The definition of a condition is separate from the causal account of knowing pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of an Extraneous Condition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The alternative absence-based definition

Another proposal states the condition using absolute absence and counterpositiveness.

It specifies occurrence relative to loci bearing the probandum or the reason.

Gaṅgeśa tests whether this formulation includes every relevant upādhi.

He finds it both too narrow and too broad in difficult cases.

KEY INSIGHT

Formal precision does not save a definition that fails its examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Alternative Definition of an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Manifest color and external perception

The source considers “Air is perceptible because it bears perceptible touch.”

Possession of manifest color is proposed as an extraneous condition.

The reason can occur without the claimed externally perceptible substance.

The counterexample exposes the limit of the initial inferential connection.

KEY INSIGHT

Perceptible touch does not alone guarantee the claimed perceptibility of a substance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of Manifest Color

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vegetable-cooking and the dark crow

The inference is: “The crow is dark because it is Mitra’s son.”

Being produced by vegetable-cooking is discussed as a relevant extraneous condition.

The condition tests whether family relation establishes the purported color.

The example challenges a reason that is insufficient for the targeted probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

Upādhi analysis asks whether the reason still occurs where the probandum fails.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Produced by Vegetable-Cooking

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The danger of overextension

A definition may accidentally include being distinct from what is in the mountain.

That property is not always a genuine extraneous condition.

A formally plausible restriction may therefore vitiate valid smoke-to-fire inference.

The text demands exclusions that preserve legitimate inference.

KEY INSIGHT

A useful theory must not condemn every true reason as defective.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Definition; Over-extension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Subject-otherness becomes contested

The discussion considers being other than what occurs in the subject.

Some formulations threaten to classify all subject-otherness as an upādhi.

Other examples show that it can produce cognition of the reason's deviation.

The text therefore resists eliminating it by a blanket exception.

KEY INSIGHT

Subject-otherness must be tested by its inferential work in each context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Other than What Occurs in the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the subject qualifier can matter

The term “mountain” in an inference can delimit the exact reason.

It is not necessarily redundant simply because a general other-than relation exists.

Without the subject qualifier, the intended reason may not even be established.

The objection that subject-otherness is always a useless qualifier is rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing a qualifier can change the proposition being argued.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Other than What Occurs in the Subject

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A second definition of subject-otherness

An alternative identifies what is other than the subject yet occurs in it.

It also requires actual pervasion of the probandum.

The condition's force still comes from its capacity to produce cognition of deviation.

The text tests rather than simply endorses this special proposal.

KEY INSIGHT

Definition and defect-producing power remain distinct logical questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Alternative Definition of Subject-Otherness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Adding an exclusionary qualifier fails

One proposal adds a condition about lacking a qualifier in counter-instances.

The translation notes properties such as knowability occur everywhere.

Such an exclusion can become impossible or contradictory.

The proposed addition cannot rescue the definition.

KEY INSIGHT

An extra clause is not an improvement when it is incoherent or inapplicable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View That a Qualifier Should Be Added

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Genuine defect, not merely jāti

An opponent calls subject-otherness a self-defeating rejoinder, or jāti.

The reply emphasizes its ability to reveal deviation of the reason.

That ability can mark a genuine weakness in inference.

The discussion refuses to replace the logical test with a rhetorical classification.

KEY INSIGHT

One must show the condition's actual relation to the reason and probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation: Subject-Otherness Is Not an Extraneous Condition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What is the seed of vitiation?

- The condition can reveal a locus where the probandum is absent.
- The role of the condition's own absence is critically examined.
- Some teachers compare a condition's exclusion with a reason's establishing role.
- The precise cognition of deviation, not mere mention of a condition, matters.

KEY INSIGHT

Vitiating force has to be causally explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Argument That an Extraneous Condition Is the Seed of Vitiation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Not merely an equally strong counter-reason

The text distinguishes upādhi from an opposed inferential reason.

A defective inference may already face an equally strong counter-reason.

It would be redundant to define upādhi as merely that same defect.

The distinction preserves a separate diagnosis of conditional deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

An upādhi and a counter-reason are not automatically interchangeable.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Extraneous Condition Is Not an Equally Strong Counter-reason

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The lake example checks subjecthood

A proposed inference places fire in a lake because of smoke.

The issue is already sublated or undercut in the subject.

Subject-otherness cannot be indiscriminately identified as the operative upādhi.

The case tests the boundary between an absent probandum and an extraneous condition.

KEY INSIGHT

A bad inference may fail for more than one different reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection to Treating Subject-Otherness as an Extraneous Condition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Subject-otherness: the provisional conclusion

- Multiple relations of difference can arise within a mountain–lake example.
- Some forms can make the reason's deviation cognizable.
- Uncommonness and equal counter-reasons are also considered.
- The preliminary analysis admits that simple definitions include subject-otherness.

KEY INSIGHT

The inquiry cannot exclude difficult cases merely to protect a favored formula.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion: Subject-Otherness Is an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Udayanācārya’s proposed limit

- Udayana’s definition introduces a condition of being coextensive with the probandum.
- The translation asks whether this added requirement explains the defect.
- Gaṅgeśa argues coextensiveness adds no essential vitiating force.
- Asymmetrical relations may still be relevant to deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

A definition should not contain restrictions that play no inferential role.

SOURCE TOPIC · Udayanācārya’s Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The asymmetrically pervaded property

- Several proposals dispute whether such a property is an extraneous condition.
- The text distinguishes the word's customary application from genuine logical defect.
- The example of a hibiscus reflecting redness on a crystal is discussed.
- The analogy does not by itself settle upādhi in inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic usage and the causal production of inferential error must not be conflated.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Asymmetrically Pervaded Property Is Not an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Another criterion and its refutation

Some scholars link upādhi to an absence that opposes the reason’s deviation.

Sound, non-eternality, qualityhood and knowability furnish counterexamples.

Gaṅgeśa rejects the proposed criterion as unable to prevent regress or deviation.

The relevant pervasion and its delimiters must be articulated anew.

KEY INSIGHT

The negative condition must actually do the logical work ascribed to it.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of Another Decisive Criterion; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The danger of a too-narrow probandum

A definition may restrict the probandum to a property of the subject.

Then it can miss cases qualified by a property of the reason.

Conversely, non-audibility or earthhood may enter where they should not.

The text rejects several attempts to save the definition by moving the qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between subject-property and reason-property matters to extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-pervasion of the Reason Does Not Constitute an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Irrelevant diversion: a logical concern

A condition may establish deviation from an excessively qualified probandum.

But the inference concerns the unqualified probandum.

If the first deviation does not support the second, the argument changes the subject.

The text calls this the defect of irrelevant diversion.

KEY INSIGHT

A successful criticism must target the probandum actually proposed.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Defect of Irrelevant Diversion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prabhākara Upādhyāya and the Ratnakośa

- Prabhākara Upādhyāya suggests an order for establishing deviations.
- The Ratnakośa author appeals to the finally determined probandum.
- Sound and air inferences are used to probe their definitions.
- The text rejects responses that fail to reveal deviation from the intended probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

The target property must be fixed before a proposed condition is declared vitiating.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prabhākara Upādhyāya's Argument; Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gaṅgeśa's own definition

The established view identifies a condition whose deviation causes the reason's deviation.

It does not pervade the reason, yet it pervades the finally determined probandum.

The formulation treats deviation as a discriminating test.

The example of manifest color in the inference about air remains central.

KEY INSIGHT

Upādhi is defined by the defect it makes known in the intended inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Reason Deviates from the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The qualified and unqualified probandum

A subject-property may delimit the probandum in the actual inference.

The reason may deviate from that qualified probandum via the unqualified target.

The text examines the direction of dependence between those deviations.

When properly ordered, the apparent “irrelevant diversion” objection is avoided.

KEY INSIGHT

A condition must connect back to the original conclusion, not a substituted one.

SOURCE TOPIC · No Defect of Irrelevant Diversion Arises

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An alternative formulation of the defect

The translation describes a condition that deviates from the reason.

That deviation can occasion the reason’s deviation from the probandum.

Direct and mediated cases are both examined.

The crow and air examples are reused to check the same mechanism.

KEY INSIGHT

A condition’s defect may be transmitted through a chain of relevant relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Doctrine of the Extraneous Condition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Wet fuel versus an arbitrary difference

- Conjunction with wet fuel is linked to the smoke-to-fire reverse inference.
- Being different from what exists in a portion of the mountain is not automatically an upādhi.
- The comparison illustrates how causally relevant restrictions differ from arbitrary location qualifiers.
- Favorable hypothetical reasoning also affects what pervasion may be ascertained.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every difference from a subject is a genuine extraneous condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of Fire Produced from Wet Fuel

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An unresolved objection at the chapter break

The section asks whether upādhi itself produces inferential defect.

A critic may instead blame lack of favorable hypothetical reasoning.

The reply must explain why both have a place in the causal analysis.

The English text continues this question in the next titled division.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation expressly carries the debate into "Doctrine of Extraneous Conditions (Continued)."

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: An Extraneous Condition Is Not a Defect

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Definitions and Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part I: what has been established

Baseline

A genuine upādhi pervades the target, not the stated reason.

Method

Test each candidate against deviation and counterexamples.

Central dispute

Subject-otherness and competing definitions are difficult cases.

Transition


Whether an upādhi itself is a defect remains under dispute.

Part II resumes the argument without treating the objection as already settled.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Doctrine of Extraneous Conditions (Continued) — Part II

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded account of arguments, objections, refutations, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Doctrine of Extraneous Conditions (Continued) — Part II

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Established Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From rival definitions to vitiating power

I

Reply to the challenge

Upādhi and absence of supportive tarka may both be defects.

II

Rival tests

Exclusionary definitions and counterpositive delimiters.

III

Classification

Certain, doubtful, and distinct pseudo-reasons.

IV

Established causal account

Pervasion of the target without pervasion of the reason.

V

Apparent conditions

Ten source-listed kinds at the end of the chapter.

The continuation explicitly resolves the objection left open by the preceding presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Resolution: upādhi can be a defect

- The objection separates an upādhi from failure of favorable hypothetical reasoning.
- The response analyzes competing relations within the same substrate.
- A reason attended by an upādhi can conflict with the probandum and its absence.
- The translation accepts both upādhi and the absence of helpful tarka as defects.

KEY INSIGHT

The vitiating condition is not simply identical to missing hypothetical reasoning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Resolution of the Objection That an Extraneous Condition Is Not a Defect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Another definition: exclusion of a property

- Some define an upādhi as the property whose exclusion removes the probandum from the subject.
- The test is framed as a loss of pervasion between reason and probandum.
- Producedness and non-eternality, and air with perceptible touch, provide examples.
- Subject-otherness does not automatically satisfy the account.

KEY INSIGHT

A counterfactual exclusion test is offered and examined rather than simply assumed decisive.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another Definition of an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Yattu author’s formulation

A proposed definition invokes counterpositiveness and a particular locus relation.

It distinguishes a general and a special extraneous condition.

The lake-and-smoke example yields an undesirable inclusion of subject-otherness.

Gaṅgeśa judges the formulation too broad for what obstructs inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The correct delimitor must identify the cognition responsible for obstruction.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Yattu Author’s Definition; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A disjunctive definition of upādhi

Other scholars propose: pervading the probandum or not pervading the reason.

The translation compares this with cases involving other pseudo-reasons.

It is too permissive to treat either relation alone as sufficient.

A genuine upādhi must be distinguished from coincident defects.

KEY INSIGHT

The two required relations cannot simply be split into unrelated alternatives.

SOURCE TOPIC · Extraneous Condition According to the View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Dividing actual and doubtful conditions

The source next classifies extraneous conditions.

Being produced by vegetable-cooking is reconsidered against the intended probandum.

A doubtful upādhi is not the same as one whose pervasion has been established.

An apparent restriction can cause uncertainty without conclusively proving deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

A condition's epistemic status matters as much as its formal description.

SOURCE TOPIC · Division of Extraneous Conditions; Doubtful Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The prima facie account of vitiating power

- The debate asks whether upādhi works by indicating absence of pervasion.
- It compares extraneous conditions with counter-reasons and unestablished reasons.
- Pervasion and subject-propertyhood alone do not constitute logical strength.
- The source rejects absorbing every upādhi into another standard pseudo-reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Defect-producing power is analyzed separately from the mere presence of a reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Account of the Seed of the Vitiating Power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Subject-otherness revisited

An interlocutor again denies subject-otherness is an upādhi.

The earlier discussion shows its possible role in cognition of deviation.

The text distinguishes cases where the condition is established from cases where it is doubtful.

Its treatment is not settled by one unrestricted yes-or-no claim.

KEY INSIGHT

The category is sensitive to the inferential target and available evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Subject-Otherness Is Not an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Not merely non-establishment of pervasion

A critic tries to include upādhi under absence of knowledge of pervasion.

The text tests negative concomitance and rival causes of inference.

Failure to know a pervasion is different from knowing a condition that reveals deviation.

These states can have different logical consequences.

KEY INSIGHT

An upādhi can be a separate pseudo-reason, not just uncertainty about the main inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Extraneous Condition Cannot Be Included under Non-establishment

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Different subject: answering the objection

The source addresses whether an upādhi must share the precise subject of the inference.

Its causal role is not reduced to an already-known absence of pervasion.

What matters is its evidential relation to deviation of the reason.

A different substrate does not alone eliminate its defect-producing function.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical role is determined by the relation, not surface identity of subjects.

SOURCE TOPIC · Avoidance of the Defect of Having a Different Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conclusion: a separate pseudo-reason

The text concludes that upādhi is not merely a generic defect.

It can generate a distinctive cognition of the reason's deviation.

Its status must be established through the same inferential resources used to compare pervasions.

The translation expressly treats it as a separate pseudo-reason.

KEY INSIGHT

A technical diagnosis requires a separate criterion, not a renamed familiar failure.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion: An Extraneous Condition Is a Separate Pseudo-reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established conclusion on vitiation

Conjunction with wet fuel serves as a paradigm extraneous condition.

Hypothetical reasoning and related means must ascertain its pervasion of the probandum.

They must also establish that it does not pervade the reason.

Without such ascertainment, the condition cannot be treated as a certain upādhi.

KEY INSIGHT

The power to vitiate depends on justified knowledge of both asymmetrical relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion concerning the Seed of the Vitiating Power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An alternative causal expression

Another account begins from a reason present where a probandum-pervading property is absent.

The pattern is used to generate cognition that the reason deviates.

The discussion distinguishes the condition’s occurrence from an indiscriminate locus test.

The chapter formally closes its account of the seed of vitiation.

KEY INSIGHT

Different formulations are tested against the same inferential phenomenon.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative View

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Extraneous Conditions: Established Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apparent upādhis: first four

1. A condition tied to a particular absence of the probandum.

2. A condition invoking an unestablished absence of the probandum.

3. A condition invoking an absence already sublated by knowledge.

4. A condition involving an absence not pervading the entire subject.

KEY INSIGHT

The first four cases arise from distinct kinds of missing or untenable probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Exposition of Apparent Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apparent upādhis: fifth through seventh

5. Absence of an earlier reason in the presence of an equal counter-reason.

6. Absence of something pervaded by that earlier reason.

7. Difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter-instance.

The fire-from-smoke inference is used to check spurious subject differences.

KEY INSIGHT

Some apparent conditions are artifacts of the dialectical setting, not enduring defects.

SOURCE TOPIC · Exposition of Apparent Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apparent upādhis: eighth through tenth

8. Absence of the probandum in an object other than the subject.

9. A property resembling a property tied to such an absence.

10. The entire causal complex of fire or a similar effect.

These complete the ten kinds enumerated in the translated text.

KEY INSIGHT

The taxonomy distinguishes an alleged upādhi from one established to vitiate the reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Exposition of Apparent Extraneous Conditions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Certain upādhi versus an apparent upādhi

Established defect

- Its pervasion of the intended target is ascertained.
- Its failure to pervade the alleged reason is ascertained.
- It provides grounds for cognition of deviation.

Apparent candidate

- It may rest on a sublated or unestablished absence.
- Its relation may depend on an unrelated subject difference.
- The relevant vitiating power is not thereby established.

The translation ends by listing categories of apparent conditions, not equating them with proven defects.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part II: resolution of the Upādhivāda

Causal question

An upādhi and absence of favorable reasoning may both obstruct inference.

Definitive test

Ascertain pervasion of the target and non-pervasion of the reason.

Classification

Distinguish certain, doubtful, and merely apparent conditions.

Next doctrine


Having expounded pervasion, the text turns to subjecthood.

The next section asks what makes something the subject (pakṣa) of an inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Subjecthood (Pakṣatā)

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A source-grounded account of arguments, objections, refutations, and determinations.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Subjecthood (Pakṣatā)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

What qualifies as the pakṣa?



Initial candidates

Doubt about the probandum or the absence of evidence.

Earlier teachers

Desire to establish the proposed conclusion.

Counterexamples

Inference despite certainty or the absence of conscious desire.

Established conclusion

Qualified absence involving establishing evidence and desire.

Final account

The language of subjecthood has a precise inferential basis.

The source separates the subject from the reason that occurs in it.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE THEORY OF SUBJECTHOOD (PAKṢATĀ)

Why subjecthood matters

After examining vyāpti and upādhi, the translation turns to pakṣatā.

An inference requires a reason present in the subject under discussion.

The question now concerns what entitles that locus to be called the subject.

The text distinguishes the subject-condition from mere possession of the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Pakṣatā is a condition in the inferential situation, not simply the physical object named.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Account of Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Doubt about the probandum is insufficient

A proposed account defines the subject by doubt whether it possesses the probandum.

But that doubt may cease before subsumptive reflection occurs.

Inference can still arise after one has already ascertained the conclusion.

Temporal coexistence of doubt and inference does not establish a causal qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

Doubt cannot be made an indispensable constituent of subjecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of a Doubtful Probandum Is Not Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two absences do not provide the definition

Another account requires absence of both establishing and sublating evidence.

The translation argues the double absence is not necessary.

One may infer a thing already known through perception or testimony.

The Self and subsequent inferential inquiry provide the illustrative case.

KEY INSIGHT

A known proposition can still become the topic of inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Absence of Both Establishing and Sublating Evidence Is Not Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The lake and the overbroad condition

The discussion mentions an inference of smoke in a pond from fire.

An unestablished reason can independently block that inference.

Adding a blanket condition about absence of sublating evidence is redundant.

The definition should not collect irrelevant safeguards.

KEY INSIGHT

A proper pakṣatā criterion should be neither too broad nor causally superfluous.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Absence of Both Establishing and Sublating Evidence Is Not Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier teachers: desire to establish

Some identify the subject with the bearer of what a person wishes to establish.

Desire to prove the probandum then becomes subjecthood.

One can wish to infer the Self even after hearing scriptural testimony.

Vācaspati Miśra is cited on inquiry into something already known.

KEY INSIGHT

The account explains inference motivated by further inquiry after earlier knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Bearer of a Probandum Desired to Be Established

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The elephant and the wish to infer

- The cited discussion contrasts a seeker of inference with someone who has seen an elephant.
- A person need not infer an elephant again from its trumpet merely after seeing it.
- The earlier account explains the contrast through the presence or absence of desire.
- The translation nevertheless asks whether desire is a necessary causal condition.

KEY INSIGHT

A useful illustration of motivation is not yet a definition of pakṣatā.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Earlier View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

No desire, yet inference occurs

One can infer a cloud from thunder without first desiring to establish a cloud.

An unwelcome conclusion can also arise through subsumptive reflection.

Desire may disappear before the inferential cognition arises.

Gaṅgeśa rejects desire by itself as a necessary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Inference is not restricted to conclusions the knower actively wants.

SOURCE TOPIC · Desire to Establish Is Not Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established conclusion: qualified absence

The translation defines subjecthood through a qualified complex of absences.

It refers to absence of evidence establishing the probandum.

It also specifies absence of the absence of a desire to establish it.

The condition is framed to handle both new inquiry and further inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The final doctrine is subtler than either mere doubt or mere desire.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion: Absence of Establishing Evidence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The mountain under the established account

"The mountain has fire because it has smoke" is the reference inference.

What matters is whether fire is already established for the cognitive purpose.

A mountain with established fire and no wish to establish it is not pakṣa in that respect.

The account locates subjecthood in the qualified inferential situation.

KEY INSIGHT

The same object need not always count as a subject under every epistemic circumstance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Avoiding underextension

A person may want to infer something already established by another means.

A cloud can be inferred from thunder without a prior wish to do so.

The relevant qualified absence handles these contrasting situations.

The chapter expressly tests both desire and establishing evidence.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed definition is intended to cover motivated and unmotivated inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Subjecthood through a Qualified Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The final doctrine of pakṣatā

The source calls subjecthood affirmative in its own character.

Yet its attribution is explained by a qualified epistemic condition.

This grounds the proper use of the word “subject.”

The section then closes and turns to subsumptive reflection.

KEY INSIGHT

The theory concerns precise conditions for using pakṣa in inferential reasoning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Final Doctrine of Subjecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three proposed criteria for pakṣatā

Rejected as sufficient

- Mere doubt about the probandum.
- No evidence establishing or sublating it.
- Mere desire to establish the conclusion.

Established qualified account

- Considers the state of establishing evidence.
- Includes the relevant qualified absence involving desire.
- Admits inquiry even after earlier knowledge and without conscious desire.

The final account responds to different defects in the three earlier definitions.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From subjecthood to subsumptive reflection

Subject (pakṣa)

The locus in which a reason is under consideration.

Pervasion (vyāpti)

The relation of reason to the target probandum.

Pakṣatā

The qualified inferential condition of the subject.

Next stage


Parāmarśa, cognition of the pervaded reason in that subject.

The next source section begins the debate over the extraordinary cause of inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Prima Facie and Established Doctrines of Subsumptive Reflection

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

An analysis of the English translation: arguments, objections, refutations, and established doctrines.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Prima Facie and Established Doctrines of Subsumptive Reflection

Tattvacintāmaṇi · Appendix 2 · Theory of Subsumptive Reflection (Parāmarśa)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Why does knowledge of smoke yield knowledge of fire?

1

Initial proposal

A qualified cognition of the pervaded reason in the subject.

2

Mīmāṃsaka objection

Recollection of pervasion plus subject-propertyhood already suffice.

3

Testing alternatives

Recognition, sense perception, identity and generic qualification.

4

Established doctrine

The final subsumptive reflection gives rise to inference.

5

Further disputes

Whether the mark, pervasion, or a subsequent operation is causal.

The source tests competing accounts of inference and ends by affirming parāmarśa as its extraordinary cause.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The crucial qualified cognition

The subject is the mountain; smoke is the inferential mark; fire is the probandum.

The reason is apprehended as qualified by its pervasion by the probandum.

The characteristic formulation is that fire-pervaded smoke is present on the mountain.

This specific cognition is proposed as the extraordinary cause of the ensuing inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Parāmarśa is not mere knowledge of smoke or mere recollection of a rule.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Account of Subsumptive Reflection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What is the extraordinary cause?

Mīmāṃsaka proposal

- Recall the general smoke–fire pervasion.
- Know that smoke occurs on this mountain.
- A separate subsumptive cognition adds no explanatory power.

Naiyāyika reply

- The two antecedents yield a distinct qualified cognition.
- That cognition makes the inference possible.
- A causal account must identify the final relevant state.

The controversy concerns causal priority, not denial of the smoke–fire example.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The economy objection

- Mīmāṃsakas treat recollection and subject-property cognition as sufficient jointly.
- They dispute that a separate parāmarśa invariably occurs before every inference.
- Making it simultaneous with inference fails to explain an antecedent cause.
- The dispute asks whether explanatory economy or a qualified final cognition should govern.

KEY INSIGHT

The candidate cause must be shown to precede inference rather than be named after it.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mīmāṃsaka Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Recognition cannot replace subsumption

One might recognize present smoke as the very smoke known to be pervaded by fire.

But an inference can arise without a separate recognition of this identity.

Demanding recognition after recognition risks an endless sequence of prerequisites.

The source therefore denies recognition the status of a universally required cause.

KEY INSIGHT

A possible accompanying cognition is not automatically an indispensable cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Recognition of Identity Is Not a Cause of Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Nor is pervasion of this particular smoke alone enough

A proposed cause is cognition that the mountain-smoke is pervaded by fire.

Sense contact with that particular reason is not available in every inference.

Recollection of the general relation can still support inferential cognition.

A source-wide account cannot demand perceptual access to each particular smoke.

KEY INSIGHT

A cause must work even when the relevant particular is beyond present sensation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of the Pervasion of the Subject-Property

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can mind substitute for the external senses?

- Mind can support external-object doubt, as in wondering about a remote person.
- Dream cognition may arise with sleep and mnemonic impressions.
- These cases are raised to explain a mental reflection on an unseen mountain.
- The answer denies that dreaming or unsupported mind alone is a veridical external sense.

KEY INSIGHT

Mental processing assists inference without becoming ordinary external perception.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Mind Can Produce Perceptual Cognition of External Objects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remembered smoke and general pervasion

The opponent recalls smoke as delimited by smokehood.

The maxim is that whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire.

Without previous cognition of that rule, the present inference is unavailable.

Yet the rule need not be newly perceived in the remote case.

KEY INSIGHT

The example distinguishes recalled generality from immediately sensed particulars.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inference of Fire's Pervasion in Remembered Smoke

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can inference occur amid residual doubt?

The particular smoke may be classified as smoke without settling all possible doubts.

Remembered smoke–fire pervasion can displace doubt about this smoke.

The inferential act or subsumptive cognition can remove remaining uncertainty.

The availability of such doubt does not make inference impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

Uncertainty about an application does not refute every causal account of inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inference Is Possible Despite Doubt

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Do we need two separate ascertainments?

One proposed step identifies smokehood-delimited smoke on the mountain.

Another would separately prove that this very smoke is fire-pervaded.

The prima facie position rejects that extra required division.

Recollection of the rule together with mountain-smoke cognition is offered instead.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent presses economy against proliferation of cognitive stages.

SOURCE TOPIC · Separate Ascertainment of Pervasion Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowability under alternatives

The example asks whether an object exists or does not exist.

An objection treats the opposing alternatives as impossible to apprehend together.

The reply invokes a property distinct from the opposing predicates.

An inference with smoke or light as a disjunctive reason illustrates the structure.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternation of reasons is not automatically a contradiction in knowability.

SOURCE TOPIC · Knowability Is Possible in Both Alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Difference and identity are not independent causes

A candidate obstruction is awareness that mountain-smoke differs from remembered smoke.

Another candidate cause is awareness of identity with the pervaded smoke.

The source argues that the complete inferential causal complex can survive these cases.

Neither difference-awareness nor identity-awareness receives independent causal priority.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal explanation should not be multiplied by optional recognitions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Neither Cognition of Difference nor Identity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does qualified cognition introduce needless duplication?

A special qualified cognition of mountain and fire-pervaded smoke is proposed.

The opponent questions its necessity once the pervasion and reason-location are known.

The stated reply maintains that inference can arise from those materials.

This sets up the established conclusion's more exact account of the final qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The same examples support sharply different analyses of what is causally essential.

SOURCE TOPIC · Qualified Cognition Is Not a Cause: Prima Facie

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can a universal serve as inferential reason?

The discussion tests cowhood and sweetness in claims of difference.

An individual cow is cognized through a qualification by cowhood.

The general and individual can be related without an infinite regress.

This allows a universal or an intermediate property to be relevant to a reason.

KEY INSIGHT

A general inferential property need not be reduced to an isolated individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Conclusion: A Universal as Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How the source changes argumentative direction

Prima facie conclusion

- Recollection and subject-propertyhood appear sufficient.
- Recognition and extra qualifications appear dispensable.
- Economy weighs against a special causal state.

Established position

- A further qualified subsumptive cognition is affirmed.
- Pervasion and occurrence in the subject qualify the reason.
- The resulting inference follows this final cognition.

The text explicitly distinguishes pūrvapakṣa from siddhānta; they should not be conflated.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gaṅgeśa states the established doctrine

- Perceived or recollected pervasion supplies the general link of the mark to the probandum.
- Cognition of subject-propertyhood identifies the relevant reason in the subject.
- Their relation issues in the subsumptive reflection of pervaded smoke on the mountain.
- That reflection, rather than the two materials separately, is the extraordinary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential conclusion follows a synthesis of the universal relation and local reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion concerning Subsumptive Reflection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Difference from smoke is not itself a reason

The inference may mention smoke or light as alternative fire-related marks.

Mere otherness from smoke or light includes many things with no fire.

Thus otherness is not an adequate delimitor of pervasion.

Smokehood and lighthood are the suitable candidate delimiting characters.

KEY INSIGHT

A legitimate reason must be pervaded by fire, not merely different from another mark.

SOURCE TOPIC · Otherness from That Is Not the Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified subsumption and perceptual cognition

An objection says cognition of smoke as fire-pervaded may be perceptual.

The reply examines perception of smoke with remembered pervasion and subject-propertyhood.

Distinct qualifications of smokehood or lighthood enter the explanation.

But the target inferential cause remains knowing that a fire-pervaded mark occurs in the subject.

KEY INSIGHT

Perceptual assistance does not collapse the inference into direct perception of hidden fire.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of Being Pervaded Is Perceptual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why pervasion itself is not a redundant qualifier

- Being fire-pervaded is proposed as a delimiter of the reason's general pervasion.
- The source asks how this is grounded in individual smokes actually cognized.
- Cognition of separate individual pervasions cannot simply be bypassed by stipulation.
- The subject and pervasion must be jointly determined in the relevant cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The established doctrine resists a free-floating universal relation detached from the case.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Pervaded by Fire Is Not the Delimitor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PRIMA FACIE AND ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES OF SUBSUMPTIVE REFLECTION

Acceptance of a qualified cause is not a defect

A distinct qualified cognition is sometimes accused of explanatory excess.

The reply holds its causal efficacy to be supported by examination of cognition.

Mental reflection may work with recollection where a particular smoke is not sensed.

The source rejects the need for an additional pramāṇa called application.

KEY INSIGHT

Parāmarśa is a cognitive operation within inference, not another independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Application Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Against the identity-with-the-pervaded proposal

The opponent proposes matching a present smoke with fire-pervaded smoke in general.

That recognition could appear to obviate a further inferential step.

But fire at this very mountain has not previously been directly perceived.

Recognition by impression therefore cannot supply veridical perception of mountain-fire.

KEY INSIGHT

Remembered pervasion does not become a fresh sensory encounter with the probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Apprehending Identity with the Pervaded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the sandalwood analogy has a limit

- Sandalwood-fragrance recognition can invoke an earlier sense-acquaintance with fragrance.
- The mountain's hidden fire was not similarly perceived there before the inference.
- Perception of smoke and recollection of smoke–fire relation must remain distinct.
- The source refuses to treat remembered correlation as direct sight of unseen fire.

KEY INSIGHT

A memory-assisted recognition requires prior acquaintance of the right kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Veridical Perception of Fire Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal requirements for qualified perception

The qualifier must be known and its relation to the qualificand apprehended.

Non-apprehension of their non-relation is included among the conditions.

Perception of the qualificand and proper sense contact are also required.

The mountain is not in sensory contact as visibly qualified by its hidden fire.

KEY INSIGHT

The detailed perceptual causal test protects the distinction from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Causes of Qualified Perception

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Universals versus individual inferential marks

- Some scholars formulate reflection as mountain possession of smokehood pervaded by fire.
- If smokehood alone were the reason, the particular smoke would become dispensable.
- The text observes that people infer from a particular smoke without comprehensive universals.
- Hence the individual inferential mark figures in the third subsumptive reflection.

KEY INSIGHT

The reasoning connects an actual reason in the subject to a general pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Individual Inferential Mark and Third Reflection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Another formulation: probandum pervades the subject-property

- Some scholars describe reflection as fire pervading the smoke found on the mountain.
- They distinguish fire’s pervadingness from smoke’s being pervaded.
- The proposal stresses a relation of the probandum to the subject-property.
- The ensuing reply criticizes needless multiplicity of jointly required cognitions.

KEY INSIGHT

Different grammatical forms do not always imply different causal machinery.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another View: Probandum Pervades Subject-Property

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can a subject become the resulting qualificand?

An objection notes that the mountain can be subordinate in prior cognition.

Yet the final inference predicates fire of that mountain.

The reply compares “staff belongs to the man” with “man is staff-bearing.”

A resulting cognition need not preserve the earlier qualificand in precisely the same role.

KEY INSIGHT

The shift of grammatical focus does not disable inferential causation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Rule concerning the Subject as Qualificand

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What directly causes the inference?

The reason as an object

- One might call the individual smoke the extraordinary cause.
- A present smoke then appears to have causal priority.
- The account strains when the mark concerns past or future cases.

Reflection on the reason

- The mark is a qualifier within subsumptive cognition.
- That cognition may concern past, future, or present cases.
- Its validity controls the resulting inference's validity.

A reason can figure within causal cognition without having independent causal power.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Past and future marks exclude physical presence as cause

The inference need not refer only to presently visible smoke.

Replacing future smoke by its prior absence is rejected as an artificial qualifier.

Replacing past smoke by its destruction also makes temporal doubts problematic.

The general cause remains cognition concerning a mark pervaded by the probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

What matters is the valid subsumptive reflection, not the current existence of smoke.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Inferential Mark Is Not the Cause of Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PRIMA FACIE AND ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES OF SUBSUMPTIVE REFLECTION

Is pervasion the cause and reflection only its operation?

Some scholars treat cognition of pervasion as the extraordinary cause.

They then call subsumptive reflection an operation of that prior cognition.

The established position identifies the mnemonic impression as causing recollection.

Subsumptive reflection arises subsequently and immediately gives rise to inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The source ultimately locates the final causal role in parāmarśa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative View: Cognition of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Result: the third subsumptive reflection

The general relation

Smoke is known as pervaded by fire.

The local application

Smoke is cognized as occurring on the mountain.

The final cognition

Fire-pervaded smoke is present in this subject.

Inferential result


Fire is inferred of the mountain; the mark itself is not the final cause.

The source closes the doctrine of subsumptive reflection before discussing the types of inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Purely Affirmative Inference: Preliminary Debate and Established Conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

An analysis of the English translation: arguments, objections, refutations, and established doctrines.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Purely Affirmative Inference: Preliminary Debate and Established Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

When a probandum has no counter-instance

I

Three forms

Affirmative, negative, and affirmative-negative inference.

II

Provisional definition

Purely affirmative lacks an instance of the probandum's absence.

III

Critical tests

Nameability, ether, and kinds of absence.

IV

Established definition

Counterpositiveness of an instantiated absolute absence.

V

Conditions

Knowability, doubt, and sufficient apprehension of pervasion.

The source defends purely affirmative inference while refining what absence of a counter-instance means.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

The threefold inferential division

The translation distinguishes purely affirmative, purely negative, and mixed inference.

Purely affirmative inference has no counter-instance of the probandum.

The illustrative inference is: a jar is nameable because it is knowable.

The claim is examined in terms of where nameability could be absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The defining issue is whether the probandum genuinely permits a dissimilar instance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

Nameability and the problem of the unnameable

An object called unnameable may still be referred to as “ether.”

The opponent argues that the expression unsettles nameability’s supposed universality.

The reply distinguishes unnameability identical with an alleged object from a distinct property.

Neither reading furnishes the needed straightforward counter-instance.

KEY INSIGHT

A verbal designation is not sufficient to establish the proposed counterexample.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection to the Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absolute absence and the proposed criterion

An early definition concerns counterpositiveness of an absolute absence.

What counts as an instantiated absence must be specified carefully.

Ordinary conjunction is not pure affirmation, because its absence occurs somewhere.

The source tests whether being excluded and counterpositiveness are distinct types.

KEY INSIGHT

Defining the class requires a criterion that survives counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · Defect in the Alternative Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

The end of a quality is not purely affirmative

The discussion considers absolute absence arising with destruction of a quality.

Before destruction, the prior absence and the later absolute absence differ.

After destruction of the substratum, the former locus itself is gone.

This does not support the claim that the relevant absence occurs everywhere.

KEY INSIGHT

Changes in a locus cannot be ignored when classifying an absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Absolute Absence That Destroys a Quality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The ether case

An opponent proposes an absolute absence destroying ether.

The putative destruction of ether would require a corresponding locus.

The source denies a general inference from “absence of absence” to pure affirmation.

Its final verdict distinguishes claims about ether from generic names for absences.

KEY INSIGHT

Complex negative expressions do not by themselves satisfy the definition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Absolute Absence Destroying Ether

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From the tentative test to the final test

Earlier account

- No counter-instance of the probandum is found.
- Various descriptions of absence look sufficient.
- Ether and post-destruction cases create ambiguity.

Established criterion

- The relevant property is not the counterpositive of an instantiated absolute absence.
- Application depends on a genuinely possible locus of absence.
- The definition can be used with nameability and knowability.

The established conclusion tightens the ontology underlying the inference type.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established definition of purely affirmative

The source explicitly states its established conclusion.

A purely affirmative property is not counterpositive to an instantiated absolute absence.

Ether lacks origination and destruction in this analysis.

Knowability and nameability are considered possible cases under the refined test.

KEY INSIGHT

The absence must be instantiated, not merely verbally posited.

SOURCE TOPIC · Purely Affirmative Inference: Established Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

How knowability can be generalized

An objection denies that being an object of veridical cognition is a universalizable property.

The reply invokes an indirect relation to means-of-knowledge character.

This allows knowability to apply to multiple individuals.

The source examines both the individual and the qualifying universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument concerns the range of a property, not a claim that every cognition is veridical.

SOURCE TOPIC · Knowability Is Purely Affirmative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

The word: individual or universal?

Some scholars give lexical priority to cognition of an individual.

They deny that a word primarily signifies a universal.

The reply points to possession of universals by individuals and the matup suffix.

It distinguishes qualifierhood and qualificandhood in semantic cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The semantic debate is part of the epistemic defence of generality.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of the Individual Is the Denotatum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Doubt as an auxiliary cause

A doubt may obstruct establishing the probandum in the subject.

Ascertaining the probandum removes or answers that uncertainty.

The example asks whether a jar is knowable or not.

The text warns against multiplying auxiliary causes for the same cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A recognizable inferential problem can exist without a negative example.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt Is a Component of Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility for doubt versus actual doubt

A competing proposal requires eligibility for doubt, not doubt now actually entertained.

The relevant doubt may already have disappeared by the inferential moment.

But treating eligibility only as lack of confirming or defeating evidence is defective.

Its qualification must be given with the source's criterion of instantiated absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests how a potential uncertainty functions in the inferential sequence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Eligibility for Doubt Is a Component

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY AFFIRMATIVE INFERENCE: PRELIMINARY DEBATE AND ESTABLISHED CONCLUSION

Is negative concomitance always needed?

- The opponent says an affirmative-only inference lacks a negative counter-instance.
- Without that counter-instance, one might question the probative force of the reason.
- The reply says ascertainment of either affirmative or negative pervasion suffices.
- Both modes are not individually indispensable for each valid inference.

KEY INSIGHT

An affirmative pervasion can support inference in the absence of any negative example.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ascertainment of Pervasion on One Side Is Sufficient

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Affirmative-negative is a different case

A mixed inference can display both similar instances and dissimilar instances.

The presence of both patterns in a mixed example does not make both causal requirements universal.

A purely affirmative reason lacks a counter-instance to test negatively.

Its classification follows the probandum's range, not a failure to search widely enough.

KEY INSIGHT

The trichotomy separates logical form from a fixed classroom proof template.

SOURCE TOPIC · Threefold Classification of Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Result: purely affirmative inference defended

Class

There is no counter-instance of the probandum.

Definition

It is not counterpositive to an instantiated absolute absence.

Example

Knowability and nameability receive detailed scrutiny.

Pervasion


An affirmative grasp may suffice without negative concomitance.

The source closes the affirmative-inference account and proceeds to purely negative inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Purely Negative Inference: Definition, Objections, and Earth-Example

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

An analysis of the English translation: arguments, objections, refutations, and established doctrines.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Purely Negative Inference: Definition, Objections, and Earth-Example

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Inference without a similar instance



Classification

A purely negative inference has no positive example.

Earth argument

Odor and difference from other substances.

Objections

Is negative pervasion genuinely inferential?

Probandum

How can an absence or difference be familiar?

Established position

Negative concomitance yields subject-specific ascertainment.

This presentation follows the source through its first established reply and later alternatives concerning earth.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Definition and central example

A purely negative inference has no similar instance.

It proceeds from cognition of negative pervasion.

The illustration argues that earth differs from the other eight substances because it has odor.

The other substances do not provide a comparable positive example of the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

The absent positive instance makes the negative relation decisive.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Purely Negative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Negative concomitance in the earth case

The argument relates absence of difference to absence of odor.

In counter-instances other than earth, odor is absent.

The question is whether this exclusion can generate a positive conclusion about earth.

The example places difference, not simply odor, as the inferential target.

KEY INSIGHT

Negative pervasion is the route by which the reason supports exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Earth and the Eight Other Substances

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does negative pervasion produce inference?

Prima facie objection

- Only affirmative pervasion and subject-propertyhood cause inference.
- Negative concomitance merely yields a negative cognition.
- Thus purely negative inference would lack an independent inferential cause.

Reply

- Different causal complexes can produce different inferences.
- Knowledge of negative pervasion is a distinct causal resource.
- Positive causes are not required in every negative inference.

The general form of inference need not erase variation in its causal complexes.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Distinct causal routes are permitted

A positive reason pervaded by a probandum yields one kind of inferential reflection.

In the negative case, the reason’s absence is related to the probandum’s absence.

The source refuses to demand one identical cause for every inferential type.

Absence of a positive example is not an inferential defect by itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal account must track the structure of the specific inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY NEGATIVE INFERENCE: DEFINITION, OBJECTIONS, AND EARTH-EXAMPLE

Can affirmative pervasion be inferred first?

One proposal derives negative pervasion only after establishing the positive counterpart.

But the proposal makes the negative example redundant.

Requiring a fresh positive inference at every stage threatens regress.

The source therefore treats negative concomitance as independently apprehensible.

KEY INSIGHT

A negative inference should not depend circularly on a completed positive inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative Pervasion from Affirmative Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From negative concomitance to affirmative pervasion

The rule is: wherever the probandum is absent, the reason is absent.

A positive relation can be reached from such an unobstructed negative relation.

The source requires freedom from extraneous conditions in this transfer.

Earth’s odor and its difference from other substances supply the illustration.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical relation can be grasped through the exclusion of counter-instances.

SOURCE TOPIC · Affirmative Pervasion from Negative Concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY NEGATIVE INFERENCE: DEFINITION, OBJECTIONS, AND EARTH-EXAMPLE

Is earthhood, rather than odor, the reason?

One objection observes that odor’s occurrence is delimited by earthhood.

It proposes earthhood as the proper inferential reason.

The reply distinguishes the delimiter of the subject from a special property.

The text invokes Udayana in reviewing which feature may function as a reason.

KEY INSIGHT

The fine structure of the reason affects the classification of the inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Earthhood Alone Is the Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Negative subsumptive reflection

An alternative view makes cognition of negative pervasion itself causally decisive.

It considers the absence of the reason in the absence of the probandum.

A special negative subsumptive reflection then precedes inference.

One can retain reflection in general while allowing different special causal forms.

KEY INSIGHT

The alternative reconciles the inference types at the level of parāmarśa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The unfamiliar-probandum challenge

- The opponent asks how “difference from other substances” is known before inference.
- If it is entirely unknown, no content seems available for the proof.
- If fully known already, the inference may appear pointless.
- The reply distinguishes the general notion of a probandum from its establishment here.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior comprehension of a property is not identical to ascertainment in this subject.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: The Probandum Is Unestablished

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earth and water supply accessible differences

Earth and water are already available as recognizable things.

Their distinct properties make differences intelligible.

Absence of earthhood in water and related counter-instances can be apprehended.

The probandum is thus not an utterly inconceivable novelty.

KEY INSIGHT

The known counterpositives ground the intelligibility of their difference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Dissimilarity Is Not Unfamiliar

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PURELY NEGATIVE INFERENCE: DEFINITION, OBJECTIONS, AND EARTH-EXAMPLE

Should mutual absence itself be the probandum?

Some propose a collection of mutual absences of other substances.

That collection can become unfamiliar or yield an uncommon reason.

The source examines the alternative of combined difference across the contrasted substances.

The intended probandum must remain available for inferential qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

A negative predication still requires a carefully specified logical object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mutual Absence Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Difference from multiple contrasted substances

The translation examines earth as different from light and other numbered entities.

A first doubt about difference from light can lead to a second broader doubt.

The combined difference can become the target of inference.

Alternatively, multiple separately considered absences determine the relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The description of a complex probandum matters to the proof's scope.

SOURCE TOPIC · Difference from the Twelve Beginning with Water

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A controversial statement does not settle the issue

An assertion that earth differs from others may initially be disputed.

Doubt about the statement's authority is not ascertainment of earth's difference.

Nor does repeating the contested statement remove every uncertainty.

The prima facie discussion therefore retains a need for negative inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Doubt and testimony cannot be conflated with the argument's inferential result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established doctrine: difference may be apprehended

The source takes earthen jars as a site where difference is perceptually accessible.

That perception yields the general form of the probandum.

The intended inference then establishes difference in the disputed subject.

The argument no longer needs to infer a wholly unknown logical form.

KEY INSIGHT

A prior general acquaintance supports a new subject-specific inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion concerning Purely Negative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligible non-apprehension and absence

The earlier teachers question perception of difference from imperceptible atoms.

Mere failure to notice a counterpositive does not always establish absence.

The reply requires a locus where an eligible counterpositive is impossible.

Hypothetical reasoning together with eligible non-apprehension supports absence-cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every absence follows from simply failing to see something.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection of the Earlier Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the negative relation is still needed

One objection says affirmative inference already establishes earth's difference.

The reply points to cases where complete exclusion is not gained from positive pervasion.

Negative concomitance excludes appropriate counter-instances.

An affirmative proof does not automatically make negative inference useless.

KEY INSIGHT

The evidential work of exclusion deserves separate recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative Inference Does Not Arise from Affirmative Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Proving what is generally known in a new subject

A general property may be known without being established in a particular subject.

For example, non-eternality is understood before it is inferred of speech.

Similarly, difference can be generally understood before its inferential determination in earth.

The source rejects the charge that such inference is merely redundant.

KEY INSIGHT

Knowledge of the predicate and knowledge of its instantiation are distinct.

SOURCE TOPIC · Re-establishment of an Already Established Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which portion of earth is the subject?

Doubt may concern a particular earthen jar or a broader earth-class.

If the probandum is already certain in one portion, no inference is needed there.

The doubtful portion can be the proper inferential subject.

The source distinguishes general class-terms from subjecthood in the actual act.

KEY INSIGHT

Pakṣatā belongs to what remains unsettled, not automatically to every instance.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Jar Can Be the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative descriptions of the negative target

The source considers thirteen separate mutual absences.

Another proposal uses absence of properties such as waterhood distinct from earthhood.

Other scholars treat familiar counterpositives as enough to make absence knowable.

These alternatives are weighed for their actual probative contribution.

KEY INSIGHT

Different representations of difference must be tested for unnecessary complexity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Position and Absolute Absences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why a positive reformulation may fail

A positive inference is again proposed once general difference is familiar.

The reply denies that the same probandum is automatically established in earth thereby.

Its relation to counter-instances such as water still needs negative pervasion.

A counter-inference “Earth is water because of earthhood” is defeated by deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

The established defence still assigns unique work to negative concomitance.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative Inference Is Not Established by Affirmative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part I: what the earth-example establishes

Definition

No similar instance and a negative pervasion.

Cause

Negative concomitance or negative subsumptive reflection.

Probandum

Difference must be generally intelligible before local establishment.

Subject


The doubtful portion, not necessarily every known earthen thing.

Part II continues the same source discussion with the Self, desire, and further objections.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Purely Negative Inference: The Self, Desire, and Final Doctrine

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

An analysis of the English translation: arguments, objections, refutations, and established doctrines.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Purely Negative Inference: The Self, Desire, and Final Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From earth to the inference of the Self



The source closes purely negative inference through a detailed examination of the Self and its negative examples.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Familiarity of the probandum is indispensable

An object’s presence in a subject can be unknown before inference.

Its general meaning nevertheless must be intelligible.

The source asks how the Self can be inferred from respiration or desire.

General notions of selfhood and non-selfhood precede local inferential establishment.

KEY INSIGHT

A property may be known generally without yet being verified of this body.

SOURCE TOPIC · Familiarity of the Probandum Is Indispensable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Desire, causality, and the Self

The proposed proof treats desire as an effect requiring an inherent causal basis.

The Self is considered as the candidate substratum of desire.

But mere conjunction with the Self cannot be the reason: jars also have such conjunction.

The relevant distinguishing causal relation needs a more exact delimiter.

KEY INSIGHT

An inference about the Self cannot rely on a relation shared by inert objects.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection That Desire Is Not Produced by an Inherent Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why a causal delimiter matters

The text examines conjunction with the Self as a non-inherent cause of desire.

Assuming the crucial delimiter already proved risks proving what is established.

Without the delimiter, the supposed negative inference loses specification.

Arbitrarily treating any unknown object as inferable from jarhood is rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal relation must explain this special effect, not just coexist with it.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of Delimitation by Conjunction with the Self

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established reply: conjunction qualified by Self

The proponent differentiates bare conjunction from conjunction delimited by Self-presence.

Desirehood is discussed as a distinct quality of desire.

The qualification prevents over-extension to jars and other inert things.

The argument depends on the precise form of the non-inherent cause.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified relation, not mere association, supplies inferential discrimination.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Delimited by Conjunction with the Self

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An alternative account of selfhood

Another account characterizes the substratum of desire by pervasive conjunction with Self.

It compares the substratum of a special quality with the substratum of sound.

Respiration, desire, movement, growth, and decline are examined in the living body.

Their absence in inert things supplies negative examples.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed evidence draws its significance from contrasting living and inert cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Doctrine of Selfhood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can affirmative inference make negative inference redundant?

An opponent proposes proving the Self by absence of obstruction to life.

The response denies that this eliminates the need for negative inference.

The source examines movement and effort with both positive and negative concomitance.

An inert jar lacks the relevant qualified causal relation of a living body.

KEY INSIGHT

Different inferential methods may establish differently specified conclusions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Without Negative Inference the Body Cannot Be Established as Possessing a Self

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The substratum of desire differs from eight substances

Desire is taken as a quality residing in a substance.

A question asks whether that substance differs from the other eight substances.

General ignorance of such a distinct substratum creates an epistemic difficulty.

Negative inference is proposed to determine the relevant difference.

KEY INSIGHT

The probandum is difference of the bearer of desire, not mere existence of desire.

SOURCE TOPIC · Desire Resides in a Substance Different from the Eight Substances

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Doubt is not already a proof

An opponent calls the inferential task redundant after doubt arises.

But doubt merely presents alternatives about the probandum.

It does not ascertain the Self's difference or the absence of alternatives.

The source retains negative pervasion as necessary for determination.

KEY INSIGHT

Uncertainty about two options is not equivalent to establishing one option.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection That Doubt Does Not Determine Negative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does unfavorable hypothetical reasoning add?

An objection combines doubt with an unfavorable tarka.

The reply requires adequate prior cognition of what the probandum is.

The Self as substratum of desire must be distinguished from the other eight substances.

Only then can a relevant negative proof specify the difference.

KEY INSIGHT

Tarka cannot rescue an inference whose probandum has not been made intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · First Objection: Doubt about the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does a positive instance make the reason affirmative?

- Once an affirmative example is known, the reason may appear no longer purely negative.
- The answer allows negative inference when negative pervasion is recalled without positive pervasion.
- A reason's uncommonness is context-dependent, not an automatic defect in all settings.
- The source compares special cases involving gold, luminosity, and non-eternal sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The operative cognition of pervasion, not only a catalog of examples, matters.

SOURCE TOPIC · Second Objection: The Reason Would Become Affirmative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why positive inference may still not establish difference

An objector infers desire's residence in Self affirmatively.

But that may give only general cognition of the substratum.

The precise probandum—difference from the eight other substances—remains.

Negative pervasion supplies this more specific exclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

A proof of presence and a proof of distinctive exclusion have different targets.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative Inference Is Not Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God’s desire and indirect knowledge of Self

- The text discusses divine desire as absent from the eight other substances.
- It asks whether the Self as the relevant substratum is directly known.
- The reply permits knowledge of the substratum while inferring its difference.
- The analogy of sandalwood-fragrance shows the qualifier need not be learned by one uniform route.

KEY INSIGHT

The source distinguishes what is perceived about a locus from what is inferred of it.

SOURCE TOPIC · Negative Concomitance with the Eight Substances

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Some scholars: difference without full prior classification

An alternative view permits inference of difference from the eight without prior complete knowledge.

An apparent counter-reason is raised against the claim.

The response says the unfavorable reason is defeated in this setting.

The result remains dependent on how the negative relation is established.

KEY INSIGHT

The source registers rival assessments rather than hiding their disagreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Views of Some Scholars concerning Negative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A different claim: mutual absence is the probandum

Other scholars make mutual absence or difference itself the inferential target.

Earthhood indicates exclusion of the other substances from earth.

Water and analogous counter-instances already display absence of earthhood.

The structure seeks an absent positive example with a valid negative relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The form of the negative probandum can be specified as mutual absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Another View: Absence Is the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From desire to selfhood in a living body

- Desire is proposed as residing in the Self.
- Jars and other inert objects lack desire and become negative examples.
- Respiration and similar properties separate a living body from inert objects.
- The source uses negative concomitance in explaining the inference of selfhood.

KEY INSIGHT

The absent living properties of inert loci support the contrast essential to the argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · Selfhood Can Be Established in a Living Body

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Negative inference and epistemic validity

Invalid cognition fails to produce successful action for a competent agent.

The source examines a cognition’s capacity to produce successful activity.

The absence of an opposed delimiting property is used in the analysis.

It calls this non-delimitation a form of the cognition’s validity.

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment connects negative inference to the earlier problem of prāmāṇya.

SOURCE TOPIC · Validity as Not Being Delimited by a Property Occurring in a Different Locus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What must be grasped of the reason?

- The relevant reason must stand as counterpositive to an absence tied to the probandum's absence.
- The source asks how this works when the probandum has not yet been established locally.
- A valid complete causal complex permits qualification of the subject by the probandum.
- The mere presence of an arbitrary feature is not enough to carry the conclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

Negative inference requires an apt exclusion relation, not an unfamiliar predicate plus any mark.

SOURCE TOPIC · Counterpositive of an Absence Pervading the Absence of the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference for oneself and for another

For oneself

- A general notion of difference may be personally available.
- The cognition of negative concomitance can establish the disputed case.
- The speaker need not first form a five-member public argument.

For another

- The hearer may lack familiarity with the intended probandum.
- A thesis cannot be intelligibly stated with an unknown target.
- The source limits this specified negative-inference method in such contexts.

The difference concerns the hearer’s prerequisites for intelligible inference.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Result: a precise negative inferential test

Probandum

General familiarity is needed even when local certainty is absent.

Reason

A genuine mark must not deviate from the absence of the probandum.

Negative examples

Inert substances help specify exclusions in the Self debate.

Scope


The closing account distinguishes inference for oneself and for others.

The text then moves to the Theory of Presumption (Arthāpatti).

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Presumption (Arthāpatti) · Part I: Doubt, Conflict, and Inference

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Objections, counterexamples, inferential structures, and established conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Presumption (Arthāpatti) · Part I: Doubt, Conflict, and Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The epistemological question: is arthāpatti independent?

01

Challenge

Does purely negative inference make presumption redundant?

02

Mīmāṃsā thesis

Conflicting judgments about Devadatta prompt postulation.

03

Objections

Can mere doubt or absence cause reliable external-location cognition?

04

Naiyāyika account

Inference and hypothetical reasoning resolve the contradiction.

05

Further testing

Defeaters, special causes and fresh Mīmāṃsaka proposals.

The section explicitly alternates a prima facie account with a later established response.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Opening objection: no separate pramāṇa

- The text begins after establishing the possibility of purely negative inference.
- A critic argues that all work assigned to presumption may already be done by that inference.
- The dispute is about the source of knowledge, not whether unobserved facts can be known.
- The Mīmāṃsaka proposes a distinctive operation that must resist reduction to inference.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed new means of knowledge must perform an epistemic role that inference cannot.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: Presumption Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Devadatta: the house and the unseen person

Evidence is invoked for Devadatta's continued life, including a specified long lifespan.

A rule is assumed connecting the living Devadatta with presence in the house.

Eligible non-apprehension establishes that he is not in the house.

The Mīmāṃsaka says the conflict prompts cognition that he is outside.

KEY INSIGHT

External presence is the inferred or postulated answer to seemingly incompatible claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Mīmāṃsaka View of Presumption Based on Doubt

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What exactly causes the postulation?

Possible Mīmāṃsaka causes

- Doubt about whether Devadatta is alive.
- Doubt between rules of living and compulsory indoor presence.
- Cognition of conflict between the two ascertainments.

Naiyāyika challenge

- The qualifier “being alive” is disputed or doubtful.
- A qualified inferential mark requires secure premises.
- Doubt as such does not always select a true alternative.

The proposed extraordinary cause must distinguish this case from ordinary uncertainty.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Not every doubt produces supposition

Doubt whether a distant object is a post or a person does not necessitate a postulation.

Doubt about being alive may arise even when the person has died.

The Mīmāṃsaka response invokes a special causal complex involving an eligible counterpositive.

The restriction is meant to avoid overextension from Devadatta's case to all doubts.

KEY INSIGHT

The controversy turns on what differentiates epistemically productive doubt.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt Is Not the Cause of Supposition: Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why choose “outside” rather than “dead”?

- If living and necessary residence are supported by apparently equal evidence, both could be challenged.
- Supposing death would preserve the indoor-residence rule while rejecting the living premise.
- Supposing outdoor presence would preserve the life premise while rejecting compulsory residence.
- The source tests whether there is an independent ground for preferring either alternative.

KEY INSIGHT

Presumption needs a principled selection rule, not a preferred narrative.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: Supposition of External Presence Is Incoherent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The negative-inference alternative

Inference offered by Naiyāyika

- Take Devadatta to be alive on unopposed grounds.
- Know his absence in the house.
- Establish external presence using negative inferential relation.

Presumption advocate replies

- The antecedent certainty about life is at issue.
- Two ascertainments cannot remain valid in contradiction.
- A further epistemic operation may be required.

Whether the known reason is located in the subject becomes decisive.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mutual contradiction: what must be withdrawn?

> “He lives for a hundred years” and “he remains only in the house” jointly resist his absence there.

> The source distinguishes sublating a rule about residence from sublating several cognitions about life.

> The Mīmāṃsaka argues that external presence resolves the conflict more selectively.

> This account weighs how much established knowledge must be abandoned.

KEY INSIGHT

Contradiction is analyzed by the number and kind of cognitions it displaces.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mutual Contradiction of the Two Ascertainments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy and complexity in postulation

- Temporal judgments such as “alive today” and “alive tomorrow” support many life-related regularities.
- Rejecting life may overturn more concomitances than rejecting exclusive indoor presence.
- The discussion considers whether positive external presence is more economical than death.
- A contrary accounting is presented: an external location may imply extra relations.

KEY INSIGHT

Economy is argued for, not assumed to decide the problem automatically.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt Produces the Supposition of External Presence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tarka: a cooperating cognitive operation

- Hypothetical reasoning weighs the consequences of alternative suppositions.
- The Mīmāṃsaka treats it as an auxiliary cause that selects the less complex account.
- The text distinguishes a properly terminating hypothetical test from a pseudo-reason.
- The Naiyāyika later assigns that same operation a role in inference, not independent presumption.

KEY INSIGHT

The existence of tarka does not by itself establish a sixth pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Hypothetical Reasoning Is a Cooperative Cause of Presumption

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie conclusion on doubt

- The first account permits a special doubt, joined with tarka, to occasion veridical external-location knowledge.
- Defective doubt may instead produce erroneous cognition, analogized to a sense-organ defect.
- A difference between valid and invalid collections of cognitions remains necessary.
- The next section explicitly announces an established conclusion against this account.

KEY INSIGHT

The provisional thesis must not be mistaken for Gaṅgeśa's final determination.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conclusion of the Prima Facie Account of Presumption Based on Doubt

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion: a general inference

- A general inference establishes that two genuinely contradictory cognitions cannot both be valid.
- Hypothetical reasoning helps determine which of the rival means of cognition is defeated.
- The exclusive indoor-residence claim is set aside while the life claim survives.
- Purely negative inference can then establish Devadatta's external presence.

KEY INSIGHT

On this analysis there is no necessity to recognize presumption as an independent cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Established Conclusion concerning Presumption Caused by Doubt

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The “first knowledge” objection

Presumption supporter

- Indoor residence cannot be defeated before outdoor presence is known.
- Therefore the first knowledge of external presence must be presumption.
- Tarka appears to strengthen this act.

Naiyāyika reply

- General inference can first defeat an inconsistent means.
- Tarka assists this inferential sorting.
- External-location inference follows from the surviving premise.

The apparent circle is dissolved by distinguishing stages of defeating evidence.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the general inference is indispensable

The merely recognized existence of two opposed cognitions does not yet settle which is invalid.

Hypothetical reasoning directs the choice but does not alone perform the epistemic defeat.

An inference from general observation identifies one cognition as invalid.

The same inferential form can yield a more specific result with a suitable cooperative cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The source assigns a causal role to general inference rather than postulating another pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Inference from General Observation Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

One causal pattern, different specifications

Without special tarka, general inference can establish only that one competing means is invalid.

With tarka it can target the evidence for compulsory indoor presence.

The discussion denies that any arbitrary new conclusion can be generated from a familiar rule.

A proposed analogy from desire in the Self is rejected as involving a different qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential ground must remain compatible with its precise delimiting property.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Inference from General Observation Is Causal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Could an equally strong counter-reason defeat it?

An opponent proposes an inference toward Devadatta's death from compulsory residence and observed absence.

The opponent questions whether tarka increases strength when pervasion and subject-propertyhood look equal.

The Naiyāyika replies that otherwise special inferences would be countered systematically.

Independent evidence for life blocks the proposed opposing inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Strength is assessed within the complete inferential evidence, not by isolated symmetry.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Equally Strong Counter-reason against the Evidence Apprehending Being Alive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Hypothetical reasoning is cooperative, not sovereign

The text assigns tarka an auxiliary role in specifying the conclusion of general inference.

Without it the same pattern need not settle the special property at issue.

With it the reason can remove the threatened counter-inference.

Separating qualifier, qualificand and the absence of a qualified cognition avoids false cancellation.

KEY INSIGHT

The account remains an inference informed by supporting reasoning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Hypothetical Reasoning Is Cooperative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Another Mīmāṃsaka route is assessed

One variant says the first two statements about life and residence are mutually compatible.

Observed absence generates a contradiction specifically with compulsory residence.

External presence is then postulated against the allegedly invalid residence claim.

The rebuttal says doubt alone cannot determine a reliable outcome without a decisive auxiliary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Simply naming the chosen result “presumption” does not establish its independent validity.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of Some Mīmāṃsakas; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part I: where the controversy stands

Opening question

Does a separate presumption fill a genuine gap left by negative inference?

Mīmāṃsaka account

Special doubt and hypothetical economy generate external-location cognition.

Naiyāyika response

A general inferential defeat and negative inference supply the result.

Unfinished issue


The next proposal invokes “inexplicability” rather than doubt.

Next: whether arthāpatti is required to resolve something otherwise inexplicable.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Theory of Presumption (Arthāpatti) · Part II: Inexplicability and What Is Heard

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Objections, counterexamples, inferential structures, and established conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · The Theory of Presumption (Arthāpatti) · Part II: Inexplicability and What Is Heard

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Three tests of the claim that presumption is independent

01

Inexplicability

Can the living Devadatta be absent from home without being outside?

02

Inferential reduction

Does negative concomitance already supply the conclusion?

03

Peacock case

Is a newly located dance a matter of presumption?

04

What is heard

Does semantic fitness require unspoken words or meanings?

05

Conclusion

Gaṅgeśa separates what is inferred from what is supplied by language.

The section ends with an explicit Naiyāyika conclusion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From doubt to inexplicability

The second Mīmāṃsaka proposal no longer makes mere doubt the extraordinary cause.

It cites a cognition: the living Devadatta cannot be absent from the house without existing outside.

This impossibility without a postulated condition is termed inexplicability.

The claimed result is his presence outside the house.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed mechanism is knowledge of an otherwise inexplicable state.

SOURCE TOPIC · Presumption Caused by Inexplicability

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does inference already explain Devadatta?

Reduction to inference

- The living person does not occur within the house.
- A real existent absent at one place must be somewhere else.
- Thus external location appears inferable.

Mīmāṃsaka reply

- The alleged general pervasion is disputed.
- The required reason need not reside in the inferred subject.
- Cognition of inexplicability supplies a different causal role.

Both accounts target the same external-location cognition but assign it different causes.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Specific and general inexplicability

- A too-specific cognition of Devadatta outside would presuppose what it aims to prove.
- A merely general claim about somebody outside does not determine Devadatta's location.
- The Mīmāṃsaka responds with a general relation applied to this specified situation.
- The familiar smoke–fire inference is introduced as a parallel for a general rule applied locally.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection is about circularity and overextension, not the everyday plausibility of "outside".

SOURCE TOPIC · The Incoherence of Inexplicability; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The general rule and a particular conclusion

A rule relating smoke in general to fire can license fire on this mountain.

Similarly the presumption advocate applies a general inexplicability relation to Devadatta.

The specific conclusion need not already appear as a premise.

The criticism remains whether this relation differs from the generality required in inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Applying a general rule to a particular case is not by itself a new pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A more exact negative-inference proposal

An inferential mark may be characterized through the counterpositive of a relevant pervasive absence.

The Naiyāyika regards this as a regulator of negative inference.

The Mīmāṃsaka denies that the normal subject-property cognition required for inference is present.

They also distinguish a reason in the subject from an absence located in the house.

KEY INSIGHT

The technical dispute concerns the locus and form of the inferential sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Argument That Presumption Is Unnecessary; Presumption Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How many kinds of inference are in play?

- The source acknowledges affirmative, negative, and affirmative-negative forms of concomitance.
- The Mīmāṃsaka stresses that absence within the house is not itself a property of Devadatta.
- An inference requiring the subject to possess the reason therefore seems unavailable.
- The Naiyāyika explores a formulation involving Devadatta as counterpositive of the house-absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The rival analyses locate subject-propertyhood at different levels.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Three Types of Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can an absence disclose its counterpositive?

Mīmāṃsaka objection

- Devadatta is not sensed directly.
- A perceptual cognition with him as qualificand seems impossible.
- No third subsumptive reflection can arise.

Naiyāyika reply

- “Devadatta is absent” cognizes an absence and its counterpositive.
- The relevant delimitation is accessible in cognition of absence.
- Mind and recollection can support a final subsumptive reflection.

The debate returns to how perception of absence can ground inferential qualification.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Naiyāyika's final response on the absent person

- The cognition of Devadatta's absence presents counterpositiveness as a relevant relation.
- The reason can be known through its relation to the remembered Devadatta.
- The third parāmarśa need not be a fresh sensory encounter with Devadatta.
- Ordinary mental auxiliary causes suffice; no separate means of knowledge is needed.

KEY INSIGHT

A remembered subject can enter an inferential cause without new direct perception.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā's final claim from smoke and fire

- The opponent asks whether fire can be inferred from pervasion combined with recalled smoke.
- It claims a special cognition of "smoke is impossible without fire" may operate instead.
- It construes some cases as presumption where the inferential mark is not freshly perceived.
- This proposed distinction is addressed by the Naiyāyika's account of recollected qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The status of parāmarśa remains central to distinguishing the pramāṇas.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Mīmāṃsaka Conclusion—Presumption Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The peacock dancing on a mountain

Mīmāṃsā argues that knowledge of dancing somewhere does not pre-establish the mountain-locus.

Postulation of the new location supposedly cannot use a prior negative concomitance.

The Naiyāyika invokes an inference that dancing has a locus.

Excluding other loci specifies the mountain as its location.

KEY INSIGHT

An unknown particular location can be established from a general inferential structure.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Mīmāṃsaka View: A Peacock's Dancing; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An affirmative-negative version of the peacock proof

The alternative reason states that the dancing has a locus and no different locus.

The general relation associates a property restricted to a locus with that very locus.

From this restriction the dance's mountain-location is inferred.

The passage uses this as a counterexample to the need for an independent supposition.

KEY INSIGHT

Exclusion of alternative locations is used within inference, not treated as a new source.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika's Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The corpulent Devadatta who does not eat by day

The Bhāṭṭas use an utterance about corpulence with denial of daytime eating.

They propose the unstated fact of eating at night to restore coherence.

The case is designated presumption from what is heard (śrutārthāpatti).

The Naiyāyika allows nocturnal eating to be concluded from the known corpulence.

KEY INSIGHT

What must be supplied: an unuttered word, an unexpressed meaning, or an inference?

SOURCE TOPIC · The Bhāṭṭa Doctrine of Presumption from What Is Heard

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does a sentence need for fitness?

Bhāṭṭa account

- Word expectancy must be met by words.
- The phrase about eating at night is postulated.
- Only then can the heard expression deliver coherent meaning.

Naiyāyika account

- Sentence meanings can relate without unspoken words.
- What needs explanation is the established corpulence.
- The unseen eating is inferred from it.

The opposition concerns the source of cognition, not merely the missing fact.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Injunction, apūrva, and unspoken mediation

The discussion also invokes “One desiring heaven should sacrifice.”

Some Mīmāṃsakas postulate an unseen apūrva connecting sacrifice and the intended result.

The Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara explanations differ over what the optative expresses.

The Naiyāyika rejects the claim that the postulated apūrva must be a directly expressed meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute tests both semantic expectancy and an alleged unseen link.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of the Bhāṭṭas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What the concluding Naiyāyika reply actually says

- Semantic fitness is analyzed as the absence of a contrary means of knowledge or incoherent relation.
- The corpulence sentence can yield its relational meaning before nocturnal eating is separately known.
- Corpulence is what calls for explanation; nocturnal eating is the inferred explanation.
- Apūrva is likewise not established as a directly expressed value of an optative ending.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation ends the presumption discussion by denying a separate pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Naiyāyika Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part II: the verdict on arthāpatti

Doubt theory

Special doubt does not independently secure the required conclusion.

Inexplicability theory

Apparent explanatory necessity can be analyzed inferentially.

Heard presumption

Unspoken nocturnal eating is inferred; the sentence remains intelligible.

Naiyāyika conclusion


No independent presumption is required beyond established inference.

The next translated division introduces the five members of a Nyāya syllogism.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Members of a Nyāya Syllogism · Part I: The Whole, Thesis, and Reason

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Objections, counterexamples, inferential structures, and established conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Members of a Nyāya Syllogism · Part I: The Whole, Thesis, and Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From an inference for another to five linked statements



Pratijñā · thesis

This mountain possesses fire.

Hetu · reason

Because it possesses smoke.

Udāharaṇa · example

Where there is smoke, there is fire, as in a kitchen.

Upanaya · application

So too, this mountain possesses that pervaded mark.

Nigamana · conclusion

Therefore this mountain possesses fire.

The five-member order corresponds to different successive cognitive needs.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why an argument for another needs words

- The section expressly concerns inference for the sake of another person.
- A speaker uses ordered statements to communicate the basis of an inferential conclusion.
- The form is not merely repetition of a private act of inference.
- It creates verbal cognitions assisting the hearer’s subsumptive reflection.

KEY INSIGHT

The five statements are analyzed by their cognitive functions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Nyāya and Its Members

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The mountain–smoke–fire demonstration

Thesis: the mountain possesses fire.

Reason: it possesses smoke.

Example: wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in a kitchen.

Application and conclusion return the general rule to this mountain.

KEY INSIGHT

An argument passes from a proposed probandum through the ground and back to the subject.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Members of a Nyāya Syllogism

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Definition of nyāya as an inferential instrument

The whole discourse is treated as a cause of cognition leading to the hearer's inference.

Its member-statements produce distinct but coordinated verbal cognitions.

The decisive qualification concerns the inferential reason and its relation to pervasion.

The final subsumptive reflection has a specific causal role in attaining the result.

KEY INSIGHT

Nyāya is defined by its inferential operation, not by the mere count of phrases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Nyāya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can the application alone count as nyāya?

Objection

- Application expresses a pervaded reason in the subject.
- This may suffice to assist parāmarśa.
- Hence one sentence could seem to be the whole nyāya.

Response

- Application depends on prior cognition of what is being applied.
- Each member fulfills a different expectancy.
- A mere part should not be equated with the entire instrument.

The source rejects an overbroad definition that would collapse a five-part procedure.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of parts and whole

One proposal makes five statements produce a single qualified cognition.

Another treats each statement as generating its own qualified verbal cognition.

Gaṅgeśa tests whether these definitions overlap or classify one statement under another.

The shared property must be appropriately restricted to avoid intermixing thesis- and reason-status.

KEY INSIGHT

The logic of definition is tested by counterexamples and classification failures.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Members of Nyāya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why “statement of the probandum” is too broad

- Simply calling any expression of the probandum a thesis produces overextension.
- Even a bare word indicating the proposed property might meet that broad criterion.
- The definition instead connects verbal cognition with the intended inferential act.
- A thesis must be neither deficient nor excessive in the relevant inferential context.

KEY INSIGHT

Thesis-hood is functional and context-sensitive.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Thesis

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The thesis primes a particular epistemic task

- A thesis states the subject as endowed with the proposed property.
- It creates the hearer’s expectancy for the means that would establish that property.
- It does not itself communicate the inferential mark.
- Later reason- and example-statements fill the specific gap opened by that expectancy.

KEY INSIGHT

The thesis introduces what must be proved without pretending the proof is already complete.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Alternative Definition of the Thesis

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Competing definitions of thesis-hood

Some alternatives emphasize cognition of the probandum without cognition of the reason.

Others emphasize the desire to know or establish the proposed property.

The conclusion differs from the thesis because it depends on the completed inferential apparatus.

The text rejects treating thesis-hood as an autonomous universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The same sentence-type gains its place through inferential function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Definition; Thesis-Hood Is Not a Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is a thesis dispensable before a dispute?

Against the thesis

- Stating the conclusion at the outset may invite contradiction.
- The reason-statement might appear to be the true instrument.
- A neutral judge may already know what is disputed.

For the thesis

- The relation of reason to probandum still needs articulation.
- A rival's opposition does not automatically replace the speaker's thesis.
- The thesis fixes the intended inference and its delimiters.

A statement can be epistemically necessary even when it is not itself a proving reason.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sound is impermanent: a second running example

The proposed conclusion “Sound is impermanent” specifies the probandum.

The subsequent reason “because it is produced” supplies a relevant causal ground.

Without a prior thesis, the reason alone may not communicate the intended property.

The source uses this to defend the thesis as an instrumental member.

KEY INSIGHT

The relation between two propositions must be taught, not assumed.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Thesis Is an Instrumental Member

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why implication cannot replace the thesis

The opponent’s statement need not specify the settled sense of the new speaker’s probandum.

An example cannot supply what is required to interpret the example itself.

Treating all missing content as implicitly recoverable creates overextension.

The source warns against mutual dependence among the definitions of members.

KEY INSIGHT

A hearer’s assumed knowledge is not a substitute for the articulated sequence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: The Thesis Is Unnecessary and the Probandum May Be Understood Implicitly

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The neutral judge does not eliminate expectancy

A request to establish impermanence is not equivalent to providing a reason qualified by that property.

The proponent still needs to present the specific conclusion being argued.

The next sentence can then be understood as its reason.

The thesis is defended both against opposing and neutral audiences.

KEY INSIGHT

The communicative function persists even when the general question is already familiar.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Thesis Is an Instrumental Member

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The reason satisfies a demand for a cause

After the thesis, an expectancy arises for a statement explaining why the probandum holds.

The reason-statement uses the ablative (fifth-case) construction.

Substitution of an unrelated statement would fail to meet that expectancy.

The grammar indicates the reason's role in producing the intended inferential cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Syntax is treated as part of the causal account of verbal understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Statement of the Reason Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defining hetu by its inferential operation

A reason-statement expresses the mark without directly repeating the probandum.

Its verbal cognition assists the cognition that leads to parāmarśa.

The ablative case expresses the causal character of the stated ground.

Alternative definitions emphasize removal of the demand for a causal explanation.

KEY INSIGHT

Reason-hood is not any statement about the object: it has a defined inferential task.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative characterizations and their limits

The text records definitions grounded in the fifth-case ending or in producing expectancy for an example.

A definition involving a universal such as smokehood is considered.

An objection says this demands prior cognition of the general universal.

The discussion favors a characterization that need not rely on such problematic recognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A technical category is refined against both too-wide and too-narrow candidates.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definitions of Affirmative, Negative, and Affirmative-Negative Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Part I: what each statement contributes

Whole discourse

Ordered verbal acts guide an inference for another person.

Thesis

Introduces the probandum and fixes the question at issue.

Reason

Provides a suitably expressed and qualified inferential ground.

Next step


The example makes pervasion explicit; application and conclusion complete the reasoning.

The following presentation treats types of reason, example, application, and conclusion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Members of a Nyāya Syllogism · Part II: Example, Application, Conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

Objections, counterexamples, inferential structures, and established conclusions.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Members of a Nyāya Syllogism · Part II: Example, Application, Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The remaining argument: pervasion, application, closure

01

Types of reason

Affirmative, negative and mixed patterns are distinguished.

02

Example

The speech-act discloses an appropriate pervasion.

03

Application

The pervaded reason is placed in the particular subject.

04

Conclusion

The inferential result is stated with defeating objections excluded.

05

Boundary

Doubt and purpose are auxiliaries, not extra syllogism members.

The ordered five-member nyāya is defended against attempts to omit its later stages.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Affirmative, negative, and mixed reasons

A positive reason calls for an example expressing affirmative pervasion.

A negative reason calls for the corresponding negative concomitance.

A mixed reason can employ both affirmative and negative examples.

A purely affirmative reason admits no available negative counter-instance.

KEY INSIGHT

Reason types are classified by inferential support, not by arbitrary labels.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definitions of Affirmative, Negative, and Affirmative-Negative Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two descriptions of purely affirmative reasoning

One formulation relies on occurrence in subject and similar instances, with no possible counter-instance.

Another makes the reason an ablative-containing expression yielding cognition of affirmative pervasion.

A modified definition is used for purely negative reasons by denying affirmative pervasion.

The debate also examines the force of grammatical qualifiers such as the possessive ending.

KEY INSIGHT

A formal definition must fit both the reason’s extension and its linguistic role.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Definitions of the Affirmative-Negative and Purely Affirmative Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A grammatical objection to complex grounds

- The example considers sound as impermanent on grounds of external perceptibility without universalhood.
- An objector questions whether the qualifying expression can join the ablative ground.
- The reply uses a locative relation within the qualifying property to secure coherence.
- A complex reason can be semantically fitted without confusing grammatical cases.

KEY INSIGHT

Reason-statements are analyzed through both logic and grammar.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Use of “External Perceptibility Devoid of Universalhood” Is Not Incoherent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the example follows the reason

After a causal mark is named, the hearer asks how it establishes the probandum.

The example-statement is designed to make the pervasion intelligible.

Only after that relation is clarified is the mark applied to this particular subject.

The source defines an example through the cognition of pervasion it produces.

KEY INSIGHT

The example is a verbal expression of the link between inferential mark and probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Example

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is an illustrative kitchen indispensable?

The smoke–fire rule can be expressed as “Whatever possesses smoke possesses fire.”

The use of a familiar instance such as a kitchen is customary.

An example-statement does not lose its status merely because a named instance is absent.

The essential feature is communicating pervasion, not naming a particular location.

KEY INSIGHT

Do not confuse illustrative objects with the formal inferential relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Example

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How narrowly can “example” be defined?

Overly narrow candidate

- A sentence happens to mention the relevant relation.
- This may include the application as well.
- The resulting category overextends.

Functional refinement

- An example produces cognition of pervasion.
- It gives rise to expectancy for application.
- The latter will locate the reason in the subject.

A valid definition must separate the example from adjacent stages.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relative pronouns and scope of the rule

- The source considers repeating the relative term in formulations of smoke–fire concomitance.
- Some teachers make repetition guard against deviation of the inferential mark.
- The author says repetition is unnecessary when the relevant pervasion is already understood.
- Special comments concern relative and correlative pronouns and their case relations.

KEY INSIGHT

Even small grammatical choices are tested against the intended inferential meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Repetition of the Relative Pronoun

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defective examples: where a proof misleads

The translation names examples missing the probandum or missing the reason.

It also discusses absence of both and absence of a proper locus.

Other defects include unstated pervasion or presenting affirmative or negative pervasion in reverse.

These are failures in expressing or illustrating the required logical relation.

KEY INSIGHT

A vivid example is not necessarily a sound evidential example.

SOURCE TOPIC · Defective examples

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The application locates the reason in the subject

Once pervasion is understood, a new question remains: does its reason occur here?

The application answers by qualifying the subject with that pervaded reason.

It produces cognition that yields the third parāmarśa.

The mountain is linked to smoke in precisely the way needed for fire-inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Universal concomitance and local subject-propertyhood are separate cognitive steps.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Application

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Applications differ by inferential form

- For affirmative inference, “So too this mountain” supplies smoke pervaded by fire in that subject.
- For purely negative inference, the text uses earth, odor and difference from the other substances.
- The latter formulation uses counterpositiveness and the relevant pervasive absence.
- Both applications secure a subject-level cognition appropriate to their reason-type.

KEY INSIGHT

The surface sentences vary, but the purpose of final subsumption persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of the Application

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can the last two members be dropped?

Three-member proposal

- Thesis, reason and example may seem sufficient.
- A hearer may already know subject-propertyhood.
- Application and conclusion appear repetitive.

Gaṅgeśa's defense

- The reason and example do not supply the precise third parāmarśa.
- Application communicates the pervaded mark in the subject.
- Conclusion expresses the established inferential outcome.

The defense depends on the different cognitive roles of the five members.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The application is not a redundant reason

> The reason-statement explains what mark counts as cause of the probandum.

> It does not by itself communicate that this subject possesses the mark pervaded by the probandum.

> Nor can all necessary content be inferred freely from an opponent's earlier words.

> If every unstated step were implied, the entire five-member sequence would collapse.

KEY INSIGHT

The author insists on explicit communication where it is epistemically needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Application Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does the conclusion add?

The conclusion follows application and states the probandum as established.

The prior members articulate pervasion and subject-propertyhood.

A possible defeating reason or equal counter-reason may still obstruct ascertainment.

The conclusion expresses the inference once these obstacles have been excluded.

KEY INSIGHT

The final member is a determination, not simply an ornamental repetition.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Conclusion Statement

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: no expectancy remains

A critic argues that, after reason and pervasion, the needed information is already complete.

The conclusion is not a new sensory perception able to override any doubt.

The reply says absence of defeaters and counter-reasons matters to the resulting cognition.

The concluding statement expresses the qualified probandum after these concerns are settled.

KEY INSIGHT

Completed argumentation includes protection against an undefeated rival explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: There Is No Expectancy for the Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge of the absence of defeaters

The text distinguishes actual absence from cognition of that absence.

It argues that awareness of the absence of defeating reasons assists inferential cognition.

It links this awareness to why the full conclusion has epistemic force.

The conclusion's connective expression is analyzed for its relation to the established probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

The last step marks the transition from candidate proof to ascertainment.

SOURCE TOPIC · Knowledge of the Absence of Defeaters and the Like Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

“So” and “therefore” in the final statement

- The interpretation of the correlative “so” is contested.
- The text tests whether it refers to the previously stated reason, its qualifier, or similarity.
- It rejects readings that make the application and conclusion semantically indistinguishable.
- The last formulation reconnects the qualified reason with the qualified probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

The final connective is part of the logic of completion, not a filler word.

SOURCE TOPIC · “So” Refers to the Reason; Objection about the Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why doubt and purpose are not sixth and seventh members

Doubt can occasion an inquiry, and purpose can explain why it is undertaken.

Neither meets the defining function of a nyāya member-statement.

Questions such as “Does it have fire?” help in particular teaching situations.

They remain auxiliary rather than additional formal members.

KEY INSIGHT

The five-member count is preserved on functional, not merely conventional, grounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubt, Purpose, and the Like Are Not Members

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The complete five-member procedure

Thesis

Sets out the subject and proposed property to be established.

Reason and example

Give the inferential mark and its pervasion.

Application

Brings the pervaded mark to the particular subject.

Conclusion


States the established property with defeaters accounted for.

The source next turns from well-formed reasons to fallacious reasons.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Fallacious Reasons · General Definition, Deviation, Common, Uncommon, Non-exclusive

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A chapterwise presentation of the translated text: objections, refutations, examples, and the established conclusion.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From a proposed reason to a defeater

01

General criterion

A reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition.

02

Deviation

Why a purported sign fails to determine its probandum.

03

Common reason

The sign occurs in a counter-instance.

04

Uncommon reason

The sign fails to enter suitable confirming instances.

05

Non-exclusive

The conditions for learning pervasion remain unavailable.

The labels in this presentation mark distinct defects rather than synonyms.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why examine fallacious reasons?

The translation introduces fallacious reasons as useful in discovering truth and debate.

Their common feature is their capacity to obstruct an intended inference.

A reason need not be false as a property to be logically defective as proof.

General definitions are followed by investigation of the individual varieties.

KEY INSIGHT

Assessment begins with whether a proposed reason can accomplish this specific inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Fallacious Reasons; General Definition of a Fallacious Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The general definition is causal

One proposal identifies a factor opposed to the cause of an inferential cognition.

Another describes fallaciousness as the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inference.

These formulations distinguish cognition of a defect from a mere external disagreement.

The source reserves fuller analysis of how defects defeat an interlocutor for later.

KEY INSIGHT

A defective reason is understood by its relation to the production or inhibition of cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · General Definition of a Fallacious Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A substance cannot establish absence of heat

The text offers: “Fire is not hot because it is a substance.”

Substancehood is not pervaded by the absence of heat.

The known nature of fire conflicts with the intended negative probandum.

This example tests the scope of the reason, not merely its grammatical form.

KEY INSIGHT

A general property is inadequate where it fails to imply the proposed conclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · General Definition of a Fallacious Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cognitions that obstruct inference

Cases in the text

- “The mountain has smoke because it has fire.”
- “Fire is not hot because it is a substance.”
- A reason may be known without supporting the proposed absence.

Common question

- Does the alleged sign reliably establish the stated property?
- Does apprehending its defect interrupt the inference?
- What defect is present: deviation, contradiction or another?

The same formal pattern can fail for importantly different reasons.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Are all defects productive of the same result?

An alternative view separates obstructing the production of inference from rendering a cognition invalid.

In perception, the effect of defeat and counterbalance is characterized differently by that view.

In inference, these defects may prevent inferential cognition itself.

The book records this as an alternative account before developing individual kinds.

KEY INSIGHT

Do not conflate the rival causal descriptions into one unqualified doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Alternative View and the Division of Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Deviation: three recognized forms

A common reason is found among both relevant and counter-instances.

An uncommon reason is excluded from relevant classes of examples.

A non-exclusive reason cannot provide the conditions needed to ascertain pervasion.

One broad simple definition cannot capture all three in exactly the same way.

KEY INSIGHT

The forms differ in why a claim to inferential connection fails.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Alternative View and the Division of Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why one simple definition fails

Overbroad characterization

- “Establishes both probandum and its absence.”
- “Occurs in both positive and negative instances.”
- “Is absent from both positive and negative instances.”

Text’s response

- One reason cannot establish opposed probanda simultaneously.
- Commonness and uncommonness have different distributions.
- Non-exclusiveness has its own basis for doubt.

A genus must accommodate the distinctions without erasing their causes.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Doubt is not an adequate formula by itself

- A proposed definition links deviation to recollection of opposing alternatives and doubt.
- The text tests that definition against the exact cognition of the reason in the subject.
- Questions such as “Is sound impermanent?” do not themselves establish subject-propertyhood.
- The productive property must be located in the relevant defect of the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

A psychological episode of doubt is not an exhaustive definition of defective inferential signhood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Proposal about Recollection of Opposed Alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: the proposed definition underextends

The debate asks whether defect-awareness requires actual apprehension of the reason in the subject.

Commonness can obstruct proof for oneself or another when demonstrated.

A presented defect may be established through an argument rather than firsthand inspection.

The source therefore distinguishes showing a defect from presupposing every part of the intended inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Demonstrated commonness may suffice to stop the inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Underextension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine of deviation

Deviation is defined through the form delimiting recollection of opposed alternatives.

Those alternatives produce doubt concerning the probandum.

Actual deviation resides in each specific defective condition, such as commonness.

In debate an opponent defeats a proposed reason by showing its particular defect.

KEY INSIGHT

The genus of deviation is realized through determinate, demonstrable species.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of Deviation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common reason: a decisive counter-instance

The decisive definition is occurrence of the reason in a counter-instance.

A counter-instance is one where absence of the probandum has been ascertained.

The reason’s occurrence there breaks its claimed pervasion by the probandum.

The text rejects definitions that add unnecessary conditions involving similar instances.

KEY INSIGHT

One verified counter-instance can expose commonness.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Common Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common vs uncommon reasons

Common reason

- The reason is present where the probandum is known absent.
- A counter-instance demonstrates the inferential failure.
- Occurrence in a similar instance is not required as an extra condition.

Uncommon reason

- The proposed sign is too restricted to yield ordinary pervasion.
- Soundhood is the recurring example for a subject-restricted sign.
- Its failure is not the same as occurrence in a counter-instance.

The kinds are classified by distinct conditions of inferential failure.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why similar-instance presence is not required

The text disputes definitions that demand presence in both similar and dissimilar loci.

Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject yet endowed with the probandum does not define commonness.

A known counter-instance already establishes the logical defect.

Additional conjunctive restrictions make the definition unnecessarily narrow.

KEY INSIGHT

The counter-instance, not symmetrical occurrence, carries the decisive burden.

SOURCE TOPIC · Occurrence in a Similar Instance Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Uncommonness: the soundhood example

The example is “Sound is eternal because of soundhood.”

Soundhood is restricted to sound and is unavailable among the needed confirming instances.

Its status must be analyzed at the point where pervasion is being sought.

The tradition debates whether exclusion from both similar and counter-instances is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Uniqueness in the subject can block the intended acquisition of a general relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An uncommon reason is not automatically useless

The source distinguishes non-occurrence in similar instances from exclusion from every counter-instance.

Exclusion from counter-instances can sometimes be evidentially useful.

The established view gives special importance to lack of occurrence in similar instances.

Known contradiction, however, is a distinct defect rather than merely uncommonness.

KEY INSIGHT

A missing positive example is not itself proof of the opposite conclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · For an Uncommon Reason in Purely Negative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can the entire world be the subject?

The text considers inferences where all things together form the subject.

There can then be no independent objects outside the subject serving as instances.

A proposed sign such as knowability cannot be evaluated through an external example.

Defining the defect as mere ignorance of an outside concomitance underextends or overextends.

KEY INSIGHT

The “all things” case tests limits on demonstration of pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-Exclusive Reason; All Things Are Nameable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established account of non-exclusiveness

- A proposed reason lacks the properties required for determinate cognition of pervasion.
- Pervasion is normally grasped through affirmative or negative concomitance.
- If all objects are subsumed under the subject, no suitable separate example is available.
- A sign such as knowability in “All things are nameable” is used to test that failure.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-exclusiveness is an epistemic defect in establishing the intended universal relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three defects: a comparative diagnosis

Evidence can show the failure

- Common: verified occurrence in a counter-instance.
- Uncommon: exclusion from the appropriate similar instances.
- Contradiction, if known, should be classified separately.

Evidence cannot establish the link

- Non-exclusive: the needed conditions to know pervasion are missing.
- With all things as subject, external examples disappear.
- One may not infer certainty from an inaccessible example.

Distinguish a counterexample from failure to grasp the requisite concomitance.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Outcome: the deviation family

General fallacy

Cognition of the reason in a defective form inhibits inference.

Common

Reason occurs where the probandum is absent.

Uncommon

Reason is unavailable in relevant similar instances.

Non-exclusive


Conditions for determinate knowledge of pervasion are absent.

The English text next treats contradictory reasons and counterbalance.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Fallacious Reasons · Contradictory Reason and Equally Strong Counter-Reason

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A chapterwise presentation of the translated text: objections, refutations, examples, and the established conclusion.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Two different kinds of inferential obstruction

01

Contradiction

A purported sign points away from its probandum.

02

Rival definitions

How to distinguish contradiction from deviation and non-establishment.

03

Three types

Three forms of opposition are set out.

04

Counterbalance

A comparably strong opposing sign interrupts inference.

05

Cognition and debate

How reflection, competing evidence and defeat interact.

The distinction between an opposed reason and two equally poised reasons remains central.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is contradiction a distinct fallacy?

The traditional objection says the allegedly contradictory reason may just be unestablished.

If reason and probandum are opposed, one might not need another category.

Another proposal assimilates this defect to deviation.

The English text examines these reductions before offering an established definition.

KEY INSIGHT

Classificatory economy is tested against the actual operation of the reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Contradiction Is a Distinct Fallacious Reason—Traditional View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The reduction to deviation is disputed

One account emphasizes co-location of a reason with absence of the probandum.

Critics object that this creates a burdensome or useless restriction.

Other scholars defend the restriction as excluding an ordinary common reason.

An inferential mark can be defective in different ways even where absence is involved.

KEY INSIGHT

The differences depend on the precise relation between the proposed reason and what is to be proved.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Traditional View; View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative accounts of contradiction

Competing proposals

- A reason located with the absence of the probandum.
- A reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum.
- A reason known to be pervaded by the probandum’s absence.

Critical problem

- Mere non-apprehension of pervasion may be too broad.
- A common reason can also occur in absence-loci.
- Definitions must not include faultless proofs.

The source rejects several formulations for overextension or inadequate differentiation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established definition: a relation of opposition

The text states contradiction in terms of the counterpositive of an absence of the reason.

That absence stands in a relation of pervasion to the probandum.

Alternative detailed formulations are then supplied using occurrence and co-location.

The purpose is to capture reasonhood that works against the probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

This is not merely missing evidence; the offered sign is opposed to the intended conclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Contradictory Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three modes of a contradictory reason

The first is a sign directly pervaded by the absence of the probandum.

The second is a sign pervaded by absence of a property that pervades the probandum.

The third involves direct awareness of something opposed to a probandum-pervading property.

The text illustrates these with non-apprehension of smoke, absence of fire, and a reservoir.

KEY INSIGHT

Contradiction is differentiated by how the opposition is mediated.

SOURCE TOPIC · Three Types of Contradictory Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Contradiction versus ordinary inconclusiveness

Contradictory

- The counter-evidence goes against the proposed probandum.
- Three forms are distinguished by direct and mediated opposition.
- The text explores how this works for oneself and another.

Merely deviating

- A sign can occur with instances where the probandum is absent.
- Some proposed “contradictory” examples are instead inconclusive.
- Knowledge of non-concomitance must be classified precisely.

A reason incompatible with the conclusion is not identical to a reason that is simply non-diagnostic.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Counterbalance is a different problem

A prima facie account considers a counter-reason of equal strength.

The reason and counter-reason support opposed probanda.

If their operations mutually obstruct each other, neither establishes its intended result.

This differs from one defective sign being independently contradictory.

KEY INSIGHT

Two purportedly compelling arguments can block determination without either concluding.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why alternative definitions fail

Some accounts characterize two reasons by pervasion and subject-propertyhood alone.

Others locate counterbalance in a special subsumptive reflection.

The source asks whether two incompatible conclusions could both be proved.

The definitions must account for the causal inhibition rather than merely naming opposed theses.

KEY INSIGHT

Counterbalance must describe why inferential determination is not produced.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Alternative Definitions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine of counterbalance

A reason loses capacity to produce inferential cognition through an equally strong opposing reason.

The counter-reason is capable of establishing the absence of the original probandum.

Its strength involves pervasion and subject-propertyhood.

Opposed reflections can prevent inference even where two proposed arguments are articulate.

KEY INSIGHT

The critical issue is an opposing causal complex, not rhetorical volume.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What counts as strength?

Pervasion connects the sign with the property to be established.

Subject-propertyhood locates that sign in the particular subject.

These together constitute the relevant strength of the inferential reason.

An opposing reason may produce counterbalance when equivalent connections are apprehended.

KEY INSIGHT

Formal evidence, rather than mere assertion, determines equality of opposing force.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does counterbalance apply in public debate?

Objection

- The proponent accepts pervasion and subject-propertyhood for the first reason.
- The opponent's counter-reason may not be accepted on both sides.
- Therefore the opposing argument might simply be defeated.

Reply

- Where both are known with their inferential properties, they counterbalance.
- The obstruction can operate in inference for oneself and for another.
- Cognition of both complete causal patterns is the important condition.

The text refuses to limit counterbalance to an isolated private thought.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

FALLACIOUS REASONS · CONTRADICTORY REASON AND EQUALLY STRONG COUNTER-REASON

Can two complete inferences both prevail?

The text tests whether opposed reasons can possess all elements for conclusion.

Recognition of the opponent’s sign can introduce doubt about one or both pervasions.

The proposal of universal stoppage of inference is resisted.

Opposition is relevant only where an appropriately supported counter-reason exists.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every challenge amounts to a logically equal counter-reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Failure of Either Pervasion or Subject-Propertyhood; All Inferences Would Be Stopped

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is doubt the defining product?

Some scholars relate counterbalance to doubt concerning the probandum.

Others describe failure of a decisive veridical cognition.

The Ratnakośa authors propose that separately supported opposed inferences together take the form of doubt.

The chapter raises objections to the inference-as-doubt characterization.

KEY INSIGHT

The source records competing explanations of the mental result.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of the Ratnakośa Authors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ratnakośa and its qualification

Ratnakośa account

- Each reason has a complete inferential complex.
- Separate opposite conclusions jointly generate doubt.
- Doubt signals the fallacious counterbalance.

Qualification in the text

- Inference itself is questioned as a doubtful cognition.
- An obstructed inference need not produce a particular absence-cognition.
- The role of the counter-reason cannot be reduced to one required mental outcome.

The chapter does not simply equate every counterbalance with a final doubting judgment.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Do opposed reflections arise simultaneously?

An objection says two subsumptive reflections cannot coexist if they occur in succession.

The first reflection may cease when the second arises.

An alternative explanation invokes memories of opposed pervasions.

The established reply allows collective apprehension to ground simultaneous reflections.

KEY INSIGHT

The temporal form of cognition matters to the causal theory of obstruction.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection about Subsumptive Reflections; Refutation of the View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can memory of two pervasions work?

Opponents argue that recollecting opposed pervasions must itself fail.

The response considers a collective cognition of the two reasons.

With both pervasions remembered, reflections capable of opposed results can be generated.

Their competing causes stop either intended result from arising.

KEY INSIGHT

The source distinguishes loss of memory from mutual inhibition by concurrent cognitive causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The final alternative of Sauṇḍadāsa

- Sauṇḍadāsa extends discussion to purely affirmative inference.
- The example concerns a jar's nameability and knowability.
- The reply turns on identity and eternal absence, not merely a familiar contradictory pair.
- An additional qualifier is rejected where direct opposition already explains the defect.

KEY INSIGHT

This closes the established discussion of the equally strong counter-reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of Sauṇḍadāsa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Outcome: two distinct fallacious forms

Contradiction

The offered reason is opposed to what it purports to prove.

Threefold account

Opposition may be direct or mediated through a connected property.

Counterbalance

A comparably supported opposing reason inhibits determination.

Cognitive mechanism


Pervasion, subject-propertyhood and reflection explain the obstruction.

The next source section analyzes non-establishment of the inferential reason.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Fallacious Reasons · Non-establishment: Three Types and Their Relation to Other Defects

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A chapterwise presentation of the translated text: objections, refutations, examples, and the established conclusion.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

When a reason has not been established

01

Initial proposals

Define non-establishment through absence of required elements.

02

Hard cases

Why combined or disjunctive absence definitions fail.

03

Established division

Substratum, reason’s nature and pervasion.

04

Boundary disputes

Separate non-establishment from deviation and upādhi.

05

Transition

Which forms of opposition count as defeat?

The chapter distinguishes failure of a causal condition from an actual inferential inhibitor.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An inferential reason has two essential tests

- Pervasion connects the reason with the probandum.
- Subject-propertyhood establishes that the reason occurs in the intended subject.
- An opponent may challenge either element, or the underlying subject.
- The chapter questions whether all such challenges can be placed under one complex absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Failure of one prerequisite does not automatically take the form of a single conjunctive defect.

SOURCE TOPIC · Prima Facie View of Non-Establishment

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The qualified-absence proposal

A prima facie definition joins absence of pervasion with absence of subject-propertyhood.

It treats the complex qualified absence as non-establishment.

The text asks whether separate awareness of one missing factor already inhibits inference.

If so, requiring both absences in one qualified form would underextend.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-establishment cannot demand more absent elements than actual counterexamples require.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence Qualified by Pervasion and Subject-Propertyhood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The golden-mountain example

The inference is “There is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke.”

A failure of either pervasion or subject-propertyhood can defeat the claim.

There need be no special cognition of a joint qualified absence.

The example therefore challenges the composite definition.

KEY INSIGHT

Each missing inferential condition can matter in its own right.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Qualified-Absence Proposal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why add veridical cognition?

Another candidate definition invokes absence of true cognition of pervasion or subject-propertyhood.

The text questions making veridicality a necessary extra qualifier.

Direct demonstration of a missing property may expose the defect.

A refined formula must still match the actual mode in which an argument fails.

KEY INSIGHT

Adding conditions does not repair a definition if it excludes known instances.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absence of Pervasion and Subject-Propertyhood Is Non-Establishment

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Certainty and non-establishment

Proposed account

- Establishment means certainty based on pervasion and subject-propertyhood.
- Non-establishment is the absence of that certainty.
- Unknown defects could still block a conclusion.

Criticism

- This may absorb deviation and contradiction into one category.
- A sleeping or inattentive person may infer nothing without a defective reason.
- Missing a cause is different from an active inhibitor.

Non-production of inference cannot alone establish that the reason is fallacious.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A cause can simply be absent

The text compares failure of inference with failure of burning when fire is absent.

Lack of the necessary cognitive cause need not imply an additional inhibiting object.

In sleep, pervasion and subject-propertyhood may exist without being presently known.

That non-production is not proof of a fallacious sign.

KEY INSIGHT

Do not infer the presence of a defeater from absence of a result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Even Unknown Non-Establishment Is Fallacious; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why category collapse matters

If every failure to reach certainty is non-establishment, the other classes lose independent identity.

Deviation and contradiction can be presented as mere failures of establishment.

The text resists losing the peculiar operation of each kind of defect.

It preserves a recognized fivefold classification of fallacious reasons.

KEY INSIGHT

Definitions should explain actual diverse defects rather than recode all of them as one.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation; Conclusion of the Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three distinct non-establishments

The established division distinguishes non-establishment of the substratum.

It distinguishes non-establishment of the reason’s nature.

It distinguishes non-establishment of pervasion.

Cognition or demonstration of any of these can obstruct inference in its own form.

KEY INSIGHT

A tripartite account tracks the locus of failure.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Three Divisions of Non-Establishment

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The three divisions in practical terms

Existential and subject-side

- Substratum: the proposed subject is not established.
- Nature of reason: the claimed inferential mark is not established in the appropriate form.
- Example: a “sky-flower” cannot support a normal subject-based inference.

Connection-side

- Pervasion: the sign’s implication of the probandum is not established.
- An unproved relation cannot be treated as known universal concomitance.
- This differs from an independently known counterexample.

Different missing conditions need different demonstrations.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An impossible substratum

The example is “A sky-flower is fragrant because it is a flower.”

The putative sky-flower is treated as unrelated to a real subject.

Cognition of this problem obstructs the intended inference.

The absence is not repaired by supplying a familiar word such as “flower.”

KEY INSIGHT

The substratum must be established for the property predication to have its intended force.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-Establishment of the Substratum Is an Independent Non-Establishment

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why individual defects stay distinct

A simultaneous qualified absence is not necessary if either of two simple missing elements suffices.

The source says definitions should follow experience, not compel experience to match them.

The three divisions are separately recognizable and debatable.

Their differentiation does not overturn the general classification of fallacious reasons.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinctive way a proof fails should guide its diagnosis.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Three Divisions of Non-Establishment; Restatement

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Upādhi is not simply absence of pervasion

- The chapter returns to the extraneous condition as a proposed source of failure.
- An upādhi is relevant to how the probandum is pervaded while the reason may be under-inclusive.
- Calling the condition merely “absence of pervasion” erases differences in inferential analysis.
- The established discussion treats upādhi in relation to the actual concomitance sought.

KEY INSIGHT

An extraneous condition and failure to establish the connection must not be silently identified.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Extraneous Condition Is Not Absence of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Odor, earthhood and the property of a sign

The text contrasts substancehood with odor and earthhood.

Odor is an invariable mark of earthhood in the example.

General substancehood does not become an independent extraneous condition merely by being broader.

The exact direction of pervasion matters.

KEY INSIGHT

One must specify which property pervades which, rather than use “relation” vaguely.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Extraneous Condition Is Not Absence of Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defeat cannot be reduced to every absence

- The subsequent discussion distinguishes a known absence of the probandum from known deviation.
- A reason may be known to accompany a property that implies the probandum’s absence.
- The source asks whether this creates a separate defect or merely grounds ordinary deviation.
- It rejects counting the absence alone as an automatic sixth category.

KEY INSIGHT

The relation of defeater to defect must be causally specified.

SOURCE TOPIC · Co-Location with Something Pervaded by Absence of the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-establishment vs deviation

Non-establishment

- The subject, nature of the reason or pervasion has not been established.
- A demonstrable failure in one required inferential component.
- The tripartite doctrine identifies where proof breaks.

Deviation

- A demonstrably bad relation, such as reason occurrence in a counter-instance.
- Known deviation may use evidence from the probandum's absence.
- It has its own causal and classificatory role.

Missing proof of a connection is not equivalent to a proven counter-instance.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why the inquiry turns toward defeat

A final objection compares inference with perceptual cognition of absence.

If knowing the probandum absent blocks other cognitions, perhaps that knowledge is itself a defect.

The text distinguishes absence in an object from knowledge of the absence.

The ensuing established doctrine studies the status of an independently defeating cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The transition is from lack of inferential establishment to a countervailing pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection about Perception and Other Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Outcome: three ways establishment fails

Substratum

The proposed inferential subject is not established.

Reason's nature

The proposed sign is not established in the required form.

Pervasion

The sign's universal connection to the probandum is not established.

Boundary


These failures are distinguished from deviation and an extraneous condition.

The next presentation completes Inference with defeat and incapacity to prove.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ANUMĀNA-KHAṆḌA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Fallacious Reasons · Defeat, Ten Examples and the Incapacity of a Reason

Tattvacintāmaṇi · English translated text

A chapterwise presentation of the translated text: objections, refutations, examples, and the established conclusion.

Appendix 2 · Anumāna-khaṇḍa · Fallacious Reasons

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The concluding argument of the Inference section

01

Defeat

Veridical opposing cognition can inhibit inferential cognition.

02

Taxonomy

Ten modes are illustrated in the English text.

03

Debate

A fallacy both stops proof and exposes inability to prove.

04

Incapacity

Competing analyses of what a defective reason cannot establish.

05

Determination

A decisive formulation closes the Inference division.

The discussion ends at the explicit source heading “The Inference Division Ends.”

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What is a defeater?

The chapter tests whether a mere absence of the probandum constitutes a defect of the reason.

It distinguishes actual absence from a veridical cognition of that absence.

The established doctrine concerns an opposing cognition that inhibits inference.

The text compares this operation with obstacles in perception and verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The epistemic effect depends on known counter-evidence, not merely the logical absence of a property.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Established Doctrine of Defeat

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why defeat is not just deviation

A critic proposes that known deviation already explains every such failure.

The reply distinguishes deviation through known counter-instances from the defeat occurring in the subject.

Presence of the reason in a subject with prior absence need not itself be deviation.

Specific kinds of absence and the time of cognition matter.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinct form of opposing knowledge can block the proposed inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Difficulty Arising If Defeat Is Not Accepted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The already-proved is a separate issue

Re-establishing an already established probandum may be purposeless.

But this is not an independent fallacious reason of the same kind as defeat.

Repeated cognition of an established property remains possible.

A blocked inferential purpose is not identical to an intrinsically defective sign.

KEY INSIGHT

The book differentiates redundancy from a defeating cognitional cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Re-establishing an Already Established Object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defeat is tied to cognition

Not sufficient by itself

- A property merely happens to be absent in a locus.
- A desired result has already been established.
- An unrecognized counterexample has not entered the cognition.

The decisive challenge

- A veridical cognition opposed to the probandum is available.
- It inhibits the attempted inference through its epistemic force.
- Known deviation remains a different diagnostic category.

The precise cognitive state determines the function of the defeater.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why an erroneous absence-cognition differs

The text gives examples in which an erroneous judgment of absence is followed by true awareness.

Illusion about yellow in a conch provides another comparison.

An erroneous negative cognition does not have the same defeating authority as veridical knowledge.

The examples test a definition that treats every absence-cognition as equally obstructive.

KEY INSIGHT

Epistemic validity, not the mere negative form of words, matters.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection on Cognition of Absence in General

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ten ways a reason can be defeated

The text enumerates ten modes rather than leaving defeat as an abstract label.

Some are grounded in perception, inference or verbal testimony.

Other examples use comparison or cognitions establishing the subject or counterpositive.

The list demonstrates how different pramāṇas can defeat a proposed sign.

KEY INSIGHT

The classifications concern how an opposing cognition is reached.

SOURCE TOPIC · Such a Defeated Reason Is of Ten Kinds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defeat examples I: perception and inference

> “A jar is omnipresent because it exists” is defeated by an appropriate means such as perception.

> “An atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance” is opposed by inference.

> “Fire is not hot because it is produced” is opposed by perception of the contrary.

> The example about inaudible sound is opposed by inference concerning sound.

KEY INSIGHT

A reason can be formally stated yet defeated by knowledge from another route.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ten Types of Defeated Reasons (Examples 1, 2, 4, 5)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defeat examples II: testimony and comparison

"The golden mountain is made of stone" is among the verbal-testimony cases.

The example about the skull of a dead human being involves opposed verbal testimony.

Gavaya-hood and the word "gavaya" illustrate a case involving comparison.

The Rājasūya example invokes verbal testimony of a ritual injunction.

KEY INSIGHT

The text's taxonomy is wider than sensory counter-evidence alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ten Types of Defeated Reasons (Examples 3, 6, 7, 10)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Defeat examples III: the reason or subject

A claim that water and air are hot because they possess touch is tested by the perception apprehending the reason.

The inference that mind is omnipresent is opposed by an inference about its subject.

These examples distinguish the target of the defeating cognition.

A reason may be defeated without first constructing a mirror-image syllogism.

KEY INSIGHT

Counter-evidence can bear on the reason, the subject or the probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Ten Types of Defeated Reasons (Examples 8, 9)

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ten defeat modes: a compact classification

Direct and inferential

- Perception or another pramāṇa can challenge the target.
- Inference may establish an incompatible property.
- Some defeats arise from grasping a contrary property in the subject.

Linguistic and relational

- Verbal testimony can counter an inference.
- Comparison can discredit a proposed semantic relation.
- Cognition of the reason or the subject may itself yield a defeater.

These are descriptions of the source’s examples, not an expansion of its ten-item list.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why debate about fallacies serves two ends

First, displaying the defect stops another person’s proposed inference.

Second, characterizing that defect establishes the reason’s incapacity to prove.

Merely producing doubt does not always communicate why the inferential mark is unfit.

This explains continued analysis of a fallacy after the conclusion is already blocked.

KEY INSIGHT

Formal dialectic both prevents an erroneous inference and diagnoses its reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Fallacious Reasons Establish Incapacity to Prove

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Must every defect use all five syllogism members?

A critic suggests a complete five-membered statement would be needed for every defect.

The text weighs circumstances where the opponent already knows the relevant pervasion.

A full reconstruction need not be required in every established context.

The point is to demonstrate incapacity with sufficient inferential support.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate procedure should fit the epistemic needs of the interlocutors.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection about Five-Membered Nyāya Statement

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

First candidates for incapacity are rejected

One proposal defines incapacity as failure to produce cognition of the qualified subject.

Another takes it as lacking one required connection, such as pervasion.

Cases involving equal counter-reasons and uncommon reasons challenge oversimple formulas.

The text also examines incapacity relative to a specific probandum, subject and time.

KEY INSIGHT

A reason can have a different status in different inferential contexts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Definition of Incapacity to Prove

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A proposal based on causal ability

One school describes incapacity as absence of ability to produce valid cognition of this probandum.

Its proposal is indexed to a particular subject and moment.

The source asks whether such a definition applies equally across the fallacy types.

The analysis separates an intrinsically misleading reason from a reason blocked by competing cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Capacity and incapacity are assessed within a complete inferential situation.

SOURCE TOPIC · One View: Incapacity Is Absence of Causal Capacity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The object of inhibiting cognition

An alternative describes incapacity as being the object of veridical knowledge that prevents inference.

The discussion considers known deviation and equally strong counter-reasons.

It rejects introducing additional intervening cognition when direct inhibition suffices.

Otherwise the account becomes too prolix and collapses into non-establishment of pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory definition should not multiply required cognitive causes unnecessarily.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative View: Incapacity Is Being the Object of Veridical Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A correct result from an improper sign?

- The text distinguishes an inference’s successful conclusion from the quality of its offered sign.
- The example of vapor mistaken for smoke tests whether fire might still be truly present.
- Even when the probandum happens to obtain, the inferential route may be defective.
- It examines the relation between the sign’s pervasion and the context of inference.

KEY INSIGHT

A true conclusion does not automatically vindicate the proposed inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Incapacity Is Not Failure to Produce Proper Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Truth of result versus valid proof

Result can coincide with fact

- Fire may actually be present on the mountain.
- A perceived vapor could be taken for smoke.
- A proposition may accidentally be true.

Reason needs epistemic fitness

- The inferential mark must genuinely be pervaded by the probandum.
- Defeating knowledge and context also matter.
- Validity of a conclusion is not identical to a sound route to it.

The source uses this distinction to refine the final notion of incapacity.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The decisive formulation of incapacity

The text now states its decisive view explicitly.

When the reason is cognized as present, it does not produce cognition of the probandum in the subject.

Contradictory status and the other fallacies provide reasons for that non-production.

The account is tied to the time and context of apprehending the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Incapacity means failure of this reason to prove this property in this subject.

SOURCE TOPIC · Incapacity: The Decisive View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An alternative decisive formulation

The text also frames incapacity through the form delimiting an inhibiting cognition.

A fallacious reason can be an object of a cognition that blocks inferential production.

The proposed definition is applied to inconclusive and other defective reasons.

Its purpose is to capture a common function without assuming identical surface features.

KEY INSIGHT

The final emphasis is on what makes cognition of the defective mark obstructive.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative View: Incapacity Consists in Possessing the Form

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The concluding distinction

Other scholars assign non-pervasion, inconclusiveness or inhibiting cognition to different defect classes.

The source accepts that incapacity may lack a single recurrent nature across all cases.

By contrast, fallacious-reasonhood has a general form: cognition of the reason inhibits inference.

This restores the general definition while preserving the separate kinds.

KEY INSIGHT

The closing doctrine unifies by epistemic function without erasing diagnostic differences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Incapacity and Capacity to Prove: Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference Section: concluding synthesis

Fallacy

A defective reason can inhibit inferential cognition.

Defeat

Veridical opposing cognition can obstruct the proposed result.

Incapacity

The reason fails to establish the probandum in this inferential context.

Next division


The English translation proceeds to Inference of God.

The English source explicitly ends the Inference Division before Appendix 3.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

God as Creator: Effecthood, Subjecthood, and the Opponent's Challenges

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A source-grounded presentation of the objections, inferences, replies and determinations.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The opening proof and its tests



Thesis

Earth and other effects have an agent.

Challenge

Can the inferential subject be defined?

Illustration

The jar and the limits of analogy.

Pervasion

How can effecthood prove the proposed agent?

Alternatives

Dyads and mental operation are tested.

These objections precede the author’s settled reply in the next presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT’S CHALLENGES

The opening inference

The translated text proceeds from inference generally to an inference concerning the creator.

Thesis: “Earth and the other things have an agent.”

Reason: they are effects; example: a jar is produced by an agent.

The controversy concerns whether this form reaches a supreme agent rather than human agency.

KEY INSIGHT

The validity of the reason, subject and probandum must be established independently.

SOURCE TOPIC · Opening proposition, §1

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

What is the inferential subject?

- An opponent asks whether earth, water and the other entities can each be a subject.
- Treating all the entities together requires a common recurrent form delimiting the class.
- Defining the subject as whatever happens to be under dispute is also challenged.
- The opponent and proponent each begin with certainty about God's existence or absence.

KEY INSIGHT

An inferential subject cannot be supplied simply by pointing to disagreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: Earth and the Other Things Are Not the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does a neutral judge solve the problem?

Proposed escape

- Opposing arguments might produce doubt in a neutral judge.
- A judge's doubt could supply the occasion for the inference.
- The subject could be whatever the disputants question.

The objection

- Arguments are offered after doubt begins.
- Doubt is said to be produced by those same arguments.
- This creates a circle of mutual dependence.

A procedural dispute does not itself establish a logically delimited pakṣa.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

"Not made by a human" is too narrow

A candidate subject is whatever lacks production by a human bodily agent.

The source tests this against sound, scriptural utterance, conventions and other produced entities.

Human action and unseen merit can enter complicated production sequences.

Exclusion by an ordinary human maker does not uniquely define products of God.

KEY INSIGHT

Restricting the subject may omit relevant effects or admit already-established cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Not Made by a Human Being; Not Produced by a Body

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Could earth alone be the subject?

The opponent tries isolating earth as the inferential subject.

But the status of effecthood in a sprout becomes a possible source of doubt.

Doubt about the reason in a counter-instance can threaten the required pervasion.

The text distinguishes doubt concerning a subject from doubt in an external instance.

KEY INSIGHT

The sprout case tests whether the reason is inferentially conclusive.

SOURCE TOPIC · Earth Alone Is Not the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Why a sprout does not finish the proof

Once effecthood in a sprout is accepted, it may motivate a further inference.

The opponent argues that such an inference would introduce a second thesis.

Dependence on further inferences can undermine the primary proof.

Creation itself is not an established starting point for every opponent.

KEY INSIGHT

Establishing possible worldly causes does not automatically establish God.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Sprout Cannot Be the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Agenthood and the jar example

Possible definition

- The effect is produced by someone who knows the material cause.
- That person desires to act and exerts effort.
- The jar is the working illustration.

Difficulty

- Earth is not made by the potter’s specific knowledge.
- Too-general knowledge or effort also belongs to ordinary persons.
- A special God-making property remains to be demonstrated.

An analogy must preserve the same relevant probandum in example and subject.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Effort is not a simple explanatory shortcut

Agency is not identical with bare exertion or the simultaneous presence of a striving person.

Nor is it safely defined as direct production by effort alone.

The exact timing and intermediary causes of a jar matter.

A too restrictive definition might make agency absent from the jar itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal route linking agent and effect requires careful specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of an Agent Is Not Being Produced by Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Knowledge of the material cause

- A proposed probandum refers to cognition, desire and effort concerning a material cause.
- The translation distinguishes particular material causes from their general class.
- An inference needs an apprehended general pervasion, not just verbal implication.
- A special linguistic convention cannot silently supply a missing inferential relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Specifying the material cause does not by itself show the universal probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Possession of an Agent Is Not Being an Object of Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Pervasion must be genuinely general

In jars, agency may be known only through cognition of that jar's particular material cause.

This local relationship does not immediately establish the general claim needed for earth.

A broader formulation risks re-proving familiar human actions.

A narrower one may lack instances from which pervasion can be learned.

KEY INSIGHT

The central challenge is a general vyāpti that reaches the disputed subject.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion by the Probandum Cannot Be Apprehended

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Proposed subject and probandum

Proposed subject

- A produced entity unlike effects of ordinary human knowledge or effort.
- Further exclusions invoke yogic and generic-character contacts.
- The construction aims to isolate a non-ordinary effect.

Proposed probandum

- Production through an agent with cognition, desire and effort.
- The agent's awareness targets the relevant material cause.
- Its precise causal role must remain detectable in examples.

The proposal is tested for unestablished features and circular restriction.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Why adding special qualifiers does not settle it

The opponent examines yoga-derived cognition and direct awareness of future entities.

Some proposed cognitive contacts have not been independently established.

The result risks defining the subject using the very conclusion under debate.

The distinction between an observed example and an inferred exceptional agent remains.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid importing unproved causal machinery into the proof's definition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of Proposed Forms of the Subject and Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

The problem of proving what is known

One side says that effecthood is pervaded by production through a suitably knowing agent.

The opposing reply asks what precise form of this pervasion is learned from jars and cloth.

If the conclusion is only an ordinary agent, it may already be known.

If it is a new supreme agent, the example must justify that extension.

KEY INSIGHT

Siddhasādhana and unproved vyāpti pull the argument in opposite directions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Argument and Refutation: What Is Already Established

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Ancient form: the first atomic conjunction

An older argument takes the initial conjunction of two atoms as its subject.

The proposed reason is that the dyad is fit to be produced by a suitably powerful cause.

This introduces the beginning of creation rather than familiar pottery.

The opponent disputes the proposed reason and the status of the first conjunction.

KEY INSIGHT

Moving to atoms does not eliminate the need to establish pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Form of the Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CREATOR: EFFECTHOOD, SUBJECTHOOD, AND THE OPPONENT'S CHALLENGES

Alternative proof from extraordinary cognition

A proposed alternative says that a jar is fit for production by cognition distinct from ordinary impermanent cognition.

Another route appeals to the effort that directs mind toward a sense organ.

The argument then extends that form to the initial conjunction of self and mind.

The translation challenges the requisite causal relation in the beginning of creation.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative proofs are judged by the same standard of evidence as the original one.

SOURCE TOPIC · Alternative Form; Second Alternative; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Where the preliminary objections lead

Pakṣa

The inference needs a delimited, non-circular subject.

Hetu

Effecthood must be certain in the intended subject.

Vyāpti

Jar-made agency does not automatically generalize.

Sādhya


The inferred maker must not be merely the familiar potter.

The text now moves from objections to its proposed determination of the probandum.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Determination of the Probandum, Causal Agency, Knowledge, Desire, and Effort

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A source-grounded presentation of the objections, inferences, replies and determinations.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

From the probandum to divine agency

01

Definition

Inhering effects and their productive cause.

02

Challenge

Can special knowledge and effort be inferred?

03

Causal role

The jar, the self and favorable effort.

04

Motivation

Desire, aversion and intentional action.

05

Unseen agency

Why lack of perception is not a disproof.

A proposed answer is repeatedly refined through causal counterexamples.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

The text states its answer

The Naiyāyika response now gives a more carefully delimited probandum.

It considers inhering produced entities not adequately explained by ordinary human effort.

The proposed agent has knowledge, desire and effort directed to relevant material conditions.

Different formulations of this agent's instrumentality are then tested.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion must account for effects while avoiding a definition fixed by the example alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Answer: The Nature of the Probandum, §21

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Human effort and unseen mediation

An objection questions how non-production by human-generated effort could be known.

Merit and demerit can operate as unseen causal factors in production.

The reply distinguishes the relevant immediate causal agent from remote enabling actions.

It asks whether a subject can be delimited without presupposing the disputed creator.

KEY INSIGHT

Ordinary participation in a causal chain need not be the direct efficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-Production by Humanly Generated Effort Can Be Apprehended

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

What exactly does “earth” pick out?

The text considers whether inherence itself is a required qualifier.

One formulation treats earth as the subject without that extra specification.

“Material cause” may mean a cause generally rather than a rigidly named substrate.

The terminology is revised to remove dispensable conditions.

KEY INSIGHT

An inferential formula should not contain qualifiers that do no work.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inherence Is Not a Qualifier; Earth Is the Subject

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

Revisiting doubtful inconclusiveness

The sprout and the jar remain test cases for the proposed reason.

Doubt concerning agency does not automatically cancel certainty about effecthood.

The source distinguishes an actual counter-instance from an object where the probandum is simply unknown.

A reason must be tested where the absence of its probandum is established.

KEY INSIGHT

Not every unconfirmed instance demonstrates deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Doubtful Inconclusiveness Does Not Arise

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The epistemic status of the sprout

Concern

- The sprout resembles the proposed subject.
- Its origin is not directly known as human production.
- The opponent fears deviation of effecthood.

Reply

- Unknown agency is not established absence of agency.
- Certainty of effecthood may still obtain.
- The relevant pervasion must be assessed separately.

Doubt about an unknown cause is not equivalent to a decisive counterexample.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

A more exact account of instrumentality

The probandum is made specific to the agent’s relevant causal contribution.

The text asks how cognition, desire and effort operate together in an effect.

It rejects the inference that the triad itself must be the material product.

Instrumentality differs from the thing ultimately brought into existence.

KEY INSIGHT

An agent can be an efficient cause without being the material substance of an effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Specific Instrumentality Is Intended in the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

Is cognition itself the producer?

One objection says that knowledge, desire and effort would become the very producers.

The reply treats them as factors related to the production of inhering effects.

Their causal roles must be specified with respect to material causes and substrate.

The source considers generic-character cognition and the risk of overbroad attribution.

KEY INSIGHT

An inferential proof needs the correct causal relation, not only the presence of mental qualities.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: Cognition, Desire and Effort Would Be Producers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The jar as a contested similar instance

An opponent argues that a jar is produced through bodily movement rather than through a self as agent.

If this were true, the illustrative jar might lack the intended probandum.

The reply connects the effort-bearing self with physical substances through conjunction.

Movement can act as a mediator without excluding the self as a cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The example is retained only by analyzing its complete causal structure.

SOURCE TOPIC · Objection: The Jar Is Devoid of the Probandum; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, conjunction and efficient causality

The text defends the causal role of conjunction involving a self endowed with effort.

Negative concomitance is employed to test whether this conjunction is necessary.

It distinguishes the merely adjacent person from the person causally responsible.

Both effort and the conjunction with the self can enter a causal explanation.

KEY INSIGHT

Attribution of agency must track productive connection rather than proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Conjunction with the Self Is a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Two accounts of agency

Effort as qualifier

- Agency is the self's possession of effort favorable to an effect.
- A qualified self is not identical with the bodily instrument.
- The time of actual effect-production matters.

Causal conjunction

- Physical substances are joined to the effort-bearing self.
- Action can mediate that conjunction.
- The causal configuration produces a jar.

The discussion refines, rather than presumes, what being an agent means.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

Agency is not just successful willing

The text disputes whether intention to attain a result by itself produces the effect.

Knowledge of a means and desire to act belong to the relevant causal series.

The role of physical motion in ordinary production remains specific.

The argument must avoid treating every conceived purpose as an achieved cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Effort and its prerequisites are assessed as causes under appropriate conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Non-Establishment of the Probandum Does Not Arise

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cognition in divine and human agents

In a potter, knowing how a jar serves desired ends can guide action.

The source resists simply transferring this particular inferential cognition to God.

God, as described by the thesis, does not seek pleasure by means of a jar.

Human instrumental reasoning and divine knowledge are not interchangeable.

KEY INSIGHT

The structure of divine cognition must be established without copying human motivation wholesale.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inferential Cognition Establishing God's Agency Is Unacceptable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

Desire, aversion and effort

An opponent argues that some actions result from aversion rather than desire.

This threatens a model where desire always causes effort.

The reply explains that even aversion-driven action aims at a desired outcome, such as relief from pain.

A mere sensation of dislike does not produce effort without a purposive end.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire for a result can causally mediate action even when aversion is present.

SOURCE TOPIC · Desire Is the Cause of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Acting against a danger

Opponent

- Escape or destruction of a threat seems driven by aversion.
- Aversion appears to produce effort without desire.
- The model risks assigning worldly aversion to God.

Answer

- The agent aims at removing the means to suffering.
- Cognition of that means informs desire for relief.
- Desire then produces the appropriate effort.

The debate separates affective dislike from purposively directed action.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

DETERMINATION OF THE PROBANDUM, CAUSAL AGENCY, KNOWLEDGE, DESIRE, AND EFFORT

An unseen cause is not thereby nonexistent

The opponent rejects God because the agent is not ordinarily perceived.

The reply distinguishes absence of perception from perception of absence.

Atoms furnish a precedent for objects admitted despite ordinary imperceptibility.

An impossible object such as a hare’s horn is ruled out on other grounds.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-apprehension defeats a claim only when the alleged object is fit for perception.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Unseen Agent Cannot Be Rejected

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The hare’s horn is not a parallel

A hare’s horn conflicts with the observed nature and structure of a hare.

It cannot be inferred merely because other animals possess horns.

The source treats a causal account of the supposed object as essential.

By contrast, the proposed supreme agent is not said to be visibly accessible.

KEY INSIGHT

The absence of ordinary visual evidence alone is not the refutation sought.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Unseen Agent Cannot Be Rejected

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The next challenge: eternal effort

- The opponent objects that an eternal cause never has an observable absence.
- Ordinary negative concomitance seems unavailable for eternal divine effort.
- The smoke–fire case is used to highlight this difference.
- The next discussion asks how general pervasion could be known under these conditions.

KEY INSIGHT

An imperceptible eternal cause requires a carefully justified inferential relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion of Effects by Eternal Effort Cannot Be Apprehended

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The agency debate at this stage

Subject

The subject and probandum are delimited more precisely.

Causality

Effort, knowledge and self-conjunction are distinguished.

Motivation

Desire for an end explains effort amid aversion.

Epistemology


Imperceptibility alone does not prove nonexistence.

The next presentation tests whether the needed pervasion supports an eternal bodiless agent.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Pervasion, Eternal Cognition, and Agency without Bodily Operations

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A source-grounded presentation of the objections, inferences, replies and determinations.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The central causal and inferential tests



The text tests the strength of rival pervasions rather than assuming a familiar human model.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

General pervasion and inherent causes

- The opponent asks how a pervasive inherent cause can be known when it is never altogether absent.
- The reply appeals to distinctions between inherent and non-inherent causal relations.
- An effect is situated in its inherent cause, not in an unrelated non-inherent cause.
- This provides a model for apprehending a general causal relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Causal pervasion may be learned through a relational difference, not only total absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion: An Effect Is Produced by an Inherent Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

From particular effects to a general rule

Specific efforts and effects supply instances of affirmative and negative concomitance.

The source warns against using the mere conjunction of one mountain-fire with one smoke event.

In the absence of a defeater, repeated particulars can establish a relation involving their general kinds.

The argument similarly considers effort and produced effects.

KEY INSIGHT

A proper universal inference must not reduce to one isolated causal pairing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Affirmative and Negative Concomitance between Particular Effort and Effect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The lesson of smoke and fire

Insufficient route

- One particular fire is accompanied by one particular smoke.
- The causal connection is then asserted of all smoke.
- An accidental local pairing is over-generalized.

Stronger route

- A general pervasion is established through relevant cases.
- Absence of defeating instances remains material.
- The relation is stated at the proper level of generality.

The same generalization problem governs an argument from effecthood to agency.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Can inference yield a supersensible agent?

- The text considers the charge that agency cannot be inferred without first assuming God.
- It distinguishes a general causal predicate from a particular unobserved individual.
- Comparison is drawn with inference of fire from smoke.
- The objection is answered by checking whether the proposed hidden cause can produce the observed effect.

KEY INSIGHT

Inference of a hidden agent depends on causal fitness, not invisibility alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Pervasion of Effecthood by Supersensible Agency

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why invisible gastric fire is not the model

An objection imagines inferring invisible gastric fire from any smoke.

The reply says that the kind of fire causally responsible for smoke is restricted.

Gastric fire lacks the relevant productive relation to the observed smoke.

An inference must select a cause capable of producing the target effect.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal powers of a proposed unobserved cause remain testable.

SOURCE TOPIC · An Unseen Agent Is Not Established Merely by Pervasion by Agency

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The triad of knowledge, desire and effort

The agent is described through cognition, desire and effort.

An opponent notes that absence of any one of these may block the effect.

The reply treats the separate factors as each established through the causal relation.

The joint triad can then be formulated without illicit extra qualifications.

KEY INSIGHT

The composite account must be grounded in the parts' causal contributions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Effecthood Establishes the Triad

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Contradiction with familiar human agency?

In jars, familiar agents are embodied, finite and possess impermanent cognition.

The proposed God is bodiless and has eternal cognition.

The opponent calls this a contradiction between the example and the probandum.

The reply denies that effecthood is pervaded specifically by finite embodied agency.

KEY INSIGHT

An illustration need not make every incidental trait of the potter universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Concomitance with Opposite of Probandum Is Not Contradiction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Distinguishing qualified probanda

The debate separates agency generally from the qualifications of mortal or eternal cognition.

A supposed contradiction arises only if incompatible qualifiers are required together.

The subject-propertyhood of earth and pervasion from examples contribute jointly to inference.

Neither alone is presented as an independent full demonstration.

KEY INSIGHT

Care is needed when transferring a general cause to a uniquely qualified subject.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Qualified Probanda Are Not Mutually Opposed

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Human maker versus the proposed supreme maker

Human illustration

- The potter’s cognition is ordinarily produced and finite.
- Manual operations figure in jar production.
- This is an observable instance of agency.

Supreme-agent proposal

- God’s cognition is asserted to be eternal.
- God is described as bodiless and omniscient.
- The agency to be proved is not restricted to manual operation.

The argument turns on which properties are essential to agency itself.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Can eternal cognition be a cognition?

The opponent proposes that cognitionhood and eternality cannot share a substrate.

A parallel objection says agency and bodilessness cannot coexist.

The reply treats the alleged incompatibility as unestablished.

Neither conjunction is refuted simply by the ordinary perception of human instances.

KEY INSIGHT

An incompatibility must itself be evidenced rather than borrowed from habit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Establishment of an Agent with Eternal Cognition Is Possible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God as a hypothetical posit?

A further challenge claims God’s qualities are only products of hypothetical reasoning.

The reply distinguishes reductio or tarka from an independent inferential proof.

Atoms provide an analogy for posited but not ordinarily perceived entities.

No conclusion follows merely from describing a hypothetical object.

KEY INSIGHT

The source preserves a distinction between support from tarka and the intended inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition Concerning God Is Not Merely Hypothetical

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

The challenge of hands and bodily motion

The opponent points to manual operations accompanying jar production.

Bodiless God, by definition, lacks hands and similar organs.

A person merely standing beside a working potter is not an agent of that jar.

So the argument cannot equate vicinity or bare effort with effective production.

KEY INSIGHT

The question is whether effort can produce effects outside the bodily sequence.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Bodiless God Has No Operations of Hands

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Effort may be general; manual production specific

The reply distinguishes effort as a cause from its manifestation in bodily action.

Manual operation produces some effects such as jars under particular conditions.

It need not be a universal property of every causal effort.

The analysis separates an efficient cause from specific auxiliary instruments.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of bodily action cannot by itself define all possible agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · Effort Alone Is the Producer of Produced Entities in General

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why effort alone may not suffice

An objection notes that an inactive person’s effort does not produce a jar.

The reply considers whether instruments and auxiliary conditions are also required.

A supreme cause need not be described as lacking all other causal conditions.

The distinction between general capacity and its operative setting matters.

KEY INSIGHT

“Effort is a cause” does not mean every effort produces every effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · Mere Effort Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prior absence and conditions of production

The text discusses auxiliaries and their absence as explanatory factors.

An effect may be absent where a necessary auxiliary is missing.

The causal analysis must not confuse absence of an auxiliary with incapacity of the main cause.

The role of prior absence is considered among relevant production conditions.

KEY INSIGHT

Effecthood requires a structured causal complex, not a single isolated factor.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inherent and Other Causes; Prior Absence Favorable to Production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

Are eternal qualities intrinsically excluded?

The opponent proposes defeating inferences against eternal cognition and bodiless agency.

The reply asks whether their pervasions have actually been established.

The form “all cognition is impermanent” is not simply granted.

The mere observation of finite human knowledge cannot settle an eternal case.

KEY INSIGHT

The burden of proof remains on any alleged universal incompatibility.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Bodiless Agent with Eternal Cognition Is Unacceptable; Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

PERVASION, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND AGENCY WITHOUT BODILY OPERATIONS

What is the proper strength of effecthood?

- One argument says effecthood is particularly certain in earth and similar entities.
- A contrary argument offers regularities of ordinary cognition and material production.
- The text rejects treating one relation as stronger without proving its pervasion.
- Even the causal explanation of a particular effect can depend on specific circumstances.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential contest is over warranted universals, not a simple vote among examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Reason Effecthood Is Not Stronger

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The closing reply to this group of objections

- The discussion challenges the alleged defeat of eternal divine cognition.
- It treats cognitionhood and eternality as not already known to be incompatible.
- The possibility of an inferentially supported bodiless agent is retained.
- A further Navya-Nyāya objection asks whether bodily production is an upādhi.

KEY INSIGHT

The next stage tests extraneous conditions in the inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · Refutation of the Prima Facie Opponent’s Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The causal questions preserved

Vyāpti

General concomitance needs relevant grounds and no defeater.

Reason

Effecthood must indicate agency, not just visible craftsmanship.

Probandum

Bodilessness and eternal cognition require separate scrutiny.

Upādhi


Is production through a body an illicit limiting condition?

The Navya-Nyāya treatment of the alleged bodily-production upādhi follows.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Navya-Nyāya Debate: Bodily Production, Extraneous Conditions, and Counter-Inference

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A source-grounded presentation of the objections, inferences, replies and determinations.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

The structure of the upādhi dispute



Claim

Effects have an agent.

Restriction

Does an agent require a body?

Criterion

When is a proposed qualifier an upādhi?

Counter-proof

The absence of bodily production is invoked.

Analysis

Qualified reasons and negative pervasion.

The source stages repeated positions; not every paragraph expresses the final view.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

The new Naiyāyika position

A bodiless Supreme Self with eternal cognition is introduced as the specific inferred agent.

The opponent asks whether the proposed causal pervasion is defeated by an embodied-maker example.

The question is not whether an ordinary potter has a body.

It is whether bodily production restricts the relationship between effecthood and agenthood.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute concerns a potentially illicit upādhi in the reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · The View of the Navya-Naiyāyikas, §67

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The upādhi objection

Being produced through the agent’s body is proposed as an extraneous condition.

The opponent suggests that all observed agency is accompanied by bodily operations.

If so, the apparently general reason effecthood may not reach non-bodily production.

But an upādhi must satisfy a more exact pervasion criterion.

KEY INSIGHT

Observed co-occurrence alone cannot settle whether bodyhood limits agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Produced by a Body Is an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

Do auxiliaries impose universal restrictions?

An objection argues that a cause which produces with an auxiliary cannot produce without it.

This would make bodily instruments necessary for agent-produced effects.

The reply asks whether the necessity concerns jars specifically or all possible effects.

It separates a particular auxiliary from a universal condition of agenthood.

KEY INSIGHT

A condition required for one effect may be inessential to the entire kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Certainty of Pervasiveness by the Probandum Determines an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

Is a body a necessary upādhi?

Objection

- The observed jar is made by an embodied potter.
- Body-related operations occur in known examples.
- Without a body, the inferred divine maker may lack causal fitness.

Reply

- The inference concerns agency as such.
- Bodily channels may be specific auxiliaries.
- A genuine upādhi must be properly pervasive of the probandum.

The body condition must be shown necessary, not simply familiar.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

The precise test for an upādhi

A proposed restriction is assessed by its distribution with reason and probandum.

The text examines how a candidate condition relates to agent-production and effecthood.

Its occurrence only in selected examples is not enough.

The inference cannot gain or lose universality by an unexamined added qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

An upādhi is a logical defect requiring proof of the relevant pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Produced by a Body Is Not an Extraneous Condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

Can a specific causal relation settle the generic?

One view argues that a general causal link requires support from specific productive relations.

It observes bodily agency in jars but not in earth.

The counter-reply distinguishes specific instances and their more general property.

No adequate defeater is secured merely by invoking ordinary bodily production.

KEY INSIGHT

Generalization remains possible where the proposed specificity is not a valid restriction.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Produced by a Body Is an Extraneous Condition; Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Producedness and agenthood

A further argument says that producedness is pervaded by possession of an agent.

Being produced by a body may also be pervaded by possession of an agent.

Two separately pervaded properties are not thereby equivalent.

The opponent’s attempted restriction must show more than mutual occurrence in jars.

KEY INSIGHT

Distinct reasons can each have a relevant pervasion without one limiting the other.

SOURCE TOPIC · Producedness and Being Produced by a Body

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Three distinct logical properties

Producedness

- The general status of being an effect.
- Used as the original hetu for agency.
- May cover products beyond jars.

Body-mediated production

- A more specific feature of familiar artifacts.
- It also may indicate an agent in ordinary cases.
- It need not delimit all producedness.

The question is which property actually supports inference to agency.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Bodyhood does not delimit all agency

The text disputes treating bodily production as the delimiter of being produced by an agent.

A property of the known illustration cannot be promoted without proof.

In specific cases, jarhood and associated auxiliaries may condition an event.

The inferred common agency need not inherit every specific factor.

KEY INSIGHT

A special-case causal accompaniment is not automatically a universal qualifier.

SOURCE TOPIC · Being Produced by a Body Does Not Delimit Being Produced by an Agent

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

A counter-inference from bodilessness

The opponent offers: earth and the like are not produced by an agent because they are not produced by a body.

Ether is supplied as an illustrative case.

The reply disputes whether the negative reason establishes the absence of the relevant unknown agent.

The original inference concerns an agent not already identified with a human maker.

KEY INSIGHT

Absence of one known kind of cause may not prove absence of every cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · A Counterbalanced Inference Does Not Sublate an Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The unfamiliar individual matters

The proof aims to establish a particular hitherto unestablished agent.

A counter-inference directed only against ordinary known agency may miss its target.

The source distinguishes a recurrent universal from its occurrence in a new individual.

Subject-propertyhood can make the inferred agent specific to the world's formation.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical contest must preserve identity of the intended probandum.

SOURCE TOPIC · Inference Establishes an Unestablished Individual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Counterbalance need not cancel everything

The source resists a rule that all rival inferences simply eliminate one another.

A counter-inference may concern an already known general property.

The new inference may have a different, more specifically delimited target.

Other attempted counter-reasons involving cognitionhood and eternity are also reviewed.

KEY INSIGHT

Two apparent proofs must be compared at the level of what each actually establishes.

SOURCE TOPIC · Counterbalance Does Not Eliminate Every Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The problem of a futile qualifier

Some suggested reasons add cumbersome conditions concerning generated cognition or unseen merit.

The text asks whether an added condition excludes any otherwise applicable case.

If not, the qualifier may be logically idle.

But a superfluous qualifier does not invariably destroy inferential function.

KEY INSIGHT

The decisive pervasion and cognition of the reason still must be identified.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Defect of a Futile Qualifier Arises

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A qualified reason: when does it help?

Reason with a useful qualifier

- The qualifier prevents a recognized deviation.
- It identifies the relevant inferential class.
- It helps apprehension of a sound pervasion.

Reason with a futile qualifier

- It excludes no additional countercase.
- It merely restates or complicates the reason.
- Its presence may not alter the causal path to inference.

A qualification is judged by its inferential work, not its verbal length.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion can be known without qualifiers

An objection requires every reason to have a deviation-preventing qualifier.

The reply invokes simple properties such as cowhood as potential reasons.

The same property can be considered without a newly attached adjective.

Adding a qualifier can introduce redundancy or circular dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

Pervasion belongs to the proper inferential property, not necessarily a decorated phrase.

SOURCE TOPIC · Cognition of Pervasion Is Possible Even in a Reason without a Qualifier

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

Qualified smoke does not license any conclusion

The text tests a reason formulated as “knowable smoke.”

Knowability is not simply interchangeable with smokehood as the relevant pervaded property.

The inferential cognition depends on which property functions as the operative reason.

A useless or deviant qualifier must not silently alter the claim.

KEY INSIGHT

The relation of qualifier, qualificand and inferential substrate is made explicit.

SOURCE TOPIC · The Absence of an Apprehended Deviation-Preventing Qualifier

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An example from qualified smoke and fire

The text examines smoke qualified by fragrance and fire produced from sandalwood.

It also discusses smoke and fire produced through contact with moist fuel.

The absence of a qualified cause need not establish absence of every more general effect.

Both negative and affirmative inference must respect exact qualification.

KEY INSIGHT

The example warns against invalidly passing between broad and narrow causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · Immediate Cognition of Material Cause; Qualified Inferences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy does not uniquely determine pervasion

Some scholars privilege simpler reciprocal absences over more complex qualified ones.

The reply notes that multiple non-contradictory properties may each be pervaded.

Waterhood and cold touch, or smokehood and black smoke, supply illustrative contrasts.

A complex property is not invalid merely because a simpler one exists.

KEY INSIGHT

Lāghava guides analysis but cannot substitute for evidence of pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Both Economical and Complex Properties Can Be Pervaded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE NAVYA-NYĀYA DEBATE: BODILY PRODUCTION, EXTRANEOUS CONDITIONS, AND COUNTER-INFERENCE

Negative pervasion and qualified absence

The source discusses absolute absence of producedness as a possible negative term.

An opponent proposes privileging rapid recollection of the simplest absence.

The reply distinguishes ease of recall from logical status.

A qualified absence may still enter a pervasion when its conditions are correctly specified.

KEY INSIGHT

The next part continues testing precisely which absences belong to a valid inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · Absolute Absence of Producedness; Qualified Absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Conclusions of this stage of the debate

Original reason

Producedness is proposed to indicate agency.

Suggested upādhi

Bodily production is not granted as a universal restriction.

Counter-reasons

Opposed inferences must match the relevant unestablished probandum.

Qualified inference


Pervasion and qualifiers are assessed through their actual logical roles.

The English Inference of God text continues beyond this presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Qualified Negative Pervasion, Embodied Agency, and the Defeat of Counter-Inference

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

The successive objections, replies, and logical distinctions in the translated text.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Qualified Absence and Logical Defeaters

01

Problem

Precisely what the opponent contests.

02

Analyses

Qualifiers, examples, and causal relations.

03

Replies

The source tests possible logical defects.

04

Determination

The position reached before the next division.

The teaching divisions follow consecutive paragraphs of the actual English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 1/6

But this view is unsound.

If this were admitted, existence accompanied by origination could not be understood as pervaded by both non-eternality and possession of an agent, because, …

… on account of quicker recollection, only properties such as jarhood would be regarded as pervaded.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 2/6

Moreover, if existence and jarhood are both accepted as pervaded because there is no contradiction between the general and particular forms of an effect, …

… then the absence of being produced by a body and the absence of producedness in general must likewise be accepted as equally pervaded.

Furthermore, it should be noted that being produced by a body, as a qualified property, distinguishes its own absence as the absence of being produced by a body; …

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 3/6

> … it does not, however, directly distinguish its own absence merely in the form of “absence.” Therefore the absence of being produced by a body is, …

> … in its specific indivisible form, the reason in the inference of God; consequently there is no futile qualifier in that absence.

> It should not be said that a qualified absence is merely the absence of the qualificand.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 4/6

If so, non-producedness would be established in a subject such as earth.

Therefore being produced by a body is an extraneous condition in the inference of God, ...

... because the absence of being produced by a body is pervaded by the absence of the probandum, and being produced by a body, as the counterpositive of that absence, ...

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 5/6

... is thereby a pervader of the probandum.

It should also not be said that an additional qualifier in a qualificand already containing a futile qualifier is merely a point of defeat.

Such a defect applies only when two distinct reasons are presented.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The indivisible absence of bodily production · 6/6

Here only a single qualified reason is stated; the admission of such a single qualified reason in the case of a contradictory reason has already been accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The indivisible absence of bodily production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Smokehood, not blackness, is the delimiter · 1/2

Our answer here is that pervasion certainly occurs in a qualified reason such as black smoke.

Otherwise, if the qualified reason were not pervaded by the probandum, pervasion would be left without a substrate.

Nevertheless, because of ontological extravagance, properties such as blackness do not delimit the pervadedness of the reason; only smokehood delimits pervadedness.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualifier can occur without determining the pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Smokehood, not blackness, is the delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Smokehood, not blackness, is the delimiter · 2/2

Likewise, the causal capacity of a staff is delimited by staffhood, and color does not delimit that causal capacity.

It should also be noted that smokehood does not occur in black color; rather, it occurs in smoke possessing black color.

Therefore black smoke is not the reason for an inference of fire.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualifier can occur without determining the pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Smokehood, not blackness, is the delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why black-smokehood is fallacious · 1/3

If black color is regarded as a qualifier of black smoke, then smokehood will not be the delimiter of reasonhood in smoke qualified by blackness.

If, however, black color is regarded as an adventitious qualifier of black smoke, inferential cognition of fire can arise simply from unqualified smoke.

Moreover, only the property that delimits the delimiter of pervadedness is the delimiter of reasonhood; therefore black-smokehood is not the delimiter of reasonhood.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal role of a qualified reason is examined separately from bare smokehood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why black-smokehood is fallacious

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why black-smokehood is fallacious · 2/3

> It should not be said that, although smokehood delimits reasonhood, black smoke will not be a fallacious reason, …

> … because when the total causal complex is present an inference of fire can arise from black smoke, and only a reason that obstructs inferential cognition is fallacious.

> For even in the absence of an obstructer, cognition of the probandum fire in the mountain from the qualified reason black smoke is erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal role of a qualified reason is examined separately from bare smokehood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why black-smokehood is fallacious

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why black-smokehood is fallacious · 3/3

Therefore black smoke may be called a fallacious reason on the basis of its being a cause of such erroneous cognition. The matter should be understood in this way.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal role of a qualified reason is examined separately from bare smokehood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why black-smokehood is fallacious

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What enables apprehension of pervasion · 1/4

For this very reason, even apart from the state of not being produced by a human body, the human body does not delimit the pervadedness of the reason, ...

... because such a supposition would be extravagant.

Only that qualifier without which the pervasion of the reason cannot be apprehended is regarded as the delimiter of the reason's pervadedness.

KEY INSIGHT

Only a logically necessary qualifier can determine pervadedness.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · What enables apprehension of pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What enables apprehension of pervasion · 2/4

For the same reason, in the statement “among qualities such as color, only smell indicates smell,” the qualifier “among qualities such as color” is a useful qualifier …

… that removes lack of proof; for without it the pervasion of the reason would remain unestablished and could not be apprehended.

Likewise, fire produced from sandalwood is the cause of smoke qualified by fragrance, and absence of a cause is the cause of absence of its effect.

KEY INSIGHT

Only a logically necessary qualifier can determine pervadedness.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · What enables apprehension of pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What enables apprehension of pervasion · 3/4

Therefore, from cognition of fire produced from sandalwood, the pervadedness of smoke qualified by fragrance is ascertained.

Nor does the defect of containing a futile qualifier arise in the pervader.

For only the qualified probandum becomes the pervader in the form of being the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Only a logically necessary qualifier can determine pervadedness.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · What enables apprehension of pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What enables apprehension of pervasion · 4/4

Moreover, in a negative example, because of a sublater excluding the counterexample, only the qualified probandum becomes the pervader.

KEY INSIGHT

Only a logically necessary qualifier can determine pervadedness.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · What enables apprehension of pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 1/6

The absence of the qualified probandum is pervaded by the absence of the reason's presence.

But where the qualifier does not exclude the counterexample, the qualified probandum is not itself pervaded.

For example, in such a case the qualified probandum does not remain pervaded in relation to an effect.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 2/6

Moreover, the absence of being produced by a body is an indivisible reason with respect to the absence of possession of an agent.

If being produced by a body were the determining condition of possession of an agent, …

… the absence of possession of an agent would arise only from the absence of being produced by a body; …

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 3/6

> … consequently being produced by a body would be pervaded by the probandum possession of an agent.

> But being produced by a body has no such pervadedness.

> By economy, only unqualified effecthood is pervaded by the probandum possession of an agent.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 4/6

Therefore only non-producedness—that is, the absence of effecthood—is the extraneous condition.

For the reason consisting in the absence of being produced by a body, which is taken to be pervaded by the pervading absence of the probandum possession of an agent, …

… is not in fact pervaded by the absence of the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 5/6

Since there is no pervasion between being produced by a body and possession of an agent, there is likewise no pervasion between their absences; consequently the reason, …

… absence of being produced by a body, suffers from lack of proof concerning pervasion.

For this reason the view “the absence of being produced by a body is pervaded by the absence of possession of an agent; hence there is a relation of pervaded and …

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The bodily-production counter-reason fails · 6/6

… pervader between these two absences” is rejected.

For being produced by a body is not the determining condition of possession of an agent.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The bodily-production counter-reason fails

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of a previous reason · 1/4

It should not be said that non-producedness is not an extraneous condition because it is the absence of the first reason; …

… otherwise all counterbalancing reasons would disappear.

Only in a case where an inferential statement is erroneous and, in the absence of knowledge of the differentiating factor, a counterbalancing reason arises, …

KEY INSIGHT

A counterbalancing inference cannot treat every missing original reason as an upādhi.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of a previous reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of a previous reason · 2/4

... is the absence of the first reason not an extraneous condition, because it does not pervade the probandum.

For example, when the counter-position “Sound is eternal because it is a quality occurring only in ether” is raised against the inference “Sound is non-eternal because ...

... it is a quality,” the absence of qualityhood is not an extraneous condition, because in atoms of water it does not pervade the probandum non-eternality.

KEY INSIGHT

A counterbalancing inference cannot treat every missing original reason as an upādhi.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of a previous reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of a previous reason · 3/4

It should also not be said that it is proper to disregard the counterbalancing reason and raise only inconclusiveness.

When inhering producedness is the counterpositive of prior absence, or existence is the counterpositive of prior absence, or an entity, while existing, …

… is the substrate merely of origination—of these three reasons, the absence of only one is an extraneous condition.

KEY INSIGHT

A counterbalancing inference cannot treat every missing original reason as an upādhi.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of a previous reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of a previous reason · 4/4

Thus the absence of the first reason is not itself an extraneous condition, because in the case of destruction it does not pervade the probandum. In this way no defect arises.

KEY INSIGHT

A counterbalancing inference cannot treat every missing original reason as an upādhi.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of a previous reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter · 1/4

Other scholars hold as follows: wherever a pervasion situated in a locus and determined by a property cannot be apprehended without a qualifier, …

… that qualified property is regarded as the delimiter of pervadedness.

Even in a disembodied condition, producedness—that is, effecthood—can be regarded as the delimiter of the pervasion occurring in the absence of non-agency; …

KEY INSIGHT

The alternative view rejects an extraneous bodily-production qualification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter · 2/4

… therefore being produced by a body is not the delimiter of that pervasion.

Moreover, like blackness in smoke, being produced by a body is not a delimiter because its postulation is extravagant; and producedness is not a delimiter because …

… it is not the counterpositive of the absence of non-agency.

KEY INSIGHT

The alternative view rejects an extraneous bodily-production qualification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter · 3/4

Therefore the absence of being produced by a body, because it is the absence of the delimiter of pervadedness, is not pervaded by the absence of non-agency.

It should not be said that, because deviation is absent, being produced by a body is the delimiter of that pervasion.

Deviation of being produced by a body is observed in earth and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The alternative view rejects an extraneous bodily-production qualification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter · 4/4

Otherwise the counter-inference would arise: “The cause of effects such as earth is perceptually known, because they are not produced by a body.”

KEY INSIGHT

The alternative view rejects an extraneous bodily-production qualification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Other scholars on the alleged bodily delimiter

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the inference of God itself erroneous? · 1/4

Now it may be argued: let us admit an inference of God as a disembodied agent possessing eternal cognition; nevertheless, …

… the counter-inference can be raised that the cognition of agency concerning God is erroneous.

For this inferential cognition generates cognition of agency in a disembodied self; it depends upon cognition of eternal cognition, desire, and effort; …

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes a counter-inference against the original cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is the inference of God itself erroneous?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the inference of God itself erroneous? · 2/4

… and it generates cognition of possession of an agent with respect to something not produced by a body—like the cognitions “a jar is an agent,” “the jar's cognition is …

… eternal,” and “ether possesses an agent.”

It should not be said that such a counter-inference lacks an auxiliary cause, for the inferential cognition itself is its auxiliary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes a counter-inference against the original cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is the inference of God itself erroneous?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the inference of God itself erroneous? · 3/4

Nor should it be said that such an inferential cognition can be veridical.

There is no unconditional causal relation between agent and effect, and therefore cognition of such veridicality is not determinative.

Otherwise all inferences possessing positive and negative concomitance would be refuted by the counter-inference “The inferential cognition of fire on the mountain is …

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes a counter-inference against the original cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is the inference of God itself erroneous?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the inference of God itself erroneous? · 4/4

… erroneous, because it is a cognition of fire in a locus different from the locus of fire accepted by both parties.”

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes a counter-inference against the original cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is the inference of God itself erroneous?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive · 1/4

Moreover, the counter-inference would merely cause recollection of the erroneousness or falsity of the inference of God.

But the counter-inference cannot again produce that very falsity.

Hence the question arises: is the falsity produced by the defect in the inference of God and recalled by the counter-inference the very same defect, or a different defect?

KEY INSIGHT

Unwelcome consequences alone do not establish a defective inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive · 2/4

The first alternative is untenable, because mutual dependence would arise: only after the falsity of the inference of God had been produced would the same falsity have …

… to be produced again by the counter-inference.

The second alternative too is untenable, because no different defect is established.

KEY INSIGHT

Unwelcome consequences alone do not establish a defective inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive · 3/4

It should also be noted that an unrefined form of hypothetical reasoning is not itself a defect.

For example, merely deriving an unwelcome consequence such as “If God is an agent, he will be an embodied individual self; …

… then he will possess knowledge of a means to the desired end, possess a purpose, and possess non-eternal cognition; and if there is an agent of earth and the like, …

KEY INSIGHT

Unwelcome consequences alone do not establish a defective inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive · 4/4

… then only an embodied individual self will be the agent of that earth and the like” does not establish a fallacious reason.

For when this unwelcome consequence is reversed, its reversed form will not yield a conclusion because of lack of proof concerning the subject and the futile qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

Unwelcome consequences alone do not establish a defective inferential reason.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why hypothetical consequences are not decisive

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified smoke versus smokehood

Qualified observation

- Smoke can appear together with blackness or fragrance.
- A qualification may matter to a more narrowly formulated inference.
- Qualified causes and effects must be tested together.

Logical delimiter

- Smokehood is treated as the operative reason for inferring fire.
- Blackness does not necessarily delimit pervadedness.
- A surplus qualifier can make a purported reason defective.

The rule concerns the relevant qualifier, not the mere vividness of an example.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Qualified Absence and Logical Defeaters

Problem

A qualified absence must be distinguished from absence in general.

Middle

Non-embodied production does not by itself establish the absence of agency.

Further debate

The opponent proposes a counter-inference against the original cognition.

Conclusion


Unwelcome consequences alone do not establish a defective inferential reason.

The next presentation continues the source argument without treating objections as settled facts.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Single Agent, the Use of Economy, Eternal Cognition, and Omniscience

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

The successive objections, replies, and logical distinctions in the translated text.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Unity and Eternal Cognition of God

01

Problem

Precisely what the opponent contests.

02

Analyses

Qualifiers, examples, and causal relations.

03

Replies

The source tests possible logical defects.

04

Determination

The position reached before the next division.

The teaching divisions follow consecutive paragraphs of the actual English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can one agent be inferred? · 1/4

Now it may be argued: how can only one agent be established for earth and the like?

For no pervasion of the reason effecthood by “being produced by one agent” has been established.

The proponent cannot say that a single agent is established by economy, because economy is not itself a means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Agency, numerical unity, and economy are separate epistemological questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can one agent be inferred?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can one agent be inferred? · 2/4

The proponent may propose that the proof establishing mere possession of an agent, assisted by economy, establishes a single agent.

But economy cannot be an auxiliary cause in inference in general, because deviation would arise and there is no means for such cognition.

When subsumptive reflection on the reason is present, inference is not delayed; therefore delay in economy cannot establish delay in inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Agency, numerical unity, and economy are separate epistemological questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can one agent be inferred?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can one agent be inferred? · 3/4

> Nor is economy the cause of a simpler inference; otherwise mutual dependence would arise.

> Economy is not a cause even in the inference of an individual agent; otherwise, in the inference of fire from smoke, …

> … there would be no doubt whether the agent had one hand or two hands.

KEY INSIGHT

Agency, numerical unity, and economy are separate epistemological questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can one agent be inferred?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can one agent be inferred? · 4/4

It also cannot be said that establishing possession of an agent itself establishes one agent, because the existence of many agents has not been established.

If, in the absence of proof establishing unity, the agent's unity is not established, ...

... it would be equally possible to regard the mere establishment of agency as establishing many agents.

KEY INSIGHT

Agency, numerical unity, and economy are separate epistemological questions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can one agent be inferred?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does an inference directly prove unity? · 1/3

In the subject, the probandum—namely, possession of an agent—is established by the force of the reason's presence in the subject, ...

... although the inference does not separately mention that probandum.

But more than one occurrence of that same probandum in the subject is not established.

KEY INSIGHT

The source distinguishes proof of an agent from proof of an additional agent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Does an inference directly prove unity?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does an inference directly prove unity? · 2/3

Hence it follows that the inference of God does not concern a second—that is, an additional—agent.

Inference can concern an agent, but not a second agent; consequently only one agent is established.

If the inference of God did not concern one agent, it could not concern an agent at all.

KEY INSIGHT

The source distinguishes proof of an agent from proof of an additional agent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Does an inference directly prove unity?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does an inference directly prove unity? · 3/3

Nor is mention of many agents possible without mention of one agent, because mention of many agents is constituted by mention of agents one by one.

Other scholars, however, say that the unity of the agent too is not the object of the inference of God.

The inference can concern the agent even though it does not concern the agent's unity.

KEY INSIGHT

The source distinguishes proof of an agent from proof of an additional agent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Does an inference directly prove unity?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy as an auxiliary factor · 1/4

Now it may be argued that in fact only one agent, God, is established, but that single agent is not established as qualified by unity. But this argument is unsound.

If unity is not established, cognition of a single agent too cannot arise.

Therefore permanent doubt concerning unity and multiplicity would remain in the case of God.

KEY INSIGHT

Lāghava can assist cognition without being an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Economy as an auxiliary factor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy as an auxiliary factor · 2/4

The proponent replies: the auxiliary causal role of economy in a means of knowledge is acceptable where both economy and extravagance can be considered.

All authors of śāstra accept economy as an auxiliary cause in perception in the apprehension of causal capacity, effecthood, and pervadedness; …

… in comparison in the apprehension of the cause of word usage; in inference in the apprehension of a word's signifying power; and in all such means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Lāghava can assist cognition without being an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Economy as an auxiliary factor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy as an auxiliary factor · 3/4

When cognition is produced in this manner, both economy and extravagance are understood, but only the economical property—such as causal capacity, effecthood, …

… being the ground of word usage, or word-signifying power—is cognized.

If economy were ignored in the case of such properties, doubt would arise concerning word-signifying power and the like; …

KEY INSIGHT

Lāghava can assist cognition without being an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Economy as an auxiliary factor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Economy as an auxiliary factor · 4/4

… and in the absence of an alternative decisive cause, verbal practice would disappear.

Therefore it is extremely unreasonable not to admit economy as an auxiliary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Lāghava can assist cognition without being an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Economy as an auxiliary factor

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single agent through economy · 1/4

Now it may again be argued that, even though a jar may have many potters, when a potter is inferred as the agent, …

… only one agent is established by economy in the absence of a sublater.

This cannot be called an objectionable consequence, because after inferring a potter as agent, doubt will necessarily arise whether there is one agent or many.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparent single agency may be overridden by further proof of multiplicity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single agent through economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single agent through economy · 2/4

But this argument is unsound.

Even in the case of a jar, only the unity of the agent is established by economy.

Nevertheless, doubt concerning the agent's unity arises from doubt concerning the cognition's validity.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparent single agency may be overridden by further proof of multiplicity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single agent through economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single agent through economy · 3/4

Later, when proof establishing many agents becomes available, the inference of one agent is sublated.

It may also be countered that in this way the unity of God as the agent of earth and the like will not be established, …

… because doubt concerning unity will be difficult to remove through doubt concerning validity. But this counter-position is unsound.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparent single agency may be overridden by further proof of multiplicity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single agent through economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single agent through economy · 4/4

Veridical cognition of the agent's unity arises from the absence of proof sublating unity.

The absence of a separate proof establishing unity is not an obstructer; the inference of God itself, with the aid of economy, establishes God's unity.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparent single agency may be overridden by further proof of multiplicity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single agent through economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness · 1/5

Some other scholars propose that one sole agent, God, can be established through an inference of non-difference: …

“The agent of earth-substance is not different from the agent of the sprout, because he is a bodiless agent, …

… like the agent of the sprout.” The inference of difference—“The agent of the earth is different from the agent of the sprout, …

KEY INSIGHT

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness · 2/5

> … because he is not an agent with respect to the sprout, like a potter”—does not constitute a counter-inference, …

> … because being the substrate of non-eternal cognitions is an upādhi of this reason.

> It should also be noted here that, in positing difference or non-difference among agents, extravagance and economy render the inference non-probative.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness · 3/5

This view, however, raises the question of how eternal cognition of every object in the universe is to be established in God, the agent.

If it is said that this eternal cognition is established in God by the force of the reason's presence in the subject, ...

... the answer is that the force of the reason's presence in the subject establishes only the relation of the pervading probandum to the subject.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness · 4/5

> Consequently, only cognition relating to the substratum in the subject—that is, the cause or God—would be established; …

> … eternal cognition of every object in the universe would not be established.

> For no pervasion has been apprehended in which the probandum God is qualified by eternal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE SINGLE AGENT, THE USE OF ECONOMY, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND OMNISCIENCE

Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness · 5/5

Nor may it be said that a property—eternal cognition—without which the inference of God would be inexplicable therefore also becomes an object of the inference, …

… for on that assumption ordinary negative inference would disappear.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative arguments for divine uniqueness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness · 1/4

> The earlier Naiyāyikas hold that whatever entity—cognition and the like—is indispensable if the inference is to apprehend the occurrence of the probandum in the subject …
>
> … is established in the subject by the force of the reason's presence there.
>
> Thus a purely affirmative inference depends upon the inexplicability of an entity, whereas a purely negative inference depends upon the inexplicability of a known entity.

KEY INSIGHT

Beginningless effect-streams raise the issue of the eternity of their cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness · 2/4

In the inference, “The beginningless stream of effects is produced by cognition concerning its material cause, …

… because it is a beginningless stream of effects,” when the beginningless stream of effects in the form of dyads and the like is the subject, …

… the establishment of its being produced by cognition concerning the cause does not depend upon the requirement that the cause itself be the object of a beginningless cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Beginningless effect-streams raise the issue of the eternity of their cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness · 3/4

Beginninglessness alone is eternality.

Beginninglessness is present even in the state of universal liberation, because the liberated state is beginningless.

Moreover, objecthood with respect to all things extends in both directions—to the effect that is the subject and to God, its cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Beginningless effect-streams raise the issue of the eternity of their cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness · 4/4

Yet, by economy, only one beginningless cognition concerning all effects is established; two distinct cognitions, one eternal and the other non-eternal, are not established.

KEY INSIGHT

Beginningless effect-streams raise the issue of the eternity of their cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Earlier Naiyāyikas and beginninglessness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE SINGLE AGENT, THE USE OF ECONOMY, ETERNAL COGNITION, AND OMNISCIENCE

The Navya-Naiyāyika restriction

The Navya-Naiyāyikas hold that the subject of the inference of God—effects such as the earth—must be qualified as not produced by non-eternal cognition.

The cognition thereby established is then established specifically as eternal cognition, because the supposition of non-eternal cognition encounters a sublater.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential subject is qualified to exclude non-eternal producing cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The Navya-Naiyāyika restriction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vācaspati Miśra and residual elimination · 1/2

Vācaspati Miśra holds that, once a single cognition has been established by economy, it is established as eternal by residual elimination, …

… because a cognition possessing an origin cannot produce a beginningless stream of effects.

Cognition concerning a limited range of objects depends upon its cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Eternal cognition is proposed when an originated cognition cannot explain beginningless effects.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Vācaspati Miśra and residual elimination

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vācaspati Miśra and residual elimination · 2/2

In eternal cognition, freedom from dependence upon a cause is established on the basis of freedom from limitation of objecthood.

Thus eternal cognition concerning all objects is established.

KEY INSIGHT

Eternal cognition is proposed when an originated cognition cannot explain beginningless effects.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Vācaspati Miśra and residual elimination

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Other routes to omniscience

> Certain scholars hold that God is omniscient, either because he is the author of the Veda that expounds the six categories, or because …

> … he possesses immediate perceptual cognition of the six categories.

> It is also said that God has agency with respect to the conjunction of pots and the like with ether; consequently cognition of pots and the like is also established in God.

KEY INSIGHT

Authorship of the Veda and direct knowledge of categories are presented as alternatives.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Other routes to omniscience

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The two attitudes to logical economy

Objection

- Simplicity alone cannot serve as an independent means of knowledge.
- The initial inference establishes agency, not explicitly one agent.
- Additional agents cannot be excluded merely by assertion.

Reply

- Economy may help determine what a valid cognition establishes.
- The simplest established agent is accepted absent defeating evidence.
- Further proof may still sublate the initial conclusion.

The text debates the auxiliary epistemic role of lāghava rather than making it a freestanding proof.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Unity and Eternal Cognition of God

Problem

Agency, numerical unity, and economy are separate epistemological questions.

Middle

Non-difference of agents and the scope of the inference are separately tested.

Further debate

Eternal cognition is proposed when an originated cognition cannot explain beginningless effects.

Conclusion


Authorship of the Veda and direct knowledge of categories are presented as alternatives.

The next presentation continues the source argument without treating objections as settled facts.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

God as Cause, Omniscience without Error, Compassion, and the Diversity of Creation

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

The successive objections, replies, and logical distinctions in the translated text.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Divine Agency, Illusion and Karma

01

Problem

Precisely what the opponent contests.

02

Analyses

Qualifiers, examples, and causal relations.

03

Replies

The source tests possible logical defects.

04

Determination

The position reached before the next division.

The teaching divisions follow consecutive paragraphs of the actual English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does God make each individual pot? · 1/2

It may now be argued: how can divine agency be admitted in pots and the like?

Suppose divine agency is established by the inference, “A pot is produced by God, because it is an effect, like the earth.” This reasoning, however, is unsound.

If a pot is held to have two agents, then effects such as the earth must likewise have two agents.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection tests double agency and uncontrolled multiplication of creators.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Does God make each individual pot?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does God make each individual pot? · 2/2

A pot resembles the earth, and the earth resembles a pot; consequently an infinite plurality of Gods would follow.

It may also be said that God's causal relation to an effect is through agency alone, not through dual agency.

The answer, however, is that this assertion would mean only that God's causal relation to an effect is not through dual agency but through divine agency alone.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection tests double agency and uncontrolled multiplication of creators.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Does God make each individual pot?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God as a cause of every effect · 1/3

No; that reasoning is unsound.

God’s cognition and other qualities are eternal and therefore take every effect as their object.

For this reason, those very cognitions and other qualities also take as their object the material causes of pots and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply assigns cosmic causal efficacy to eternal knowledge, desire, and effort.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God as a cause of every effect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

God as a cause of every effect · 2/3

> God’s cognition and other qualities therefore possess causal efficacy with respect to effects such as pots, since they resemble the cognition and other qualities of a potter.

> Udayanācārya likewise says that, once God has been established as the substrate of the adṛṣṭa belonging to atoms and the like, God’s cognition and other qualities, …

> … being eternal, take every effect as their object.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply assigns cosmic causal efficacy to eternal knowledge, desire, and effort.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God as a cause of every effect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God as a cause of every effect · 3/3

It can therefore follow by rule that God is also the presiding agent of looms and the like, …

… although it is unnecessary to establish God separately merely in order to establish a presiding agent of a loom.

Statements of śruti or āgama such as “I am the cause of every effect” and “Every effect is produced through me” likewise express that God is the presiding agent of every effect.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply assigns cosmic causal efficacy to eternal knowledge, desire, and effort.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God as a cause of every effect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

Knowing an illusion without being deluded · 1/3

It may now be argued that, if God is omniscient, he must also cognize every erroneous cognition concerning every object; consequently God himself would become deluded.

For God too can become the object of an error, just as an error itself can be the object of an error. This reasoning, however, is unsound.

A cognition such as “This person possesses cognition of an object qualified by silverhood” is not erroneous, ...

KEY INSIGHT

The object of a cognition must be distinguished from the mode of that cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowing an illusion without being deluded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

Knowing an illusion without being deluded · 2/3

... for only a person who is not deluded possesses such a cognition.

In the cognition “This shell is silver,” silverhood functions as the mode of cognition, and the cognition is therefore erroneous.

In God’s cognition, however, a “cognition qualified by silverhood” is the object; silverhood itself does not function as the mode of God’s cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The object of a cognition must be distinguished from the mode of that cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowing an illusion without being deluded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowing an illusion without being deluded · 3/3

God’s cognition is therefore not erroneous.

Scholars such as ourselves can be cognizers of an error without themselves being deluded.

KEY INSIGHT

The object of a cognition must be distinguished from the mode of that cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowing an illusion without being deluded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

Why are creatures unequally placed? · 1/3

Granted. But for what purpose does God create the world?

No pleasure accrues to him, and, because he has no demerit, he experiences no pain either.

If it is said that he creates out of compassion, the only benefit would be the removal of others' suffering and the production of others' happiness; God should therefore …

KEY INSIGHT

Karma, compassion, and the purpose of creation are contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why are creatures unequally placed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

Why are creatures unequally placed? · 2/3

> … create only beings who dwell in heaven, not inhabitants of hell.

> It may also be argued that the creation of living beings depends upon merit and demerit, and that God therefore gives results in accordance with that merit and demerit.

> But then the diversity of the world must be held to depend upon karma; in that case, why admit a God endowed with unnecessary cognition of insects and the like?

KEY INSIGHT

Karma, compassion, and the purpose of creation are contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why are creatures unequally placed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

Why are creatures unequally placed? · 3⁄3

> Again, if the world's diversity did not depend upon karma, creation and dissolution would, because of God's eternal cognition and other qualities, …

> … always have to occur at the same time.

> If God's effort arose from compassion, the creation of the world would have to be produced by God's body and the like; consequently God would become a transmigrating being.

KEY INSIGHT

Karma, compassion, and the purpose of creation are contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why are creatures unequally placed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

God and the causal order · 1/4

No; this reasoning is unsound.

If God’s existence is not admitted at all, discussion concerning God would lack a substratum.

Once God’s existence has been accepted, hear the answer: the entire world is an object of his will; …

KEY INSIGHT

The reply coordinates divine will with adṛṣṭa and the qualified causal complex.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God and the causal order

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God and the causal order · 2/4

> … therefore he necessarily possesses cognition serving as a means to the object he desires.

> In fact, the usage “God creates the earth and the like” is appropriate only when God’s cognition is conjoined with a specifically ordered aggregate of causal conditions, …

> … such as adṛṣṭa, relating to the earth and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply coordinates divine will with adṛṣṭa and the qualified causal complex.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God and the causal order

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

GOD AS CAUSE, OMNISCIENCE WITHOUT ERROR, COMPASSION, AND THE DIVERSITY OF CREATION

God and the causal order · 3/4

In the same way, being conjoined with such a specifically qualified causal complex constitutes God’s will, in accordance with which the world is created or destroyed.

It must not be said that God’s cognition and other qualities are purposeless.

The earth and the like, being effects, are produced by cognition; therefore God’s eternal cognition and other qualities produce the world, just as self and …

KEY INSIGHT

The reply coordinates divine will with adṛṣṭa and the qualified causal complex.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God and the causal order

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

God and the causal order · 4/4

… ether respectively produce pleasure and sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply coordinates divine will with adṛṣṭa and the qualified causal complex.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · God and the causal order

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

An illusion as object versus mode

Erroneous human cognition

- A shell is cognized under the mode of silverhood.
- The predicated qualifier is not actually present in the shell.
- That cognition is consequently mistaken.

God’s cognition of the error

- The mistaken human cognition is itself what is known.
- Silverhood is not the mode of God’s own cognition.
- Cognizing error does not make the cognizer deluded.

The difference between the object of knowledge and its mode protects the proposed omniscience.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Divine Agency, Illusion and Karma

Problem

The objection tests double agency and uncontrolled multiplication of creators.

Middle

The object of a cognition must be distinguished from the mode of that cognition.

Further debate

Karma, compassion, and the purpose of creation are contested.

Conclusion


The reply coordinates divine will with adṛṣṭa and the qualified causal complex.

The next presentation continues the source argument without treating objections as settled facts.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ĪŚVARĀNUMĀNA



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Linguistic Convention, Transmission of the Veda, Valid Verbal Knowledge, and Śruti–Smṛti

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

The successive objections, replies, and logical distinctions in the translated text.

Appendix 3 · Īśvarānumāna · Inference of God

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Vedic Language and the Closing Proof

01

Problem

Precisely what the opponent contests.

02

Analyses

Qualifiers, examples, and causal relations.

03

Replies

The source tests possible logical defects.

04

Determination

The position reached before the next division.

The teaching divisions follow consecutive paragraphs of the actual English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can a bodiless God establish word usage? · 1/4

> The following objection may now be raised: how can a bodiless God establish the convention governing the use of words such as “Veda” and “pot”? The answer is as follows.

> At the beginning of cosmic creation, a fish’s body, qualified or assisted by adṛṣṭa, is produced from the diversity of the elements.

> Thereafter, the sounds of the Veda are produced by conjunctions generated through the movements of the fish’s throat and palate, …

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument supplies embodied conduits for the production and transmission of speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · How can a bodiless God establish word usage?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can a bodiless God establish word usage? · 2/4

> … accompanied by cognition of all the meanings of the Veda and by the desire to speak.

> Alternatively, it may be held that the Veda is produced by the conjunction of a self possessing adṛṣṭa, or by conjunction with God endowed with effort assisted by adṛṣṭa.

> In the same manner, once effort has arisen in the potter's body, a pot is produced, together with cognition and desire, …

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument supplies embodied conduits for the production and transmission of speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · How can a bodiless God establish word usage?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can a bodiless God establish word usage? · 3/4

> … through conjunction with God endowed with effort assisted by adṛṣṭa and through all the operations conducive to the pot.

> Likewise, God's cognition, desire, and effort—assisted by adṛṣṭa—produce linguistic usage in bodily substrates consisting of an instigating elder and an elder who is instigated.

> A child who observes the conduct of such elders thereafter learns the same linguistic usage.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument supplies embodied conduits for the production and transmission of speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · How can a bodiless God establish word usage?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How can a bodiless God establish word usage? · 4/4

This process of linguistic usage among human beings is called the “bhūtāveśa-nyāya,” the analogy of possession by a spirit.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument supplies embodied conduits for the production and transmission of speech.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · How can a bodiless God establish word usage?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda · 1/5

Certain scholars propose that Manu and other sages, who are born at the beginning of creation in order to experience results and …

… who retain knowledge of reality acquired in a previous creation, apprehend by intuitive awareness the Veda present in the intention of the omniscient God and …

… recite it again—just as a silent reader's verse is repeated inferentially upon seeing its written form. The succeeding transmission of the Veda then begins.

KEY INSIGHT

A plurality of omniscient sages is challenged as unnecessary and unproved.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda · 2/5

Thus the earlier view holds that, through the creation of the sages' bodies, this very transmission of the Veda establishes the traditional usage of words such as "pot."

This proposal, however, is unsound.

Positing infinitely many omniscient sages in every creation incurs the defect of extravagance.

KEY INSIGHT

A plurality of omniscient sages is challenged as unnecessary and unproved.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda · 3/5

> Moreover, if those omniscient sages can themselves exercise agency in creating the earth and the like, …

> … the inference that establishes God as creator of the world becomes fruitless.

> This refutation also disposes of the proposal that yogins perfected in another creation should be regarded at the beginning of every creation as the creators of the …

KEY INSIGHT

A plurality of omniscient sages is challenged as unnecessary and unproved.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda · 4/5

> … earth and the like.

> For the question would arise whether the infinitely many omniscient beings at the beginning of creation are established by some other means of knowledge or …

> … by the very proof that establishes God as the agent of the earth and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

A plurality of omniscient sages is challenged as unnecessary and unproved.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda · 5/5

> The first alternative is unacceptable, because no such other proof is possible.

> The second is also unacceptable, because the inference establishing agency with respect to a stream of effects—such as the beginningless conjunction of dyads—establishes …

> … only one omniscient being.

KEY INSIGHT

A plurality of omniscient sages is challenged as unnecessary and unproved.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Rival theory: sages transmit the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error · 1/5

The following objection may now be raised.

If a word’s signifying power is apprehended through God’s cognition, then, with regard to the cognition of a pot inferred from the conduct of the person being prompted, …

… the cognition that the word “pot” is its cause will be erroneous, because God’s cognition is exclusively eternal.

KEY INSIGHT

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error · 2/5

Consequently, all verbal cognitions of pots and the like will be erroneous, since cognition of the signifying power of words such as “pot” is held to arise from such …

… cognition of verbal causality. An endless succession of error would thus arise.

An atheist may say that, if cognition of word-power is held to be produced by non-eternal omniscient human beings, this defect of error does not arise.

KEY INSIGHT

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error · 3/5

This reasoning, however, is unsound.

Even if the cognition “This cognition of a pot, inferred from the instigator’s conduct, …

… is the cause of cognition of the signifying power of the word ‘pot’” is erroneous, the cognition of word-power—“The word ‘pot’ conveys a pot”—is veridical because …

KEY INSIGHT

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error · 4/5

> … its object is not contradicted.

> Nor is it proper to infer that the cognition of the signifying power of the word “pot” is erroneous merely because that cognition of power is itself produced by an error.

> The qualifier of a cognition of power that is not related to a co-located qualificand is absent in the case of word-power; …

KEY INSIGHT

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error · 5/5

… hence error is absent from the cognition of power as well.

Only the state of taking a contradictory qualifier as one's object causes error.

KEY INSIGHT

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why verbal knowledge need not inherit an error

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The puppet example and scriptural evidence · 1/3

> For this very reason, when a child sees a wooden puppet moved by a puppeteer's strings bring a pot after hearing words such as "Bring the pot," the child understands the ...

> ... causal efficacy of the word "pot" in producing cognition of a pot.

> Hence the cognition of the signifying power of the word "pot," produced by such cognition of verbal causality, is not erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

The text concludes with language acquisition and the authority attributed to śruti and smṛti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The puppet example and scriptural evidence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The puppet example and scriptural evidence · 2/3

> Were such cognition of power erroneous, cognition of verbal causality would not arise from the instigator's use of the word "pot," because …

> … the child would remain firmly in doubt whether that causality had been apprehended from the conduct of a conscious person or from the conduct of an unconscious wooden puppet.

> Furthermore, the śruti—"That one God alone, whose eyes are in every direction, whose faces are in every direction, whose arms are in every direction, …

KEY INSIGHT

The text concludes with language acquisition and the authority attributed to śruti and smṛti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The puppet example and scriptural evidence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The puppet example and scriptural evidence · 3/3

> … who abides in every direction, creates both earth and heaven by blowing with his arms and flying with his wings”—and the smṛti—“That one, regarded as distinct, supreme, …

> … the highest among persons and of the nature of the Supreme Self, who enters the three worlds and sustains them, …

> … is the imperishable Supreme Lord”—should be accepted as means of knowledge establishing God.

KEY INSIGHT

The text concludes with language acquisition and the authority attributed to śruti and smṛti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The puppet example and scriptural evidence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How verbal cognition may still be valid

Causal history

- Knowledge of word convention can involve an imperfect causal inference.
- The agent whose conduct is observed need not explain the entire origin of language.
- An objection attempts to pass error through the causal chain.

Semantic validity

- The word “pot” actually conveys a pot.
- The object of the word-power cognition is not contradicted.
- A mistaken account of a cause need not contaminate the true meaning.

The translation separates a cognition’s truth from every previous cognition in its causal ancestry.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Vedic Language and the Closing Proof

Problem

The translated argument supplies embodied conduits for the production and transmission of speech.

Middle

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

Further debate

Correct word-meaning cognition is distinguished from a defective cognition of its causal history.

Conclusion


The text concludes with language acquisition and the authority attributed to śruti and smṛti.

The translated Inference of God formally ends here; the following division turns to the power to burn.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · DOCTRINE OF THE POWER TO BURN



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Burning, the Jewel, Adṛṣṭa, and the Causal Status of an Inhibitor's Absence

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Source-grounded objections, replies, causal distinctions, and conclusions.

Appendix 3 · Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Power to Burn · Fire and Inhibitors

1

Why fire does not always burn

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

2

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

3

Can absence cause anything?

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

4

Recurrent usage versus inferred power

Evidence from ordinary language faces a logical test.

5

Changing stimulants and the gem

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

The successive arguments come only from the English Appendix 3 translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why fire does not always burn · 1/4

But, like God, fire’s power to burn can also be inferred from its effect.

It may be explained as follows.

The experience of burning is observed to arise from the conjunction of the hand and fire;

KEY INSIGHT

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why fire does not always burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Why fire does not always burn · 2/4

yet when an inhibitor such as a gem is present in that very conjunction, no experience of burning arises.

Therefore a power to burn must be admitted in fire, in whose absence no experience of burning occurs in the palm.

For without admitting a power to burn, it would be incoherent to explain the absence of the experience of burning as arising from the absence of that power.

KEY INSIGHT

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why fire does not always burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Why fire does not always burn · 3/4

In this way, through an exclusively negative inference, a power to burn is established in fire and the like.

It should not be said that the defect of the absence of adṛṣṭa would arise.

When observable adṛṣṭa is present, absence of adṛṣṭa does not arise; the presence of observable adṛṣṭa means that the presence of the effect is established.

KEY INSIGHT

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why fire does not always burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Why fire does not always burn · 4/4

Otherwise, a potter’s wheel impelled by a firm staff would not turn.

KEY INSIGHT

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why fire does not always burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 1/7

A Naiyāyika may argue as follows: delay in the production of an effect may be due to delay in the production of adṛṣṭa.

For example, delay in the production of offspring through intercourse with a barren woman, delay in the production of the conjunction of two atoms,

and likewise the failure of a result to arise in one place despite equal study—all these may be explained by delay in adṛṣṭa.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 2/7

But this reasoning is unsound.

Delay of adṛṣṭa cannot be called destruction or non-production of adṛṣṭa.

Even after the gem serving as inhibitor has been removed, the consequence would follow that the experience of burning remains absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 3/7

Moreover, it is regularly observed that when the gem is present the effect is not produced, and that in the absence of the gem the power to burn is present.

Otherwise, even when the gem is absent, an effect such as the experience of burning would become impossible because

the power to burn serving as its cause might sometimes be absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 4/7

In intercourse with a barren woman, delay in the production of offspring is due to deviation in an observable cause and delay in adṛṣṭa;

but sometimes adṛṣṭa itself directly produces an effect.

Otherwise, that adṛṣṭa could not be regarded as a cause even mediately.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 5/7

It is never observed that, of two students who are equally talented and constantly diligent in study, one becomes intelligent and the other unintelligent.

Likewise, it is never observed that adṛṣṭa alone is the efficient cause of every produced effect.

There is deviation in the case of pleasure obtained from intercourse with a forbidden woman.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 6/7

The adṛṣṭa producing such pleasure cannot arise from demerit, because it is conducive to pleasure.

Nor can that adṛṣṭa arise from merit, because in order to produce pleasure it would have to produce intercourse with a forbidden woman.

Therefore, because it causes intercourse with a forbidden woman, such adṛṣṭa is not merit; and because, like the adṛṣṭa generated by the Śyena sacrifice,

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes · 7/7

it produces a forbidden result, it is merely a cause of harm.

KEY INSIGHT

Adṛṣṭa does not automatically explain the inhibited effect.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Gem, delayed effects, and unseen causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Unseen opposition to burning · 1/5

It may now be argued as follows: adṛṣṭa opposed to the experience of burning alone produces the absence of the experience of burning.

But this reasoning too is unsound.

If the gem together with the absence of a stimulant did not produce the absence of the experience of burning,

KEY INSIGHT

Missing effects and unproved unseen causes are distinct claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Unseen opposition to burning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Unseen opposition to burning · 2/5

a person desiring the experience of burning would not seek to obtain a gem together with the absence of a stimulant.

And if such a gem is held to produce the absence of burning, the consequence would follow that the absence of burning is produced merely by the absence of that

gem which produces the absence of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

Missing effects and unproved unseen causes are distinct claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Unseen opposition to burning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Unseen opposition to burning · 3/5

What need is there for adṛṣṭa, when it is not antecedently present and depends upon another thing?

The Naiyāyikas too regard the absence of an inhibitor as a cause of the effect.

Drinking water and purity of action are held to be productive causes of adṛṣṭa; similarly, the absence of an inhibitor may be regarded as a cause here.

KEY INSIGHT

Missing effects and unproved unseen causes are distinct claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Unseen opposition to burning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Unseen opposition to burning · 4/5

If adṛṣṭa is held to arise even from impure action, the consequence of the absence of adṛṣṭa when pure action is present would arise.

If the adṛṣṭa that establishes the absence of the effect is itself the inhibitor,

then even without the use of the gem the experience of burning would become impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

Missing effects and unproved unseen causes are distinct claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Unseen opposition to burning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Unseen opposition to burning · 5/5

Moreover, the absence of the gem is not established, because its presence is directly perceived in the immediately following moment.

KEY INSIGHT

Missing effects and unproved unseen causes are distinct claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Unseen opposition to burning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition · 1/4

Granted that, on the basis of positive and negative concomitance, the absence of an inhibitor connected with the absence of a stimulant is a cause of the

In this way, the absence of a qualified inhibitor becomes the invariable cause of the effect when only the stimulant is present, when both the stimulant and

the inhibitor are present, or when both are absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Positive and negative concomitance identify a candidate cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition · 2/4

Being the counterpositive of an absence that functions as a cause is inhibitorhood.

The causal status of a qualified absence of an inhibitor is established specifically as absence of the gem, not as absence of an inhibitor in general.

Therefore no defect of mutual dependence arises here.

KEY INSIGHT

Positive and negative concomitance identify a candidate cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition · 3/4

Hence the very aggregate of absences of the gem and the like that has been regarded as the inhibitor is the cause.

Consequently, when the gem is present, the experience of burning need not arise even if a mantra and the like are absent.

Furthermore, according to the Mīmāṃsaka view that regards an absence as non-different from its substrate,

KEY INSIGHT

Positive and negative concomitance identify a candidate cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition · 4/4

only the compact substrate conventionally accepted in the form of an absence is regarded as the cause for ease of usage.

KEY INSIGHT

Positive and negative concomitance identify a candidate cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of inhibitor as a causal condition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can absence cause anything? · 1/4

The older Naiyāyikas may say as follows: the statement that absence is not a cause is incorrect.

The means of knowledge that apprehends the causal status of an absence is the same as the means of knowledge that apprehends the causal status of a positive

It is observed that absence of conjunction with a wall causes movement; absence of perception causes cognition of absence;

KEY INSIGHT

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absence cause anything?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can absence cause anything? · 2/4

non-performance of a prescribed action causes sin; and absence of defect causes the validity of the Veda.

But the view of the older Naiyāyikas is unsound.

A qualified entity has no existence separate from an unqualified entity; therefore it is improper to regard the absence of a qualified entity as an invariable

KEY INSIGHT

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absence cause anything?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Can absence cause anything? · 3/4

A qualified entity is merely the state consisting in the relation between a qualifier and a qualificand.

Thus, if the separate absences of these constituents are regarded as causes, sometimes the absence of the qualificand—that is,

the gem—sometimes the absence of the qualifier—that is, the stimulant—and sometimes the absence of both the qualificand and

KEY INSIGHT

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absence cause anything?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can absence cause anything? · 4/4

the qualifier will be regarded as the cause.

Consequently, because of mutual deviation, none of these can be the true cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absence cause anything?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Specific qualifications of causal absence · 1/3

But an absence differs with the difference of the qualifier delimiting counterpositiveness,

just as an absence differs with the difference of the counterpositive and the like.

Otherwise, even when separate absences of colour in earth, water, and fire were known, doubt concerning colour in air would be impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant counterpositive and delimiter must be identified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Specific qualifications of causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Specific qualifications of causal absence · 2/3

Therefore, the absence of a lone person—that is, the potter—which arises from the absence of both qualifier and qualificand,

is established through cognition of an unsublated recurrent usage when only the rotating staff is present, when both the staff and the person are present,

or when both the staff and the person are absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant counterpositive and delimiter must be identified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Specific qualifications of causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Specific qualifications of causal absence · 3/3

In the same way, the mere absence of the inhibiting gem—which pervades the absence of both qualifier and qualificand and

is recurrent—should be regarded as the cause of the experience of burning when the qualificand, namely the gem serving as inhibitor, is absent;

when the qualifier, namely the stimulant, is absent; or when both qualifier and qualificand are absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant counterpositive and delimiter must be identified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Specific qualifications of causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Recurrent usage versus inferred power · 1/2

The following objection may now be raised: the usage concerning the absence of a lone person—that is, the potter—is established merely because

of the absence of the qualifier and the like, since that absence alone is endowed with power.

But this objection is unsound.

KEY INSIGHT

Evidence from ordinary language faces a logical test.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Recurrent usage versus inferred power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Recurrent usage versus inferred power · 2/2

The establishment of recurrent usage arises solely from recurrent cognition; power is supersensible.

KEY INSIGHT

Evidence from ordinary language faces a logical test.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Recurrent usage versus inferred power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

BURNING, THE JEWEL, ADṚṢṬA, AND THE CAUSAL STATUS OF AN INHIBITOR’S ABSENCE

Changing stimulants and the gem · 1/5

The following objection may again be raised: what kind of absence of the gem serving as inhibitor can remain when a stimulant is applied?

The prior absence and the destruction of the gem cannot exist at the same time as their counterpositive, the gem.

Nor can it be said that in the state expressed by “This was a dark pot,” only the destruction of the baked pot, produced by the destruction of the dark pot,

KEY INSIGHT

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Changing stimulants and the gem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Changing stimulants and the gem · 2/5

remains, whereas the destruction of that same baked pot does not remain with respect to pothood in general.

Similarly, the destruction of the gem qualified by the absence of a stimulant, produced by the destruction of the absence of the stimulant, may remain.

For, since destruction is endless, the consequence would follow that the experience of burning arises even after the stimulant has been removed.

KEY INSIGHT

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Changing stimulants and the gem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Changing stimulants and the gem · 3⁄5

Nor can the absolute absence of the gem remain at that time, because absolute absence cannot be sometimes produced and sometimes unproduced.

But this objection is unsound.

Both origination and destruction occur in the absence of a merely unqualified person—origination when a staff is placed with the person,

KEY INSIGHT

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Changing stimulants and the gem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Changing stimulants and the gem · 4/5

and destruction when the staff is removed.

Otherwise, the unsublated usages concerning the absence of a lone person and the absence of a staff at the times when a staff is placed with and

removed from a person could not be explained.

KEY INSIGHT

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Changing stimulants and the gem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Changing stimulants and the gem · 5/5

By the same rule, when a stimulant is placed and removed, the absence of an inhibitor such as the gem must also be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Changing stimulants and the gem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inhibited fire: two explanatory approaches

Distinct power

- Fire ordinarily produces a burn.
- A gem prevents burning without removing fire.
- A separate positive ability is postulated.

Absence of obstruction

- The inhibitor’s absence may enter the causal complex.
- The appeal to adṛṣṭa is separately questioned.
- An absence requires a specified counterpositive.

The discussion does not initially assume either explanation to be established.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Power to Burn · Fire and Inhibitors

Opening

A gem turns a familiar conjunction into a puzzle about power.

Dialectical core

Older Naiyāyikas and their critics dispute negative causation.

Further argument

Evidence from ordinary language faces a logical test.

Continuation


The closing reply tracks the absence through altered conditions.

The source argument continues in the following presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · DOCTRINE OF THE POWER TO BURN



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Relational, Destructive, and Qualified Absence and Their Causal Delimiters

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Source-grounded objections, replies, causal distinctions, and conclusions.


Appendix 3 · Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Power to Burn · Qualified Absence



The successive arguments come only from the English Appendix 3 translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is there a fourth relational absence? · 1⁄3

If the absence of an inhibitor such as the gem cannot be included among the three kinds of relational absence because it is distinct from all three,

that absence of the inhibitor should be regarded as a fourth relational absence.

Although the qualified absences already admitted are mutually opposed, general relational absences need not be mutually opposed,

KEY INSIGHT

The extra category is tested against established kinds of absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is there a fourth relational absence?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is there a fourth relational absence? · 2/3

because those same general absences can be explained by including another qualified absence.

Otherwise, because destruction is distinct from the beginningless relational absence already admitted,

destruction too could not be established as a separate relational absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The extra category is tested against established kinds of absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is there a fourth relational absence?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is there a fourth relational absence? · 3⁄3

Furthermore, the inexplicability of other kinds of usage is the same under both the older and the newer alternatives.

This dispute concerning the inexplicability of the absence of an inhibitor is merely an internal dispute among Naiyāyikas of the same lineage;

therefore a separate doctrine of power is not established by this dispute.

KEY INSIGHT

The extra category is tested against established kinds of absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Is there a fourth relational absence?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

A produced absence as destruction · 1/4

Granted that the absence of an inhibitor is simply destruction, because in the division of relational absences only destruction has been determined as an

It should not be said that the absence of an inhibitor is merely prior absence because it is an absence subject to destruction;

for the established usage concerning the absence of an inhibitor cannot be called into question.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence is not always the destruction of its bearer.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A produced absence as destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A produced absence as destruction · 2/4

Alternatively, it may be proposed that the absence of an inhibitor is merely absolute absence.

Although such an absence of the inhibitor is eternal, because the relation is present only occasionally, cognition of the effect sometimes does not arise and

the effect is sometimes not produced.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence is not always the destruction of its bearer.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A produced absence as destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

A produced absence as destruction · 3/4

This relation is sometimes the absence of the qualifier, sometimes the absence of the qualificand, and sometimes the absence of both.

Qualified absolute absence resides only in such a relation.

If the destruction of a presently existing qualificand were to reside in a past qualifier,

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence is not always the destruction of its bearer.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A produced absence as destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A produced absence as destruction · 4/4

the consequence would follow that the destruction of a qualificand such as a pot exists in the present,

because that same pot is delimited by a past qualifier—namely, a past moment.

It would then be necessary to accept only the doctrine that things are continuously destroyed at every successive moment.

KEY INSIGHT

A qualified absence is not always the destruction of its bearer.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A produced absence as destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

A subject outlives its qualification · 1/4

Moreover, an existing thing is not regarded as destroyed.

Contrary yet unsublated cognitions such as “The topknot was destroyed, but the man wearing the topknot was not destroyed” are also experienced.

Therefore, even when a qualifier is destroyed, the qualificand is not destroyed.

KEY INSIGHT

The qualifier and the qualified object need not perish together.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A subject outlives its qualification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

A subject outlives its qualification · 2/4

In usages such as “This was a dark man” or “This was a solitary man,” only the destruction of the qualifier—darkness or

solitariness—is experienced in the qualificand, the man.

For when a qualificand is qualified by a qualifier, affirmation and negation concern only the qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

The qualifier and the qualified object need not perish together.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A subject outlives its qualification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A subject outlives its qualification · 3/4

Furthermore, what has already been destroyed cannot be destroyed again; therefore the destruction of an existing thing cannot be admitted.

On this basis, the following view is also refuted: when a stimulant is present,

the destruction of the power to burn produced by the gem qualified by the absence of the stimulant is itself destroyed when the stimulant is removed;

KEY INSIGHT

The qualifier and the qualified object need not perish together.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A subject outlives its qualification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

A subject outlives its qualification · 4/4

therefore only an undestroyed destruction is the cause, and removal of the stimulant is not pointless.

According to the older Naiyāyika view, the renewed destruction of an existing destruction is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The qualifier and the qualified object need not perish together.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A subject outlives its qualification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

Qualified absence and ontological economy · 1/5

Nor should it be said that a relational absence distinct from destruction is the absence of the qualified gem.

For a produced absence is the cause of cognition of a destroyed object; consequently,

a produced absence would generate cognition of destruction with respect to an existing object.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid multiplying negative entities without necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified absence and ontological economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified absence and ontological economy · 2/5

Nor can qualified absence be regarded as absolute absence.

If the same absence of the inhibiting gem, qualified sometimes by the absence of the qualifier and sometimes by the absence of the qualificand,

is regarded as the cause of the experience of burning, the defect of non-recurrence will remain in that very state.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid multiplying negative entities without necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified absence and ontological economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified absence and ontological economy · 3/5

For there is no recurrent form in the absences of the qualifier and the qualificand that can bind them together.

It may now be proposed that the state of being opposed to a qualified entity delimits the absence of the qualified gem and

recurs in the absences of both the qualifier and the qualificand.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid multiplying negative entities without necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified absence and ontological economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified absence and ontological economy · 4/5

For the absolute absence of the qualified gem exists only when both the qualifier and the qualificand are absent.

The answer, however, is as follows: these two absences of the qualifier and the qualificand, unified by the state of being opposed to the qualified entity,

should themselves be regarded as the causes that produce the experience of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid multiplying negative entities without necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified absence and ontological economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified absence and ontological economy · 5/5

Therefore there is no need to admit a separate absence of the qualified gem dependent upon these two absences.

KEY INSIGHT

Avoid multiplying negative entities without necessity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified absence and ontological economy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 1/6

It may again be proposed that, when a stimulant is present, the eternal absence of the gem serving as inhibitor may indeed remain;

but when the stimulant is removed, the absence of the gem delimited by the then-produced absence of the stimulant will not be present there.

Therefore the experience of burning cannot arise at that location.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 2/6

Consequently, only the many absences of the gem qualified by different specific absences of stimulants are causes of the experience of burning.

But this proposal is unsound.

The different specific absences of stimulants are non-recurrent; therefore recurrent usage concerning the qualified absence of an inhibitor would become

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 3/6

And if the absences of stimulants are apprehended generically, the definition will be overextended.

It may again be proposed as follows: the state of being opposed to the specific inhibitor in the form of a jewel is the common delimitor of the causality of

the absence of the qualifier and the qualified.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 4/6

For the rule of co-absence—"where one of these two is absent, the specific jewel is absent; and where the specific jewel is present,

neither of these two is absent"—is established by experience.

But this proposal too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 5/6

The rule of co-absence of the two cannot be established on the basis of the mutual absence of the qualifier and the qualified.

For the absence of the qualifier and the absence of the qualified are, each separately, absences of the qualified object.

The absence of these individual absences would then have to be regarded as the qualified object; consequently, the qualifier and

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Stimulants and causal delimiters · 6/6

the qualified would each separately become a qualified object.

For the absence of the qualifier and the absence of the qualified are absences of the qualified object.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibitor’s absence must have its correct specification.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Stimulants and causal delimiters

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 1/9

It should be noted here that the absence of the absence of both the qualifier and the qualified cannot be the qualified entity possessing both qualifier and

Again, the absence of both the qualifier and the qualified constitutes only the absence of the qualified entity;

the two do not thereby remain as their own separate absences.

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 2/9

Therefore, treating the absence of the qualified entity on the basis of two distinct absences would not be proper.

The state of being pervaded by the separate absence of the qualifier and the separate absence of the qualified,

or the state of indicating those separate absences, cannot constitute the state of being the absence of the qualified entity.

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 3/9

When the absence of the qualifier and the absence of the qualified constitute the absence of the qualified entity,

that qualified absence can neither be pervaded by those separate absences nor be their indicator.

If the qualified absence and the absence of the qualifier-and-qualified are taken to be one and the same, it is impossible to admit such pervasion or

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 4/9

indicativeness in the very same thing.

By this refutation, the second view concerning the common character of the qualified absence as that which is opposed to the usage of a specific inhibitor is

Again, if the absence of the qualifier and the absence of the qualified were to constitute the qualified absence in some common form,

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 5/9

then the absence of those separate absences— which takes the form of the qualifier or the qualified—would become the qualified entity.

For it has already been stated that the absence of the absence of a counterpositive is the counterpositive itself.

Hence it must be admitted that the absence of the qualifier and the absence of the qualified, or the absence of the qualified delimited by the qualifier,

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 6/9

is not the absence of the qualified entity.

The usage concerning a qualified entity, namely an inhibitor, arises because of the relation between qualifier and qualified.

Therefore, the usage concerning the absence of a qualified entity arises because of the absence of the relation between qualifier and qualified.

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 7/9

This is exactly as the presence and absence of a pot respectively give rise to the usages "there is a pot" and

"there is no pot." When the qualifier-qualified relation is absent, there is no usage concerning the qualified entity;

and when the absence of that relation is not present, there is likewise no usage concerning the absence of the qualified entity.

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 8/9

It is only through the relation of the entity functioning as qualifier with the entity functioning as qualified that the qualifiedness of the latter is

constituted by the former.

The absence of the relation is caused by any one of these three: the absence of the qualifier, the absence of the qualified, or the absence of both.

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence of a qualifying relation · 9/9

The invariable cause of the uniform usage concerning the absence of the qualified entity is solely such an unqualified absence of relation,

which occurs throughout all these kinds of absence.

The same sort of cause is seen also in the usage "there is no staff-bearing man here."

KEY INSIGHT

Two absent items do not simply amount to one qualified absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence of a qualifying relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 1/7

It may now be argued as follows.

For this very reason, the mere absence of the man constitutes the absence of the inhibitor when only the staff is present, when both the staff and

the man are present, or when both are absent; and the stimulating factor is the cause of the experience of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 2/7

Then, even when the stimulator is absent, the experience of burning could arise when both objects are absent; but even when the stimulator is present,

the experience of burning could not arise if the inhibitor is present.

But this argument is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 3/7

Only an absence and its locus constitute an intrinsic relation.

If the absence of a pot at the crossroads and a piece of ground containing a pot were also taken to stand in an intrinsic relation,

the usage of the absence of a pot would have to occur everywhere even on ground containing a pot.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 4/7

Therefore, only the uniform usage of the mere absence of the man should be admitted.

Hence it is necessary to hold that the absence of relation between the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator is the cause of the experience of burning.

Such an absence of relation is present when the inhibitor is absent, when both the inhibitor and the stimulating factor are present, and when both are absent;

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 5/7

for in all these states the cognition "there is no relation between the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator" is possible.

But the proponent of the established doctrine rejects this argument.

In his view, only an absence and its locus stand in an intrinsic relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 6/7

The usage "mere absence of the man" is uniform, because the absence of relation between being alone and the man is present when only the staff is present,

when both staff and man are present, and when both are absent.

Therefore, the proponent of the established doctrine holds that the absence of relation between the inhibitor and

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation · 7/7

the absence of the stimulator is the cause of the experience of burning.

Such an absence of relation is present when the inhibitor is absent, when both the inhibitor and the stimulating factor are present, and when both are absent.

In all these states the cognition "there is no relation between the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator" is available.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal fact concerns a precise absence of relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an inhibitor–stimulant relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

RELATIONAL, DESTRUCTIVE, AND QUALIFIED ABSENCE AND THEIR CAUSAL DELIMITERS

Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation · 1/5

It may now be argued that wherever both the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator are present, the experience of burning would necessarily have to arise,

because there is no distinct relation between an absence and its locus.

But this argument is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation · 2/5

Even when the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator are present, the intrinsic relation between the absence and its locus is absent.

For the cognition of an absence as qualified by its own locus arises only through the intrinsic relation.

It may again be argued as follows: the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator alone constitute an intrinsic relation;

KEY INSIGHT

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation · 3/5

the absence of both constitutes the absence of the inhibitor; and the stimulating factor is the cause of the experience of burning.

Consequently, when both are absent and the absence of the stimulator is present, the experience of burning could arise;

but when the inhibitor is present in the locus of the stimulating factor, the experience of burning would not arise.

KEY INSIGHT

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation · 4/5

But this argument too is not tenable.

Only an absence and its locus constitute an intrinsic relation.

If the absence of a pot at the crossroads and ground containing a pot were taken to be connected by an intrinsic relation,

KEY INSIGHT

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation · 5/5

there would arise the consequence that the usage of the absence of a pot could occur even on ground containing a pot.

Therefore, only a nature consisting in contingent qualification must be regarded as the intrinsic relation.

Such a contingent nature means the capacity to produce qualified cognition without any additional relation.

KEY INSIGHT

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Absence, its locus, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified cognition tests the account · 1/3

It may now be said that the absence of a pot existing at a crossroads and ground containing a pot does not possess the capacity to produce a qualified

cognition of the absence of a pot in that ground, because in a place containing a pot a qualified cognition of the absence of a pot never arises.

Therefore, in the present case too, the capacity of the inhibitor and the absence of the stimulator to produce qualified cognition is itself the intrinsic

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of absence is constrained by object and locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified cognition tests the account

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified cognition tests the account · 2/3

Otherwise, a qualified cognition of the absence of the stimulator existing at the crossroads would arise even when the inhibitor is present in a place

containing the stimulating factor.

The absence of such an intrinsic relation remains equally undifferentiated when the jewel-like inhibitor is absent, when both the inhibitor and

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of absence is constrained by object and locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified cognition tests the account

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Qualified cognition tests the account · 3⁄3

the stimulating factor are present, and when both are absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of absence is constrained by object and locus.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Qualified cognition tests the account

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The fate of a qualified entity

Undifferentiated approach

- Removing a qualifier is equated with removing its bearer.
- Every qualified absence risks becoming a further entity.
- The causal relation remains obscure.

Relational analysis

- The subject may survive the loss of a qualifier.
- The lack is qualified by a precise relation.
- The proper locus governs qualified cognition.

The distinction between a bearer, its quality, and their relation matters.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Power to Burn · Qualified Absence

Opening

The extra category is tested against established kinds of absence.

Dialectical core

An inhibitor's absence must have its correct specification.

Further argument

An absence must be considered with its appropriate locus.

Continuation


Cognition of absence is constrained by object and locus.

The source argument continues in the following presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · DOCTRINE OF THE POWER TO BURN



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Counterpositives, Relational Absence, Mantras, and Inferential Proof of Power

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Source-grounded objections, replies, causal distinctions, and conclusions.

Appendix 3 · Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Power to Burn · Causal Absences

1

Which counterpositive is denied?

Qualification determines the particular absence.

2

Relational absence as the cause

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

3

Mantras and the duration of inhibition

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire's nature.

4

A supersensible power in fire

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

5

Alternative inferences for power

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

The successive arguments come only from the English Appendix 3 translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 1/9

Alternatively, it may be proposed as follows.

In the case of the absence of a man without a staff, a staff-bearing man is not the counterpositive,

because the property of being a man without a staff is absent in that very man.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 2/9

Rather, only a man distinct from the staff-bearing man is the counterpositive.

In the presence of a staff-bearing man, in the presence of the staff alone, or in the absence of both,

the absence of a man without a staff remains undifferentiated; therefore the usage of the mere absence of the man is uniform.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 3/9

Consequently, the following usage is proper: "When a staff-bearing man is present, it is not that other men without staffs are absent; rather,

there is the absence of the absence of the staff." Otherwise, the use of the word "other" would be pointless.

In the same way, in the case of the mere absence of the jewel-like inhibitor, an inhibitor conjoined with the stimulating factor is not the counterpositive,

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 4/9

because in such a conjoined inhibitor the property of being the inhibitor alone is absent.

Therefore, what is distinct from such a conjoined inhibitor, namely the inhibitor alone, is the counterpositive.

In the presence of an inhibitor accompanied by the stimulating factor, in the presence of the stimulating factor alone, or in the absence of both,

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 5/9

the conjoined inhibitor remains undifferentiated as a qualified entity; hence no defect of non-uniformity arises.

But after the stimulating factor is removed, only the inhibitor remains.

Then the absence of the inhibitor is no longer present, and therefore the experience of burning does not arise.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 6/9

It may now be argued that the mere absence of an inhibitor is not the cause of the experience of burning.

For a pot is produced merely by operating a single rotating staff; but, unlike the case of the pot, when one inhibitor is present,

the experience of burning does not arise even though another inhibitor is absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 7/9

Therefore, the rule that in every case the effect arises merely from the operation of a causal aggregate delimited by the delimitor of causality does not apply

But this argument is not tenable.

If the causality of the cause is taken to have the form "being the absence of an inhibitor," a defect of mutual dependence arises.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 8/9

Rather, the causality should be taken to consist in the absences of particular inhibitors such as the jewel.

And even if the causality of the causal aggregate is admitted on the basis of the absence of an inhibitor,

only the aggregate of the absences of inhibitors such as the jewel will be the cause of the experience of burning—just as the aggregate of water and

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which counterpositive is denied? · 9/9

the rotating staff is the cause of the production of a pot.

KEY INSIGHT

Qualification determines the particular absence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Which counterpositive is denied?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 1/7

Alternatively, it may be said that only that absence whose counterpositive is delimited by inhibitorhood is the cause.

Such an absence is delimited by all the particular absences of inhibitors; therefore, when one inhibitor is present,

the effect does not arise even though another inhibitor is absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 2/7

Again, only the perpetual relational absence of the inhibitor is the cause of the effect.

Consequently, even though the mutual absence of inhibitors is present, the experience of burning does not arise when an inhibitor is present.

When the pervasion and causality of the absence of the inhibitor are apprehended through positive and negative concomitance,

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 3/7

you too admit that only the relational absence of the inhibitor is the cause.

Otherwise, when the pervaders belonging to the causal aggregate are present, the absence of that which is pervaded by the effect would have to be admitted in

the mutual absence within the causal aggregate; consequently, the relation of pervaded and pervader between cause and

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 4/7

effect would become mutually contradictory.

Again, if productive power is admitted in the absence of an inhibitor, then when the absence of the inhibitor is present,

that same productive power would have to be admitted even in the mutual absence of inhibitors.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 5/7

It is not difficult to explain the relational absence of an inhibitor.

No lack of uniformity or deviation arises through such properties as prior-absencehood.

To superimpose the relation of the counterpositive upon the locus and then negate that relation is relational absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 6/7

For example, in the sentence "the ground does not stand in relation to a pot," the relation between the pot and the ground is not superimposed; rather,

only the identity consisting in pothood is superimposed.

Our doctrine is this: where negation is understood by superimposing upon the locus the relation of the counterpositive, the negation is relational absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Relational absence as the cause · 7/7

And where negation is understood by superimposing upon the locus the relation of the delimitor of counterpositiveness, the negation is mutual absence.

In the sentence "the ground is not a pot," the ground is understood as possessing the absence of pothood; therefore,

pothood alone constitutes the identity of the pot.

KEY INSIGHT

Removing one inhibitor does not remove another.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Relational absence as the cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 1/7

The question may now be raised: what is the proof that, in perpetual relational absence,

the superimposition of the counterpositive's relation upon the locus is the cause,

whereas in mutual absence the superimposition of the relation of the delimitor of counterpositiveness upon the locus is the cause?

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 2/7

The proponent of the established doctrine replies: no further proof is required here.

Uncontradicted and mutually distinct usages such as "this pot is not on this ground" and "this pot is not the ground" are themselves the proof.

The first usage establishes, in the case of perpetual relational absence, the superimposition of the counterpositive's relation upon the locus;

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 3/7

the second establishes, in the case of mutual absence, the superimposition upon the locus of the relation of the delimitor of counterpositiveness.

An objection may now be raised that the absolute absence of the inhibitor is not the cause of the effect,

because sometimes the effect does not arise even when the absolute absence of the inhibitor exists.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 4/7

Again, the absolute absence of the jewel-like inhibitor and the absolute absence of conjunction with the jewel do not reside in a person's palm.

For the jewel resides in its own parts, and conjunction with the jewel is not a relation that must necessarily occur in its own locus.

For the same reason, the prior absence and the destruction of the inhibitor also cannot be causes of the effect.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 5/7

Those absences do not reside in the person's hand and so forth.

Qualities and actions, moreover, cannot themselves be inhibited; consequently, since the inhibitor is not the locus of the property produced by the inhibitor,

prior absence and destruction cannot reside in the inhibitor.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 6/7

Nor should it be said that there exists some distinct absolute relational absence of the inhibitor.

But the proponent of the established doctrine refutes this objection.

In his view, the specific absence of an inhibitor whose counterpositive is delimited by a relation cannot remain when the inhibitor is present.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Superimposition and causal absence · 7/7

Therefore, such an absence of the inhibitor must be regarded simply as an absolute relational absence occurring relationally at a specific time,

because positive and negative concomitance are determined in precisely this way.

KEY INSIGHT

Relational and mutual absence require separate argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Superimposition and causal absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 1/6

It may now be argued that if, in the cases of destruction and prior absence, the effect is established through the absolute relational absence of the inhibitor

delimited by a particular time, then destruction and prior absence of the inhibitor cannot be established as separate causes.

Relational absence is non-pervasive in occurrence; therefore, place and time can sometimes serve as delimitors of the presence and

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 2/6

absence of absolute absence at one location.

But this argument is not tenable.

A cognition of prior absence such as "the pot is not in either of its two halves" possesses a distinctive causal character because

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 3/6

its mode of occurrence differs.

But a cognition of absolute absence such as "the pot is not on the ground" does not possess such a distinctive causal character.

Some other scholars hold as follows: the distinct cognitions "the pot will be produced" and "the pot has been destroyed" cannot be accounted for by one and

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 4/6

the same absolute absence alone.

Therefore, that absolute relational absence must be an absence distinct from prior absence and destruction.

This view also rejects the following proposal: that the absence of the qualifier, the absence of the qualified, and the absence of both qualifier and

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 5/6

qualified be regarded as three causal aggregates productive of the effect.

For then three universals would have to be admitted in the effect consisting in the experience of burning.

Yet only one uniform cause productive of the experience of burning is available.

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Destruction and absolute absence · 6/6

The distinction of three universals of the experience of burning is contradicted by qualified non-apprehension.

The fitness of a universal arises from the fitness of its individuals; therefore, an unfit universal cannot reside in a fit individual experience of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

The kinds of absence cannot be used interchangeably.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Destruction and absolute absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

COUNTERPOSITIVES, RELATIONAL ABSENCE, MANTRAS, AND INFERENTIAL PROOF OF POWER

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · ১/১০

An objection may now be raised that, in the case of a mantra recited with a fixed duration—"do not burn for three hours"—the experience of burning must

necessarily arise when the mantra ends, that is, when it is destroyed.

It should not be said that the particular period of three hours, as the object of the desire alone, is the inhibitor.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 2/10

Once the desire is destroyed, the three-hour time-limit does not by itself remain as a distinct inhibitor.

Nor should it be said that the mere purposiveness of the mantra-recitation is the mantra's distinct inhibitorhood,

because after the three-hour period has passed, that purpose itself is destroyed.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire's nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 3/10

Nor should it be said that the destruction of the purpose is itself the cause of the effect, that is, the inhibitor;

for such destruction of the purpose continues even after the three-hour period has passed.

It may be argued that only the unseen potency produced by the mantra-recitation is the inhibitor of the experience of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 4/10

After the result consisting in the non-occurrence of burning during the specified period has been enjoyed, such an inhibitor is destroyed; therefore,

there is no need for the inhibitor to remain after the appointed period.

But this argument is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 5/10

A mantra-recitation that prevents burning is neither prohibited nor enjoined; therefore, it cannot produce an unseen potency.

Again, the practice of such mantra-recitation is censured; hence it cannot be inferred from any prescriptive Vedic revelation either.

No, this objection is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 6/10

Only the three-hour period specified by the disposition produced by cognition of the purpose is the inhibitor of the effect.

It may now be proposed as follows: what does not inhibit is not an inhibitor.

Mantras and the like do not destroy the power to burn; therefore, they are not inhibitors.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 7/10

Consequently, a power to burn is established in fire and the like.

Nor should it be said that mere non-production of the effect is the inhibitor and that the state which produces absence of the effect is inhibitorhood.

The non-production of that effect is not the prior absence of the effect, nor is it related to the time after the effect has been produced.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 8/10

For mantras and the like do not produce that non-production of the effect.

But this proposal is not tenable.

Mantras and the like are not themselves inhibitors; the person who applies the mantra-recitation is the inhibitor, and he produces some obstruction.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 9/10

The use of the word "inhibitor" with respect to mantras and the like arises either through the secondary use of a causal term for an effect or

through the use of the suffix "kan" in its own sense.

The word "inhibitor" means the absence of the causal aggregate.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantras and the duration of inhibition · 10/10

Mantras and the like amount to the absence of a causal aggregate qualified by the absence of mantras and the like,

because the absence of the absence of anything is that very thing, namely its counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire’s nature.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantras and the duration of inhibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 1/6

The New Nyaya thinkers propose that neither the absence of an inhibitor nor a power is the cause of the experience of burning.

Rather, at a particular moment, fire as distinct from the inhibitor is the cause of the effect consisting in the experience of burning at that very moment.

Hence the absence of the inhibitor is merely the delimitor of causality, not a cause —just like the property of being a rotating staff.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 2/6

In the case of ether, which is a single individual, causality does not belong to the absence of an inhibitor; for even when sound is inhibited at one place,

sound is produced at another.

Therefore, drums and the like alone are the causes of sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 3/6

But this proposal of the New School is not tenable.

The absence of a jewel-like inhibitor and fire are both causes of the experience of burning because they stand equally in positive and negative concomitance.

In the absence of any decisive regulator, however, only one of these two cannot be regarded as the delimitor of causality.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 4/6

It should also be noted that only that whose absence produces absence of the effect despite the presence of some other thing is a cause;

but on that account it does not become a delimitor of causality.

A negation unrelated to the effect does not constitute causality; causality consists in the invariable presence of the cause before the effect is produced.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 5/6

This causality of the cause remains intact even when absence of a cooperating cause produces absence of the effect.

Otherwise, if a staff conjoined with a wheel were rotating but the effect failed to arise because a cooperating cause was absent,

that staff would lose its causality.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School and two causal factors · 6/6

Ultimately, only a property such as fireness is the delimitor of causality when cognition of that property enables one to know the invariable presence of the

cause before an effect such as burning is produced.

A cooperating cause, however, possesses no such property.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts one causal delimiter with two co-causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The New School and two causal factors

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference as a proof of positive power · 1/4

Even if postulation is not accepted as a proof of the power to burn, inference can serve as its proof.

The inference is as follows: "In fire having stable parts and qualified by a productive state,

there is a positive productive state distinct from the non-productive state, because it is productive; just as a sharp axe is distinct from a blunt axe,

KEY INSIGHT

Productive and non-productive states become inferential signs.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference as a proof of positive power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference as a proof of positive power · 2/4

and fire conjoined with fuel is distinct from fire not conjoined with fuel." Through this inference the power to burn is established.

When an inhibitor is present, the conjunction of fire has a non-productive state.

Therefore, a positive productive state or power, distinct from that non-productive state and supersensible, is established by inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Productive and non-productive states become inferential signs.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference as a proof of positive power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference as a proof of positive power · 3/4

It should be noted here that a power produced by a positive cause, merely insofar as it is a power, need not be excluded from a non-productive power or state;

but that productive power as qualified by its production must indeed be excluded from the non-productive power or state.

Alternatively, "supersensibility" may be taken as the qualification of productive power.

KEY INSIGHT

Productive and non-productive states become inferential signs.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference as a proof of positive power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference as a proof of positive power · 4/4

In that case the example will not be unestablished.

Although the locus of the material cause may be the same, an extraordinary sharpness in an axe made of a particular iron,

conducive to the particular act of cutting, may be established as supersensible.

KEY INSIGHT

Productive and non-productive states become inferential signs.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference as a proof of positive power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A supersensible power in fire · 1/5

An alternative inference establishing a distinct class of the power to burn is as follows:

"Only in fire qualified by such a power there inheres a supersensible power, conducive to the act of burning and not residing in two objects,

because it is productive, like the self."

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A supersensible power in fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A supersensible power in fire · 2/5

Here, "being supersensible" does not mean simply not being an object of perception, nor not being an object of non-eternal perception,

nor not being an object of perception produced by some yogically generated property.

For such a condition cannot be established in the properties of other objects.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A supersensible power in fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A supersensible power in fire · 3/5

Again, the condition of not being the object of cognition produced through the five relations such as sense-contact is present even in powers that are

But the state of not being an object of perception produced by either of two relations such as conjunction is established, in both the subject and the example,

It should be noted here that the condition of being one or the other of these two relations is simply the condition of being distinct from what is distinct

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A supersensible power in fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A supersensible power in fire · 4/5

There is no supersensibility in absence, because the condition of not being an object of perception cannot be established in absence.

Nor does the proof that establishes the basic state of the power to burn generate in fire the defect of proving something irrelevant, that is,

a different intended object; for no means establishing such a basic state is available in fire.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A supersensible power in fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A supersensible power in fire · 5/5

Again, action is produced by momentum or by conjunction with a self possessing unseen potency.

But absence of selfhood or eternality does not constitute a condition.

For absence of pervasion by the probandum occurs only in a dyad possessing a single touch-quality.

KEY INSIGHT

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A supersensible power in fire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 1/6

Alternatively, the inference proving the power to burn would be as follows: "In fire in the form of a mass there exists a positive power which is

supersensible, does not reside in two objects, and is conducive to the experience of burning, because it produces the experience of burning, like the self."

Absence of selfhood is not a condition.

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 2/6

For unseen potency is conducive to the experience of burning; therefore, absence of pervasion by the probandum occurs only in unseen potency.

A further alternative inference is as follows: "In the conjunction of fire with the hand there inheres a supersensible power conducive to the experience of

burning, because that conjunction produces the experience of burning, like the self and

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 3/6

a dyad." Neither absence of selfhood nor absence of substancehood is a condition here,

because absence of pervasion by the probandum occurs only in the unity and touch and the like of a dyad.

Another alternative inference would be: "Fire which is not conducive to the experience of burning,

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 4/6

although furnished with all the perceptible causes of burning, is devoid, in its productive state while the inhibitor is present,

of a positive power conducive to burning, because it does not produce the experience of burning, like a blunt axe."

It may also be inferred as follows: "Such fire, in its productive state, is devoid of a positive power conducive to the experience of burning,

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 5/6

because it does not produce the experience of burning, like fire not conjoined with fuel."

The state of being conducive to the experience of burning is the state of being the counterpositive of the absence that occasions the absence of the experience

of burning; and this state is common both to the cause and to its delimitor.

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative inferences for power · 6/6

For even when the causality of a staff delimited by rigid-staff hood is present,

absence of the effect consisting in a pot is observed owing to absence of rigidity in the staff.

KEY INSIGHT

Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative inferences for power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is the absence of inhibition itself a cause?

New School proposal

- Fire distinguished from the inhibitor is the productive cause.
- The absence serves as a delimiting condition.
- No separate positive power is needed.

Opposing analysis

- Fire and non-inhibition are both tested by concomitance.
- Choosing one alone needs further argument.
- The proof of a positive potency is proposed in reply.

The proofs concern rival causal models, not a single uncontested position.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Power to Burn · Causal Absences

Opening

Qualification determines the particular absence.

Dialectical core

An inhibiting temporal condition need not destroy fire's nature.

Further argument

The inferential route to a new positive entity is scrutinized.

Continuation


Active and inhibited fire yield competing formulations.

The source argument continues in the following presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · DOCTRINE OF THE POWER TO BURN



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Need for Power, Regress, Causal Class-Characters, and Consecrated Rice

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Source-grounded objections, replies, causal distinctions, and conclusions.

Appendix 3 · Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Power to Burn · Competing Causal Accounts



The successive arguments come only from the English Appendix 3 translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 1/6

Here the proponents of the established doctrine reply that reasons such as productiveness are acceptable merely on the basis of the absence of an inhibitor,

which both parties admit, even without a probandum such as power.

Therefore, the various inferences advanced by the Mimamsakas are futile, because they do not rule out the counter-position.

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 2/6

If knowledge of pervasion is admitted merely from observation of concomitance, absence of observation of deviation, and non-apprehension of a condition,

then after power has been established, the very same reason could also establish "a property distinct from the power to burn, yet supersensible and

conducive to the experience of burning" by adding to the probandum the qualification "distinct from the power to burn."

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 3/6

In the same way, by adding the qualification "distinct from the individual powers," infinitely many powers or

properties could be established by the same reason.

You may say that productiveness of the effect and the like are accounted for by the one power established by the first inference, and therefore

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 4/6

there is no need to establish additional powers.

But then our reply is this: the effect consisting in the experience of burning can likewise be accounted for without postulating any power to burn in fire.

Therefore, there is no need to admit a power to burn in fire.

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 5/6

The Mimamsaka statement that "the infinity of powers to burn would not follow in the way that the infinity of God would" is said only out of ignorance.

For an agent is in general a cause of effects merely on the basis of agency toward them.

It is not a cause because the agent is God or because there are two agents; to admit this would involve unnecessary multiplication of entities.

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established doctrine: is power needed? · 6/6

In the case of an effect such as a pot, a group of many agents is accepted as the cause of the nature of the effect.

In the same way, the conduciveness of causes to an effect consists merely in their exclusion from a non-productive state.

But this conduciveness of a cause is not a positive ontological property, for to admit it as such would involve unnecessary multiplication of entities.

KEY INSIGHT

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Established doctrine: is power needed?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 1/8

Again, a positive effect is generally produced from its inhering cause.

Therefore, a power too would have to be produced from that same inhering cause.

Consequently, in the inhering cause of the first power one would have to admit a second distinct power conducive to that first power.

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 2/8

The second power would in turn be produced from an inhering cause, and so a third power conducive to it would have to be admitted.

In this way an infinite regress of powers would result.

Again, in the first of the five inferences, the reason "being non-productive" does not mean mere natural incapacity,

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 3/8

for neither fire nor an axe possesses such incapacity.

Rather, the reason means not being present prior to the effect.

Yet even in a state not present prior to the effect, fire possesses power and the axe possesses sharpness.

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 4/8

Hence both defects arise: contradiction and the absence of the probandum in the example.

An implement made of a particular metal performs cutting merely because of its particular excellence; consequently,

supersensible sharpness cannot be established in an axe.

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 5/8

In the following four inferences, the condition of being imperceptible to the external senses functions as a condition.

Although all five inferences have the same form, the last four are defective because of a doubtful condition.

Again, the reason consisting in "being productive" is purely affirmative; therefore, the absence consisting in "not being productive" cannot be established.

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 6/8

Consequently, that very reason cannot be one involving both positive and negative concomitance.

Nor should it be said that the absence of productiveness can itself be established in the power to burn, for then the defect of mutual dependence would arise.

Nor should it be said that this absence of productiveness is established as sentence-meaning through the unbroken succession of a teacher's words.

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 7/8

For according to the Mimamsaka view, a sentence-meaning that is already established is not a means of knowledge.

Again, the productiveness of cognition of the probandum and its absence cannot be established by the number called supreme magnitude.

The absences of the reason and the probandum are not apprehended by perception; supreme magnitude is itself imperceptible and

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Regress of powers and concomitance · 8/8

is known only through verbal testimony.

This refutation also rejects the view that "absence of productiveness can be established in a known unseen potency."

KEY INSIGHT

Each alleged productive power seems to need its own explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Regress of powers and concomitance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 1/7

But grass, fire-sticks, and the jewel are causes of fire; therefore, one and the same power should be admitted in all of them.

For causes of an effect belonging to one class are held to possess causality of one class.

Yet grass, fire-sticks, and the jewel each possess mutually distinct causalities toward the burning activity of fires belonging to intermediate classes.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 2/7

But this view is not proper.

If it were accepted, the burning activity connected with fire of the principal class would become accidental.

Again, to disregard the homogeneous causality of causes and instead admit many classes of burning activity would involve unnecessary multiplication of entities.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 3/7

This view is also contradicted by the absence of intermediate classes among fires produced from grass, fire-sticks, and jewels.

Moreover, the doctrine that only one power is present in a cause becomes impossible where distinct class-properties are directly experienced in lamp-fire and

wood-fire produced from different fuels.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 4/7

Again, if a difference of universal is admitted between a scorpion produced from cow-dung and a scorpion produced from another scorpion,

then a further difference of universal would have to be admitted in the next scorpion produced from that scorpion.

In this way, by admitting a new difference of universal in each successively produced scorpion, an infinity of universals would result.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 5/7

For the rule has been admitted that different causes produce different effects.

Nor should it be said that many scorpions are produced both from cow-dung and from scorpions, because there is no difference in the cognition or

Again, if one and the same power of producing an effect were admitted to inhere in different causes,

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 6/7

then nowhere would it be possible to infer a different cause from a different effect, or a different absence of a cause from a different absence of an effect.

In that case, a specific effect could arise even from something distinct from the cause possessing the specific power of that class,

despite that specific power not being present in the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions · 7/7

But then the same rule would have to be admitted in both the case of fire and the case of scorpions.

KEY INSIGHT

Multiple producers test the identity of an effect-class.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Grass, fire-sticks, and scorpions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 1/6

The question may now be raised: why should a distinct universal not be inferred in effects such as smoke, when fire is said invariably to be their cause?

Otherwise, despite there being differences among effects, the causality of fire would be only toward a particular smoke,

not toward smoke in general —just as the causality of grass is not toward fire in general but toward the particular fire produced from grass.

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 2/6

It may also be doubted whether cognition of the intermediate universal of smoke arises only after cognition that smoke is produced from a cause such as fire,

just as cognition of the intermediate universal of fire arises only after cognition that fire is produced from causes such as grass.

But if, in the absence of any defeater, the effecthood of smoke produced by fire is taken to be delimited simply by smokehood,

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 3/6

then by the same parity the causality of fire too should be taken, as delimited by firehood, to be toward smoke in general.

Some scholars propose that the causality of grass, delimited by grasshood, produces fire; and in order to preserve this causality,

a distinct universal property must be admitted in fire.

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 4/6

But this proposal is not proper.

The effecthood of fire delimited by firehood is known; in order to preserve this effecthood, a distinct power would have to be admitted in grass and the like.

Just as the mutual cooperation of grass and blowing air is established by positive and negative concomitance,

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 5/6

so too the mutual cooperation of the powers in grass and blowing air conducive to fire would have to be admitted,

because fire is observed to arise in precisely this way.

Thus grass, fire-sticks, a jewel, blowing air, friction, sunlight, and the like become causes of fire because they possess powers conducive to fire.

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Firehood, smoke, and specific power · 6/6

Yet one and the same fire is produced from grass through blowing air, from fire-sticks through friction, and from the jewel through reflected sunlight.

Fire is not produced directly from the jewel, blowing air, and the like, because their powers lack mutual cooperation.

KEY INSIGHT

Generality and distinct causal pathways must both be considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Firehood, smoke, and specific power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 1/7

Some other scholars say that the power to burn is present in the specific aggregate of three things— grass, fire-sticks, and blowing air.

But this view is not proper.

If it were accepted, the causality of grass and the like delimited by grasshood and so forth would be lost.

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 2/7

Again, the individuals of grass, fire-sticks, jewels, blowing air, and so forth are infinite;

hence to admit infinitely many powers produced from positive individual causes would involve unnecessary multiplication of entities.

By contrast, economy is achieved by admitting a single universal of firehood in the infinitely many individual fires produced from infinitely many causes.

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 3/7

Therefore, only one universal property should be admitted in fire.

Nor should it be said that qualified non-apprehension rules out such a distinction within the universal of firehood.

Among scorpions produced from cow-dung and those produced from scorpions, a difference of universal manifested through slight blueness and

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 4/7

slight tawny color is established by perception.

Again, after cognition of various individual fires produced from grass, the uniform cognition that occurs with respect to an individual fire produced from a

jewel has the universal firehood as its object.

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 5/7

It should not be said that such uniform cognition arises merely because of a condition consisting in "being produced from grass." Uniform cognition free from a

defeater has as its object the universal firehood indicated by similar individual fires.

The objection is not proper that an irregular universal would have to be admitted in the succession of scorpions produced from cow-dung and

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 6/7

scorpions produced from scorpions.

In scorpions produced from both cow-dung and scorpions, the universal of being scorpion-produced remains intact.

Parts possessing burning touch, conjunction of the parts with fire, and consumption of fire are all causal factors of fire in general.

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The specific causal aggregate · 7/7

Nor should it be said that fire could then arise even without grass and the like.

The general causal aggregate produces the effect only by taking up a special causal aggregate.

KEY INSIGHT

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The specific causal aggregate

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 1/6

It may now be argued that once the causality of grass, wood, and a jewel with respect to fire is known, either power or

a distinct universal property must necessarily be admitted.

But their causality cannot be known through positive and negative concomitance, because grass, wood,

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 2/6

and jewel deviate mutually with respect to the effect consisting in fire.

An objection may now be raised that, within a specific causal aggregate qualified by the absence of wood and jewel, the positive and

negative concomitance expressed by "when grass is present, fire is produced" and "when grass is absent,

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 3/6

fire is absent" produces cognition of the causality of grass and the like.

This invariable positive concomitance excludes a non-cause such as a donkey; for example, when all causes other than a donkey are present,

"if grass is present, the effect consisting in fire necessarily arises."

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 4/6

But this objection is not proper.

In the cognition "there is fire even without grass," causality consisting in the invariable presence of grass immediately prior to fire cannot be apprehended.

Nor should it be said that the causality of the jewel can be apprehended with respect to fire not produced from grass.

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 5/6

For, because of the deviation, when the property of being produced from grass has not been apprehended in fire,

the absence of being produced from grass cannot be apprehended either.

Again, fire in general is not produced only from grass.

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Power or a specific class-character? · 6/6

Nor should it be said that cognition of being produced from grass is obtained because of the condition of not being produced from a jewel.

If this were admitted, a defect of mutual dependence would arise between the cognitions of being grass-produced and being jewel-produced.

KEY INSIGHT

Both alternative ontologies face tests of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Power or a specific class-character?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 1/7

Some scholars propose that where no means of cognizing causality is available, deviation alone is the obstruction to cognition of causality.

But this proposal is not proper.

When there is cognition of the absence of the uncontradicted invariable prior occurrence of grass, cognition of the causality of grass is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 2/7

For in a veridical cognition of the absence of a cause, cognition of the positive presence consisting in causality cannot arise.

It should be noted here that in grass there is the character of being the delimitor of causality determined by the effecthood residing in fire,

and in fire there is the character of being the delimitor of effecthood determined by the causality residing in grass.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 3/7

These two characters, which exclude non-causes and non-effects, are separately identified by the aforesaid means of cognition.

But grasshood does not respectively delimit the causality of grass, nor does firehood delimit the effecthood of fire.

These two characters may be determined in either direction: either the effecthood of fire delimited by firehood, or the causality of grass and

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 4/7

the like qualified by a power conducive to causality, or the effecthood delimited by a specific intermediate universal of fire may be taken as decisive.

It may now be proposed that the causality of grass, wood, and jewel is established through positive and

negative concomitance in the form of the absence of the absence of all three.

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 5/7

When the absence of the absence of the three is present, the effect consisting in fire is produced; and when all three are absent, fire is not produced.

Therefore, the defect of deviation does not arise in grass and the like, because the absence of an absence terminates in a positive entity.

But the question is this: is the absence of the three—grass and the like—the absence of each individual grass and so forth,

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 6/7

some distinct entity pervading each individual, or the individuals grass and the like themselves?

On the first alternative, only the causality of the absence of individual absences can be understood, not the causality of positive grass and the like.

On the second alternative, positive grass, wood, and jewel cannot terminate as the absence of their absences; otherwise, one and

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The absence of an absence · 7/7

the same grass would have to be regarded also as wood and jewel.

By this refutation, the following proposal is also rejected: that the causality of each of grass and the like is known through the positive and

negative concomitance, "when the absence of the absence of the three—grass and the like—is present, fire is produced; when all three are absent,

KEY INSIGHT

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The absence of an absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrated rice and future efficacy · 1/2

Let it be granted that a natural power is not admitted; nevertheless, a power resident in a substrate must be admitted.

For example, in the action expressed by "rice is consecrated by sprinkling water over it," both parties admit a supersensible peculiarity produced by the

consecration and conducive to a future effect.

KEY INSIGHT

A new ritual example begins a continuing argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrated rice and future efficacy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrated rice and future efficacy · 2/2

Such a specific power must be admitted in the rice precisely when there is doubt whether such a peculiarity has been produced in it.

Otherwise, why would the very same rice, after being consecrated merely by sprinkling water, subsequently become fit for pounding and the like?

Nor should it be said that mere conjunction with mantras and the like is the peculiarity of the rice, because mantras and the like are destroyed long before.

KEY INSIGHT

A new ritual example begins a continuing argument.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrated rice and future efficacy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Distinct power and explanatory economy

Against separate power

- Postulating one power invites a further power.
- A regress of causal entities threatens the explanation.
- The causal complex may suffice.

For a distinct causal feature

- Multiple sources yield effects of one class.
- A special universal is itself contentious.
- Consecration introduces future efficacy as a new case.

The next presentation will continue the text’s examination of the consecration example.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Critical synthesis · Power to Burn · Competing Causal Accounts

Opening

A commonly admitted absence may explain the result without surplus entities.

Dialectical core

A collection is not automatically a new unitary power.

Further argument

The logical negation of a lack must be applied carefully.


Continuation

A new ritual example begins a continuing argument.

The next section continues the discussion of consecrated rice.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Semantic Connection, Sprinkling, Pounding, and Consecratory Efficacy

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A study of the philosophical arguments, objections, and replies.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Consecrated Rice · Sprinkling and Apūrva

1

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the

2

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce

3

A single excellence and re-usable rice

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continu

4

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relati

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of cau

5

Apūrva versus the consecratory act

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is ope

The divisions correspond to consecutive passages in the English translated text.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 1/7

It may now be argued: why should semantic connection with the act of pounding be admitted only for rice consecrated by sprinkling water?

The Vedic sentence "he pounds the rice" is equally compatible with unconsecrated rice alone being connected with the act of pounding.

It may be proposed that in Vedic sentences such as "one should sacrifice with rice," "one consecrates the rice by sprinkling water on it," "one pounds the rice," and

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 2/7

"one should sacrifice with a cake of cooked rice," because of the continuity of the parts of the pounded rice,

there is an expectancy of the whole rice for the cooked rice-cake; therefore only the pounded rice is semantically connected with the sacrifice.

The whole rice brought for the sacrifice is connected with the consecration by sprinkling water.

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 3/7

In the same way, because of the expectancy involved in pounding, only consecrated rice is connected with pounding.

According to some scholars, in the absence of a defeater a word conveys the nearest specific meaning.

Other scholars say that an individual-denoting word apprehends the nearest specific meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 4/7

Otherwise, to abandon the nearest meaning established by context and the like and admit a remote meaning would involve unnecessary multiplication of assumptions.

But this proposal is not proper.

Pounding occurs only in rice upon which two consecrations have been performed by sprinkling water;

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 5/7

that same pounding does not occur in rice qualified by only one consecration.

This is like the example, "in the very locus in which color exists in water, taste also exists." When the word does not express productivity of a future effect as the

meaning of consecration, how can a distinct specific power be admitted in order to establish such an effect?

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 6/7

Let it be granted that from the supplied remainder of the incomplete sentence "consecrated rice is useful for pounding," cognition of causality concerning pounding arises

with respect to rice qualified by consecration.

Nevertheless, in the word "consecrated" the past passive participial suffix is prescribed in the sense of the past;

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Ritual wording and what the rice denotes · 7/7

therefore pounding would have to be connected with rice possessing a former consecration.

Consequently, only the destruction of the former consecration would be the cause of pounding; the present consecration would not be a cause of pounding.

KEY INSIGHT

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Ritual wording and what the rice denotes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object · 1/5

No, this view is not proper.

The consecration performed by sprinkling water is conducive to pounding, because on the basis of the authoritative text that consecration is performed specifically for the

The act of consecration is conducive to pounding, just as the rice itself is conducive to pounding.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce the later rite.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object · 2/5

It should not be said that the consecration would be unestablished or unproved.

The act of pounding does not occur in unconsecrated rice; therefore consecration is necessarily performed for the sake of pounding.

Pounding is impossible without the act.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce the later rite.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object · 3/5

But destruction of the consecration is not the act of pounding; otherwise, the counterpositive, namely the consecration, would be non-causal.

And if destruction itself were regarded as the act, then in sacrifice and the like too only the destruction of consecration would have to be regarded as the act.

Production of the result at the specified time occurs naturally, like the result of unseen potency.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce the later rite.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object · 4/5

Nor should it be said that rice contingently qualified by consecration alone is the cause of pounding.

Rice with such a contingent qualifier cannot be the cause, because without semantic connection that rice would perish.

In the usage "the country of the Kurus is called the Kuru country," cognition of the Kurus gives rise to the usage of the Kuru country as distinguished from other

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce the later rite.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Sprinkling, pounding, and the object · 5/5

countries; but the Kurus themselves do not produce that usage.

Otherwise, the Yajurveda, contingently qualified by sacrifice, alone would be regarded as producing heaven, and unseen potency would become useless.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic connection must be distinguished from the capacity to produce the later rite.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Sprinkling, pounding, and the object

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 1/9

It should not be said that the causality of Devadatta's special qualities can be established by the inference:

"Devadatta's first body will be produced by his special qualities, because, although produced, that very body is the instrument of his experience,

like a garland produced by his special qualities." Such an inference suffers from the defect of proving what is already established, because

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 2/9

those special qualities related to a previous birth and intended to produce unseen potency have already been established through cognition, desire, and effort.

Therefore, it should be admitted that consecrations such as sprinkling produce a positive peculiarity and give rise to a result that is to occur in the future.

Such consecration is performed because of authoritative cognition of a future peculiarity, just as sacrifice and medical treatment are.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 3/9

For the sake of economy, such a peculiarity is co-located with the result itself; hence it resides only in the rice.

Consequently, the rice stands in a direct relation to this peculiarity.

If the peculiarity were admitted in the person, it would have no direct relation to the rice,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 4/9

and the need to admit a mediated relation would involve unnecessary multiplication of assumptions.

Again, an act performed with the intention of obtaining a result present in some object, in the absence of a defeater,

produces in the cause of that result alone a peculiarity conducive to the result—just as in sacrifice and medical treatment.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 5/9

It may now be proposed that the consecration performed by sprinkling water produces a peculiarity inhering in the person, because, like sacrifice,

it is an enjoined act at the time of producing a future result.

Otherwise, the injunction concerning sprinkling would become self-contradictory.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 6/9

But this proposal is not proper.

In agriculture, medical treatment, and the like, deviation of such a peculiarity is observed, and that peculiarity is not even conducive to a result.

The injunction is intelligible even without such a peculiarity.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 7/9

It should also be noted that the peculiarity of each grain of rice is distinct.

Nor should it be said that if one grain of rice is destroyed, production of the result would become impossible, because at that time many consecrations remain present.

If the consecrations are conducive to the result merely as consecrations, the result may arise even when only one specific peculiarity is present,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 8/9

just as a pot is produced through the operation of a rotating staff.

Alternatively, it may be admitted that only one peculiarity resides in all the grains of rice.

Then, when one grain is destroyed, destruction of that one peculiarity need not follow, because destruction of a single substrate does not destroy the effect,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Consecrations and future effects · 9/9

as in the case of a tree.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests whether sprinkling produces a future excellence and how it persists.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Consecrations and future effects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 1/8

Our reply here is this: the proof that establishes the peculiarity, on grounds of economy, establishes only one peculiarity.

Therefore, such a peculiarity is single and does not exist separately in many individuals.

The doctrine may be explained as follows.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 2/8

The consecration performed by sprinkling water produces unseen potency, because it is enjoined as a cause productive of a future result without any known intermediate

unseen factor—just like sacrifice and its subsidiary acts.

But in agriculture and the like, because a visible intermediate result is available,

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 3/8

there is neither deviation nor absence of conduciveness to the result in the consecration itself.

Sacrifice, gift, oblation, and their subsidiaries are conducive to producing unseen potency only when they are enjoined as producers of a future result.

It is this enjoined status that is conducive to the result, not some other condition.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 4/8

The rule "an act performed with the intention of producing a result in an object, in the absence of a defeater,

produces in that very object an unseen potency conducive to that result" is not acceptable.

It deviates in the Syena sacrifice performed with the intention of causing the death of an enemy, and the opposite rule too is not contradicted.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 5/8

Likewise, the rule "an act performed with the intention of producing a result does not produce in that very object a peculiarity conducive to that future result" is also

unacceptable, because it deviates in actions such as the abandonment of the sacrificial oblation.

An objection may now be raised that if consecrated rice produces unseen potency, it could not be used for any other purpose, just like sacrificial kusa grass, because

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 6/8

reuse of an object once employed is contrary to scripture.

And if reuse of a previously employed object is admitted, then because of generic non-difference, any other rice of the same class could also be used.

But this objection is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 7/8

In the Vedic sentence "he pounds the consecrated rice," according to the rule stated above, the intended use is only of rice consecrated by sprinkling water, because

an injunction cannot be violated.

For example, in injunctions such as "he spreads the consecrated kusa grass" and "he places the sacrificial rice upon the consecrated kusa grass," only consecrated

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A single excellence and re-usable rice · 8/8

sacrificial kusa grass is used.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · A single excellence and re-usable rice

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 1/6

Alternatively, it may be said that different consecrations produce future results with the assistance of their intended objects.

For example, a consecration produced by an incantation directed against a particular body produces, with the assistance of that body,

suffering connected with that very body.

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 2/6

Similarly, a consecration produced by sprinkling water, being conducive to its intended object—the rice— produces a future result, namely unseen potency.

Because the self possessing the unseen potency produced by consecration is conjoined with the rice, a specific future effect or result is produced in the rice.

This is just as, because the person who is the locus of the unseen potency produced by the Kariri sacrifice is conjoined with a cloud,

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 3/6

a specific result is produced in the cloud.

Failure of the result because of deficiency in the agent, act, or instrument is merely accidental.

Scripture also states that the consecration produced in the Ahavaniya fire is destroyed by the touch of a Candala; therefore,

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 4/6

even a favorable act can destroy unseen potency.

This is just as the result of an act is lost when merit is destroyed through performance of a prohibited action, or the desired shore can no longer be reached.

Again, the peculiarity produced by sprinkling water and residing in the rice cannot be many, because, according to the rule stated above,

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 5/6

even a single peculiarity residing in the self is sufficient to produce the result.

But that peculiarity cannot be single either.

The substrates of one, two, or three peculiarities are not destroyed one by one in corresponding order; therefore,

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Many excellences or only one? · 6/6

destruction of the substrate in general would have to be regarded as the cause of destruction of the result.

Again, if the peculiarity is destroyed by destruction of the rice, there would arise the consequence that its relation with the remaining consecrated grains of rice must

KEY INSIGHT

An explanatory potency cannot simply be made plural or singular without evidence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Many excellences or only one?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 1/6

An objection may now be raised that in the sentence "he consecrates the rice," the accusative case is used in the sense of the object most intensely desired; therefore,

the state of possessing the desired result produced by the act is understood only in the rice.

But the result consisting in unseen potency does not reside in the rice, because the general rule expresses only a direct relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 2/6

But this objection is not proper.

The status of the rice as the object of the action can be established merely because it bears the conjunction delimiting the meaning of the verbal root.

Nor should it be said that a particular sprinkling delimited by conjunction is itself the meaning of the verbal root "to sprinkle"; otherwise, how could conjunction,

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 3/6

which is a subsidiary of sprinkling, be related as a result to be accomplished by that very act of sprinkling?

Conjunction is only a contingent qualifier, not a constituent of the meaning of the act of sprinkling.

Otherwise, how would the meaning of an accusative expression be established in sentences such as "he goes to the village" or

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 4/6

"he sprinkles water on the floor of the rice-store"?

In such sentences, the word denoting the locus possesses no semantic power conveying such a meaning.

Again, in an accusative construction such as "he directly sees the pot," the disposition and the like produced by the act of seeing do not reside in the pot; nevertheless,

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 5/6

that disposition is regarded as occurring in the pot and the like on the basis of an intrinsic relation.

This is exactly like the accusative construction "he infers the fire."

If it is said that in such a sentence the accusative case is employed merely for grammatical correctness,

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation · 6/6

then in the present sentence too the use of the accusative may be regarded as serving only linguistic correctness.

KEY INSIGHT

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Objecthood, disposition, and intrinsic relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apūrva versus the consecratory act · 1/5

It may now be proposed that the sacrificer's unseen potency produced by the consecration of a deity is not conducive to the worship-worthiness of the image, because

even after that unseen potency has been destroyed through enjoyment and the like, the worship-worthiness of the image remains intact.

Again, even while the unseen potency remains, the worship-worthiness of the image is destroyed by the touch of an untouchable and the like, because

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Apūrva versus the consecratory act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apūrva versus the consecratory act · 2/5

one person's unseen potency is not conducive to another person's worship-worthiness.

Nor is it proper to say that the destruction of the deity-consecration is not conducive to worship-worthiness.

If that were admitted, the conduciveness of the consecration as a cause would itself have to be destroyed by the destruction of that consecration.

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Apūrva versus the consecratory act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apūrva versus the consecratory act · 3/5

Therefore, it should be admitted that a distinct power, produced by the consecration and destroyed by the touch of an untouchable and the like, resides in the image.

But the older Nyaya thinkers reply that the rite of consecration produces in the image the deity's presence in the form of "I" and

"mine." This is like a reflection that displays one's likeness in an image; even after the cognition is destroyed, its disposition remains.

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Apūrva versus the consecratory act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apūrva versus the consecratory act · 4/5

The deity's presence is destroyed by the touch of an untouchable and the like.

On the doctrine that regards the deity as insentient, the deity's presence is a recognition based on veridicality and

assisted by the absence of the touch of an untouchable and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Apūrva versus the consecratory act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Apūrva versus the consecratory act · 5/5

Because of the injunction "only a consecrated deity should be worshipped," recollection of the consecration is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Apūrva versus the consecratory act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does consecration accomplish?

Semantic reading

- The Vedic injunction connects rice with successive ritual acts.
- Sprinkling and pounding raise questions of objecthood.
- A semantic connection does not alone prove a new causal power.

Causal reading

- The act may prepare rice for a later effect.
- The proposed excellence must have a definite locus.
- The status of apūrva is examined against the rite itself.

The competing claims about ritual efficacy are retained as arguments.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Consecrated Rice · Sprinkling and Apūrva

Opening question

Ritual stages raise a question about which rice is connected with the sacrificial action.

Central distinction

A proposed unseen excellence is examined for locus, unity, and continued efficacy.

Reply or further debate

The grammar of consecration must not be substituted for a proof of causality.


At the boundary

The treatment asks whether an unseen product or the rite itself is operative.

The next presentation continues the English translated argument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Consecratory Destruction, Ordeal, Merit, and Definitions of Causal Power

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A study of the philosophical arguments, objections, and replies.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Power to Burn

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Consecration · Ordeal and Causality

1

New School and established positions

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its ce

2

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to

3

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unex

4

Alternative definitions of causality

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prio

5

Supersensible properties and their absence

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal im

The divisions correspond to consecutive passages in the English translated text.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 1/7

The New Nyaya thinkers propose that the rite of deity-consecration in an image produces another unseen potency, similar to the superadded power admitted by you.

Worship-worthiness exists only in the deity that is the locus of conjunction with a self possessing that unseen potency.

When that unseen potency is destroyed by the touch of an untouchable and the like, non-worship-worthiness arises in the deity.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 2/7

We proponents of the established doctrine say that an injunctive sentence such as "one should worship the deity consecrated in the image" does not teach that the

deity-consecration is a cause of worship-worthiness in the image.

Rather, by the rule governing the suffix "kta" prescribed in the sense of the past, the sentence states the worship-worthiness of a deity previously consecrated.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 3/7

Therefore, the destruction of the consecration—conjoined with beginningless relational absence and having as its counterpositives all contacts with untouchables and

the like from the time of consecration onward—is conducive to worship-worthiness.

Such an absence is sometimes of the nature of prior absence and sometimes of the nature of absolute absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 4/7

It should nevertheless be noted that a superadded power cannot be established, even though an increase of flowers is observed in Asoka and

other trees after being struck by the foot of a beautiful woman or through the pregnancy-longing of a pregnant woman.

For the destruction of foot-contact and the like, delimited by a specified time, is itself the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 5/7

Alternatively, the tree whose other branches have bent from the kick itself produces the increase of flowers.

Since increase and decrease of flowers occur at different times, a difference among the trees must be admitted.

Again, a superadded power in the form of purity produced by contact with ash cannot be admitted in copper, bronze, and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 6/7

The destruction of contact with ash—conjoined with all beginningless relational absences having as their counterpositive the touch of an untouchable and

the like from the time of the ash-contact onward—constitutes the purity of copper, bronze, and the like.

Some other scholars, however, hold that the disposition produced by contact with ash and residing in the user of the bronze and

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New School and established positions · 7/7

the like is itself the purity of the bronze and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · New School and established positions

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 1/7

It may now be proposed that in consecrated water, sprouts, and the like, merely the destruction of the consecratory incantation delimited by a specified time removes pain

Alternatively, only the presence of the deity of that particular mantra removes pain and the like.

It should also be noted that when black-grain seeds and the like have been destroyed down to their atoms and no subordinate universal property remains in them,

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 2/7

the absence of commonness in the atoms of the black-grain seed is established only through a peculiarity produced by atomic cooking.

Color and the like produced by cooking, distinct from the prior color and the like yet belonging to the same class as the color and the like present in the effect,

are held to be established in the atoms according to both the established doctrine and the Mimamsaka view.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 3/7

A black-grain seed is distinguished from wheat and the like by the color produced by cooking; similarly,

the atoms of the black-grain seed are distinguished from the atoms of wheat and the like on the basis of the universal property of wheat.

Likewise, winter crops are produced from the peculiarity of the succession of atomic cooking produced by ploughing in the month of Magha.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 4/7

This explanation also clarifies the case of sprinkling lac-dye.

It may now be said that special qualities produced successively by cooking from a particular occasional cause produce specific results.

For example, a special quality of pigeon meat of the color of orpiment, cooked in a yellow fire, kills the eater immediately;

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 5/7

but if the same meat is cooked in another way, it does not kill the eater so quickly.

In the case of water, light, air, and the like, cooking does not produce any distinct special quality.

In such cases, specific qualities such as origination and non-origination, fluidity, and hardness are produced only by unseen potency productive of the result.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 6/7

After the preliminary testing in a balance-ordeal, the entire causal complex for giving testimony, when conjoined with the witness's state of making a true or

false declaration, produces victory and defeat as results of prior merit and demerit.

Alternatively, in a balance-ordeal the entire causal complex of the act of giving testimony, when conjoined with the accused person's specific cognition,

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal’s outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal · 7/7

"I am innocent" or "I am guilty," produces victory and defeat.

For this reason it has been said that the gods, while witnessing the accused persons in a balance-ordeal, see them as though they were persons distinct from themselves.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal analysis tests how testimony and ritual materials relate to an ordeal's outcome.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Mantra, deity, and the balance ordeal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 1/6

Alternatively, it may be proposed that the entire causal complex for giving testimony in a balance-ordeal produces merit or demerit depending on the truth or

falsity of the declaration.

The truth and falsity of that declaration in turn produce victory and defeat respectively.

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 2/6

The result of the accused person's act of testimony in the balance-ordeal is desirable when the declaration is true and undesirable when it is false;

therefore the act in fact assumes the character of an injunction or prohibition.

From this very balance-ordeal one may infer a Vedic statement such as: "An accused person desiring victory and

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 3/6

making a true declaration should give testimony in the balance-ordeal; but an accused person making a false declaration should not give testimony in the balance-ordeal."

Alternatively again, the act of consecrating a deity produces the presence of the deity in the image,

while consecratory acts such as sprinkling indicate the corresponding causes.

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 4/6

The question may now be raised: what then is meant by the word "power"?

The answer is that the causality of a cause itself is the meaning of the word "power." The causality of a cause is the state in which there is counterpositiveness to the

absence of a cause that pervades absence of the effect when all other cooperating causes are present; and this state is pervaded by each particular effect.

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 5/6

absence of the other cooperating causes.

For example, in a seed the pervasion by absence of a sprout is not delimited by seedhood, because when all other cooperating causes are present,

a sprout can arise from the seed.

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit · 6/6

Therefore, in the seed the pervasion by absence of a sprout is taken to be delimited by absence of the other cooperating causes.

But in a piece of stone, the pervasion by absence of a sprout is delimited by stonehood.

KEY INSIGHT

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Causal aggregate, merit, and demerit

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 1/10

Alternatively, causality may be defined as follows: the state of being pervaded by non-production of the effect,

when that state is delimited by the absence of other cooperating causes, constitutes the causality of the cause.

But a non-cause such as a donkey is, by its own nature, pervaded by absence of the effect.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 2/10

Therefore, the absence of other cooperating causes is superfluous and cannot serve as the delimitor of causality.

As a further alternative, causality is membership in the class of causes that are invariably present prior to the effect and are not otherwise accounted for.

Being otherwise accounted for is of three kinds.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 3/10

First: that which is known to be present prior to the effect together with the general causes is otherwise accounted for in relation to the effect; for example,

the color of the staff in relation to a pot.

Second: that whose prior occurrence in relation to one thing is known only after the prior occurrence of a third,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 4/10

otherwise-accounted-for thing has been known is itself otherwise accounted for.

For example, the prior occurrence of ether in relation to cognition is known only after the prior occurrence of ether in relation to sound has been known.

Third: that which is present along with a cause but is superfluous in relation to an effect whose production is possible solely from causes invariably present before the

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 5/10

effect is otherwise accounted for.

For example, no new smell is produced in a substance already possessing smell; therefore,

the presence of absence of smell along with the causes is superfluous in relation to smell, because

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 6/10

prior absence of smell is taken to be invariably present before the effect.

Hence, in the case of a smell produced by cooking, the prior absences of color and the like are otherwise accounted for in relation to the smell.

When the three kinds of being otherwise accounted for described above are absent, the invariable presence of a cause prior to the effect is causality.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 7/10

In the relation between sacrifice and unseen potency, sacrifice is regarded as a cause only when its prior occurrence is known; when its prior occurrence is not known,

the causality of sacrifice is not apprehended.

Where the prior occurrence of a cause becomes known only by depending upon cognition of the prior occurrence of the effect,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 8/10

there the cause is otherwise accounted for as a cause of the effect.

But in the case of unseen potency, the prior occurrence of its cause, sacrifice, is known simply through cognition of the sacrifice itself;

therefore sacrifice is a cause of the effect consisting in unseen potency.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 9/10

> The prior occurrence of the conjunction of the staff and the rotation of the potter's wheel is known at the same time;

> therefore both are causes of the production of the pot.

> Among all the causal factors produced after each separate cause, that alone is a cause of an effect and not otherwise accounted for,

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative definitions of causality · 10/10

in whose absence the effect does not arise despite the presence of all the other factors, and in whose presence an effect of that same class arises.

Some other scholars, however, hold that such invariable prior occurrence of the cause, when not otherwise accounted for, itself constitutes causality.

KEY INSIGHT

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Alternative definitions of causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Supersensible properties and their absence · 1/5

But this other view is not proper.

Such a definition of causality does not include God and His cognition and the like, because both the absence of God and

the absence of the conjunction of God's cognition and the like are absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Supersensible properties and their absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Supersensible properties and their absence · 2/5

Alternatively, it may be admitted that the condition of that thing whose absence establishes that the effect would otherwise be inexplicable constitutes the state of a

cause as not otherwise accounted for.

It may now be argued that in this way, because of the permanent absence of both proving and refuting evidence in the case of a distinct power,

KEY INSIGHT

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Supersensible properties and their absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Supersensible properties and their absence · 3/5

doubt concerning a distinct power will always remain.

Nor is it proper that absence of proving evidence should become refuting evidence, because

absence of refuting evidence could likewise be taken as proving evidence that establishes the power.

KEY INSIGHT

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Supersensible properties and their absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Supersensible properties and their absence · 4/5

But this argument is not proper.

The absence in fire of a supersensible property established elsewhere is established economically from the absence of evidence proving it;

whereas to establish a supersensible power from the absence of refuting evidence would involve unnecessary multiplication of assumptions.

KEY INSIGHT

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Supersensible properties and their absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Supersensible properties and their absence · 5/5

Therefore, from the absence of proving evidence only the absence of power in fire is established.

KEY INSIGHT

Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Supersensible properties and their absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does causation require a new power?

Distinct unseen factor

- Ritual effects invite a proposed supersensible property.
- Ordeals and testimony complicate the causal explanation.
- The proposed factor must be independently warranted.

Specified causal complex

- Causal concomitance and lack of cooperators are examined.
- Merit and demerit can enter the causal aggregate.
- A cause may be defined by invariable prior occurrence.

The question is whether causal work remains unexplained without a special potency.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Consecration · Ordeal and Causality

Opening question

Competing explanations assign causal efficacy to the rite or to its cessation.

Central distinction

A result depends upon an identified causal complex rather than an unexplained surplus power.

Reply or further debate

The text tests dependence, absence of cooperators, and invariable prior occurrence.

At the boundary


Inferences about what is not sensed are constrained by their causal implications.

The following presentation begins the Doctrine of the Human Goal.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

The Doctrine of the Human Goal: Suffering, Its Means, and the Purpose of Liberation

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A study of the philosophical arguments, objections, and replies.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Human Goal · Suffering and Its Cessation



1

Why cessation of suffering is sought

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal c

2

Knowledge of reality and the human end

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of

3

Purpose, recognition, and effort

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object o

4

The established position and its alternatives

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of sufferin

5

Non-production versus destruction

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere d

The divisions correspond to consecutive passages in the English translated text.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 1/10

Following Gautama's Nyaya-sutra, the proponent of the established doctrine, Gangesa, says that the destruction of suffering is the supreme human end.

The highest aim of knowledge of the Supreme Self is liberation.

Scripture says: "The Self should be heard, reflected upon, and meditated upon — that is, directly realized." Therefore,

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 2/10

liberation is the destruction of suffering that does not coexist in the same locus with the prior absence of suffering.

It may now be argued that destruction of suffering cannot be the supreme human end.

Destruction of past suffering is already accomplished; destruction of future suffering is impossible;

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 3/10

and present suffering may be destroyed even without human effort because of an opposing quality.

Once the cause has been destroyed, human activity is futile, like expiation performed after the fact.

But this argument is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 4/10

Destruction of a cause, being distinct from both pleasure and absence of suffering, is not itself the supreme human end;

and in order to accomplish non-production of future suffering, destruction of its cause is required as a means.

Therefore, here too, as elsewhere, only the non-production of suffering is the supreme human end.

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 5/10

It may now be argued that, because non-production of suffering is a prior absence, it cannot be produced by any means.

Direct realization of the Supreme Self produces no result other than destruction of suffering.

Therefore, in the absence of any alternative, only destruction of the means of suffering, like destruction of a thorn, should be regarded as the supreme human end.

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 6/10

In that case destruction of suffering itself would not be a human end; and thus destruction of past and future suffering too could not be the supreme human end.

But this argument is not proper.

Although the destruction of other sufferings may occur through causes other than human effort,

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 7/10

destruction of one's own suffering occurs only through true knowledge of the Supreme Self;

and this knowledge depends upon human effort through the destruction of false cognition.

When false cognition together with its latent impressions is destroyed through true knowledge of the Supreme Self,

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 8/10

activity is destroyed through the non-production of defects; birth is destroyed through the non-production of unseen potency; and through the non-production of birth,

destruction of a person's suffering is produced.

It may now be proposed that when a person's final suffering has arisen, the destruction of that final suffering is produced by cognition of that suffering,

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 9/10

namely the counterpositive.

If cognition of that suffering does not destroy it, then true knowledge of the Supreme Self or ultimate reality likewise could not produce its destruction.

But this proposal is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why cessation of suffering is sought · 10/10

Like cognition of the counterpositive, true knowledge of the Supreme Self or ultimate reality is also a cause of the destruction of the final suffering.

Cognition of the counterpositive and knowledge of reality are equally causes of the destruction of suffering, because

without both these cognitions destruction of suffering cannot arise.

KEY INSIGHT

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Why cessation of suffering is sought

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 1/8

For this very reason, when true knowledge of ultimate reality or the Supreme Self arose in the sage Suka, the destruction of his final suffering also arose.

But in ordinary persons like us, who lack true knowledge of the Supreme Self, the destruction of that suffering does not arise.

It may be argued that suffering itself does not arise in us, and therefore its destruction will not arise either.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 2/8

But then the question would arise: why, in the beginningless cycle of worldly existence, does suffering not arise in ordinary persons like us?

It may again be said that suffering does not arise in us because of the absence of its respective inhering causes.

But this argument too is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 3/8

According to positive and negative concomitance, no cause of the destruction of suffering distinct from knowledge of reality is found even after search.

The invariable relation "where there is destruction of suffering, there is liberation; and where there is liberation,

there is destruction of suffering" is observed in experience.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 4/8

Therefore, everyone admits that the destruction of suffering which produces liberation must be produced.

The only question is whether that destruction of suffering is itself liberation or not.

It may now be argued that, on this account, suffering too would have to be acquired in order to obtain its destruction, because

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 5/8

without the arising of suffering its destruction cannot arise.

The answer is: yes, this is true.

In this world both suffering and the means of suffering are acquired as means to the human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 6/8

Just as one sees an effort to obtain a hammer for the purpose of destroying a future pot,

so too an effort to obtain future suffering is necessary for the sake of the future destruction of that suffering.

An objection may again be raised that the destruction of the final suffering cannot be an object to be attained, because it is merely destruction of suffering in general.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 7/8

Just as destructions of other sufferings that arise without effort are not human goals, so the destruction of the final suffering, accomplished without effort,

But this argument is not proper.

The destruction of the final suffering is a destruction of suffering that does not coexist with the prior absence of suffering and resides in the very locus of suffering;

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Knowledge of reality and the human end · 8/8

therefore, it is an object to be attained.

Like pleasure, the destruction of final suffering unmixed with suffering must be accomplished through human effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The causal place of true knowledge is examined alongside the nature of suffering.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Knowledge of reality and the human end

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 1/10

The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that "mere destruction-of-sufferinghood is liberationhood." The word "liberation" is used only for the aggregate of all

destructions of all sufferings of an individual living being.

The collection of destructions of suffering belonging to each living being indicates that particular individual,

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 2/10

just as the expression "pitch darkness" is used for a collection of absences of light.

Likewise, volition is directed toward an aggregate, and cognition and naming of "two" also have a pair of objects as their content.

But a collection of objects cannot itself be what is to be accomplished.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 3/10

If the cause of the collection were non-different from the collection, there would be over-extension;

and if the cause of the collection were different from the collection, no result could be produced in a collection consisting in destructions.

Then the status of an unproduced entity as a human goal would also be lost.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 4/10

The expression "pitch darkness" is used only for the collection of absences of light.

This refutation also rejects the view that "a destruction of suffering relating to experience which does not produce a disposition,

or a destruction of experiences which does not produce dispositions, is liberation." Such a definition is not free from over-extension, because

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 5/10

a state productive of a result is possible even in a non-cause.

Mere destruction of suffering is not the supreme human end.

Some other scholars hold that liberation is the destruction of the means of suffering that does not coexist with the prior absence of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 6/10

In worldly life, destruction of means of suffering such as snakes and thorns, and in Vedic expiations the destruction of means of suffering such as sin, are regarded,

in the absence of any alternative, as human goals merely in the form of destruction of the means of suffering.

But an objection may be raised as follows: volition is directed only toward non-production of suffering, as in "let the means of suffering, such as a snake, thorn, or sin,

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 7/10

be destroyed so that the suffering caused by it may not arise." Therefore, only non-production of suffering is the purpose.

Destruction of the means of suffering is not the purpose, because it is distinct from both pleasure and absence of suffering.

But this objection is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 8/10

Non-production of suffering, being of the nature of prior absence, is beginningless; therefore, it cannot be something to be accomplished.

Again, maintenance or cultivation of the non-production of suffering cannot itself be something to be accomplished.

Maintenance is not itself the nature of the non-production of suffering; and the nature of non-production of suffering is not something that can be accomplished.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 9/10

Nor can the relation of non-production of suffering to future time be something to be accomplished.

In prior absence no distinct relation different from both relata—the relatum and its counter-relatum—is admitted; therefore,

no such relation can be accepted in the non-production of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation and the means of suffering · 10/10

Even if non-production of suffering were taken as the relatum and counter-relatum, it still could not be something to be accomplished, because

prior absence itself is not something to be accomplished.

Time and its properties too are established without any human effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The text asks which absence or destruction properly counts as liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Liberation and the means of suffering

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 1/6

It may now be proposed that because there is aversion toward the means of suffering, a desire for the absence of the means of suffering arises, just as because

there is aversion toward suffering, a desire for the absence of suffering arises.

Therefore, volition arises for establishing the absence of the means of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 2/6

But this proposal is not proper.

For the person in whom volition toward accomplishing a purpose arises from desire for that purpose, only the means of that purpose becomes a purpose for that person.

Therefore, only the absence of the means of suffering is the purpose.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 3/6

It may now be proposed that cognition of the purpose is necessary for effort that is the cause of a desire to produce, because

without cognition of the purpose no desire to produce its means arises.

But cognition of the purpose is not necessary for effort generated by aversion.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 4/6

From cognition that something is a means to an object of aversion, aversion toward that means arises;

and from that aversion arises the effort that destroys the means of the object of aversion.

The nature of aversion is that, in the absence of an inhibitor, it produces an effort conducive to the destruction of its object.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 5/6

Otherwise, it would be impossible to admit two kinds of effort.

For this very reason, a person blinded by excessive anger undertakes self-destructive activity even without any result or purpose.

But this proposal is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Purpose, recognition, and effort · 6/6

A discerning person does not, merely because of aversion and without any purpose, exert effort toward an action whose only result is suffering.

Even a person blinded by extreme anger entertains a momentary notion of a result,

just as a person blinded by extreme passion entertains a momentary notion of a result when approaching another man's wife.

KEY INSIGHT

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Purpose, recognition, and effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

The established position and its alternatives · ı/ıı

But the other view is not proper.

People undertake expiation and the like with the purpose, "may I not suffer"; therefore only the non-production of suffering is the purpose or human goal.

Nor should it be said that the prior absence of suffering cannot be something to be accomplished.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 2/11

It can be accomplished through effort by destroying the means of suffering.

Positive and negative concomitance also establishes this view: when the means of suffering is deliberately destroyed, the prior absence of suffering remains in the future;

when the means of suffering is not destroyed, that prior absence does not remain.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

The established position and its alternatives · 3/11

In the case of a pot too, producibility by effort is established through positive and negative concomitance: when effort is present, a pot exists in the future;

when effort is absent, the pot does not exist.

But to speak of the production of a prior absence does not mean that in the future there comes into being a prior absence that was wholly non-existent before;

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 4/11

for that would involve unnecessary multiplication.

An objection may now be raised that only what cannot be accomplished without effort is accomplishable by effort;

but the nature of the prior absence of an effect is not like that.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 5/11

But this objection is not proper.

A pot continues to exist even after effort has ceased; therefore, in the nature of prior absence the qualification "in the future" must be added.

For this very reason, preservation or maintenance, like acquisition, produces the absence of a future undesirable consequence and

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering’s means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 6/11

becomes the object of the agent's activity.

It may again be said: if the prior absence of suffering produced by sin and destroyed by expiation exists, then suffering must necessarily arise, because

that very prior absence produces its counterpositive, suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 7/11

And if that prior absence does not exist, then merely because of its absence, non-production of suffering must follow.

Thus in either case expiation would be futile.

Therefore, the prior absence of suffering should be regarded as accomplishable through destruction of the means of suffering,

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 8/11

and effort terminates only in the accomplishment of that prior absence.

Consequently, only destruction of the means of suffering is the human goal; the absence of suffering aimed at as the non-production of suffering is not the human goal.

The dispute over the existence or non-existence of prior absence is pointless.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · 9/11

It may now be proposed that if there is no prior absence of suffering, then even when sin occurs suffering will not occur;

consequently no effort to destroy sin will arise from the thought "sin is a means of suffering." And if the prior absence of suffering exists,

it produces suffering through sin.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering’s means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

The established position and its alternatives · ১০/১১

Then even when expiation is present, one quarter of the sin would remain and the sin would not be completely destroyed.

But this proposal is not proper.

Even when the prior absence of suffering is absent, destruction of something of the same class as a means of suffering, such as sin, becomes a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The established position and its alternatives · II/II

Again, even when prior absence exists, suffering may be produced by some other sin.

After sin has been destroyed by expiation, doubt remains as to whether the prior absence of suffering exists or does not exist; therefore,

undertaking expiation is beyond dispute.

KEY INSIGHT

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · The established position and its alternatives

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 1/9

Our reply here is this: wherever sin is destroyed by expiation, the prior absence of suffering certainly exists.

That prior absence in the form of non-production of suffering is the human goal.

Through destruction of sin, that non-production is accomplished by expiation; therefore, expiation is not futile even though prior absence exists.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 2/9

If it is said that prior absence necessarily produces suffering, that is true; but in order for that prior absence to produce suffering, it must take up some other sin.

Nor should it be said that expiation thereby becomes futile.

It produces the non-production of suffering, and therefore it is successful.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 3/9

Nor should it be said that the result of one non-production of suffering is only another non-production of suffering, and because that other non-production is absent,

the first non-production is futile.

The non-production of suffering that exists in its own nature is itself the human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 4/9

Otherwise, an infinite regress would arise.

Therefore, expiation is undertaken to destroy present sin with the intention, "may I not suffer because of this sin."

The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that "in the case of a sin for which expiation has been completed, there is no prior absence of suffering." Otherwise,

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 5/9

because that prior absence would be destroyed by its counterpositive, suffering, the absence of liberation would become accidental.

Nevertheless, expiation is not thereby useless.

God does not become unreliable as the teacher of the means for removing suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 6/9

The destruction of sin itself is the result of expiation.

Even when the prior absence of suffering is not established with certainty, definite cognition that a particular sin is a means to hell causes one to undertake expiation

in order to destroy that sin.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 7/9

Destruction of the means of suffering is not itself the human goal.

When another sin produces the counterpositive of the absence of suffering, the prior absence of suffering is destroyed.

Therefore, expiation is undertaken to destroy the means of suffering with the intention, "may I not suffer because

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 8/9

of this means of suffering." Thus only non-production of suffering is the human goal, not destruction of the means of suffering.

Again, destruction of false cognition, which is the seed of the world of suffering, is not liberation.

Otherwise, after true knowledge destroyed false cognition, liberation would arise even while bodily properties still remained.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Non-production versus destruction · 9/9

Nor can destruction of merit and demerit, which are causes of the body, senses, intellect, and the like, be liberation.

Acts of expiation not performed are destroyed only through experience, not through true knowledge.

Destruction of merit and demerit through experience is not a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Non-production versus destruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

What is the human goal?

Destruction of suffering

- Liberation is considered as the removal of suffering.
- Past, present, and future pain pose different logical problems.
- Destruction of its means is offered as an alternative.

Non-production of suffering

- One may act with the intention not to suffer.
- Prior absence requires careful treatment of its object.
- True knowledge enters the account of what prevents suffering.

The rival definitions should not be collapsed into a single account.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL: SUFFERING, ITS MEANS, AND THE PURPOSE OF LIBERATION

Arguments considered · Human Goal · Suffering and Its Cessation

Opening question

A completed destruction, future suffering, and the removal of causal conditions are contrasted.

Central distinction

Desire to avoid suffering must be connected with a cognizable object of action.

Reply or further debate

Non-production of suffering is contrasted with destruction of suffering's means.

At the boundary


The discussion distinguishes prevention, removal of causes, and mere destruction of false cognition.

The next presentation continues the English translated argument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Absolute Absence, Prābhākara Objections, Scriptural Testimony, and Eligibility

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

A study of the philosophical arguments, objections, and replies.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Human Goal · Rival Accounts of Liberation

1

Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and

2

Prābhākara view and prior absence

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suff

3

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess th

4

Inference and scripture on liberation

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptura

5

Separate verbal connections and worldly selve

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek l

The divisions correspond to consecutive passages in the English translated text.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 1/11

> Other scholars hold that liberation is the absolute absence of suffering in general.

> The absolute absence of another person's suffering is established by itself; but the absolute absence of one's own suffering in one's own self is impossible,

> and the definition over-extends to pots and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 2/11

Nevertheless, the relation of the absolute absence of one's own suffering residing in one's own self is constituted by the destruction of the means of suffering,

and that relation is something to be accomplished.

It should not be said that liberation is merely the destruction of the means of suffering because that alone is required.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 3/11

Destruction of the means of suffering is not itself a human goal; human activity aims at establishing the absence of suffering.

Scripture too, by saying "he moves about completely free from suffering," describes liberation as the absolute absence of suffering.

In fact, destruction of the means of suffering is not the human goal, and the absolute absence of suffering itself is not directly accomplishable.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 4/11

Rather, the human goal is the absence of suffering qualified by the absence of the means of suffering; when the qualifier, namely absence of the means of suffering,

is established, the qualified absence of suffering is established.

Destruction of snakes, thorns, and the like too is accomplishable as a relation to the absence of suffering through establishing the separate absences of the respective

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 5/11

But this other view is not proper.

Destruction of the means of suffering such as demerit does not accomplish liberation.

Again, the relation of the absolute absence of future suffering in one's own self cannot be something to be accomplished.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 6/11

Future suffering cannot be admitted in a liberated person; if suffering were admitted, the liberated person would become unliberated.

Therefore, a relation involving the absolute absence of suffering is contradictory.

Nor can the relation of the absolute absence of present, already arisen suffering be accomplished in one's own self, because

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 7/11

absolute absence of present suffering is itself contradictory and its absence is established by itself.

A relation to the absence of past suffering cannot be the purpose.

Nor can a relation to the absolute absence of another person's suffering be the purpose, because that relation is established by itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 8/11

There is moreover no proof that destruction of the means of suffering constitutes a relation of absolute absence of suffering.

It may now be argued that in cases such as destruction of the means of suffering, cognition and

usage concerning a relation of the form "this is the absolute absence of suffering" are possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 9/11

But this argument is not proper.

By merely recollecting the absence of suffering that does not occur in the same place and time, cognition of the absolute absence of suffering is possible;

this cognition does not have any distinct relation of absolute absence as its object.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · 10/11

This refutation also rejects the view that "liberation is the absence of relation of the prior absence of all suffering." Since inert objects such as pots are not

liberated, one might try to take the referent of the word "liberated" to be only that which bears the said relation qualified by the destruction of the means of suffering,

just as the word "pankaja" through etymology and convention is used in a specific sense.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Can absolute absence constitute liberation? · II/II

But the absence of relation of the prior absence of suffering is not itself the purpose; on the contrary, the absolute absence of suffering is not accomplishable.

It is of the nature of destruction; therefore, the conception of absolute absence as the very nature of suffering must be abandoned.

KEY INSIGHT

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Can absolute absence constitute liberation?

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 1/13

The Prabhakara Mimamsakas hold that the prior absence of endless suffering itself is liberation.

It should not be said that such prior absence of suffering, being beginningless, cannot be a human goal.

Although at times it does not depend upon effort, it is nevertheless accomplishable through effort by destroying the demerit that would produce its counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 2/13

When demerit is destroyed by true knowledge dependent on effort, the very nature of the prior absence of suffering remains in the following moment.

But without effort demerit produces suffering; therefore, the nature of the prior absence of future suffering cannot remain by itself.

For this reason, like a pot, that prior absence is accomplishable by effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 3/13

In the activity of a person seeking protection through expiation that destroys snakes, thorns, and the like,

you yourself have already admitted that the prior absence of suffering is accomplishable by effort.

Nor is it proper that merely the destruction of demerit produced at one time by discriminative knowledge of merit constitutes liberation;

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 4/13

for the prior absence of suffering is eternal, and therefore accomplishability by effort terminates only in the destruction of demerit.

The destruction of demerit itself is not a human goal.

The utility of destroying demerit lies only in its being the cause of the non-production of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 5/13

If the prior absence of suffering were not accomplishable, even this utility of destroying demerit could not be accepted.

For this very reason, the statement of the Nyaya-sutra that "liberation is attained through the successive destruction of suffering and the rest" is coherent.

Otherwise, the non-production of false cognition and the like would not be causes of the non-production of suffering, and the sutra would become incoherent.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 6/13

It may now be argued that in a liberated person, because there is no cooperation of demerit, body, and the like,

the consequence of the production of suffering does not arise even if the prior absence of suffering is present.

But the answer is that if this is admitted, the prior absences of suffering would disappear; for in the absence of an upper limit,

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 7/13

a beginningless prior absence would become absolute absence.

It may also be said that calling the prior absence of suffering "prior absence" is in reality eternal, because it falls within the class of absences and

is capable of being destroyed by its counterpositive, suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 8/13

But this argument too is not proper.

Since the prior absence of suffering is beginningless and eternal, it would be of the nature of absolute absence; hence it would in fact differ from prior absence and

would not possess the nature of an absence that can be destroyed.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 9/13

Consequently, that prior absence cannot be accomplished through its own destruction produced by its counterpositive.

Future suffering, which is co-located with the prior absence of liberation, is not the counterpositive of the prior absence of suffering, because

such future suffering is presently absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 10/13

And if future suffering were taken as presently present, only the non-liberated state of the liberated person would be established.

Present and past sufferings, which are co-located with the prior absence of liberation, are not counterpositives of the prior absence of suffering, because

the prior absences of those sufferings have already been destroyed.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 11/13

Suffering that is not co-located with the prior absence of liberation is likewise not the counterpositive of the prior absence of suffering.

Suffering present in one place is continuously absent elsewhere; therefore, the prior absence of such suffering is absent.

Moreover, the prior absence of suffering is co-located with its own counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 12/13

Suffering in general too is not the counterpositive of the prior absence of suffering.

General suffering that resides neither in one's own self nor in another self is wholly unreal.

Such wholly unreal general suffering is always remote from the self; therefore, a discerning person's effort to remove such suffering would be incoherent.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prābhākara view and prior absence · 13/13

Only future suffering is co-located with the prior absence of suffering.

That prior absence is accomplishable through expiation that destroys snakes, thorns, and the like.

Future suffering is likewise co-located with the prior absence of eating red poisonous meat; here the eating of the meat itself is the counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

Prior absence raises the question of the counterpositive and when suffering arises.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Prābhākara view and prior absence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 1/10

An objection may now be raised that absence of suffering is not a human goal, because then destruction of pleasure too would count as a human goal under the same rule as

acquisition and expenditure.

It should not be said that pleasure pervaded by many sufferings is to be abandoned by a discerning person and therefore deserves destruction.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 2/10

Only suffering is necessarily to be abandoned; pleasure is the object of unconditional desire.

Otherwise, if only pleasure not pervaded by suffering were taken as an object of desire, human-goalhood would become opposed to that pleasure itself.

But this objection is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 3/10

People frightened by suffering strive to destroy suffering even without any intention of obtaining pleasure.

Therefore, absence or destruction of suffering is itself a human goal.

At the time of absence of suffering no one undertakes to destroy suffering with the purpose of obtaining pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 4/10

If the contrary view were admitted as possible, even pleasure could not count as a human goal.

Therefore, at a time when suffering is absent, the cognition "there is no pleasure" creates no obstruction in the activity of one who desires the absence of suffering.

An undiscerning person who desires pleasure alone, approaches another man's wife, resolves "let my head reel if it will,

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 5/10

so long as I get pleasure," desires pleasure pervaded by many sufferings, and says "it is better to live in beautiful Vrindavan than to attain liberation"—such a person is

not qualified for liberation.

But discerning people who, reflecting that "this world is like the shadow beneath the hood of an enraged serpent," wish to renounce even pleasure,

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 6/10

and who discriminate thus—"how many dark days of suffering and how few sky-lamps of pleasure there are in this forest of worldly existence!"—are the true candidates for

The fact that a pleasure-seeking person does not strive for liberation does not destroy liberation's status as a human goal.

Medical treatment remains a human goal even though some persons do not seek treatment.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 7/10

An objection may now be raised that what is not known as absence of suffering cannot be an object of desire or a human goal.

A discerning person is not seen to desire a state of unconsciousness.

Only something known, like pleasure, is taken to be a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 8/10

Nor is cognition of liberation possible.

The answer is that the discerning person's activity does not arise with the aim "I shall know absence of suffering," but rather with the aim "may I not suffer." Therefore,

absence of suffering alone is the human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 9/10

Cognition of the human goal depends upon its own cause; but cognition of absence of suffering is not the cause of its being a human goal.

A person acts with the aim "may I be happy," not with the aim "may I know happiness." Therefore, pleasure alone is the human goal, not cognition of pleasure.

If cognition of pleasure were held necessary, it would be superfluous and ontologically costly.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain · 10/10

A person whose body is torn by many sufferings may even strive toward death with the aim of obtaining absence of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Eligibility and the purpose of avoiding pain

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Inference and scripture on liberation · 1/10

It may now be argued that a person tormented by suffering does not know death, because such a person is not discerning.

But this argument is not proper.

Discernment is not useful for knowing that absence of suffering is a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 2/10

Destruction of future suffering becomes the object of experience of the final suffering.

Therefore, the destruction of future suffering occurs in the next moment, and cognition of that destruction of suffering,

which stands in the state of being about to be destroyed, occurs now; hence the experience of present suffering is immediate.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Inference and scripture on liberation · 3/10

At the time of cognition the characteristic of liberation is present; therefore cognition is not opposed to liberation.

The proof that absence of suffering is liberation is the following inference: "Devadatta's sufferinghood resides in suffering, that is,

in the counterpositive of the destruction of suffering, but does not coexist at the same time with suffering possessed of sufferinghood, because

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 4/10

sufferinghood is either a property residing only in effects or is an uninterrupted series like light."

Being an uninterrupted series is a property present in all effects produced at different times.

In the same way, proofs of liberationhood with respect to pleasure and the like must also be established.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 5/10

Therefore, when all suffering has been destroyed, liberation is attained.

Nor should it be said that destruction of suffering and the like is not conducive to liberation.

The destruction of false cognition, the root cause of worldly existence, breaks the uninterrupted continuity of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 6/10

Through true knowledge produced by the sequence of hearing and the rest, the cessation of false cognition, the root of worldly existence, is possible.

The scriptural statement "the Self should be known; then he does not return again to worldly existence" is the proof of this.

According to the principle of the Night-Sacrifice, the non-return of the Self to worldly existence stated in the eulogistic passage is merely a qualification of a

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 7/10

specially qualified person.

Therefore, the meaning of the scripture is: "the knower of the Self does not return again to worldly existence," that is, does not again become an embodied living being.

The scriptural passage beginning with "the Self should be heard, reflected upon, meditated upon—that is, directly realized" and

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 8/10

ending with "the Self becomes completely freed from the bondage of suffering" establishes destruction of suffering as liberation.

Udayanacarya holds that the scriptural statement "pleasure and suffering do not touch the bodiless Self" establishes destruction of suffering as liberation.

The word "vavasantam" is a form with the y-an-luk ending.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 9/10

Therefore, the statement does not become pointless because of the momentary absence of a body in the Self during worldly existence.

Here, according to the natural meaning of the copulative compound "priyapriye," only a joint negation of pleasure and suffering is understood.

Such joint negation is merely accidental, like an eternal entity.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Inference and scripture on liberation · 10/10

If the negation of only one of pleasure or suffering were admitted, there would be sentence-splitting.

KEY INSIGHT

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Inference and scripture on liberation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 1/6

An objection may now be raised that no proof concerning liberation is available.

But this objection is not proper.

Even if negation is admitted separately with respect to pleasure and suffering, which are jointly indicated by the dual number, sentence-splitting can be avoided.

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 2/6

This is like the sentence "cut the khadira and dhava trees," where khadira and dhava are each separately related to the act of cutting;

they are not intended to be cut jointly as one object.

In worldly existence, pleasure and suffering together do not constitute a single thing.

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 3/6

The joint negation of the two is possible either in relation to each of the two or in the absence of each relation.

Since in the embodied self the relation of only one of pleasure or suffering is inappropriate, the negation applies separately to both.

For this very reason liberation of all living beings is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 4/6

When the uninterrupted continuum of all suffering becomes the subject of inference, liberation of all beings can be established.

Otherwise, liberation of the self in general would not be established, because deviation would arise in respect of that very liberation.

If only other selves possessing some such special feature were considered eligible for liberation, then because of doubt concerning that feature,

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 5/6

> no one would strive for liberation.

> It may be proposed that this doubt is removed by characteristics of liberation established by scripture, such as tranquility, self-control, and detachment from enjoyment.

> But this proposal is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Separate verbal connections and worldly selves · 6/6

Only selves bound by worldly existence are eligible for liberation.

A self already possessing the characteristics of liberation such as tranquility is not eligible for liberation.

Eligibility for liberation resides in a particular self only when those characteristics of liberation are absent in the self in general.

KEY INSIGHT

The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English Appendix 3 · Separate verbal connections and worldly selves

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Which absence is liberation?

Absolute or prior absence

- The absence of suffering is interpreted in several ways.
- Prābhākara arguments emphasize the structure of prior absence.
- The counterpositive must be specified.

Naiyāyika reply

- The human end is tested against practical effort.
- Inferential proof and scripture are brought into the discussion.
- Eligibility extends the inquiry beyond abstract definitions.

The translation distinguishes the disputants and their respective evidence.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ABSOLUTE ABSENCE, PRĀBHĀKARA OBJECTIONS, SCRIPTURAL TESTIMONY, AND ELIGIBILITY

Arguments considered · Human Goal · Rival Accounts of Liberation

Opening question

The account tests a supposed relation between suffering's absence and the self.

Central distinction

The established position uses practical desire and action to assess the human goal.

Reply or further debate

Arguments for the destruction of suffering are compared with scriptural passages.

At the boundary


The final debate addresses the reading of negations and who can seek liberation.

The next presentation continues the English translated argument.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Human Goal · Eternal Pleasure, Brahman, and the Dissolution of the Self

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

An examination of the translated arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Eternal Pleasure and the Vedānta Debate

1

Why manifest eternal pleasure is challenged

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the defin

2

Self, mind, and destruction of the body

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a suf

3

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its

4

Cognition and bliss as the essence of the Self

A conception of the Self as cognition-and-bliss is subjected to causal

5

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as

The sequence follows the consecutive discussions in the complete English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Why manifest eternal pleasure is challenged · 1/4

Scripture calls tranquility and the like cooperating causes of liberation, but does not call them results to be produced.

Even if tranquility and the like are regarded as results, they still must be produced by selves attached to worldly existence.

Tranquility and the like may be results, but their production occurs only through worldly attached selves.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the definition of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14117–14117

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why manifest eternal pleasure is challenged · 2/4

There is no obstruction to liberation in the self in general.

Manifestation of eternal pleasure is not liberation.

Such manifestation cannot itself be eternal; otherwise, there would be no difference between a liberated self and a self attached to worldly existence.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the definition of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14117–14118

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Why manifest eternal pleasure is challenged · 3/4

Nor can manifestation of eternal pleasure be a produced result, because its causes, such as the body, are absent in the liberated self.

The causality of the body and the like is established with respect to cognition in general and pleasure in general.

It cannot be said that the body and the like are causes only of the eternal pleasure of a worldly attached self.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the definition of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14118–14119

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Why manifest eternal pleasure is challenged · 4/4

There is no obstacle to regarding the body and the like as causes of eternal pleasure in the self in general; for this very reason, the postulation of bodies and

the like for selves in heaven is regarded as consistent.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the definition of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14119–14119

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 1/8

The conjunction of mind with an individual self cannot be the cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure.

Conjunction of mind with an individual self devoid of unseen potency and the like produces no result.

If mere dependence upon an object were taken as the cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure,

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14121–14121

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 2/8

there would follow the consequence that eternal pleasure would be manifested even in a self attached to worldly existence.

Merit produced by meditation also cannot be a cooperating cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure.

The cause producing such merit is destructible; therefore, if that merit were taken as a cause, liberation too would become destructible.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14121–14122

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 3/8

A manifestation of pleasure produced by such merit could not be endless; once the merit was destroyed, the manifestation would also be destroyed.

It may now be argued that when false cognition together with its latent impressions is destroyed by true knowledge, no new merit or demerit is produced because

activity ceases.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14122–14124

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 4/8

When old merit and demerit are exhausted, the body and other means of suffering are destroyed; and that very destruction of the body and

the like becomes the cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure.

Since there is no end to the destruction of the body and the like, the stream of manifestation of eternal pleasure is also endless.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14124–14124

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 5/8

But this argument is not proper.

Without the body and the like, manifestation of eternal pleasure cannot arise.

There is no proof that destruction of the body and the like is a cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14125–14125

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 6/8

The mere activity of a person desiring liberation does not establish bodily destruction as a cause of the manifestation of eternal pleasure, because

activity toward destruction of the body may also be undertaken for the purpose of destroying suffering.

No proof establishing the existence of eternal pleasure is available.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14125–14126

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 7/8

Scriptural statements such as "Brahman is by nature eternal consciousness and bliss" or "Brahman is of the nature of bliss,

and that very bliss is attained in liberation" do not constitute proof of eternal pleasure.

Cognition and pleasure arise and perish, and they are experienced separately in the forms "I know" and "I am happy." Therefore, taking cognition and

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14126–14126

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Self, mind, and destruction of the body · 8/8

pleasure as non-different from Brahman is contradicted by direct experience.

KEY INSIGHT

Neither contact with mind nor removal of the body is accepted as a sufficient cause.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14126–14126

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 1/7

It may be argued that because of the incapacity of the scriptural sentence, it sets aside non-eternal pleasure and establishes eternal pleasure,

for it teaches the non-difference of pleasure from Brahman.

This is like a sentence concerning heaven.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14128–14128

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 2/7

> But the non-difference of eternal pleasure from Brahman could be established only after eternal pleasure itself had first been established; consequently,

> the establishment of eternal pleasure and the establishment of its non-difference from Brahman would depend mutually upon each other.

> Alternatively, it may be said that scripture first teaches eternal pleasure and then states its non-difference from Brahman.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14129–14130

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 3/7

There is no sentence-splitting here, because the non-difference of Brahman and eternal pleasure is the single meaning of the whole sentence.

But this argument is not proper.

If the Self is an object of direct realization, eternal pleasure non-different from the Self must also be an object of direct realization.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14130–14131

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 4/7

Pleasure in general produces direct awareness of itself.

If eternal pleasure is not experienced, experience of the Self would also become incoherent, because eternal pleasure is taken to be non-different from the Self.

It may now be argued that only eternal pleasure distinct from the Self or Brahman is experienced in liberation, but

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14131–14133

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 5/7

in that pleasure there is no experience of the pleasure itself.

But this argument is not proper.

The complete causal complex of the experience of pleasure produces the experience of pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14133–14133

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 6/7

Therefore, it cannot be admitted that pleasure is present but is not experienced.

In scriptural expressions such as "anandam brahma," because the word "ananda" ends in the suffix ac, it teaches Brahman as the substrate of bliss.

Thus the status of being the bearer of bliss belongs to Brahman.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14133–14134

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Vedānta · Brahman and the locus of bliss · 7/7

Otherwise, the use of the neuter "anandam" in scripture would be incoherent.

KEY INSIGHT

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14134–14134

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

Cognition and bliss as the essence of the Self · 1/3

The foregoing refutation also rejects the Vedanta view that, when ignorance ceases through direct realization of the non-duality of Brahman, only the pure Self or

Brahman consisting of cognition and bliss remains in liberation.

Brahman, self-luminous and of the nature of bliss, is eternal; therefore, if this view were accepted, there would be no distinction between the liberated self and

KEY INSIGHT

A conception of the Self as cognition-and-bliss is subjected to causal and ontological objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14137–14138

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cognition and bliss as the essence of the Self · 2/3

the worldly attached self.

The pure Self consisting of bliss and cognition exists even without human effort; hence it cannot itself be a human goal.

It may be argued that cessation of ignorance is accomplishable by human effort.

KEY INSIGHT

A conception of the Self as cognition-and-bliss is subjected to causal and ontological objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14138–14139

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cognition and bliss as the essence of the Self · 3/3

But the question is: is ignorance false cognition, or is it some entity wholly distinct from cognition?

In either case, ignorance is distinct from bliss and also distinct from the absence of suffering and its means.

Therefore, cessation of false cognition cannot itself be a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

A conception of the Self as cognition-and-bliss is subjected to causal and ontological objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14139–14139

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 1/6

The Tridandins hold that liberation is the dissolution of the individual self into the blissful Supreme Self.

Dissolution of the individual self means destruction of the subtle body.

The subtle body consists of the eleven senses and the five great elements; these remain together in subtle form and

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14141–14141

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 2/6

determine the limits of the individual self's pleasure and suffering.

But this view is not proper.

Destruction of the subtle body constitutes only absence of a means of suffering; hence it cannot by itself be a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14141–14142

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 3/6

It should not be said that when the limiting adjunct consisting in the body is destroyed,

the destruction of the conditionally constituted individual self is the dissolution of the individual self.

Destruction of one's own self cannot be a human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14144–14144

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 4/6

Brahman is eternal; therefore destruction of the individual self non-different from Brahman is impossible.

To admit both difference and non-difference between the individual self and Brahman at the same time produces a contradiction in nature.

Nor should it be said that an uninterrupted continuum of mind is liberation.

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14144–14145

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 5/6

An uninterrupted absence of suffering is necessarily the human goal; therefore, a mental continuum is not the human goal.

Without causes such as the body, a mental continuum cannot arise.

A mere collection of thoughts is not the complete causal complex of a mental continuum; otherwise, causes such as the body would become useless.

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14145–14145

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Tridaṇḍin dissolution and the mental continuum · 6/6

> Nor should it be said that abandonment of the self, which is a cause of suffering, is liberation.

> Abandonment of the self, being distinct from both pleasure and absence of suffering, is not a human goal.

> Abandonment of the self in the form of cognition can be established even without any additional effort; therefore, no distinct abandonment of the self is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14146–14146

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · ETERNAL PLEASURE, BRAHMAN, AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SELF

What constitutes liberation?

Eternal bliss disclosed

- Manifest eternal pleasure is proposed as the human goal.
- Brahman is read as bliss or as its substratum.
- A cognitive account of the Self is tested.

Cessation of suffering

- The Nyāya conclusion is defended through absence of suffering.
- Body and mind alone cannot establish an eternal bliss.
- Dissolution of the self is rejected as liberation.

These are competing arguments preserved in the English philosophical text.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Eternal Pleasure and the Vedānta Debate

Initial problem

The translation rejects manifestation of eternal pleasure as the definition of liberation.

Central distinction

The Vedānta interpretation of eternal pleasure is examined against its scriptural formulation.

Reply or opposing position

A conception of the Self as cognition-and-bliss is subjected to causal and ontological objections.

At the source boundary


Dissolution of a conditioned self and uninterrupted mind are tested as rival accounts of liberation.

The next presentation continues the Human Goal section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Human Goal · Meditation, Knowledge of Reality, and Knowledge–Action Conjunction

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

An examination of the translated arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Knowledge, Action and the Path to Liberation

1

Meditative activity and self-realization

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as poss

2

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have

3

Liberation through knowledge alone

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true

4

The conjunction defended by other teachers

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessar

5

The relative standing of action and knowledge

The debate compares a causal complex containing both action and knowle

The sequence follows the consecutive discussions in the complete English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 1/9

Some scholars hold that while alive a person acts for the sake of unsurpassed blissful liberation.

This activity, produced by perfection of meditation, with the assistance of a special cause brings about liberation in the form of endless absence of suffering.

But this view is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14148–14149

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 2/9

If it were accepted, supreme liberation would cease to be a human goal.

If only a person possessing dispassion is entitled to blissful liberation, such a person would not strive for liberation with the aim of obtaining bliss.

Persons in all four stages of life are eligible for liberation.

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14149–14150

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 3/9

Scripture says: "he who is steadfast in Brahman attains immortality." Therefore eligibility for liberation cannot be restricted to only certain persons.

Since the desire for liberation is the same, the order of the stages of life is also irrelevant here.

The question may now arise: how then is the scriptural statement "the stage of liberation is the fourth stage,

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14150–14151

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 4/9

and it is prescribed only for the wandering renouncer" coherent?

The answer is that the act of renunciation itself is the stage of liberation.

Because the householder necessarily has relations with sons, wife, and the like, the stage of liberation is primarily stated for the wandering renouncer.

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14151–14151

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 5/9

Nevertheless, the scriptural statement "a householder steadfast in true knowledge is also liberated" accepts liberation for householders and others as well.

When the matter is considered in this way, the scriptural passage concerning liberation —"the Self should be heard, reflected upon, meditated upon, that is,

directly realized"—enjoins reflection upon the Self in order to produce determinate knowledge of the nature of the Self.

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14151–14153

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 6/9

Through the proofs provided by scripture, the Self is determined as distinct from the body and the like;

and when the categories have been clearly understood from the treatises, the nature of the Self is ascertained.

It should not be said that true knowledge arising from verbal testimony itself removes false cognition together with the latent impressions that obstruct direct

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14153–14154

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 7/9

realization.

In errors of direction and the like, even after veridical cognition has arisen from verbal testimony, false cognition is not completely destroyed.

Therefore, a person desiring liberation becomes liberated by attaining direct realization of the reality of the Self through yogically generated merit produced by

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14154–14155

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 8/9

meditation performed continuously, respectfully, and for a long time in accordance with the yogic practice enjoined by scripture and tradition.

This direct realization is capable of destroying false cognition together with its latent impressions, the root seed of worldly existence.

Because defects are absent, activity no longer arises; actions accumulated from beginningless time are exhausted through experience; and future merit and

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14155–14155

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Meditative activity and self-realization · 9/9

demerit are not produced.

KEY INSIGHT

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14155–14155

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 1/6

> Even after instruction concerning the difference between body and Self has been received,

> doubt may remain in the mind of an uncertain person that the teacher's intention concerns some other subject.

> For this reason the impurity consisting in lack of faith in the distinction is not removed; hence reflection concerning Brahman is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14158–14158

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 2/6

The scriptural statement "the Self should be reflected upon by means of the proofs" teaches only the causality of scripture with respect to liberation, because

scripture presents proofs of the difference between Self and body.

Reflection concerning Brahman is possible only through scripture.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14159–14159

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 3/6

Thus liberation can be attained through true knowledge when that knowledge is accompanied by obligatory and occasional rites and twilight worship and the like,

and is strengthened by tranquility, self-control, and celibacy.

An objection may now be raised that a combination of knowledge and action with equal primacy is not acceptable.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14160–14162

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 4/6

Actions are enjoined by their respective sentences for results other than liberation; therefore,

to regard them as being for liberation would contradict the injunction of other results.

True knowledge is regarded as an independent cause of liberation without dependence on action.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14162–14162

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 5/6

Nor is there equality of principal-and-subsidiary relation in a combination of knowledge and action.

Action is not a direct cause of liberation, because it does not assist in producing the embodiment of true knowledge.

Nor is action an indirect auxiliary like preliminary sacrifices, because action is enjoined by its own sentence directly for its own result.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14163–14163

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The knowledge–action conjunction challenged · 6/6

Therefore, the combination of knowledge and action contradicts the evidence.

In a person desiring liberation, both desired-result actions and prohibited actions are absent.

A combination with motivated actions having uncertain results is also unacceptable, because it conflicts with the duties of the fourth stage of life.

KEY INSIGHT

The objection asks how knowledge and injunction-bound action can have equal primacy.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14164–14164

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation through knowledge alone · 1/4

For this very reason, the combination of all obligatory and occasional actions is not a cause of liberation.

Nor is the combination of knowledge with actions prescribed for renouncers a cause of liberation, because

a householder too can be liberated when true knowledge is present.

KEY INSIGHT

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14166–14166

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation through knowledge alone · 2/4

Tradition says: "A householder who earns wealth justly, is steadfast in true knowledge, is hospitable to guests, performs ancestral rites,

and speaks truth is liberated."

Nor should it be said that non-uniform actions are means to liberation.

KEY INSIGHT

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14167–14168

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation through knowledge alone · 3/4

Unlike heaven, liberation has no plurality of types.

Action is not enjoined as a duty for one who desires liberation; therefore, the combination of knowledge and action is not acceptable.

Tradition says: "Liberation can be attained by renouncing all actions." Therefore, renunciation of all action is enjoined for one who desires liberation,

KEY INSIGHT

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14168–14169

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Liberation through knowledge alone · 4/4

and liberation is attained by knowledge alone.

KEY INSIGHT

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14169–14169

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conjunction defended by other teachers · 1/5

No, this objection is not proper.

Because knowledge and action have equal primacy, their combination is acceptable.

Knowledge and action are enjoined in all four stages of life, and both are taught equally for the sake of liberation.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14171–14171

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conjunction defended by other teachers · 2/5

> The Bhagavad Gita says: "A person attains perfection by remaining devoted to his own action; by worshipping God through his own action,

> a person attains perfection."

> The Vishnu Purana says: "The wise should strive to attain Brahman; both knowledge and action are enjoined as causes of attaining Brahman."

KEY INSIGHT

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14172–14173

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conjunction defended by other teachers · 3/5

The Harita-smriti says: "Just as a bird's movement through the sky is possible by means of its two wings, so the eternal Brahman is attained by both knowledge and

action."

Scripture too says: "The Supreme Self, attainable through truthful austerity, right knowledge, and restraint, is attained through both knowledge and action."

KEY INSIGHT

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14174–14175

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conjunction defended by other teachers · 4/5

> The substance is this: to hold that liberation comes through knowledge alone is a sign of laziness;

> foolish people shrink from action out of fear of bodily exertion.

> Knowledge is a principal means, but not without action; action too is a principal means, but not without knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14176–14176

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The conjunction defended by other teachers · 5/5

Therefore, Brahman is attained through both knowledge and action; a bird cannot fly with one wing.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14176–14176

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The relative standing of action and knowledge · 1/2

It should not be said that it is incoherent to regard actions enjoined for results such as heaven as being for another result, liberation.

Vedic sentences possess a natural capacity to manifest equivalence of meaning; therefore, action can be understood as a means of liberation equal to knowledge.

The proof of action that produces the specific result— liberation—is only verbal testimony or scripture.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate compares a causal complex containing both action and knowledge with their independent roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14178–14179

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The relative standing of action and knowledge · 2/2

The same rule applies elsewhere too.

The combination of knowledge and action produces liberation as a principal causal aggregate together with its subsidiaries, and also as an indirect auxiliary.

Such a combination produces liberation through apurva or unseen potency, like the preliminary sacrifices and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate compares a causal complex containing both action and knowledge with their independent roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14179–14180

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What is causally primary?

Knowledge emphasized

- Realization of the Self is linked to the human goal.
- The knowledge-only interpretation is supported by textual testimony.
- Separate ritual injunctions raise a challenge to combination.

Knowledge with activity

- Other teachers regard ritual action as contributory.
- Meditation and righteous duty can be proposed as auxiliaries.
- A combined cause must specify how its parts operate.

The translation reports both arguments rather than merging their conclusions.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · MEDITATION, KNOWLEDGE OF REALITY, AND KNOWLEDGE–ACTION CONJUNCTION

Arguments considered · Knowledge, Action and the Path to Liberation

Initial problem

The text examines activity, meditation, and direct realization as possible means to liberation.

Central distinction

Scripture and tradition are invoked in support of the priority of true knowledge.

Reply or opposing position

The reply reads scriptural duties as contributory rather than necessarily incompatible.

At the source boundary


The debate compares a causal complex containing both action and knowledge with their independent roles.

The next presentation continues the Human Goal section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Human Goal · Prior-Birth Memory, Auxiliary Action, Merit, and the Established Doctrine

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

An examination of the translated arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Merit, Ritual Duties and True Knowledge

1

Remembering a previous birth and scripture

A special case questions whether direct remembered knowledge makes scr

2

Remote and immediate auxiliaries

The distinction concerns action as a remote auxiliary and direct true

3

Objections to the remote auxiliary account

The consequences of abandoning forbidden and desire-led actions are co

4

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of a

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted fo

5

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficie

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the

The sequence follows the consecutive discussions in the complete English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remembering a previous birth and scripture · 1/2

Some scholars say that a person who remembers a previous birth need not study scripture.

The statement in the story of Jada Bharata—"an initiated person who did not study the Veda under a teacher, did not perform Vedic rites,

and did not undertake the scriptures"—teaches abandonment of social association as a yogic duty; alternatively, it indicates absence of study because

KEY INSIGHT

A special case questions whether direct remembered knowledge makes scriptural study unnecessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14183–14183

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remembering a previous birth and scripture · 2/2

of recollection of a previous birth.

In support of this view it is said: "A twice-born person who remembers a previous birth is endowed with all sciences and

knows the truth of the meaning of all scriptures."

KEY INSIGHT

A special case questions whether direct remembered knowledge makes scriptural study unnecessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14183–14184

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remote and immediate auxiliaries · 1/3

Some scholars hold that for a person in whom true knowledge has not arisen and who desires true knowledge, action, by destroying demerit that obstructs cognition,

is a remote auxiliary to liberation, like expiation.

True knowledge, however, is an immediate auxiliary to liberation, that is, its direct producer.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction concerns action as a remote auxiliary and direct true knowledge as an immediate one.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14186–14186

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remote and immediate auxiliaries · 2/3

For a person in whom true knowledge has already arisen, the duties of the stage of life already begun are performed only for maintaining social order,

just as the Kariri sacrifice is completed even if rain occurs in the middle of the sacrifice.

In reality, maintenance of social order is not the result of the duties of a stage of life, because it is distinct from both pleasure and absence of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction concerns action as a remote auxiliary and direct true knowledge as an immediate one.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14187–14188

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Remote and immediate auxiliaries · 3⁄3

Such duties are performed only so that the blame of ordinary people for failure to perform the specific duties of one's stage may be removed.

Some scholars say that performance of the specific duties of a stage of life is undertaken for the exhaustion of demerit to be accomplished through the suffering

produced by their non-performance.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction concerns action as a remote auxiliary and direct true knowledge as an immediate one.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14188–14189

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the remote auxiliary account · 1/4

The foregoing view is not proper.

If action is regarded as an assistant to true knowledge, then action would become a producer of liberation through unseen potency.

The postulation of unseen potency is more economical than the postulation of destruction of suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The consequences of abandoning forbidden and desire-led actions are considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14191–14191

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the remote auxiliary account · 2/4

Therefore, obligatory rites such as worship of the sun at the junctions of the day, prescribed as indispensable duties for the initiated,

must also be performed by a person desiring liberation.

Abandonment of obligatory action is a cause of sin; there is no proper proof for restricting the rule.

KEY INSIGHT

The consequences of abandoning forbidden and desire-led actions are considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14191–14191

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the remote auxiliary account · 3/4

Prohibited and desire-motivated actions are to be abandoned as inhibitors of liberation because they cause bondage.

Actions dependent on wealth cease automatically when wealth is renounced.

The scriptural expression "having abandoned all actions" means precisely abandonment of action.

KEY INSIGHT

The consequences of abandoning forbidden and desire-led actions are considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14192–14193

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the remote auxiliary account · 4/4

The expression "renunciation of action" likewise denotes abandonment of action.

The Bhagavad Gita says: "The wise understand abandonment of desire-motivated action as renunciation; renunciation of obligatory action is not proper.

Abandonment of obligatory action through delusion is called tamasic abandonment."

KEY INSIGHT

The consequences of abandoning forbidden and desire-led actions are considered.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14193–14193

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of action · 1/5

Some scholars again say that true knowledge is a means of liberation only through merit, because the enjoined true knowledge produces merit.

That merit is destroyed by the result consisting in liberation.

But this view is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14195–14195

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of action · 2/5

Through the cessation of false cognition, liberation can be established from true knowledge itself; there is no need to postulate unseen potency or merit.

Otherwise, unseen potency would have to be postulated in medical treatment and the like as well.

Therefore, to hold that liberation occurs through merit leads to deviation in the injunction.

KEY INSIGHT

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14195–14195

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of action · 3/5

Some scholars say that liberation arises from the destruction of worldly effects when the causes of worldly existence are successively destroyed.

Through destruction of false cognition, true knowledge alone is the cause of liberation; action is not a cooperating cause of true knowledge.

Once false cognition is destroyed, true knowledge unsupported by action is definitively the cause of liberation,

KEY INSIGHT

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14197–14198

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of action · 4/5

just as in the destruction of an error of direction, veridical cognition without action is the cause.

Scriptural passages that describe action as a cause of liberation can be made coherent through the causality of true knowledge, because

scripture does not state that action is a direct cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14198–14199

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · PRIOR-BIRTH MEMORY, AUXILIARY ACTION, MERIT, AND THE ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE

Merit and the proposed causal cooperation of action · 5/5

A person possessing true knowledge is qualified for liberation; therefore, even if obligatory action is not performed, absence of sin may be admitted because

there is no fault.

Otherwise, performance and enjoyment of prescribed and prohibited actions would generate merit and demerit and produce the consequence that liberation is absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14199–14199

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 1/7

An objection may now be raised: how can true knowledge alone be the cause of liberation when actions such as great gifts at holy places, bathing at sacred sites,

and death in Kashi are enjoined as causes of liberation without requiring true knowledge?

It should not be said that people's true knowledge is merely the operation of action.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14202–14203

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 2/7

True knowledge does not arise instantaneously; therefore, the causality of action would have to be mediated by unseen potency.

For the sake of economy, it would be better to take unseen potency itself as the cause of liberation.

Nor should it be said that the destruction of sin obstructing true knowledge is the operation of action.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14203–14204

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 3/7

The postulation of unseen potency is more economical than the postulation of the destruction of sin opposed to true knowledge.

A counter-objection may then be raised: when the specific actions are non-uniform, how can liberation be uniform?

The answer that liberation is uniform because there is no difference of type in destruction of suffering is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14204–14206

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 4/7

In the destruction of qualities, opposite qualities that obstruct the destruction of inhering and non-inhering causes are regarded as destroyers.

It may be said that a specific quality is a cause of the destruction of a specific quality.

But then it would also have to be admitted that a specific action is a cause of the destruction of a specific suffering.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14206–14207

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 5/7

For you too admit that non-uniform specific actions are causes in producing true knowledge and in destroying sin that obstructs true knowledge.

It may also be said that the property of being an action enjoined for one who desires liberation is a uniform property in actions.

But this argument is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14207–14208

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 6/7

Scripture states independent causality of both knowledge and action.

Therefore, like rice and barley, which serve as alternative means in sacrifice, knowledge and action should also be regarded as alternative causes of liberation.

Where an effect is tied to one independent means, employment of another means without an alternative is not coherent, because

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14208–14209

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objection: is true knowledge causally sufficient? · 7/7

when one means is employed there is no expectancy of another.

And when a sentence states the causality of more than one means toward the same effect but does not use a word indicating collective employment,

the means are employed alternatively.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14209–14209

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 1/8

In fact, both the prima facie view and the established doctrine have already established that liberation is impossible without the complete destruction of false

cognition conjoined with firmly rooted latent impressions.

By positive and negative concomitance, knowledge of reality is established as the cause that destroys false cognition;

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14211–14211

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 2/8

therefore knowledge of reality is necessary for liberation.

Only a quality opposed to false cognition is a cause of the destruction of false cognition.

The destruction of false cognition that does not coexist with the prior absence of false cognition is obtained only through knowledge of reality.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14211–14212

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 3/8

The causality of knowledge of reality with respect to liberation is ascertained from scriptural texts such as, "The self should be known;

one who knows the self does not return again to worldly existence." The scriptural statement, "Having known the Supreme Self, a person crosses beyond death;

there is no other path to refuge," likewise teaches that liberation does not occur without knowledge of reality, but

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14213–14213

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 4/8

does occur when knowledge of reality is present.

Otherwise, bodies and the like could not be postulated in heaven and other realms.

Action may also produce liberation through the mediation of knowledge of reality; the complexity involved in postulating such causality is not a defect,

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14213–14215

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 5/8

since it is supported by evidence.

Action is a cause only in the production of a particular kind of knowledge of reality.

Therefore there is no defect of non-uniformity in knowledge of reality.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14215–14216

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 6/8

That death in Kashi produces knowledge of reality as its result is known only from authoritative testimony.

Only action that has not yet produced its result is destroyed by knowledge of reality—just as evil action is destroyed by expiation.

Thus the scriptural statement does not become meaningless.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14217–14217

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 7/8

Expiation is not a cause or instrument that produces sin; the result of expiation is stated to be the destruction of sin.

The suffering produced by expiation is not the result of brahmin-killing and other such sins,

for if this were admitted it would conflict with scriptural statements assigning hell as their result.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14218–14218

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established role of knowledge; action as its producer · 8/8

The injunction prescribing expiation would also become pointless.

If the result of expiation were merely suffering, undertaking expiation would be inexplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14218–14218

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does meritorious action directly liberate?

Action as auxiliary

- One view assigns ritual action a remote causal role.
- Duties and rites may produce the necessary knowledge.
- Memory of a previous birth tests the necessity of study.

True knowledge required

- The established position requires an antidote to false cognition.
- Merit alone cannot explain removal of false cognition.
- The mode of action's contribution must be separately determined.

A remote auxiliary must not be confused with the immediate cause of release.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Merit, Ritual Duties and True Knowledge

Initial problem

A special case questions whether direct remembered knowledge makes scriptural study unnecessary.

Central distinction

The text denies that bare merit or action can simply be substituted for liberating insight.

Reply or opposing position

The discussion compares scriptural rites, gifts, and bathing with the alleged causal power of knowledge.

At the source boundary


The conclusion specifies the destruction of false cognition and a distinct role for action.

The next presentation continues the Human Goal section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · THE DOCTRINE OF THE HUMAN GOAL



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Human Goal · Destruction of Action, Śruti and Smṛti, and the Final Determination

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

An examination of the translated arguments, objections, replies, and determinations.

Appendix 3 · The Doctrine of the Human Goal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Knowledge, Karma and the Closing Debate



Knowledge and the destruction of action

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts ac

Is action exhausted by experience alone?

The distinction between destruction through knowledge and fruition thr

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about th

Prima facie view · expiation instead of knowle

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy o

Prima facie view · immediate liberation

The timing of liberation is debated in relation to the arising of true

The sequence follows the consecutive discussions in the complete English translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge and the destruction of action · 1/5

The result of expiation cannot be eligibility to perform another action.

A person who has committed a minor sin distinct from a great sin does not possess such ineligibility.

Otherwise, because expiation has not been performed, even the perpetrator of a minor sin would have to be regarded as lacking eligibility for ritual action.

KEY INSIGHT

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14220–14220

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge and the destruction of action · 2/5

Nor does such ineligibility persist at the final moment of life.

The Smriti says: "When the Supreme Self is directly realized, the knot of the heart is loosened, all doubts are cut,

and the actions of the living self are exhausted."

KEY INSIGHT

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14220–14221

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge and the destruction of action · 3/5

The Smriti again says: "O Arjuna, the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes."

Another Smriti states: "Action is not exhausted without being experienced." Here an exception is understood on account of the Smriti concerning expiation.

Therefore, in accordance with economy, the words "all actions" are to be understood as referring only to those actions that are not ordinarily destroyed by a

KEY INSIGHT

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14222–14223

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge and the destruction of action · 4/5

specifically prescribed destroyer.

To take "all actions" as separately referring to every other particular action would be unnecessarily cumbersome.

There are many causes that bring about the exhaustion of demerit and merit.

KEY INSIGHT

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14223–14224

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Knowledge and the destruction of action · 5/5

That knowledge of reality destroys action is known solely through verbal testimony—that is, through Shruti or Smriti.

KEY INSIGHT

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14224–14224

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is action exhausted by experience alone? · 1/4

It may be proposed as follows: the Smriti statement, "The fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes," is figurative.

Accordingly, the burning of action produced by knowledge should be understood like ashes produced indirectly by fire.

The Smriti statement, "Action is not exhausted without being experienced," teaches that action is generally destroyed only through experience.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between destruction through knowledge and fruition through experience is challenged.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14227–14227

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is action exhausted by experience alone? · 2/4

Therefore the otherwise-unaccounted-for injunction of expiation would conflict with this Smriti teaching the exhaustion of action through experience.

Since the destruction of action by knowledge can also be made consistent through the mediation of experience,

it is improper to postulate conflict where reconciliation is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between destruction through knowledge and fruition through experience is challenged.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14227–14227

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is action exhausted by experience alone? · 3/4

But this proposal is not tenable.

If action were destroyed only through experience, knowledge of reality would not remain a destroyer of action.

Experience is not an intermediate operation of knowledge of reality; scripture does not prescribe experience as such an operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between destruction through knowledge and fruition through experience is challenged.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14228–14228

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · DESTRUCTION OF ACTION, ŚRUTI AND SMṚTI, AND THE FINAL DETERMINATION

Is action exhausted by experience alone? · 4/4

The destruction of action is possible even without the operation consisting in experience.

Finally, if action were destroyed only through experience, knowledge of reality would become purposeless.

KEY INSIGHT

The distinction between destruction through knowledge and fruition through experience is challenged.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14228–14228

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 1/6

Some other scholars raise the following objection here: the Shruti, "When the Supreme Self is directly realized,

the actions of the living self are exhausted," enjoins the exhaustion of action through knowledge.

But the Smriti, "Action is not exhausted without being experienced," contradicts it.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14232–14232

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 2/6

Therefore the Shruti should be interpreted in another way—namely, as enjoining the exhaustion of action through experience.

But this objection is not tenable.

The cited Smriti is opposed to an explicit Vedic statement; therefore it cannot establish by inference a Vedic Shruti having a contradictory meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14232–14233

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 3/6

Again, it may be objected that sages such as Vamadeva and Saubhari assumed many bodies.

Therefore, through knowledge of reality, actions are exhausted by manifesting many bodies and undergoing their results through them.

But this objection too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14234–14235

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 4/6

Even without the arising of knowledge of reality, the manifestation of many bodies is possible merely through the power of austerity.

The bodies of living beings arise from action for the production of experience;

therefore knowledge of reality has no role in the manifestation of a plurality of bodies.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14235–14235

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 5/6

The simultaneous manifestation of many bodies occurs either through the nature of the action that produces bodies or through the power of austerity.

For this very reason, scripture states that knowledge does not destroy action through the mediation of experience.

This refutation also disposes of the following objection: because Shruti and Smriti are mutually contradictory, they become inconclusive; therefore the inference,

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14235–14236

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Reconciling Śruti and Smṛti · 6/6

"The disputed action is destroyed through experience, because it is not action destroyed by expiation and the like,

just like action that has already been experienced or is presently being experienced," yields a decisive conclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

Apparently divergent passages are interpreted in the argument about the fate of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14236–14236

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · expiation instead of knowledge · 1/4

When knowledge is treated as analogous to expiation, it cannot generally be the destroyer of all action.

The view that knowledge destroys action is contrary to Shruti.

The state of not being destroyed by a destroyer prescribed by the Veda constitutes a condition limiting the cited inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14238–14238

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · expiation instead of knowledge · 2/4

Furthermore, the merit produced by a subsidiary sacrifice may be present whether or not the principal sacrifice is performed;

hence it gives rise to deviation in the reason.

For the merit produced by a subsidiary sacrifice must be destroyed through the principal sacrifice.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14239–14239

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · expiation instead of knowledge · 3/4

It should not be said that the result of the merit produced by sacrifice is heaven and therefore that it is destroyed only through the experience of heaven.

A person who desires heaven is also entitled to perform the sacrifice, although an injunction confers eligibility for action only on a qualified person.

Otherwise, undertaking an action devoid of a result would be impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14240–14240

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · expiation instead of knowledge · 4/4

If the merit produced by a subsidiary sacrifice were held to have heaven as its result, its subordinate status or subsidiarity would be compromised.

A person's undertaking directed toward heaven arises because of the desire for the principal sacrifice that bears the result.

For this very reason Shruti says, "He performs the subsidiary sacrifice out of a desire for the principal sacrifice."

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy of knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14240–14240

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · immediate liberation · 1/4

It may now be proposed as follows: Shruti says that the liberation of a knower is delayed so long as action has not been destroyed; after that,

through relinquishment of the body, isolation is attained.

That is, liberation of the knower of reality is delayed until the destruction of action that has already arisen,

KEY INSIGHT

The timing of liberation is debated in relation to the arising of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14242–14242

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · immediate liberation · 2/4

and after action is exhausted through experience and the body is relinquished, isolation is attained.

Here the phrase "after exhausting action through experience" is to be supplied.

Nor should it be said that there is no separate evidence for supplying this phrase.

KEY INSIGHT

The timing of liberation is debated in relation to the arising of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14242–14243

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · immediate liberation · 3/4

When action remains even in the presence of knowledge of reality, experience, which is capable of destroying action, must be supplied as the destroyer of action.

But this proposal is not tenable.

The Shruti may be understood in this way: "Supreme liberation does not occur in the very same moment in which knowledge of reality arises; rather,

KEY INSIGHT

The timing of liberation is debated in relation to the arising of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14243–14244

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · immediate liberation · 4/4

supreme liberation arises in the immediately following moment."

KEY INSIGHT

The timing of liberation is debated in relation to the arising of true knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14244–14244

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · DESTRUCTION OF ACTION, ŚRUTI AND SMṚTI, AND THE FINAL DETERMINATION

Prima facie view · knowledge does not destroy action · 1/5

Some other scholars say that the scriptural statement, "O Arjuna, the fire in the form of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes," concerns only the merit produced

by a subsidiary sacrifice that has remained independent because the principal sacrifice was not performed; for such action has no destroyer other than knowledge.

But this proposal is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14246–14247

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · knowledge does not destroy action · 2/5

If the sacrifice held to produce the principal sacrifice does not produce the merit arising from the principal sacrifice,

then the causal complex of the principal sacrifice would be unestablished.

And even if the causal complex were admitted to be established, no evidence is available for the restriction that the expression "all actions" refers only to other

KEY INSIGHT

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14247–14247

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · knowledge does not destroy action · 3/5

actions.

Again, it may be proposed that the real meaning of the statements "the fire of knowledge reduces all actions to ashes" and

"actions are exhausted" is the non-production of results from action.

KEY INSIGHT

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14247–14248

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Prima facie view · knowledge does not destroy action · 4/5

Because of knowledge of reality, even prescribed action, when performed, does not produce a result.

It is in this sense that Shruti says, "Just as water remains separate from the leaf of a blue lotus, so action remains separate from the knower of reality."

But this proposal too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14248–14249

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · DESTRUCTION OF ACTION, ŚRUTI AND SMṚTI, AND THE FINAL DETERMINATION

Prima facie view · knowledge does not destroy action · 5/5

The expressions "reduces to ashes" and "is exhausted" are not used in the sense of the non-production of the fruit of action or the non-production of action.

Such secondary signification cannot be admitted in these expressions, since no contradiction arises if their primary meaning, the destruction of action,

is accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14249–14249

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion · knowledge and experience · 1/4

Our established doctrine here is this: although action is destroyed through experience, knowledge of reality is nevertheless the destroyer of action, because

experience is an intermediate operation of knowledge of reality.

The argument that the causality of knowledge of reality in destroying action is deviant because experience is generally capable of destroying action is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The final position distinguishes knowledge's destructive operation from experience as an intermediate process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14251–14251

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion · knowledge and experience · 2/4

With respect to a destruction of action that does not occur at the same time as the prior absence of action, the causality of knowledge of reality is not deviant;

nor is there deviation in the case of the experience of action simultaneous with knowledge of reality.

Therefore no inference is available that establishes opposition to authoritative testimony and

KEY INSIGHT

The final position distinguishes knowledge's destructive operation from experience as an intermediate process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14251–14251

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion · knowledge and experience · 3/4

thereby proves that "experience" must be supplied as an ellipsis in the scriptural statement.

Only the supplying of experience is necessary to explain the delay in supreme liberation for a person who has attained knowledge of reality.

Thus the inference established by Shruti proves release or liberation as the supreme human goal.

KEY INSIGHT

The final position distinguishes knowledge's destructive operation from experience as an intermediate process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14251–14252

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Established conclusion · knowledge and experience · 4/4

Thus ends the inference of God in the Inference Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by the great Mahamahopadhyaya, the teacher Gangesha.

KEY INSIGHT

The final position distinguishes knowledge's destructive operation from experience as an intermediate process.

SOURCE TOPIC · Complete English translation · original DOCX paragraphs 14253–14253

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

HUMAN GOAL · DESTRUCTION OF ACTION, ŚRUTI AND SMṚTI, AND THE FINAL DETERMINATION

How does knowledge destroy action?

Opposing arguments

- Expiation and fruit-experience are proposed as alternatives.
- The timing of liberation after knowledge is disputed.
- Scriptural language of burning action receives several readings.

Closing determination

- Knowledge is maintained as operative in the destruction of action.
- Experience is admitted as an intermediate process.
- The final argument compares the testimony of Śruti and Smṛti.

The source concludes this debate before the Upamāna translation begins.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Knowledge, Karma and the Closing Debate

Initial problem

Śruti and Smṛti are considered in explaining how knowledge exhausts accumulated action.

Central distinction

The opponent proposes expiatory causation and questions the efficacy of knowledge.

Reply or opposing position

Metaphorical accounts of destruction and non-production of results are examined.

At the source boundary


The final position distinguishes knowledge's destructive operation from experience as an intermediate process.

The next translated book division begins the Upamāna section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Upamāna · Initial Definition, Distinct Similarity, and the Bhāṭṭa View

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Analysis of arguments, objections, replies, and conclusions in the source text.

Appendix 4 · The Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Mīmāṃsā Accounts of Similarity

1

The initial Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through simila

2

Degrees, plurality and common similarity

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity ca

3

What category could similarity belong to?

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, univers

4

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous u

The sequence follows the complete English translation in Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The initial Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna · 1/4

After the account of the inference of God, the third means of knowledge—upamana, or knowledge through similarity—is now expounded.

Some Mimamsakas say that in the case of upamana, the means of knowledge that produces the true determinate cognition concerning similarity, "This animal,

which resembles a cow, is the referent of the word gavaya," is the means of knowledge called upamana.

KEY INSIGHT

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through similarity produces.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14256–14258

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The initial Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna · 2/4

It should be noted here that the determinate cognition obtained through upamana is, "This animal, which resembles a cow,

is the referent of the word gavaya," not "The gavaya is the referent of the word gavaya."

The similarity between two things, a gavaya and a cow, the cognition of which is produced through upamana, is a distinct category of reality.

KEY INSIGHT

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through similarity produces.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14259–14261

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The initial Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna · 3/4

Its existence is established by the uncontradicted usage concerning similarity, "The gavaya is an animal similar to a cow."

This similarity is not one and the same in all things.

Otherwise every thing would have similarity to every thing.

KEY INSIGHT

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through similarity produces.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14261–14262

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The initial Mīmāṃsā account of upamāna · 4/4

If similarity were one, distinct usages such as "This is very similar to a cow" and "This is less similar to a cow" would be inexplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through similarity produces.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14262–14262

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 1/7

It may be argued that the greater or lesser number of common properties produces the cognition of similarity; therefore the usage of greater or

lesser similarity is explained by that alone.

But this argument is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14264–14264

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 2/7

In the similarity present in known objects such as pots, increase or decrease due to a greater or lesser number of common properties is not directly perceived.

Usages such as "This is very similar to a cow" and "This is much less similar to a cow" can be explained through the greater or

lesser number that is taken to manifest cognition of similarity; therefore no distinct entity called similarity is established.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14264–14264

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 3/7

> Similarity cannot be many or infinite, nor can it, like conjunction, pervade two substrates.

> If this were admitted, the cow too, being the substrate of the similarity qualified by cowness just as the gavaya is, would become very similar to the cow.

> Then, when there is no conjunction of the eye with the cow, that similarity would, like conjunction, become imperceptible.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14267–14268

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 4/7

> And if that similarity were held to be perceptible, visual perception in the cow would also follow, because

> the similarity determined by the gavaya would also reside in the cow.

> Therefore, although similarity becomes knowable through one contingent means of cognition, it must be regarded as distinct in each separate substrate.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14268–14268

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 5/7

An objection may be raised: the similarities present in many things such as cows and buffaloes deviate from one another and possess no single recurrent form;

therefore a uniform cognition of similarity and the derivation of the word "similarity" would be incoherent.

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14270–14271

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 6/7

Uniform cognition and linguistic derivation are possible because of the universal similarityhood, known through the recurrent form of similarities and

the cognition having that form as its object.

This universal is distinct from the seven accepted categories and is known through its own extraordinary characteristic, just like a universal or

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14271–14271

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Degrees, plurality and common similarity · 7/7

an ultimate particular.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments test whether the appearance of greater or lesser similarity can be coherently explained.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14271–14271

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 1/7

Such similarity is neither substance, quality, nor action, because similarity also occurs in qualities and actions.

It should not be said that usages concerning similarity in qualities and actions are possible only because

similarity resides in a substrate that possesses similar qualities or actions.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14273–14273

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 2/7

Such usages concerning qualities and actions occur even when similarity does not reside in the substrate.

Nor can it be said that such usage occurs because of non-apprehension of the non-relation of similarity in the substrate.

There is no obstacle to accepting similarity in qualities and actions.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14273–14274

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 3/7

Absence of evidence is equal on both sides; therefore the contrary view—that similarity resides only in qualities and actions and

not in the substrate—would also become possible.

Similarity cannot be regarded as a universal or class.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14274–14276

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 4/7

The occurrence of similarity in all things is not admitted; therefore it is not a single universal residing in every thing.

Furthermore, if similarity were treated as a universal, usages such as "This is very similar to a cow" and

"This is less similar to a cow" would become inexplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14276–14276

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 5/7

It may be proposed that, though similarity is a distinct property, it is an aggregate of many universal properties residing in parts, qualities, and actions.

For this very reason, when the counterpositive, such as a cow, is remote, the usage of similarity does not arise because

there is no cognition of all the recurrent universal properties in the cow.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14278–14278

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 6/7

In the absence of plurality and grouping, usage concerning similarity cannot arise, just as in the usages "This is a forest" or

"This is a group of houses." Therefore the cognition and usage "similarity is one" are coherent.

Otherwise the relation of unity in a forest and the like would become inexplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14279–14280

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What category could similarity belong to? · 7/7

Usages such as "This is very similar to a cow" and "This is less similar to a cow" arise because of the greater or lesser number of universal properties.

The Bhatta Karika likewise says that many universals belonging to parts, qualities, and actions, when manifested by a distinct principal universal,

are called similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14280–14280

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 1/9

The foregoing view of the Bhattas is not tenable.

Cognition of similarity also arises in qualities, actions, and universals that are devoid of similar parts and the like—for example,

the cognition of similarity between two lotuses belonging to the same class.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14283–14283

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 2/9

Cognition of similarity also occurs between completely dissimilar things such as a young elephant and a donkey; for example,

the cognition "This donkey eats like a young elephant" commonly arises.

The mere fact that a plurality of universal properties of one substrate resides in another substrate is not similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14283–14285

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 3/9

Nor is mere absence of an extraordinary property, even where a plurality of universal properties present in another substrate is lacking, similarity.

Nor is similarity the possession of a plurality of universal properties that are co-located with properties whose absolute absences have their counterpositives in

one's own substrate; for because of distinctions such as threeness, fourness, and fiveness, such plurality cannot be generalized under a single recurrent form.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14285–14285

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 4/9

Similarity does not reduce to the presence of three universal properties, as in "Three partridges should be sacrificed." If this were accepted,

similarity would follow even between extremely dissimilar things such as an elephant and

a mosquito that share only a few universal properties such as possessing a proboscis.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14287–14287

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 5/9

Therefore it has been said that, with respect to their own properties in universals, qualities, substances, and capacities for action,

variation in similarity arises because of differences in one, two, or three universal properties.

It may be proposed that similarity consists in the abundance of common properties in similar things as compared with the abundance of uncommon properties in

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14288–14290

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 6/9

dissimilar things.

Similarity recurs across three or four objects.

Although an elephant and a mosquito possess many uncommon properties and very few common properties,

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14290–14290

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 7/9

> the plurality of those common properties as qualified by difference of relata is itself called similarity.

> But this proposal is not tenable.

> Usage concerning similarity occurs even on the basis of a very small and limited number of common properties whose number is equal to that of uncommon properties.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14290–14291

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 8/9

A universal remains identical despite difference of substrates, whereas similarity differs because of difference of substrates.

A universal has no counterpositive or relatum and is not determined by its substrate.

Similarity, however, has a counterpositive and is determined or manifested through cognition of that counterpositive.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14293–14293

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Objections to the Bhāṭṭa aggregate theory · 9/9

Therefore similarity is distinct from a universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14293–14293

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · INITIAL DEFINITION, DISTINCT SIMILARITY, AND THE BHĀṬṬA VIEW

What is similarity?

Separate reality proposed

- The Mīmāṃsā argument distinguishes resemblance from the object compared.
- Degree and intensity of likeness demand explanation.
- The shared universals account is presented in an alternative form.

Objections to reduction

- Many universals alone do not settle the issue.
- A definite number such as three is not a sufficient analysis.
- The discussion rejects facile identity with other categories.

The translated argument presents distinct ontological accounts before comparing their defects.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Mīmāṃsā Accounts of Similarity

Opening issue

The cow–gavaya example motivates a debate over what cognition through similarity produces.

Key distinction

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

A further objection

The proposed similarity is compared with substance, quality, action, universal and aggregation.

Result at this boundary


The text distinguishes resemblance from merely counting shared or numerous universals.

The next presentation continues the English Upamāna translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Upamāna · Common Properties, Relata, and the Eastern Naiyāyikas

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Analysis of arguments, objections, replies, and conclusions in the source text.

Appendix 4 · The Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Common Properties and the Eastern Nyāya View

1

Common properties and the relatum

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object ar

2

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing dem

3

What manifests the cognition of resemblance?

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity witho

4

Plurality, recognition and relational gramma

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the

The sequence follows the complete English translation in Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 1/11

It may be proposed that possessing many universal properties present in the relatum, while being distinct from the relatum—that is, the cow—is similarity.

Difference from the relatum varies with each substrate, and it too has a counterpositive such as the cow.

But the Prabhakara Mimamsaka replies: if similarity consisted in difference from the relatum, it would be delimited by that difference.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14296–14297

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 2/11

> Then only the inappropriate expression "The gavaya is similar from the cow" would be coherent, not the correct expression "The gavaya is similar to the cow."

> It may be argued that similarity has a counterpositive; therefore the usage "The gavaya is similar from the cow" would necessarily follow.

> But this argument is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14297–14299

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 3/11

Cognition and usage of the form "similar from such-and-such" occur only when there is some limit or boundary in the object,

not merely when there is a counterpositive.

Otherwise, in the case of an absence having only a counterpositive, the inappropriate cognition and

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14299–14299

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 4/11

expression "On the ground there is an absence from the pot" would also follow.

If possessing the property of the relatum were similarity, identity with that relatum and difference from it would become conflated.

Possession of the relatum's properties would constitute identity with it, while a state distinct from possession of the relatum's properties would be taken as

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14299–14301

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 5/11

similarity to that very relatum.

If the similarity of a relatum such as the cow were itself present in the cow, the cow would become similar to itself.

Then cognition of similarity would be merely a cognition of identity, like the cognition "the gavaya is a cow," and

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14301–14302

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 6/11

not a cognition of non-identity such as "the gavaya is similar to the cow."

If cognition of similarity were only a cognition of identity, there would be both cow-cognition and use of the word "cow" with regard to the gavaya.

Like a cow possessing cowness, the gavaya too would, by being a substrate of that identity, become non-different from the cow, although

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14302–14303

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 7/11

perception reveals difference.

Similarity is not inherence either, because it occurs as a resident property.

Therefore similarity must be accepted as a distinct category of reality.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14303–14304

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 8/11

Some scholars object that similarity must be either a positive entity or an absence.

If it is positive, it must either possess qualities or be without qualities; if it possesses qualities, it must either inhere in a substance or

not inhere in a substance; and if it inheres in a substance, it must either possess a universal or be without a universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14306–14306

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 9/11

If it possesses a universal, it must either be an action or not an action.

If it is qualityless, it must be without a universal, reside in a substance, and reside either in one substance or in many substances.

Therefore similarity, as appropriate, must be included in one of the seven accepted categories.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14307–14307

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · 10/11

This objection is not tenable.

If similarity were included among the seven categories, the usage "The gavaya is similar to the cow" would become inexplicable.

Therefore similarity must be accepted as outside the seven categories.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14309–14309

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common properties and the relatum · ११/११

Otherwise universality, particularity, and inherence could also be included within substance, quality, and action, because

they have some resemblance to substances and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14309–14309

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 1/8

The Eastern Naiyayikas say that similarity determined by a relatum is the state of possessing many common properties present in that relatum and

distinct from its extraordinary class-properties.

The state of possessing many common properties present in a relatum is, even though common also to universals and the like, unlimited because

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14312–14312

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 2/8

it is free from difference; hence it must be determined by the relatum.

Thus merely being determined by another constitutes the counterpositive character of similarity.

The Mimamsaka too may accept that the counterpositive character of similarity is established through this very determination by another.

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14312–14313

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 3/8

> Being limited, as in difference, length, and the like, does not constitute counterpositive character;

> otherwise the expression "The gavaya is similar from the cow" would follow.

> Plurality or manyness is common to three or four objects; therefore no defect of non-uniformity arises in it.

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14313–14315

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 4/8

Nor does plurality suffer from over-extension.

An elephant and a mosquito possess similarity on the basis of properties such as being living, experiencing pleasure, and experiencing pain.

For this very reason, despite dissimilarity, the usage "The face is like the moon" is coherent because of a property that produces delight,

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14315–14316

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 5/8

and "The cow is like the buffalo" is coherent because of grossness and the like.

Greater or lesser similarity is likewise coherent because of the greater or lesser number of common properties present in the relatum.

For this reason, when an elder is asked about the gavaya's similarity to a cow,

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14316–14318

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 6/8

he explains similarity precisely as the state of possessing common properties present in the relatum.

In the sentence "The cow runs behind the boar," similarity to the cow is predicated of the boar.

In poetry, usage concerning the standard of comparison and the object compared occurs because the latter possesses a common property present in the relatum.

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14318–14319

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 7/8

> Investigators use the word "example" for a kitchen in which there is an entity possessing both the probans and the probandum,

> and which manifests similarity to the subject.

> There is no need to regard these usages as secondary, since nothing prevents their being taken as primary.

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14319–14320

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Eastern Naiyāyika theory · 8/8

Therefore the state of bearing similarity to some object because of some common property is non-uniform.

KEY INSIGHT

The eastern account treats plural properties as explanatory while facing demands for a uniform basis.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14320–14320

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What manifests the cognition of resemblance? · 1/4

If cognition of possessing many common properties present in the relatum is the manifestor of similarity,

that very cognition may be taken as the regulator of usage concerning similarity.

What need is there then to admit any additional universal as the manifestor of similarity?

KEY INSIGHT

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14322–14322

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What manifests the cognition of resemblance? · 2/4

Otherwise, if possession of three or four common properties manifests similarity, the state of possessing many common properties would, although a manifestor,

itself become non-uniform.

It may be argued that even a non-uniform property can manifest similarity, just as directly perceived smoke and the like, though not uniform with fire,

KEY INSIGHT

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14323–14325

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What manifests the cognition of resemblance? · 3/4

manifest fire.

But this argument is not tenable.

In the case of fire, among manifestors such as smoke and light, only the recurrent property of being pervaded by fire is the manifestor.

KEY INSIGHT

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14325–14325

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What manifests the cognition of resemblance? · 4/4

It may be said that in the case of similarity too, the recurrent property of being pervaded by similarity resides in the non-uniform properties that manifest

similarity.

But then the Mimamsaka may say that the universal pervaded by similarity is itself the cause of usage concerning similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14326–14326

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · COMMON PROPERTIES, RELATA, AND THE EASTERN NAIYĀYIKAS

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 1/8

It may now be objected that the state of possessing many common properties present in the relatum is not the manifestor of similarity.

But this objection is contradicted by experience.

Without cognition of the greater or lesser number of common properties present in the relatum, cognition of greater or lesser similarity does not arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14329–14329

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 2/8

Therefore this cognition is the manifestor of similarity.

It may further be said that the relatum is not present in this state of possessing many common properties, whereas similarity does have a relatum;

therefore the two are distinct.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14329–14330

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 3/8

But this argument is not tenable.

Like similarity, this state too is determined by the relatum.

It may now be objected that the state of possessing many common properties—that is, possession of its properties—and similarity would collapse into one another.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14330–14332

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 4/8

The answer is this: possessing many common properties present in the relatum, or being non-different from the relatum, is possession of it.

Cognition of possession of it arises in recognition of the form "This is that very thing."

But when cognition of difference is present, in a gavaya distinct from the relatum, such as a cow,

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14332–14333

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 5/8

the state of possessing common properties of that relatum constitutes similarity.

For this very reason the cognition arises: "This gavaya is similar to the cow, but it is not a cow."

If possession of the relatum and similarity are distinct, then when cowness is cognized in another cow, the usage "This animal is like that cow" is possible;

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14333–14335

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 6/8

but the usage "This animal too is a cow" need not arise on that basis alone.

For in another cow only the universal cowness is cognized; there is no cognition of the mutual relation among the many common properties present in one cow.

Only when the many common properties present in the other cow are known does the similarity-cognition "This animal too is like that cow" arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14335–14335

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 7/8

It may be objected that if similarity is the state of many common properties,

then there would be merely an aggregate cognition such as "The gavaya possesses horns and

so forth," not a similarity-cognition such as "The gavaya is similar to the cow." The answer is this: the joint presence of many properties in one and

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14337–14337

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Plurality, recognition and relational grammar · 8/8

the same object is aggregation.

But the presence in the gavaya of many common properties that are present in the cow is similarity.

This makes clear the distinction between possession of the relatum and possession of its properties.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14337–14337

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · COMMON PROPERTIES, RELATA, AND THE EASTERN NAIYĀYIKAS

What makes resemblance recognizable?

Property-based proposal

- An object shares several properties with a relatum.
- Plurality is offered as an explanatory basis.
- Comparative expressions track the properties recognized.

Difficulties tested

- Similarity must not be identical with the compared object.
- The manifestor of resemblance must be sufficiently uniform.
- The role of qualification and relational predication matters.

The source analyzes the relatum and the properties it exemplifies separately.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · COMMON PROPERTIES, RELATA, AND THE EASTERN NAIYĀYIKAS

Arguments considered · Common Properties and the Eastern Nyāya View

Opening issue

The objections examine whether properties shared with the compared object are sufficient for similarity.

Key distinction

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

A further objection

The candidate manifestor must explain a stable cognition of similarity without unacceptable non-uniformity.

Result at this boundary


The discussion distinguishes possession of properties from possession of the object itself.

The next presentation continues the English Upamāna translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Upamāna · New-School Objections and the Conclusion on Similarity

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Analysis of arguments, objections, replies, and conclusions in the source text.

Appendix 4 · The Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Later Theories and the Status of Similarity

1

The New School view and its refutation

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separat

2

Common and divergent properties in usage

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and charac

3

The partial view and final conclusion

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called simil

The sequence follows the complete English translation in Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 1/8

The New Naiyayikas say that in two mutually distinct pleasures, similarity distinguished from other pleasures is experienced,

yet no common class-property present in both is experienced.

If, after those two pleasures are destroyed, the universal were to become substrateless, the consequence would be that the universal is non-eternal.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14339–14339

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 2/8

Therefore there is no need to admit a separately newly produced similarity in two pleasures; some specific property produced in both is its basis.

The Eastern Naiyayikas object: how can similarity be manifested without a manifestor in the form of a common property?

The New Naiyayikas reply: similarity is admitted in substances because it is experienced there; there is no reason for deviation in qualities.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14339–14340

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 3/8

The state of possessing common properties is not purposeless; it is a manifestor of similarity.

Sometimes similarity is experienced even in the absence of such a manifestor.

Two mutually distinct pleasures cannot arise solely from causes common to pleasure; otherwise pleasure in general itself would assume mutually distinct forms.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14340–14343

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 4/8

Therefore distinct unseen potencies must be admitted for distinct pleasures.

Such a specific unseen potency may also arise in another person through a specific prescribed action.

Then that same specific pleasure would arise in the other person too, and a specific action-produced universal would have to be accepted in those pleasures.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14343–14343

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 5/8

Living selves are beginningless and infinite.

No pleasure can be admitted as distinct from all pleasures that have neither arisen nor will arise in the future.

In effects of the form of pain too, a specific universal would have to be admitted in the same way.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14344–14344

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 6/8

It is not proper to place any effect in a class that is unproduced or incapable of being produced.

It may be objected that when individual substrates are destroyed, the universal would become non-eternal.

But no cause that destroys a universal is available; therefore a universal is not destroyed.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14344–14346

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 7/8

For this reason similarity may be accepted even between two distinct pleasures.

The similarity of a single gavaya differs with difference of relata: it is of one kind relative to a cow and another relative to a buffalo.

For this very reason distinct usages arise: "This is very similar to a cow" and "This is less similar to a buffalo."

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14346–14347

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The New School view and its refutation · 8/8

If one common similarity were accepted, cognition of one similarity would entail cognition of all its kinds at once, because all would be equally knowable.

KEY INSIGHT

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14348–14348

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 1/6

Cognition of a greater or lesser number of common properties present in the relatum successively produces cognition of greater or lesser similarity.

Therefore such cognition is the occasion for usage concerning similarity.

If the presence of many common properties were the cause of similarity, absence of the common properties would constitute absence of the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14350–14350

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 2/6

But in an object possessing similarity, absence of the cause does not necessarily entail absence of similarity, because

there the absence of the absence of similarity—that is, similarity itself—is present.

It may be objected that in the word "dissimilar" the prefix "dis-" is negative; therefore dissimilarity is merely the absence of similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14350–14352

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 3/6

But if this were accepted, in the cognitions "The gavaya is similar to the cow" and

"The gavaya is similar to the buffalo," since the gavaya lacks similarity to the cow with respect to such properties as purity or giving milk expected of the cow,

dissimilarity to the cow would also have to be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14352–14352

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 4/6

Similarity to the cow and dissimilarity to the cow would then be present in one and the same object.

Therefore possessing a common property is sameness of property or similarity, while not possessing a common property is difference of property or dissimilarity.

One partial theorist says that similarity is possessing many common properties present in the relatum.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14352–14355

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 5/6

On this view comparison is possible even in the case of incomparable objects: "The sky is like the sky," "The ocean is like the ocean," "The battle of Rama and

Ravana is like the battle of Rama and Ravana."

An objection arises: if there is no difference in similarity, the cow would become similar to the cow and

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14355–14356

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Common and divergent properties in usage · 6/6

the cow could become the meaning of the word "gavaya." The answer is that in such incomparable examples certain specific common properties such as having horns are

intended.

Otherwise, if similarity to a cow were the delimitor of the meaning of the word "gavaya," there would be over-extension to the buffalo as well.

KEY INSIGHT

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14356–14356

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 1/6

A comparative sentence such as "The gavaya is similar to the cow" conveys difference, not identity.

If identity between the standard of comparison and the object compared were admitted, the relation between the two would become incoherent.

In incomparable examples, the sentence means only that the common property present in the sky and the like is not present in another object.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14359–14359

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 2/6

In a sentence such as "The sky is like the sky," the sky in another place is the standard of comparison and the sky before the speaker is the object compared.

In the example of the battle of Rama and Ravana, a battle in an earlier or another context is the standard of comparison and

the battle in the present context is the object compared.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14361–14361

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 3/6

It may be objected that even in the absence of doubt about identity or difference, a similarity-cognition such as "This is Devadatta or someone else, but

he is like Devadatta" occurs; therefore similarity is a distinct category.

But the word "similar" is sometimes used for one component of similarity—namely, the common properties present in Devadatta.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14363–14363

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 4/6

Otherwise mutually opposed cognitions and usages such as "This is Devadatta, but he is not like Devadatta" or "This is like Devadatta, but

he is not Devadatta" could not be explained.

It is not tenable to say that the primary meaning of the word "similar" is similarity and that, through secondary signification,

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14364–14366

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 5/6

difference is understood as a component of that similarity.

When the primary meaning is possible, it is improper to admit secondary signification in a component in the form of difference.

Therefore similarity is not a distinct category of reality.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14366–14366

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The partial view and final conclusion · 6/6

Thus ends the exposition concerning similarity in the Upamana Section of the Tattvacintamani.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14367–14367

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is similarity an independent category?

Arguments for an addition

- The new-school account invokes additional shared or permanent properties.
- Similarity can be analyzed across different experiences.
- A partial view construes likeness by the relatum's many properties.

The concluding position

- More or fewer shared properties explain comparative usage.
- Identity and resemblance are not equivalent.
- The source concludes against a separate ontological category.

This conclusion closes the ontological exposition of similarity, not the entire Upamāna section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · Later Theories and the Status of Similarity

Opening issue

The case of distinct pleasures probes whether resemblance requires a separate eternal universal.

Key distinction

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

A further objection

Comparative expressions are explained through the cognized number and character of properties.

Result at this boundary


The concluding argument rejects a distinct ontological category called similarity.

The subsequent division examines upamiti, the resulting cognition of comparison.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Upamāna · Mīmāṃsā, Perception, and the Older Naiyāyika View

Tattvacintāmaṇi · complete English translation

Analysis of arguments, objections, replies, and conclusions in the source text.

Appendix 4 · The Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Resulting Cognition of Upamāna

1

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognitio

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and perv

2

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of kn

3

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctiv

4

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditi

The sequence follows the complete English translation in Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 1/9

Granted that similarity is not a distinct category.

Nevertheless, the determinate cognition "The cow is similar to the gavaya," produced by perceptual or verbal cognition of the gavaya's similarity to the cow,

is the result of upamana.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14369–14369

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 2/9

This cognition is not perceptual, because the qualified object, the cow, and the relatum, the gavaya, are remote.

Nor is it inferential, because no probans is available here.

Similarity residing in the gavaya cannot be the probans, because it is not a property residing in the subject, namely the cow.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14369–14369

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 3/9

It may be objected that after seeing two similar things, one obtains the cognition of pervasion,

"Whatever is the relatum of a similarity residing in some object is similar to that object." On that basis the inference occurs: "The cow is similar to the gavaya,

because the cow is the relatum of the similarity residing in the gavaya."

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14372–14372

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 4/9

But even without prior cognition of pervasion, once the gavaya's similarity to the cow has been known by perception or testimony,

cognition of the cow's similarity to the gavaya arises.

Therefore cognition of pervasion is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14373–14373

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 5/9

The gavaya's similarity to the cow cannot be the probans for the cow's similarity to the gavaya, because

without prior cognition of pervasion that probandum is not established.

The state of being the relatum of the similarity residing in the gavaya is not perceptually cognized in the cow.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14375–14375

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 6/9

The cow is not in contact with the sense organ; therefore that state would have to be established by inference.

But the probans of that inference is available only in the gavaya.

Then another means would be required to establish that property of the gavaya, resulting in an infinite regress.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14375–14375

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 7/9

> The inference, "The cow is similar to this gavaya, because the cow possesses common properties such as horns that are present in the gavaya,
>
> just like another gavaya," is not tenable.
>
> Cognition of the cow's similarity to the gavaya arises even when no other gavaya has ever been seen.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14377–14377

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 8/9

The following proposal is also refuted: the gavaya's similarity to the cow is impossible without the cow's similarity to the gavaya;

therefore the former establishes the latter.

One cannot say, "The gavaya is similar to the cow, but the cow is not similar to the gavaya." Yet unless the gavaya's similarity to the cow has already been

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14378–14379

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

Mīmāṃsā · the distinctive resulting cognition · 9/9

established, cognition of this impossibility too cannot arise without cognition of the cow's similarity to the gavaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14379–14379

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 1/12

The Naiyayikas say that postulation is merely a negative-only inference.

But this view is not tenable.

The state of the cow as the relatum of the similarity residing in the gavaya cannot be known through perception or any other means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14381–14381

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 2/12

Therefore postulation must be accepted as a distinct means of knowledge.

It may be objected that if the donkey's dissimilarity to the cow is known through upamana,

then the cow's dissimilarity to the donkey should likewise be known through upamana.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14381–14383

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 3/12

But if the cow's dissimilarity to the donkey means possessing common properties that are absent in the donkey,

then that dissimilarity in the remembered cow is known through non-apprehension—just like other previously known dissimilarity.

Therefore upamana is not required here.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14383–14383

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 4/12

If the cow's dissimilarity to the donkey means the possession by the cow of properties absent in the donkey, those properties of the cow are already known.

What remains is only to add cognition of the absence in the donkey of the remembered cow-properties; this absence is known through perception of the donkey.

It may be objected that as soon as the gavaya's similarity to the cow is known, the cow's similarity to the gavaya and

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14386–14388

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 5/12

the cow's dissimilarity to the donkey are simultaneously perceived; therefore cognitions of similarity and

dissimilarity should arise from the same means of knowledge.

But it is not established that all these cognitions arise from one and the same means of knowledge merely because the qualifier, the qualified,

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14388–14389

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 6/12

and the relatum are different.

In the cognitions "This is similar to that" and "This is not similar to that," "this" is the qualified object.

Sense-contact with this object is the cause of perception.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14389–14389

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 7/12

It may be objected that contact with the qualified object alone is the cause of perception;

requiring contact with every qualified object would introduce unnecessary complexity.

Otherwise direct perception of pervasion relating to past, future, and present instances would become impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14391–14391

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 8/12

But this argument is not tenable.

A relation qualified by a common property is present in past, future, and present qualified objects;

therefore cognition of pervasion concerning all of them is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14392–14392

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 9/12

The cow's similarity to the gavaya consists in the cow's possessing common properties such as horns that are present in the gavaya;

this property in the cow is known once the gavaya's similarity to the cow is cognized.

Alternatively, the presence in the gavaya of such properties as horns that reside in the cow is the gavaya's similarity to the cow,

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14394–14394

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 10/12

while the presence in the cow of such properties as horns that reside in the gavaya is the cow's similarity to the gavaya.

It may be objected that the universals such as hornhood are one and are in contact with the sense organ;

therefore cognition of similarity is produced by the senses, just like inverse recognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14394–14396

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 11/12

The Mimamsaka replies that cognition of the cow as the qualified object possessing hornhood and the like present in the gavaya cannot be produced by the senses,

because the cow is not in contact with the sense organ.

Therefore, without sense-contact with the qualified object, cognitions such as "This is similar to that," "This is not similar to that," or

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14396–14397

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Postulation, dissimilarity and perception · 12/12

"That is larger than this" do not arise.

Consequently, cognition of similarity in which a relatum such as the cow is made the qualified object is a distinct cognitive result called upamiti,

and its instrument, upamana, is a distinct means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks which cognitions actually require a distinct means of knowing.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14397–14398

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 1/6

The foregoing doctrine of the Mimamsakas is not tenable.

Mutually similar elephants and the like can be directly perceived.

Therefore, after obtaining the general cognition of pervasion, "Whatever is the relatum of similarity residing in another object is similar to that object," one

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14401–14401

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 2/6

may infer: "The cow is similar to the gavaya, because the cow is the relatum of the similarity residing in the gavaya—just as a sister elephant is similar to her

brother elephant."

The cow's state of being the relatum of the similarity residing in the gavaya must be known in the cow through cognition of the similarity residing in the gavaya

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14401–14402

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 3/6

itself, because in the gavaya's similarity to the cow, the cow is known precisely as the relatum.

Otherwise the cow could remain unrelated even while the gavaya were similar to the cow.

The upamiti-result, "The gavaya is similar to the cow," cannot be obtained without general cognition of pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14402–14403

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 4/6

Therefore, as soon as pervasion is known through correlative terms such as "whatever" and "that," upamana becomes unnecessary.

The cognition of pervasion produced by the use of correlative pronouns is, for us Naiyayikas, a negative-only inference; for the Mimamsaka,

that same cognition is postulation.

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14403–14405

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 5/6

Similarity residing in two substrates—the relatum and the related object—can be perceptually known on the basis of sense-contact with either one of these qualified

objects.

Sense-contact with all qualified objects is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14405–14405

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Refutation of the Mīmāṃsā account · 6/6

Otherwise there would be no way to explain erroneous recognition, "This is that very thing."

The status of being a relatum determined by the similarity residing in this object is known by the mind alone.

Being a qualified object in perception is not a cause of reflective cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14405–14406

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 1/10

According to the old Naiyayika Jayanta, when an inquirer asks, "What does a gavaya look like?" the answer received is,

"A gavaya is like a cow." Later the person sees an animal resembling a cow, remembers the meaning of the instructional sentence—"This gavaya is like a cow"—and

determines, "This gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya.'"

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14408–14408

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 2/10

This determinate cognition concerning the referent of the word "gavaya" is called the result of upamana, namely upamiti.

It should not be said that the determination "This gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya'" is produced solely by the instructional sentence.

If that were so, the cognition would arise even in a person who had never seen an animal resembling a cow.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14409–14411

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 3/10

Nor should it be said that the cognition is produced solely by perception of the animal.

If that were so, the determination would arise even in a person who had never heard the instructional sentence.

Nor is it simple to say that cognition is produced by the combination of the instructional sentence and perception of the animal.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14412–14413

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 4/10

> The combination would have to be either of the means of cognition or of the resultant cognitions.

> If a combination of means is admitted, the means would have to come together as mutual auxiliaries; if a combination of results is admitted,

> one would have to accept a combination constituted by mutual cooperation among many cognitions.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14413–14413

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 5/10

In the first option the sentence and perception occur at different times; in the second, a single aggregate of many resultant cognitions is incoherent.

If cognition of the object from the instructional sentence and perception of the animal are treated, through memory,

as auxiliaries to the upamiti "The gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya,'" then the particularity of the word's denotative power in the gavaya cannot be

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14413–14415

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 6/10

established.

If upamiti is included within the results of both perception and the instructional sentence, then verbal cognition and

inference too would have to be included within perception.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14415–14416

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 7/10

A clear answer is required as to whether the result of upamiti lies outside the result of every other means of cognition or

is included within the result of perception.

If it is included in perception, it must be explained under which class of perception that cognition falls.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14417–14417

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 8/10

If the result called upamiti were held to arise from the operation of a sense organ such as an open eye,

then the operation of the eye would also be required for cognition of the gavaya's similarity to the cow produced through memory of the meaning of the

instructional sentence.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14420–14420

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 9/10

But if memory of the meaning is present, direct perception of the gavaya-animal would become redundant.

A person who remembers the meaning of the instructional sentence and sees a gavaya-animal similar to the known cow can, even much later,

determine the denotative power of the word "gavaya" by remembering the animal seen earlier.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14420–14421

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · MĪMĀṂSĀ, PERCEPTION, AND THE OLDER NAIYĀYIKA VIEW

The older Naiyāyika account of upamiti · 10/10

Therefore old Naiyayikas such as Jayanta Bhatta hold that cognition of similarity, conjoined with memory of the instructional sentence but

distinct from both verbal cognition and perception, is the means of knowledge called upamana.

KEY INSIGHT

The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · English translation · source DOCX paragraphs 14422–14422

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What is the resulting cognition?

Mīmāṃsā emphasis

- Similarity cognitions are assessed as the proposed fruit of upamāna.
- Perception and postulation are tested as competitors.
- Dissimilarity from a donkey provides a counterexample.

Older Nyāya emphasis

- Prior verbal instruction prepares word–object recognition.
- Seeing the gavaya gives an indispensable perceptual occasion.
- Whether the two together form a distinct means is disputed.

The next discussion refutes the older view and formulates the established Upamāna account.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Arguments considered · The Resulting Cognition of Upamāna

Opening issue

The proposed cognition of resemblance is examined against inference and pervasion.

Key distinction

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

A further objection

A perception-based account is used to challenge similarity as the distinctive result.

Result at this boundary


The instructional sentence and seeing the animal are tested as joint conditions for word–object knowledge.

The next presentation continues the English Upamāna translation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Donkey dissimilarity · gavayahood · word-power

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Gangeśa's arguments, objections, refutations and determinations, drawn from the translated text.

Appendix 4 · Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Refuting the Older Nyāya View of Upamāna

1

A dissimilarity counterexample

The donkey case defeats a resemblance-only account.

2

The basis of denotation

Power resides in a common property, not one individual.

3

Why resemblance is insufficient

Similarity does not by itself determine the word's extension.

4

Instruction and its later result

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

A dissimilarity counterexample · 1/4

This doctrine does not cover cognition concerning the dissimilarity of a donkey.

Suppose a person from the north gives directions to an inquirer from the south who wishes to travel north, saying: "The contemptible donkey,

lowest among animals, has an extremely long neck, long moving lips, eats hard tender twigs, and has a body infested with lice."

KEY INSIGHT

The donkey case defeats a resemblance-only account.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14424–14424 · Refutation of the Old Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

A dissimilarity counterexample · 2/4

The southern person hears this instruction, travels north, sees an animal of that description, and determines: "This animal is a donkey."

Which means of knowledge produces cognition of the donkey here?

It cannot be called upamana because similarity is absent; nor can it be inference or another means of knowledge because cognition of pervasion is absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The donkey case defeats a resemblance-only account.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14425–14426 · Refutation of the Old Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

A dissimilarity counterexample · 3/4

Thus the Old Naiyayika definition is under-extended.

An ordinary person, merely from direct perception of horns and the like, cannot know the denotative power of the word "gavaya" by taking a cow-like animal to be

a gavaya when the orderly delimitor of denotation—that is, gavayahood—is unknown.

KEY INSIGHT

The donkey case defeats a resemblance-only account.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14426–14428 · Refutation of the Old Naiyayika View; The Siddhantin's Theory of Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

A dissimilarity counterexample · 4/4

This case differs from that of people who take there to be only one body such as Chaitra's; they can know the denotative power of the word "Chaitra" in that particular body.

But the power of the word "gavaya" also applies to other gavayas that have never been perceived.

KEY INSIGHT

The donkey case defeats a resemblance-only account.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14428–14428 · The Siddhantin's Theory of Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The basis of denotation · 1/4

It should not be said that, through a scholar's definition, the power of the word "gavaya" can be known in an unperceived gavaya known through inference or

another means, just as with the word "ether." A power residing in only one individual becomes a definition;

though an indicatory property is itself directly perceived, it is not proper to exclude it from the power—as in the case of the correlative pronoun "that."

KEY INSIGHT

Power resides in a common property, not one individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14430–14430 · Denotative Power Is Not Known in an Unperceived Gavaya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The basis of denotation · 2/4

Nor is it proper to accept only conventional denotative power in the word "gavaya" while abandoning derivational connection.

Otherwise usage such as "He cooks" with respect to a cook not presently engaged in cooking would be incoherent.

The denotative power of the word "cook" is held to reside in a person possessing knowledge and other capacities favorable to cooking; by virtue of the relation,

KEY INSIGHT

Power resides in a common property, not one individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14431–14431 · Denotative Power Is Not Known in an Unperceived Gavaya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The basis of denotation · 3/4

cooking itself is taken as an indicator or delimitor.

The power of the word "gavaya" cannot be accepted only in some particular gavaya-individual, delimited by known substancehood and the like.

The power of the word "heaven" does not reside in anything other than heaven, but the word "gavaya" applies to many gavaya-individuals.

KEY INSIGHT

Power resides in a common property, not one individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14431–14433 · Denotative Power Is Not Known in an Unperceived Gavaya; Conclusion: The Pow

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The basis of denotation · 4/4

Therefore the power of words such as "gavaya" resides in a common property such as gavayahood, indicated by similarity —just as the power of the word "earth"

resides in earthhood, indicated by smell and the like.

Otherwise the result of upamiti would be erroneous and the status of upamana as a means of valid knowledge would be lost.

KEY INSIGHT

Power resides in a common property, not one individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14434–14435 · Conclusion: The Power of the Word 'Gavaya' Resides in Gavayahood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why resemblance is insufficient · 1/4

Gavayahood has never previously been known; no means of cognition is available to present it.

It should not be said that the word "gavaya" itself makes gavayahood known.

Cognition of gavayahood is required in order to know the power of the word "gavaya," and cognition of the word's power is required in order to know gavayahood;

KEY INSIGHT

Similarity does not by itself determine the word’s extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14438–14438 · Gavayahood Has Not Previously Been Presented

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why resemblance is insufficient · 2/4

thus a defect of mutual dependence would arise.

It may be objected that a gavaya known through similarity as the conventional meaning of the word "gavaya" is not the result of upamiti, because

after instruction the person recognizes that this animal, indicated by resemblance to a cow through the word "gavaya," is that very gavaya.

KEY INSIGHT

Similarity does not by itself determine the word’s extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14438–14440 · Gavayahood Has Not Previously Been Presented; Similarity Alone Does Not Pro

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why resemblance is insufficient · 3/4

But similarity alone is not the delimitor of denotation.

Other gavayas not known through similarity to a cow would not become objects of linguistic usage, and such a supposition is unnecessarily cumbersome.

Nor can gavayahood alone be called the delimitor of denotation, because gavayahood was not previously known.

KEY INSIGHT

Similarity does not by itself determine the word's extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14441–14442 · Similarity Alone Does Not Produce Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why resemblance is insufficient · 4/4

If similarity and gavayahood are jointly taken as the cause, use of the instructional sentence for learning the meaning of the word "gavaya" itself would become pointless.

A person knows the power of the word "gavaya" only in gavayahood, not in similarity to a cow.

The object of that person's cognition is gavayahood precisely as the delimitor of denotation.

KEY INSIGHT

Similarity does not by itself determine the word’s extension.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14442–14443 · Similarity Alone Does Not Produce Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 1/6

Before the power of the word "gavaya" in the meaning gavaya is specifically known, the instructional sentence does not directly produce specific cognition of

the delimitor of denotation, that is, the basis for linguistic application.

But when that same sentence is later remembered, it produces a specific cognition of the cause of renewed word-use —that is, of the delimitor of the gavaya's denotation.

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14445–14445 · The Instructional Sentence Does Not Directly Yield Perceptual Cognition of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 2/6

This is exactly like Vedic study: the entire body of the Veda learned during study, together with its six ancillary disciplines and

innumerable subsidiary sciences, fulfills its meaning when remembered after a long time.

It should not be said that from prior cognition of the sentence meaning one decisively knows the word's power in the gavaya in the form,

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14446–14448 · The Instructional Sentence Does Not Directly Yield Perceptual Cognition of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 3/6

"In the cow-like gavaya, the referent of the word 'gavaya' is established." Both the indicatory status of similarity to a cow in relation to gavayahood and

the causality of gavayahood as the delimitor of the denotation of the word "gavaya" are doubtful.

Therefore upamana is necessary for understanding the gavaya as the referent of the word "gavaya."

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14448–14448 · The Causal Role of Gavayahood Is Doubtful

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 4/6

It may be objected that once gavayahood has been known as the referent of the word "gavaya," reasoning from economy fixes similarity to a cow as the indicator,

and then the relational cognition "The gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya'" arises —just as with cognition from the sentence "The village is on the Ganges."

But the causality of denotation in gavayahood and the indicatory status of similarity to a cow are respectively doubtful.

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14450–14451 · There Is No Need to Cognize Again a Meaning Brought in by Another Means of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 5/6

Merely through co-location, the relational cognition "The cow-like gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya'" is possible.

Therefore there is no need to cognize again, by another means of knowledge, the gavayahood already supplied by another means—just as from the sentence "The

cloth is being made" cognition of the sentence meaning occurs despite uncertainty whether the cloth is red.

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14451–14452 · There Is No Need to Cognize Again a Meaning Brought in by Another Means of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Instruction and its later result · 6/6

Otherwise, if another means of knowledge were required for relational cognition after hearing a complete sentence, the defect of splitting the sentence would arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The instruction is remembered when the animal is encountered.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14452–14452 · There Is No Need to Cognize Again a Meaning Brought in by Another Means of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What yields word–object knowledge?

The older formulation

- The known cow and the cow-like gavaya supply an analogy.
- The objection appeals to recognizing a donkey by dissimilarity.
- Similarity is not always present when identification succeeds.

The established account

- Word-power is determined in gavayahood, the cause of usage.
- Similarity is indicative, not itself the exclusive cause of denotation.
- Instruction plus later recognition establishes the relevant meaning.

The rebuttal extends beyond resemblance as an isolated cognitive item.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Refuting the Older Nyāya View of Upamāna

Counterexample

A donkey may be identified through dissimilarity.

Scope

A word applies to many individuals bearing its basis of usage.

Key property

Gavayahood is treated as the common cause of the name.

Sequence


Instruction is remembered in the later encounter.

The following presentation continues this same translated section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Secondary signification · intention · upamāna

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Gangeśa's arguments, objections, refutations and determinations, drawn from the translated text.

Appendix 4 · Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Instructional Sentences and Denotative Power

1

Secondary meaning and instruction

The speaker’s sentence introduces the word’s meaning.

2

Why the instruction is upamāna

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

3

Intention and convention

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

4

Censure and syntactic relation

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Secondary meaning and instruction · 1/4

In a sentence involving secondary signification such as "The village is on the Ganges," the expressed meaning "Ganges" is not fit to be directly related to the

village; therefore it is proper to accept secondary signification of another meaning such as the bank.

But if the second meaning obtained through the force of a known semantic relation is also taken as a meaning of that same sentence,

KEY INSIGHT

The speaker's sentence introduces the word's meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14455–14455 · There Is No Defect of Sentence-Splitting in an Indicatory Sentence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Secondary meaning and instruction · 2/4

the defect of sentence-splitting would arise because two independent meanings are being attributed to one sentence.

It may be objected that in the phrase "a gavaya similar to a cow," the word "similar" must secondarily signify an animal possessing similarity to a cow, because

the speaker's intention cannot concern the animal alone.

KEY INSIGHT

The speaker’s sentence introduces the word’s meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14455–14457 · There Is No Defect of Sentence-Splitting in an Indicatory Sentence; Seconda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Secondary meaning and instruction · 3/4

This is like taking the word "sticks" in the sentence "Bring the stick-bearers inside" as secondarily referring to the bearers of sticks.

But a trustworthy elder instructs a person who wishes to know the power of the word "gavaya" by saying,

"An animal similar to a cow is a gavaya." Such cognition of word-power is impossible without knowledge of the delimitor of denotation that accords with the speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The speaker’s sentence introduces the word’s meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14457–14458 · Secondary Signification of the Correlative Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Secondary meaning and instruction · 4/4

Therefore there is no need to posit separate secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The speaker’s sentence introduces the word’s meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14458–14458 · Secondary Signification of the Correlative Is Unnecessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the instruction is upamāna · 1/5

It should not be said that the phrase "similar to a cow" secondarily denotes gavayahood, and that gavayahood indicated by similarity to a cow is co-located in

the cow-like animal; for the speaker's intention makes similarity to a cow the delimitor of the denotation of the word "gavaya."

Nor should it be said that, as with a sentence concerning smoke, secondary signification is unnecessary because,

KEY INSIGHT

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14460–14461 · The Instructional Sentence Itself Is Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the instruction is upamāna · 2/5

on hearing "There is smoke," the speaker's intention regarding fire is known by inference.

Nor should it be said that some other means of knowledge in the instructional sentence establishes gavayahood as the delimitor of denotation.

The instructional sentence itself is upamana; if another means of knowledge is required, upamana and the instructional sentence would become mutually dependent.

KEY INSIGHT

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14461–14462 · The Instructional Sentence Itself Is Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the instruction is upamāna · 3/5

Nor is secondary signification simply the nature of words.

It will be established below that only one word in a sentence undergoes secondary signification; the other word merely regulates the speaker's intention.

It may be proposed that gavayahood can be known through secondary signification of the word "gavaya," but

KEY INSIGHT

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14463–14465 · The Instructional Sentence Itself Is Upamana; Upamana Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the instruction is upamāna · 4/5

the denotative status of the word "gavaya" in an individual qualified by gavayahood cannot be known through that same secondary signification;

therefore upamana must be accepted as a distinct means of knowledge for cognition of denotation.

Nor is the rule tenable that gavayahood residing in an individual gavaya is itself the referent of the word "gavaya." If that were accepted,

KEY INSIGHT

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14465–14466 · Upamana Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the instruction is upamāna · 5/5

there would be deviation in the case of the word "universal."

In fact, the instructional sentence, together with the speaker's intention, makes known an individual gavaya qualified by gavayahood—conveying the denotative

status of the gavaya that possesses gavayahood; gavayahood is the cause of the word's application.

KEY INSIGHT

A further means must not be silently smuggled into the explanation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14466–14467 · Upamana Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention and convention · 1/5

It may be proposed that if, in the phrase "similar to a cow," the speaker's intention of the word "similar" were directly taken to be gavayahood,

that intention would be the cause of secondary signification.

But the intention of the word "similar" is not known to concern gavayahood; the speaker's intention concerns similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14469–14469 · The Nature of Upamana Is Not Mere Speaker's Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention and convention · 2/5

> Otherwise, in the inference "There is fire on the mountain because there is smoke," secondary signification would likewise have to be accepted on account of similarity.

> But only when there is no distinct cause for knowing a word's power with respect to a particular meaning does the speaker's intention directly make known the

> word's indication—that is, secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14469–14471 · The Nature of Upamana Is Not Mere Speaker's Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention and convention · 3/5

In inference, inferential cognition makes fire known.

In upamana no such directly perceived speaker's intention is available to make known the convention of the word "gavaya"; otherwise establishment of upamana and

cognition of intention would become mutually dependent.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14471–14472 · The Nature of Upamana Is Not Mere Speaker's Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention and convention · 4/5

Where the speaker's intention does not directly make known the cause of use of the word "gavaya"— gavayahood—as the delimitor of denotation,

the upamana sentence "Whatever is similar to a cow is the referent of the word 'gavaya'" merely states the fact.

From the complete causal complex for cognition of word-power, cognition of the specific convention of the word "gavaya" necessarily arises.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14475–14476 · No Separate Intention Is Postulated with Respect to the Specific Basis of U

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention and convention · 5/5

No separate intention of the speaker is admitted with respect to gavayahood as the basis for usage;

therefore the impossibility of such intention is not a reason to postulate secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention by itself does not determine gavayahood.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14476–14476 · No Separate Intention Is Postulated with Respect to the Specific Basis of U

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 1/6

The sentence "Damn the donkey with the extremely long neck" is intended to censure the donkey, not to state that donkeyhood is the cause of applying the word.

Nevertheless, a person who sees such an animal and remembers the sentence meaning obtains the cognition,

"This donkey is the referent of the word 'donkey.'" The speaker's intention that is held to be the cause of secondary signification is not present with respect

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14478–14478 · 'Damn the Donkey' Is an Expression of Censure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 2/6

to donkeyhood as the basis for usage; the intention of the sentence is solely to censure the donkey.

The impossibility of mutual connection among the meanings of words is the cause for postulating secondary signification,

as in "The village is on the Ganges." In an injunction such as "Bring the stick-bearers inside," the act of bringing inside is known from context to be

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14478–14481 · 'Damn the Donkey' Is an Expression of Censure; Impossibility of Syntactic C

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 3/6

conducive to attainment of the intended result.

But the directly expressed meaning of the word "stick" is not itself directly related to the act of bringing a stick-bearing person inside.

Even the impossibility of the speaker's intention cannot be understood without knowing the speaker's actual intention.

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14481–14482 · Impossibility of Syntactic Connection Is the Basis of Secondary Significati

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 4/6

Therefore context and the like are necessary causes of cognition of the speaker's intention.

It may be objected that context and the like are not uniform; if generalized, the pervasion of the speaker's intention would be known,

and mere impossibility of intention could be taken as the cause of secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14482–14484 · Impossibility of Syntactic Connection Is the Basis of Secondary Significati

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 5/6

But even non-uniform entities such as smoke can be pervaded entities.

Even if the general inference "Learned people use the word 'gavaya' for a particular kind of animal" is admitted,

on grounds of economy the gavaya qualified by gavayahood is established as the referent of the word "gavaya."

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14485–14485 · A Distinct Means of Knowledge—Upamana—Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Censure and syntactic relation · 6/6

At this point no means of knowledge other than upamana is available; therefore a distinct means of knowledge called upamana,

which produces cognition of the cause of word-use, must be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Context tests whether secondary signification is justified.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14486–14486 · A Distinct Means of Knowledge—Upamana—Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

How does instruction establish meaning?

Meaning by intention alone

- An appeal to direct knowledge of the speaker's intention is proposed.
- Similarity is distinct from gavayahood.
- The relation would become circular without an independent ground.

The text's reply

- A trustworthy instructional sentence introduces the unknown word.
- The entire causal complex generates cognition of its convention.
- Secondary signification is not freely postulated for every word.

The translation distinguishes speaker intention from the determinate ground of word-use.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Instructional Sentences and Denotative Power

Sentence

An animal similar to a cow is a gavaya.

Problem

Resemblance cannot by itself fix a word’s entire extension.

Condition

The cause of application must be cognized.

Result


Upamāna is defended as a distinct way to know word-power.

The following presentation continues this same translated section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Negative inference · definition · the resulting cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Gangeśa's arguments, objections, refutations and determinations, drawn from the translated text.

Appendix 4 · Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Why Inference Cannot Replace Upamāna

1

Inference and negative proof

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

2

Pervasion and instruction

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

3

Definition and question

Asking what an animal is like differs from asking its defining condition.

4

The result called upamiti

The relevant word–object cognition follows an encounter and recollection.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 1/6

It may be proposed that denotative status is known by inference: "The word 'gavaya' denotes a gavaya qualified by gavayahood, because

trustworthy elders use this word in the absence of another meaning, just as the word 'cow' is used with the meaning cow."

But even when it is known that the word denotes a gavaya qualified by gavayahood, it is not thereby established that gavayahood is the cause of using the word.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14488–14489 · Inference Does Not Produce Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 2/6

Without knowledge of the word's power, it cannot be ascertained that there is no other meaning or secondary signification.

Gavayahood is a common property residing in the same substrate; the cause of word-use and an indicatory property are both co-located.

Therefore upamana is necessary for determination of the meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14490–14490 · Inference Does Not Produce Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 3/6

It may be objected that since accepting similarity to a cow as the cause of use of the word "gavaya" would introduce unnecessary complexity and

would not produce upamiti, reasoning establishes the following: no property distinct from gavayahood is the delimitor of denotation;

therefore gavayahood is the cause of use of the word "gavaya." The word has some cause, and there is no cause distinct from gavayahood; therefore gavayahood itself is the cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14493–14493 · Establishment of Meaning by Negative Inference Is Not Possible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 4/6

But reasoning by itself is not a cause of determination.

It is not based on cognition of pervasion; therefore the denotative status of the word "gavaya" cannot be established by a negative-only inference.

It may further be said that the inference from general observation, "The word 'gavaya' is used because of some property,

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14494–14496 · Establishment of Meaning by Negative Inference Is Not Possible; An Inferenc

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 5/6

and no property distinct from gavayahood is the cause," is established with the aid of reasoning.

If a distinct upamana is accepted, there would be no need to treat reasoning as an auxiliary.

But we do indeed know this much: that there is some cause for the use of the word "gavaya," and that there is no other cause distinct from gavayahood.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14496–14497 · An Inference from General Observation Does Not Establish a Different Basis

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference and negative proof · 6/6

Nevertheless the specific cognition "gavayahood itself is the cause of word-use" does not arise without upamana.

Inference apprehends only the delimitor of what pervades denotative status.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed inferences fail to deliver the particular cause of word-use.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14497–14497 · An Inference from General Observation Does Not Establish a Different Basis

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pervasion and instruction · 1/7

It may be objected that the cognition "qualities such as desire do not reside in eight substances" arises through an inference from

general observation aided by a specific defeater.

In the absence of such a defeater, absence of the quality in the eight substances would not be known.

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14499–14499 · Reasoning Motivates a Negative-Only Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion and instruction · 2/7

Likewise, once it is known through an inference from general observation that the word "gavaya" has no cause of application distinct from gavayahood,

the reasoning consisting in the burden of unnecessary complexity assists the negative-only inference.

Taking reasoning as an auxiliary to an already accepted inference is more economical than postulating a distinct upamana.

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14500–14500 · Reasoning Motivates a Negative-Only Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion and instruction · 3/7

This argument is not tenable.

With the aid of a defeater distinct from the eight substances—earth and the rest—and of the absence of residence in one of them,

cognition of counterpositiveness determined by the eight substances arises with regard to desire and the like;

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14502–14502 · General-Observation Inference Does Not Convey the Absence of Residence in t

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion and instruction · 4/7

the inference from general observation itself does not produce cognition of non-residence in the eight substances.

Specific cognition of a qualified object arises only from cognition of two qualifiers.

When the reasoning has not been understood, an object delimited merely by the non-delimitor of pervasion produces specific cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14502–14503 · General-Observation Inference Does Not Convey the Absence of Residence in t

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pervasion and instruction · 5/7

Therefore a distinct upamana is necessary.

It may be objected that the instructional sentence "The gavaya is similar to a cow" is meant to produce cognition of pervasion.

A person who knows the pervasion "Whatever is similar to a cow is the referent of the word 'gavaya'" immediately infers,

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14503–14505 · General-Observation Inference Does Not Convey the Absence of Residence in t

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion and instruction · 6/7

"This cow-like animal is the referent of the word 'gavaya.'" Therefore upamana is unnecessary.

But a person who knows that the gavaya is similar to a cow does not ask an elder, "What does the word 'gavaya,' which is similar to a cow,

mean?" A person who knows the meaning of the word "gavaya" asks, "What does a gavaya look like?"

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14505–14506 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Intended to State Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Pervasion and instruction · 7/7

Through derivation and first use, only the gavaya-animal is known as the meaning of the word; what then is the purpose of similarity?

Therefore the instructional sentence is not intended to convey pervasion.

KEY INSIGHT

The sentence does not function merely as a general law.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14507–14507 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Intended to State Pervasion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and question · 1/4

It may be proposed that the sentence "The gavaya is similar to a cow" is intended to state the characteristic of a gavaya.

The purport of the question is, "What is the characteristic of a gavaya?" The answer, "A gavaya similar to a cow is the referent of the word 'gavaya,'"

means that a cow-like animal is called a gavaya.

KEY INSIGHT

Asking what an animal is like differs from asking its defining condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14510–14510 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Intended as a Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Definition and question · 2/4

But on this view an animal that is not similar to a cow— such as an elephant— would not be called a gavaya.

No evidence establishes this; usages are not known by all persons at all times, and some usages are deviant.

The question "What is a gavaya like?" is not the same as "What is the characteristic of a gavaya?" The inquirer does not know the gavaya; therefore,

KEY INSIGHT

Asking what an animal is like differs from asking its defining condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14511–14513 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Intended as a Definition; The Instruction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Definition and question · 3/4

without a probans from which the denotation, pervasion, and characteristic of the word "gavaya" could be inferred, the question cannot have such a meaning.

Nor should it be said that the question concerns the probans establishing the specific cause of use of the word "gavaya"—gavayahood.

On that view the questioner's cognition of the referent of the word "gavaya" would already be established by inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Asking what an animal is like differs from asking its defining condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14513–14514 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Merely an Answer to the Question

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and question · 4/4

Nor should it be said that the answer states a particular characteristic consisting in the gavaya's similarity to a cow.

The answer may also be general: "When you go into the forest you will see a gavaya." Since all the senses have an equal role in perceptual cognition here,

the answer is not restricted to a particular similarity.

KEY INSIGHT

Asking what an animal is like differs from asking its defining condition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14515–14515 · The Instructional Sentence Is Not Merely an Answer to the Question

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result called upamiti · 1/3

The questions "What is a gavaya like?" and "For what reason is the word 'gavaya' used?" are asked in order to know the specific cause of word-use.

Gavayahood cannot be directly pointed out by perception; therefore the respondent indicates gavayahood through similarity to a cow.

After seeing the animal, the person who remembers the instructional sentence acquires, with the aid of reasoning, the specific cognition:

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant word–object cognition follows an encounter and recollection.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14517–14518 · Conclusion: Determination of the Specific Basis for Usage Is the Result of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result called upamiti · 2/3

"This animal qualified by gavayahood is the referent of the word 'gavaya.'" This cognition is the result called upamiti.

It may be objected that the status of gavayahood as the basis for usage is known from the negative-only reason,

"There is some cause for use of the word 'gavaya'; there is no other cause distinct from gavayahood," together with reasoning based on the burden of unnecessary complexity.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant word–object cognition follows an encounter and recollection.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14518–14520 · Conclusion: Determination of the Specific Basis for Usage Is the Result of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result called upamiti · 3⁄3

But the reasoning concerning the absence of a cause distinct from gavayahood is not based on pervasion; therefore it is not a means of valid knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The relevant word–object cognition follows an encounter and recollection.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14521–14521 · The Status of Gavayahood as the Basis for Usage Is Not Established Merely b

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can ordinary inference produce upamiti?

The inference proposal

- There must be some cause for applying the word gavaya.
- Economy eliminates possible alternative causes.
- Negative inference is said to isolate gavayahood.

The reply in the source

- A generic cause does not establish the specific linguistic basis.
- The proposed negative inference lacks demonstrated pervasion.
- Upamiti is the determinate cognition of this animal as the referent.

A relation inferred in the abstract is not automatically the specific cognition at issue.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Why Inference Cannot Replace Upamāna

The question

What is a gavaya like?

The obstacle

A name’s determining basis is initially unknown.

The occasion

The animal is seen and the instruction recollected.

Upamiti


The specific cognition of the gavaya as the word’s referent.

The following presentation continues this same translated section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · UPAMĀNA · COMPARISON



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Word-use · objections · definitions · close of section

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Gangeśa's arguments, objections, refutations and determinations, drawn from the translated text.

Appendix 4 · Upamāna Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Established Definitions of Upamāna and Upamiti



Specific word-power and economy

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage

Rival account and answer

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

Definitions of the means and result

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

Alternative wording and final note

The negative instruction is included before the section closes.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 4.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 1/9

A further objection arises: if the reasoning from complexity is not a means of knowledge and some property distinct from gavayahood may be the cause of use,

how can the upamiti-result—"gavayahood is the delimitor of denotation"—arise in gavayahood merely with the aid of reasoning?

The answer is that both cognitions—"The cause of use of the word 'gavaya' is gavayahood" and "No property distinct from gavayahood is the cause of use"—are

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14523–14524 · Cognition of Having a Specific Cause Is Produced by Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 2/9

produced by upamana itself, with the aid of reasoning from complexity.

It may be objected that from evidence showing that some property is the cause of word-use, together with the consideration of unnecessary complexity,

gavayahood is established as the cause of word-use.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14524–14527 · Cognition of Having a Specific Cause Is Produced by Upamana; The Causality

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 3/9

But if this were accepted, negative pervasion in the general reason would be destroyed.

Because the earth is an effect, its maker is inferred; only after the defeater "there is no maker other than God" is established does the negative pervasion arise.

When the absence on earth of a maker distinct from God is already established, God is inferred solely from effecthood.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14527–14528 · The Causality of Gavayahood Is Not Established Merely from Evidence That Wo

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 4/9

Likewise, even after knowing only that "the word 'gavaya' has some cause of use, but none distinct from gavayahood," the specific cognition

"gavayahood itself is the cause" remains unestablished.

A partial theorist says that in usages such as "Bring the cow," from the conduct of elders the power of the word "cow" is known only in an individual cow, not in cowness.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14528–14530 · The Causality of Gavayahood Is Not Established Merely from Evidence That Wo

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Specific word-power and economy · 5/9

Cognition of word-power in the individual cow is not contradicted by the cause of use, cowness.

Properties distinct from cowness are rejected on grounds of unnecessary complexity and over-extension; therefore cowness alone is known as the cause of word-use.

Although reasoning from complexity is not itself a means of knowledge, the determination of power in the individual cow and causality in cowness,

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14530–14531 · A Partial View: Cognition of Specific Word-Power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 6/9

aided by semantic economy, constitutes the result called upamiti.

But the Siddhantin says: the very means of knowledge that makes word-power known in a specific meaning also makes known, with the aid of economy, the cause of word-use.

For example, the inference of a maker of the earth also determines that maker to be God alone.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14531–14532 · A Partial View: Cognition of Specific Word-Power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 7/9

It may be objected that then, in effects such as pots having many different makers, the reason effecthood would, through semantic economy, infer a single maker;

only later would a defeater force abandonment of the single-maker view.

But an inference of a single maker with respect to different makers is erroneous from the outset because of contrary facts.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14534–14534 · Effecthood Does Not Teach a Single Maker

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 8/9

Cognition of economy with respect to distinct makers involving greater complexity is itself erroneous; an inference based on it is erroneous as well.

An objection arises: the result called upamiti, being cognition of word-power, is an auxiliary cause of another means of knowledge—verbal testimony;

otherwise upamiti would not be described as cognition of word-power.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14534–14536 · Effecthood Does Not Teach a Single Maker; Upamiti Is Not an Auxiliary to De

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Specific word-power and economy · 9/9

But if upamiti in the form of cognition of word-power were an auxiliary to verbal testimony, there would be deviation in upamana whenever cognition of

word-power is already available from another means of knowledge.

In fact, cognition of word-power is that cognition on which understanding of a specific word-meaning depends; upamiti alone is not an auxiliary to the derivation of other words.

KEY INSIGHT

Reasoning helps a distinctive means of knowledge determine the cause of usage.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14536–14537 · Upamiti Is Not an Auxiliary to Derivation of Other Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rival account and answer · 1/5

Some scholars say that correlative pronouns such as "whatever" and "that" have no single recurrent form; nevertheless,

the power of the word "whatever" is accepted in one individual such as Chaitra, while other individuals such as Maitra are taken as its meanings by convention.

In the same way, the power of the word "gavaya" may be accepted in one gavaya-individual, and other gavaya-individuals may be taken as its meanings by convention.

KEY INSIGHT

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14539–14540 · Another View: Upamana Is Not a Distinct Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rival account and answer · 2/5

Since words with different sequences of letters are different, different individuals cannot be meanings of different words on that account.

Therefore upamana does not assist either in cognition of different powers of different pronouns or in taking different individuals as their meanings;

hence upamana is not a means of knowledge distinct from perception, inference, and verbal testimony.

KEY INSIGHT

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14540–14541 · Another View: Upamana Is Not a Distinct Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rival account and answer · 3/5

The foregoing view is not tenable.

An indicatory property such as being an object of cognition, which resides uniformly in pothood and the like,

assists upamana in grasping the power of pronouns and other words with respect to a specific meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14544–14544 · Refutation of the Other View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rival account and answer · 4/5

The power of a pronoun reaches a specific meaning such as a gavaya only when that meaning is known as the object of a specific cognition.

Linguistic usage too occurs only with respect to such a specific meaning.

If pronoun-power is not accepted with respect to a specific meaning delimited by an indicatory property, pronoun-use with regard to gavayas and

KEY INSIGHT

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14544–14545 · Refutation of the Other View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Rival account and answer · 5/5

the like would be incoherent— even if upamana were accepted as a distinct means of knowledge.

There is no rule that pronoun-power is accepted only with respect to a specific meaning in which some common recurrent property is known.

Therefore upamana can be a distinct means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

An alternative denies that upamāna is independent; the reply defends it.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14545–14546 · Refutation of the Other View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of the means and result · 1/5

It may be objected that if the powers of the words "father" and "mother" are accepted respectively in a progenitor and a bearer of offspring,

how can meanings such as "Maitra is a father" and "Chitra is a mother" be obtained?

Merely hearing the words "Maitra" and "Chitra" will not yield these meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14548–14548 · Objection: Another Means of Knowledge Is Needed for Understanding Syntactic

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of the means and result · 2/5

One word-meaning is related only to another word-meaning; but being a progenitor and being a bearer of offspring are components of word-meanings, not independent word-meanings.

Therefore a distinct means of knowledge like upamana would be required to understand the relation of progenitorship to Maitra and motherhood to Chitra.

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14548–14549 · Objection: Another Means of Knowledge Is Needed for Understanding Syntactic

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of the means and result · 3/5

Progenitorship has a sentential expectancy for being born, and motherhood has an expectancy for offspringhood;

therefore the connection of Maitra with progenitorship and Chitra with motherhood is possible through semantic fitness and the other conditions alone.

The defining characteristic of upamana is being the instrument of the determinate upamiti-cognition,

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14549–14551 · Objection: Another Means of Knowledge Is Needed for Understanding Syntactic

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of the means and result · 4/5

"The gavaya is the referent of the word 'gavaya.'" Instrumentality toward the result called upamiti is a distinct universal property.

There is no defect of its being unestablished: difference of causes is required on the basis of difference of effects, and therefore

a distinct common property is established in the instrument of the upamiti-result.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14551–14551 · Definition of Upamana

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of the means and result · 5/5

Upamiti is cognition of gavayahood as the cause of use of the word "gavaya," or donkeyhood as the cause of use of the word "donkey"—properties that reside in

the same substrate as common properties such as similarity or dissimilarity.

The state of being the object of word-power constitutes, in a qualifier such as gavayahood, the causality of word-use.

KEY INSIGHT

The concluding definitions specify upamāna and upamiti.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14553–14553 · Definition of Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative wording and final note · 1/3

Alternatively, the result called upamiti is cognition of gavayahood—the cause of word-use—as qualifying something,

delimited by co-location with the sentence meaning of a word such as "gavaya" whose power was previously unknown.

Alternatively again, upamiti is cognition of a cause of word-use as qualifying something, delimited by co-location with the sentence meaning of a word.

KEY INSIGHT

The negative instruction is included before the section closes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14555–14555 · Alternative Definition of Upamiti

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative wording and final note · 2/3

Gangesha gives this second definition in accordance with the traditional rule that, only after cognition of the power of the word "gavaya" has been obtained

from linguistic usage, does upamana produce a specific determination of gavayahood and the like.

In the negative instructional sentence "An animal that is not similar to a cow is not a gavaya," the speaker's intention indirectly concerns only the gavaya's similarity to a cow.

KEY INSIGHT

The negative instruction is included before the section closes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14556–14559 · Alternative Definition of Upamiti; Even a Negative Instructional Sentence E

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative wording and final note · 3/3

Therefore even a negative instructional sentence assists cognition of the gavaya's similarity to a cow.

Thus ends the third chapter of the Upamana Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Mahamahopadhyaya Gangesha.

KEY INSIGHT

The negative instruction is included before the section closes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14559–14560 · Even a Negative Instructional Sentence Expresses Only Similarity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What is defined at the end?

Upamāna · the means

- The instrument of determinate upamiti-cognition.
- Its distinct instrumental status is defended against rival explanations.
- An instructional sentence contributes to recognizing word-power.

Upamiti · the result

- Cognition of gavayahood as the cause of applying “gavaya.”
- The defining mode identifies the relevant cause of linguistic usage.
- The source also supplies alternative technical formulations.

The division closes explicitly after the definitions and the negative instructional case.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

UPAMĀNA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · The Established Definitions of Upamāna and Upamiti

Why independent?

Other proposed means fail to account for the full determination.

Means

Upamāna functions as the instrument of upamiti.

Result

Upamiti determines word-power through a specific basis of use.

Ending


The third chapter of the Upamāna Section formally ends.

The English Upamāna Section is complete.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Buddhist denial · Vaiśeṣika inference · verbal cognition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Can Verbal Testimony Be a Pramāṇa?

1

Definition and Buddhist objection

The refutation tests whether denying verbal testimony is self-consistent.

2

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

3

Cognition of the relation

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished

4

Objections and Nyāya replies

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and Buddhist objection · 1/4

Now verbal testimony, or the verbal means of knowledge, will be expounded.

A word that is produced from true cognition of the actual nature of its meaning and that becomes the cause of linguistic use—that is, utterance—is a means of valid verbal cognition or understanding.

Verbal testimony is not a means of valid verbal cognition or understanding.

KEY INSIGHT

The refutation tests whether denying verbal testimony is self-consistent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14565–14567 · Definition of Verbal Testimony; The Buddhist Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and Buddhist objection · 2/4

This may be explained as follows: only an extraordinary instrument is a means of valid knowledge, and an extraordinary instrument is that in whose presence the effect necessarily arises.

But even when a word alone is present, valid verbal cognition or understanding does not necessarily arise; therefore that word cannot be regarded as a means of valid verbal cognition or understanding.

No; this Buddhist objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The refutation tests whether denying verbal testimony is self-consistent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14567–14569 · The Buddhist Objection; Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and Buddhist objection · 3/4

The Buddhist assertion "verbal testimony is not a means of valid knowledge" falls into self-contradiction on both alternatives— whether verbal testimony is accepted as a means of valid knowledge or is not accepted as such.

Nor can it be said that although a word is not itself a means of valid knowledge, recollection of the meanings produced by that word can occur without contradiction.

For a word possessing expectancy and the other conditions, assisted by operations such as recollection of individual word-meanings, must be accepted as a means of valid verbal cognition;

KEY INSIGHT

The refutation tests whether denying verbal testimony is self-consistent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14569–14570 · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definition and Buddhist objection · 4/4

consequently, the production of valid verbal cognition from a word endowed with such auxiliaries must be regarded as necessary.

And when a word lacks expectancy and the other conditions, its failure to produce the result called verbal cognition is comparable

to the failure of perception and other means of knowledge to produce their results when their requisite conditions are lacking.

KEY INSIGHT

The refutation tests whether denying verbal testimony is self-consistent.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14570–14570 · Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 1/11

The Vaisheshikas object as follows: although a word possessing expectancy and the other conditions is capable of producing valid verbal cognition or understanding, it is nevertheless not a distinct means of knowledge,

because cognition of the sentential relation among different word-meanings can be obtained solely by inference, in which either the words or their meanings constitute the subject.

For example, the inference that causes verbal cognition may be understood as follows: a worldly sentence such as "dandena gam abhyaja"—"Drive the cow near with a stick"—or a Vedic sentence such as "jyotishtomena svargakamo yajeta"—

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14572–14573 · The Vaisheshika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 2/11

> "One who desires heaven should perform the Jyotishtoma sacrifice"—is preceded by cognition of the mutual sentential relation among the word-meanings remembered from the words intended by the speaker,

> because these sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other conditions, like "ghatam anaya"—"Bring the pot."

> But neither "because they are words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually related word-meanings and possess semantic fitness and mutual proximity"

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14573–14575 · The Vaisheshika Objection; Refutation of the View of the Author of the Lilavat

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 3/11

nor "because they are words uttered with the intention of cognizing mutually related word-meanings and possess syntactic proximity" can be accepted as the reason.

For no example can be given of "the state of being words uttered with the intention of cognizing meanings mutually related in meaning" or "the state of being words uttered with the intention of

cognizing mutually related meanings and possessing proximity," because cognition of the sentential relation cannot be possible before the actual inference giving rise to verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14575–14575 · Refutation of the View of the Author of the Lilavati

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 4/11

> Likewise, neither "the state of being words uttered with the intention of producing cognition in which the subjecthood of mutually related word-meanings is the qualifier"—
>
> being intended for a cognition having relatedness as its mode—nor "the state of being words used with the intention of producing cognition in which the subjecthood of
>
> mutually related word-meanings is the qualifier and possessing sentential proximity"—possessing proximity intended for a cognition of that mode—can be taken as the reason.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14577–14577 · Being Intended to Produce a Cognition Qualified by Relatedness Is Not the Reas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 5/11

For such a reason deviates in an untrustworthy statement such as "payasa sincati"—"He sprinkles with coconut water"—when what is actually intended is "He sprinkles with a coconut shell";

and it also deviates in a group of words lacking expectancy such as "karmatvam anayanam kritih"—"objecthood, the act of bringing, and conscious effort."

Although sentential relations are of many kinds, in "dandena gam abhyaja"—"Drive the cow near the house with a stick"—there is no need to take unintended relations such as objecthood between

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14577–14579 · Being Intended to Produce a Cognition Qualified by Relatedness Is Not the Reas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 6/11

the act of driving near conveyed by the verbal root "abhyaj" and the operation conveyed by the suffix "a" as sentential relations, because these relations are not objects intended by the speaker.

Otherwise the intended sentential relations such as instigation among those very word-meanings could not be understood from the same group of words.

Otherwise, even unintended relations among word-meanings would have to be cognized as sentential relations.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14579–14581 · Exclusion of Unintended Relations; Refutation of the View That 'Being Preceded

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 7/11

For this reason, "words preceded by cognition of the sentential relation among word-meanings" and "words conveying meanings that stand in a qualifier-qualified relation" may be taken as the probandum of the inference.

Some teachers hold as follows: "words conveying the intended sentential relation among meanings remembered from the words" are the probandum of the inference.

The meaning of the possessive suffix 'matup' used in the probandum is the status of the word as a sign or indicator that causes verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14581–14583 · Refutation of the View That 'Being Preceded by Cognition of That' Is the Proba

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 8/11

Nor can it be objected that accepting "possessing a relation among remembered meanings" as the probandum gives rise to mutual dependence.

Once such a relation has been established in earlier words, those words may be taken as examples for establishing such a relation in later words; in this way the inference is beginningless.

That is, to infer the same probandum in the example does not require that the probandum have already been inferred in the subject.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14584–14584 · The View of Some Teachers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 9/11

No; this view is not tenable.

The desired purpose is not achieved merely by the indicative capacity of the word—that is, by inferring the word as a cause of the intended relation among word-meanings.

On the other hand, if wordhood as an instrument producing true cognition of the relation among word-meanings is taken as the probandum,

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14586–14587 · Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · 10/11

then because of deviation in the reason consisting of an untrustworthy utterance, this probandum becomes contradictory or untenable.

In the original Vaisheshika inference—see above—the sentential relation among word-meanings may be known as the property delimiting cognition of the relation, that is, as the probandum.

For it is necessary to accept the rule that cognition of a cognition—that is, inferential cognition concerning the cognition of related word-meanings—takes as its own objects all the objects of the original cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14587–14589 · Refutation; Establishing the Relation by Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Vaiśeṣika inferential proposal · ११/११

Cognition of related word-meanings can become a specific qualifier in cognition of the relation.

Thus, in "dandena gam abhyaja," a specific sentential relation such as the cow's objecthood being determined by the act of driving near is established by inference through the force of the subject's possessing the reason.

This occurs even when those specific relations themselves have not been taken as the pervader, that is, as the probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposed sign and its sentential relation undergo logical scrutiny.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14590–14590 · Establishing the Relation by Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 1/8

It may be objected that, on this view, cognition of an erroneous cognition would itself become erroneous cognition.

Nor can it be said that this consequence is acceptable, because then even God would become merely a deluded person—one who has only cognition of erroneous cognitions.

Among ordinary people too, from the cognition "This person has the erroneous cognition of silver in the shell" there would arise an impulse to obtain the shell, just as an impulse arises from the erroneous cognition "This is silver."

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14592–14592 · The Doubt That 'Cognition of Cognition Cannot Refer to the Objects'

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 2/8

Some Vaisheshikas reply here as follows: erroneousness cannot be defined as the state of a cognition being about the objects that are the objects of an erroneous cognition.

For this view is refuted whether the objects of the erroneous cognition exist or do not exist.

No; this view of those Vaisheshikas is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14594–14595 · Reply of Some Vaisheshikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 3/8

The erroneousness of an erroneous cognition does not arise because its object is unreal, since the object of erroneous cognition does in fact exist.

Rather, erroneousness consists in the cognition's determining a qualifier such as silverhood that is not co-located with qualifiedness.

Nor can it be said that in erroneous cognition the qualifying property such as silverhood is devoid of co-location.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14595–14596 · Reply of Some Vaisheshikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 4/8

For even in an erroneous cognition such as "This is silver," silverhood is determined as a qualifier.

Otherwise there would be no example of a distinct kind of erroneous cognition devoid of such a condition, because no means of knowledge would be available to establish it.

It may now be objected that in the sentence "bhutalam ghatabhavavat"—"The ground possesses absence of a pot"— uttered by a deceiver when a pot actually exists on the ground, the reason deviates from the probandum.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14596–14598 · Reply of Some Vaisheshikas; Objection of Deviation in the Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 5/8

For cognition of a relation between pot-absence and the ground does not arise; that relational cognition is blocked by perception of the pot and the ground and by true cognition of the pot's actual presence on the ground.

It may be argued that sentence formation is impossible without actual cognition of the sentential relation among word-meanings;

therefore before constructing a sentence such as "The ground possesses absence of a pot," the deceiver must be held to have an intentionally assumed or imposed cognition of the relation.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14598–14600 · Objection of Deviation in the Reason; Refutation of the Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 6/8

But this argument too is not correct.

A human being—and even a parrot—can form a sentence merely from knowledge of the sequence of words.

In the case of fools and children as well, mere knowledge of word-order is established as the operative cause of sentence formation.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14601–14601 · Refutation of the Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 7/8

No; this refutation is not tenable.

A sentence is used with the intention that this sentence cause this particular person to understand this particular sentential relation among these particular word-meanings.

Therefore even a deceiver must possess true cognition of the sentential relation.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14603–14603 · Restatement of the Original View by the Vaisheshikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the relation · 8/8

Moreover, semantic fitness in the form of absence of a defeater to the specific inferential reason is itself absent in the phrase "the ground possessing pot-absence" used by the deceiver.

Therefore there is no deviation of the reason from the probandum either in a deceiver's contrary statement or in a group of words uttered by a parrot and the like without understanding the relation.

But in such cases, where the reason is actually absent, inferential cognition of the relation among word-meanings arises because of the mistaken cognition that sentential fitness is present in the words.

KEY INSIGHT

A word's object, speaker and inferred relation must be carefully distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14604–14604 · Restatement of the Original View by the Vaisheshikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 1/8

It may now be objected that there is deviation in repeated or imitative utterances by a parrot or another person without prior cognition of the relation;

there is also deviation in the statements of a deluded person and of a deceiver whose intended meaning lacks fitness.

For how can true cognition of the sentential relation among word-meanings be established in such cases when even inference of the speaker's true cognition is impossible?

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14606–14606 · The Vaisheshika Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 2/8

But this objection is not tenable.

It has already been stated in the sections on origination and perception that if true cognition of the relation is obtained from an ordinary generative sentence, then even an ordinary sentence acquires validity like the Veda.

Expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity are useful in producing from words verbal cognition of a relation only when they are understood to be present in the words.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14607–14608 · The Vaisheshika Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 3/8

Otherwise the production of erroneous relational cognition from words would be inexplicable.

We Naiyayikas now reply: the cognition of meaning produced by a sentence such as "This is silver" itself removes the doubt "Is this silver or not?" and produces action.

Cognition of that cognition—that is, meta-cognition—is not such a cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14608–14610 · The Vaisheshika Conclusion; Refutation of the Vaisheshika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 4/8

For admitting meta-cognition would introduce both unnecessary complexity and deviation.

Therefore the cognition "This person has the cognition that this is silver" is not the cause of action; rather, the cognition "This is silver" itself removes doubt and produces action.

It may now be objected that the meta-cognition "This person has the cognition that this is silver" also takes silver as its object. Yes, that is true.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14610–14612 · Refutation of the Vaisheshika View; Refutation of the Vaisheshika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 5/8

But in a meta-cognition distinct from the cognition of the object, word-meanings such as silverhood are not principal qualifiers.

Only that object-cognition in which word-meanings such as silverhood are principal qualifiers removes doubt and produces action.

Otherwise a person who cognizes someone else's erroneous cognition would, like the deluded person, have doubt removed and proceed toward the silver.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14613–14614 · Refutation of the Vaisheshika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 6/8

In addition, an improper mutual conflation of the objects of the two types of cognition would arise.

This also refutes the argument that, in accordance with the utterance of words having secondary or multiple meanings, cognition of the speaker's intention must be taken as the cause of understanding the sentence meaning.

Here "speaker's intention" means the intended production of cognition of some particular sentential relation of one word-meaning with other word-meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14614–14616 · Refutation of the Vaisheshika Objection; Refutation of the View That 'Cognitio

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 7/8

Thus, on the basis of the inference establishing cognition of the speaker's intention, relational cognition can be established as the delimitor of that cognition of intention.

Moreover, inferential cognition is cognition having the delimitor of pervasion as its mode.

Therefore the inference will have the general form, "These words are preceded by cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings remembered from the words"; it will not have the specific form,

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14616–14617 · Refutation of the View That 'Cognition of Speaker's Intention Is the Cause'

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and Nyāya replies · 8/8

"These words are preceded by cognition of a relation to silver." Hence the cognition that removes doubt and produces action must be taken to arise from the words themselves.

For this very reason the view of the Old Mimamsakas is also refuted, according to which, with respect to removing doubt and producing action in the hearer, words are merely reiterative or restate what is already known.

KEY INSIGHT

Reliance on intention alone remains contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14617–14618 · Refutation of the View That 'Cognition of Speaker's Intention Is the Cause'

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

A word or an inference?

Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika challenges

- The Buddhist challenge denies independent pramāṇa-status to words.
- The Vaiśeṣika account treats verbal cognition as inferentially produced.
- A sentence is analyzed through a proposed inferential sign.

Replies developed in the translation

- The Buddhist universal denial faces a reflexive objection.
- Inferred relations cannot simply replace the words that convey them.
- The intended sentential connection has to be distinguished from unrelated meanings.

These positions are objections and responses inside the source, not independently established results.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Can Verbal Testimony Be a Pramāṇa?

Issue

Whether speech is itself a means of valid cognition.

Denial

The Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika positions are not identical.

Complication

Sentence meaning, intended relation and inferred relation differ.

Transition


The Naiyāyika argument continues with conditions of verbal cognition.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Semantic fitness · trustworthy speech · Mīmāṃsā objections

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Verbal Testimony as an Independent Pramāṇa

1

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

2

Further challenges to inferred speech

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

3

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

4

Memory, Veda and final objections

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 1/12

In verbal cognition and inferential cognition different objects—namely particular and general properties—function as qualifiers.

Therefore it cannot be said that the objects of the two cognitions are wholly identical; consequently verbal testimony cannot be regarded as mere repetition.

Thus verbal testimony must be accepted as a distinct means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14620–14620 · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 2/12

The inference may take the following form: "These word-meanings—the object delimited by thisness and silver—have among themselves a natural sentential relation that is the object of the speaker's intention,

because these meanings have been remembered from the group of words 'This is silver,' which possesses expectancy and the other conditions;

or because these meanings have been remembered from a group of words possessing semantic fitness and proximity and used for producing cognition of a sentential relation."

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14622–14622 · An Alternative Vaisheshika Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 3/12

There is no deviation of the reason from the probandum in a sentence such as "payasa sincati" uttered by an untrustworthy person, because semantic fitness is absent there.

In such a case fitness is absent because a defeating cognition is present.

The cognition produced by the words of an untrustworthy speaker uttered with the intention of producing cognition of a sentential relation is naturally erroneous as well.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14623–14623 · An Alternative Vaisheshika Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 4/12

> Words of one and the same linguistic form, such as "payasa sincati," when different meanings are intended, are semantically fit or unfit according to the absence or presence of a defeating cognition.

> Therefore semantic fitness is simply the absence of defeat.

> According to the Vaisheshikas, the sentence "payasa sincati" is true when used in the sense of sprinkling with a liquid, and false when used in the sense of sprinkling with a coconut shell.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14623–14624 · An Alternative Vaisheshika Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 5/12

The same formally identical sentence uttered by a trustworthy or untrustworthy person may respectively be called true or

false according to the absence or presence of a defeating cognition concerning the relation of sprinkling by means of 'payas.'

The Naiyayika view is now as follows: for a knower, that is, a hearer who desires to know the sentence meaning, cognition of fitness is required.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14624–14626 · An Alternative Vaisheshika Inference; Naiyayika View: Fitness and the Other Co

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 6/12

This cognition of fitness is of three kinds: (1) cognition of expectancy in the form of the prior absence, in the hearer, of cognition of the sentential relation;

(2) cognition of semantic fitness in the form of absence of a defeating cognition of invalidity; and (3) cognition of proximity in the form of cognition of the words that are relata of an uninterrupted relation among the meanings.

But semantic fitness, expectancy, and proximity are causes of verbal cognition merely by their actual presence, not as understood to be present in the words.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14626–14627 · Naiyayika View: Fitness and the Other Conditions Function as Causes Merely by

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 7/12

For the latter assumption would introduce unnecessary complexity.

Even without cognition of fitness and the like there is no delay in cognition of the sentential relation; and it is impossible to determine fitness and the like beforehand on the basis of the sentential relation itself.

Therefore fitness and the other conditions are not qualifiers of an inferential reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14627–14627 · Naiyayika View: Fitness and the Other Conditions Function as Causes Merely by

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 8/12

No; this view is not tenable.

Even when actual fitness and the other conditions are absent, false cognition that they are present produces cognition of the sentential relation.

Otherwise the very conception of erroneous verbal cognition arising from pseudo-verbal testimony would collapse.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14629–14629 · Refutation of the Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 9/12

Both when there is doubt whether the word "rajnah" expects the word "purushah" or the word "putrah," and when there is the contrary

determination that "rajnah" does not expect "purushah" but expects only "putrah," cognition of the sentence meaning is blocked.

Therefore the requisite cognition of fitness, which is equally absent under doubt and contrary cognition, must be regarded as a cause of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14629–14629 · Refutation of the Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 10/12

Absence of cognition of the truth of a defeating cognition can be ascertained by oneself or by another on the basis of a determination of absence.

For example, in the sentence "atra ghato nasti"—"There is no pot here"—once the absence of a pot has been determined from non-apprehension of a perceptible pot,

the absence of validity in a defeating cognition asserting the pot's existence can be ascertained by oneself or by another.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14630–14630 · Refutation of the Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 11/12

It should also be noted that cognition of the sentential relation generally arises even when there is doubt about the invalidity of a defeating cognition, because doubt concerning a defeating cognition is not itself an inhibiting defect.

Moreover, you Naiyayikas too must accept that cognition of fitness and the other conditions alone is the generative cause of the validity of verbal testimony.

Taking the fact of being uttered by a trustworthy person as the cause would introduce unnecessary complexity.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14630–14632 · Refutation of the Naiyayika View; The Vaisheshikas Establish the Causality of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika positions · 12/12

> Even words uttered by an untrustworthy person may become a means of valid knowledge through agreement with a trustworthy statement— that is, because their object is uncontradicted.

> Thus, once words are understood as the means of verbal cognition, the necessity of cognition of fitness and the other conditions as the cause generating their validity is established.

> Consequently, cognition of fitness and the like must be accepted as causes of valid verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Semantic fitness and defeating cognition help test alleged inferential causes.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14632–14633 · The Vaisheshikas Establish the Causality of Cognition of Fitness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 1/9

No; this Vaisheshika view is not tenable.

When the group of words "nadyah kacche mahishas carati"—"A buffalo walks on the riverbank"—is heard without hearing the group "vimalam jalam"—"The water is clear"—cognition of expectancy and the other conditions must certainly be present.

Yet the reason deviates from the probandum because cognition of a sentential relation among such meanings as "bank" and "river" is not intended.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14635–14635 · Refutation of the Alternative Vaisheshika Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 2/9

Therefore cognition of expectancy, fitness, and proximity alone is not the generative cause of the validity of words; the speaker's intention too must be accepted as a cause.

It may now be objected that the condition "words uttered together" should be added as a qualifier of the inferential reason.

Cognition of a sentential relation among meanings obtained merely by remembering some uttered words could then be explained by a false cognition that such a qualified reason is present.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14635–14636 · Refutation of the Alternative Vaisheshika Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 3/9

But this objection is not tenable.

The sentence meaning— that is, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings—arises even when there is doubt concerning the qualified reason.

It may again be objected that in a case such as "A buffalo walks on the riverbank" only an erroneous cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings arises.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14637–14639 · Refutation of the Alternative Vaisheshika Inference; Refutation of a Second Ob

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 4/9

But this objection is not tenable.

Since no other cause is available for producing such erroneous cognition, the words themselves must be taken as its cause.

No one can prevent a grammatically correct group of words such as "on the riverbank..." from producing non-erroneous cognition of the sentential relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14640–14640 · Refutation of a Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 5/9

It may further be said that in such a case there is merely non-apprehension of the absence of a sentential relation among the meanings.

But this objection too is not tenable, because in such a case there is no obstacle to apprehending a sentential relation among the meanings.

It may now be proposed that the property of being a meaning remembered from words uttered by a trustworthy person is either a necessary qualifier of the inferential reason—that is, a qualifier of the sign—or is itself the sign.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14641–14643 · Refutation of a Second Objection; Proposal to Treat Being Uttered by a Trustwo

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 6/9

Such being-remembered-from-trustworthy-words is absent with regard to the relation between river and bank.

Being remembered from words uttered by a trustworthy person is a necessary condition for establishing the validity of the word-meaning; therefore meanings become causes of verbal cognition only when understood to possess this property.

Just as cognition of a sign qualified by pervasion is indispensable for inferential cognition, cognition of a meaning remembered from words uttered by a trustworthy person is indispensable for verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14643–14643 · Proposal to Treat Being Uttered by a Trustworthy Person as a Qualifier of the

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 7/9

In ordinary linguistic usage, this property is understood to be present because the utterance is not rooted in error; in Vedic words and Smriti, its presence is understood because of the unanimous acceptance of great authorities.

No; this proposal is not tenable.

In many cases trustworthiness may be cognized even in an untrustworthy person; and in many other cases trustworthiness cannot be cognized even in a trustworthy person, because human beings are naturally prone to error.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14644–14646 · Proposal to Treat Being Uttered by a Trustworthy Person as a Qualifier of the

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 8/9

In the present context, trustworthiness in the form of possessing true cognition of the sentence meaning cannot be known before actual cognition of the sentence meaning.

The means of knowing trustworthiness—absence of being rooted in error and agreement with an original statement that prompts action—cannot be known before actual cognition of the sentence meaning, that is, verbal cognition.

Moreover, use of the expression "prompting action" is coherent even when there is merely doubt whether the statement was uttered by a trustworthy person.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14647–14647 · Refutation of the Proposal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further challenges to inferred speech · 9/9

Furthermore, without prior cognition of the specific relation expressed in "This person is not deluded and possesses true cognition of the relevant relation," it would be impossible to obtain cognition of the sentence meaning.

But the sentence meaning cannot be determined before the actual semantic relation among the meanings is known.

KEY INSIGHT

The words and a speaker's trustworthiness are not the same kind of sign.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14648–14648 · Refutation of the Proposal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 1/9

Our Naiyayika view here is as follows: semantic fitness is the absence of the causal complex of a defeating cognition; but this fitness is not a qualifier of an inferential reason.

For the general absence of the causal complex of defeating cognition cannot be ascertained in all places and all conditions.

Verbal cognition of a relation arises from words even when there is doubt about the presence of fitness.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14650–14650 · Establishing Verbal Testimony as a Distinct Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 2/9

Cognition of fitness, which remains equally applicable to positive determination and doubt concerning absence, may be regarded as a generative cause of the validity of words.

Thus verbal testimony is established as a distinct means of knowledge.

But the Old Mimamsakas hold as follows: in the case of ordinary non-Vedic words, cognition of the sentence meaning can be established by inference

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14650–14652 · Establishing Verbal Testimony as a Distinct Means of Knowledge; The View of th

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 3/9

of the speaker's cognition of the sentence meaning, or by an inference of the relation dependent on that inference of the speaker's cognition.

Therefore ordinary non-Vedic words are merely reiterative— that is, they restate a meaning already known.

In the case of Vedic words, inference of the speaker's cognition of the sentence meaning and the like is not required; therefore Vedic words are independently a means of knowledge and are not reiterative.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14652–14653 · The View of the Old Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 4/9

No; this view of the Old Mimamsakas is not tenable.

The causal complex accepted in the case of Vedic words can also produce, in the case of ordinary words, cognition of the sentential relation among meanings.

Otherwise even the reiterative status of ordinary words could not be established.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14655–14656 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 5/9

Although cognition of the inferential reason may be obtained before the complete causal complex of verbal cognition,

inference of the speaker's cognition of the sentence meaning is delayed because recollection of the pervasion between reason and probandum is delayed.

Because, in words uttered by an untrustworthy person, the causal complex deviates from the result, the causal complex of verbal cognition in ordinary words—

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14656–14657 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 6/9

even though of the same form as the causal complex in Vedic words—cannot be regarded as a determinative producer of valid verbal cognition.

But this objection is not tenable.

Sense organs such as the eye sometimes generate erroneous cognition; nevertheless, even without certainty that they cannot produce erroneous cognition, they are accepted as means of valid perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14657–14658 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 7/9

It may again be objected that a word which produces its result only when understood to have been uttered by a trustworthy

person will not be capable of producing determinate cognition of the relation among meanings when trustworthiness is doubtful.

The same applies to an inferential reason.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14659–14659 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 8/9

But this objection too is not tenable.

Doubt concerning the sequence of phonemes in a sentence is not possible, because the phoneme-sequence is fixed in an ordinary non-Vedic sentence.

Doubt concerning the validity of the verbal cognition produced by ordinary non-Vedic words arises only after verbal cognition has arisen.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14660–14660 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Distinct testimony versus old Mīmāṃsā · 9/9

Doubt as to whether the words were uttered by a trustworthy person likewise cannot prevent verbal cognition, because determination that they were uttered by a trustworthy person is not an auxiliary cause of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Verbal cognition is argued to stand apart from inference.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14660–14660 · Refutation of the Old Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 1/10

It may again be objected that in the case of ordinary words, cognition of the sentence meaning does not arise while the fact of their being

uttered by a trustworthy person remains doubtful; therefore determination of trustworthiness must be taken as an auxiliary cause of cognition.

Hence it must be accepted that cognition of the sentence meaning is produced by an inference that establishes the utterance as generated by true cognition of the sentence meaning and depends on the fact of being uttered by a trustworthy person.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14662–14662 · Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 2/10

But this objection is not tenable.

In the Veda, words are certainly accepted as capable of producing cognition of the sentence meaning despite the absence of their having been uttered by a trustworthy person.

In the case of Smriti too, the words and sentences of Manu and others, studied as secondary authorities consonant with the Veda, are held capable of producing determinate cognition of the sentence

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14663–14663 · Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 3/10

meaning in southern practitioners who mistakenly regard the Veda as non-human, even without determination that those words were uttered by trustworthy persons.

The determination of the sentence meaning produced by such words is not erroneous, because it is not defeated.

Nor can determination of the meaning be called erroneous, because even after it is ascertained that the words of Manu and others are human utterances, the same determination continues to have uncontradicted meanings as its objects.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14663–14664 · Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 4/10

It may now be objected that the determination of the sentence meaning produced by non-Vedic words of Smriti is merely non-apprehension of the absence of a sentential relation among the meanings.

But this objection is not tenable.

If, even in the absence of defeat of the sentence meaning, mere non-apprehension of the absence of sentential relation were admitted, the entire conception of cognition of sentential relation would collapse.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14666–14667 · Refutation of the Objection That Words of Smriti Produce Mere Non-Apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 5/10

It may further be said that because the result in the form of cognition of relation is not produced, the cause in the form of being uttered by a trustworthy person is absent.

But this objection too is not tenable.

Since, in the words of Manu and others, that condition deviates from the result consisting of cognition of relation, the causality of trustworthiness is opposed to the facts in the context of cognition of relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14668–14668 · Refutation of the Objection That Words of Smriti Produce Mere Non-Apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 6/10

It may then be said that being uttered by a trustworthy person is an auxiliary cause only for those words that are clearly understood to be ordinary human utterances.

But this objection too is not tenable, because there is no evidence establishing such causality.

Moreover, before actual cognition of the sentence meaning, the inferential reason in the form of cognition of the relation cannot be established; consequently, cognition of the sentence meaning cannot be taken as obtained by inference either.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14669–14669 · Refutation of the Objection That Words of Smriti Produce Mere Non-Apprehension

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 7/10

It may again be objected that merely removing doubt concerning the utterance's being untrustworthy is an auxiliary cause of cognition.

In the case of the Veda this doubt is removed by determination of its non-human authorship, and in the case of ordinary words of Smriti and the like by determination that they were uttered by a trustworthy person.

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14671–14672 · Final Refutation of the Objection of the Old Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 8/10

Determination of such a condition is impossible.

If cognition of the sentence meaning were possible merely from determination of non-human authorship, then even Vedic cognition of sentence meaning would become a repetition of inference;

for the sentential relation among meanings in the Veda would then have to be apprehended merely as a relation among meanings remembered from words possessing expectancy and the other conditions and being non-human words free from human defects.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14672–14672 · Final Refutation of the Objection of the Old Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 9/10

For this reason Udayanacharya says: "If you hold that ordinary words are reiterative because of the mutual relation among meanings remembered from words free from doubt concerning human defects, why do you not, on the same ground,

regard Vedic words as reiterative too?" Thus, on the assumption that true cognition of the sentence meaning can be obtained by inference alone, the validity of neither ordinary nor Vedic words can be sustained.

Ultimately, on the basis of Udayana's statement, the Naiyayikas refute the Old Mimamsaka objection: if verbal cognition from ordinary words is regarded

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14673–14674 · Final Refutation of the Objection of the Old Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Memory, Veda and final objections · 10/10

as an inferential repetition on the basis of words free from human defects, then on the same basis Vedic words too would be established as reiterative.

KEY INSIGHT

The attempted reduction of verbal knowledge faces further counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14674–14674 · Final Refutation of the Objection of the Old Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does the sentence contribute?

Inferential reduction

- The hearer is said to infer a relation from features of the utterance.
- A speaker’s trustworthiness may be proposed as a sign.
- Fitness or its cognition may be made an inferential condition.

Independent verbal testimony

- A semantically fit sentence can produce sentential cognition.
- Inferential premises are not always available beforehand.
- Competing accounts of Vedic and ordinary speech require separate analysis.

The source tests how verbal understanding arises, not merely whether the speaker is believable.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Verbal Testimony as an Independent Pramāṇa

Fitness

Semantic compatibility must be examined in particular cases.

Counterexample

An untrustworthy speaker is not enough to settle linguistic causation.

Veda and Smṛti

Claims about authorship and validity are examined separately.

Open issue


The Prābhākara position introduces speaker intention as a causal proposal.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Trustworthiness · defect · desire · sentence meaning

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Speaker Intention and the Prābhākara Account

1

Against simple trustworthiness

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

2

The role of known intention

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cogniti

3

From desire to inference

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed

4

Ritualist objections and conclusion

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 1/10

> The Prabhakaras hold as follows: the state of being words uttered by a speaker with the intention of producing true cognition of the word-meaning, or the speaker's intention itself—
>
> which is absent in deviant words but present in the non-deviant ordinary words of a trustworthy person—must be accepted as the cause of true cognition of word-meaning from ordinary valid words.
>
> The absence of such a cause prevents the production of true cognition from ordinary words uttered by an untrustworthy person.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14676–14676 · The Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 2/10

Otherwise it would be impossible to explain the difference of results in the presence and absence of verbal cognition.

This cause is effective only when its presence in ordinary words is known together with determination of their status as a means of knowledge.

For it is a cause of true cognition through a specific property—absent in deviant words that generate erroneous cognition and present in valid words as a specific cause, like pervasion and word-power.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14676–14677 · The Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 3/10

Otherwise the possibility of erroneous verbal cognition would disappear.

Being uttered by a trustworthy person cannot be accepted as the cause of true verbal cognition.

For this property is absent in words repeated by a parrot in conformity with an original valid sentence,

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14677–14679 · The Prabhakara View; Being Uttered by a Trustworthy Person Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 4/10

in words of a deluded person or deceiver that happen to conform to an original valid sentence, and in Vedic words; nevertheless all these words can become means of true cognition.

Nor can it be said that, excluding deviant words, there is an inferential reason available for establishing trustworthiness.

And if such a reason were admitted, only words possessing that inferential reason would have to be regarded as means of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14679–14680 · Being Uttered by a Trustworthy Person Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 5/10

Inference of trustworthiness is itself impossible because no sign of it is available.

If some reason such as "being generated by cognition of the meaning while preceded by cognition of the absence of defect" were postulated, only words possessing that reason would become valid.

Therefore establishing trustworthiness as a cause is pointless.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14681–14681 · Being Uttered by a Trustworthy Person Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 6/10

> This also refutes the view that absence of sharpness of the instrument, desire to deceive people, carelessness, and human defects or perceptual error are not causes of false cognition because they deviate from one another and,

> even taken collectively, do not pervade all erroneous cognition; hence only absence of trustworthiness should be taken as the cause of false verbal cognition, and its absence—that is, trustworthiness—as the cause of true verbal cognition.

> But before actual verbal cognition no inferential reason is available that gives cognition of trustworthiness; consequently, even such absence of trustworthiness cannot be accepted as a cause of false cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14683–14684 · Refutation of an Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 7/10

> Absence of Doubt about Deviation Therefore the following view too is refuted: the cause of verbal cognition from ordinary words is absence of doubt about the deviation of those words;

> an error based on inference of trustworthiness is destroyed when the inference concerning the speaker's trustworthiness is destroyed; whereas in the case of Vedic words such doubt is removed by determination of the absence of human authorship.

> For before actual cognition of the sentence meaning from ordinary words, the intended relation among the meanings is not known; therefore the probandum consisting in trustworthiness cannot be established.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14686–14687 · Refutation of the Reason Consisting in

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 8/10

> And if cognition of the relation among meanings in Vedic words too is taken to arise merely on the basis of meanings remembered from words free from human defects, the reiterative status of Vedic words will remain unavoidable.

> Absence of human defect or error cannot be accepted as the cause of verbal cognition.

> For when a sentence of a deceiver or deluded person has not been directly recognized as conforming to the sentence of a trustworthy and non-deluded person, absence of defect is not present in the resulting sentence cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14687–14689 · Refutation of the Reason Consisting in; Absence of Defect Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 9/10

> Nor can it be said that mere absence of defect is the cause of verbal cognition, while the sentences of a deceiver and a deluded person are themselves inactive and results such as action arise from perception of the relation among meanings.

> For this view contradicts the actual experience, "I know the cow from the word 'cow.'" There is also disagreement as to whether mere absence of defect should be accepted as a cause; and on such a view even Vedic words would become reiterative.

> Moreover, if absence of human defect is accepted as the cause of true verbal cognition, human defect or error would become the cause of false verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14690–14693 · Absence of Defect Is Not the Cause; Further Difficulty in Accepting Absence of

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Against simple trustworthiness · 10/10

If each defect such as delusion is taken separately as a cause, deviation results; if all defects are taken collectively as the cause, false verbal cognition produced by only one defect would become impossible.

If each human defect such as perceptual error is separately taken as an inhibitor of true verbal cognition, recurrent generality is lost;

and if all are taken as one collective inhibitor, there arises the defect that false verbal cognition would not be produced even when one defect is present.

KEY INSIGHT

A parrot, a mistaken speaker and the absence of defect test causal claims.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14693–14694 · Further Difficulty in Accepting Absence of Defect as the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 1/12

Therefore the state of being words uttered by a speaker with the intention of conveying a true meaning—having true intention—or the speaker's intention itself is the cause of true verbal cognition.

This condition consists in having true cognition of the sentence meaning as the intended result or goal.

It is present equally in both Vedic and ordinary non-Vedic words.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14696–14696 · Conclusion: Intention to Convey the True Meaning Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 2/12

From the absence of this condition arises absence of verbal cognition; and the absence of such a condition is itself the defect or inhibitor.

Generally, something is not a defect merely because it falls under a class of defects.

Only that defect in utterance is counted as a defect which, because the words were not uttered with the intention of producing true cognition, destroys the cause of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14696–14698 · Conclusion: Intention to Convey the True Meaning Is the Cause; A Defect Is Not

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 3/12

For this very reason, sentences of deluded persons, deceivers, parrots, and the like can become means of true cognition when they conform to an original true sentence.

But if in the statement "gehe ghato'sti"—"There is a pot in the house"—the speaker intends a blue pot, while the hearer sees a yellow pot and brings the yellow pot,

then those words are not a valid means of knowledge, because their intention is to convey only the blue pot.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14699–14699 · A Defect Is Not Merely Membership in a Class of Defects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 4/12

The action of bringing the yellow pot is to be explained solely by perception.

For this very reason, in a sentence such as "yastih praveshaya"—"Bring the stick-bearers inside"—

the words are not a means of valid cognition of the primary meaning "stick." The rule is that the meaning of words extends only so far as the meaning intended to be conveyed by using them.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14700–14700 · A Defect Is Not Merely Membership in a Class of Defects

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 5/12

Such speaker's intention, or having true intention, is a cause of verbal cognition only insofar as it is understood to be present in the words.

For it is understood to be absent in deviant words and present in valid words as a specific cause, just like word-power and the pervasion of an inferential reason.

Otherwise distinctions among verbal cognitions conveying different non-principal word-meanings could not be determined.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14702–14703 · Known Intention Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 6/12

The rule that cognition does not arise from a deceptive pseudo-verbal expression when the speaker's intention is doubtful would likewise collapse.

Therefore it must be accepted that false verbal cognition arises from erroneous cognition of the speaker's intention, or erroneous cognition that the words were uttered with the intention of conveying a true meaning.

For this very reason, in "yastih praveshaya"—"Bring the stick-bearers inside"—the meaning indicated through secondary signification is understood;

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14703–14704 · Known Intention Is the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 7/12

and in an ambiguous sentence such as "saindhavam anaya"—"Bring the saindhava"—the specifically intended meaning, either salt or a horse, is understood.

Determination of secondary signification and of the word's power in a specific meaning is based on cognition of the speaker's intention.

On the other hand, if a word were taken to convey only that meaning in which the speaker's intention actually resides,

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14704–14706 · Known Intention Is the Cause; Statement of a Supporting Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 8/12

then the impossibility of a sentential relation between one primary word-meaning and another primary word-meaning would no longer be useful in postulating secondary power in any particular word.

For this reason—because intention functions as a cause only when known—from utterance of the predicate alone, "He cooks," the verbal cognition of the relation "He cooks peas" does not arise when

recollection of peas from the word "peas" has occurred through someone else's utterance or one's own prior memory, because in such a case the presence of the speaker's intention in the words has not been ascertained.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14706–14707 · Statement of a Supporting Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 9/12

It may now be objected that cognition of context and the like, which generates cognition of the speaker's intention, is prior to cognition of the speaker's intention; therefore only that cognition of context is required for verbal cognition.

Consequently, in the production of verbal cognition by words, cognition of the speaker's intention would not be an auxiliary cause; only cognition of context would be.

But this is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14708–14709 · Statement of a Supporting Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 10/12

Contexts such as eating and going are not mutually uniform and deviate from one another; therefore they cannot be auxiliary causes of verbal cognition.

Nevertheless cognition of context, because it is pervaded by cognition of the speaker's intention, can produce cognition of that intention—

just as cognition of a specific smoke distinct from smoke in general produces cognition of the object by which it is pervaded.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14709–14709 · Statement of a Supporting Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 11/12

In the case of Vedic words, cognition of the speaker's intention is obtained through the rule of economy accepted by the Mimamsakas; and the meaning with respect to which intention is fixed by this rule of economy is the Vedic meaning.

But in the case of ordinary words, cognition of the speaker's intention is not governed solely by the rule of economy, but by ordinary human convention.

For words used by ordinary people produce cognition of the objects desired by them, even though those objects need not be obtained by the rule of economy propounded by the Mimamsakas.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14711–14712 · Ordinary Words Are Reiterative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The role of known intention · 12/12

Therefore ordinary words are reiterative—that is, they restate cognition already produced by inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Intention to convey a true meaning is proposed as necessary for verbal cognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14712–14712 · Ordinary Words Are Reiterative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 1/13

A speaker utters a sentence with the desire—that is, the intention—to produce cognition of the sentence meaning in the hearer.

Only when such desire is preceded by the speaker's true cognition of the sentence meaning—that is, produced from that cognition—

can the speaker's utterance be regarded as an utterance intended to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning and pervaded by the speaker's desire to produce such true cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14714–14714 · Intention Is a Desire Preceded by True Cognition of the Sentence Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 2/13

Therefore, without ascertaining the presence in the speaker of true cognition of the sentence meaning, it cannot be ascertained that the sentence was uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning.

Hence the hearer must first infer, from the statement of a trustworthy person, the validity of the speaker's cognition of the sentence meaning;

only thereafter can the hearer determine the speaker's intention to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14715–14715 · Intention Is a Desire Preceded by True Cognition of the Sentence Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 3/13

The general inference establishing true cognition of the sentence meaning in the speaker is as follows: "The utterance of the sentence 'ghatam anaya'—'Bring the pot'—

is an effect produced by qualificative cognition or by error and the like; but it is not produced by error, because it is the statement of a trustworthy person."

Thereafter, once absence of error in the speaker concerning the sentence meaning is ascertained, the hearer infers the speaker's true cognition of the sentence meaning by means of a negative qualifier as follows:

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14717–14718 · Form of the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 4/13

> "This speaker possesses true cognition of the meaning of the sentence used by him, because he is a user of this sentence and is not, like me, a user of a sentence generated by error."

> Here trustworthiness is not the reason for inferring cognition of the sentence meaning, because it is not distinct from the probandum—true cognition of the sentence meaning.

> Finally, by an inference of the following form the hearer obtains the sentence meaning, that is, verbal cognition: "These meanings—pot and the like—stand in an appropriate or semantically fit sentential relation with other meanings—

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer's reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14718–14721 · Form of the Inference; Acquisition of Verbal Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 5/13

objecthood and the like—because they are objects of the speaker's true cognition of the sentence meaning, and

because they have been remembered from words uttered by a trustworthy person, just like the meanings remembered from words uttered by myself."

In the stated inference, some specific qualificative cognition of the sentence meaning must be inferred in the speaker.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14721–14723 · Acquisition of Verbal Cognition; Objection Concerning Absence of Pervasion in

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 6/13

In such cognition only a specific meaning—such as objecthood in an individual pot—is the qualified or qualified object.

But what grammarians call the "form," an entity distinct from the meaning and dependent on it, cannot be the qualified object.

In Udayana's verse, "arthenaiva vishesho hi nirakarataya dhiyam," the instrumental expression "arthena" is used secondarily; it does not convey qualifierhood in the form of an image.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer's reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14723–14724 · Objection Concerning Absence of Pervasion in the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 7/13

Likewise, in "cognition of the sentence meaning," the expression "cognition of meaning" is also secondary; it does not convey qualificative cognition of meanings in their specific form.

Therefore only specific cognition of the sentence meaning must be taken as the probandum of the inference.

But as long as such specific cognition has not been established, the pervasion of the reason by the probandum cannot be established.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14724–14725 · Objection Concerning Absence of Pervasion in the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 8/13

Therefore it cannot be determined whether the speaker is non-erroneous or trustworthy concerning the sentence meaning; consequently, mere words such as "ghatam anaya" must be accepted as conveying the meanings.

No; this objection is not tenable.

You Naiyayikas too must accept that, in order to determine the speaker's intention —the intention to produce qualificative

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14725–14726 · Objection Concerning Absence of Pervasion in the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 9/13

cognition of the relation among meanings—the cognition of the specific relation among meanings is non-verbal, that is, inferential.

Otherwise the speaker's intention could never be determined.

For this very reason, both the fact of being uttered by a trustworthy person and the state of not being generated by error can be explicitly established.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14726–14727 · Objection Concerning Absence of Pervasion in the Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 10/13

Before the speaker's intention is obtained, verbal cognition of the sentential relation among meanings is impossible; but inferential cognition of that relation is possible before the speaker's intention is obtained.

It may be objected that once cognition of the relation among meanings has already been established by inference before actual verbal cognition, words cannot be accepted as an independent means of knowledge.

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14729–14731 · Cognition of the Verbal Relation Is Not Possible Beforehand

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 11/13

The same defect occurs in your Naiyayika view, because qualificative cognition of the relation among meanings is a constituent of the speaker's intention.

It may again be objected: how can cognition of a specific relation among specific meanings be established by inference when pervasion of the reason with the specific probandum cannot previously be grasped?

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer's reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14731–14733 · Cognition of the Verbal Relation Is Not Possible Beforehand

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 12/13

After a general pervasion has been grasped—the general rule that a person engaged in an action has cognition of that action—

observation of a person engaged in cooking allows one to infer cognition of the result-producing character of the cooking action.

Likewise, from observing a person move a finger ten times near ten pots, on the basis of the pervasion that a person moving a finger generally intends to count, one infers specifically the intention to count ten pots.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14733–14733 · Cognition of the Verbal Relation Is Not Possible Beforehand

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

From desire to inference · 13/13

In the same way, in the present context too, after grasping a general pervasion, qualificative cognition of a specific relation among specific meanings can be established by inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The hearer’s reasoning through fit relations and sentence meaning is developed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14734–14734 · Cognition of the Verbal Relation Is Not Possible Beforehand

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 1/8

Alternatively, the process for obtaining specific cognition of the specific relation among meanings may be stated as follows.

First the hearer infers: "This sentence is an effect produced by a single cognition of specific meanings possessing expectancy and the other conditions, because,

although it is a set of words uttered by a trustworthy person, it conveys specific meanings, just like my own sentence."

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14736–14736 · Alternative Procedure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 2/8

Thereafter, after establishing the pervasion, the hearer infers specific cognition of the sentence meaning as follows: "These specific meanings stand in a specific sentential relation to one another,

because they are objects of one cognition—just as cognition of a pot qualified by objecthood is an object of the true cognition of silver qualified by silverhood."

Thus, after true cognition of a specific sentence meaning has been inferred in the speaker, the hearer, from context and the like,

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14737–14738 · Alternative Procedure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 3/8

takes the ordinary sentence to be intended to produce true cognition of the specific sentence meaning intended by the speaker.

Thereafter, because the causal complex is the same as in Vedic words, the hearer obtains cognition of the sentence meaning indirectly from those words.

But specific cognition of the sentence meaning has already been established by inference—sometimes by treating relational cognition as a qualifier in the speaker's cognition, sometimes by an inference dependent on relational cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14738–14739 · Alternative Procedure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 4/8

Therefore ordinary words are established as reiterative, that is, repetitive.

One group of ritualists objects here as follows: error is merely indeterminate cognition of the sentential relation among meanings.

Therefore absence of such error—that is, absence of indeterminate cognition—is qualificative cognition of the relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14739–14741 · Alternative Procedure; Objection of One Group of Ritualists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 5/8

Accordingly, when the Prabhakaras infer absence of error, only qualificative cognition of the relation is inferred.

Inference of the speaker's cognition is included merely as a constituent in inference of the speaker's trustworthiness.

Consequently, inference of absence of error does not become the reason for inference of the speaker's cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14742–14742 · Objection of One Group of Ritualists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 6/8

No; this objection is not tenable.

Erroneous cognition can be of two kinds: (1) cognition that does not make difference in form its object, and (2) cognition that does not make difference of objects its object.

Likewise, absence of these two kinds of erroneous cognition is of two kinds: (1) cognition that makes difference in form its object, and (2) cognition that makes difference of objects its object.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14743–14743 · Objection of One Group of Ritualists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 7/8

The word "error" is never used in the sense of absence of qualificative cognition of a relation; even in sleep, non-apprehension of the absence of relational cognition is not called "error."

Therefore it is not necessary to accept that inference of the speaker's cognition arises only after absence of erroneous cognition has been ascertained.

If inference that the words were uttered by a trustworthy person is itself taken as an inference of absence of error, then the reason in that very inference—

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14744–14747 · Objection of One Group of Ritualists; The Prabhakara Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritualist objections and conclusion · 8/8

the property of the words consisting in being uttered by a trustworthy person—produces inference of the speaker's cognition, and thus becomes a cause of cognition of the sentence meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is stated before the Naiyāyika response.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14747–14747 · The Prabhakara Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does intention generate verbal understanding?

The Prābhākara account

- A speaker desires the hearer to cognize the sentence meaning.
- The desire is analyzed as preceded by the speaker's true cognition.
- Recognition or inference of intention is said to explain comprehension.

Questions raised in the debate

- True speech can be repeated without the original speaker's intention.
- The absence of defect may not suffice to explain cognition.
- The proof must avoid presupposing the very sentence meaning at issue.

The position and its criticisms remain distinct until the next presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Speaker Intention and the Prābhākara Account

Trust

Being uttered by a trustworthy person is tested, not simply assumed.

Intention

A desire to communicate a sentence meaning is analyzed.

Inference

The proposed reasoning depends on knowing linguistic relations.

Next step


Gangeśa's Naiyāyika siddhānta responds to these reductions.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Siddhānta · secondary signification · verbal pramāṇa

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Naiyāyika Conclusion on Verbal Testimony

1

Naiyāyika established doctrine

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

2

Refuting rival causal conditions

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

3

Fitness and secondary signification

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

4

Independent testimony and conclusion

Expectancy and related conditions are auxiliary; the doctrine is formally clos

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 1/17

> Here the Naiyayikas state their established doctrine as follows: the state of being words uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning need not be accepted,

> merely insofar as it is understood to be present in the words, as the extraordinary cause of true cognition of the sentence meaning.

> For such a view involves unnecessary complexity; and before actual cognition of the sentence meaning is obtained, it cannot even be ascertained that the words were uttered with this intention.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14749–14749 · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 2/17

It has also been said that, after error and the like have been removed, an inference of the true cognition of the sentence meaning intended by the speaker arises in the case of ordinary non-Vedic words—

sometimes indirectly as a qualifier of that cognition in the speaker, sometimes directly after the speaker's cognition; thereafter, from context and the like, the intention of the words to produce true cognition of the meaning is determined.

But this statement is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14750–14751 · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 3/17

Without first knowing the actual sentence meaning, the determination "This speaker is not erroneous regarding the sentence meaning" cannot occur.

Human speakers are capable of error and mistake; therefore, before actual qualificative cognition of the sentence meaning, it cannot be determined that the words are not generated by error and the like.

The hearer's action and agreement with an original statement are likewise possible only after actual cognition of the sentence meaning; therefore these cannot become inferential reasons.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14751–14752 · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 4/17

Consequently, inference of cognition of the state that the words were uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning is untenable,

because the hearer's action occurs only after actual cognition of the sentence meaning has been obtained.

Therefore the Naiyayikas establish verbal testimony as a distinct means of knowledge, because an inference that produces cognition of the sentence meaning cannot be established.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14752–14753 · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 5/17

In ordinary non-Vedic words, there is no available determination that words generating true cognition are distinct from words produced by error and the like.

But if those words are in fact distinct, on the basis of that distinction the accepted words can unobstructedly be regarded as means of cognition of the sentence meaning.

In the case of Vedic words too, the state of being uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning, or the speaker's intention,

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14755–14756 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 6/17

cannot be ascertained by Mimamsaka tradition or reasoning without knowing the actual sentence meaning, because cognition of such a state would have to be taken as produced from the meanings themselves.

In the case of ordinary non-Vedic words, even you Prabhakaras must accept that before the actual sentence meaning arises, non-verbal—that is, inferential—cognition of the sentence meaning arises in order to determine the speaker's intention.

Otherwise inference of the speaker's cognition would not be possible.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14756–14757 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 7/17

It may again be objected that, just as in the case of ordinary words, so in the case of Vedic words too,

qualificative cognition of the sentence meaning produced from the meanings arises from a means of knowledge other than verbal testimony—namely inference.

But this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14758–14759 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 8/17

Vedic meanings are not objects of another means of knowledge such as inference.

For Vedic words would become mute—that is, incapable of themselves producing qualificative cognition of the sentence meaning—if,

before actual cognition of the sentence meaning, cognition of the speaker's intention to produce the true sentence meaning were unavailable.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14759–14759 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 9/17

It may further be said that after the meaning of Vedic words has been ascertained through tradition or reasoning,

cognition of the speaker's intention to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning can be obtained through another means of knowledge such as inference.

But this objection too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14761–14762 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 10/17

In that case Vedic words would become reiterative.

Then both Vedic and ordinary non-Vedic words would be established as reiterative, and verbal testimony would cease altogether to be a means of knowledge.

Moreover, when the sentence meaning has not been known from the words, neither reasoning nor doubt is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14762–14763 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 11/17

It may be said that in reasoning such as "If this meaning were not related to another meaning, the Vedic sentence meaning would be impossible," or in doubt such

as "Is this meaning related to another meaning or not?" the sentential relation among the meanings is partially specified by one or both sides of the proposition.

But this too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14764–14765 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 12/17

When the mutual sentential relation among the meanings has not been ascertained at all, the speaker's intention to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning cannot be ascertained.

For reasoning and doubt concern only meanings understood as unrelated or whose very existence is uncertain; therefore they do not have the complete sentence meaning as their object.

Moreover, if reasoning or doubt were held to have the sentence meaning consisting in the relation among meanings as its object,

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14765–14766 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 13/17

then the sentence meaning in ordinary words too could be obtained from that same reasoning or doubt; consequently inference of the speaker's cognition would become pointless.

In fact, if the state of being words uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning—having true intention—

is accepted as the cause of verbal cognition only insofar as it is understood to be present in the words, verbal testimony in general would cease to be a means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14766–14768 · Being Generated by Error and the Like Is Not the Probandum; Statement of the D

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 14/17

> For in both Vedic and ordinary non-Vedic words, inference of the sentential relation among meanings is possible merely on the basis of their having been remembered from those words.

> Once it is inferred that ordinary people's sentences are produced by one of two causes—defect or qualificative cognition—negative determination that they are not produced by human defect allows them not to be regarded as defect-generated.

> In such a case the entire causal complex of verbal cognition, just like that of a Vedic sentence, is available in the ordinary sentence too; consequently determination of the sentence meaning will arise from that very complex.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14768–14769 · Statement of the Defeater

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 15/17

For this reason ordinary words too would become intrinsically valid like Vedic words.

Inference of the speaker's intention, which depends on inference that the words are free from human defects, arises later because recollection of pervasion is delayed; therefore it cannot be regarded as a cause of verbal cognition.

This also refutes the view that the state of being words uttered with the intention of conveying an uncontradicted meaning is the cause of true verbal cognition in both ordinary and Vedic words.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14770–14772 · Statement of the Defeater; Refutation of a View Held by One Group of Mimamsaka

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 16/17

For in the case of ordinary words, even though the sentence meaning appears uncontradicted, the hearer cannot determine its

uncontradictedness without sense-generated cognition of the sentence meaning or inference of the speaker's trustworthiness.

But in the case of Vedic words the sentence meaning is never contradicted; therefore its uncontradictedness can be determined by reasoning alone.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14772–14772 · Refutation of a View Held by One Group of Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika established doctrine · 17/17

No; the requirement of another means of knowledge such as inference for verbal cognition cannot be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Cognition of sentence meaning need not await an inference of true intention.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14773–14773 · Refutation of a View Held by One Group of Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 1/15

Before actual verbal cognition, both absence of error—that is, the state of not being generated by human defect—and the speaker's trustworthiness cannot be ascertained because an inferential reason is absent.

If determination of the absence of defeat in a specific sentence meaning is accepted as a cause of verbal cognition, even Vedic words would become reiterative.

Therefore cognition of not being generated by error and the like, cognition of being uttered by a trustworthy person, cognition of being words that generate an uncontradicted meaning,

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14775–14777 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 2/15

cognition of being uttered with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning, cognition of being words free from doubt about deviation, and cognition of being words distinct from deviant words—

all these must be regarded as auxiliary conditions that function merely by being actually present, not as understood to be present in the words.

Otherwise the relation among meanings remembered from the non-deviant words of a trustworthy person would be established merely by inference;

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14777–14778 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 3/15

consequently only the Vaisheshika doctrine that verbal testimony is included within inference would be established.

It may now be objected that words such as "ghatam anaya"—"Bring the pot"—are regarded, in producing cognition of word-meaning, as causes of cognition of the pot qualified by objecthood and related to the act of bringing.

Thus the words cause cognition of the relation of the meanings to the action; but the words themselves merely remind one of meanings related to the action.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14778–14779 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 4/15

Therefore the words themselves are not inferential reasons of verbal cognition.

But this objection is not tenable.

Once cognition of the relation of meanings to the action is taken to be produced by cognition of the words, postulating causality on the basis of expectancy

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14779–14780 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 5/15

and the like in the words introduces unnecessary complexity, because there is no independent reason from which that relational cognition could be inferred.

It may further be said that cognition of the words will be the inferential reason, but a child does not understand the words.

This objection too is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14780–14781 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 6/15

The child's lack of cognition of the words is the child's defect; such a defect does not destroy the status of the words as an inferential reason.

If being uttered by a trustworthy person and the like are accepted as auxiliary causes of verbal cognition, Vedic words too would be established as reiterative just like ordinary words.

The refutation of the Prabhakara view also refutes the Vaisheshika position that "inference of the speaker's intention to produce the sentence meaning, as the delimitor of cognition of that intention,

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14781–14784 · Final Refutation of the Prabhakara View; Final Refutation of the Vaisheshika V

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 7/15

produces the sentence meaning independently of the words; therefore verbal testimony is not a distinct means of knowledge." For the

speaker's intention to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning is not a cause of actual cognition of the sentence meaning.

Some scholars say that the state of being words uttered by the speaker with the intention of producing true cognition of the sentence meaning is an auxiliary cause of verbal cognition only when it is known as a specific cause of the words.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14784–14786 · Final Refutation of the Vaisheshika View; Having True Intention Is Not the Cau

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 8/15

But this view too is not tenable.

Before actual cognition of the sentence meaning, having true intention and the like cannot be ascertained;

therefore words possessing such a condition, distinct from deviant words and present in valid words, cannot be established as an inferential reason.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14787–14787 · Having True Intention Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 9/15

Nor can pervasion between the inferential reason and the probandum consisting in cognition of the sentence meaning be established.

Nor can it be said that pervasion and word-power are causes only insofar as known.

For inference occurs even concerning past events when the inferential reason has already ceased to exist; and cognition of the relation between word and meaning arises even from a corrupt word on the basis of erroneous cognition of word-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14788–14789 · Having True Intention Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 10/15

Therefore cognition of pervasion is the cause, not pervasion itself; cognition of word-power is the cause, not word-power itself.

Consequently known true intention too cannot be the cause.

Nor is it proper to take having true intention as the probandum in an inference of cognition of the speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14789–14790 · Having True Intention Is Not the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · ११/१५

For before actual verbal cognition, having true intention is impossible to establish; therefore it cannot function as the probandum either.

Therefore cognition that ordinary words are distinct from deviant words must be regarded as useful in inference of cognition of the

sentence meaning only when the ordinary words serving as the means are understood to be non-deviant with respect to the meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14790–14792 · Having True Intention Is Not the Cause; Statement of a Limiting Condition in t

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 12/15

Otherwise, if words generally understood to be non-deviant with respect to their meanings are treated as inferential reasons for cognition of the sentence meaning,

all words including Vedic words would become inferential reasons and inference of the sentence meaning would have to be accepted everywhere. Granted.

But when an untrustworthy person utters the sentence "jalena sincati"—"He sprinkles with water"—with the meaning of cooking, the absence of the sentence meaning consisting in cooking is evident from a defeating cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14793–14794 · Statement of a Limiting Condition in the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 13/15

Consequently a doubt arises whether such a sentence, although possessing expectancy and the other conditions, produces the uncontradicted sentence meaning of sprinkling with water or the contradicted meaning consisting in cooking.

Therefore determination of the sentence meaning is not possible merely from cognition and the other factors; an additional cause consisting in determination that the words produce an uncontradicted meaning is necessary.

No; this objection is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14794–14796 · Statement of a Limiting Condition in the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 14/15

It cannot be held that doubt concerning the truth of the word-meaning and the absence of defeat blocks the efficacy of the means of verbal cognition.

For even in the presence of doubt whether fire exists or does not exist, perception and inference produce determination of fire.

Otherwise the efficacy of means of knowledge in general would collapse, because before determination of an object there can always remain doubt concerning its presence or absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14796–14796 · Statement of a Limiting Condition in the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting rival causal conditions · 15/15

Moreover, the sentence "jalena sincati" can be constructed even without understanding the actual meanings of the words.

Therefore doubts whether the act of sprinkling is present, whether the sentence conveys that act,

or whether the cognition produced by the sentence concerns an actual uncontradicted meaning can arise only after the sentence meaning has been understood.

KEY INSIGHT

The account distinguishes words from inferences about the speaker.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14797–14797 · Statement of a Limiting Condition in the Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 1/9

> Therefore being uttered by a trustworthy person, not being generated by error and the like, an intention to produce an uncontradicted meaning, and an intention to produce true cognition of the sentence meaning—

> even if assumed to occur successively—are not causes of verbal cognition insofar as they are understood to be present in the words, because cognition of all these is impossible before actual verbal cognition.

> Of these four, only cognition of one factor—context—or cognition of the word generated by reasoning, as established by the logicians, which assists in grasping the speaker's intention, can be accepted as an auxiliary cause of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14799–14800 · Having True Intention and the Like Are Not Causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 2/9

For cognition of context and the like is pervaded by cognition of the speaker's intention to convey the word-meaning.

Determination of expectancy and proximity should likewise be accepted as auxiliary causes of verbal cognition, because

verbal cognition arises when cognition having these as its objects is present, and even doubt concerning them blocks the production of verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14800–14801 · Having True Intention and the Like Are Not Causes

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 3/9

On the other hand, general cognition of semantic fitness is an auxiliary cause of verbal cognition, because cognition of the sentence meaning arises under all three conditions —doubt, error, or true cognition concerning fitness.

Likewise, cognition of relations among words such as case endings, and cognition that the words were uttered together, are generally auxiliary causes of verbal cognition.

In the case of an ambiguous word, a specific sentence meaning arises by selecting the particular meaning on the basis of educated usage and context, even though many meanings continue to be recalled from the same word.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14803–14805 · Cognition of General Fitness Alone, or the Case of Inflectional Connection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 4/9

In a sentence such as "yastih praveshaya"—"Bring the stick-bearers inside"—cognition of the indicated meaning does not arise merely from impossibility of the speaker's intention;

rather, it arises from impossibility of a sentential relation among the expressed word-meanings.

For the indicated relation "Bring the stick-bearers into the dining hall," known from the context of eating and the speaker's intention, is in no way possible with the expressed meaning "stick."

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14807–14807 · Impossibility of Syntactic Connection Is the Cause of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 5/9

In the case of secondary signification without abandoning the expressed meaning, as in "chatrino yanti"—"The umbrella-bearers are going"—

the agency described by the action of going is understood from context to belong not only to those with umbrellas but also to people without umbrellas.

Therefore restricting the relation of agency solely to the expressed meaning "umbrella-bearers" is untenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14809–14809 · The Basis of Inclusive Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 6/9

In a solitary predicative use such as "pacati"—"He cooks"—even when peas are recalled from the word "kalayam" uttered by another person or from one's own memory,

the word "cooks" does not convey a relation of the act of cooking to peas, because the expectancy-based conjunction of "kalayam" and "pacati" as words uttered together is absent.

Some other scholars hold that, in the case of ambiguous and secondarily used words, cognition of the speaker's intention is necessary for recollection of the specifically intended meaning;

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14810–14812 · The Basis of Inclusive Secondary Signification; View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 7/9

without such cognition of intention, recollection of the specific meaning does not arise from the word.

But cognition of the speaker's intention is not necessary for general cognition of the sentence meaning.

Sometimes, even without understanding the intention, a hearer understands from context that the word "saindhava" denotes a particular kind of horse and that the word "crow" denotes some animal that spoils curd.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14812–14813 · View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 8/9

In words that are neither ambiguous nor used secondarily, recollection of a specific relation occurs even without cognition of intention.

In fact, the speaker's intention is the state in which words are uttered with the purpose of producing cognition of the sentential relation of one meaning with another.

In the case of Vedic words, such intention is ascertained by traditional reasoning; in the case of ordinary words, by reasoning or context and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14813–14815 · View of Other Scholars; Gangesha's Distinction Concerning Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Fitness and secondary signification · 9/9

It is not proper to accept any uncertain or irregular factor as a cause of verbal cognition.

Cognition of the sentential relation among meanings is itself cognition of the sentence meaning; therefore intention to produce such cognition in its specific form is impossible before actual verbal cognition and cannot be a cause.

But the general intention to produce cognition of a relation of one meaning with another is possible before actual verbal cognition; hence words, assisted by such a general intention of the speaker, produce verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Context, ambiguity and incompatibility are treated within word understanding.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14816–14816 · Gangesha's Distinction Concerning Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Independent testimony and conclusion · 1/3

For this very reason, in the case of an ambiguous word, specific cognition of the speaker's intention functions as an auxiliary cause, making determinate cognition of the specific word-meaning possible.

In a sentence such as "yastih praveshaya," secondary signification is postulated because the speaker's intention is impossible with the expressed meaning.

In a solitary predicative use such as "pacati"—"He cooks"—because the speaker lacks the intention to convey a relation between the act of cooking and peas,

KEY INSIGHT

Expectancy and related conditions are auxiliary; the doctrine is formally closed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14818–14819 · Verbal Testimony Is a Distinct Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Independent testimony and conclusion · 2/3

no cognition of that relation arises with peas remembered from the word "kalayam" uttered by another person.

Therefore in both Vedic and non-Vedic usage, ordinary words are established as a distinct means of valid verbal cognition, different from inference.

In words lacking expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity, cognition of the words alone does not produce cognition of the sentential relation among meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

Expectancy and related conditions are auxiliary; the doctrine is formally closed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14819–14822 · Verbal Testimony Is a Distinct Means of Knowledge; Expectancy and the Other Co

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Independent testimony and conclusion · 3⁄3

Therefore cognition of expectancy, fitness, and proximity too is an auxiliary cause in the production of verbal cognition by words.

Thus ends the discussion of the doctrine that verbal testimony is not a means of valid knowledge in the fourth chapter of the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Shri Gangeshopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

Expectancy and related conditions are auxiliary; the doctrine is formally closed.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14822–14824 · Expectancy and the Other Conditions Are Auxiliary Causes; End of the Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The causal status of spoken words

Reductive accounts

- Words are reduced to inferential signs of intention.
- Truth of intention or absence of defect is proposed as prior condition.
- Vedic testimony is sometimes treated differently from ordinary words.

Naiyāyika siddhānta

- Words themselves constitute a distinct verbal means of knowledge.
- Recognition of the speaker's intention is not invariably required first.
- Expectancy, fitness and the other auxiliary conditions are separately specified.

The source explicitly concludes the doctrine before opening the next, on expectancy.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · The Naiyāyika Conclusion on Verbal Testimony

Independence

Śabda is established as a pramāṇa distinct from inference.

Intention

Knowledge of a truthful intention is not an invariable prior cause.

Secondary meaning

Syntactic impossibility and context bear on interpretation.

Formal ending


The doctrine that verbal testimony is not a pramāṇa is concluded.

This doctrine closes here; the Doctrine of Expectancy follows.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Word expectancy, relational cognition and New Nyāya debate

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Doctrine of Expectancy (Ākāṅkṣā)

1

Definitions and objections

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

2

Saundada and verbal expectancy

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

3

Eastern and New Nyāya positions

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 1/11

Now, what is expectancy, one of the three auxiliary causes of verbal cognition?

The invariable relation or fixed concomitance of one meaning with another cannot be called expectancy.

For in a usage such as "nilam sarojam"—"The lotus is blue"—blueness and lotus are not invariably concomitant, yet the words possess expectancy.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14827–14827 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 2/11

On the other hand, in the paired sentences "vimalam jalam, nadyah kacche mahishas carati"—"The water is clear; a buffalo walks on the riverbank"—

the river is invariably related both to water and to the bank; nevertheless the word "river" expects the word "bank" rather than the word "water."

Nor can expectancy be called the desire to know the relation of one meaning remembered from jointly uttered words to another meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14828–14829 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 3/11

For verbal cognition sometimes occurs even in a person who has no desire to know the relation.

According to the Mimamsaka view, in "visvajita yajeta"—"One should perform the Visvajit sacrifice"—and "dvaram pidhehi"—"Close the door"—the meanings "svargakamah"—

"one who desires heaven"—and "dvaram"—"door"—though not explicitly stated, are understood as expected.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14829–14830 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 4/11

If expectancy is established by supplying these words, then in an unrelated expression such as "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih"—"pot, objecthood, bringing, and

effort"— expectancy would have to be improperly admitted as well, because a desire could arise to know the mutual relation of pot, objecthood, bringing, and effort.

The teachers and others may say that expectancy is the capacity for desire to know the relation among meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14831–14832 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 5/11

Desire for cognition of a relation arises even before the specific character of the particular relation is known;

and capacity for cognition of relation means the prior absence, in the hearer, of cognition of the sentential relation produced by the uttered words.

But in the paired sentences "vimalam jalam, nadyah kacche mahishas carati," because of the speaker's intention the hearer sometimes understands the relation of the river to water and sometimes its relation to the bank.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14832–14833 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 6/11

Consequently, the prior absence of cognition of the river's relation to water exists in the context of the bank, and the prior absence of cognition of its relation to the bank exists in the context of water.

From this standpoint expectancy would have to be admitted in the word "river" toward both "water" and "bank"—an undesirable consequence.

This view is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14833–14835 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 7/11

In an expectancy-less expression such as "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih," the prior absence of cognition of the relation among the meanings

is contradicted both when cognition of the relation is established and when it is not; therefore it cannot be regarded as expectancy.

And in the paired sentences, one person, through error concerning the speaker's intention, understands the river's relation to the bank, while another, through true cognition of the intention,

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14835–14836 · Definition of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 8/11

understands its relation to the water; therefore the defect that expectancy must be admitted in the word "river" in both directions is not avoided.

The prior absence of cognition of the relation is pervaded by the absence of another cause such as cognition of the speaker's intention;

therefore failure of the resulting cognition of relation can be explained by the absence of that other cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14836–14838 · Definition of Expectancy; Further Difficulty

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 9/11

Then there would be no separate need for expectancy.

In the same way, semantic fitness and proximity too would cease to be auxiliary causes of verbal cognition, because in semantically unfit and non-proximate words

such as "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih," the prior absence of cognition of relation is itself absent from the absence of the resulting cognition of relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14838–14839 · Further Difficulty

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · 10/11

Even if absence of defeat is accepted as a general cause of all qualificative cognition, including inferential cognition,

it cannot thereby be regarded as a specific cause of verbal cognition, because absence of the result is generally explained by the prior absence of cognition itself.

It is difficult even to regard expectancy as a special causal property of words; otherwise one would have to distinguish between

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14840–14841 · Further Difficulty

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and objections · ıı/ıı

an expectancy active earlier and an expectancy active later, when such higher-lower distinction is impossible in a prior absence.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation rejects several simplistic accounts of expectancy.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14841–14841 · Further Difficulty

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 1/11

> According to Saundada, expectancy is that state in which a still-unproduced cognition of a sentential relation that is the object of the speaker's intention produces recollection of a meaning

> conducive to a desire to know the relation, and that cognition of the sentence meaning has as its qualifier the relation between remembered and unremembered meanings.

> In "ghatam anayati"—"He brings the pot"—after hearing only "ghatam" there arises the inquiry "What does he do?" concerning the action; after hearing only "anayati" there arises the inquiry "What does he bring?" concerning the object.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14843–14844 · The View of Saundada

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 2/11

In the semantically unfit and expectancy-less expression "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih," no cognition of a sentence meaning consisting in identity between pot and bringing arises, because semantic fitness is absent.

Nor does the relational cognition "bringing belongs to the pot" arise, because the word "ghatah" is not furnished with a case ending expressing relation.

In "ayam eti rajnah putrah purusho'pasaryatam"—"This one goes; the king's son; let the man be removed"—

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14845–14846 · The View of Saundada

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 3/11

"rajnah" has already produced cognition of a relation with "putrah"; therefore there is no further expectancy to know a relation with "purushah."

But it may be objected that if recollection of the intrinsic meanings of pot, objecthood, bringing, and effort is not the cause of desire to know their sentential relation,

then in "ghatam anaya" too recollection of the intrinsic meanings of pot, objecthood, bringing, and effort will not cause a desire for cognition of their relation; consequently expectancy would be unestablished.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14846–14847 · The View of Saundada

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 4/11

If recollection of the intrinsic meanings is taken as the cause of desire to know the relation,

then in the expectancy-less "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih" the unwanted consequence of cognition of a relation consisting in bringing qualified by pot-objecthood cannot be avoided.

Moreover, in both "ghatah karmatvam..." and "ghatam anaya," the intrinsic forms of the meanings are remembered in the same way; therefore the presence of expectancy in one and its absence in the other cannot be explained.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14848–14849 · The View of Saundada

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 5/11

In addition, the three meanings "king's," "son," and "man" are remembered together.

Before cognition of the relation, the distinction in the speaker's intention—that "king's" relates only to "son" and not to "man"—is not known; therefore the phrase "object of the speaker's intention" in the definition becomes pointless.

Our established doctrine is this: expectancy of a word is the incompleteness or non-termination by which a word, because another word has not been uttered, fails to become a cause of cognition of the relation of its meaning to another meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14850–14852 · The View of Saundada; The Doctrine of Verbal Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 6/11

For example, in "ghato'sti"—"There is a pot"—or "ghatam anaya"—"Bring the pot"—the nominal stem, case ending, verbal root, finite verbal suffix,

and case-related words cannot produce cognition of the relations of their respective meanings without mutual assistance.

This mutual incapacity is expectancy.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14853–14853 · The Doctrine of Verbal Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 7/11

Blueness and pot—the meanings of two nominal stems— are not directly related to one another in "nilo ghato'sti" and "nilam ghatam anaya";

they are connected in verbal cognition through meanings such as number and objecthood expressed by case endings.

Therefore the resulting cognition is not merely a single combined qualificative cognition of a "blue pot"; rather, it is cognition of the collective relation among blueness, objecthood, pot, and bringing.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14854–14854 · The Doctrine of Verbal Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 8/11

According to Gangesha's view, in "nilah ghatah" cognition arises of the identity relation between blueness and the pot,

while in "nilam ghatam anaya" cognition arises of the relation of bringing to the blue pot qualified by objecthood; case endings are used for grammatical correctness.

Alternatively, it may be said that cognition of identity arises on the basis of qualifier and qualified words bearing the same case ending.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14855–14857 · The Doctrine of Verbal Expectancy; Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 9/11

Thus the case ending of the qualifier-word itself conveys identity; qualifier and qualified words cannot produce cognition of the qualifier-qualified relation without mutual assistance, and therefore they possess mutual expectancy.

In "pidhehi"—"Close"—the object related to the act of closing is not known without supplying the word "dvaram"—"door"; therefore "pidhehi" expects "dvaram." In "visvajita yajeta"—"One should perform the Visvajit sacrifice"—

cognition of the enjoined agent is impossible without supplying "svargakamah"—"one who desires heaven"; therefore "yajeta" expects "svargakamah."

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14857–14858 · Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · 10/11

There is yet another view: in "visvajita yajeta," the qualified person, that is, the eligible agent, is obtained by implication or inference,

just as the agent is understood in "pacati"—"he cooks"; therefore such relational cognition is inferential, not verbal.

But in words used in a secondary or figurative sense, the word itself does not become the cause of relational cognition; the indicated meaning does not produce cognition of the relation without the aid of another word.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14860–14860 · A Second Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Saundada and verbal expectancy · II/II

In an expectancy-less expression such as "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih," no relational cognition arises from the unrelated words; each word merely recalls its own separate meaning.

In a sentence possessing expectancy, such as "ghatam anayati," cognition of the sentence meaning arises as the mutual relation among the act of bringing, objecthood, and pot.

In "agnina odanam pacati"—"He cooks rice with fire"—the relation among fire, instrumentality, rice, objecthood, the act of cooking, and the agent's effort is understood as one sentence meaning from mutually expectant words.

KEY INSIGHT

The text distinguishes inquiry, incompleteness and the syntactic relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14861–14862 · A Second Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 1/10

Because the separate forms of words function as causes, in "dvaram pidhehi"—"Close the door"—the verbal expression "pidhehi" is supplied.

Even if the meaning of closing has been known from some other word such as "pidhanam"—"closing"—the objecthood of "door" is not thereby related to that action;

hence the word "pidhanam" does not by its nature possess the capacity to produce such a relation, because it is not a finite verb.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14864–14864 · Description of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 2/10

But even words uttered at a distance can produce cognition of the relation of their meanings if a relation-expressing word is understood to have been uttered immediately nearby, or if there is an illusion of such proximity.

In the sentence "vahnina sincati"—"He sprinkles with fire"—the instrumental word and the verb are by nature capable of producing relational cognition;

but cognition of the semantic incompatibility between fire and the act of sprinkling blocks relational cognition—just as cognition of a magical jewel opposed to burning fire blocks the act of burning.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14865–14866 · Description of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 3/10

If such cognition of incompatibility is removed, then through erroneous cognition of fitness even this sentence can produce relational cognition.

An entity that is by nature unfit cannot be made to burn or cook merely by superimposed fitness.

Likewise, an unrelated group of expectancy-less words such as "ghatah karmatvam..." produces only separate recollections of the

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14866–14867 · Description of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 4/10

meanings even when there is an illusion of expectancy; it does not produce erroneous cognition of a sentential relation among them.

But in "ayam eti rajnah putrah purusho'pasaryatam"—"This one goes; the king's son; let the man be removed"—

the word "rajnah" produces cognition of the king's relation to "putrah" without the assistance of "purushah"; therefore "rajnah" has no expectancy for the word "purushah."

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14867–14868 · Description of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 5/10

Alternatively, it may be said that after recollection of the three meanings king, son, and man, cognition arises of the king's relation to the son, not to the man.

Since the speaker does not intend to convey a relation of the king to the man, such relational cognition cannot be insisted upon; even later no such cognition arises.

But it is not proper to say that because an already operative expectancy of the word "son" is present, the king's relation is cognized only with the son.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14870–14871 · The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 6/10

Because of the speaker's intention, one would first have to allow cognition of the king's relation to the man; to block such cognition some scholars therefore define expectancy as follows:

a still-unproduced cognition of relation, which is an object of the speaker's intention and is capable of producing relational cognition.

For this reason the expectancy-less group "ghatah karmatvam..." is not capable of producing such an unproduced relational cognition;

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14871–14872 · The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 7/10

but the expression "rajnah putrah" has the intention to produce cognition of the king's relation to the son, and therefore relational cognition arises there.

According to this view, in "ghatam anaya" expectancy is the state of producing a still-unproduced cognition of the relation between the pot as object and the act of bringing;

and the cognition of the relation between the meaning of the nominal stem "pot" and the meaning objecthood of the case ending, which arises before complete cognition of the sentence meaning, is an auxiliary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14872–14873 · The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 8/10

According to the New Naiyayikas, proximity in the form of recollection of meanings produced by a specific sequence of words such as "ghatam anaya," or a specific form

of separate recollection of meanings not produced by the unrelated expectancy-less group "ghatah karmatvam anayanam kritih," is a secondary cause of verbal cognition.

Therefore the absence of cognition of a sentential relation from an unrelated group of words is due to absence of such proximity; the Easterners need not regard recollection of meanings as a cause of expectancy.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14875–14876 · The View of the New School

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 9/10

The sentence "ayam eti rajnah putrah purusho'pasaryatam" produces cognition of the king's relation to the son, but merely because of absence of the speaker's intention it does not produce cognition of the king's relation to the man.

Therefore there is no need to admit a separate auxiliary causality for expectancy.

At most, expectancy is merely an indicator or aid of that recollection of meanings which directly produces verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14877–14878 · The View of the New School

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern and New Nyāya positions · 10/10

Thus ends the established doctrine concerning expectancy in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Shri Gangeshopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The dispute reaches the formal closure of the expectancy doctrine.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14880–14880 · End of the Doctrine of Expectancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

How does an utterance demand completion?

Preliminary definitions

- Fixed concomitance of meanings cannot explain all meaningful expressions.
- A hearer’s desire to know a relation also generates counterexamples.
- Expressions with scattered words do not always generate sentential cognition.

Later Naiyāyika refinements

- The grammatical incompleteness of one word in relation to another is tested.
- The Eastern and New schools dispute the explanatory role of expectancy.
- Specific recollection and proximity are distinguished from mere desire to know.

The concluding position must not be conflated with every earlier proposal.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Doctrine of Expectancy (Ākāṅkṣā)

Initial question

What sort of mutual need connects word meanings?

Counterexamples

Lotus, river-bank, king's son and scattered expressions.

Refinement

Grammatical form and ordered recollection enter the causal account.

Closure


The source explicitly ends the Doctrine of Expectancy.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Prima facie proposals · defeating cognition · established definition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Doctrine of Semantic Fitness (Yogyatā)

1

Definitions of semantic fitness

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

2

Further prima facie objections

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

3

Established doctrine and conclusion

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of semantic fitness · 1/5

Now, what is the nature of semantic fitness in the context of verbal cognition?

Cognition of the relation of one meaning to another of the same class cannot be called fitness.

For if sameness of class among meanings is determined on the basis of some property residing in an object, that property is not restricted to the particular meaning; consequently the definition is not determinate.

KEY INSIGHT

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14883–14883 · Definition of Semantic Fitness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of semantic fitness · 2/5

If sameness of class is restricted by the property delimiting meaninghood, then in the sentence "adya jatah payah pibati"—"The child born today drinks milk"—

fitness with respect to the particular relation is not available in this form; and before actual verbal cognition the complete sentence meaning remains unknown.

Nor can fitness be defined as possessing a property pervaded by a relation among the meanings of the words uttered in the context, because then the sentence meaning would be established by inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14884–14885 · Definition of Semantic Fitness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of semantic fitness · 3/5

> Nor is it proper to say that fitness is in fact possession of a property pervaded by the relation among meanings, while only cognition of its presence is useful for verbal cognition.

> For then the erroneous verbal cognition produced by an illusion of fitness could not be explained.

> This also refutes the view that fitness is merely absence of determination of absence of the relation among meanings and therefore functions as a cause by its own unknown nature.

KEY INSIGHT

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14886–14887 · Definition of Semantic Fitness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of semantic fitness · 4/5

For in a substrate where absence of a property has been ascertained, verbal cognition of a meaning qualified by that property does not arise.

Nor can fitness be defined as absence of a property pervaded by absence of the relation among meanings uttered in the context.

In an indefeasible sentence such as "prameyam abhidheyam"—"The knowable is expressible"—absence of the relation among meanings is unestablished; hence such fitness does not apply there.

KEY INSIGHT

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14887–14889 · Definition of Semantic Fitness; Alternative Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions of semantic fitness · 5/5

And when absence of a pot is ascertained, cognition of the pot's presence does not arise from the sentence "ghato'sti"—"There is a pot"; but this absence of cognition cannot be called the cause of fitness.

Nor can fitness be defined as absence of a defeating means of knowledge concerning the relation among meanings, because even in the semantically unfit meaning "sprinkling with fire" a defeating means established elsewhere may be absent.

KEY INSIGHT

Class-sameness and relations among meanings are tested against examples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14890–14891 · Alternative Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 1/6

Fitness cannot be called absence of an element opposed to the contextual relation among meanings, because on either the establishment or non-establishment of the opposed element, the counterpositive of such absence remains unestablished.

Nor is absence of a defeating means of knowledge established elsewhere fitness, because before actual verbal cognition the contextual relation is unknown, and absence of such a defeater may also occur in semantically unfit meanings.

If it is said that cognition of such absence of a defeater in an unfit meaning is contradictory,

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14893–14895 · Refutation of a Second Alternative Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 2/6

then absence of a defeating means of knowledge for the contextual relation would have to be regarded as fitness; but such fitness is itself unestablished.

As long as fitness is unestablished, its defeating means of knowledge cannot be known even in a fit meaning.

Fitness cannot be defined as the general absence of objecthood with respect to cognition of the absence of one meaning's relation to another, because there is no example of this in an undefeated context.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14895–14897 · Refutation of a Second Alternative Definition; Refutation of a Third Alternati

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 3/6

This also refutes the view: "A meaning is fit when no means of knowledge is present that apprehends non-relation of one meaning to another in that fit meaning."

Nor is fitness absence of true cognition of mutual non-relation between two meanings, because its counterpositive would lack an example, and before actual cognition of the sentence meaning the relation between the two meanings is unknown.

It has also been said that fitness is a cause of verbal cognition in its unknown own nature; but the absence of such fitness cannot be made explicit in an unfit expression such as "He sprinkles with fire."

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14898–14900 · Refutation of a Third Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 4/6

Moreover, in an unfit meaning there is absence of one's own erroneous defeating cognition; but in a fit meaning it is impossible to ascertain the general absence of true cognition of a defeating relation.

Another person's true defeating cognition may itself be understood as unfit.

Nor can it be said that the general absence of true cognition of a defeating relation functions as a cause merely by its own nature.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14902–14903 · Conclusion of the Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 5/6

For then erroneous verbal cognition arising at the time of an illusion of fitness could not be explained.

Nor can it be said that the general absence of true cognition of a defeating relation is known by inference as present in an entity having a form favorable to the relation among meanings.

For there is deviation when a liquid such as water is present yet is unrelated to the act of sprinkling.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14903–14904 · Conclusion of the Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further prima facie objections · 6/6

Nor is the very form favorable to the relation among meanings fitness.

For even when expectancy and proximity are present, relational cognition does not arise from the sentence of an untrustworthy person when true cognition of a defeating relation is present.

Therefore, by necessity, only absence of true cognition of a defeating relation must be regarded as fitness.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals using absence of a defeater are refined and rejected.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14905–14906 · Conclusion of the Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 1/8

Our established doctrine is that semantic fitness is the absence of true cognition of a defeating relation.

It is the absence of that state in which a meaning is the qualified object of a true cognition whose counterpositive is delimited by a property

determined by a constant absence residing in one meaning, while the counterpositiveness is found with respect to the relation of another meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14909–14910 · Final Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 2/8

In an indefeasible sentence such as "prameyam vacyam"—"The knowable is expressible"—with respect to the relation of expressibility,

the knowable lacks the status of being the qualified object of a true cognition of a counterpositive determined by a constant absence residing in it; therefore fitness is established.

But fitness formulated in terms of such qualified-objecthood involves unnecessary complexity and is difficult to know.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14911–14912 · Final Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 3/8

Therefore a more economical definition is this: fitness is absence, in one meaning, of a property delimiting the counterpositive determined by a constant absence that is found with respect to the relation of another meaning.

This definition is easily knowable and does not require a particular means of knowledge before verbal cognition.

It may be objected: how can cognition of impurity arise from Vedic words stating the impurity of a human skull when an inference concerning the purity of a human skull defeats that meaning?

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14912–14913 · Final Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 4/8

But this is not tenable.

Because Vedic words belong to the same class of words that grounds their validity, they are stronger than inference; therefore they defeat the inference concerning purity and produce verbal cognition of impurity.

It may further be said that words are a means of knowledge merely through expectancy and proximity; fitness is not a separate auxiliary cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14914–14915 · Final Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 5/8

Fitness as absence of defeat is a cause of true cognition in general, not specifically of verbal cognition.

But this too is not tenable.

When an opposition to verbal cognition is present, a defect must be admitted in the means of knowledge; otherwise a defeating cognition could not block the true cognition that is the object of a means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14915–14916 · Final Definition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 6/8

Just as in an inference with a condition, a defeating cognition blocks cognition of pervasion, so in verbal cognition too absence of defeat is necessary.

It may again be objected that fitness is not a cause of verbal cognition merely by its own nature; otherwise pseudo-verbal cognition produced by an illusion of fitness in a sentence such as "He sprinkles with fire" would disappear.

Nor is determination of fitness possible in all such cases.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14916–14918 · Final Definition; Refutation of the Final Objection and Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 7/8

But this objection is not tenable.

General cognition of fitness, which remains equally present in doubt, error, and true cognition, can be accepted as the cause of verbal cognition.

Cognition of unfitness is an inhibitor of verbal cognition, but such an inhibitor is not present in every verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14919–14919 · Refutation of the Final Objection and Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and conclusion · 8/8

In many cases a positive determination of fitness is possible from non-apprehension of an appropriate defeater.

For example, in the sentence "iha ghato nasti"—"There is no pot here"—cognition of the absence of the pot arises because no competent defeater in the form of the pot's presence is available.

Thus ends the doctrine of semantic fitness in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Shri Gangeshopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The text specifies fitness by restrictions on erroneous non-relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14920–14922 · Refutation of the Final Objection and Conclusion; End of the Doctrine of Seman

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

When can meanings coherently combine?

Rejected preliminary definitions

- Same-class meanings alone do not guarantee fitness.
- The absence of any observed contrary relation is not a complete criterion.
- A definition cannot assume the relational cognition it is meant to explain.

The established discussion

- The distinction between relation and non-relation is specified more carefully.
- A defeating cognition and a genuinely impossible connection must be separated.
- The final proposal is assessed through source examples and objections.

The source develops the siddhānta only after a sequence of unsuccessful definitions.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Doctrine of Semantic Fitness (Yogyatā)

Concept

Yogyatā concerns compatibility of word meanings.

Problem

Either overextensive or circular definitions cannot serve as conditions.

Method

Counterexamples expose the limits of negative definitions.

Formal ending


The Semantic Fitness doctrine reaches its stated conclusion.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Undelayed recollection · supplementary meanings · Nyāya conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Doctrine of Proximity (Āsatti)

1

Eastern account of proximity

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

2

Prābhākara challenges and supplementati

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

3

Established doctrine and completion

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern account of proximity · 1/5

Proximity is recollection, without improper delay, of meanings that are relata.

Such recollection is merely recollection of word-meanings, not verbal cognition; therefore proximity and verbal cognition are not mutually dependent.

It may be objected: how can recollections, produced by successively uttered words, of an action qualified by object, agent, instrument, locus, and many qualifiers all remain simultaneously present?

KEY INSIGHT

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14925–14926 · Definition — The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern account of proximity · 2/5

No cause is apparent that could bring these momentary successive recollections together.

How then can qualificative cognition of the sentence meaning involving all the meanings arise?

The answer is that there is a special cause that simultaneously activates the latent impressions produced by direct hearing of all the separate words.

KEY INSIGHT

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14926–14927 · Definition — The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern account of proximity · 3/5

That cause makes the impressions of all the words yield their results at the same time and brings about a combined recollection of all the meanings; after this joint recollection, cognition of the sentence meaning arises.

It should not be said that recollection of one meaning cannot be produced by the latent impression of another meaning located elsewhere.

Otherwise, in order to make sentence cognition possible, one would have to accept everywhere a single combined recollection of all meanings through mutual cooperation of the separate impressions of each meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14927–14928 · Definition — The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern account of proximity · 4/5

This is analogous to recollection of an entire word produced through cooperation among impressions of the separate phonemes.

The Prabhakaras say that each word itself conveys the meanings, which possess expectancy, fitness, and proximity, as related.

But then unified cognition of the relation among meanings would be impossible, because a word that has once conveyed its own meaning cannot operate again.

KEY INSIGHT

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14928–14929 · Definition — The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Eastern account of proximity · 5/5

This defect pertains only to a unified final verbal cognition, not to separate initial cognitions.

Granted, ultimately a single combined recollection of the meanings must be accepted, because when the sentence meaning arises the separate recollections of the meanings have already disappeared and there is no other way.

KEY INSIGHT

The Eastern view treats timely recollection of meanings as proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14929–14930 · Definition — The View of the Easterners

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 1/9

The Prabhakaras reply: proximity in the form of recollection of meanings produced only by uttered words is not the cause of verbal cognition.

In "dvaram pidhehi"—"Close the door"—cognition of the relation of the door to the act of closing also arises from recollection of

the meaning of the supplied word "dvaram." Therefore recollection of a meaning obtained through supplementation is also a cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14932–14932 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 2/9

It should not be said that only the word "pidhehi"—"close"—is supplied and therefore only words are causes.

For the factor useful as the related meaning is the "act of closing," not the word.

The cause of cognition of the sentence meaning is recollection of the actual assisting meaning, not merely an uttered or supplied word.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14933–14933 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 3/9

Words are only occasional causes; recollection of meanings is the direct cause.

Otherwise recollection of meanings produced through accidental association would become useless, and one would have to accept the rigid rule that only a meaning expressed by a word can enter into cognition of the sentence meaning.

It may be said that a word is used only to convey the relation of its own meaning; therefore the word "pidhehi"—"close"—does not produce the relation of the word "dvaram" to a supplied action, and supplementation of "pidhehi" is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14934–14935 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 4/9

> But this is not tenable: in secondary signification and the like, cognition of a relation with an indicated meaning distinct from the expressed meaning arises; consequently such a rigid rule is deviant.

> Nor is it proper, on grounds of economy, to accept only the co-presence of the words "dvaram" and "pidhehi." Among the latent impressions of many possible words meaning closing, there would be no way to determine which word is remembered.

> Even admitting a specific word-recollection based on the relative strength of impressions is insufficient, because the decisive factor is capacity to convey the specific meaning related to the speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14935–14936 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 5/9

Therefore, on grounds of economy, supplementation of the meaning rather than supplementation of the word should be accepted.

It should not be said that the used word has already fulfilled its purpose, and therefore no speaker's intention can be accepted with respect to the supplied meaning.

When the mutual relation among the expressed meanings is impossible, the speaker's intention extends to the supplied meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14937–14938 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 6/9

It may be objected that in "odanam pacati"—"He cooks rice"—recollection of other meanings such as peas is also possible; then why is the act of cooking understood as related only to the meaning of the uttered word "odanam"?

The answer is that the speaker's intention is restrictive.

Relational cognition arises only with that meaning which the speaker intends to convey.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14939–14939 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 7/9

It may be objected that in an expression such as "ayam devadattah odanam"—"This is Devadatta and rice"—since the agent is not expressed when the verb is not supplied, use of the instrumental case would become necessary.

But even the supplied verb "pacati"—"cooks"—does not express the number and the like of the agent.

It should not be said that number has already been expressed in Devadatta.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14940–14941 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 8/9

> Then, in a genitive expression such as "devadattasya pakah"—"Devadatta's cooking"—because number is not expressed, the instrumental case would likewise become necessary.

> If regulation of case usage is admitted on the basis of the speaker's intention, that same regulation is possible in the Mimamsaka view; supplementation of a word is not established as necessary.

> It may further be said that after cognition of "pidhehi"—"close"—the word becomes the cause of recollection of the meaning closing.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14941–14942 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Prābhākara challenges and supplementation · 9/9

But a word is a cause as a specific word, not as a word in general, because recollection of the related action-meaning arises from the specific word.

Otherwise verbal cognition from words used in secondary and figurative senses would become impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of missing words versus missing meanings is contested.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14942–14942 · The Prabhakara Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 1/7

Our established doctrine is that the action remembered from a verb and the case-role remembered from a case-word mutually expect one another for cognition of the sentence meaning; general recollection of those meanings alone is not sufficient.

Otherwise an un-sentential group such as "dvaram karmata pidhanam kritih"—"door, objecthood, closing, effort"—would necessarily produce cognition of a sentence meaning, because recollection of all the meanings is equally possible there.

It may be objected that in a non-sentence there is no mutual expectancy.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14944–14946 · The Established Doctrine of Proximity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 2/7

The answer is that the state of producing recollection of a specific meaning from a specific word is itself an auxiliary operation, not mere general recollection of meaning.

For this reason an un-sentential group does not produce relational cognition, whereas a grammatically proper sentence containing a supplied word does.

The ungrammaticality of a non-sentence cannot be regarded as the cause of absence of relational cognition, because once the necessary word is supplied, that same group becomes grammatical and produces relational cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14946–14947 · The Established Doctrine of Proximity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 3/7

Nor is cognition of grammatical correctness a cause, because relational cognition also arises from corrupt forms.

Therefore proximity is precisely the mutual expectancy of related meanings remembered from specific words.

It should not be said that in the case of corrupt forms there is merely non-apprehension of non-relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14947–14948 · The Established Doctrine of Proximity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 4/7

No opposing cause of relational cognition is present there; therefore a verb, with the assistance of a case-word, and a case-word, with the assistance of a verb, produce relational cognition.

Otherwise, once the meaning of a transitive action had been remembered, the accusative case expressing the object would automatically become pointless;

or in an expression such as "puspebhyah sprhayati"—"He desires flowers"—the dative case expressing the recipient would become unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14948–14949 · The Established Doctrine of Proximity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 5/7

Action and case-role mutually require one another's words in order to be understood as related.

It may be objected that with case-words such as "dvaram" and "puspebhyah," verbs such as "pidhehi" or "sprhayati" are supplied merely for grammatical correctness; relational cognition itself arises merely from cognition of the related meanings.

The answer is that a case ending is not coherent without a verb, and a verb whose action-meaning is fit to be related to a case-role is likewise not coherent without a case-word.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14949–14952 · The Established Doctrine of Proximity; Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 6/7

Therefore, for grammatical completeness, a verb must be supplied for an isolated case-word, and a case-word for an isolated verb.

The action and case-role remembered from these supplied words mutually produce relational cognition.

The detailed doctrine of implication of the agent's meaning will be given below.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14952–14953 · Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Established doctrine and completion · 7/7

Thus ends the doctrine of proximity in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Shri Gangeshopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The formal conclusion specifies mutual expectancy and case roles.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14954–14954 · Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Do words or remembered meanings stand together?

Eastern and Prābhākara debate

- The Eastern account emphasizes recollection without undue delay.
- The Prābhākara view scrutinizes supplementation of word and meaning.
- Case markers, verbs and omitted components supply counterexamples.

Established proximity account

- Recollected action and case-role must combine through the proper structure.
- An unsentential list cannot automatically generate relational cognition.
- Suitable supplied expressions can yield the intended action–case relation.

The source regards recollection, expectancy and grammatical relation as distinct issues.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Doctrine of Proximity (Āsatti)

Question

What makes remembered word meanings jointly available?

Dispute

Missing words versus missing meanings.

Conclusion

Action and case roles must relate appropriately.

Formal ending


The doctrine of proximity closes before Tātparya begins.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Purpose, secondary meaning, polysemy and multiple understandings

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

Arguments, opposing positions and replies as presented in Gangeśa's translated book.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Doctrine of Speaker’s Intention (Tātparya)

1

Purposiveness and objections

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

2

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

3

Polysemy and several simultaneous meani

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 1/9

The validity of verbal testimony depends on the speaker's intention.

But the meaning of purposiveness—the state of words being used to convey a valid meaning—is not that cognition of the word-meaning or of the

sentential relation among meanings is produced directly from the words as an effect, because neither of these is a direct effect of the words.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14957–14957 · Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 2/9

It may be objected that purposiveness toward conveying a valid meaning is the state in which action or effort directed toward a meaning is produced and cessation of action away from that meaning is likewise produced as a result.

In an injunctive sentence, cognition of the object to be done directly conveys its status as a means to the desired end; in sentences of praise and blame,

it recalls the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness of an already accomplished object and indirectly produces action or cessation.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14958–14959 · Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 3/9

In a sentence involving secondary signification, purposiveness should be understood as producing action toward the indicated object and cessation from such action.

No; this definition is not tenable.

If purposiveness as an intention to produce action toward a valid meaning is known only after cognition that "the word has been

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14960–14961 · Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 4/9

used with such an intention," while that cognition itself depends on cognition of purposiveness, mutual dependence results.

A word used secondarily—such as "Ganges" in "The village is on the Ganges"—does not directly convey the bank, yet it indirectly assists cognition of the bank; therefore even a secondarily used word has an intention to convey meaning.

Otherwise poetry and the like, in which the purpose is not immediately to prompt a person to act, would have to be regarded as conveying only verbal forms; this is improper.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14961–14963 · Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 5/9

It may further be said that purposiveness is the capacity to produce valid cognition of word-meaning.

Sentences of praise and blame also produce cognition of a praiseworthy or blameworthy object, and that cognition in turn becomes a cause of action or cessation.

All people act toward what is praiseworthy and desist from what is blameworthy; therefore cognition of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness may itself be regarded as the means of action and cessation toward a valid meaning. No.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14965–14966 · Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 6/9

Words used in a secondary sense—such as in "gauh ayatu"—and words used figuratively —such as in "candrah iva mukham"—are not direct causes of cognition of the sentential relation of the secondary or indicated meaning.

Therefore defining purposiveness as "the capacity to produce cognition of a valid meaning" again gives rise to mutual dependence.

Nor can purposiveness be defined as "the possible capacity to produce cognition of the relation of many meanings." Then an ambiguous word uttered once would have to be regarded as conveying many meanings simultaneously,

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14967–14968 · Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 7/9

and a figurative word would have to be regarded as conveying its primary meaning, because it possesses such possible capacity.

Nor is "the intention to produce cognition of word-meaning" a definition, because such an intention cannot be understood without knowing the speaker's intention, and the speaker's intention cannot be known without understanding the intention.

Sentences of praise and blame are not direct causes of action and cessation, and a figurative word is not a direct cause of cognition of the primary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14968–14969 · Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 8/9

It may be objected that the word "Ganges" conveys only the bank of the Ganges because the bank is invariably related to the water of the Ganges; thus the indicated meaning is cognized through the primary meaning.

But in a secondary sentence such as "mancah krosanti"—"The platforms are shouting"—the word "platforms" conveys the people seated on the platforms, although there is no invariable relation between platform and people.

Therefore invariability does not regulate the indicated meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14970–14971 · Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Purposiveness and objections · 9/9

If the word "Ganges" is said to convey only the indicated meaning bank because of absence of the speaker's intention toward the primary meaning, then no word would ever convey its primary meaning,

because in every case of a primary meaning there is absence of the speaker's intention toward some other possible meaning.

In a sentence of ironic praise such as "Dear one, if you wish to go, then go," the actual intention is "Do not go"; therefore purposiveness is not determined merely from the expressed meaning of words.

KEY INSIGHT

Proposals restricting meaning to action or praise/blame face counterexamples.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14972–14973 · Second Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 1/8

Our reply is that purposiveness toward conveying a valid meaning is the state in which the purpose of the word is "that." Here "that" includes both cognition of the word-meaning or object and action toward or cessation from that object.

Being a purpose does not mean merely being an effect that is produced; otherwise mutual dependence would again arise.

Nor is the hearer's being desirous of something the purpose, because then words would convey everything desired by the hearer, whereas the purpose of words is only to convey the meaning intended by the speaker.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14975–14976 · Reply — Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 2/8

Nor can desire be restricted merely to the word-meaning, because in "Here the word 'smoke' is intended for smoke," meaning "the word smoke is

intended to convey smoke and action toward it," the object of desire changes according to the distinction between expressed and indicated meanings.

Purposiveness is the state in which a word points toward an object that is the object of the speaker's desire.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14977–14979 · Reply — Definition of Purposiveness; Final Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 3/8

A word used by the speaker to convey a particular meaning is regarded as conveying only that meaning.

The speaker's desire concerns both producing cognition in the hearer and producing action or cessation in accordance with that cognition;

therefore a word used with respect to a specific meaning is said to be intended to convey that valid meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14979–14980 · Final Definition of Purposiveness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 4/8

Multiple cognitions of ambiguous words, doubly meaningful words, several primary meanings connected with one verb, and secondary or figurative meanings generally arise through repetition,

not simultaneously from one utterance, because linguistic convention treats one utterance as conveying one meaning at one time.

We say that with a single utterance of an ambiguous expression such as "puspavantau"— the sun and the moon— the speaker may intend to convey several meanings at once.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14981–14983 · Final Definition of Purposiveness; Gangesha's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 5/8

There is no rule restricting the speaker's intention to only one meaning.

If the speaker did not have an intention to convey several meanings, repetition too could not convey several meanings.

The purpose of repetition is to make the intention to convey several meanings explicit; otherwise even a univocal word would have to be repeated several times.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14983–14984 · Gangesha's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 6/8

Therefore, when an ambiguous word uttered once is used to convey both sun and moon, repetition is unnecessary.

When cognition of the speaker's intention is present, several meanings and their relations to the action are understood simultaneously.

There is no restriction that one meaning—such as the sun— must be understood first and the other—the moon—later, because the complete causal complex for cognition of both meanings is present at the same time.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14985–14986 · Gangesha's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 7/8

It may be objected that when the meaning of the word "aksam" is disputed between eye and dice, one utterance produces cognition of only one object because a single word has only one denotative power.

Even if several powers are accepted, if the word is used with the intention of conveying one meaning, cognition of several meanings is impossible.

But this inference is not tenable.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14987–14988 · Gangesha's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Definitions and Gangeśa’s reply · 8/8

When the complete causal complex for cognition of several meanings is present, an example in which only one meaning is cognized does not defeat it.

In some cases the failure to cognize several meanings is due only to an additional inhibitor.

KEY INSIGHT

Speaker desire and the capacity for multiple meanings are distinguished.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14988–14988 · Gangesha's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Polysemy and several simultaneous meanings · 1/5

From the sentence "aksam anaya"—"Bring the aksa"—two hearers in two different contexts can understand the two different meanings, eye and dice, from the very same utterance,

provided there is true or erroneous cognition of the speaker's intention to convey both meanings.

Here cognition of one meaning is not delayed, nor is repetition of the word necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14990–14990 · Supporting Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Polysemy and several simultaneous meanings · 2/5

Likewise, in "ghatam patam va anaya"—"Bring the pot or the cloth"—from the one verb "anaya" two relational cognitions, bringing the pot and bringing the cloth,

arise simultaneously; repetition of the verb is unnecessary if the speaker intends to convey both actions.

Sentence-splitting arises only because of two different meanings or action-meanings, not merely because one action is related to two nominal meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14991–14992 · Supporting Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Polysemy and several simultaneous meanings · 3/5

In "gangayam jalam ghosas ca prativasati"—"In the Ganges dwell both the stream of water and the village"—when the intention of the word "Ganges" is understood to convey both the water-stream and the bank,

recollection of both meanings occurs simultaneously from the same word, and the relation of both meanings to the action "dwelling" is understood.

For this, two separate powers—denotation and secondary signification—need not necessarily be postulated in the word "Ganges"; such a postulation of powers serves only to explain the speaker's specific intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14994–14995 · Cognition of Two Meanings without Repetition and the Importance of Speaker's I

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Polysemy and several simultaneous meanings · 4/5

The powers of words used secondarily or figuratively assist the speaker's intention; they do not replace it.

When there is an intention to convey the relations of several meanings at once, repetition is unnecessary.

But when the order of cognition of meanings depends on the order of the speaker's intention—the primary meaning first,

KEY INSIGHT

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14995–14996 · Cognition of Two Meanings without Repetition and the Importance of Speaker's I

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Polysemy and several simultaneous meanings · 5/5

the indicated meaning later—repetition of the word is necessary, because the first utterance exhausts itself by conveying the first meaning.

If speaker's intention is accepted in ordinary non-Vedic words according to this rule, intention must also be accepted in Vedic words; this raises the question of whether the Veda is of human authorship.

KEY INSIGHT

The role of intention is tested in ambiguous and figurative expressions.

SOURCE TOPIC · English DOCX paragraphs 14996–14997 · Cognition of Two Meanings without Repetition and the Importance of Speaker's I

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Can one utterance convey more than one meaning?

Narrow accounts of purpose

- Meaning is reduced to promoting or preventing an action.
- An ambiguous expression is assumed to convey only one meaning at a time.
- Secondary and figurative usage is treated as dependent on a single literal effect.

Gangeśa's source discussion

- A speaker can intend multiple relations with one utterance.
- Examples with sun and moon, pot and cloth, or the river challenge forced repetition.
- Primary and indicated meaning are tested through intention and context.

The next source subsection treats non-human authorship and the Veda; it is not included in this deck.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Doctrine of Speaker’s Intention (Tātparya)

Purpose

The speaker’s intended object is central to the definition.

Secondary meaning

Figurative and indicated senses require separate analysis.

Ambiguity

One utterance may yield multiple intended cognitions.

Transition


The translated text next turns to the Veda and authorship.

This presentation ends before the discussion of Vedic authorship.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Mīmāṃsaka beginninglessness · competing definitions · Nyāya objections

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Non-Human Authorship of the Veda

1

Beginningless tradition and Vedic statu

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda

2

Inference of human authorship and its d

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

3

Alternative authorship inference

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitati

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 1/9

The Mimamsakas say that just as a disciple's utterance depends on a teacher's prior utterance, so in Vedic sentences the intention of one speaker depends on the intention of a preceding speaker.

There is no first, original intention of any speaker; therefore Vedic intention is beginningless and eternal.

A later Vedic utterance is made with the intention of knowing the meaning of an earlier Vedic utterance, and the earlier utterance with the intention of knowing the meaning of an utterance prior to that.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Non-Human Authorship — The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 2/9

Ultimately, the purposiveness that the words are uttered to convey a valid meaning means that the words are uttered with the purpose of knowing the Vedic sentence meaning.

Such a purpose is common to both ordinary and Vedic words.

Whether the purpose depends on another speaker or not is irrelevant.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Non-Human Authorship — The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 3/9

Such intention in the Veda is understood through the beginningless reasoning of the Mimamsaka tradition.

The Veda is uttered in accordance with eternal speaker's intention; therefore it is not of human authorship.

It may be objected: how can cognition of the sentence meaning arise from Vedic words whose sentence meaning has not previously been known?

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Non-Human Authorship — The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 4/9

It may be answered that words are never uttered without prior cognition of the sentence meaning; each utterance is distinct because the speaker is distinct.

But then cognition of the sentence meaning from the present recitation of the Mahabharata would be impossible, because a reciter may recite without previously knowing the meaning.

If it is said that the present recitation of the Mahabharata is of the same kind as Vyasa's original recitation and conveys meaning because of Vyasa's intention to convey a specific meaning, the same situation applies to Vedic words.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Non-Human Authorship — The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 5/9

If cognition of the sentence meaning is accepted from a Mahabharata recitation made without knowledge of the meaning, it must be accepted in the Veda too.

Only "being of the same kind as words uttered by the original speaker with an intention to convey a specific meaning" may be taken as the regulator;

otherwise meaning would not be understood from the Vedic recitation of a present-day ignorant person.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Non-Human Authorship — The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 6/9

It may be objected that the Veda, like the Mahabharata, is a collection of sentences and therefore is humanly authored.

But the Mimamsaka asks: what exactly is meant by "Veda"?

There is no single recurrent property common to all Vedas; different branches convey different meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That the Veda Is Humanly Authored

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 7/9

No single Veda can everywhere be specified as the primary referent of the word "Veda."

Nor is it proper to define "Veda" as the aggregate of many branches, because the aggregate of branches is not in fact taught by the Veda, and the aggregate itself is not a means of cognition of sentence meaning.

Nor can the Veda be defined as an aggregate of injunctive sentences such as "svargakamo yajeta"—"One who desires heaven should sacrifice"—because Smriti and the Mahabharata also contain injunctive sentences and would thereby become Veda.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That the Veda Is Humanly Authored

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 8/9

Nor can it be defined as a collection of sentences whose author is doubtful, because disputants on the two sides hold definite positions respectively on human and non-human authorship.

If Vedic status depended on the doubt of a neutral person because both inferences are equally strong, mutual dependence would arise—the neutral person's doubt would depend on the inference, and the inference on that person's doubt.

Nor is it proper to define Veda as "a collection of sentences disputed with respect to the qualifier non-human authorship," because a similar dispute could arise regarding the Mahabharata and other works.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That the Veda Is Humanly Authored

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Beginningless tradition and Vedic status · 9/9

Nor is a universal Vedahood established from continuous usage such as "This is the Veda," because there would arise a cross-classification like the improper mixture of different properties in

expressions such as "Devadatta's." Since there is no common recurrent universal across distinct branches, the inference of human authorship is unestablished.

KEY INSIGHT

The text presents the Mīmāṃsaka defence before testing definitions of the Veda.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That the Veda Is Humanly Authored

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 1/6

Human authorship of the Veda cannot be defined as "being words produced from cognition of Vedic meaning," because if this property is

taken as produced jointly by the teacher's cognition of meaning and utterance of the words, the probandum would already be established.

Nor is human authorship "having a beginning of the utterance of Vedic words"; every reciter begins each utterance.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Human Authorship

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 2/6

> Nor is it "being composed by an independent agent"; the Veda and Mahabharata are presently being re-recited, whereas the original composition is not the present recitation.

> Nor is it "being of the same kind as a text actually composed by an independent agent"; then one could not distinguish the present recitation of the Mahabharata from Vyasa's composition and the present reader's repetition.

> Nor is it "being words used to convey a previously known meaning"; written words of a mute person would then count as humanly authored, and in the case of a teacher who already knows the meaning the probandum would again be already established.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Human Authorship

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 3/6

If the probandum is "being of the same kind as a text actually composed by an independent agent," the reason deviates in the first original composition of the Mahabharata, where the probandum would be absent.

If the probandum is taken as "a text of the same kind as one composed by an independent agent"—just as in the inference "a living being must exist somewhere" an unspecified particular living being is the probandum—

then the reason deviates in the Mahabharata recited by a present reader, because that text is not a composition of the present reciter.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 4/6

> If human authorship is taken as "being words that convey only a previously known meaning," the probandum is again already established in the words of a teacher who conveys meaning;

> if the qualifier independence is added, the reason deviates in present recitations of both the Veda and Mahabharata.

> The foregoing defects of deviation and already-established probandum also refute the parallel inference: "Vedahood belongs to sentences composed by an independent agent, as in the Mahabharata and the like."

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Arguments; Refutation of a Parallel Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 5/6

Being composed by an independent agent actually amounts merely to uttering words with the purpose of producing valid cognition of the sentence meaning.

This probandum is already established in the words of a teacher who previously knows the meaning.

Nor are the defects avoided by taking "agent" as the probandum on the ground that the distinction between speaker and repeater is established by scriptural tradition.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Inference of human authorship and its defects · 6/6

If human authorship is called "an utterance independent of the utterance of a text of the same kind," there is deviation in the Mahabharata.

KEY INSIGHT

Opposing inferences are tested for already-proved conclusions and deviation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative authorship inference · 1/6

The Naiyayikas reply: Vedahood is the status of being authoritative words whose cognition of sentence meaning is not the result of cognition of sentence meaning produced by words,

and whose meanings are not objects of valid cognition obtained from other means of knowledge.

God's valid cognition is not produced by human means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply — Decisive Definitions of Vedahood and Human Authorship

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative authorship inference · 2/6

The Vedic sentence meaning may become the object of inference and the like, but those inferences themselves depend on the Veda.

Veda-like portions of Smriti and the Mahabharata arise from Vedic cognition; therefore they are not the Veda.

Human authorship may be defined as being of the same kind as a text that was independently uttered without depending on repetition of an identical text.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply — Decisive Definitions of Vedahood and Human Authorship

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative authorship inference · 3/6

This property is present in all humanly authored texts including the first composition of the Mahabharata; therefore the reason does not deviate.

Alternatively, it may be said: the Veda is a composition produced from independent valid cognition of the sentence meaning that is not generated by words, like the Mahabharata and the like.

Objection: the probandum is absent in the Vedic recitation of a present student, and the reason deviates in Smriti and the Mahabharata.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply — Decisive Definitions of Vedahood and Human Authorship; Alternative Inference

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative authorship inference · 4/6

Reply: the present reciter and the original composer are different agents; the Vedic recitation possesses sameness of kind with the composition produced from the independent cognition of the original God.

Vedahood may also be defined as "being of the same kind as words generated by independent cognition of the sentence meaning." According to the Mimamsaka view this property is denied in the Veda; the dispute is precisely about this.

The Mimamsakas say that postulating such an independent composer is pointless.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Alternative Inference; The Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative authorship inference · 5/6

The actual basis of the validity of the Veda is simply the status of being words preceded by valid cognition of the sentence meaning; the cumbersome qualifier "not generated by words" is unnecessary.

Otherwise it would become difficult to accept validity even in sentences with two agents, such as the Mahabharata—the original author and the present reciter.

The speaker's intention in the Veda is ascertained by the reasoning of the beginningless Mimamsaka tradition, and a disciple understands the meaning from the teacher's prior recitation.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative authorship inference · 6/6

This sequence can be beginningless; why postulate an independent agent in the form of God?

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika account distinguishes original composition from present recitation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does the Veda require an original author?

The Mīmāṃsaka position

- A reciter follows a preceding reciter in a beginningless tradition.
- Successive recitations may convey meaning without a new original intention.
- Defining the Veda by injunctive status or contested authorship risks counterexamples.

The Naiyāyika argument

- The original speaker differs from a student repeating a received text.
- Independent cognition of sentence meaning is proposed as the source of an initial utterance.
- The precise definition of Vedahood and authorship is crucial to the inference.

These are rival arguments in the translated text, not an independently established historical result.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Essential conclusions · Non-Human Authorship of the Veda

Opening thesis

Mīmāṃsā asserts a beginningless series of Vedic recitations.

Counterexamples

The Mahābhārata and Smṛti test proposed definitions.

Nyāya response

Original composition is distinguished from later repetition.

Ongoing debate


The validity and eternity of the Veda are treated next.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Mīmāṃsaka inferences · regress objections · divine knowledge

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Eternity and Validity of the Veda

1

Veda in past time

The Mīmāṃsaka infers an earlier Vedic study behind present Vedic study.

2

Self-dependence and the foundation of v

Nyāya examines circularity and regress in a purely transmitted account of warr

3

The author, divine cognition and object

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God's

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Veda in past time · 1/2

The Mimamsakas infer: the past was not devoid of the Veda, because it is time, like the present.

There is neither absence of the probandum in half the time of cosmic dissolution nor unestablishedness of the subject in the remaining half; the subject "time" is taken as an undivided whole.

A second inference: Vedic study in the past too was preceded by the Vedic study of an earlier teacher, because it is study, like the study of a present student.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka infers an earlier Vedic study behind present Vedic study.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Eternity and Validity of the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Veda in past time · 2/2

There is no deviation of the reason in study from writing; writing itself comes down through a tradition dependent on earlier Vedic study.

Nor is there deviation from study of the Mahabharata; the Mahabharata itself mentions a text composed by Vyasa, so beginningless study is unnecessary there.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka infers an earlier Vedic study behind present Vedic study.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Eternity and Validity of the Veda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Self-dependence and the foundation of validity · 1/4

The Naiyayikas reply: if the validity of the Veda is held to depend on the validity of cognition of the sentence meaning, and the validity of cognition of the sentence meaning on the validity of the Veda, self-dependence results.

Even if one distinguishes later Vedic validity as depending on earlier Vedic validity, an infinite regress results; the validity of each earlier recitation would have to be established from the validity of a still earlier one.

It is not enough to say that the Veda is eternal and therefore there is no defect of regress.

KEY INSIGHT

Nyāya examines circularity and regress in a purely transmitted account of warrant.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Self-dependence and the foundation of validity · 2/4

There would be no foundational means for intrinsic validity; one blind tradition would depend on another blind tradition.

If every Veda depends on another earlier Veda, there would be no first foundation anywhere.

To remove doubt concerning validity dependent on the tradition and conduct of reciters of Smriti, an independent foundational means of knowledge is required.

KEY INSIGHT

Nyāya examines circularity and regress in a purely transmitted account of warrant.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection; The Validity of the Veda through God's Direct Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Self-dependence and the foundation of validity · 3/4

If Smriti is held to be based on the Veda, there is no independent foundation for the Veda's validity; if, conversely, the Veda is held to depend on Smriti, the tradition becomes circular.

Therefore the validity of the Veda must be regarded as based on God's independent direct cognition—that is, the omniscient God's cognition of the sentence meaning.

God's direct cognition does not depend on another means of knowledge and is the seed of confidence underlying social acceptance.

KEY INSIGHT

Nyāya examines circularity and regress in a purely transmitted account of warrant.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Validity of the Veda through God's Direct Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Self-dependence and the foundation of validity · 4/4

The inference that the past possessed the Veda does not oppose this independent divine cognition; rather, the Vedic tradition is established through God's eternal knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Nyāya examines circularity and regress in a purely transmitted account of warrant.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Validity of the Veda through God's Direct Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The author, divine cognition and objections · 1/5

The Mimamsakas object: the inference "The Veda is not humanly authored because its author is not remembered" is a counter-inference.

Reply: memory of the author is possible through the Vedic tradition; through traditions of Kapila, Kanada, Gautama, and others one can proceed back to the composer of the first Veda.

Nor should it be said that authors of Smriti do not directly know the human authorship of the Veda; inference of human authorship can supply the absence of direct cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God's knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Removal of the Counterbalancing Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The author, divine cognition and objections · 2/5

Failure to remember the author is not a defeater; non-memory and ignorance are not mutually dependent, and a means of knowledge can produce cognition of the author even if memory of the matter is absent.

Shruti says, "The four Vedas arose from the Supreme Lord"; other statements describe reconstruction of scripture in different Manvantaras.

Statements in the Bhagavata and elsewhere such as "O Lord, in ancient times you yourself recited the self-born Veda" are intended to convey the authority of the Veda, not to deny human authorship.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God's knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Removal of the Counterbalancing Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The author, divine cognition and objections · 3⁄5

The meaning of an injunctive sentence conveying a future result to be accomplished is not everywhere "memory of the agent"; therefore memory of an agent obtained from Smriti cannot be taken as the direct meaning of every injunction.

Arthavada statements declaring the human authorship of the Veda—such as "From that austerity the four Vedas arose"—assist injunctive sentences, just like descriptions of hell and heaven.

Through an injunction such as "Worship God," cognition of God as the author is obtained.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God’s knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Removal of the Counterbalancing Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The author, divine cognition and objections · 4/5

The independent validity of arthavada concerning already accomplished objects will also be established below.

Supreme bliss is not a newly acquired quality of God; the Shruti "Brahman is eternal consciousness and bliss" declares God's bliss to be eternal.

God is not subject to error like an ordinary human being; because Shruti establishes him as omniscient and free from defects, complete confidence in the Veda composed by him is possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God's knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Removal of the Counterbalancing Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The author, divine cognition and objections · 5/5

Thus ends the doctrine of intention in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Shri Gangeshopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated debate closes with recollection, scriptural authority and God's knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Removal of the Counterbalancing Reason

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can transmission alone establish scriptural validity?

Mīmāṃsaka case

- Past study is inferred from the study of current students.
- A continuous tradition is argued to extend through time.
- Lack of a remembered initial author supports the tradition-oriented explanation.

Naiyāyika reply

- Reliance of Vedic validity upon the validity of Vedic meaning may be circular.
- An endless chain of prior valid recitations is challenged as lacking foundation.
- The source proposes God’s independent cognition of sentence meaning as the grounding warrant.

The discussion concerns the philosophical warrant claimed for the Veda.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Eternity and Validity of the Veda

Temporal argument

Earlier study is posited behind contemporary study.

Foundational objection

Circular dependence and infinite regress are contested.

Proposed ground

Nyāya appeals to the direct cognition of God.

Transition


The next doctrine asks whether individual words are eternal.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Produced sound · recognition · pitch · Mīmāṃsaka objections

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Are Words Eternal? The Preliminary Debate

1

Production and recognition of phonemes

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

2

Pitch, air and the identity of sound

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articu

3

Production, destruction and manifestati

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 1/9

It may be objected that inference of the human authorship of the Veda is pointless; since Vedic words are eternally free from defects, they can be accepted as intrinsically valid means of knowledge.

But phonemes are non-eternal; therefore a word, being an aggregate of phonemes, is wholly non-eternal.

The non-eternity of words is established by the inference: "A word as an aggregate of phonemes is non-eternal, because although it inheres in phonemes it is produced, like a pot."

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Words Are Non-Eternal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 2/9

The reason "being produced" is directly established in the subject: one experiences "The sound g has been produced." Cognitions such as "The sound g has been produced;

the sound of the ploughing machine is being produced" are perceptual; they are not merely manifestations of an eternal word.

It should not be said that because the production of one sound is apprehended but that of another is not, the experience is erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Words Are Non-Eternal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 3/9

The experience of production of even one sound is enough to establish non-eternity.

Nor is it proper to posit superimposition of a remembered eternal word; there is no means of knowledge defeating the non-eternity of words, otherwise even the production of a pot could not be established.

Some scholars say that the sequence of phonemes is grasped only by the ear; audibility is established by the uncontradicted recognition "I hear the word," and no other sense organ grasps the sequence of phonemes.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Words Are Non-Eternal; Refutation of the View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 4/9

In the word "ghata," the phoneme "ta" is the counterpositive of a prior absence that persists at the time the phoneme "gha" is uttered; therefore phonemes appear to be produced.

But this is not tenable.

The posteriority of the cognition of "ta" after the cognition of "gha" is grasped by the mind.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 5/9

Cognition of phoneme-sequences such as "ghata" and "pata" is mental; therefore the phonemes themselves need not be regarded as produced.

The Mimamsakas say that the inference of the non-eternity of words is defeated by the recognition "This is that very sound g." Individual sounds "g" are one and the same eternal entity.

The object of recognition is not merely the eternity of the word but the unity of a sound persisting continuously over a long time.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Some Scholars; The Mimamsaka Objection — Words Are Eternal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 6/9

If a later sound destroyed the earlier sound, such continuity could not be established; therefore words are not momentary but eternal.

It should not be said that although individual instances of the sound g are mutually distinct, recognition occurs on the basis of their belonging to one class.

In that case the cognition would be only "This belongs to the class g," not "This is that very g."

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Objection — Words Are Eternal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 7/9

The Naiyayikas say that such recognition is not valid; its object is an individual sound g delimited by mutually opposed properties such as high and low pitch.

Highness and lowness are not merely mutually opposed; they are intrinsic properties.

This is established by non-redundant perceptions such as "The sound g is high, distinct from the low one" and "The low g is distinct from the high one."

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Counter-Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 8/9

If a property appearing in a substrate were regarded merely on that account as an intrinsic property of the substrate, then in "the cloth is red" and "the crystal is red," redness would become an intrinsic property of the cloth and crystal.

But conformity to a nearby hibiscus flower and its absence reveal that the latter is an illusion.

Highness and lowness of pitch are not such superimpositions; they are intrinsic and mutually opposed.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Counter-Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production and recognition of phonemes · 9/9

Therefore highness and lowness cannot be present simultaneously in one and the same sound, and recognition does not establish numerical identity of the word.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika and Mīmāṃsaka disagree over production and repeated recognition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Counter-Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 1/13

Highness and lowness are not known as properties of something distinct from sound; sounds such as g are not experienced as some other entity possessing a property opposed to highness.

The rule that highness belongs to sound is directly established.

It should not be said that highness is a property of the air of articulation and is superimposed on sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Highness and the Like Are Properties of Sound

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 2/13

Air is grasped by touch, but the skin does not grasp highness residing in sound.

The ear is an external sense distinct from air; therefore a property of air would not be grasped by the ear.

Even if air is present in the auditory passage, the ear does not grasp its properties, just as the eye does not grasp properties of air.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Highness and the Like Are Properties of Sound

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 3/13

Sound is not a quality of air, because air is a physical substance whereas sound is a quality of ether.

Mere vibration of air as noise is not the substrate of sound.

Nor can it be said that sound is located in the atmosphere and that, although highness is a quality of the ear, the ear superimposes that highness on sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Highness and the Like Are Properties of Sound

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 4/13

In "This g is high," only the sound is experienced, not the ear.

Nor can it be said that only the sound-universal is heard, not the individual, because a universal is not manifested without an individual.

A universal is manifested by the same means of knowledge that manifests the individual; manifestation of a universal without an individual is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Highness and the Like Are Properties of Sound

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 5/13

The Mimamsakas say that highness and the like are not properties of the sound g; otherwise they would cross-classify with g-ness.

Nor can highness be many forms; otherwise cognition of high pitch in general would be impossible.

Highness cannot be generalized in sound by the universal g-ness present there, because cognition of highness arises even when the property delimiting it is recalled.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 6/13

Highness and lowness are not universals of sound; they are relational or comparative properties.

The same pitch may be called high or low depending on the speaker.

Recognition such as "That very sound g was high before and is low now" establishes unity of the substrate and only difference of properties.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 7/13

High and low pitch are not mutually opposed; they can occur in the same sound at different times and with different speakers.

Cognition such as "This is red, not black" conveys difference of properties, not difference of objects.

Therefore sound is one and eternal.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 8/13

It may be objected that a high g inhibits a low g; one object cannot inhibit itself, therefore the two are different.

Direct perception and non-perception of one sound at the same time by the same speaker are mutually opposed.

But the actual cause is difference in the force of the articulatory air.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That High and Low Sounds Are Different

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 9/13

Stronger air manifests highness and prevents manifestation of lowness; therefore not the sounds but the manifesting airs mutually inhibit one another.

There is no harm in accepting unity between the earlier high and later low sound; highness appears reflected in sound from the property of the articulatory air, just as a property of a mirror appears reflected in the face.

Highness and lowness are grasped by touch, assisted by tactile contact delimited by the auditory passage; alternatively they are grasped by the ear itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That High and Low Sounds Are Different

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 10/13

There is no universal rule that a sense organ cannot grasp its own quality; otherwise the ear would not grasp its own sound-quality and the eye would not grasp the form of earth.

Objection: articulatory air is grasped by touch, while word is grasped by hearing; how can identity be superimposed on two objects grasped by two senses?

Cognition such as "This g is high" takes air and sound as one.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Argument That High and Low Sounds Are Different; Refutation of the Objection That Air and

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 11/13

Reply: through non-apprehension of the non-relation between air grasped by touch and high sound grasped by hearing, an illusion of identity is possible; or the ear superimposes identity of the sound with the air already grasped by touch.

The view that highness itself is grasped by the ear is also possible.

The production of sound is not established; the recognition "This g was heard before" defeats cognition of production.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Air and Word Are Not Identical

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 12/13

> Nor should it be said that cognition of production itself defeats recognition; unless the universal g-ness has already been established, cognition of identity based on a universal is impossible.

> No cognition of difference among g-sounds occurs; highness and lowness do not cause difference, because there is recognition "That very g was high before and is low now."

> If g is held to be non-eternal, cognition of production may merely be an adventitious qualification consisting in reflection of a property of the articulatory air, just as the redness of a hibiscus appears in a crystal.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Air and Word Are Not Identical

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pitch, air and the identity of sound · 13/13

Because there is uniform recognition across sounds, contact of throat and palate is merely a manifestor, not a producer.

KEY INSIGHT

The arguments distinguish audible sound from the physical medium of its articulation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Air and Word Are Not Identical

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 1/16

Objection: words are produced because they exhibit increase and decrease, like sweetness. No.

Increase and decrease of highness and lowness in sound have not been established by the preceding rule; even if admitted, they would be conditioned,

like properties pervaded by fluidity and the universal sweetness, and would not decisively establish production of words.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Inference of Production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 2/16

Reasons such as "the universal high pitch is delimited by a property that inhibits perception of homogeneous sound" and "the universal

low pitch delimits objecthood in perception of an audible object" are likewise refuted; highness and lowness are not universals of g.

The conditions consisting in physical-substancehood pervading the probandum and beginningless soundhood block the inference of production.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Inference of Production

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 3/16

Increase and decrease do not always depend on a cause; maximum and minimum magnitude can exist without a distinct cause.

The co-presence of two things in one substrate is not a special cause of either; therefore such increase of a property is not evidence for production of sound.

Granted.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Inference of Production; Further Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 4/16

But after hearing there arise cognitions such as "The first g no longer exists" and "The sound of the ploughing machine has now ceased"; therefore the non-eternity of words is directly perceived.

Alternatively, destruction of sound is established, like destruction of a pot, by inference from the production of perishable sound.

For direct perception of destruction, the counterpositive of the destruction and the substrate of destruction must be perceptible.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 5/16

But if perceptibility of the substrate is taken as the regulator, the destruction of smell and taste, whose substrates are perceptible, would also become perceptible, whereas it is not.

If both a suitable counterpositive and a suitable substrate of destruction are taken as causes, unnecessary complexity results; the imperceptibility of destruction of the contact of a remembered pot would likewise be improper.

If perceptibility of destruction of a suitable counterpositive is accepted, destruction of the touch of air would become perceptible; but air whose touch has been destroyed is not in contact with a sense organ.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 6/16

Non-apprehension of an object capable of being perceived causes cognition of its absence.

Absence of color in a water-atom is not perceived, but absence of earthhood in air is perceived; similarly, absence of sound is perceived in an auditory field in which sound would be fit to be present.

No.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Naiyayika Objection; Refutation of the Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 7/16

Here there is not destruction of an existing sound, but only non-apprehension of sound because of absence of manifesting air.

Nowhere is a suitable sound unapprehended when all causes that manifest sound are present.

The cognition "the sound has ceased" is caused by an adventitious condition consisting in destruction of the tactile air that manifests it, not by destruction of the sound.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 8/16

The regulator for the view that air is only a manifestor, not a producer, is recognition upon rehearing: "This is that same g that was heard before" and "This is that same ploughing sound."

After a pot is destroyed there is no recognition "This is the former pot"; therefore the general recognition of sound cannot be called erroneous.

Recognition of identity occurs even while cognition of highness and the like is true.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 9/16

It may further be said that sound is produced by effort; like a pot it becomes available after human effort and is not merely manifested by effort.

Manifestation occurs in two ways: by removal of an obstacle to sense-object contact, or by bringing a manifesting object near the object.

A curtain is removed to see cloth; but no such curtain or external manifestor can be brought near sound, because sound is held to inhere eternally in the ear.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 10/16

It is also difficult to accept manifestation of sound through a modification or instrument of the ear.

Once the eye is modified by light, all objects in suitable contact are seen together; then if the ear were similarly modified, all words would be heard simultaneously.

It should not be said that at each moment a specific modification manifests a specific word; such an unlimited postulation of modifications is improper.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 11/16

The Mimamsakas counter that sound may be accepted as having the property of being manifested by a fixed corresponding manifestor, just as a result has the property of being produced by a fixed corresponding producer. No.

Two phonemes of one word occur in the same substrate, are grasped by the same sense organ, and are delimited by the same determinant; yet one fixed manifestor does not manifest both phonemes.

Difference of manifestors is observed despite sameness of substrate and delimitor, just as in measure and unity of a pot.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 12/16

A whole-part relation or blueness is manifested through lotushood, but that property is not located in one and the same substrate under one delimitor; the property of the whole is pervasive.

This example does not establish fixed corresponding manifestation.

Word is inferred to be produced like a pot; therefore its eternity is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 13/16

The Naiyayika inference of the non-eternity of words is not sound; it has a counterbalancing inference:

"A phoneme is manifested by a fixed corresponding manifestor, because the unity of that phoneme is established by non-purposive recognition, like smell."

It is untenable to hold that one word produces and destroys another word; production of words through a wave-sequence is mere supposition.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 14/16

In the initial first and final words there is nowhere a sequence of producer and destroyer.

The inference "Although word is an object of cognition produced by an external sense, it possesses the universal wordhood and

therefore is produced" is defeated by recognition and defective because the universals wordhood and g-ness are unestablished.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 15/16

Therefore word is eternal—the single quality of ether, apprehended by the ear, not co-located with another specific quality such as temporal magnitude,

inhering in the one eternal ether, not a quality generated by cooking, and not a fire-produced non-eternal quality like smell.

Recognition itself defeats the doctrine of the non-eternity of words.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Production, destruction and manifestation · 16/16

Thus ends the prima facie view in the doctrine of the non-eternity of words.

KEY INSIGHT

Both schools test the evidence from hearing, silence, and successive sounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Second Naiyayika Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does recognition prove numerical persistence?

Arguments for eternity

- Repeated recognition of a phoneme is taken to favor its persistence.
- Sound may be said to be manifested rather than produced anew.
- Variations in pitch or articulatory force are proposed as external modifications.

Arguments for non-eternity

- The text adduces apparent production and cessation of individual sounds.
- High and low pitch are examined as audible differences in sound itself.
- A repeated phoneme may share a kind without being the same individual sound.

The established Naiyāyika conclusion follows in the next presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Are Words Eternal? The Preliminary Debate

Central issue

Whether sound is produced or only made manifest.

Hard case

Repeated recognition of letters such as g and k.

Further evidence

Pitch, auditory difference and sound cessation.

Next argument


The source turns from objections to its siddhānta.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Individual sounds · phonemic universals · word order · conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Established Doctrine of Non-Eternal Words

1

Audible diversity and generic recogniti

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a pho

2

Phoneme universals and properties of so

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

3

Individual production, sequence and fin

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Audible diversity and generic recognition · 1/5

Our conclusion is that individual sounds such as g are mutually distinct.

Sounds produced by parrots, mynas, other animals and birds, men, women, and other persons are intrinsically experienced as clearly distinct—just as the sweetness of sugarcane juice and that of milk are distinct.

Cognition of difference among sounds does not depend on prior cognition of difference among speakers.

KEY INSIGHT

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a phonemic universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Decisive Doctrine of the Non-Eternity of Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Audible diversity and generic recognition · 2/5

Even a person who does not directly perceive the difference between a man and a woman infers on hearing sounds,

"This is a parrot's sound" and "This is a woman's sound." Otherwise sound-difference would depend on speaker-difference and speaker-difference on sound-difference, producing mutual dependence.

Nor is cognition of sound-difference produced by inference of speaker-difference while inference of speaker-difference is produced from sound-difference; there is directly perceived distinctiveness in sound.

KEY INSIGHT

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a phonemic universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Decisive Doctrine of the Non-Eternity of Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Audible diversity and generic recognition · 3⁄5

No adventitious condition such as "long sword" delimits cognition of sound-difference; in words there is no regulator, present and absent like length in a sword.

Nor is it the case that only differences of manifesting air are reflected in sound.

The manifesting airs of parrots and others are different, but sound-difference itself is directly perceived in g and other phonemes.

KEY INSIGHT

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a phonemic universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Decisive Doctrine of the Non-Eternity of Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Audible diversity and generic recognition · 4/5

Recognition "This is that same g" does not oppose the non-eternity of words; it conveys identity of the universal g-ness, like "This is that same cow"—identity of cowness in a black and a white cow.

Difference of individual sounds remains clear.

Difference of the speaker's air is not the sole cause of sound-difference; otherwise there would be no difference among distinct g-sounds of the same parrot.

KEY INSIGHT

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a phonemic universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Decisive Doctrine of the Non-Eternity of Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Audible diversity and generic recognition · 5/5

Therefore recognition of identity and cognition of difference are not contradictory—identity belongs to the universal, difference to the individuals.

KEY INSIGHT

Directly perceived differences are distinguished from the recognition of a phonemic universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Decisive Doctrine of the Non-Eternity of Words

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 1/10

If universals such as g-ness are not accepted, it becomes difficult to explain collective cognition of noise.

A person at a distance hears "noise" even without clearly hearing the individual differences among many phonemes uttered simultaneously by many people.

It should not be said that only non-phonemic sounds such as drums are heard; even in the absence of drumbeats, the combined sound of many phonemes is heard as noise.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · G-ness and the Like Are Universals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 2/10

Nor is it the case that air manifesting phonemes also manifests distant non-phonemic sound; a manifestor of one k does not manifest another g, much less a non-phonemic sound.

Nor is only the universal soundhood heard while individual phonemes are not; a universal is not perceived while the individual is imperceptible.

Nor is the air manifesting phonemes itself apprehended as noise; that air is heard in the form of phonemic sound.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · G-ness and the Like Are Universals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 3/10

On such a view, even at a short distance only noise would be heard in place of each phoneme.

Nor is noise produced merely by non-apprehension of mutual differences among individual phonemes; the actual phoneme-individuals are distinct.

Even accepting simultaneous utterance of many phonemes as a cause cannot explain distant cognition of noise if universals such as g-ness are denied.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · G-ness and the Like Are Universals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 4/10

Therefore each phoneme necessarily possesses a universal such as g-ness.

Even when individual phonemes are not heard clearly, collective cognition of these universals produces cognition of noise.

There are specific universals such as highness in sound.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · G-ness and the Like Are Universals; Specific Universals in Sound — Highness and the Like

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 5/10

Highness is grasped by the ear; on hearing a conch-sound or parrot-sound from the eastern direction, the cognition arises, "A high sound produced from the east."

Although this property is not a cause of word-use, it resides in sound in the same way as degrees of sweetness reside in sugarcane and milk.

If such a specific universal is not accepted, how could the ear understand the source of a directionally specified conch-sound?

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Specific Universals in Sound — Highness and the Like

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 6/10

Objection: highness and lowness are not g-ness; therefore the highness of a human g is absent in a parrot's g.

Reply: individual universals of highness pervaded by k-ness and the like may differ in distinct k-sounds of the parrot; through that difference the usage "produced by a parrot" is established.

Nor should one accept one property "being produced by a parrot" in all the parrot's k-sounds and infer production from that; such a single property would create unnecessary cross-classification among g and other phonemes.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Specific Universals in Sound — Highness and the Like

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 7/10

G-ness itself is not many; but the universals highness and the like, which are pervaded by g-ness, are many.

Continuous usage of "high g" is possible because of the universal highness even when there is uncertainty about the exact nature of g-ness.

Objection: highness and lowness are not universals but only graded properties.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Specific Universals in Sound — Highness and the Like; Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 8/10

No; highness is a property of increase and lowness a property of decrease, and they are apprehended as universals like greater and lesser sweetness.

Highness does not depend merely on the boundary of its substrate; a high pitch is compared with a low pitch.

The property pervading highness in the sound g is inferred from otherwise-unaccounted-for cognition of difference; because different inferers are involved, distinct universals of highness may be taken as delimited by g-ness and k-ness.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 9/10

If lisp-producing character is admitted in the manifesting air, the air that manifests k and the air that manifests g would have to be different.

If the general property "air that manifests a lisping sound" is held to pervade the air qualified by k, it will not occur in the air qualified by g; and if it occurs generally, then all air would manifest lisping sound.

Therefore a specific sound-differentiating property would have to be admitted in the manifesting air.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Phoneme universals and properties of sound · 10/10

In the same way, it is more reasonable to admit universals such as high pitch in sound itself.

KEY INSIGHT

Noise, high pitch and distinct articulation test the ontology of words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · ı/ıı

.

An objection may be raised: let the g uttered by a man and that uttered by a woman be taken as different, and since speakers are infinite,

let letter-individuals also be taken as infinite; nevertheless, because of recognition of identity, they may still be eternal.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 2/11

But even when there is cognition of production and destruction, the recognition "this is that very g" occurs.

Therefore recognition does not necessarily establish eternality.

It should not be said that, since cognition of production and cognition of identity are mutually opposed, some third regulator must prove one of them erroneous.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 3/11

There is no external regulator determining why one of two opposed cognitions should arise first; the actual situation is that their objects are different.

Cognition of production concerns an individual sound; recognition of identity concerns the universal g-ness.

"This g is of the same g-kind as that" is the meaning, not "this individual sound is numerically the very same one."

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 4/11

Generic identity is seen in usages such as "this medicine is the same" and "what people do, I too do the same." Hence eternality of word is not established by recognition.

.

A word does not consist merely in a fixed number of letters; order also matters.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Support; Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 5/11

In "jara" and "raja", and in "nadi" and "dina", the number of letters is the same but the order differs.

Order is the condition in which a fixed number of letters are uttered in a fixed sequence, or in which cognition of a fixed number of letters arises after utterance in that sequence.

Such an order differs with different words; therefore the order too differs across word-series.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 6/11

If it is said that at the time of recognition of identity, cognition of production apprehends the production of some other thing,

then cognition of difference among individual g-sounds would become erroneous; but there is no regulator for admitting such a universal error.

Cognition of identity does not always apprehend numerical identity of an individual sound.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 7/11

When difference has not previously been cognized, generic cognition of identity arises; after difference has been directly perceived, individual recognition of identity does not arise, or, even if it arises, it is restricted to generic identity.

The recognition "this is that same sound" regarding the clamour of Gujarat likewise apprehends identity of the class of clamour.

Cognition of production, destruction, and highness and lowness establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 8/11

If sound were eternal and merely manifested by air, then in the absence of manifesting air there would only be doubt whether sound exists or not;

there would be no definite cognition, "there is no sound now." Therefore articulate sound is produced even though it was not previously present, and is thus non-eternal. .

When cognitions of the production, destruction, highness, and so on of sound, as well as recognitions of identity, are all taken as veridical, articulate sound and clamour cannot both be simultaneously eternal and non-eternal.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · 9/11

In conventional usage recognition apprehends only sameness of kind—"this Gujarati sound is of that same kind", "this g is of that same g-kind." It does not establish the eternality of an individual sound.

If articulate sound were eternal and merely manifested, then when the manifesting air is absent it would be difficult to have definite cognition of the absence of sound.

Yet absence of sound in general is experienced.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · ১০/১১

Therefore sound is not eternal.

Word is non-eternal because it is produced when it was not already existent.

Universals responsible for usages such as "high" and "low" can equally belong to words; therefore the reason does not conflict with non-eternality.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Individual production, sequence and final siddhānta · ॥/॥

Non-eternal letters, which are qualities of ether, constitute sentences.

Since letters are non-eternal, words, sentences, and Vedic sentences too are non-eternal.

Sri Gangesopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument closes with word order and the non-eternity of Vedic sentences.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Further Objections; Thus ends the Doctrine of the Non-eternality of Word in the Verbal-Testim

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Can a kind remain identifiable while its instances perish?

Generic identification

- A repeated g may be recognized through g-ness shared across its instances.
- Sound classes and audible qualities explain uses such as high and low.
- A conventional recognition need not assert numerical identity of individual sounds.

Individual sound and sentence

- Individual sounds are said to arise and cease in time.
- Ordering the same letters differently can produce distinct words.
- The doctrine concludes that words, sentences, and Vedic sentences are non-eternal.

Gangeśa's source conclusion is presented as the Naiyāyika philosophical position.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · The Established Doctrine of Non-Eternal Words

Recognition

Sameness of a universal does not entail individual eternity.

Audibility

Sound diversity, pitch and phonemic classes are distinguished.

Word structure

Sequence as well as the presence of letters matters.

Formal closure


The translation ends the Doctrine of Non-eternality of Words.

This presentation closes the discussion of the non-eternity of words.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Teacher-disciple transmission · lost branches · inference from Smṛti and practice

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Lost and Hidden Vedic Texts

1

The Guru objection and inferred scriptu

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from

2

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make other

3

Further objections, dissolution and clo

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts,

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 1/12

The Gurus say that the eternality, or uninterrupted continuity, of the Veda is established by the long teacher-disciple tradition.

Some Vedic branches inferred from Smriti and the conduct of the learned are admitted to have been lost; this does not establish the complete destruction of the Veda.

Smriti texts convey knowledge of supersensible duty and are based on the Veda.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection of the Gurus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 2/12

If Smriti texts arise from knowledge produced by the Veda and are composed from recollection of Vedic meaning, then through that well-known tradition the existence of the Veda as their basis, as well as its eternality, is established.

It cannot be said that the Veda merely repeats the meaning of Smriti.

In an inference of the Veda as the cause of cognition of the meaning of Smriti, Vedic meaning cannot itself be the probandum, because something known through another cognition can serve as a qualifier in a qualified cognition;

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection of the Gurus; Refutation of the Charge of Redundancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 3/12

but if Vedic meaning has not already been established, inference of the Veda as the cause of cognition of Smriti-meaning is impossible.

Nor can Vedic meaning be placed as that which pervades Smriti-meaning.

Hence the Veda is not redundant.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Charge of Redundancy

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 4/12

Smritis may be composed after understanding an inferred Vedic meaning; therefore the Veda is always accessible by inference.

The objection that a text not recited from the beginning of creation is not Veda is improper.

A sequence-less sound is meaningless because of defective production, utterance, or lack of a speaker's intention;

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Veda Is Always Inferable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 5/12

but the Vedic recitation posited as the cause of cognition of Smriti-meaning is inferred as a particular recitation having a definite sequence of letters.

The general denotative power of a word is the cause of cognition of a particular meaning; a particular sequence of letters sometimes merely makes that power known.

Even when there is doubt whether the word is "hasta" or "kara", sentence-meaning can be understood from case endings and the like.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Veda Is Always Inferable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 6/12

Therefore one single beginningless order of utterance for every word is not indispensable.

A sentence is said to be a collection of words having a definite order; yet in usages such as "gaur asvah" no single fixed order for all times is found.

In principle, a sentence is a collection of words bearing the intention to convey a particular relation among their meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Veda Is Always Inferable; The Nature of a Sentence and the Process of Sentence Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 7/12

A group of words inferred from writing can also be a sentence, because it produces cognition of word-meanings.

Sentencehood does not depend on audible utterance alone; otherwise words read silently would not constitute a sentence.

Words uttered earlier, being uttered now, and to be uttered later are not collectively present at one time.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of a Sentence and the Process of Sentence Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 8/12

Nevertheless, cognition of particular inflected words, recollection of their meanings, cognition of expectancy, and mutually relation-supporting recollection become causes of sentence cognition.

Mere cognition of words conveying general meanings is not enough; cognition of the particular inflected words is necessary.

An individual word qualified by a particular case ending cannot itself be regarded as the cause of sentence cognition, because there would be no commonality in such causality.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of a Sentence and the Process of Sentence Cognition; Refutation of the View that Particular Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 9/12

In fact, recollection of meaning is also a cause; for recollected meanings such as pot and objecthood arising from unrelated words do not generate cognition of mutual relation.

In the case of the Veda, causality is special.

The Vedic word known as the cause of cognition of Smriti-meaning itself produces that cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View that Particular Words Themselves Are the Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 10/12

The means of knowledge that grasps duty establishes the Veda in that role; therefore cognition of Vedic meaning occurs even when every particularity of letter, word, or case ending has not been known.

Whether the Veda is inferred or heard, its authority rests on its being known in that causal role.

By understanding praise in an injunctive sentence and censure in a prohibitive sentence, people engage in good action and refrain from bad action.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View that Particular Words Themselves Are the Cause; The Veda Is Not Redundant

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 11/12

It would be burdensome to infer infinitely many Vedic sentences together with every particularity of case ending and the like;

therefore the sentence-meaning consisting in praise or censure itself is the more economical cause of engagement and cessation.

In inference from ordinary sentence-meaning there is delay caused by knowledge of pervasion, but a Vedic sentence, being complete with its competent auxiliary causes, immediately generates knowledge of Vedic meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Veda Is Not Redundant

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru objection and inferred scripture · 12/12

Therefore the Veda is a direct verbal means of knowing meaning, not a redundant repetition of inference.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether an unbroken Vedic tradition can be inferred from teaching and remembered texts.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Veda Is Not Redundant

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 1/12

First, an auspicious observance that is not prohibited by the learned is inferred to be obligatory; thereafter the Veda inferred from Smriti and learned conduct produces cognition of this oughtness.

The inference is: "The auspicious observance ought to be performed, because it is an otherworldly-fruit-producing practice not prohibited in the tradition of the learned." As a result, one engages in the proper action.

It is not necessary that some particular Vedic sentence such as "the auspicious act is to be performed" be inferred.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Oughtness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 2/12

First oughtness is inferred, and afterwards the Veda is inferred as the cause of cognition of that oughtness.

Some scholars say that sentences such as "the Astaka is to be performed" or "the Astaka produces fruit" are what is inferred, because before inference of the Veda there is recollection of such a sentence.

But there is no fixed relation between one remembered sentence and the inferred Veda; different speakers may infer different sentences for the same meaning of an auspicious observance.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Oughtness; Establishment of Perpetual Inferability

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 3/12

The Manusmriti is not a repetition of many Vedic sentences, because the meanings of Smriti are manifold.

The Veda is inferred as the cause of Smriti-meaning; there is no defect of a blind tradition here, because the directly apprehended tradition of word-power and learned conduct is the basis of evidence.

We Naiyayikas say: the meaning of Smriti and learned conduct can be understood only from Vedic passages that are lost or hidden; therefore it is unnecessary to postulate an additional totality of causes.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Establishment of Perpetual Inferability; The Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 4/12

Smriti and learned conduct are based on experience of Vedic meaning, and for this reason the Veda is inferred.

The Veda is also an object of study and direct hearing, because an inferred Veda possesses sentencehood just like an accepted Vedic recitation.

In understanding injunction and prohibition from praise and censure, it is not necessary to infer a complete sentence with all particular case endings and so on; only the meaning that causes engagement or cessation is inferred.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 5/12

Some scholars remember many Vedic branches, but no single person can study all branches.

Therefore, merely because one branch is not studied, another branch still studied by some person cannot thereby be regarded as automatically preserving it.

From the statement "all branches are collectively present in social memory" an uninterrupted tradition of each individual branch does not follow.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 6/12

Even if sages such as Vyasa are admitted to have known the branches, the utterance, words, and sentences of branches may nevertheless be lost in the present age.

Yet Vedic meaning is not wholly lost, because the necessary meaning is re-established from Smriti, learned conduct, collective tradition of hearing, and cognition of duty.

Different branches of the Veda teach different injunctions.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Reply; Conduct Is Reliable; the Veda Is Not Inferred Everywhere

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 7/12

Therefore the fear that an injunction may have existed only in a lost branch does not make current Vedic conduct unreliable.

Smriti texts of the great sages do not lose authority over time, because they gather injunctions from different branches.

The expression "Veda that is always inferable" does not mean that every sentence with particular words or case endings is inferred.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conduct Is Reliable; the Veda Is Not Inferred Everywhere

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 8/12

Veda-hood is a property of a tradition of revelation that generates cognition of duty.

Learned persons determine the absence of Veda-hood in an unheard sentence; hence Veda-hood cannot be inferred there.

A neutral observer says: only after Smriti and learned conduct have been established as based on the Veda does the dispute arise whether the Vedic tradition has been lost or not.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conduct Is Reliable; the Veda Is Not Inferred Everywhere; The Neutral View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 9/12

A Smriti of the same meaning accepted by many persons can itself serve as a reason for inferring the Veda; thus the sentence-meaning concerning supersensible duty is first known from Smriti, and the Veda is inferred afterwards.

In that case the Veda appears redundant.

But Smritis are themselves means of knowledge because they arise from accepted cognition of sentence-meaning and are accepted by many.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 10/12

An earlier directly transmitted Smriti serves as the basis of later Smriti; this is not a blind tradition.

Similarity to Vedic meaning can sometimes also arise from an erroneous belief about a directly heard Veda; therefore it is not necessary that every Smriti have the Veda as its source.

It may be objected: just as acceptance by many establishes the authority of a Smriti, so too the common cognition "this Smriti is based on directly apprehended Veda" should establish its Vedic basis.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 11/12

Otherwise the authority of both Smriti and Veda would be unstable.

But a fabricated Smriti, prompted by greed, prescribing that an elephant be tied to every post, is not accepted by many; hence there is deviation.

Widespread disagreement also shows the possibility of another basis for a Smriti.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Oughtness, Smṛti and learned conduct · 12/12

Therefore a Smriti established through a sound chain of reasoning may be authoritative without necessarily being Veda-based.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate examines whether remembered scripture and learned custom make otherwise unavailable Vedic prescriptions inferable.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 1/11

It cannot be said that people accept a Smriti only after understanding it to be Veda-based, because cognition of its Vedic basis has not already been established.

Later people accept texts such as the Manusmriti because earlier people accepted them.

In the same way, refined practices such as the Holaka can be understood as obligatory from the tradition of the learned; inference of the Veda is not indispensable for them.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 2/11

Ordinary refined practices such as eating are not Veda-based, yet people engage in them through social tradition.

The beginninglessness of learned conduct and of inference of oughtness does not make them a blind tradition; every inference is an independent means of knowledge on the basis of pervasion and the presence of the reason in the subject.

If every inference were deemed invalid because it "depends on a prior inference", then perception and other means of knowledge too would have to be regarded as dependent on some other basis.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another Objection; Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 3/11

In the inference "this learned practice is based on the Veda because it is accepted by many", the qualifier "independent means of knowledge" is unnecessary.

Learned conduct can be based on an ordinary means of knowledge; the conclusion that only the Veda is its basis does not follow.

The weighty supposition that people adopt someone's practice only after understanding it to be Veda-based is unproved.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 4/11

Later people adopt the practice of earlier exemplary persons after observing it.

If an invariable relation of "being based on the Veda" is admitted between Smriti and learned conduct, then even a fabricated Smriti born of greed would become Veda-based.

Alternatively, Smriti and conduct can be taken as beginningless; they can themselves be sources of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 5/11

We Naiyayikas reply: at dissolution prior Smriti and conduct are destroyed; at the beginning of a new creation the omniscient God composes the Veda, and Smriti authors such as Manu compose Smriti on the basis of that Veda.

Thus there is no defect of blind tradition.

To suppose that Manu and others independently possessed direct perception of supersensible matters is burdensome and unproved.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 6/11

Compared with postulating many omniscient authors of Smriti, postulating one omniscient God is more economical.

It is not necessary to hold that God wrote the Smritis; the Smritis explicitly state Manu and others to be their authors, but their knowledge is Veda-based.

It may be objected: let practices such as auspicious observances be received directly from God; what need is there for the Veda?

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 7/11

But to suppose that every complex practice was separately received from God is a burdensome hypothesis.

It is more economical to posit a brief Vedic sentence such as "perform the auspicious observance."

Nor is direct instruction by God required in order to know the power of the word "auspicious"; its power is established through the tradition of sentence meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 8/11

Not every utterance of God is Veda; only that utterance which serves as the basis of cognition of dharma and duty is Veda.

Objection: to regard Smriti as based on the Veda is possible only in a creation preceded by dissolution, because if there were no dissolution time would not be observed apart from produced substances.

But just as the prior absence of a pot exists in a time distinct from the parts of the pot, so in the time of dissolution the absence of produced substances is established.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 9/11

A future dissolution too can be inferred.

From a condition destructive of effects, from the survival of eternal substances such as atoms, and from a state that obstructs present effects, a temporal distinction in the form of dissolution is established.

All contemporaneous atoms can exist in a state characterized by continuous absence of all perceptible produced substances, because they are eternal substances.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Other Arguments; Further Inferences Establishing Dissolution

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · 10/11

Alternatively, the series of terrestrial globes is the counterpositive of a destruction produced in a locus different from the substratum of its effect, because it is an effect like a pot.

Activities other than the present activity will be stopped by an inhibitor of the present activity because the nature of activity is the same.

In these inferences there is no defect of proving what is already established, because absence, destruction, and temporal difference are independently established.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Inferences Establishing Dissolution

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Further objections, dissolution and closure · II/II

From these considerations are established dissolution, re-creation, the Veda composed by God, and the tradition of Smriti based on the Veda.

the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply distinguishes genuine conduct, unreliable invented texts, cosmic dissolution, and fresh Vedic composition.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Inferences Establishing Dissolution; The Doctrine of Lost and Hidden Vedic Texts Ends Thus ends the

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Can lost Vedic branches still ground present duties?

Continuity and the Guru view

- Teacher-disciple transmission is invoked to defend uninterrupted access to Vedic authority.
- A lost or hidden branch may be inferred when a practice is believed to rest on Vedic prescription.
- Recollection and learned observance are proposed as paths to cognition of oughtness.

Naiyāyika objections and reply

- Not every popular practice or Smṛti is reliable; fabricated prescriptions pose counterexamples.
- An unlimited appeal to lost branches risks making current prescriptions epistemically insecure.
- The source invokes dissolution and an omniscient author at a new creation to address alleged beginninglessness.

The text records opposing philosophical accounts; claims about lost texts are not external historical verification.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Lost and Hidden Vedic Texts

Contested continuity

Uninterrupted transmission is argued, not simply assumed.

Normative evidence

Smṛti and learned conduct require criteria of reliability.

Ontological reply

Dissolution changes the debate about perpetual Vedic recitation.

Formal closure


The doctrine of lost and hidden Vedic texts ends here.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Prima facie accounts · effort, desire, and the desired result

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Injunction and the Cause of Activity

1

What cognition prompts a person to act?

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, des

2

Competing accounts of volition and exer

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whe

3

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 1/12

The Veda is the basis of conduct because it produces cognition of the cause of activity.

We now consider what the cause of activity is.

Mere cognition of word-power, volition, apurva, or bhavana is not the cause of activity, because activity sometimes fails to occur in their presence and occurs even in their absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cognition That Causes Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 2/12

The Gurus say that cognition of accomplishability by one's own effort—"the result of this action will be accomplished through my effort"—is the cause of activity.

A delayed production of the action is due to the absence of some other necessary cause, such as a staff; even in the absence of desire, that cognition is not useless.

Desire-to-act is the desire for an action capable of being accomplished by one's own effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Gurus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 3/12

From the cognition "I shall accomplish cooking through effort" arises desire-to-act, and desire-to-act is an auxiliary cause of activity.

Mere cognition "this result is desired" does not produce desire-to-act, because there is no activity toward something already accomplished of itself.

Objection: prior to activity, cognition of accomplishability by effort is not established; it may be admitted only when obtained from verbal testimony or inference.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Gurus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 4/12

Let desire-to-act arise from cognition of accomplishability qualified by one's own effort, and let only cognition that destroys awareness of causality be the inhibitor.

Otherwise, cognitions such as "not achievable by one's own effort", "a means to something undesirable", and "fruitless" would each have to be separately admitted as inhibitors, which would be needlessly burdensome.

Saundada says: a desiderative verbal root signifies only a desire whose object is the action expressed by the root; for economy, understand desire-to-act simply as desire directed toward effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Gurus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 5/12

This desire arises from cognition of being a means to the desired result.

But the cognition preceding effort, "I shall accomplish cooking in order to cook rice by means of fire", cannot be ignored.

In "he desires to cook", the action of cooking itself is the object of desire, not effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Gurus

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 6/12

In "he knows a pot, desires a pot, makes a pot", the object is the same pot in all three.

Therefore it is proper to admit desire-to-act as directed toward action.

Objection: if desire-to-act is desire to accomplish cooking through effort, then when cooking is accomplished by another means the desire would not be destroyed,

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Gurus; Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 7/12

because desire to obtain a result by a particular means may remain even after the result has been obtained by another means.

Reply: cognition that the result has been accomplished and cognition of the non-obtainment of the means to the result are opposed to desire-to-act.

When both cooking and the rice are accomplished, cognition opposed to further attainment of the result destroys the desire.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 8/12

When wealth is obtained by another means, the general desire to obtain wealth is destroyed, though desire for more wealth may remain.

Effort conducive to action is known as a means to attainment of the desired result; therefore desire-to-act is desire for an action to be accomplished by effort.

Desire-to-act is a cause of effort only when that very effort qualifies it, not some other effort; otherwise the causal hypothesis would become burdensome.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Argument; Desire-to-act Is a Cause of Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 9/12

Objection: rain, insofar as it occurs in one's own field, is a means to a desired result; cooking, insofar as it is accomplished by effort, is a means to a desired result.

Therefore desire would be related not merely to effort or an effort-produced action, but to whatever is a means to the result.

Reply: an action is regarded as a means to a desired result insofar as it is accomplishable by effort; the object of desire-to-act is the action that can be accomplished by effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Being a Means to the Desired Is a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 10/12

Such desire-to-act does not occur with respect to rain, which cannot be accomplished by effort.

Objection: dependence on desire-to-act is only an accidental qualifier of effort; therefore it cannot constitute a recurrent causal character common to the universal effort.

Reply: every effort other than life-sustaining effort is specified by desire-to-act.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Being a Means to the Desired Is a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 11/12

Just as the expression "a milk-giving cow" indicates the cow-universal through an accidental qualifier, so dependence on desire-to-act indicates the recurrent causal character of effort.

Objection: effort does not exist before the future action; how then can effort be a qualifier in cognition of accomplishability by effort?

Reply: effort is present as an object of cognition, and accomplishability is attached to the result as an accidental qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Being a Means to the Desired Is a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

What cognition prompts a person to act? · 12/12

When one infers a past or future entity from a reason, objective existence of that entity at the time of inference is not required; this is an accepted rule.

KEY INSIGHT

Guru and Mīmāṃsaka positions distinguish accomplishability through effort, desire to act, and cognition of a desired means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Being a Means to the Desired Is a Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 1/10

Objection: exertion too is accomplished by effort; therefore desire for exertion would be indispensable.

Reply: a person trying to lift a heavy object experiences exertion even without succeeding in producing the action of lifting; therefore effort, not the action, is the cause of exertion.

Pleasure is not a result of effort produced by desire-to-act, because pleasure itself is not the intended object of activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection That Desire-to-act Would Be Necessary for Exertion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 2/10

Effort arises from desire concerning the means, not merely from desire for attainment of the result.

Some scholars say: exertion is accomplished by effort alone, not by effort dependent on desire-to-act.

Otherwise unintended motions and the like too would conflict with the doctrine that only a desired action is accomplished by effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection That Desire-to-act Would Be Necessary for Exertion; The View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 3/10

But unintended motion is produced by a particular effort, whereas life-sustaining effort does not produce exertion.

Therefore each individual exertion is accomplished by the individual effort connected with it.

Let exertion be held to arise only from an effort that produces exertion, not from life-sustaining effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 4/10

The exertion inferred from sweating during sleep is not an effect of life-sustaining effort, because in the waking state life-sustaining effort continues without exertion continuing at every moment.

Therefore every exertion involved in eating, walking, lifting a weight, and so on is accomplished by the effort specific to that action.

The Prabhakaras say that the preceding objection is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 5/10

The condition of depending on one's desire-to-act is a qualifier of effort.

Exertion is produced not by a desire for exertion itself but by effort directed toward something other than exertion, because exertion, being painful, is not desired.

Therefore exertion is said to be accomplished by effort dependent on a desire for something else.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 6/10

Dependence of exertion on a desire for itself is not a qualifier of effort; saying so would add needless complexity.

Other Mimamsakas say that exertion is accomplished merely by effort, not by effort qualified by a special purposive property, because exertion is not desired.

Here only one factor —accomplishability by effort—is admitted as the cause of desire-to-act; the Naiyayikas must admit many factors such as being a means to the desired, accomplishability by effort, pleasure, and absence of pain.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Scholars; The View of Other Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 7/10

For producing desire for pleasure, cognition of absence of pain alone is sufficient; adding cognition of instrumentality and the like is burdensome.

That there is no desire to consume poison despite its being accomplishable by effort is evident from common experience.

Consuming poison is accomplishable by effort, yet a person engages in it when, through error, it is understood to be a means to pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Other Mimamsakas; The Naiyayikas' Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 8/10

Therefore cognition of accomplishability by effort alone is not the cause; cognition of being a means to the desired is necessary.

If it is said that mere experience of accomplishability by effort is the cause, then even when consuming poison is known to

be accomplishable through an erroneous means of knowledge or through trustworthy testimony, activity toward it would follow.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 9/10

The Prabhakaras reply: the cause of activity is the inference "this result is to be accomplished", produced by recollection of a special qualification of the agent.

In optional rites desire, and in obligatory rites purity and the like, qualify the agent; recollection of this gives rise to cognition of duty.

At the time of consuming poison, because there is strong cognition of what is undesirable, the inference of duty does not arise; hence there is no activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Competing accounts of volition and exertion · 10/10

In a satiated person there is no desire that would establish duty, so he does not engage in eating.

The author of the Maharnava says that in exertion the cause is cognition that it is accomplished by an effort distinct from life-sustaining effort, this cognition arising from recollection of preservation of life.

But in indispensable obligatory action there is likewise no accomplishability by an effort distinct from preservation of life in all cases; therefore this view is not universally applicable.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections concern lifting weights, exertion, rain, satiation, poison, and whether desire for action must itself be caused.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Objection; The View of the Author of the Maharnava

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 1/8

It is more economical to make being a means to the desired a qualifier of cognition of accomplishability by effort in cases other than consuming poison.

Desire concerning a means arises from cognition that it is a means to the desired; there is no desire-to-act toward a means such as rain that is not accomplishable by effort, because accomplishability by effort is absent.

Therefore accomplishability by effort and being a means to the desired jointly constitute the cause of activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 2/8

Being an end to be accomplished and being a means can belong to the same thing at different times.

The action of cooking is an end to be accomplished at a future time prior to the effort, and after its accomplishment it is a means to obtaining rice.

"End" and "means" are not absolutely opposed; only accomplishment and non-accomplishment at the very same time are opposed.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 3/8

For this reason one and the same sacrifice is presently obligatory and later a means to a result.

Different relations are possible through difference of time.

The objection that cognition of the form "to be accomplished now and to be a means later" cannot be a cause of activity is improper.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Argument; Further Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 4/8

The expressions "now" and "later" are relative; nevertheless their meanings are fixed by objective differences of time.

A person does not desire to accomplish again something already accomplished, but makes a present effort for a future result not yet accomplished.

Therefore joint cognition of present accomplishability by effort and future instrumentality toward the desired can be a cause.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Refutation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 5/8

Some scholars admit a separate property called "being an objective", common to pleasure and to means to pleasure, which produces desire-to-act.

But cognition of being an objective does not occur without first knowing pleasure, and once pleasure is known desire arises directly.

Therefore a separate property of being an objective is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 6/8

Future pleasure itself is not a present cause; cognition of pleasure is the cause.

While effort is present, the cognition "this result will be accomplished by my effort" arises in the present.

Even though a future apurva is momentary, the relation whereby a present action is a means to its result can be known.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View; Cognition of Accomplishability by Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 7/8

> The action of cooking can be inferred before it is perceived: "this cooking will not occur without my effort, and through the effort the desired result in the form of cooked rice will be accomplished." From this cognition desire-to-act arises.

> Something unaccomplished is not itself a means to the desired; in food mixed with poison that has an undesirable result, the qualifier "not accompanied by a stronger undesirable consequence" is absent, so the causal reason does not deviate.

> Past cooking, having already been accomplished by effort, is not a present means to the desired.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Accomplishability by Effort; Absence of Deviance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika arguments and counterexamples · 8/8

When obtaining water is understood to be possible through rainfall without one's own effort, there is no activity toward plunging into a reservoir, because cognition of accomplishability by one's own effort is absent.

When relief is understood to be impossible without one's own effort, activity occurs.

KEY INSIGHT

Means-character, temporal differences and the distinction between accomplished and still-to-be-accomplished actions are compared.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Absence of Deviance

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What makes an injunction practically effective?

Prima facie proposals

- Cognition that an undertaking can be accomplished by one’s own effort is proposed as a cause of action.
- Some positions emphasize desire-to-act; others emphasize recognition of a means to a desired result.
- The cause is tested against unwanted results, fruitless actions, and exertions that occur without a fresh desire.

Naiyāyika difficulties and refinements

- A means may be useful but not voluntarily achievable, as in rainfall rather than deliberate action.
- An already accomplished action and a future achievable action do not have the same motivational role.
- Temporal qualification and practical attainability constrain which cognitions cause activity.

The translated debate asks for a sufficient cognition of activity, not merely a grammatical definition.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Injunction and the Cause of Activity

Motivation

Desired ends and effective means must be connected.

Agency

Achievability by one’s effort is a separate question.

Counterexamples

Poison, rain, satiation, and physical exertion test each model.

Transition


The next unit moves to the established Nyāya response.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Prābhākara revisions · Naiyāyika siddhānta · volition and objecthood

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Established Doctrine of Injunction

1

Initial Prābhākara positions

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being

2

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle

3

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimit

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 1/8

It should not be said that being a means to the desired is the reason for inferring accomplishability by effort as the probandum, because before activity toward cooking there is no means of knowledge of that relation.

Even if cognition of being a means to the desired alone is held to be the cause, accomplishability by effort is still necessary; otherwise there would be unnecessary activity toward a result obtainable by another means.

The Prabhakaras say that cognition of accomplishability by effort alone produces desire-to-act; cognition of being a means to the desired is not indispensable.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie View and Beginning of the Established Doctrine in the Doctrine of Injunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 2/8

The Naiyayikas say that both are causes.

If future cooking is made the subject of the inference, there is the defect of an unestablished locus; if present or past cooking is the subject, there is contradiction.

If "cooking in general" is the subject, both accomplished and unaccomplished cooking are included, producing deviation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie View and Beginning of the Established Doctrine in the Doctrine of Injunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 3/8

A reply in the form of an objection: if cooking in general, independent of present, past, and future, is taken as the object, accomplishability by effort does not belong to it; only accomplished cooking is available.

How then can accomplishability by effort be inferred?

Some Prabhakaras say that non-apprehension of the absence of the relation of accomplishability by effort in remembered past cooking, produced by cognition of being a means to the desired, generates activity toward future cooking.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie View and Beginning of the Established Doctrine in the Doctrine of Injunction; The View of S

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 4/8

But past cooking has already been accomplished; absence of the relation of accomplishability by effort is clear there.

If its non-apprehension were admitted, then a satiated person who has obtained cooked food would engage in cooking again.

Therefore this view is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 5/8

The Prabhakaras say: accomplishability of cooking in general is established in future cooking, not in past cooking that is already accomplished.

Co-location of the delimitor of subjecthood and the delimitor of the probandum is possible in future cooking; contradiction in past cooking does not destroy the case of cooking in general.

Just as fire is established on a mountain by cognition of fire in general and the reason smoke even though fire on that

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 6/8

mountain was previously unestablished, so accomplishability by effort is established for cooking in general in future cooking.

Inference may be of three kinds: concerning an unestablished object, an established object, or an unknown object.

How can there be desire for rain even without its being a means to the desired?

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Some Prabhakaras; A Further Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 7/8

Desire concerning a pleasurable result arises from cognition of "being a means to pleasure", but rain, whether already occurring or not yet occurring,

can give rise to a general desire through cognition of a pervasive general relation —such a cognition is possible.

The Prabhakara view is that a child recollects, from impressions of a previous birth, the duty of suckling at the breast.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Further Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Initial Prābhākara positions · 8/8

The Naiyayikas say that activity arises from recollection that suckling is a means to pleasure.

In both views, if the beginningless cycle of births is admitted, there is no blind tradition.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contests whether effort-achievability alone, or knowledge of being a means to an end, produces desire-to-act.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Further Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya reply · 1/5

The new Prabhakaras say that mere cognition "this action will be accomplished by my effort" is not the cause;

cognition of the accomplishability of one's own action arises from observing similarity of agents, the requisite means, and successful action by other agents.

In consuming poison or in worship of a prohibited deity, strong cognition of an undesirable result prevents cognition of being a means to the desired; hence there is no activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle that a desired means is the primary cognized object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the New Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya reply · 2/5

A satiated person has already obtained the desired result, so he does not engage in eating.

The very new Prabhakaras say that the agent's effort should be qualified as "not producing a prohibited result"; hence a person faced with a great undesirable consequence does not engage in consuming poison or worshipping a prohibited deity.

Actions such as cooking in general are not delimited by a particular time; future cooking is the object of activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle that a desired means is the primary cognized object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the New Prabhakaras; The View of the Very New Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya reply · 3/5

Desire-to-act concerns cooking in general, not specifically future cooking.

We Naiyayikas say that in the cognition causing activity, being a means to the desired is the principal delimitor of objecthood; this is economical.

There is no need for the burdensome hypothesis "the result will be accomplished through cognition of a qualifier of one's desire."

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle that a desired means is the primary cognized object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Very New Prabhakaras; Established Doctrine of the Doctrine of Injunction—the Naiyayikas' Re

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya reply · 4/5

Being an end to be accomplished and being a means can belong to the same action or sacrifice at different times; only accomplishment and non-accomplishment at the same time are opposed.

Objection: if being an end and being a means are opposed, how can both belong to the same sacrifice?

There is no means of knowledge for separating them by qualifiers of different times.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle that a desired means is the primary cognized object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Established Doctrine of the Doctrine of Injunction—the Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

New Prābhākara revisions and the Nyāya reply · 5/5

Reply: present end-status and future means-status are conjoined through temporal difference.

Just as treehood and conjunction with a monkey can occur in the same locus under different delimitors, so there is no opposition between these two states.

KEY INSIGHT

Alternative qualifications of effort are compared with the Naiyāyika principle that a desired means is the primary cognized object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Established Doctrine of the Doctrine of Injunction—the Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimitation · 1/5

In the example of cooking, cognition of the form "accomplishable by effort now and a means to the desired result later" will be the cause of activity.

This relation cannot be established for cooking in general while abandoning the distinction between future and past; therefore cognition of a particular time is necessary.

Desire for pleasure does not arise without cognition of accomplishability by effort; otherwise a person facing a great undesirable consequence would desire pleasure from consuming poison and engage in it.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability, and the qualification of objecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Observation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimitation · 2/5

Therefore both cognition of being a means to the desired and cognition of accomplishability by effort are required.

Some say that cognition of accomplishability by effort and cognition of being a means to the desired produce only desire concerning a means.

When something accomplishable by effort is understood to be a means to a desired result, desire for that means arises; otherwise there is only a general desire.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability, and the qualification of objecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Observation; The Cause of Desire-to-act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimitation · 3/5

In cooking, accomplishability by effort becomes an object of cognition of being a means to the desired, and thus desire to cook arises.

In rain, accomplishability by effort is not an object, so only general desire for the result arises.

In the case of pleasure, cognition of its causal status produces desire for pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability, and the qualification of objecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Desire-to-act

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimitation · 4/5

Cognition of being a means to the desired has been established as a cause of desire for a means;

therefore accomplishability by effort must be admitted as a delimitor of objecthood, otherwise desire for a means would arise toward something impossible through one's own effort.

Experience establishes causality in this combined form.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability, and the qualification of objecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Accomplishability by Effort Is a Delimitor of Objecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Observation, desire-to-act, and delimitation · 5/5

The objection that "means-status is a property of something already accomplished, so that very thing cannot be desired" is improper.

Accomplishment and non-accomplishment are qualified by particular times and are not mutually opposed in an unrestricted sense.

Therefore the combined form of cognition of accomplishability by effort and cognition of being a means to the desired is the cause of desire for a means and of activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desired pleasure, known means, effort-achievability, and the qualification of objecthood.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Accomplishability by Effort Is a Delimitor of Objecthood

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Which cognition is central in voluntary activity?

Prābhākara refinements

- Some thinkers give priority to recognizing that an act can be accomplished by one's own exertion.
- Later proposals qualify effort by conditions involving non-prohibited or non-undesirable results.
- These distinctions are tested using cases where accomplishment and desirability come apart.

Naiyāyika siddhānta

- Means-character with respect to a desired end is assigned a central role in the motivating cognition.
- Knowledge of attainability by effort helps delimit the object of desire-to-act.
- Present and future status can qualify a single action differently without contradiction.

The concluding formulation is the Naiyāyika position within the translated debate.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · The Established Doctrine of Injunction

Contested cause

Achievability alone is tested against desire for the result.

Motivating object

The desired means figures in the causal account.

Role of effort

Effort-achievability qualifies what can be chosen as action.

Continuation


The source next tests injunctions concerning means, duty and prohibitions.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Heaven, sacrifice, violence, obligatory rites · language of the optative and prohibition

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Injunction, Duty and Instrumentality

1

Means to a desired end and the problem

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the

2

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and s

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory acti

3

Effort-achievability and verbal motivat

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative su

4

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of inj

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 1/13

Some scholars say that activity toward obtaining a result such as heaven is possible only when the agent knows that an action such as sacrifice is accomplishable by his effort and bears a means-relation to the desired result.

But because the action is momentary, it cannot have a direct relation to a future result; therefore an apurva must be admitted as an intermediary of that relation.

Yet this doctrine is not established merely from this.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Injunction—the Question of Instrumentality and Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 2/13

The agent completes the sacrificial action by his own effort and understands, from the authority of scripture, that the action will produce the result.

Separate cognition of what unseen state persists in the interval before the result arises is not a necessary cause of activity.

Nor can it be said that mere cognition of "a means to the desired" prompts activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Injunction—the Question of Instrumentality and Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 3/13

A person who has already eaten cooked food does not again engage in cooking, even though cooking is a means to food.

Activity occurs toward a means that is connected with a desired result and has not yet been completed.

Therefore the cause of activity is the combined cognition of the desired result, its means-character, and its accomplishability by effort; cognition of means-character alone is not enough.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Injunction—the Question of Instrumentality and Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 4/13

The Mimamsaka view that a prince will engage in a means merely from desire for kingship without knowing a means to obtain the kingdom is improper.

Without cognition of a particular means there can be no regulation of activity.

According to the Naiyayikas, cognition of a means capable of obtaining the desired result and capable of being accomplished by one's own effort generates activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Injunction—the Question of Instrumentality and Activity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 5/13

Pounding grain, making flour, performing a sacrifice, and so on are accomplished in sequence; yet there is not a separate desire for a result at each stage, because cognition of relation to the final result is sufficient.

A qualifier of being a means to the desired is that the means not produce pain greater than the pleasure obtainable from the desired result.

Mere absence of producing pain is not the cause, but it is certainly a delimitor of the prompting cause.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Injunction—the Question of Instrumentality and Activity; Qualifier of a Means to the Desire

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 6/13

Even when honey-mixed poisonous food is understood to be a means to pleasure, cognition that it causes the pain of death prevents activity.

Therefore cognition of means-character prompts only when the means does not have a greater undesirable consequence.

There is difficulty in treating "not having a stronger undesirable consequence" as a qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Qualifier of a Means to the Desired; The Question of Connection with a Stronger Undesirable Consequence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 7/13

Greater exertion certainly causes more pain, yet sometimes the pain of lesser exertion may be more intense; therefore mere quantity or intensity of pain is not decisive.

The prohibitive sentence "do not eat poisoned meat" prevents activity in the sense that such food is a means to an undesirable result greater than the desired pleasure.

A prohibition generally does not convey mere absence of an action, but the fact that the action is a means to something undesirable.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Question of Connection with a Stronger Undesirable Consequence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 8/13

Objection Concerning Activity toward the Syena Sacrifice .

The objection is: if the Syena sacrifice, though a means to killing an enemy, is also a cause of a greater undesirable result such as hell, how can the injunction "perform the Syena sacrifice" lead to activity?

The reply is that one who knows the truth does not engage in the Syena sacrifice because of prohibitive or condemnatory statements.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Question of Connection with a Stronger Undesirable Consequence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 9/13

A person who ignores the undesirable aspect such as hell, or who has only an intense desire to kill the enemy, may engage in it.

This establishes that an injunction does not by itself prompt everyone; only the combined cognition of a desired result, means-character, accomplishability by effort, and absence of a greater undesirable consequence prompts activity.

Violence cannot be defined merely as "an action whose result is death." If someone falls into a well and dies because a well was dug, or if a person later dies because a noose was made, the digger or maker does not thereby become violent.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Question of Connection with a Stronger Undesirable Consequence; The Nature of Violence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 10/13

Violence is an action from which death arises immediately, or which is performed with the intention of causing death.

The Syena sacrifice is not itself violence; wielding a sword or shooting an arrow, if it immediately causes death, is called violence.

A more accurate definition is this: violence is a death-causing action performed with the intention of causing death without the assistance of unseen merit.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of Violence; An Alternative Definition of Violence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 11/13

The Syena sacrifice gives its result through unseen potency and is therefore not direct violence.

If even remote causes were counted as violence, then taking an oil bath on the seventh day, serving food, digging a well, and the like would all become causes of violence.

Therefore violence should be admitted only in an action that directly or proximately causes death.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · An Alternative Definition of Violence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 12/13

According to Harinathopadhyaya, violence is an action that causes death without the assistance of an unintended action by another person.

A sword-maker does not desire death, so his action is not violence; but a person who mixes poison into rice knows that the eater will die from that poison, so his action is violence.

An objection to this view is that a person serving food may sometimes become a cause of death by choking; then he too would have to be regarded as violent.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Harinathopadhyaya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Means to a desired end and the problem of violence · 13/13

Therefore mere absence of an unintended intermediate action is not an adequate delimitation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source analyzes sacrifice, heaven, stronger undesirable consequences, the Śyena sacrifice and rival definitions of violence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Harinathopadhyaya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 1/12

The Mimamsakas say that obligatory rites, such as the Sandhya worship, yield no desired result; therefore the optative suffix cannot convey "being a means to the desired."

The Naiyayikas reply that explanatory statements, condemnatory statements, or prescriptions of expiation indicate a result of obligatory rites—absence of sin, removal of suffering, heaven, or the like.

But the Mimamsakas say that admitting such a result would turn an obligatory rite into an optional rite performed for a desired result.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Objection—Absence of Fruit in Obligatory Rites

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 2/12

The problem here is that cognition of duty and cognition of the result appear mutually dependent: duty is known by knowing the result, and the result by knowing the duty.

Some Naiyayikas say that sin is caused not by failing to perform an obligatory rite, but by the absence of the worship that constitutes the obligatory rite; the injunction merely removes that absence.

But if mere removal of sin is taken as the result, then because its absence is beginningless it will not count as a "result to be produced." And a prohibitive sentence states only absence of the action, not absence of sin.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka Objection—Absence of Fruit in Obligatory Rites; Sin Caused by the Absence of Worship

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 3/12

Therefore the relation between the result of an obligatory rite and its obligatoriness requires further examination.

The new Naiyayikas say that the prior absence of an unseen potency produced by obligatory action is the cause of suffering, and

the absence of that absence is the desired result; therefore the injunction presents the obligatory rite as a means to unseen potency and as accomplishable by effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Sin Caused by the Absence of Worship; Refutation of the New Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 4/12

The Mimamsakas object that if such unseen potency is taken as the result of obligatory action,

the obligatory rite would become an optional rite performed for a desired result; even admitting heaven would be simpler by the rule of the Visvajit sacrifice.

Moreover, knowing the unseen potency from the injunction and understanding the meaning of the injunction from that unseen potency would involve mutual dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the New Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 5/12

According to the Prabhakaras, the result of obligatory and occasional rites is attainment of the world of Brahman; the duties of the various stages of life and regular observances progressively assist in producing this result.

But this view is burdensome, because each obligatory injunction does not state a separate result.

With the assistance of result-expressing arthavada passages, the injunction merely conveys an action accomplishable by effort, while cognition of the result supplies general motivation.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 6/12

Some Naiyayikas say that an intelligent person does not engage in an ordinary action that is fruitless or yields only pain.

Some result must therefore be admitted for obligatory rites too; otherwise activity would be impossible.

Occasional rites such as those performed at an eclipse or a sraddha are sometimes optional because of statements of a result, and sometimes like obligatory rites because they prevent the sinful result of omission.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 7/12

In Sandhya worship too, statements are found both of a result and of the defect of omission; hence the optative suffix here too expresses being a means to the desired.

The Prabhakaras object that if a desired result is admitted for an obligatory rite, a living person who is indifferent to that result would cease to be qualified to perform it, and its obligatoriness would be lost.

Reply: the principal injunctive sentence and the result-expressing arthavada are connected by unity of sentence.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Reply; Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 8/12

One who desires the result is qualified to perform it as an optional rite, while one who wishes to avoid the defect of omission is qualified to perform it as obligatory.

The same action can be called optional or obligatory for different reasons.

In general all living beings have some desire for a result; even one who desires liberation desires cessation of suffering or removal of sin.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection; Clarification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 9/12

Therefore a general desire for a result as a ground for performing obligatory rites is not excluded.

In an occasional rite a special occasion is the reason for obligatoriness; in an obligatory rite, a regular time is the reason.

Absence of a particular result does not necessarily entail absence of duty.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Clarification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 10/12

Some Prabhakaras say that mere "cognition of duty" learned from the Veda leads one to perform a fruitless obligatory rite.

But an intelligent person does not engage in a painful fruitless action merely from cognition of duty.

The view of Acarya Khandadeva that "being enjoined by the Veda is itself the fruit" is also excessively burdensome.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of One Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 11/12

It is simpler to hold that activity occurs because an arthavada makes known a result or the removal of a defect arising from omission.

A fruitless unseen potency cannot itself be a purpose.

A purpose is pleasure, absence of pain, heaven, liberation, or the like; a means to it is a secondary purpose.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of One Prabhakara View; A Fruitless Unseen Potency Is Not a Purpose

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Obligatory rites, unseen outcomes and sin · 12/12

A fruitless unseen potency generated by obligatory action is neither a primary result nor a secondary purpose.

Therefore some result must be admitted in obligatory action—absence of sin or an unseen potency productive of pleasure.

Without desire for a result, activity is impossible, just as on the Mimamsaka view there would be no activity without a desire for a fruitless unseen potency.

KEY INSIGHT

Mīmāṃsaka, Prābhākara and Naiyāyika answers dispute whether an obligatory action must produce a fruit.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Fruitless Unseen Potency Is Not a Purpose

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 1/7

To explain the meaning of the injunction by a bahuvrihi sense, "that which is desired as something to be accomplished", is burdensome.

More economically, according to a genitive tatpurusa analysis, the meaning of the optative suffix should be taken as "being a means to the desired result."

Nor does accomplishability by effort mean being produced immediately after its cause; a pot is not produced immediately after a staff.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Definition of Accomplishability by That

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 2/7

The proper definition is: being a means with respect to a cause from which an acceptable effect of the same kind is produced.

The Prabhakaras say that if cognition of being a means to a desired result is the cause of activity, a satiated person too would engage in eating, because food is a means to pleasure.

Reply: a satiated person has no present desire for pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Definition of Accomplishability by That; The Prabhakara Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 3/7

Cognition of means-character prompts only when a desire concerning the connected result exists.

To make cognition of desire itself a cause would be burdensome and lead to regress; desire itself, together with cognition of means-character, is the cause.

When the desired result is to be produced, cognition of a means related to that result causes activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prabhakara Objection; The Naiyayikas' Rejoinder

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 4/7

The object of desire is pleasure and the like, while the object of cognition of means-character is cooking, sacrifice, and the like; there is no need to treat both as one and the same object.

An injunction does not express each particular result; it expresses being a means to a result in general.

In "one who desires heaven should sacrifice", the word "heaven" specifies the desired result and the optative suffix states the means-character of the sacrifice.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Rejoinder

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 5/7

From this combined cognition activity occurs.

Some scholars hold that the injunctive suffix does not directly produce activity; it only produces the verbal cognition "this is a means to my desired result." That cognition itself is the prompting cause.

On hearing the statement concerning the Darsapurnamasa sacrifice, one who desires heaven understands the sacrifice to be a means to heaven.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Rejoinder; Verbal Cognition Is the Prompting Cause

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 6/7

To admit a separate inference would be unnecessary; the injunctive expression itself produces cognition of means-character.

According to some views, the literal meaning of the optative suffix is merely means-character; when used together with words such as "heaven", a particular means-character is understood.

From "should sacrifice", the sacrifice is understood as accomplishable by effort and productive of a result; the particular result is fixed by context.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Cognition Is the Prompting Cause; Postulation of Expressive Power

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Effort-achievability and verbal motivation · 7/7

But on the Naiyayika view, being a means to the desired and accomplishability by effort are invariably connected; therefore the expressive power of the optative suffix must be admitted with respect to this combined meaning.

The grammarians say that if the optative suffix expresses being a means to the desired, then the meaning of the instrumental case would also be expressed by it;

in "one should sacrifice by means of the Darsa and Purnamasa", the instrumental ending would become redundant.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument distinguishes desire, prompting verbal cognition, the optative suffix, and grammatical objections.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Postulation of Expressive Power; The Grammarians' Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 1/8

Reply: the optative suffix states means-character in general, while the instrumental case states the instrumental status of a particular means.

After general means-character is understood, the particular instrument is determined by the case ending; hence there is no redundancy.

The new thinkers say that cognition of means-character is a cause of effort through desire for effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' Objection; The New or Saundada View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 2/8

Desire to cook arises from cognition of cooking as accomplishable by effort, and then effort occurs.

The desire is not merely for cooking, but has the form "to accomplish cooking through effort." Yet for economy it is better to take desire itself as the cause of effort

and cognition of means-character as the cause of desire; to take as the direct cause a desire for cooking burdened with a long qualification would be cumbersome.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The New or Saundada View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 3/8

Cognition of means-character, desire, and effort seem to concern the same object.

Just as cognition that cooking is accomplished by fire gives rise to the desire "to cook by means of fire", so cognition that cooking is accomplished by effort gives rise to desire for effort.

To avoid an infinite chain of causes, it should be held that cognition of means-character first transforms desire concerning the result into a desire concerning effort, after which the actual effort arises.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Consideration of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 4/8

The Naiyayika conclusion is this: the action of cooking is a means to cooked rice, but it is itself an effect to be accomplished by fire or effort.

The desire "to cook with fire" arises when cooking is understood both as a means to the result in the form of cooked rice and as an action to be accomplished by fire.

Similarly, when sacrifice is known both as a means to heaven and as an action accomplishable by effort, the desire "to perform the sacrifice" arises.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 5/8

Cognition of its being a means to heaven alone is not sufficient; cognition of accomplishability by effort is necessary.

According to Udayanacarya, the direct cause of activity is cognition of means-character, while the meaning of the optative suffix is the desire of the speaker or hearer.

In commands, requests, and blessings, the optative suffix is seen to convey desire.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Established Doctrine; The View of Udayanacarya

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 6/8

From "one who desires heaven should sacrifice" it is understood that the trustworthy speaker desires the effort of sacrifice by one who desires heaven.

From such a desire of a trustworthy speaker it is inferred that sacrifice is a means to heaven; from this inference activity follows.

In "do not eat poisoned meat", the trustworthy speaker does not desire the act of eating.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Udayanacarya; The Meaning of the Injunction in Prohibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 7/8

From this non-desire it is inferred that such eating is a means to a greater undesirable result; thus the prohibition is understood.

Udayanacarya treats the Vedic injunctive sentence as authored by a person, because desire is a quality of a speaker.

On the Naiyayika view, by admitting God as the speaker, the burden of postulating infinitely many human authors is avoided.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Injunction in Prohibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Later views, siddhānta and prohibitions · 8/8

Thus ends the Doctrine of Injunction.

KEY INSIGHT

The New thinkers, the Naiyāyika response, Udayanācārya, and the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions are examined.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Injunction in Prohibition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does a duty need a desirable result to move the agent?

Objections and competing accounts

- Obligatory rites seem difficult to explain if no desirable result follows their performance.
- A preventive outcome such as avoiding sin differs from producing a new pleasurable fruit.
- Rites entailing violence test whether achieving an end can override a stronger undesirable consequence.

Naiyāyika line of response

- An action's status as a means to a desired end is central to understanding why a person undertakes it.
- Verbal cognition may itself supply the relevant means-character without a further unseen prompting entity.
- Optative and prohibitive constructions receive distinct analyses in relation to speaker intention and activity.

The unit ends at the translated section on the meaning of injunction in prohibition; Apūrva follows separately.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Essential conclusions · Injunction, Duty and Instrumentality

Practical reason

Injunctions relate intentional activity to the agent's ends.

Duties and consequences

Obligatory observance raises questions about sin and unseen potency.

Semantic function

The optative and verbal cognition become central to prompting action.

Next doctrine


The independent doctrine of Apūrva follows in the English translation.

This presentation ends before the separate Doctrine of Apūrva.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Ritual efficacy · unseen potency · semantic fitness · optative meaning

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · The Doctrine of Apūrva

1

Ritual action and an enduring result

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacr

2

Neutral objections and the need for Apū

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression a

3

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an i

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 1/6

In "one who desires heaven should sacrifice", the question is considered whether the meaning of the injunctive suffix—

being a means to the desired and accomplishability by effort— is directly connected with the sacrificial action, or with some other unseen entity.

The Guru says that the momentary sacrificial action cannot directly be a means to future heaven.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Guru View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 2/6

The injunctive suffix conveys an effect accomplishable by effort; after the action has ceased, it has no relation to the future result.

Therefore something distinct from the sacrifice, productive of heaven and produced as a result of the action, namely "apurva", must be admitted.

The prima facie opponent says: let semantic fitness consist merely in cognition of a relation among homogeneous meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Guru View; Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 3/6

Although drinking ghee is momentary, it is regarded as a cause of nourishment later; similarly, sacrifice can be a means to heaven.

The Guru view replies that homogeneity does not determine semantic fitness; water is a means to irrigation, fire is not.

A specific property conducive to a causal relation is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 4/6

Without apurva, no such enduring property productive of future heaven exists in the sacrifice.

The prima facie opponent again says: let semantic fitness be merely absence of an obstructing means of knowledge.

There is no evidence opposed to sacrifice being a means to heaven, so apurva is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 5/6

The Guru replies: mere absence of obstruction is insufficient; a property rendering the relation fit is necessary.

Otherwise even unrelated things would count as fit merely because of absence of obstruction.

Direct means-character in the sacrifice is blocked; without admitting the intermediary apurva, the relation is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Ritual action and an enduring result · 6/6

Some Bhattas say that a strong impression produced by the sacrificial action remains in the self and later produces heaven; no separate apurva is necessary.

The Guru objects that cognition of an impression of the sacrifice would arise only after knowing the sacrifice to be a means to heaven, and its means-character would be known only after knowing that impression; there is mutual dependence.

It is also incongruous to make an impression, which is a quality of the self, the meaning of the sacrifice.

KEY INSIGHT

The Guru, prima facie opponent and Bhāṭṭa account dispute how a momentary sacrifice can produce a later heaven.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of One Section of the Bhattas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 1/6

The neutral party says that the verbal root "yaj" means worship of a deity.

From an act in the form of pleasing the deity an impression is produced, and from that impression heaven follows; therefore apurva is not needed.

The Guru replies that grammatical tradition alone is not evidence that this produces heaven.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 2/6

Nor is there independent evidence that deities such as Agni are sentient beings receptive to affection.

Therefore regarding an impression of pleasing a deity as the cause of heaven lacks foundation.

The neutral party again says: just as from Brahmin-killing one admits an apurva in the form of sin productive of a hundred sufferings,

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral Objection; The Neutral Party's Suggestion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 3/6

so from sacrifice one may admit an apurva productive of heaven; but let the meaning of the injunction be only effect-status, not apurva itself.

The Guru replies that in prescriptions concerning Brahmin-killing the sequential relation is established grammatically; but in the injunction for one desiring heaven only effect-status is conveyed.

Since it is impossible for the sacrificial action itself to be a means to heaven, apurva must be admitted as the locus of that effect-status.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Neutral Party's Suggestion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 4/6

A person desiring a result first regards as accomplishable by effort that entity which is the immediately preceding means to the desired result.

The sacrificial action itself does not immediately precede heaven; apurva does.

Therefore the real result accomplishable by effort is apurva, while sacrifice is merely its means.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Only Apurva Is What Is to Be Accomplished

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 5/6

In the example of cooking, one who desires food engages in cooking because cooking is a proximate means to food.

In sacrifice such proximity belongs only to apurva; therefore scriptural effect-status is located in apurva.

Some Naiyayikas say that the injunctive suffix expresses effect-status of the action; from the sacrificial action one infers its means-character with respect to heaven, so apurva is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Only Apurva Is What Is to Be Accomplished; A Superficial Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Neutral objections and the need for Apūrva · 6/6

This view is improper.

Because sacrifice is momentary it cannot be a means to future heaven.

An impossible relation cannot be established merely by inference; therefore an enduring intermediary must be admitted.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal of pleasing a deity and the proposal of a persistent impression are examined against the enduring intermediary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Superficial Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 1/6

The objection is that the optative suffix does not denote apurva, because apurva has not previously been cognized and meaning cannot be understood without knowledge of word-power.

Reply: the optative suffix has expressive power with respect to effect-status in general.

When relation of that effect-status to the sacrificial action is understood to be unfit, a particular enduring effect—apurva—is apprehended.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That the Optative Has No Power with Respect to Apurva

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 2/6

This is like the general word "effect" conveying a particular such as a pot according to context.

It may be said that words convey a relation only among meanings that have been remembered; apurva has not been previously remembered, so it cannot be part of the sentence meaning.

Reply: knowledge of word-power concerns effect-status in general, and contextual fitness determines the particular apurva.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That the Optative Has No Power with Respect to Apurva; Objection That Apurva Ca

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 3/6

Just as knowledge of the general pervasion between smoke and fire enables inference of a particular fire on a mountain, general cognition of an effect can yield cognition of the particular apurva.

If the optative suffix denotes an effect in general, the objection arises that pots and all other effects would also be its meanings.

Reply: fitness for relation and context exclude unrelated effects.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection That Apurva Cannot Be the Meaning; Further Refutation of the Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 4/6

Only an effect produced by sacrifice, enduring, and productive of heaven is fit.

In ritual, obligatory, or prohibited actions too, merit or demerit in the form of apurva is apprehended according to context.

The objection is that effect-status belongs to pots and the like too, but the optative suffix is not used for every effect-object; therefore effect-status is not the ground of application.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Further Refutation of the Objection; Ground for the Use of the Injunctive Expression

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 5/6

Reply: the ground for use of a word is not merely a property present in the meaning, but a property manifested as a qualifier in cognition produced by the word.

In ordinary injunctions, effect-status in the form of action is understood from the verbal root; in Vedic injunctions, effect-status in the form of apurva distinct from the action is understood from the optative suffix.

Some scholars say that in ordinary forms such as "pacet" the verbal root expresses the effect in the form of cooking, while the optative merely indicates the speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Ground for the Use of the Injunctive Expression

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Optative meaning, context and Apūrva · 6/6

In Vedic usage the optative suffix directly denotes apurva, the enduring effect productive of heaven.

Alternatively, one general expressive power of the optative suffix may be admitted with respect to "cognition of effect-status"; according to context, an ordinary action or Vedic apurva becomes the particular meaning.

In this way polysemy is avoided.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate asks how a previously unknown unseen effect can be conveyed by an injunction through general word-power and semantic fitness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Ground for the Use of the Injunctive Expression

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What connects a momentary sacrifice to a future result?

Prima facie alternatives

- A sacrifice could be treated as directly leading to heaven, as ghee-drinking later nourishes the body.
- Some Bhāṭṭas posit a lingering impression of the sacrifice rather than a distinct unseen potency.
- A neutral opponent proposes worship that pleases a deity, or questions whether the optative can express an unknown entity.

Guru account and replies

- The momentary act cannot itself remain present as the immediate cause of future heaven; Apūrva bridges the interval.
- The impression account is criticized as mutually dependent upon the very means-character it was to explain.
- General expressive power and contextual fitness make an enduring ritual effect intelligible without uncontrolled polysemy.

These are positions inside the philosophical source, not independently established claims about ritual efficacy.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · The Doctrine of Apūrva

Problem

A momentary action is held to yield a later fruit.

Mediating concept

Apūrva is proposed as an enduring unseen effect.

Semantic mechanism

The optative expresses effect-status qualified by context.

Transition


The next doctrine concerns word-power in connected sentence meaning.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Actions, sentence-connection, context · Guru and Naiyāyika accounts

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Word-Power and Connected Meaning · Part I

1

Must words denote meanings connected wi

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementar

2

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answe

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowin

3

Child language learning and newer theor

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 1/14

The Gurus say that arthavada sentences, because they convey already-established entities, are not independently prompting means of knowledge.

The power of words is learned only with respect to cognition of meanings connected with an action.

The primary causal relation between words and verbal cognition is established by observing the usage of elders.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine That Word-Power Concerns Meanings Connected with an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 2/14

A child hears the utterance of an elder who gives an instruction and then observes the activity of the elder who has been instructed.

By positive and negative concomitance he understands that the purpose of the intelligent elder's utterance is the activity of the instructed person.

Since words themselves do not produce an action, the cognition produced by the words, "this action is to be done by me", is taken as the cause of activity.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine That Word-Power Concerns Meanings Connected with an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 3/14

The child too understands the cause of his own activity in this way.

Words are not merely indirect causes of cognitions obtainable from many means of knowledge.

The child first understands words as direct causes of cognition of what is to be done, and afterwards learns the powers of individual words such as verbs and case-bearing nouns.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine That Word-Power Concerns Meanings Connected with an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 4/14

Through positive and negative concomitance he learns that each word conveys its meaning as related to an action.

Thus the optative suffix conveys effect-status, the verbal root conveys the action, and case-bearing words convey the connection of their respective meanings with the action.

Word-power is learned not with respect to bare word-meanings, but with respect to cognition of word-meanings connected with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine That Word-Power Concerns Meanings Connected with an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 5/14

The prima facie opponent says that cognition connected with an action is inferred from the activity of the instructed elder; but the action-component can be understood from the optative suffix and other words that denote an action.

Therefore the power of the other words should be admitted only with respect to cognition of connected meanings, not with respect to connected meanings including the action-component.

Sentential expectancy produces cognition of relation among the meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 6/14

Expectancy is an indispensable auxiliary cause.

Even when a word denoting an action is present, no cognition of connection arises if expectancy is absent; when expectancy is present, cognition of connection with the action arises.

Therefore it is unnecessary to add the action-component to the power of every word.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 7/14

Activity of an instructed elder is seen even after hearing an incomplete sentence; for example, on hearing merely "the door", the omitted words "close it" may be supplied.

This establishes that verbal proximity or supplementation is a cause of relational cognition, not that every word denotes a meaning already connected with an action.

Even sentences concerning established entities produce cognition of relations among meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 8/14

Therefore words convey their respective meanings in a related form; the particular action is supplied only by the injunction or context.

No; this reasoning is not proper.

Through positive and negative concomitance the child apprehends the direct causality of words with respect to that cognition which is the immediate cause of activity—

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 9/14

namely cognition connected with an action in the form "this action is to be done by me." Mere connected cognition or cognition of word-meanings is not a cause of activity.

When direct causality is established, it is improper to admit power merely with respect to connected cognition and then postulate indirect causality up to cognition connected with an action.

Two separate cognitions—cognition of word-meanings and cognition of action—do not by themselves cause activity; only a unified cognition in which they are specifically related does so.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 10/14

If it is said that once a semantically fit qualified cognition occurs, connection with the action is automatically remembered, the question of the cause of that action-connected cognition still remains.

Mere connected cognition is not the immediate explanatory cause of activity.

It is not proper to omit the action-component in the name of economy, because word-power is learned with respect to the cognition seen in practice to prompt directly.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 11/14

Therefore words produce cognition of their respective meanings as connected with an action.

Another view holds that expectancy and the other conditions are auxiliary causes of verbal cognition.

Words lacking expectancy do not produce relational cognition even when a causal relation is present; hence word-power should be admitted merely with respect to connected cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 12/14

If connection with an action is otherwise inexplicable, the action-component will be supplied through supplementation or secondary signification.

This view too is improper.

If word-power is admitted merely with respect to connected cognition, another distinct power would have to be admitted to produce cognition connected with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 13/14

Expectancy merely determines relations among the available word-meanings; it cannot take the place of the cognition of what is to be done that generates activity.

The fact that sentences describing established facts produce relational cognition cannot invalidate the prompting structure of injunctive sentences.

In descriptive sentences the words convey relations among established entities according to context; in injunctive sentences the same words express meanings connected with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Must words denote meanings connected with action? · 14/14

If the action-component is excluded from the object of word-power and held to come from another source, the postulation of powers does not become lighter but rather doubles.

Therefore it is reasonable to admit power with respect to cognition connected with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The Gurus argue from linguistic instruction, remembered words and supplementary speech; opponents test whether connectedness is built into word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Argument—Power Exists Only with Respect to Connected Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 1/6

In general, words produce cognition of meanings connected with an action.

At first a child understands the whole sentence as the cause of prompting cognition; later, through instruction from companions and positive and negative concomitance, he learns the power of each individual word.

An injunctive sentence directly produces cognition of connection with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Gurus' Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 2/6

Arthavada sentences, becoming subordinate to an injunction, indirectly connect their meanings with the action; narratives in the Puranas and Mahabharata likewise support the action that is enjoined.

Poetry and drama principally describe the nature of events.

Even though there is no actual prompting connection there, conventional word-power produces cognition of relations among word-meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Gurus' Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 3/6

Thus ends the prima facie view of the Doctrine that Word-Power Concerns Meanings Connected with an Action.

We Naiyayikas now state our doctrine.

A child who hears "bring the pot" and observes the activity of the instructed elder first infers only that cognition of "the act of bringing the pot" is the cause of activity;

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Gurus' Conclusion; The Naiyayikas' Final Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 4/6

he does not infer an additional general cognition called "cognition of a general meaning connected with an action." Such a general cognition is not a useful cause of the particular activity.

At first the child apprehends the causality of the whole sentence without dividing it into words.

Later, observing positive and negative concomitance among such components as "pot", the accusative ending, "bring", and the optative, he successively learns their powers to convey pot, objecthood, the action of bringing, and effect-status.

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Final Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 5/6

That is, each word conveys its own meaning as capable of being related to the meanings of other words; the action-component is the meaning only of the optative suffix.

The power of the word "pot" is not with respect to cognition of a pot connected with an action, but with respect to cognition of a pot.

The connection is produced by the total sentential causes.

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Final Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Guru conclusion and the Nyāya answer · 6/6

There is no evidence that a child first infers a general sentential causality and a general cognition connected with an action.

The causal relation between a particular sentence and a particular cognition is apprehended first; the general rule is formed later from many examples.

KEY INSIGHT

The source sets the prima facie conclusion against a Naiyāyika account allowing reliable verbal knowledge of independently given meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayikas' Final Established Doctrine

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 1/9

The prima facie opponent again says that the child first understands the general activity of an instructed elder of the form "do the task";

thereafter he learns sentence-power as the cause of general cognition connected with an action, and finally learns the powers of particular words.

But there is no evidence establishing such an order.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Rejoinder to the Guru View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Child language learning and newer theories · 2/9

On hearing the particular sentence "bring the pot", a particular activity of bringing the pot is observed; therefore the causality of the particular sentence and particular cognition can be apprehended directly.

Only after particular causal relations have been apprehended is a general causal relation established from many examples.

There is no rule that the general relation must be apprehended first and the particular relation later.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Rejoinder to the Guru View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 3/9

Therefore it is unnecessary to admit that the whole sentence has power with respect to general cognition connected with an action and then distribute the powers of individual words in that same form.

Each word denotes its own meaning; expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and speaker's intention connect those meanings.

It is further said that connected cognition is not itself the object of action-connected cognition; hence a separate recollection of connected cognition would have to be admitted in order to recall action-connected cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Rejoinder to the Guru View; Refutation of the Next Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 4/9

But this is not proper.

A qualified cognition has as its objects both the qualifier and the qualified; in cognition connected with an action, the related word-meanings too are known.

If a qualified cognition did not have the qualified as its object, then cognition of an individual qualified by a universal, or cognition qualified by cowhood, could not reveal the individual or cowhood.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Next Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 5/9

Therefore cognition of word-meanings is included within action-connected cognition.

The Guru view says that for economy power should be admitted only with respect to cognition of a universal or connected cognition.

But it is more burdensome to abandon the causality of the specific cognition that is the immediate cause of activity and posit an unnecessary intermediate recollection.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Next Argument

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 6/9

For this reason, the power of words should be admitted with respect to cognition of word-meanings, and the joint capacity of sentential auxiliary conditions with respect to cognition of relation among those meanings.

There is no separate action-component-bearing power in every word for action-connected cognition.

The new thinkers say that cognition "this is an action to be done" is the direct cause of activity; when favorable auxiliary causes are present, the action is completed.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Next Argument; Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 7/9

If the auxiliary causes are delayed, the result may be delayed, yet the direct causality of the cognition is not destroyed.

This view is improper.

Activity arises not merely from cognition "this is an action to be done", but from cognition of one's own obligation,

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 8/9

> "this is to be done by me." Nor is self-cognition of the form "I am such a person that I can perform this task even without prior experience" a cause of activity; desire for the future action is required.

> It is also inconsistent to admit the power of the whole sentence with respect to action-connected cognition while admitting the powers of particular words only with respect to mutually connected meanings.

> The direct cognition of the action-status of the sentence is built from the particular words themselves; to admit a separate action-component power in the sentence is burdensome.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Child language learning and newer theories · 9/9

Therefore each word conveys its own meaning, and sentential causes such as expectancy produce cognition of a specific relation among those meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion returns to how an instructed child learns a word, and tests the economy of power posited only for connected meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does meaningful speech always involve an action?

Guru / prima facie reasoning

- Activity by an instructed elder seems central to the original learning of word-power.
- A fragment such as “the door” may convey an omitted injunction through expectancy and supplementary words.
- Connected sentence meaning is proposed as primary, with descriptive meanings dependent on it.

Naiyāyika criticism

- Descriptive sentences can supply knowledge without directly prompting any activity.
- Separately positing power only for connected cognition can impose an unnecessary additional semantic mechanism.
- The causal role of each word must be distinguished from the completed relation among its meanings.

The controversy is about the scope of denotative power, not whether action sentences are meaningful.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Word-Power and Connected Meaning · Part I

Question

Does action-connection delimit all word-power?

Learning

Learning from another person's response is examined.

Nyāya objection

Descriptive cognition cannot be excluded without loss.

Continuation


Concrete cases of "heaven", "Indra" and poetic language follow.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Descriptive sentences · heaven and Indra · relation · poetry · Gangeśa's conclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Word-Power and Connected Meaning · Part II

1

Description, heaven, and the meaning of

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statemen

2

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are

3

Does word-power express relation itself

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word’s denoted meaning from the relatio

4

Poetic speech and the final determinati

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · ı/ıı

Word-power exists even in sentences concerning established entities.

Because the causality of the whole sentence is apprehended first, later admitting the denotative power of each word is not a double postulation;

word-power is established by evidence, and the causality of the whole sentence is merely the causality of the collection of words.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Power Is Possible Even in Descriptive Sentences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 2/11

At first the child apprehends, generally, either direct or indirect causality of the sentence; there may then remain doubt whether the causality is direct or indirect.

Through positive and negative concomitance and absence of an obstacle, the particular causality is determined.

Just as, on seeing joy on Caitra's face after he hears news of the birth of a son, a child understands cognition of the son's birth produced by the news to be the cause of joy, even though other causes of joy are possible.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Power Is Possible Even in Descriptive Sentences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 3/11

When opposing causes are known, the particular causality is determined.

Even if the reason in an inference is erroneous, when the probandum is in fact true the power relating word and meaning does not thereby become erroneous.

Seeing a wooden puppet moved by a carpenter bring a pot, a child may infer a cause of the movement; even if he errs about the agent of the action, his cognition of the bringing of the pot remains true.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret "heaven" and "Indra".

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Power Is Possible Even in Descriptive Sentences

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 4/11

For this reason, in descriptive sentences, arthavadas, histories, narratives, and the like, words too denote their respective established meanings.

Being a producer of activity is not an indispensable characteristic of word-power.

In the Veda, the power of the word "heaven" is learned with respect to supreme pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Power Is Possible Even in Descriptive Sentences; The Power of the Word "Heaven" with Respect to Suprem

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 5/11

An arthavada sentence says that such pleasure as is unmixed with suffering, unsurpassed by ordinary pleasure, and obtained merely by desire is called heaven.

The word "heaven" is not primarily used for ordinary pleasure produced by sandal paste and the like; in Vedic injunction it denotes only great, unsurpassed pleasure.

A person desiring ordinary pleasure does not engage in a costly sacrifice, so the speaker's intention too concerns supreme pleasure.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Heaven" with Respect to Supreme Pleasure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 6/11

It is not the case that the arthavada sentence separately denotes supreme pleasure and that the word "heaven" merely reminds one of it.

Supreme pleasure itself is the object intended by the word "heaven"; the arthavada clarifies its delimiting character.

Because excellence is a general property in the form of a universal, it is not necessary to make a separate comparison of the form "that pleasure is greater than this pleasure" in every case.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Heaven" with Respect to Supreme Pleasure

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 7/11

Where the word "heaven" is used in ordinary speech for common pleasure, secondary signification should be admitted.

The prima facie opponent says: if "heaven" means supreme pleasure free from suffering, its secondary use for pleasure caused by sandal paste and the like becomes difficult;

and if it means merely supreme pleasure, the qualifier "free from suffering" is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Heaven" with Respect to Supreme Pleasure; The Power of the Word "Indra" with Respect

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 8/11

Therefore let the denoted meaning be an intermediate general property—pleasure unmixed with suffering.

But this view is improper.

A general property may belong to pleasures produced by one class of means; there is no evidence for admitting one specific universal in all pleasures produced by different means.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Indra" with Respect to the Thousand-Eyed Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 9/11

Each pleasure produced by Vedic rites is determined by its own particular cause.

In injunctions such as "worship Indra", the word "Indra" denotes not merely an insentient deity embodied in a mantra, but the sentient thousand-eyed deity.

The arthavada "Indra is thousand-eyed" is evidence for this meaning; therefore the power of the word "Indra" is learned with respect to the thousand-eyed deity.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Indra" with Respect to the Thousand-Eyed Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · 10/11

It should not be said that the arthavada only causes recollection and that the denoted meaning of "Indra" is deity in general.

Through co-reference of the injunctive statement and well-known usage, the sentient Indra alone is intended.

An insentient mantra-form cannot be a recipient of oblations; an oblation is intended for a sentient deity.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Indra" with Respect to the Thousand-Eyed Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Description, heaven, and the meaning of Indra · II/II

Therefore the word "Indra" primarily denotes the sentient thousand-eyed deity; its use for mantra-form or another deity is secondary or context-dependent.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion considers word-power beyond injunctions and uses Vedic statements to interpret “heaven” and “Indra”.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Indra" with Respect to the Thousand-Eyed Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 1/8

The Mimamsakas say that although the accusative "Indram" may express a sentient deity, the deity of the sacrifice is established only by the dative form "Indraya".

Affection toward the deity, operating through the sacrificial action, produces the result of heaven; therefore no separate apurva need be admitted.

But affection for the deity, pleasure, and the impression arising from it are momentary; they cannot constitute an enduring operation that produces a result after a long interval.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View—Only "Indraya" Denotes the Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 2/8

Therefore it is more economical to admit an enduring apurva having the same substrate as effort.

In different sacrifices the same mental conception of a deity occurs; such a conception is not an enduring cause of results comparable to an impression resident in the self.

The Mimamsakas further say that Indrahood as the result of a Rajasuya and similar rite may occur in a sentient individual, but deity-status is established only through the dative form prescribed by grammar.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View—Only "Indraya" Denotes the Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 3/8

"Indraya" designates the deity, not "Indram".

For this reason, in an injunction to offer an oblation to Agni, the dative "agnaye" is used.

It cannot be said that an oblation intended for Indra produces some apurva located in Indra.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View—Only "Indraya" Denotes the Deity

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 4/8

The oblation itself is not a special cause of the result of apurva; the dative in "Indraya" is not a dative of purpose, but an upapada dative used with a fixed expression.

Thus, according to the Mimamsakas, the sacrificial deity is specified by a mantra-word in the dative; merely a deity-name in the nominative or accusative does not establish deity-status.

No; this view of the Mimamsakas is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View—Only "Indraya" Denotes the Deity; Refutation of the Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 5/8

A dative word such as "Indraya" cannot alone be regarded as denoting the deity, because usages without the dative, such as "Indra is a deity", also occur.

And if only a dative word expressed a deity, then in a sentence with two datives such as "agnaye kavyavahanaya svaha"—"svaha for Agni, the carrier of offerings to the ancestors"—two deities would have to be admitted.

Through unity of sentence between the arthavada "Indra is the thousand-eyed deity" and the injunction "worship Indra", only the sentient Indra is established as the deity to be worshipped.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 6/8

Traditional scholars may call material owned by Lord Siva "Siva's material" in statements such as "do not take material owned by Lord Siva"; but this does not make the material itself a deity.

An oblation regularly offered for Agni becomes productive of the result; therefore the material of the offering or the dative ending is not the locus of the relation to the result.

The sentient deity is.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 7/8

In some sentences, the power of a word is known only from a tradition of usage or from the remainder of the sentence.

In statements such as "let the sacrificial cake be made of yava", "let the sandals be varahi", and "let the vessel be vaitra", doubt arises because the words yava, varaha, and vaitra have different meanings in Arya and non-Arya usage.

One community understands "yava" as a grain with long awns, another as kangu and the like; by "varaha" some understand a pig and others a crow; by "vaitra" some understand cane and others the jambira tree.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Learning Word-Power from the Remainder of a Sentence in Certain Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Mīmāṃsaka dispute over ritual words · 8/8

Therefore uncertain popular usage alone is not authoritative.

The particular meaning is fixed from the remaining part of the Vedic sentence, Arya usage, and ritual tradition.

Therefore the remainder of a sentence is evidence for knowledge of word-power, even when that power was not previously known to each individual.

KEY INSIGHT

A proposed interpretation of “Indrāya” and arguments about the dative case are tested with the surrounding sentence and ritual context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Learning Word-Power from the Remainder of a Sentence in Certain Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 1/6

The doctrine that the power of a word should be admitted only with respect to cognition of a related word-meaning is not proper.

A word that causes recollection of its own meaning, with the assistance of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and speaker's intention, produces cognition of its relation with other word-meanings.

If power were admitted directly with respect to cognition of relation, a new power would have to be postulated for every new relation; and there would be no cause for independent recollection of the word's own meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View That Word-Power Lies in Cognition of Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 2/6

Therefore power is with respect to the word-meaning, while relational cognition is the joint result of auxiliary causes.

A word does not independently express the relation of something other than its own meaning.

Such a relation is established from mutual expectancy and the like among the meanings recalled by the words.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View That Word-Power Lies in Cognition of Relation; Word-Power Does Not Concern Another R

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 3/6

For example, in "ghatam anaya"—"bring the pot"—"ghatam" conveys the pot and objecthood, while "anaya" conveys the action of bringing; the relation among these meanings is understood from word order, expectancy, and intention.

Therefore to admit a separate denotative power with respect to relation is burdensome.

It may be objected that if a word denotes only an individual or a particular meaning, how can cognition of the word "pot" be regulated between cognition of pot in general and cognition of a particular pot?

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Power Does Not Concern Another Relation; Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 4/6

Recollection of word-meaning may concern many individuals.

context, or speaker's intention.

For this there is no need to locate word-power in cognition qualified by a relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection; Reply: word-power produces cognition of a meaning delimited by universal, form, or context. Dete

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 5/6

Even if word-power is admitted with respect to word-meaning, it cannot be denied that words are causes of cognition of relation.

But they are extraordinary causes of such cognition through recollection of their meanings, not because they directly denote the relation.

After cognition of words, when recollection of word-meanings, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and intention are present, sentence cognition arises.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Cognition of Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Does word-power express relation itself? · 6/6

Therefore it is unnecessary to admit word-power with respect to meanings already connected with other meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika answer distinguishes the word's denoted meaning from the relation established through fitness, syntax and context.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Cognition of Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Poetic speech and the final determination · 1/5

Some say that word-power should be admitted with respect to a generally connected meaning, while the particular relation is learned from context.

But "connected meaning" itself is of many kinds; to admit an inference of a particular relation after a general cognition of relation postulates an unnecessary intermediate cognition.

In fact, the words produce cognition of their respective meanings, and at the same time the auxiliary causes produce cognition of the specific sentence meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the doctrine of meanings connected with action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Cognition of Relation

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Poetic speech and the final determination · 2/5

No separate stage of general connected cognition is experienced.

In verse, poetry, narrative, and drama, words are not immediate causes of ordinary practical activity, yet they convey relations among meanings.

This refutes the view that word-power exists only with respect to meanings connected with an action.

KEY INSIGHT

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the doctrine of meanings connected with action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Cognition of Relation; Verbal Cognition in Poetry and the Like

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Poetic speech and the final determination · 3/5

In poetry a word recalls its meaning; metaphor, suggestion, context, and imagination function as mental auxiliary causes and produce cognition of relation.

Yet poetry or metaphor is not itself a separate means of knowledge; verbal cognition remains the fundamental cause.

In poetry, cognition of relations among meanings arises through the mind, auxiliary causes such as metaphor, and the operation constituted by cognition of word-meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the doctrine of meanings connected with action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Cognition in Poetry and the Like; Gangesa's Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Poetic speech and the final determination · 4/5

Metaphor and the like cannot be regarded as separate verbal means of knowledge because they possess no universally recurrent, non-deviating, and immediate characteristic of a means of knowledge.

Nor does recollection of word-meanings arise before the words; therefore one cannot remove the words and regard mere recollection of meanings as the means of verbal cognition.

The word is the cause of recollection of meaning, recollection of meaning is the operation, and cognition of relation among meanings together with auxiliary causes is the result.

KEY INSIGHT

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the doctrine of meanings connected with action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gangesa's Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Poetic speech and the final determination · 5/5

A cognition such as "a white horse is running" can arise without words from seeing a white form, hearing neighing, and hearing hoofbeats; but that is not verbal cognition, it is cognition produced by inference or another means.

Where activity is observed from a speaker's sentence, words are established as the initial extraordinary cause.

Meanings Connected with an Action.

KEY INSIGHT

The source treats metaphor and poetic cognition before explicitly closing the doctrine of meanings connected with action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gangesa's Conclusion; Thus ends the Doctrine that Word-Power Concerns

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Do descriptive words convey knowledge in their own right?

Restrictive proposals

- Word-power might primarily concern action-related connected meaning.
- The ritual case “Indrāya” is proposed as more determinate than the standalone word “Indra”.
- A separate word-power for the relation itself is proposed in some competing accounts.

Naiyāyika resolution

- A sentence about an established entity can still have genuine denotative power.
- Qualifiers, context, and the remainder of a sentence help establish the intended individual or relation.
- Poetic and metaphorical sentences involve auxiliaries, but do not automatically establish an extra pramāṇa.

The text ends this named doctrine before turning to the location of word-power in universals.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Word-Power and Connected Meaning · Part II

Descriptive speech

Meaningful testimony is not limited to injunctions.

Terms of worship

Vedic “heaven” and “Indra” serve as semantic test cases.

Relations

Sentence cognition combines remembered meanings with other conditions.

Close


The Doctrine of Word-Power and Connected Meaning formally ends.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Universal, individual, shape · Prābhākara, Bhāṭṭa, Naiyāyika and Maṇḍana proposals

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Does Word-Power Reside in Universals?

1

Universal-only denotation and its chall

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where c

2

Cognition of the individual and the uni

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is den

3

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single c

4

Shape, individual, and word-meaning

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 1/13

Once word-power has been established with respect to word-meaning, the nature of the word-meaning must now be considered.

The Prabhakaras say that the power of words such as "cow" cannot be admitted merely in an individual.

If power were admitted in one individual, other individuals would not be known from the word; if it were admitted in all individuals,

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 2/13

one would have the burden of infinitely many powers and the impossibility of collectively knowing all individuals.

If the word "cow" denoted only one individual, which individual is denoted could not be determined, and usage concerning other cows would become inexplicable.

Therefore the common universal—cowhood—should be taken as the locus of word-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prabhakara View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 3/13

It cannot be said that all cow-individuals together constitute a single collective denotation.

Cognition of a collection would require all individuals to be present together, which is impossible.

Nor are absent individuals cognized from cognition of one individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Unity of Individuals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 4/13

Cowhood is one and inheres in many individuals; therefore through one power general cognition of all individuals possessing cowhood is possible.

Cognition of the individual occurs as the qualified substrate of the universal or as something associated with cognition of the universal.

The objection is: if only the universal is denoted, then on hearing "bring a cow", how can the action of bringing be connected with the universal?

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Unity of Individuals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 5/13

Cowhood cannot be brought; an individual is brought.

Reply: cognition of cowhood arises from the word; cowhood does not exist without a substrate, so the individual that is its substrate is also apprehended in that cognition.

The action of bringing is related to that individual which is the substrate of the universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Unity of Individuals

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 6/13

For this reason there is no need to admit a separate known power in the individual; power with respect to the universal itself assists cognition of the individual.

Word-power should be admitted only in the universal, because learning a word's power on the basis of a universal is stable and universally applicable.

Individuals are continually produced and destroyed; the universal is enduring.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Unity of Individuals; Power Resides Only in the Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 7/13

Although cognition of an individual is necessary for practical activity, it is obtained through cognition of the universal.

In perception an individual may sometimes be known without the universal, but the causal complex of verbal cognition differs from that of perception.

Therefore, when knowledge of power with respect to the universal is present, cognition of an individual qualified by cowhood arises; to admit a separate power in the individual is an unnecessary burden.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power Resides Only in the Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 8/13

Some scholars say that a word produces cognition only of that meaning with respect to which its power is known.

Cognition of meaning can also arise from erroneous cognition of power; and even when relational fitness among word-meanings or an actual semantic relation is absent,

the mere reference to an individual produced by the word forces us to regard the individual as part of the word's meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction "bring a cow", where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power Resides Only in the Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 9/13

But this view is not proper.

Where an entity can be obtained through another means of knowledge, there is no need to admit word-power with respect to it.

Otherwise power would have to be admitted also in semantic relation, secondary signification, and other modes of usage, and the independent existence of secondary signification and the other semantic functions would disappear.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power Resides Only in the Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 10/13

It may again be said that a universal is not a word-meaning, because action does not occur in a universal; the object of practical activity is only a case-role bearer or entity possessing action.

But this reasoning too is improper.

Universal and individual are known in one cognition; the action occurring in an individual reaches the individual determined through cognition of the universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power Resides Only in the Universal

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 11/13

In "the cow goes", neither the universal alone nor an individual devoid of the universal is understood as the goer; rather, a cow-individual qualified by cowhood is understood.

Universal and individual together form one object of meaning.

Srikara says that neither the universal alone nor the individual alone, taken separately, is a case-role bearer or word-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction "bring a cow", where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power Resides Only in the Universal; The View of Srikara

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 12/13

The action is related to the individual, the individual is the substrate of the universal, and the universal delimits what the word denotes.

Just as in "bring the copper-coloured cow" the action of bringing is related to an individual delimited by the universal-like specification of copper colour,

so a universal-denoting word produces a meaning combining the individual's substrateness and the denotability of the universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Srikara

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Universal-only denotation and its challenge · 13/13

Cognition of the individual arises because the universal would otherwise be inexplicable, but the individual itself is not denoted.

The word denotes the universal; the individual is known by postulation as the substrate of the universal.

KEY INSIGHT

The Prābhākara position is tested using the instruction “bring a cow”, where cowhood cannot be physically brought.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Srikara

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 1/14

One group of Prabhakaras says that a universal-denoting word produces cognition and recollection of both universal and individual; therefore cognition of the individual too is verbal.

It cannot be called non-verbal or merely produced by postulation, because no word-meaning is incorporated into sentence cognition without a verbal convention.

From a word whose power concerns the universal, universal and individual are known in a single cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 2/14

Otherwise, since a universal is never known as wholly without an individual, verbal cognition concerning a universal itself would become inexplicable.

Therefore even the teachers who admit power in the universal accept that power with respect to the universal also produces cognition of the individual.

The question then arises: if the individual is known from the word itself, why not admit a separate power in the individual?

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 3/14

Reply: cognition of the individual is established through power with respect to the universal; where a meaning is obtained from another cause, positing a separate power is unnecessary.

If a universal-denoting word did not produce cognition of the individual, then a separate power in the individual would indeed have to be admitted.

If it were held that the universal is known from the word and the individual from the universal, the universal would become a distinct means of knowledge separate from the word.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 4/14

Therefore the word itself produces cognition of both universal and individual.

In "rice is pounded", it is enough that the action of pounding is connected with an entity delimited by ricehood; separate secondary signification in each individual grain is unnecessary.

We Naiyayikas reply that the power of the word "cow" concerns cognition of the form "this is a cow, that is,

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 5/14

an individual qualified by cowhood." Cowhood is the delimitor of denotability, but power is not confined to the universal while completely excluding the individual.

The denotability of cowhood is known with an individual in view, because cowhood is never cognized without an individual.

The denotability of the individual is secured by the denotability of cowhood; under the maxim that "what has not been apprehended cannot serve as a qualifier",

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 6/14

even though the individual is not separately cognized, the individual qualified by cowhood is established as denoted.

The Prabhakaras must accept one of two alternatives: either universal and individual are not objects of one cognition, or the denotability of the individual must be admitted.

A property by knowledge of which a delimited entity is known functions as its delimitor; therefore in cognition of an individual qualified by cowhood, the individual is a word-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 7/14

The word merely assists in producing cognition of the individual as denoted; the universal is not a separate means of knowledge of the individual.

For economy, knowledge of the word's power should be taken as delimiting the causality that produces cognition of the individual, rather than positing a separate causal role for the universal.

An objection may now be raised: only veridical cognition and conditions concerning the knower are causes of activity, so cognition of power must be admitted only with respect to "cognition of a meaning connected with an action." But no.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 8/14

Cognition of a pot and the like is itself a cause of activity; the truth of the cognition, the state of being a knower, and other conditions are not delimitors of the causality.

Therefore the power producing cognition of entities such as pots should be admitted with respect to those very entities.

Some Naiyayikas say that by observing the conduct of elders, a child first infers that a word produces cognition of an individual.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Prabhakaras; The View of One Group of Naiyayikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 9/14

On hearing "bring a cow", a particular individual is brought; therefore the word's power is learned with respect to an individual.

The child does not immediately learn power with respect to the universal, because cognition of the universal is not itself the direct cause of activity.

Later, understanding that cognition of a universal such as cowhood is necessary for excluding other individuals and generalizing across many individuals,

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Naiyayikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 10/14

he apprehends the universal as the delimitor of cognition of power with respect to individuals.

Thus cognition that admits power in individuals is not rendered pointless by cognition of power with respect to the universal.

Cognition of the universal is useful for generalizing individuals, while cognition of the individual is the immediate basis of practical activity.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Naiyayikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 11/14

A further alternative view is that word-power lies only in the universal, and cognition of an individual qualified by the universal arises from the joint cause of impressions concerning individuals and recollection of the universal.

But if cognition of the individual is made dependent on impressions independent of word-power, regularity of individual cognition in the same circumstances of verbal cognition becomes difficult to explain.

Like the universal, the individual too is denoted by a word.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of One Group of Naiyayikas; The Individual Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 12/14

Although individuals are infinite, power is not learned separately in each individual; it is learned in the general form "an individual qualified by cowhood is denoted."

Just as the pervasion "smoke is pervaded by fire" is learned generally with respect to infinitely many individual smokes and fires, so word-power is learned generally with respect to individuals qualified by cowhood.

There is no need to learn separately the denotability of every cow other than one particular cow.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Individual Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 13/14

The Mimamsakas themselves admit the power of the injunctive suffix across infinitely many individual actions in the general form

"a result qualified by effect-status"; therefore it is inconsistent to deny denotability merely because individuals are infinite.

Alternatively, through a general characterization, word-power may be learned in all cow-individuals that are known.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Individual Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cognition of the individual and the universal · 14/14

Knowing one cow does not make all cows perceptually known, but general cognition connected with the universal determines the class of individuals that can be denoted.

Words such as "animal" are admitted to denote individuals; yet from cognition of one individual there is no defect of becoming cognizant of all animals.

Therefore admitting the general denotability of individuals qualified by cowhood does not entail omniscience or collective cognition of all individuals.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival Prābhākara and Naiyāyika positions explore whether the individual is denoted, implied or cognized through a universal.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Individual Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 1/13

In the doctrine of the Bhattas, for economy only the universal is denoted; the individual is obtained by postulation.

In "bring a cow", the action of bringing cannot occur in the universal, so an individual serving as the substrate of cowhood must be admitted.

It cannot be said that because universal and individual are known in one cognition, the individual is not obtained by postulation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Bhatta Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 2/13

The universal is manifested in its own nature; universality is not the form of the individual.

The word does not state the universal as an entity wholly separated from the individual, yet it does not thereby make the individual denoted.

Nor is the proposal coherent that a universal excluded from individuals is denoted while the individual serves as the excluder.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Bhatta Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 3/13

The universal by its own nature is excluded from other universals; there is no need to make the individual an object of the same cognition as an excluder.

It may be said that the word first produces cognition of cowhood, then cognition of pervasion between cowhood and an individual,

and then inference of the individual; such a sequence is burdensome, so universal and individual should be known simultaneously.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Bhatta Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 4/13

But cognition of meaning cannot arise without word-power; there is no rule that one convention should directly make both known.

There is no contradiction in accepting sequential cognition of the universal and postulation of the individual.

The causal complex for joint cognition of universal and individual in perception and other means differs; this does not establish that power with respect to the universal in a word is an auxiliary cause of cognition of the individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Bhatta Mimamsakas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 5/13

From an inference such as "cowhood is a positive entity distinct from individuals", cognition of the universal without cognition of an individual is also possible.

There is no rule that a dependent entity must necessarily be known in the same cognition as its substrate.

Cognition of one thing can occur without cognition of another thing on which it depends.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Bhatta Mimamsakas; Universal and Individual Are Not Necessarily Known in One Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 6/13

Qualified cognition of the form "this is a cow" is not always of one and the same kind; sometimes only the universal, sometimes only the individual, is remembered.

The substrateness of a universal cannot be defined as "being known as a qualifier in an individual", because in mental consideration the universal is known in its own nature.

Recollection too is not always determinate qualified cognition; a word may produce only recollection of the universal or only recollection of the individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Universal and Individual Are Not Necessarily Known in One Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 7/13

Mental perception can be remembered even though it is not sense-generated; rememberedness is pervaded by cognitionhood.

Therefore denotability of the individual is not established merely on the ground that universal and individual are objects of one cognition.

It may be objected: in what form is the individual known by postulation?

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Universal and Individual Are Not Necessarily Known in One Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 8/13

Reply: the individual as the substrate of cowhood is established by inference or postulation: "cowhood resides in an individual,

because it is a universal." There is no contradiction in treating cowhood and the cow-individual as distinct entities.

If it is said that cowhood is explicable even without an individual and therefore the individual is not obtained by postulation, the reply is that the pervaded entity cowhood cannot be established without its pervasive substrate, the individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Universal and Individual Are Not Necessarily Known in One Cognition

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 9/13

Because existence of a universal without a substrate is inexplicable, the individual is apprehended.

Followers of Mandana say that in "bring a cow" cognition arises of a cow-individual qualified by cowhood and connected with the action of bringing.

The individual, as what is qualified by cowhood, is the cause of relational cognition; therefore the individual is known not by postulation but by secondary signification of the word "cow."

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Universal and Individual Are Not Necessarily Known in One Cognition; Mandana's View—Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 10/13

The objection is: how can the individual be directly connected with the action of bringing?

The word "cow" has no expectancy for an individual as the substrate of the universal, unlike a word such as "king" in "bring the king's man", which expects a particular individual.

If the action were connected merely with an individual, cognition would be of the form "bring an individual", not "bring a cow."

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Mandana's View—Secondary Signification in the Individual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 11/13

Cowhood is not pervaded by one individual; there is no rule "wherever cowhood exists, this individual exists." Nor is the inference "cowhood

resides in a cow-individual because it is cowhood" established, because knowledge of pervasion with its own substrate is already contained in it.

Mandana's side says that if the individual is not a word-meaning, meanings of case endings such as objecthood and number cannot be related to the individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Mandana's View—Secondary Signification in the Individual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 12/13

If, by making the individual merely the object of speaker's intention, meanings of case endings are attached to it, the separate system of linguistic convention would collapse.

Number expressed by a finite verb is related not to an inferred individual but to the meaning obtained from a nominative word.

On our view, reference to a meaning from another word can itself be called postulation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Mandana's View—Secondary Signification in the Individual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bhāṭṭa and Maṇḍana accounts · 13/13

Mandana's intention is not that the individual is in no sense obtained by postulation, but that from the word "cow" the individual characterized by cowhood is known secondarily.

Because the universal is eternal, inquiry into existence or non-existence concerns the individual; through secondary signification the individual becomes the locus of that cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The source examines whether universal and individual must appear in a single cognition and whether secondary signification supplies the individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Mandana's View—Secondary Signification in the Individual

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 1/8

We Naiyayikas say that secondary signification occurs only when the secondary meaning is known in a form distinct from the primary meaning, as the bank from the word "Ganges", the bank being distinct from the Ganges.

But a cow-individual is not known as a "mere individual" distinct from cowhood; it is known precisely as a cow.

If the cow-individual were secondarily indicated by individuality, dewlap, or some other form, cognition from the word "cow" would not be cognition in the form of cowhood, but merely cognition in the form of an individual or a shape.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Individual Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 2/8

Nor is it proper to admit secondary signification in the relation between an individual qualified by cowhood and cowhood.

The action of bringing is not directly related to cowhood; if cowhood, as delimiting the individual, were secondarily connected with the action, the individual would become the secondary rather than the primary meaning.

If the individual qualified by cowhood is made the secondary meaning, two semantic functions—power in cowhood and secondary signification in the individual—would have to be admitted in one cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Individual Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 3/8

If secondary signification is also admitted in cowhood to avoid the conflict, no place would remain for primary power.

In fact, primary usage of a word is not found merely with respect to the universal; practical action occurs with respect to an individual qualified by the universal.

In "see the cow" and "there is a cow", seeing and existence relate to the individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Individual Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 4/8

Therefore the individual qualified by the universal should be regarded as the primary denotation of the word.

If universal and individual were taken as two separate denotations, cognition would be "this is cowhood and this is a cow-individual", not "this is a cow." Therefore the denoted entity is one qualified whole—the individual qualified by cowhood.

Whether the nature of qualification is relation, qualifier-qualified structure, or something else is a separate question.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Individual Is Impossible

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 5/8

Like a specific universal, shape too is a word-meaning.

From the word "cow" one knows an individual qualified by cowhood and by a distinctive shape such as a dewlap.

In the expression "cows made of dough", the lump of dough is not a cow; therefore secondary signification of the term "made of dough" is admitted with respect to a cow-like shape.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Shape Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 6/8

In Gautama's aphorism "jati-akriti-vyaktayah padarthah", the singular indicates that one entity qualified by universal, shape, and individual is the word-meaning.

From the word "pankaja" a lotus is regularly known.

If only the etymological meaning "born in mud" were accepted, other water-flowers such as kumuda would also be understood.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Shape Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 7/8

Therefore pankaja must be admitted as both etymologically transparent and conventionally restricted to lotus.

The Eastern scholars say that conventional usage blocks cognition of kumuda.

According to the new thinkers, the suffix "ja" conveys an individual born in mud; the totality of the compound, prior usage, and contextual causes produces cognition only of lotus.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Shape Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Shape, individual, and word-meaning · 8/8

It is also improper to admit only conventional usage and deny the etymological meaning, because the powers of the component words are established and cognition of being mud-born is experienced.

Therefore both etymological composition and established usage with respect to lotus should be admitted in pankaja.

KEY INSIGHT

The later argument rejects some indirect individual meanings and analyzes the Nyāya formula joining universal, shape, and individual.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Shape Too Is Denoted

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When we say “cow”, what does the word denote?

Universal-first proposals

- A universal such as cowhood is stable across different individual cows.
- Some thinkers claim that the individual is supplied by perception, memory or secondary signification.
- The semantics of the command “bring a cow” challenges the sufficiency of the universal alone.

Responses that include an individual

- An action such as bringing concerns an individual object, not an abstract universal by itself.
- Certain Naiyāyika and Bhāṭṭa proposals include the individual as an object of word-based cognition.
- The appeal to jāti, ākṛti and vyakti raises the question of one meaning qualified in several ways.

The translated universal/individual discussion continues after this presentation; its later conclusions are not pre-empted.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Essential conclusions · Does Word-Power Reside in Universals?

Universal

Shared properties help explain repeated word use.

Individual

Practical commands normally target individual things.

Shape

Ākṛti enters the analysis of a word's meaning.

Continuity


The next presentation resumes the remaining universal/individual arguments.

The discussion continues within the next section of the original translated book.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Mīmāṃsā objections · lotus and kumuda · etymology, convention, and grammatical usage

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Word-Power, Pankaja and Conventional Meaning

1

Recollection and the word Pankaja

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that

2

Refuting the newer semantic alternative

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that w

3

Whole-word convention and component pow

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, an

4

Incorrect word-use and the final altern

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explana

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 1/10

The Mimamsakas say there is no need to admit a separate power of the word "pankaja" with respect to lotus.

Regular recollection of lotus can be caused by an impression arising from prior cognition of lotus as the object of usage of the word pankaja.

Word-power is not admitted merely for causing recollection.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 2/10

Cognition "lotus is born in mud" arises from the etymology of the components of pankaja.

Since present usage depends on prior usage and prior usage on still earlier usage, the tradition of usage is beginningless.

Whether recollection of lotus arises from established usage or etymology makes no difference to practical employment.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 3/10

The objection is: how can an irregularly awakened impression produce regular recollection of lotus?

Reply: the cause of recollection is not always fixed; even when power is known, recollection sometimes does not arise.

When the result is present, an appropriate cause is inferred.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 4/10

When cowhood is remembered, all properties pervading cowhood are not necessarily remembered.

Therefore from recollection of lotushood there is no defect that fragrance and all other associated properties must be remembered.

Regular recollection of lotus is possible without a separate lotus-power, just as cognition of power itself arises without another power.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Mimamsaka View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 5/10

It may be objected that if the word pankaja can cause recollection of lotus through impressions without a lotus-power, then the word "cow" too should cause recollection of a cow through impressions without a cow-power.

Reply: word-power is admitted not for recollection but for new cognition of meaning.

Recollection of a cow may arise from impressions, but new verbal cognition concerning a cow cannot arise from another means; therefore power in the word "cow" is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 6/10

Nor is it proper to locate power only in the general property of "knowability", namely "a cow is knowable." Cognition "a cow is knowable" does not produce cognition of a cow;

word-power must be admitted with respect to that specific cognition of a cow which has the cow itself as its object.

It may be said that if recollection of the bank of the Ganges can arise from impressions, secondary signification of the word Ganges becomes pointless.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 7/10

But secondary signification is admitted not merely for recollection of the bank, but in order to generate cognition of the bank's relation to the meaning of a case ending and to sentence-meaning.

If the bank were not a word-meaning, the case meaning could not be related to the bank.

For this reason, secondary signification concerning the bank in the word Ganges, and power or established etymological usage concerning lotus in pankaja, are necessary for smooth sentence cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 8/10

Some say that sentence cognition concerns only relations among word-meanings.

But if in "kalayam pacati" the pulse is remembered from prior perception, or in "dvaram pidhehi" cognition of the door comes from another source,

relational cognition is still possible; therefore it is unnecessary to make lotus a word-meaning of pankaja.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 9/10

Reply: in such examples the hearer's recollection is connected with the sentence by the speaker's intention.

In "close the door" a verb may be supplied or supplemented.

But in "bring the lotus", if the word pankaja has no semantic function at all with respect to lotus, there would be no reason to apprehend lotus as part of the sentence meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Recollection and the word Pankaja · 10/10

It may further be said that the word pankaja is appropriate only at the time a lotus is actually blooming, because the suffix "ja" conveys a real act of birth.

But the suffix can convey an individual capable of being born or related to birth, not merely the presently occurring act of birth; therefore pankaja can be used even when the lotus is not blooming.

The Mimamsakas conclude that pankaja may have established etymological usage with respect to lotus without a separate power; secondary signification with respect to kumuda may be admitted.

KEY INSIGHT

The Mīmāṃsaka account contrasts recall from usage with genuine word-power that yields cognition of a new meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Power of the Word "Cow" Is Not Rendered Inexplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 1/16

The new thinkers say that when the relation in sentence meaning of the lotus regularly recalled from pankaja is found inexplicable,

cognition of kumuda arises; therefore only secondary signification in kumuda is necessary, not power with respect to lotus.

We Naiyayikas say that a learned person who regularly apprehends word-power immediately recalls a particular relation on hearing the word.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 2/16

The word-cognition itself should be accepted as the cause of this regular recollection; it is burdensome to postulate some indescribable other cause on every occasion of recollection.

An impression produced by cognition of the relation of the word pankaja is the cause of recollection of lotus.

Cognition concerning a particular class from the word "rathakara" may likewise arise from impressions and not merely from convention; hence the Mimamsaka explanation exclusively in terms of convention is not stable.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 3/16

When the relation in the form of power is known, cognition of the word produces recollection of meaning.

In this sense power itself is not directly the cause of recollection of meaning; rather, the known relation as a qualification of word-cognition is the cause.

It may be objected that regular recollection of lotus arises from the fixed usage-relation of the word pankaja with lotus; hence there is no need to admit power.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 4/16

Let the word indicate lotus rather than denote it.

But mere fixed usage-relation is insufficient.

If any known relation causing recollection of meaning from a word were enough, secondary signification and power would become identical.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 5/16

Denotative power is that regular relation which grounds direct recollection of word-meaning and its relation in sentence cognition.

If it is held that the word pankaja merely indicates lotus through co-reference with a familiar lotus-word, cognition of meaning would disappear when that familiar word is absent.

In practice pankaja alone conveys lotus; therefore a denotative relation must be admitted there.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of the New Thinkers

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 6/16

We reply that if regular recollection of lotus from pankaja arose merely from a fixed usage-relation with lotus, then other properties pervading lotus and pervaded by lotus would also have to be remembered through that same relation.

It may be said that lotus, excluded from other things, is precisely the object of fixed usage.

But then admitting word-power in lotus becomes unnecessary; fixed usage alone would be said to suffice.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 7/16

Further, how would someone who has not observed that usage, or has observed it only once or twice, regularly remember lotus?

If fixed usage by its mere existence is the cause, then even one who does not know word-power would regularly recollect the meaning.

If known fixed usage is the cause, then without knowledge of pervasion covering all usages recollection would not occur.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 8/16

If it is then said that only those usages that assist acquisition of word-power cause recollection of lotus, there arises the defect that fragrance and other adjuncts too would be remembered.

If only reasoning-supported usage is the cause, recollection would become inexplicable when there is no occasion for such reasoning.

Therefore the regular cause of recollection of meaning is the known power of the word.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 9/16

Means that assist in learning the power are not themselves the direct cause of every recollection.

The preceding view is not proper.

If even in words such as "cow" natural fixed usage were accepted as sufficient for recollection of cows, there would be no need to admit power anywhere.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 10/16

Thus the question reduces to three alternatives: fixed recollection of meaning arises from power, from a fixed word-meaning relation, or from a general semantic function.

By elimination, it arises from power itself.

There is no deviation in recollection connected with power.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 11/16

A word directly produces recollection of its meaning; recollection of the power is not the intended result of the word.

Recollection of meaning arises not from recollection of power but from the word known as expressive of the meaning.

Recollection of a relation is impossible without recollection of the related entities; therefore recollection of word-meaning is required prior to recollection of power.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 12/16

There is no evidence opposed to the claim that power is the cause of recollection of word-meaning.

Alternatively, it may be said that the fixed relation itself is power.

Conventional usage of pankaja with respect to lotus may be admitted so that the powers of the components are not unnecessarily applied to kumuda.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 13/16

Since the power of the compound as a whole and the powers of its components are distinct, mixed cognition of lotushood and kumudahood is not unavoidable.

Some say that there is no evidence for a rule that recollection of the power of the compound suppresses recollection of the powers of its components.

Therefore in pankaja the etymological powers of "panka" and "ja" can produce cognition of kumuda.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 14/16

Reply: the compound is the joint form of all its components; from one and the same set of components, recollection both of compound-power and of component-power is possible.

In words such as "mandapa", these two kinds of power-recollection are observed.

It may be said that the suffix "ja", like "varda" in "balivarda", blocks cognition from component-power; or that "ja" denotes a particular class—

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 15/16

lotus; or that pankaja by nature does not convey kumuda; or that component-power is inhibited with respect to kumuda.

But if such a situation is admitted, a person who does not know the lotus-specific usage of pankaja would not cognize even kumuda through etymology, which is inconsistent.

It is difficult to admit that no cognition of meaning arises even though the total causal complex is present.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Refuting the newer semantic alternatives · 16/16

If pankaja were merely a general expression and particular cognition of lotus or kumuda arose only from the speaker's intention, both convention and secondary signification would become unnecessary.

But cognition of meaning cannot be blocked when the full causal complex is present; therefore convention with respect to lotus and secondary signification with respect to kumuda must be admitted.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges secondary signification and proposed restrictions that would make the word signify kumuda rather than lotus.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 1/15

This also refutes the parallel view that inhibition is a distinct property present in a semantic power, or the non-production of a regular power's result,

or the influence of a stronger power over another power, and that component-power is blocked by such an unknown cause.

In words such as "mandapa", convention is seen to block etymological usage; therefore it is said that the component-powers of pankaja will convey only lotus, not kumuda.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 2/15

But why, in the absence of convention, should usage with respect to kumuda and cognition of kumuda not arise from etymology?

The word "udbhid" denotes a spade etymologically and a particular sacrifice conventionally; power with respect to one meaning does not destroy power with respect to another.

Polysemous words too convey many meanings through many powers.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 3/15

A person who does not know the fixed use of pankaja for lotus can understand the general meaning of something born in mud, including kumuda.

On the conventionalist view, the lotus-specific convention alone should be taken as what blocks cognition of kumuda; if component-power is a cause of meaning-cognition, the presence of that power with respect to lotus must also be admitted.

If only a natural capacity of the word with respect to lotus is admitted and knowledge of usage is called an auxiliary to learning power, cognition of kumuda would become unavoidable when that auxiliary is absent.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 4/15

Therefore a systematic distinction among power, convention, and secondary signification must be admitted.

Some say that the rule governing the powers of the components of pankaja—that is, etymology—is based on the word's capacity to produce cognition of a relation among the connected meanings.

To block cognition of kumuda, the absence of this rule with respect to kumuda should be admitted; even if the compound as a whole has no meaning, cognition of kumuda could remain possible from component-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a Parallel View; Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 5/15

This view is not proper.

A word does not produce cognition of meaning merely through natural capacity; it does so on the basis of cognition of power.

When power is unknown, the word does not produce cognition of meaning; when there is erroneous cognition of power, it produces erroneous meaning-cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 6/15

Absence of a cause is the necessary condition for absence of its effect; therefore known power should be regarded as the cause of meaning-cognition.

The objection is: just as speakerhood in the use of "aham" and addressedness in the use of "tvam" are conditions of usage rather than denoted meanings, so lotushood may merely be a condition for use of pankaja, not a denoted meaning.

Reply: such a condition of usage does not destroy the component-power of pankaja with respect to lotus, nor does it prevent cognition relating to kumuda when speaker's intention or a sentence-meaning concerning kumuda is present.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 7/15

When expectancy, semantic fitness, power, and speaker's intention are present, relational cognition arises; a mere condition of usage does not block it.

Where a purpose concerning kumuda, speaker's intention concerning kumuda, or cognition of a result involving kumuda is present, the absence of use of pankaja with respect to kumuda would be groundless.

In pronouns, speakerhood, addressedness, and the like by their own nature delimit word-use and assist acquisition of power; cognition regularly concerns only the speaker or addressee.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 8/15

Lotushood is not such a rule, because from pankaja even the general meaning of something born in mud is understood.

Therefore convention with respect to lotus and secondary signification with respect to kumuda should be distinguished.

Some scholars say that earlier teachers did not use the word pankaja in the sense of white kumuda; therefore modern scholars too should not use it in that sense.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 9/15

But the question arises: what is the cause of word-use in general?

Different uses result from many distinct causes; an earlier use is not necessarily the cause of a later use.

If the first use of the word "go" is taken as the cause of later usages, what caused the first use? The question recurs.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 10/15

In fact, a newly trained cook, a new poetic expression, a secondary or figurative word, and a newly assigned name such as "Devadatta" can all be used without knowledge of prior usage.

Therefore a chain of prior usages cannot universally be accepted as the sole cause of usage.

It may be objected that an incorrect form such as "gramagam" does not produce cognition of semantic relation; therefore knowledge of grammatical correctness should be regarded as a cause of word-use.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 11/15

First, from usage, a word is understood as capable of producing sentence cognition; later, when forms such as "gramagam" fail to produce cognition, grammatical correctness is taken as the cause.

Reply: grammatical correctness here is not an unbroken tradition extending from the first use.

In new poetry, a new word is used correctly despite there being no prior tradition for it.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 12/15

By grammatical correctness is meant that the word-use is not produced by error.

The use of pankaja with respect to white kumuda arises from the erroneous belief that it is a lotus.

It should not be said that absence of veridical verbal cognition is established from erroneous usage and erroneous usage from absence of veridical cognition, creating mutual dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 13/15

A later erroneous usage may proceed from an earlier erroneous usage, and that from an earlier error still; at the root of the tradition lies an error concerning word-meaning.

No unrestricted use of the incorrect form "gramagam" with respect to a goer is observed among trustworthy persons; but pankaja is used without qualification for lotus.

Its use for white kumuda arises from an error of lotushood.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 14/15

Therefore pankaja is primarily correct with respect to lotus and primarily incorrect with respect to white kumuda.

It may be said that white kumuda is merely a newly arisen individual of lotus, so why should calling it pankaja be incorrect?

Reply: mere difference of individuals is not enough.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Whole-word convention and component powers · 15/15

A newly arisen cook belongs to the class denoted by "cook", whereas white kumuda is not a member of the lotus class.

The etymological meaning "born in mud" may apply to it, but the lotus-specific convention of pankaja does not.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion tests whether conventional use overrides component meanings, and whether a separate rule is needed.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Another Alternative View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 1/9

The word pankaja is not correct with respect to white kumuda without another semantic function, namely secondary signification.

A word is not correct in a meaning in which earlier teachers did not use it unrestrictedly unless another semantic function operates there.

Just as the word Ganges is not correct in the sense of its bank without secondary signification, and

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 2/9

"gramagam" is not correct in the sense of a goer without a special convention, so pankaja is not correct with respect to white kumuda without secondary signification.

But in this inference the qualifier "without another semantic function" may be said to be pointless.

The actual probandum is the incorrectness of the word in that meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 3/9

There is also absence of a cause pervading the probandum in the subject, because a sentence containing pankaja with expectancy for white kumuda can produce cognition of that meaning.

There is an equally strong counter-inference: pankaja is correct with respect to white kumuda because in a sentence possessing expectancy it produces cognition of white kumuda,

just as the word "flower" is correct with respect to a flower and "cook" with respect to a cook.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 4/9

A grammatically well-formed sentence produces meaning-cognition; therefore the possibility of cognition of relation blocks the inference of incorrectness.

In fact, cognition of grammatical correctness is not the direct cause of verbal cognition.

A poet who knows derivation can create a new word without knowing prior usage.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 5/9

Why does "gramagam" fail to produce cognition?

Because its incorrectness is determined.

Mere doubt about incorrectness does not block cognition; otherwise usage of a newly formed word such as a new term for a cook would become impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 6/9

Therefore the use of pankaja with respect to white kumuda does not arise from the primary lotus-convention; it is possible through secondary signification or a figurative relation based on the component meaning "born in mud."

Other scholars say that even incorrect words produce relational cognition, but it arises from an erroneous belief in grammatical correctness, just as an erroneous inference arises from erroneous cognition of a reason.

According to some scholars an incorrect word lacks the required expectancy; therefore, like an unrelated group of words such as "pot, objecthood, bringing", it does not produce sentence cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Incorrectness of the Word Pankaja with Respect to White Kumuda; The View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 7/9

Traditionalist scholars say that incorrect forms such as "gramagam" too possess denotative power.

A form produced by adding a suffix other than "an" after the root "gam", or by a particular form of "gam" after "grama",

can be conventionally assigned the meaning of a goer, just as words such as "kusatva" convey meanings despite having special suffixal forms.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 8/9

But this view is burdensome.

A separate power would have to be admitted for every root, every corrupted suffix, and every regional form.

A person understands words such as "kumbhakara" even without knowing the grammatical prescription of the suffix "an".

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Incorrect word-use and the final alternatives · 9/9

Therefore, instead of admitting infinitely many separate conventions, it is more economical to explain cognition from incorrect forms through recollection of the correct word, similarity, or error regarding word-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The text evaluates white kumuda, secondary signification, and proposed explanations of semantically irregular words.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of Other Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why does the established meaning of pankaja matter?

Positions examined

- A Mīmāṃsaka account treats regular recall of lotus as an impression generated by earlier use, without a separate denotative power.
- Some newer thinkers seek secondary signification in kumuda, or say the components of pankaja prevent the conventional lotus meaning.
- Alternative accounts regard incorrect usages as producing cognition through mistaken grammatical correctness or expectancy.

Naiyāyika replies

- Word-power is relevant to newly produced semantic cognition, not merely the recollection of a familiar object.
- Conventional whole-word meaning and etymological component-meaning need to be kept distinct in cases of competing interpretations.
- The white-kumuda case requires a different semantic explanation when primary usage is not appropriate.

The case tests the source’s difference between primary denotation, contextual recall and secondary usage.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Word-Power, Pankaja and Conventional Meaning

Distinction

Mere recollection does not by itself establish denotative power.

Case study

Pankaja, lotus and kumuda test the limits of component etymology.

Competing accounts

The source compares Mīmāṃsaka and Naiyāyika accounts of conventional use.

Next


Grammatical correctness and the establishment of convention are examined in detail.

The discussion continues within the next section of the original translated book.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Nyāya usage · cowhood · corrupt forms · grammatical correctness · divine convention

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Correct Words and the Ground of Denotation

1

Correctness, convention, and cowhood

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established conventi

2

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal underst

3

Alternative definitions of correct expr

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different m

4

Divine convention and the closing objec

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 1/16

Grammatical incorrectness cannot be defined merely as production through error; otherwise even a correct word uttered by an untrustworthy person would have to be regarded as incorrect.

Incorrectness consists in being a form prohibited by grammar or lacking derivation as an accepted form.

Correctness consists in a word's possessing an established semantic function or convention.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 2/16

A known word-meaning relation produces recollection of meaning, supports cognition of relations among meanings, and produces sentence cognition.

Sentence-correctness is the condition in which grammar does not prohibit the word-forms and the words are capable of producing relational cognition of their respective meanings.

The power of the compound pankaja with respect to lotus is established; this compound-power blocks primary use with respect to white kumuda.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 3/16

Power cannot be located merely in the component "ja", for otherwise all words ending in "ja", such as manduraja, would convey lotus.

Power in the whole compound must be admitted.

Power is a known convention that regularly produces cognition of the intended meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 4/16

The components may convey the general meaning "born in mud", while the compound-power regularly recalls lotus.

Where convention and etymology conflict, convention blocks the etymological application; where they do not conflict—as when a lotus is actually born in mud—convention and etymology jointly produce cognition of meaning.

Some scholars say that on hearing "bring the pankaja", lotus is rapidly recalled through convention and becomes connected with the action of bringing; the etymological meaning, something born in mud, appears later.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 5/16

Thus convention suppresses etymology because it yields its result more quickly. This is not proper.

Connection with an action arises not from recollection of meaning alone but from the totality of expectancy, case ending, and semantic fitness.

Conventional and etymological meanings may both be recalled immediately; relational cognition depends on completeness of the auxiliary causes.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 6/16

Convention recalls lotus, while etymology makes the same lotus known as "born in mud." There is no conflict between them.

White kumuda is not the conventional meaning of the whole word; therefore pankaja is not primarily used in that meaning.

In the established doctrine, known convention is the regular cause of recollection of meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 7/16

Component-power produces cognition of the relation of component-meanings, while compound-power recalls lotus.

Thus convention is not merely an inhibitor of etymology; it is itself a power with respect to lotus.

The word "go" denotes a cow and the word "ahina" denotes a particular sacrifice extending over many days; in these meanings only convention should be admitted, not etymology.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika View; Only Convention in Words Such as "Go"

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 8/16

For economy one power in the whole word should be admitted.

One might derive cow or a particular sacrifice by adding a special suffix "do" after the root "gam", or a suffix "kha" after "ahina"; but such suffixes have no independent meaning in ordinary language.

Therefore it is simpler to admit power in the whole word than separate powers in root and suffix.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Only Convention in Words Such as "Go"

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 9/16

The word "dhenu" too is conventionally established for a cow as an object of milking or suckling by a calf.

It is unnecessary to assign an independent meaning to the suffix "nu" and derive milking-action or cowhood.

Unadi suffixes are generally devices for forming words; semantic power resides in the complete word.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Only Convention in Words Such as "Go"

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 10/16

Where a suffix genuinely expresses a separate meaning, Panini prescribes it separately.

Rules such as "dabhabhyam ... nur dahet" merely establish the form; they do not establish an independent denotative power of the suffix.

Some scholars say that in the word "dhenu", cowhood is not the denoted meaning; only being an object of milking or suckling is denoted, while cowhood is merely an adjunct of the power.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Only Convention in Words Such as "Go"; Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 11/16

Thus buffaloes and others are excluded and only a milkable cow-individual qualified by cowhood is understood.

This view is not proper.

Regular recollection of cowhood is impossible without a power concerning cowhood.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 12/16

Merely calling cowhood an "accidental qualifier" does not establish generalization across infinitely many individuals.

If milkability is the denoted meaning and cowhood an adjunct, cowhood itself, as the delimitor excluding buffaloes, will perform the function of the principal meaning; then denying denotability of cowhood is pointless.

If milkability and cowhood are remembered separately from the word, their mutual relation is not automatically known; the components possess no power conveying such a relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 13/16

Some scholars say conversely that cowhood is denoted and milkability is an adjunct.

But not every cow is milkable, so cowhood is too broad.

The denoted entity is a milkable cow-individual qualified by cowhood.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 14/16

In the established doctrine, the word dhenu expresses one combined qualified meaning consisting of cowhood, milkability, and an individual; admitting power with respect to this qualified meaning produces a unified cognition.

The objection is that the components of pankaja produce cognition of "born in mud" and the compound produces cognition of lotus; but how does the unified cognition "the thing born in mud is a lotus" arise?

Reply: component-power and compound-power jointly form one causal complex that produces a single qualified cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 15/16

The components connect their meanings, the compound produces cognition of lotus, and together they produce cognition of "a lotus born in mud."

Words possessing expectancy connect their meanings in the form that is the object of the speaker's intention.

This rule does not apply in other sentences where there is no compound-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness, convention, and cowhood · 16/16

In "bring the pankaja", compound-power connects the meaning born in mud and lotus co-referentially, after which the action of bringing connects with that qualified lotus.

In "pankajam kumudam", if white kumuda is intended, the compound abandons its primary lotus-meaning and, on the basis of its component meaning, functions secondarily.

Where known conventional power exists, secondary signification is possible precisely because the lotus-meaning is found inapplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika analysis relates grammatical acceptability, established convention, and the denotation of a cow.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cowhood Is the Denoted Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 1/10

It may be said that the components of pankaja and the word "kumuda" recall their respective meanings; when lotus is found unfit, the relation of being born in mud can be applied to white kumuda.

But immediately on hearing pankaja, the cognition "the thing born in mud is a lotus" arises before cognition of the semantic fitness of the word kumuda.

The etymological meaning is remembered as related to the conventionally established lotus; applying it independently to white kumuda requires secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Word Pankaja

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 2/10

If white kumuda belongs to a class distinct from lotus, secondary signification in pankaja is unavoidable.

If it is regarded merely as a particular individual of lotus, the lotus-convention can extend to it.

According to the established doctrine, when white kumuda is intended, the primary lotus-meaning of pankaja becomes inapplicable;

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Word Pankaja

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 3/10

therefore a secondary semantic function is admitted with respect to the meaning "a water-flower born in mud", which is related to the primary meaning.

The prima facie opponent says that if power is admitted in the correct word pankaja, it must also be admitted in corrupt forms such as "gaccha", because people regularly obtain cognition of meaning from them.

Secondary signification cannot be admitted when the primary meaning is not blocked.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification in the Word Pankaja; Denotative Capacity in Corrupt Forms

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 4/10

Many people understand corrupt forms without knowing the correct Sanskrit equivalents.

Therefore an imputed power should be admitted in corrupt words.

Cognition of meaning arises from that imputed power.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Denotative Capacity in Corrupt Forms

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 5/10

The distinction between "correct" and "incorrect" would concern grammatical form and religious merit, not capacity to convey meaning.

A Sanskrit word is established by Paninian grammar and its use may be meritorious; a corrupt form may convey meaning but is not scripturally correct.

According to some views, correct Sanskrit words possess beginningless real power, whereas corrupt words possess newly imputed power.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Denotative Capacity in Corrupt Forms

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 6/10

Both generate cognition of meaning; the injunction "speak correct words" applies only to grammatically sanctioned expressions.

We siddhantins say that it is burdensome to admit real power in a Sanskrit word and imputed power in a corrupt word for cognition of the same meaning.

For economy, real power should be admitted only in correct Sanskrit words; cognition from corrupt forms arises through recollection of the correct word or error regarding power.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Denotative Capacity in Corrupt Forms; The Siddhantin's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 7/10

A word-meaning is that entity which cannot be obtained from another source without the word, so power in the word is necessary.

But admitting a separate power in many regional corrupt synonyms for one and the same meaning would produce infinite complexity.

Jaimini too rejects the impropriety of many denotative powers for one meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Siddhantin's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 8/10

Correct Sanskrit words are uniform across regions, while corrupt forms vary by region.

It is not simpler merely to admit power in Prakrit words, because Prakrit contains many tatsama, tadbhava, and regional forms.

How do people who do not know Sanskrit understand meaning from corrupt words?

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Siddhantin's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 9/10

An early grammarian hearing "gavi" infers the correct word "gauh", understands its meaning, and tells others.

Later people, even without recalling the correct word, understand the meaning through an error that the corrupt word itself is denotative.

Just as a child utters an indistinct "amba" and a learned hearer recalls the correct expression and grasps the meaning mother,

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Siddhantin's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pankaja and corrupt linguistic forms · 10/10

so the first cognition of meaning arises through recollection of the correct word; through tradition, error regarding power in the corrupt word becomes firmly established.

Real power belongs only to Sanskrit words; in corrupt and Prakrit forms there is attribution or error concerning it.

KEY INSIGHT

The translation assesses secondary signification in pankaja and verbal understanding through non-standard forms.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Siddhantin's Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 1/7

Some say that if cognition of power is erroneous, the verbal cognition produced from it must also be erroneous, just as an inference produced by erroneous cognition of a reason is erroneous. This is not proper.

Veridicality of cognition of power is not a necessary cause of veridical verbal cognition; otherwise there would be deviation when a correct word is uttered by an untrustworthy speaker.

Not every cognition produced from an erroneous causal cognition is necessarily erroneous; recognition of an error can itself be true.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Correctness Is a General Property—One View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 2/7

In sentence cognition from a corrupt word, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and so on can be veridical.

The error about power concerns only the word; the intended object can be real.

Some scholars accept the existence of the corrupt word as a valid cause of recollection of meaning, while others consider absence of opposing true cognition sufficient.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Correctness Is a General Property—One View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 3/7

Correctness cannot be defined as "the state of expressing meaning", because corrupt forms also express meaning.

Nor is beginningless usage the mark, for forms such as "ali" occur in the Veda and newly coined technical terms can be correct.

Some scholars regard correctness as a general acoustic universal apprehended by an ear refined through grammar.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Correctness Is a General Property—One View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 4/7

But if such universals belonged to words, every word would be correct in every meaning.

Therefore correctness is not merely an acoustic universal.

Even when the word "go" is used in the sense of horse, it remains acoustically correct but does not denote a horse.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Correctness Is a General Property—One View; Refutation of Alternative Definitions of Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 5/7

If correctness were a general universal, the form "gavi" too would have to be correct in the sense of cow.

To admit different correctness-universals according to meanings would produce infinite complexity.

Correctness cannot be defined as fitness for use in Vedic sacrifice; words such as "candala" are correct though not used in sacrifice.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Alternative Definitions of Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 6/7

Many correct ordinary words are absent from sacrificial injunctions.

Correctness cannot be defined as wordhood productive of religious merit; corrupt words too convey meaning, and a correct word uttered by a fallen person is not always productive of merit.

If correctness is defined as occurrence in the Veda, even corrupt forms such as "ali" would become correct while technical terms would be incorrect.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Alternative Definitions of Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative definitions of correct expression · 7/7

If it is defined as derivability by grammar, difficulties arise with technical designations.

Grammar merely explains the derivation of already accepted word-forms; the process of derivation may be an indicator of correctness, but is not correctness itself.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether correctness is a general property and why different meanings cannot be inferred from phonetic correctness alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of Alternative Definitions of Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 1/13

We Naiyayikas say that a word fixed by God's convention for a meaning is denotative and correct in that meaning.

Unlike other scholars who accept a natural relation, our view makes divine convention the delimitor of correctness.

A word conventionally fixed by God is by its nature an object of usage productive of religious merit, just as medicine touched by a mongoose's tooth is by nature capable of destroying poison.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 2/13

An injunction such as "speak correct words" directs the use of precisely such words.

Knowledge of divine convention arises from the usage of elders, similarity, grammatical similarity with a known word, sentence-remainders in contexts involving yava, varaha, Indra,

and the like, lexicons, and instruction from authoritative grammarians such as Indra and Panini.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 3/13

Grammarians are authoritative in distinguishing correct and incorrect words.

There is no mutual dependence between the authority of grammar resting on correctness and cognition of correctness resting on grammar.

Later grammars derive from earlier traditions, and the grammar at the beginning of creation may be taken as composed by God.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Divine convention and the closing objection · 4/13

Where Panini, Candra, and others differ, the decision of the author of the Mahabhasya is accepted.

Personal names such as Maitra are subjects of divine convention under the general prescription "on the twelfth day the father should give

the child a name." Forms such as Vasudeva may possess particular derivative structures and yet be correct in a general patronymic sense.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 5/13

Technical names are known through conventional assignment, and the meanings of words such as go through usage established by divine convention.

The Mimamsakas say that correctness is not being fixed by divine convention.

A word may be divinely assigned in one meaning and not another; then secondary and figurative usages would become incorrect.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 6/13

Roots and suffixes are divinely assigned; therefore corrupted combinations such as "badhati" and "gramagam" would also wrongly become correct.

If a combined root-suffix form is called incorrect because the combination itself was not divinely assigned, correct combined forms such as "badhate" too would become incorrect, since God's convention was admitted separately in root and suffix.

People call grammatically derived forms correct even without knowing divine convention; therefore correctness should be derivability by grammar.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Divine convention and the closing objection · 7/13

The Naiyayika reply: a word is correct in that specific meaning in which it is derived by grammatical rule.

"Gavi" may perhaps be derived by an Unadi rule in the sense of cow, but not in another meaning.

Incongruent forms such as "badhati" and "gramagam" are not derivable by grammar and are therefore incorrect.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 8/13

Secondary and figurative usages have a derivationally grounded relation to a primary correct word and therefore remain correct.

Correctness is neither mere capacity to convey meaning nor mere divine assignment; it is grammatical derivability in the meaning in which the word is established by grammar.

Grammar is a discipline "deriving words", not "deriving correct words"; thus self-dependence is avoided.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 9/13

Later grammar is based on correct forms known from earlier grammar; there is no mutual dependence.

The objection is that it is unnecessary to regard cognition of word-power or divine convention as the cause of meaning-cognition.

It is enough to know simply that "this word produces cognition of this meaning." The Mimamsaka speaks of cognition of power and the

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Naiyayika Reply; Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 10/13

Naiyayika of cognition of divine convention; both, from observed usage, determine only that the word is a cause of cognition of meaning.

If this view were accepted, secondary signification would disappear.

In "gangayam ghosah", if the word Ganges were treated as a direct producer of cognition of the bank, there would be no need for the intermediate primary cognition of the stream or for a secondary relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 11/13

Specific cognition of meaning is impossible without knowing a word-meaning relation.

To understand the causality of the word "Devadatta" in producing cognition of Devadatta, its convention with respect to Devadatta must previously have been known elsewhere.

To distinguish non-eternal and eternal words by saying this rule applies only to the former would be burdensome.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 12/13

Productivity of cognition of meaning is a result of power or convention, not a replacement for the relation itself.

Merely knowing "it is productive" does not determine what meaning is produced.

Knowledge of a specific word-meaning relation is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Divine convention and the closing objection · 13/13

The Naiyayika reply: cognition of convention is a cause of cognition of word-meaning because this causality is experienced elsewhere in cognition of meanings of words such as "Devadatta".

If mere productivity of a word were admitted even in eternal words, burdensome qualifiers such as "a word qualified by eternality" would have to be added.

Divine convention is the primary word-meaning relation and assists in indicating speaker's intention and related meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika reply treats the fixity of word-power and debates the Mīmāṃsaka challenge to divine convention.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Mimamsaka Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Is grammatical correctness identical with denotative power?

Objections and alternatives

- An acoustically correct word used for an unintended meaning does not necessarily denote that meaning.
- Understanding a corrupt form can be explained without conceding original power to every such form.
- The Mīmāṃsaka questions whether knowledge of divine convention adds anything to observed word-meaning regularity.

Naiyāyika resolution

- Correctness concerns an established usage or derivation and cannot be equated with any accidentally successful utterance.
- The source argues for word-power fixed by divine convention in the accepted form and meaning.
- Recognition of a word's capacity, convention, and the production of valid cognition must be carefully distinguished.

This source section explicitly contrasts the Mīmāṃsaka account with the Naiyāyika account of correctness.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Correct Words and the Ground of Denotation

Cow-word

The debate distinguishes cowhood from adjacent descriptive properties.

Corrupt forms

Successful understanding does not alone establish primary semantic power.

Correctness

Phonetic acceptability and semantic fit are separate issues.

Nyāya conclusion


The accepted form and meaning are tied to established convention.

The discussion continues within the next section of the original translated book.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Lakṣaṇā as a distinct function · relation, intention, and word-form · rival accounts

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Secondary Signification: Ganges and the Bank

1

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distin

2

Alternative accounts of secondary meani

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation ac

3

When a word signifies its own word-form

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words ca

4

Intention versus semantic function

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with seconda

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · ı/ıı

When the sentence relation of the primary denoted meaning is found impossible, another meaning related to that primary meaning is recalled

and the sentence meaning is formed with that secondary meaning; this distinct semantic function is called secondary signification.

In "gangayam ghosah", since a village cannot be located in the stream, the word Ganges recalls the bank.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Distinct Semantic Function

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 2/11

The nature of secondary signification is a relation of a secondary meaning to the primary expressed meaning, which, because relation of the primary meaning is impossible, causes recollection of a suitable secondary meaning.

This is the purport of the old formulation, "secondary signification is the relation of a meaning obtained through relation to the primary meaning."

The prima facie opponent says that the word Ganges should possess an independent power with respect to the bank too.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Distinct Semantic Function

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 3/11

Usage of elders serves equally as the means of learning power in both primary and secondary meanings; therefore Ganges should be regarded as a polysemous word.

Reply: then separate powers and separate usages of elders would have to be admitted for thousands of possible banks, nearby villages, reservoirs, and other meanings.

One primary power concerning the stream and a general relation from that meaning to secondary meanings is far more economical.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Distinct Semantic Function

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 4/11

Secondary signification is not thousands of powers; it is one semantic function in the form of a relation between the primary and secondary meanings.

Speaker's intention, context, and fitness determine the particular secondary meaning.

On hearing a trustworthy speaker's sentence and understanding that a village cannot exist in a stream, the hearer recalls the bank related to the Ganges; no separate power in the bank is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Distinct Semantic Function

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 5/11

Cognition of the speaker's intention is not necessary for cognition, within sentence meaning, of the relation of the bank recalled from the primary meaning of Ganges.

The rules governing sentence cognition and semantic fitness themselves determine the particular relation.

Objection: among many possible related entities, speaker's intention is necessary to know the particular bank.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Intention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 6/11

Reply: the particular related entity can be known from expectancy, semantic fitness, and context among the word-meanings; cognition of intention is not indispensable.

Alternatively, secondary signification may be called a relation recalled through recollection of power from the primary meaning, or a recollection of relation produced from the primary meaning.

In either case cognition of the secondary meaning is possible before apprehending the speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Intention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 7/11

If intention were necessary, then where both stream and bank are relationally fit, cognition of relation with the primary stream-meaning too would depend on intention.

But the rule is that among meanings recalled by word-power, the meaning possessing expectancy is connected.

Therefore secondary signification of bank from the word Ganges is possible without usage of elders or special cognition of intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Intention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 8/11

The prima facie opponent says that a child hearing a sentence such as "bring the village located on the bank of the Ganges" and

observing the instructed elder's behavior learns power of the word Ganges with respect to the bank; why accept only speaker's intention?

Reply: the child first understands the authority of words and semantic coherence.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · No Denotative Power in the Bank

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 9/11

To admit separate power of Ganges with respect to its many banks would be extremely burdensome; therefore he treats the bank not as denoted by a power but as understood because of relation to the Ganges.

A child reflecting on convention may initially suppose power in the bank and later recognize this as an error and accept secondary signification.

Where primary and secondary meanings possess one common delimitor, a word may have power with respect to both; but stream and bank of the Ganges possess no such single common delimitor.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · No Denotative Power in the Bank

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · 10/11

In a polysemous word such as "aksa", context makes one meaning primary; but thousands of separate powers for the banks of the Ganges are unacceptable.

If the word Ganges were powerful with respect to the bank, the expressed stream-meaning would become a qualifier of the bank.

The stream can serve only as an incidental indicator of the bank, not as a denoted qualifier.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · No Denotative Power in the Bank

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the Ganges example needs Lakṣaṇā · ıı/ıı

Therefore there is only secondary signification of the bank through relation to the Ganges.

KEY INSIGHT

The source argues that a village is on the bank, not in the stream, and distinguishes the recalled stream from the contextually intended bank.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · No Denotative Power in the Bank

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 1/9

Some say that use of the word Ganges with respect to the stream and its use with respect to the bank are different.

In the stream there is unconditional power; in the bank, because of inapplicability of meaning, there is either absence of power or secondary signification.

But why would a child who does not know secondary signification, on observing an instructed elder's action concerning the bank, not learn power of the word Ganges in the bank?

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a View Concerning Difference of Word-Use

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 2/9

If bank in general is treated as a secondary meaning, other riverbanks too would be related; if "bank of the Ganges" specifically is taken, power and secondary signification would conflict together.

Reply: the remembered bank is in fact related to the Ganges; cognition of "a bank related to the Ganges" is possible through secondary signification, but that bank is not the expressed meaning of the word Ganges.

Just as recollection of "elephant" can recall a mahout while the mahout is not denoted by the word elephant.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a View Concerning Difference of Word-Use

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 3/9

The capacity of an authoritative sentence and the expectancy in sentence meaning show the unfitness of the primary Ganges-meaning; the fitness of the required bank-meaning is obtained through secondary signification.

Though the word Ganges does not directly express the bank, it assists in generating cognition of relation with the bank.

Some scholars say that secondary signification should be admitted in order to obtain cognition of a general relation of the meaning of Ganges; bank and the like are particular forms of that general relation. This is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of a View Concerning Difference of Word-Use; Secondary Signification Is Not for Facilitating a R

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 4/9

There is no separate cause producing cognition of relation of some "general meaning" of Ganges.

Once relation with the bank is cognized, the general meaning of Ganges is not thereby related to the village.

Another view holds that unity of the sentence "the village is on the bank of the Ganges" is established through the bank recalled from the meaning of Ganges; therefore secondary signification of bank should be admitted in the word Ganges.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not for Facilitating a Relation of a General Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 5/9

But the Ganges itself is not the object of the sentence relation with the village; only the capable bank is related to the village.

In the established doctrine, the bank recalled from the primary meaning of Ganges is apprehended because it is fit for the sentence relation.

Secondary signification is admitted to make this specific relation possible, not to make possible a relation of some "general meaning of Ganges."

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not for Facilitating a Relation of a General Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 6/9

It may be said that first the relation of the Ganges to the bank is known, and then the bank, as "bank of the Ganges", becomes a qualifying element that participates in sentence meaning.

But when Ganges and bank are recalled together, two semantic functions in the word Ganges—power with respect to the stream and secondary signification with respect to the bank—would be simultaneously required and appear to conflict.

Another proposal is that the secondary meaning, the bank, is related to the expressed meaning of Ganges, and therefore secondary signification recalls the bank.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of Secondary Signification— Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 7/9

But recollection of the bank is distinct from recollection of the bank's relation to the Ganges; recollection of the Ganges-relation is located in the bank, not in the Ganges.

Just as in recollection of the semantic relation between "elephant" and "mahout", the word elephant does not thereby acquire the mahout as its meaning.

The final doctrine is that secondary signification is a semantic function of a word consisting in relation to its own expressed meaning; or,

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of Secondary Signification— Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 8/9

through relation to the expressed meaning and the intended use of the word, it is the function that generates reference to an unexpressed, dissimilar meaning.

Like denotative power, secondary signification too is a cause of reference; there is no need to admit a separate power in the secondary meaning.

There is no over-extension to the relation of the genitive case, because "the king's relation" is not present in the king in the form of an absence; the expressed king and the relation belonging to the king are distinct entities.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of Secondary Signification— Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts of secondary meaning · 9/9

If the word Ganges is intended only in its primary stream-meaning, then even though the stream is related to the bank, secondary signification of the bank remains inactive.

The semantic function becomes operative because of speaker's intention; intention itself is not the semantic function.

A word can refer to another meaning through relation to its own meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate tests an independent word-power for the bank, a general-relation account, and the final nature of secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nature of Secondary Signification— Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 1/9

Some scholars say that a word normally expresses its meaning; when such a meaning is not intended, it expresses its own form.

In "utter the word go", the word "go" expresses not the meaning cow but the word-form "go" itself.

Objection: cognition of word-form is impossible without a distinct semantic function; otherwise the word's other meanings would disappear.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: A Word Expresses Its Own Form

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 2/9

Another view is that the word-form apprehended by the ear is intended, and the other words convey meanings related to that very word-form.

But the letters are not uttered simultaneously; direct perception of the whole word at one time is impossible, while recollection of a previously perceived word without cognition of semantic capacity is pointless.

In "utter the word go", the inflected word itself would become the object of utterance, not merely the nominal stem—this defect arises.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: A Word Expresses Its Own Form

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 3/9

In a sentence containing an explicitly supplied word, the supplied word produces cognition of relations among meanings.

In the present example, the word-form itself becomes a sentence meaning; therefore a distinct semantic function—secondary signification—must be admitted in the total causal complex for cognition of the word-form.

If in sentences such as "go asti" the word go expresses both its own form and its meaning, rapid recollection of the word-form may arise from perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: A Word Expresses Its Own Form; Word-Form as Word-Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 4/9

But if recollection of word-meaning relation comes merely from perception, why should the word-form be connected with the action "utter"?

Expectancy from a case ending seeks relation with the word-meaning.

Objecthood expressed by the accusative case does not naturally relate to a remembered word-form; by rule, case-meaning is connected with the stem-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Form as Word-Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 5/9

Therefore in "utter the word go", secondary signification of the word go with respect to its own word-form is necessary, just as bank-secondary-signification in "on the bank of the Ganges."

In an example such as "he uttered the ten letters j, b, g, d ...", the group of letters is not uttered simultaneously; the action "uttered" is connected with utterance of each individual letter.

Each letter may denote its own form; with respect to cognition of letter-form, either separate secondary signification or a power concerning word-form may be admitted.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Form as Word-Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 6/9

According to some views a meaningless word has power only with respect to its own form.

In the established doctrine, wherever word-form becomes a word-meaning in sentence cognition, cognition of word-form arises through a distinct semantic function.

Other scholars say that by its natural capacity a word expresses its own form; no separate convention regarding word-form is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Word-Form as Word-Meaning; One View: Convention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 7/9

Without any convention, the word "pot" manifests its own pot-word form; the case ending is connected with that word-form.

Convention is necessary when a word expresses a meaning distinct from its own form, not when it expresses its own form.

Cognition of the word-form arises with every utterance; inapplicability of the ordinary meaning, quotation marks, and other auxiliary conditions cause the word-form to be apprehended in sentence meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: Convention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 8/9

Some say that secondary signification is merely the speaker's intention that intends another meaning related to the expressed meaning.

But intention only assists recollection of the secondary meaning; reference is impossible without cognition of a relation between the expressed and secondary meanings.

Speaker's intention is useful in identifying an inapplicable expressed meaning and in determining sentence relation; secondary signification itself is a semantic function consisting in relation to the expressed meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: Convention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When a word signifies its own word-form · 9/9

The statement that "secondary signification is admitted because of intention" means only that intention selects the secondary meaning, not that intention itself is the semantic function.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples involving uttering the word go and the word pot test whether words can express their own acoustic form.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · One View: Convention Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 1/6

It may be said that even in primary meaning the condition "the word was uttered with the purpose of expressing this meaning" is the convention;

then speaker's intention would itself be the semantic function for both primary and secondary meanings.

Reply: when the speaker's intention itself is otherwise inexplicable, secondary signification merely assists it; secondary signification is not the nature of intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 2/6

Inapplicability of the primary meaning is the cause of secondary signification, not inapplicability of intention.

For this reason secondary signification occurs in an unexpressed secondary meaning, not merely intention.

A trustworthy speaker uses a word to convey a particular meaning; the hearer understands that meaning through word-power or

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 3/6

through relation to the expressed meaning, not by making the speaker's mental state itself the direct means of meaning-cognition.

If general speaker's intention alone were the semantic function, every word could be used for every meaning and the distinction among polysemous words would disappear.

Another view says that secondary signification is the relation, to the word's expressed meaning, of the meaning the speaker wishes to convey.

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 4/6

But speaker's intention is a cause of word-use; the semantic function is only the relation between the expressed and secondary meanings.

Cognition of intention is an auxiliary cause of sentence relation, not secondary signification itself.

Traditionalists say that the relation between secondary and expressed meaning is only invariable concomitance.

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 5/6

In "bring in the staff-bearers" and "the people on the cots are crying", the expressed staff or cot is not abandoned; the staff-bearers and people on the cots are respectively invariably connected with the expressed meanings.

In "the umbrella-bearers are going", the meaning extends from the group of umbrella-bearers to companions without umbrellas.

In "protect the curd from crows", the crow represents the class of animals that destroy curd; even though dogs and others also destroy curd,

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Intention versus semantic function · 6/6

mere reference to crows does not produce secondary signification extending to dogs, because the sentence does not instruct protection from dogs.

Therefore in non-abandoning secondary signification, an invariable relation of the secondary meaning with the expressed meaning is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The source rejects the identification of speaker intention itself with secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Intention Is Not the Semantic Function of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How does “a village on the Ganges” acquire a coherent meaning?

Proposals and difficulties

- Primary denotation takes Ganges to be the stream, but a village cannot occupy the stream as its location.
- Some accounts posit independent power for the bank; others rely on speaker intention or a more general relation.
- The word-form examples raise a different problem: a word can be mentioned rather than used for its usual object.

Naiyāyika response

- Lakṣaṇā is a secondary semantic function triggered when the primary meaning does not fit the sentence relation.
- A relation between the primary and secondary meanings helps bring the bank into the cognition of the sentence.
- Speaker intention and the semantic function are causally related but must not be treated as identical.

The Ganges example is used as a philosophical case of secondary signification, not as a literal geographical assertion.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Secondary Signification: Ganges and the Bank

Primary sense

Ganges normally denotes the river stream.

Semantic problem

The sentence's locative relation cannot be satisfied literally.

Secondary sense

The associated bank supplies a fit meaning through lakṣaṇā.

Important separation


Intention is not itself the definition of secondary semantic function.

The discussion continues within the next section of the original translated book.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Eastern accounts · component-power · convention and etymology · closing examples

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Lakṣaṇā, Context and the Conclusion of Word-Power

1

Cause of secondary signification and Ea

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case ending

2

Component meanings and conventional str

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more q

3

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣa

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signif

4

Final examples and formal conclusion

The last examples examine a calf's step and the sacrificial-cake vessel before

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 1/18

In fact, the relation between secondary and denoted meaning itself is secondary signification; over-extension of this relation occurs only on the view that defines it specifically as invariable concomitance.

The rule that speaker's intention causes cognition of relation among word-meanings applies also to the view that secondary signification consists merely in a relation of the secondary meaning to the denoted meaning.

Traditionalist scholars hold that inapplicability of the speaker's intention itself is the cause of secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 2/18

Intention cannot be established without cognition of word-power; but mere inapplicability of relation among denoted meanings cannot be the cause, because

in non-abandoning secondary signification such as "bring in the staff-bearers", secondary signification occurs even though relation between the staff-bearer and entering is possible.

In fact, in an authoritative sentence intended to convey relation, inapplicability of the relation among the primary denoted meanings is the cause of secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 3/18

In "the village is on the Ganges", first the relation of the stream-form Ganges with the village is found impossible and the bank is recalled.

Even if the speaker's intention is taken as already known, inapplicability of relation of the primary Ganges-meaning remains the proximate cause.

In non-abandoning secondary usages—"bring in the staff-bearers" or "the umbrella-bearers are going"—

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Secondary Signification

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 4/18

the main staff-bearers or umbrella-bearers alone cannot constitute the complete agent or object of the action; context includes other members of the group as well.

Therefore secondary signification arises from incompleteness or inapplicability of the relation of the primary denoted meaning, not merely from inapplicability of intention.

The Eastern experientialists say that context and other auxiliary causes are useful only in recollection or cognition of a particular word-meaning, not in apprehension of speaker's intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Cause of Secondary Signification; The View of the Eastern Experientialists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 5/18

But this is not proper; then the ordered causal structure of cognition of intention would collapse.

Context and the like produce cognition of a condition pervaded by the speaker's intention; through that medium apprehension of intention is possible.

In a bahuvrihi usage such as "bring Citragu"—"bring the person possessing variegated cows"—the expressed meaning, the variegated cows, cannot be related to the action of bringing.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Eastern Experientialists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 6/18

The Easterners say that here only the speaker's intention toward the expressed meaning is inapplicable and therefore the owner possessing the variegated cows is taken as the secondary meaning.

But such a secondary meaning cannot be determined without contextual intention that the action of bringing relate to the cow-owner.

In fact, in cases of secondary signification, absence of expectancy may also accompany inapplicability of relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Eastern Experientialists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 7/18

In "the village is in the Ganges", the expectancy of a village for a solid substratum is not satisfied by the stream-form Ganges.

In "the umbrella-bearers are going", group movement is not exhausted by the explicitly expressed umbrella-bearers; the remaining group members too are expected.

But inapplicability of relation and absence of expectancy are not both jointly causes of secondary signification, because sometimes secondary signification is possible when only one is present.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Eastern Experientialists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 8/18

If their general form is taken, it becomes too broad.

Therefore inapplicability of a fit relation of the primary denoted meaning is the decisive cause.

Recollection of the secondary meaning is then produced by the secondary word through its known relation to the primary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Eastern Experientialists

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 9/18

From the word Ganges, the water-stream is first recalled; knowing its relation to the bank, the bank is recalled.

Thus the word Ganges is not a direct cause of the secondary meaning, but an indirect cause through cognition of the primary meaning.

This view of the Easterners is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Eastern Experientialists; Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 10/18

If the word "Ganges" does not refer to the bank, the locative case meaning of substrateness cannot be related to the bank.

A case ending relates its case-role meaning to the stem-meaning; therefore in "gangayam" the secondary bank must be apprehended through the stem.

If the case meaning is related to a secondary meaning merely indicated by the primary stem-meaning, irregular over-extension and disorder of sequence would result.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 11/18

To admit a separate capacity in case endings to generate relation with possible secondary meanings would be extremely burdensome.

Therefore secondary signification, as the known relation between the expressed Ganges-meaning and the indicated bank, is the cause of recollection of the bank from the word Ganges.

There is no need to admit a separate primary power of the word Ganges concerning the bank.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 12/18

It may be objected that if the secondary word is not itself the direct cause of cognition of relation with the secondary meaning, unity and authority of the sentence "gangayam ghosah" would be destroyed.

Reply: because the sentence is uttered by a trustworthy speaker, its authority remains; bank-secondary-signification together with the primary meaning of Ganges is included in the unity of that sentence.

The group of words collectively produces cognition of semantic relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 13/18

There is a subtle difference between an expressing word and a secondary word.

An expressing word is a direct cause of cognition of relation among its meanings; a secondary word is an indirect cause of cognition of relation with the secondary meaning through the primary meaning.

Nevertheless, both are parts of the causal complex of sentence cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 14/18

The new logicians say that a secondary word too is a cause of cognition of relation among word-meanings.

But this does not make the secondary meaning the denoted meaning of the word; the secondary meaning is known as related to the primary meaning, without a separate primary power.

The word Ganges denotes the water-stream; through the relation of that denoted meaning to the bank, cognition of the bank arises.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 15/18

The Mimamsakas in some cases admit secondary signification preceded by convention.

In "feed the people staying in the mandapa", the conventional meaning of mandapa is a particular building; although an etymological meaning such as "one who drinks manda" may be possible from the components,

in practice cognition of the people in the building arises through the conventional meaning and secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 16/18

It is not proper to say that convention completely destroys recollection of the etymological meaning.

Convention does not erase an etymological meaning once recalled; it prevents its use in cognition of sentence relation.

If context is favorable to the etymological meaning, the meanings of the components may again be recalled and connected.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 17/18

Exclusion of an etymological meaning does not mean disappearance of recollection, but rejection of that meaning from sentence relation.

Components may recall the etymological meaning, but because the conventional meaning of the compound is fit, that meaning enters sentence meaning.

A secondary word does not directly denote the secondary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Cause of secondary signification and Eastern views · 18/18

Cognition of the secondary meaning arises on the basis of the conventionally expressed primary meaning; for this reason secondary signification is a distinct semantic function, not primary power.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests the roles of contextual knowledge, intention, and case endings in retrieving a secondary meaning.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Eastern View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 1/21

It may be said that the word "mandapa" is used for a particular building, but such a usage cannot arise merely from the etymological powers of its components.

Therefore conventional power should be admitted in the compound and component-power regarded as inhibited; otherwise the meaning "one who drinks manda" would necessarily arise.

But this view is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 2/21

In an expression such as "the curd mixed with boiled milk is for the Visvedevas, and the essence of that curd is for the Vajins", the word "Vajin" through component etymology conveys the Visvedevas as those who take the essence of curd as food.

Although Vajin is conventionally established for horse, contextually guided etymology yields the Visvedeva meaning.

Therefore the presence of conventional power does not everywhere inhibit component-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 3/21

Context, semantic fitness, and intention can allow cognition of the etymological meaning to enter sentence meaning.

Only where the etymological meaning is not in use and the conventional meaning alone is suitable does convention become predominant.

The objection is that if in "vajibhyah vajinam" the word Vajin abandons its conventional horse-meaning and denotes the Visvedevas through etymology,

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 4/21

the established doctrine that the Visvedevas are the deities of this curd would become unstable; convention excludes the etymological meaning, so horses would instead become the deities.

In the example of a long-eared goat, the word "long-eared" is used through component etymology; but the word Vajin is not generally used in the meaning Visvedevas.

Therefore mere frequency of usage does not decide the etymological meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 5/21

A case ending expresses relation to the meaning of the whole word.

If the compound conveys the conventional meaning horse, relational cognition would concern horses, not the Visvedevas known from the components.

Yet component-derived meanings such as agent, birth, and the like are also observed to enter relations in context; the possibility of relational cognition with the meaning "one who drinks manda" likewise remains.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 6/21

It may be said that cognition of relation involving the component-derived meaning, because it depends on semantic fitness and the like, arises later, while cognition of relation involving the conventional meaning arises quickly.

Reply: even if relational cognition involving the etymological meaning is later, its recollective cognition may be present in time and assist sentence cognition.

In "bring the pankaja", first agency from the suffix, then the action of birth, and finally cognition of bringing the lotus born in mud may arise in sequence.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 7/21

If relational cognition of an etymological meaning with established meanings is admitted as possible, both conventional and component meanings may be connected.

Since cognition of relation involving the conventional meaning itself may depend on recollection of other meanings, it too can sometimes be delayed.

Therefore it is not established that convention completely removes component-power.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Component-Power Is Not Inhibited

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 8/21

The objection is that because the compound has one power while recollection of the powers of the components is multiple, convention of the compound is recalled more quickly; therefore convention is stronger than etymology.

But this is not necessary.

Recollection of compound-power is one cognition, and recollection of the relations among the meanings of the component-group can also be one collective cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 9/21

The siddhantin replies that ordinarily, on hearing "mandapa", the conventional meaning of a particular building is recalled quickly; only afterwards are component meanings such as manda, drinking, agent, and so forth recalled in sequence.

Relative strength of convention and etymology is determined by this rapidity and delay.

But if context awakens the impression of an etymological meaning, that meaning can be recalled first.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 10/21

In the context "Agni with the Vasus, Soma with the Rudras, Indra with the Maruts, Varuna with the Adityas, and Brhaspati with the Visvedevas",

the etymological meaning "all the gods" of Visvedeva is rapidly recalled, not the conventional class-meaning involving Pururavas, Madravas, and others.

Similarly, in a mantra concerning the essence of curd, the contextual etymological meaning of Vajin, "one who takes the essence of curd as food", is rapidly recalled; the conventional horse-meaning is not.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 11/21

Convention is stronger than etymology only when both meanings are recalled together or both receive equal contextual support.

If a special context completes only the causal complex for the etymological meaning, that meaning alone becomes stronger.

The objection is that in sentence cognition only word-produced recollection of component meanings should be useful, not context-produced recollection, because cognition of an unrelated context is not a reason for relational cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 12/21

Reply: context itself awakens the impressions of component meanings, and with the assistance of those awakened impressions the word produces recollection of the etymological meaning.

Thus recollection of the etymological meaning arises with the assistance of the word; because no cause awakening the conventional impression is present, recollection of the conventional meaning does not arise.

In an ordinary usage such as "feed the people in the mandapa", when no special etymological context is present the conventional building-meaning is rapidly recalled;

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 13/21

therefore people in the building are understood through convention followed by secondary signification.

When a special context related to etymology is present, the etymological meaning is recalled and no secondary signification is necessary.

In sentences concerning priests who perform Saman-chanting, a repeated word may relate both to a conventional designation and an etymological meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 14/21

If context equally assists both, the more rapidly recalled conventional meaning is stronger; therefore translation or secondary signification based on convention is adopted.

The Naiyayikas say that even if the conventional meaning is recalled quickly, if it is unfit for the sentence meaning it does not enter relation;

the meanings of the components are recalled through etymological power and, because they are fit, enter relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 15/21

Since cognition of relation with the conventional meaning is absent, it does not block the etymological meaning.

In "feed the people in the mandapa", the word is intended to refer to the people in the building; the conventional building-meaning is fit and through secondary signification connects with the people.

The component meaning "one who drinks manda" is unfit and therefore does not enter relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 16/21

Conversely, in a bahuvrihi such as "bring the long-eared goat", the component meaning is fit; even if the expression has some conventional meaning elsewhere, the meanings of the components relate to the goat.

Therefore convention removes etymology only where the two meanings conflict and the conventional meaning is fit for sentence meaning.

The objection that, in apprehending intention, meanings of the components must be grasped twice—first in relation to one another and later in relation to sentence meaning—

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 17/21

does not constitute burdensome complexity, because the causal complex of semantic relation naturally operates in this sequence.

There is no need to admit a separate secondary reason for cognition of intention.

There is no evidence that recollection of the conventional meaning inhibits cognition of relation involving the etymological meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Component meanings and conventional strength · 18/21

Convention excludes the etymological meaning only in cases where the two conflict; not in non-conflicting examples such as "long-eared goat."

The real meaning of saying that convention removes the etymological meaning is this: because the conventional meaning is fit, cognition of its relation arises, whereas cognition of relation involving an unfit etymological meaning does not.

It does not mean that even a fit etymological meaning is blocked merely by recollection of the conventional meaning; recollection of an unrelated conventional meaning does not inhibit cognition of a relation involving a fit etymological meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 19/21

Therefore there is no universal rule that secondary signification must always be preceded by convention.

When external evidence fixes the speaker's intention on a secondary meaning related to the conventional meaning, secondary signification preceded by convention may be accepted.

When context supports the etymological meaning and opposes the conventional one, the etymological meaning should be taken.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 20/21

For example, in a sentence concerning a Rathakara who preserves fire during the rainy season, the word "Rathakara" rapidly recalls the conventionally established special caste; hence the conventional meaning is taken.

But if a particular context conveys skilled chariot-makers belonging to the three higher classes, the etymological meaning enters the relation.

Abandonment of part of a word's meaning is not unnecessary; to avoid a serious defect, the part of an authoritative sentence that is compatible with its meaning is accepted and the incompatible part rejected.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Component meanings and conventional strength · 21/21

Since this does not make the sentence wholly fruitless, authoritative language can determine meaning in this way.

KEY INSIGHT

The mandapa and Vajin cases contrast etymological component powers with more quickly recalled conventional meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Convention Is Stronger Than Etymology

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 1/10

For this reason, in the sentence "one should give two golden mirrors to the Adhvaryu", the word Adhvaryu rapidly conveys by convention a particular priest.

Ownership of the mirrors is scripturally appropriate only for that Adhvaryu priest; the phrase "should give" merely reinforces the prescription.

Participation of other priests is not opposed to sacrificial fees, but special ownership of the mirrors is assigned to the Adhvaryu.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Primary Character of the Conventional Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 2/10

The objection is that in "one who desires heaven should sacrifice", the etymological meaning of "one desiring heaven" applies also to women and Sudras, so they too would acquire eligibility.

Reply: because Vedic study is prohibited for them, the expression is here restricted to members of the three higher classes who desire heaven, excluding women and Sudras.

In this restriction the word-meaning is not wholly abandoned; desire for heaven belongs to members of the three higher classes too.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Primary Character of the Conventional Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 3/10

An obstructing means of knowledge merely limits the extension of the general etymological meaning.

The case of the word Rathakara differs.

In a particular context, if the conventional caste meaning is not taken, there may appear to be a defect of completely abandoning the word-meaning; yet because the sentence is authoritative, the etymological meaning is accepted where necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Primary Character of the Conventional Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 4/10

Opposition to only part of the meaning is more economical than opposition to the whole meaning.

Like primary power, secondary signification is a semantic function of a word, but it is not primary denotative power.

In "the village is on the bank of the deep river", secondary signification should be admitted in either "river" or "deep", not both; the indicated bank is neither itself the river nor depth.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Primary Character of the Conventional Meaning; Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 5/10

If separate secondary significations were admitted in both words, there would be no determinant of their relation and needless complexity would result.

One secondary signification is sufficient; the mutual relation of the primary meanings has already been fixed in the sentence.

Alternatively, the word river recalls the bank through its own relation, while the word deep delimits that indicated bank as related to a deep river.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 6/10

Thus secondary signification should be admitted in a particular word, not in the sentence as a whole.

If sentence-level secondary signification were admitted, the sentence would have to be assigned an independent meaning and power, even though the words themselves produce cognition of relations among their meanings.

For economy, word-level secondary signification is proper.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 7/10

The new thinkers say that a sentence is not an independent meaning-denoting entity distinct from its words; therefore there is no question of sentence-level secondary signification.

A meaning known as related to the primary denoted meaning should be apprehended through secondary signification of a word.

The objection is that only the sentence expresses relation among meanings; separate words state their meanings, while the collection states the relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 8/10

Reply: the collection of words is not itself a denoter of a distinct meaning; each word is a cause of cognition of its own meaning as participating in relation.

In "the village is on the bank of the deep river", the locative case ending expresses the substratum-relation of the village to the bank secondarily indicated by the word river.

If sentence-level secondary signification were admitted, there would be no rule connecting the case meaning to the secondary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 9/10

Word-level secondary signification is more economical.

From the word river comes the bank; from deep, the bank's relation to the deep river; and from the case ending, substrateness with respect to the village.

In this sequence the sentence meaning is established.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional meaning and a single Lakṣaṇā · 10/10

No separate secondary power of the sentence is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The debate treats ritual terms, eligibility, and why a single secondary signification suffices in a sentence.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is a Function of a Word

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Final examples and formal conclusion · 1/4

In the sentence "the dust of the foot of a one-year-old calf takes the seventh step", the foot itself does not take a step; therefore secondary signification should be admitted in the word "step".

The word "seventh" is related not to the dust of the foot but to the step.

First the relation between seventh and step is known, and then the secondary meaning of the word step—the calf's foot—is apprehended.

KEY INSIGHT

The last examples examine a calf's step and the sacrificial-cake vessel before the explicit closure of word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Final Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Final examples and formal conclusion · 2/4

There is no need for secondary signification in the entire sentence.

Similarly, in the sentence "one scatters husks with the vessel of the sacrificial cake", the sacrificial-cake vessel is the vessel whose purpose is to cook the cake.

An object qualified by one purpose does not at the same time expect another unrelated purpose; therefore a special meaning concerning the relevant purpose is taken in relation to the word vessel.

KEY INSIGHT

The last examples examine a calf's step and the sacrificial-cake vessel before the explicit closure of word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Final Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Final examples and formal conclusion · 3/4

In "a vessel for the sacrificial cake", secondary signification is not necessary merely to express that the vessel is a substrate.

The word "sacrificial cake" conveys a substrate having the purpose of cooking it, while "vessel" conveys vesselhood.

Secondary signification should be admitted only in the word whose primary meaning is inapplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

The last examples examine a calf's step and the sacrificial-cake vessel before the explicit closure of word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Final Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Final examples and formal conclusion · 4/4

Thus ends the Doctrine of Word-Power in the fourth chapter of the Verbal-Testimony Section.

KEY INSIGHT

The last examples examine a calf's step and the sacrificial-cake vessel before the explicit closure of word-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Final Conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

When does a word need secondary signification?

Competing proposals

- Eastern scholars attribute much to contextual recollection or the inapplicability of speaker intention.
- Etymological components may be proposed as always available even where conventional word-use dominates.
- Some accounts needlessly multiply semantic operations across two words in a single sentence.

The closing Naiyāyika distinction

- The source holds that sentence relations and case endings require an appropriately cognized meaning of the word-stem.
- Convention can prevail over component etymology by speed and salience of established recollection.
- Lakṣaṇā is a word-function distinct from primary denotation, and one well-placed secondary function may suffice.

The English text explicitly closes the Doctrine of Word-Power before beginning the separate Doctrine of Compounds.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Lakṣaṇā, Context and the Conclusion of Word-Power

Conditions

Context, fitness, and relations govern secondary cognition.

Convention

Established usage can outweigh etymological component interpretation.

Economy

Do not posit multiple secondary powers without explanatory need.

Formal ending


The Doctrine of Word-Power ends; the Doctrine of Compounds comes next.

The discussion continues within the next section of the original translated book.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Third-entity meaning · Citragu · component words · genitive relation and grammatical correctness

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Bahuvrīhi and Tatpuruṣa Compounds

1

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is re

2

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika repl

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound;

3

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possessi

4

Correctness without a new compound-powe

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation f

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 1/10

In the bahuvrihi expression "bring Citragu"—"bring the person possessing variegated cows"—a third entity, the cow-owner, distinct from the expressed meaning "variegated cows", is understood as related to the action of bringing.

Therefore secondary signification should be admitted in the entire sentence with respect to a third entity different from the expressed meaning.

An alternative view is that in the bahuvrihi analysis "whose cows are variegated", the omitted relative pronoun "whose" conveys the third entity,

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View: Secondary Signification Is in the Sentence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 2/10

namely the owner possessing the variegated cows; just as in "see the curd" an omitted accusative conveys objecthood.

Therefore sentence-level secondary signification is unnecessary.

But if the case meaning is absent in the relative pronoun, how will the relation be cognized as a qualifier?

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View: Secondary Signification Is in the Sentence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 3/10

In "whose cows are variegated", the nominative meaning cannot directly connect with the action of bringing.

In "bring the person possessing variegated cows", relation to bringing is impossible unless the owner is apprehended together with objecthood.

Grammarians accept only a nominative analysis in the decomposition of a bahuvrihi; recollection of an omitted accusative pronoun is not necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View: Secondary Signification Is in the Sentence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 4/10

If pronouns were recalled on the ground that they have permanent relations, an unexpressed pronoun would have to be supplied in every bahuvrihi.

And the supplied accusative would connect its meaning objecthood with the cows that are brought, not with the owner, because a case ending connects its meaning with its stem-meaning.

Therefore, in order to express objecthood of the third entity, secondary signification must be admitted in the bahuvrihi expression.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Prima Facie View: Secondary Signification Is in the Sentence

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 5/10

The prima facie view says that if secondary signification of the third entity is admitted in a bahuvrihi sentence,

use of the relative pronoun becomes unnecessary because the bahuvrihi compound itself expresses the owner distinct from the expressed meaning.

But it cannot be said that the relative pronoun is merely for grammatical correctness like a feminine suffix; a bahuvrihi form can arise even without a feminine suffix.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Sentence-Secondary-Signification View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 6/10

The analysis "whose cows are variegated" conveys the third entity of the bahuvrihi; this is not merely a statement of grammatical correctness.

If the bahuvrihi already denotes the third entity, the pronoun is redundant; if it does not, the pronoun is necessary.

The divided view that the word "variegated" denotes variegated cows and the word "cow" secondarily denotes the owner possessing them is also incoherent;

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Sentence-Secondary-Signification View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 7/10

one word would then become pointless, or two secondary significations would have to be admitted in two words.

In fact, the words "variegated" and "cow" first produce cognition of the relation among their own meanings; thereafter the word cow, through the relation of the variegated cows, conveys the owner secondarily.

The word variegated remains a denoter merely of variegatedness.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Sentence-Secondary-Signification View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 8/10

In a bahuvrihi, secondary signification is in a word, not in the whole sentence.

Some Eastern scholars say that the word variegated qualifies the meaning of the adjacent word cow, after which the word cow secondarily indicates the owner possessing the variegated cows.

In this way cognition of the third entity arises through "secondary signification of an already indicated meaning."

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Sentence-Secondary-Signification View; Refutation of the View of Some Eastern Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 9/10

But this view is not proper.

To admit another secondary signification in an already indicated meaning is inferior to and more burdensome than admitting direct secondary signification in one word.

In a bahuvrihi, the meanings of the components too relate to the action; in "bring the long-eared goat", length, ear, and goat are qualifiers of the individual that is the object of bringing.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Some Eastern Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Bahuvrīhi and the third-entity problem · 10/10

The traditional view is that the third entity is apprehended through non-abandoning secondary signification without discarding the denoted meanings of the components.

The compound Citragu conveys the owner possessing variegated cows, while the meanings variegated and cow remain as qualifiers.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponent and the Naiyāyika debate whether the owner named by Citragu is reached by sentence-level or word-level secondary signification.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the View of Some Eastern Scholars

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 1/9

The Eastern grammarians say that the compound Citragu is a unified word in which the separate distinction between component words and their meanings disappears after compounding.

The whole compound acquires denotative power with respect to the third entity; the etymological meanings of the components remain mutually related, but they need not be abandoned.

In "feed the people in the mandapa", the etymological component meaning "one who drinks manda" is first left aside and the conventional building-meaning of the compound is taken.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the Eastern Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 2/9

In a bahuvrihi the third entity is regularly conveyed; therefore it is proper to admit power of the whole compound with respect to the third entity rather than secondary signification.

Speaker's intention is regularly fixed only on the third entity; regular cognition of an intended meaning is impossible without power.

The answer to the objection that ordinary bahuvrihis may sometimes not intend the third entity while Vedic bahuvrihis require regular denotation is that in practice the third entity is precisely the principal object of use of the compound.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the Eastern Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 3/9

The Naiyayikas say that a separate power of the compound with respect to the third entity is unnecessary.

The powers of the components remain intact; the word cow secondarily conveys the owner through relation to the variegated cows.

Speaker's intention can be established through secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the Eastern Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 4/9

Some other grammarians say that a merely non-denotative secondary expression is insufficient; in a bahuvrihi compound the third entity must clearly be admitted as the denoted meaning.

The Naiyayikas reply that the speaker's intention is established through secondary signification even without a separate power in the compound.

In a bahuvrihi, secondary signification is not in the sentence but in a word.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Grammarian View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 5/9

A bahuvrihi compound sometimes has intention toward the expressed meaning or the third entity and sometimes not; therefore it is improper always to admit power with respect to the third entity.

The grammarian says that the two components of a bahuvrihi are governed by a rule of intending the third entity; therefore power should be admitted either in both words or in the compound.

The Naiyayika replies that regular intention toward the third entity is established through secondary signification preceded by convention; a separate power in the compound is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Grammarian View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 6/9

The new grammarians say that if a bahuvrihi compound does not denote the third entity but only indicates it secondarily, why does the compound take the gender of the substantive denoting the indicated entity?

There is a rule that a secondary word does not abandon its original gender; hence power with respect to the third entity must be admitted in the bahuvrihi.

The Naiyayika reply is that a bahuvrihi compound regularly functions as an adjective; therefore it takes the gender, number, and case of the substantive it qualifies.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the New Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 7/9

In many cases a co-referential adjective takes the gender of the substantive even while expressing a secondary meaning.

In "the person is staff-bearing", the word "staff-bearing", used in the sense of a person possessing a staff, takes masculine gender with the word person.

In "the cloth is white", the word white, though denoting whiteness, takes neuter gender with cloth.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the New Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 8/9

Therefore agreement in gender does not establish power with respect to the third entity.

A bahuvrihi has no independent rule of gender; it has the form of an adjectival expression.

Mere adjectivality properly causes it to take the gender of the substantive.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the New Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarian views and the Naiyāyika reply · 9/9

Therefore for economy secondary signification should be admitted in bahuvrihi, not a separate power with respect to the third entity.

KEY INSIGHT

Eastern and newer grammarians propose a separate power of the whole compound; the reply preserves the component powers and adjectival agreement.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Reply of the New Grammarians

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 1/10

In a genitive tatpurusa such as "rajapurusa"—"the king's man"—the prior member rajan, through convention-based secondary signification, conveys the genitive relation; this produces cognition of a man related to the king.

There is no need to admit a separate power in the whole compound.

Some say that a compound word is not different from its component words; therefore a separate power in the compound is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king’s chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power in Tatpurusa Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 2/10

But the component words and the compound are distinct acoustic entities; hence mere argument from identity is not decisive.

The question is how the prior member can secondarily convey relation when the genitive ending is absent.

Reply: if relational meaning were not taken, in rajapurusa the king qualified by kingship would merely qualify the man, without determining the type of relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power in Tatpurusa Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 3/10

In a sentence of bringing, a genitive relation is needed for connecting the man, as object, with the king.

In "bring the king's chariot" cognition of the king as owner of the chariot likewise arises through secondary signification of relation.

When the directly expressed king-qualified person is inapplicable to the action of bringing, or because of inapplicability of the speaker's intention, the prior member secondarily indicates the relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power in Tatpurusa Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 4/10

The objection is that the relational meaning is automatically known as a qualifier of sentence cognition, so neither secondary signification nor compound-power is needed.

Reply: when the two stem meanings king and man are combined, there is no rule that an unexpressed genitive relation automatically becomes a qualifier.

Why should a meaning not expressed by any word qualify the sentence meaning?

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power in Tatpurusa Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 5/10

Therefore secondary signification of relation in the prior member is necessary.

Some scholars say that a tatpurusa compound is formed with the meaning of its genitive analysis; in "rajnah purusah" an omitted or remembered genitive ending recalls the relational meaning.

Therefore neither secondary signification in the prior member nor a separate power in the compound is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Power in Tatpurusa Compounds; The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 6/10

This view is not proper.

When one hears "bring the king's man", it is not necessary that the genitive analytic phrase have previously been heard or remembered.

In grammar the analytic expression merely explains the compound's meaning; it is not a cause of every verbal cognition.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 7/10

Optional rules of compounding and analytic expressions state alternative grammatical forms having the same meaning.

The objection is that compound and analytic expression are said to be synonymous; since the analytic expression has primary power, the compound too should have primary power.

Reply: synonymy can also arise through secondary signification; every synonymous expression need not possess the same semantic function.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 8/10

The obligatoriness of some bahuvrihi compounds and optionality of tatpurusa are differences of grammatical prescription.

There is no rule that a secondary word is incapable of conveying meaning.

A corrupt form such as "gavi" may produce meaning-cognition while not being a grammatically correct primary denoter.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 9/10

Secondary signification recalls a non-primary meaning indirectly through primary power; no separate grammatical prescription of word-power is necessary for this.

It may be said that derivational grammar is merely a rule of usage, and that rules of secondary signification too should be accepted; in "gangayam" only the locative form, not the word Ganges, should be taken secondarily.

Reply: the locative ending denotes substrateness both in "gangayam ghosah" and "gangayam snati"; there is no separate rule making it secondary in one sentence and primary in another.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tatpuruṣa and the genitive relation · 10/10

The word Ganges first indicates the bank, after which the locative connects substrateness with that bank.

Therefore in a genitive tatpurusa the prior member secondarily indicates the relational meaning.

There is no need to supplement an omitted case ending or admit a separate power in the whole compound.

KEY INSIGHT

Rajapuruṣa and the king's chariot test how a compound can communicate possession without an overt genitive ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 1/6

We Naiyayikas state our reply.

Derivational grammar gives rules concerning the correctness of correct words.

Grammatical rules are established on the basis of cognition of correctness as it arises in the practice of trustworthy learned persons.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 2/6

Corrupt forms such as "gavi" lack a rule producing cognition of their correctness; compounds, however, are correct, so the correctness of compounded forms is established by grammar.

The denotative capacity of a word is determined only where its meaning cannot be obtained from another source; grammar therefore does not establish rules of denotation.

Grammar teaches the correctness of feminine suffixes such as tap and nip, verbal class markers such as syap and syan, augmental elements such as i, i, and num,

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 3/6

and substitutions such as n for s, even though these components sometimes have no separate meaning.

For this reason grammatical rules such as "use the dual for duality and the singular for unity" are useful for teaching correctness of word-form.

Otherwise such a rule would be pointless if the meaning of the singular were already known from rules concerning jas and others.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 4/6

Grammar teaches that use of the singular for duality is inappropriate; this is not because the singular suffix is intrinsically incapable of expressing duality.

Therefore there is no need to admit separate secondary signification in case endings.

Optative and other suffixes are not prescribed in the meaning of unseen merit; in ordinary non-Vedic usage there is no need to take them secondarily as expressing a result accomplished through action.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 5/6

The instrumental case is prescribed for agent and instrument; it would be incorrect to use secondary signification in it to express objecthood.

Correctness of exceptional usages is established by other grammatical rules.

If there were no rule of compounding, compounded forms in ordinary non-Vedic usage would become incorrect like the corrupt form "gavi".

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Correctness without a new compound-power · 6/6

The rule of optionality establishes the correctness of both compounded and uncompounded usage; it removes the doubt that the analytic sentence is denotative and correct whereas the compound is non-denotative and incorrect.

It cannot be said that because correctness is established, the compound must necessarily have a separate primary denotative power.

Compound meaning can be obtained from another analysis or from relations among word-meanings; grammar establishes correctness of the compounded form, not an independent indivisible power in every compound.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated argument distinguishes grammatical rules of correct formation from a newly posited indivisible semantic power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Prima Facie Objection

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does a compound denote its third entity as a whole?

Positions and objections

- A bahuvrīhi such as Citragu communicates a person owning variegated cows although neither component simply denotes that owner.
- Some grammarians posit an indivisible power in the whole compound; other positions invoke a recalled relative pronoun.
- In a genitive tatpuruṣa such as rajapuruṣa, the missing case ending raises a similar question about the owner–owned relation.

Naiyāyika replies

- The parts first communicate their own meanings and a suitably related word can secondarily signify the owner; sentence-level lakṣaṇā is not required.
- Gender agreement follows the adjectival function of bahuvrīhi; it does not itself prove a new indivisible denotative power.
- The prior tatpuruṣa member can secondarily convey genitive relation while grammatical rules establish the compound's correctness.

Distinguish conventional word-power, secondary signification in a word, and rules of grammatical formation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Bahuvrīhi and Tatpuruṣa Compounds

Bahuvrīhi

The third entity is made known through relation to component meanings.

Alternative

Grammarians argue for an integrated compound-power; Nyāya challenges its necessity.

Tatpuruṣa

Genitive relation can be conveyed without an overt genitive case ending.

Method


Correctness of a form is not automatically proof of a separate primary meaning.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Adjectival agreement · blue lotus · Niṣādasthapati · negation and contextual exclusion

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Karmadhāraya, Genitive and Negative Compounds

1

Adjectival case endings and semantic re

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the

2

Karmadhāraya and co-reference

The blue-lotus analysis treats blueness and lotus as related through their pri

3

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpret

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāray

4

Negative compounds and non-abandoning l

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation fro

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 1/6

It may be objected that in "rajapurusam anaya", king-relation and man cannot be mutually related without a case ending after the adjectival word; how then can cognition of a man related to the king arise from the compound?

A case ending connects its meaning only to the immediately adjacent stem-meaning.

Therefore an independent power expressing a king-related man would have to be admitted in the compound rajapurusam.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 2/6

Even in bahuvrihi and karmadharaya compounds, a compound is considered correct though no case ending follows the adjectival member.

We reply that in an expression such as "bring the blue pot", expectancy and word order alone produce cognition of the qualifier-qualified relation between blueness and pot; the case ending on the adjective is not the cause.

Objecthood of the pot qualified by blueness is known even without a case ending after the adjective.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 3/6

Outside a compound, the case ending on an adjective serves grammatical correctness; its purpose is not to express objecthood.

Therefore there is no need to admit an additional indivisible power in compounds such as rajapurusam or nilaghatam to express a king-related man or blue pot.

Within a compound, usage is correct even though the adjectival member lacks a case ending.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 4/6

In the uncompounded expression the adjective's case ending merely establishes formal correctness, not objecthood of the adjective.

Thus in "bring the king's man", the final form purusam gives cognition of man and objecthood, rajan gives cognition of the king, and expectancy yields cognition of the king-relation.

The objection that king-relation cannot be related to the action of bringing because it is not the object of the case-ending meaning is improper.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 5/6

The case ending attached after compounding conveys objecthood related to all the component meanings of the compound; hence king-relation, as a qualifier of the man, becomes part of the object.

Alternatively, a case ending may be said to connect its meaning with the meaning of the immediately preceding word.

In a bahuvrihi, secondary signification may be admitted in the final member; in a tatpurusa, the primary or secondary meaning of the case ending connects with the final member's meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Adjectival case endings and semantic relations · 6/6

There is no need to admit a separate indivisible power for every compound.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-pot and king's-man cases distinguish grammatical correctness from the semantic role of an adjectival case ending.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Case Ending on an Adjective Is Only for Correctness

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Karmadhāraya and co-reference · 1/3

In a karmadharaya compound such as "nilotpalam anaya"—"bring the blue lotus"—the qualifier-qualified relation between the two stem meanings, blueness and lotus, is known without a case ending after the adjectival member.

The lotus qualified by blueness becomes the object of the action of bringing.

For cognition of relation among the intended stem meanings, neither a second power replacing primary power nor secondary signification is required in any word.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-lotus analysis treats blueness and lotus as related through their primary meanings; it is contrasted with genitive tatpuruṣa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Karmadharaya Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Karmadhāraya and co-reference · 2/3

The objection is that since co-reference of blueness and lotus is cognized, secondary signification would have to be admitted with respect to co-reference.

If co-reference is a qualifier of relation, then in rajapurusam the genitive relation too could be treated as a qualifier of relation and secondary signification in the compound would become unnecessary.

Reply: in karmadharaya, co-reference is merely the relation among the meanings, not a separate substrate or counterpositive of relation; therefore no secondary signification is necessary there.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-lotus analysis treats blueness and lotus as related through their primary meanings; it is contrasted with genitive tatpuruṣa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Karmadharaya Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Karmadhāraya and co-reference · 3/3

But in rajapurusam the king-relation is a relational property connected with the man; hence a secondary semantic function in the prior member or compound may be admitted to apprehend the genitive relation.

Thus in bahuvrihi and tatpurusa compounds, members other than the final member convey another entity or a related meaning, and secondary signification is necessary there.

In a karmadharaya compound all members express their own primary meanings; therefore there is no secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The blue-lotus analysis treats blueness and lotus as related through their primary meanings; it is contrasted with genitive tatpuruṣa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Karmadharaya Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 1/10

For this reason, in a sentence such as "the Nisada-sthapati should sacrifice with this mantra", if Nisadasthapati is taken as a karmadharaya, only the natural primary denotation of the component words is accepted.

But if the genitive tatpurusa meaning "lord of the Nisadas" is taken, secondary signification of the genitive relation must be admitted.

On the karmadharaya interpretation, the word sthapati itself makes known the lord who is a Nisada; the lord belonging to the Nisada caste is regarded as the person qualified for sacrifice.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 2/10

Thus the karmadharaya analysis appears simpler without an additional convention concerning relation to the Nisadas.

The objection is that only a member of the three higher classes who has received Vedic learning and is lord of the Nisadas can be qualified for sacrifice.

Such a person is understood through genitive secondary signification in Nisadasthapati, not an uneducated Nisada lord.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 3/10

From this standpoint it is more economical to admit secondary signification of the genitive relation.

We reply that the primary meaning should not be abandoned in the name of economy.

It is abandoned only when its relation is impossible.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 4/10

On the karmadharaya meaning, ritual eligibility of a Nisada lord is not intrinsically impossible; if prohibitive evidence exists, contextual restriction of the meaning should be accepted.

It cannot be said that mere imagination of an unapprehended secondary meaning blocks relation of the primary meaning.

An unaccepted meaning cannot obstruct the primary meaning merely by being imagined.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 5/10

Otherwise infinitely many unimagined meanings in every sentence would block the primary meaning.

The prohibition of Vedic recitation applies generally to the Sudra community; if a special injunction makes a Nisadasthapati perform a sacrifice, the scope of the general prohibition is determined by that special injunction.

When the word Nisada primarily means the lord who is a Nisada, the general prohibitive use of the word Sudra need not extend to that special individual.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 6/10

Therefore Nisadasthapati should be treated as a karmadharaya and the primary meaning preserved.

To treat it as a genitive tatpurusa, take the meaning "lord of the Nisadas", and then add restriction to a Veda-studying member of the three higher classes is more burdensome.

Some other scholars say that in "nisadasthapatim yajayet" there is no secondary signification of the genitive relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 7/10

The compound Nisadasthapati primarily denotes "lord of the Nisadas" together with the Nisada-relation.

If co-reference in a karmadharaya is admitted as a qualifier of relation, then the genitive relation in a tatpurusa too can be included in the primary meaning as a qualifier of relation.

Apprehension of semantic relation would then be of the same kind in both compounds.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 8/10

There is no authoritative evidence that a genitive relation regularly functions as the substrate or qualifier of a relation.

Therefore karmadharaya and tatpurusa both merely express particular meanings; generally karmadharaya involves stronger co-reference, whereas genitive tatpurusa expects a relational complement.

In Nisadasthapati, the word sthapati expects a relational complement indicating ownership; therefore a genitive tatpurusa analysis may be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 9/10

In nilotpalam, lotus does not expect such a relational complement; hence karmadharaya analysis is sufficient.

But this view is not wholly proper.

In a genitive tatpurusa such as rajavahanam, king-relation is apprehended through secondary signification of the genitive meaning in the prior member; no independent indivisible power is admitted in the compound.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Niṣādasthapati and economy of interpretation · 10/10

Therefore in rajapurusam too, secondary signification of the genitive relation in the prior member is sufficient.

KEY INSIGHT

Rival interpretations of ritual eligibility test whether a primary karmadhāraya reading should yield to a genitive relation.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Economy of Secondary Signification of the Genitive Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 1/8

In an avyayibhava compound such as "upakumbham"—"near the pot"—and a tatpurusa such as "ardhapippali"—"half of the pippali"—the meanings of the prior members, proximity and halfness respectively, are the principal qualifiers.

Secondary signification of a genitive relation is needed in the final words kumbha and pippali; no separate indivisible power in the whole compound is necessary.

In a negative compound such as "abrahmanam anaya"—"bring a person who is not a Brahmin"—the negative particle combines with the noun and expresses exclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 2/8

Cognition of a Brahmin-like person such as a Ksatriya arises through secondary signification based on similarity to the meaning of the final member of the negative compound.

In "aghatah patah"—"this is not a pot; it is cloth"—the negative particle expresses negation or direct prohibition.

It is connected with the word pot; because of co-reference, the cloth is known as the substrate of pot-absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 3/8

In the uncompounded expression "na ghatah patah" too, the negative particle expresses absence of pot.

In "na pacati"—"he does not cook"—and "bhutale na ghatah"—"there is no pot on the ground"—the negative particle, joined with a verb or noun, primarily expresses absence.

A negative compound is sometimes optional; even when no compound is formed, the negative does not abandon its primary meaning of absence.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 4/8

In the injunction "among the sacrifices, one recites the 'ye yajamahe' mantra, but not among the Anuyajas", the negative particle joins the noun Anuyaja and expresses exclusion of the Anuyajas.

The meaning is that the mantra is recited in the principal sacrifices but not in the Anuyajas.

The objection is that here the negative joins not the noun but the action "does" and expresses prohibition; therefore the meaning would be "one should not recite the mantra in the Anuyajas", not exclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 5/8

Reply: compounding is optional; the negative may join the noun and cause apprehension of sacrifices other than the Anuyajas.

Even while preserving its primary negative meaning, cognition of exclusion can arise according to context.

It is not possible to say that because the negative occurs in a sentence it cannot intend exclusion.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 6/8

In "gauh vahikah"—"the bull is a cart-puller"—the word gauh, though occurring in a sentence, receives contextual restriction excluding a particular class.

Similarly, in "nanuyajesu" the negative can join the noun and express exclusion of the Anuyajas.

If the negative expressed only prohibition, the sentence "recite the mantra in the sacrifices, not in the Anuyajas" would divide into two separate sentence meanings, injunction and prohibition, and the unity of the compound would be lost.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 7/8

To preserve the already apprehended unity of the sentence, non-abandoning secondary signification of exclusion should be admitted in the negative particle.

Nevertheless the negative does not wholly abandon its primary meaning of absence; sacrifices other than the Anuyajas are apprehended precisely on the basis of the primary absence.

Therefore non-abandoning secondary signification should be admitted in the negative particle.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Negative compounds and non-abandoning lakṣaṇā · 8/8

The negative particle is not independently used without another word.

If an independent negative word were possible, prohibition could be expressed merely by saying "not", making negative compounds unnecessary.

In a sentence the negative expresses negation or exclusion only by joining another word.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of non-Brahmin, non-cooking and the Anuyājas distinguish negation from contextual exclusion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Negative Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

When is secondary signification necessary in compounds?

Competing claims

- A qualification relation in “blue lotus” has been said to require secondary signification for co-reference.
- The Niṣādasthapati ritual expression is disputed between primary karmadhāraya and genitive tatpuruṣa interpretations.
- Negative expressions can look like a prohibition or an exclusion of a class depending on their syntactic and ritual context.

Source responses

- In karmadhāraya the component words retain their primary meanings; co-reference is not an extra denoted entity.
- The primary Niṣādasthapati meaning should not be displaced merely by a speculative alternative without a genuine semantic obstacle.
- A negative particle primarily expresses absence and may signal an intended exclusion without abandoning that primary sense.

The distinction concerns what a compound itself contributes and how the sentence relates its component meanings.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Karmadhāraya, Genitive and Negative Compounds

Adjectival ending

In “bring the blue pot,” the adjectival case ending serves formal correctness.

Karmadhāraya

The component meanings can be co-referential without lakṣaṇā.

Ritual phrase

The text debates whether Niṣādasthapati is a primary description or a genitive relation.

Negative compounding


Negation and exclusion must be distinguished case by case.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Dhava and khadira · dual suffixes · itaretara and samāhāra · the proposed need for lakṣaṇā

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Dvandva: Number, Association and Secondary Meaning

1

Dvandva and the dual-number problem

The discussion asks how a single dual suffix can relate to dhava and khadira t

2

Why some require secondary significatio

Advocates of lakṣaṇā argue that neither single member independently denotes th

3

Objections and the relation of co-prese

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifyin

4

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; t

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Dvandva and the dual-number problem · 1/4

In an itaretara-dvandva such as "dhavakhadirau chindhi"—"cut both the dhava and khadira trees"—duality expressed by the dual suffix cannot relate to dhava alone or khadira alone.

One object does not satisfy duality; only two objects together can be the substrate of duality.

For this reason, secondary signification is admitted in the word dhava with respect to co-presence or association of dhava and khadira, so that both together may be related to duality.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks how a single dual suffix can relate to dhava and khadira together and contrasts entity-primary with collection-primary compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Dvandva and the dual-number problem · 2/4

The objection is that the joint co-presence of dhava and khadira is one entity, so the singular rather than the dual should occur.

If the word dhava indicates a joint substratum, how can duality again relate separately to dhava and khadira?

Some scholars say that the dual suffix expresses duality of a joint collection serving as the substrate of two objects.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks how a single dual suffix can relate to dhava and khadira together and contrasts entity-primary with collection-primary compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Dvandva and the dual-number problem · 3/4

But the collection is one; it cannot possess duality.

In fact, dhava and khadira as the substrates of co-presence are the principal qualified entities, while co-presence is a secondary delimitor.

Through secondary signification the word dhava conveys the two co-present objects; therefore the dual suffix expresses duality of those two substrates, dhava and khadira.

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks how a single dual suffix can relate to dhava and khadira together and contrasts entity-primary with collection-primary compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Dvandva and the dual-number problem · 4/4

In an itaretara-dvandva the entities themselves are primary, so dual or plural forms are used.

In a samahara-dvandva, co-presence or the collection is primary, so neuter singular is used, as in "bheripataham".

KEY INSIGHT

The discussion asks how a single dual suffix can relate to dhava and khadira together and contrasts entity-primary with collection-primary compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Analysis of Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why some require secondary signification · 1/4

> The qualified entities—that is, the substrates of co-presence—are word-meanings; from one word alone, simultaneous cognition of all meanings of all words at one time cannot arise through primary power.

> One word does not express the meanings of other words; otherwise the other words would be pointless.

> Even a polysemous word does not express many meanings simultaneously in one context; nor do two words, merely by combining, automatically acquire one joint power like a single word.

KEY INSIGHT

Advocates of lakṣaṇā argue that neither single member independently denotes the meanings of both and therefore some association is necessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Necessary in Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why some require secondary signification · 2/4

Therefore secondary signification of co-presence must be admitted in the final member of a dvandva compound.

In plural forms such as "Anga, Vanga, and Kalinga", grammatical rules of suffix elision are possible because the words express joint co-presence.

If each word expressed only its own meaning, the joint relation of the plural suffix could not be established.

KEY INSIGHT

Advocates of lakṣaṇā argue that neither single member independently denotes the meanings of both and therefore some association is necessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Necessary in Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why some require secondary signification · 3/4

In "there are two pots" or "there are many pots", the word pot through its universal power recalls many pot-individuals; dual or plural suffixes relate to those many individuals.

But in dhavakhadirau, secondary signification of co-presence appears necessary to unify the meanings of two different words.

Grammatical rules concerning dvandva compounds likewise express simultaneous relation among the words.

KEY INSIGHT

Advocates of lakṣaṇā argue that neither single member independently denotes the meanings of both and therefore some association is necessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Necessary in Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why some require secondary signification · 4/4

Samahara-dvandva and itaretara-dvandva are different: in the former the collection is primary, in the latter the entities qualified by the collection are primary.

KEY INSIGHT

Advocates of lakṣaṇā argue that neither single member independently denotes the meanings of both and therefore some association is necessary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Necessary in Dvandva Compounds

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 1/8

The objection is that co-presence is merely a collection of the natures of two entities; therefore if one word dhava is made to convey both dhava and khadira simultaneously, there is conflict of two semantic functions.

Moreover, in non-abandoning secondary signification the primary dhava-meaning is not discarded, but dhava and khadira have no single continuous common form.

Nor is there a reason for secondary signification of the word dhava with respect to khadira; dhava and khadira have no intrinsically fixed relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 2/8

If co-presence is the secondary meaning, co-presence is a relation, not an entity.

This objection is not proper.

Co-presence is a condition of common or shared relation to an action; the general relation whereby similar or dissimilar actions terminate in one action-result constitutes such association.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 3/8

In "cut the dhava and khadira", all cutting actions concern both dhava and khadira.

If husband and wife perform different auxiliary actions in a sacrifice, ordinary association of duality is not admitted merely

because there is no identical action-result; their specific participation is apprehended separately according to injunction.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 4/8

In non-abandoning secondary signification the primary meaning is not discarded; the word dhava retains its dhava-meaning but conveys dhava as co-present with khadira.

Association as a relation serves as the delimitor of the secondary meaning.

This is like "the umbrella-bearers are going", where the primary meaning of umbrella-bearers is retained while the whole group is understood.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 5/8

The word khadira is not pointless; it regularly conveys the khadira individual.

The word dhava conveys the dhava individual together with the relation of co-presence.

In an Agni-Soma example, the first word indicates the collective relation while the second expresses its primary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 6/8

Some scholars say that secondary signification should be admitted in the second member of a dvandva compound.

The case ending used with the compound relates its duality or plurality meaning to the meanings of both members; otherwise use of the case ending would be pointless.

In a compound, the case ending follows only the final member, and there is no separate indivisible power in the compound; therefore the final word expresses co-presence with the meaning of the first word together with its own primary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 7/8

For example, in dhavakhadirau the word khadira expresses, together with its primary meaning khadira, khadira co-present with dhava.

The dual suffix expresses duality of the two substrates of this joint meaning, dhava and khadira.

The objection is that if both words express their respective primary meanings together with co-presence, two dhavas and two khadiras—four meanings—would be apprehended.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections and the relation of co-presence · 8/8

Reply: the two words express only the joint co-presence of one dhava and one khadira, not four separate entities.

KEY INSIGHT

The source tests whether a member may retain its primary sense while signifying its association with the other member.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Refutation of the Objection That Secondary Signification Is Inapplicable

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 1/8

Some other scholars hold that the second member of a dvandva causes re-apprehension of the meaning previously known from the first member.

Where primary and secondary meanings connected with one action are separately mentioned, or meanings connected with different actions are mentioned,

dual/plural and dvandva compounding are not possible; dvandva occurs only in the meaning of conjunction, "and."

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 2/8

But when two entities are mutually related and connect with one and the same action, dvandva compounding is possible because of conjunction.

In "cut dhava and khadira", the action of cutting applies equally to both.

In "go to the forest and bring vegetables", the actions differ; therefore there is no dvandva compound.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 3/8

"There is a cow and a horse" too is like independent sentences; it does not convey a specific common association.

Some scholars say that in order to cognize duality the two meanings must be apprehended as objects of one enumeration;

therefore it is more economical to admit secondary signification in the second member with the meaning "two countable entities."

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 4/8

Other scholars refute this: to admit being-an-object-of-enumeration as a separate adjunct is burdensome.

Duality can directly relate to two entities obtained in one recollection.

Therefore the general capacity of the dual suffix is sufficient instead of secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Another View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 5/8

We Naiyayikas reply that two words and their two meanings can be remembered together; therefore secondary signification concerning association is unnecessary merely for recollection of two or more meanings.

Cognition of two words and two meanings in one recollection arises from two pairs of impressions.

This is like group cognition produced by individual sense contacts.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 6/8

If secondary signification were admitted, a separate semantic function simultaneously recalling many meanings would have to be posited in the second member of every dvandva, which is not established by experience.

The dual suffix produces cognition of duality related to the very forms of dhava and khadira recalled from the two words.

This cognition is like cognition of duality of two nearby objects, dhava and khadira, through perception.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 7/8

In such a case no separate collective property of identical action or co-presence need be known beforehand.

The dual suffix can directly connect duality with the forms of the two word-meanings.

The objection is that a word connects its meaning with another word's meaning through a delimitor of semantic fitness; dhava and khadira are fit to connect with duality only as substrates of co-presence, not separately.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative accounts and the Naiyāyika turn · 8/8

Reply: relational cognition occurs among the fit meanings that are present; there is no need to apprehend an additional qualifier "substrates of co-presence."

Just as the word pot conveys a pot and not the additional cognition "a pot distinct from a supported pot", so the meanings dhava and khadira connect directly with duality.

Therefore a separate convention concerning association is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Some interpret the second member through recollection and joint enumeration; the Naiyāyika disputes the need for a new semantic function.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does dhavakhadirau require the word-power of association?

Arguments in favour

- The dual suffix cannot express duality of dhava alone or khadira alone, so some commentators propose a combined substrate.
- One member of the compound is claimed to convey association with the other through non-abandoning secondary signification.
- Samāhāra-dvandva treats a collection as primary, unlike itaretara-dvandva where the members remain principal.

Pressure on those arguments

- If association itself were a single item, the dual-number suffix would still need its two individual substrates.
- Positing the same member meanings again through extra semantic function threatens redundancy and needless complexity.
- The Naiyāyika begins an account in which the two component words can be recalled jointly by their own primary powers.

The source stages rival explanations before giving the more explicit Nyāya conclusion in the following presentation.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Dvandva: Number, Association and Secondary Meaning

Example

Dhavakhadirau: the two tree-names are connected with a dual suffix.

Distinction

Itaretara treats distinct members as primary; samāhāra emphasizes the aggregate.

Debate

Some argue association needs lakṣaṇā; others resist multiplying powers.

Transition


The Naiyāyika response develops joint recollection without secondary association.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Collective recollection · duality without extra lakṣaṇā · coordination and heterogeneous pairs

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Dvandva: Naiyāyika Conclusion and Compound Types

1

No extra collective secondary significa

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the man

2

Association and sentence unity

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combine

3

Why conjunction does not entail compoun

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disp

4

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and marrie

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 1/7

It may be objected that in a dvandva compound relation of the case meaning with meanings simultaneously recalled from two words is impossible.

The rule is that a word and its case ending successively relate to the meaning of another word and to the stem-meaning; many meanings in one word or a joint meaning of two words are not word-meaning.

Therefore secondary signification expressing word-meaning status and co-presence must be admitted in the members of a dvandva.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 2/7

This objection is not proper.

Word-meaning status consists in being indicated by a word or being the object of the speaker's intention through the word.

In a dvandva, many meanings together are objects of the intention of the words; therefore they are word-meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 3/7

Whether cognition of many meanings arises from secondary signification of the second member or from the primary powers of both members does not alter the nature of word-meaning status.

It is unnecessary to define word-meaning as "being indicated by one word."

The meaning of a case ending relates to the stem meanings uttered in the complete sentence, not through a delimitor called "word-meaning status." Therefore duality can relate to both word-meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 4/7

Thus secondary signification imposing word-meaning status or co-presence upon the group of meanings of the compounded words is unnecessary.

A further objection is that a case ending expresses number, and number resides in a substrate delimited by word-meaning status.

Outside dvandva, number connects only with one stem-meaning; therefore in dvandva secondary signification in the final member is needed to make both meanings a common substrate of word-meaning status.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 5/7

Reply: for economy, the case ending can be said to express its number meaning in a co-located substrate delimited by word-meaning status; but this rule does not require a separate secondary signification in the compound.

In "bring two pots and one cloth", duality relates to the pots, not the cloth, because the cloth is not the meaning of the stem bearing the dual ending.

In "cut dhava and khadira", the entire compound dhavakhadira is the stem bearing the case ending; therefore duality relates to both dhava and khadira in their own forms.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 6/7

If it is said that a case ending connects number with only one meaning, the word "only" is unnecessary in the rule.

If relation of number with many meanings is regarded as unfit, the grammatical rule of dvandva itself establishes an exception.

The two forms dhava and khadira are delimited by word-meaning status; therefore no secondary signification is needed for relation of duality.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

No extra collective secondary signification · 7/7

The sentence produces one unified cognition: cutting dhava and khadira qualified by duality.

KEY INSIGHT

The Naiyāyika argues that a case ending relates its number directly to the many component meanings in the same compound.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Collective Secondary Signification Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Association and sentence unity · 1/5

It cannot be said that "dhavakhadirau chindhi" fails to be one sentence because the meanings dhava and khadira would relate separately to the action of cutting and create sentence division.

Even if secondary signification were admitted, the entities ultimately relate separately to the action of cutting; there is no one universal co-presence already present in the actions.

Nevertheless, because dhava and khadira delimited by duality possess joint objecthood, the sentence produces one unified meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combined cognition needs an independent association-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification of Association Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Association and sentence unity · 2/5

Grammatical rules concerning elision of plural suffixes in patronymic expressions meaning "descendants of the king" serve collective cognition; they do not make secondary signification of association indispensable in every word.

In a long uncompounded sentence such as "a spot on the moon, poverty in the virtuous, deformity in a lotus-faced woman...",

many words are remembered together but there is no associative compound; the meaning of each word connects with its own action-relation.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combined cognition needs an independent association-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification of Association Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Association and sentence unity · 3/5

In a dvandva, even if co-presence is not previously established, the dual suffix and verb together produce one unified cognition of

the relation of similar or dissimilar actions —like the combined result of "cut dhava and khadira" or "cut dhava and cut khadira."

Therefore association need not first be known through secondary signification in dhava and khadira.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combined cognition needs an independent association-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification of Association Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Association and sentence unity · 4/5

After cognition of duality, the case ending and verb produce relation of both to the action.

The objection is that unless the first word collectively conveys multiple meanings, how can elision of plural suffixes or relation of plurality occur?

Reply: many meanings can be objects of one recollection; no additional secondary signification of association in the word-group is necessary.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combined cognition needs an independent association-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification of Association Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Association and sentence unity · 5/5

The Naiyayika conclusion is that the combined cognition of duality, plurality, and action-relation applies directly to meanings recalled through the primary powers of the words.

Therefore secondary signification of association need not be accepted.

KEY INSIGHT

Examples of cutting two trees and several unrelated items test whether combined cognition needs an independent association-power.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Secondary Signification of Association Is Not Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 1/9

It cannot be said that a dvandva compound is obligatory whenever two meanings connected with the same action are separately mentioned.

When they are mentioned successively, there is no compound, as in "Caitra will go; Maitra too will go." Nor is there a dvandva when two meanings are related to different actions.

Suppose that in separate mention the two meanings possess co-presence involving the same action.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 2/9

The resulting cognition would be "two persons whose action is the same are going", not the specific cognition "Caitra and Maitra are going" involving duality of those individuals.

Case endings and verbal roots relate their respective meanings to the meanings of the words.

In "Caitra and Maitra are going", the action of going does not apply by one relation to the group of two persons; it applies separately to each individual.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 3/9

Therefore there would be a conflict in taking one person both as an individual agent and then as a member of a group with Maitra.

It cannot be said that the root meaning going separately connects with Caitra and Maitra through the component words while the words are unified by association.

Then the unwanted meaning "Caitra goes together with Maitra" would arise.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 4/9

If each action is separate, the meaning duality of agents cannot be related to the action of the verbal suffix.

One plural verbal suffix can relate generally to many agents, but the obligatoriness of dvandva compounding does not follow from that.

Some scholars say that in "the Gargyas eat", the verbal suffix expresses plurality related to the eating-action.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 5/9

But this view is not proper; grammatical co-reference between noun and verb would collapse because the individual eating-actions themselves are not substrates of plurality.

Duality and plurality can relate through primary power to many individuals recalled from separate words or one general word.

No indivisible co-presence of identical actions is necessary for this relation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 6/9

Another view says that association is not relation to the same action but joint apprehension of two entity-forms distinct from one another.

Though the word dhava expresses one meaning, it indicates the two forms dhava and khadira; duality relates to those two forms.

This view too is improper.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 7/9

Many meanings can be known in one recollection produced by the primary powers of many words; duality relates directly to those meanings.

Secondary signification of association is unnecessary.

In "two pots" or "many pots", the word pot through universal power expresses many pot-individuals; duality or plurality relates to those individuals.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 8/9

No prior cognition "the pots are a group possessing the same action" is necessary.

Cognition of co-presence of identical actions cannot occur before cognition of numerical relation.

Therefore to base the relation of number on that co-presence would involve mutual dependence.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why conjunction does not entail compounding · 9/9

In conclusion, duality or plurality relates through primary power to many word-meanings; secondary signification concerning association is unnecessary.

KEY INSIGHT

The source contrasts compound use with successive independent clauses and disputes a required common identity of action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Dvandva Is Inapplicable to Mere Conjunction

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 1/7

Grammarians say that a neuter singular samahara-dvandva expresses a collection or aggregate; many objects become one aggregate or one unit under a common property, like an army, a forest, or a counted unit such as "five bundles."

In an irregular or dissimilar dvandva where only one word remains, as in "pitarau" meaning mother and father, the word pitr is secondarily used in the sense of the parental pair.

The dual suffix relates to the dissimilar mother and father together.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 2/7

In "svasurau", the pair father-in-law and mother-in-law who are parents of husband or wife, and in "brahmanau", a male and female Brahmin pair, are apprehended from context and grammatical rule.

The masculine form merely repeats the gender of the principal member.

In "sivau namaskuryat", the pair Siva and Parvati is intended, so sivau is a dissimilar dvandva.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 3/7

Depending on context, bhratarau may express brother and sister, and putrau son and daughter; if a combined male-female intention is not known, these forms will express merely two brothers or two sons.

Thus the meanings of homogeneous and heterogeneous dvandvas are determined by context, gender rules, and speaker's intention.

Secondary signification is admitted in a heterogeneous dvandva.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 4/7

It may be objected that in "ksaumavasanau agnim adadhiyatam"—"the linen-clad pair should establish the fire"—the dual word vasanau requires a second person for cognition of the pair.

The word-meaning is limited to a male, and there is no separate evidence expressing a female; therefore the meaning should be two men, not husband and wife.

If cognition of the woman arises from another means of knowledge, the grammatical rule for heterogeneous dvandva "a male with a female" would become pointless; the basis for expressing the woman would already exist.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 5/7

And if the dual merely repeats masculine gender in the stem, cognition of the woman would not arise.

This objection is not proper.

In establishment of the fire, the wife is necessary as companion of the husband under the prescription "an action to be performed by the

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 6/7

married pair is performed by the husband together with his wife." Therefore admitting a second unrelated man would split the sentence.

The dual suffix repeats the masculine gender of the stem, but not merely maleness as a component of meaning.

The stem meaning of vasanau is the man who cohabits with a woman, that is, the husband; on that basis the wife is apprehended together with him.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Grammarians, mixed pairs and the formal close · 7/7

Therefore ksaumavasanau, as a heterogeneous dvandva, expresses husband and wife.

Thus ends the Doctrine of Compounds in the Verbal-Testimony Section.

Gangesopadhyaya.

KEY INSIGHT

The final discussion treats collections, parent-pairs, Śiva–Pārvatī and married ritual partners before formally ending the Doctrine of Compounds.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Grammarians' View; Thus ends the Doctrine of Compounds in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacin

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How do two expressed meanings yield one numbered cognition?

The rejected additions

- Some posit an added semantic function for word-meaning status, association or a shared action before duality can apply.
- Another approach makes any two entities with one action necessarily form a dvandva compound.
- The grammarians distinguish aggregates from pairs with dissimilar gender or semantic composition.

Naiyāyika conclusion

- Two words can produce a single recollection of two meanings; number then directly qualifies those individual objects.
- The case ending and verb establish one sentence cognition without an independent association-power.
- Context and grammatical usage still determine when special heterogeneous pairs such as husband and wife are intended.

The translated section explicitly closes the Doctrine of Compounds before beginning the Doctrine of Finite Verbs.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Dvandva: Naiyāyika Conclusion and Compound Types

Direct relation

Dual and plural suffixes can connect to the meanings of individual component words.

Economy

Do not add a secondary association-power without explanatory need.

Not any conjunction

Independent mentions and distinct actions do not automatically produce a dvandva.

Formal ending


The Compound Doctrine ends; the Doctrine of Finite Verbs follows.

The Doctrine of Compounds ends here; the Doctrine of Finite Verbs follows.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Tiṅ endings · conscious effort · karoti analysis · operation with sentient and insentient subjects

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Finite Verbs: The Ācārya and Bhāṭṭa Views

1

The Ācārya account of tiṅ and effort

The teacher locates conscious effort in the finite ending and treats insentien

2

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather tha

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and ar

3

Two-effort alternatives and primary usa

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ācārya account of tiṅ and effort · 1/3

A finite verbal suffix denotes effort of a conscious agent.

Therefore in usages with an insentient agent, such as "the chariot moves", the finite suffix must be taken secondarily in the meaning of an operation other than effort.

In expressions such as "he cooks", the finite suffix expresses conscious effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The teacher locates conscious effort in the finite ending and treats insentient-agent usages such as “the chariot moves” secondarily.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Acarya's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ācārya account of tiṅ and effort · 2/3

Every finite verbal form can be analyzed with the auxiliary "karoti"—"does"; for example, pacati means "pakam karoti"—

"he performs the act of cooking." In the absence of contrary evidence from the usage of elders, the meaning of the finite suffix is learned from this analysis.

Because the analytic meaning of a samahara-dvandva is obtained from another source, no separate power of the compound is admitted with respect to that meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The teacher locates conscious effort in the finite ending and treats insentient-agent usages such as “the chariot moves” secondarily.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Acarya's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ācārya account of tiṅ and effort · 3⁄3

Followers of Acarya Khandadeva say on this basis that the answer "he cooks" to the question "what is he doing?" is possible only

if the finite verb has effort as part of its meaning; if effort-denotation is denied, the question-answer relation would not fit.

KEY INSIGHT

The teacher locates conscious effort in the finite ending and treats insentient-agent usages such as “the chariot moves” secondarily.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Acarya's View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 1/6

The Bhattas hold that neither finite suffixes nor the auxiliary verb karoti denotes effort.

In expressions such as "the chariot moves", "he knows", "he makes an effort", and "he sleeps", conscious effort favorable to the root-meaning is not found universally, yet finite verbs are used primarily.

Finite suffixes are analyzed by karoti.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 2/6

If karoti is taken to mean operation in general, the same operation can be admitted as the meaning of the finite suffix even in usages with a conscious agent.

It cannot be said that the finite suffix and karoti are secondary usages here; the question "what is he doing?" is answered by "he cooks" or

"he goes." Since a general question about action is properly answered by a particular action, the root kr merely expresses action in general.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 3/6

The objection arises that regarding a pot and a sprout the usages "made" and "not made" occur respectively because of being produced by effort and not produced by effort; and the word "agent" denotes the substrate of effort.

Therefore the root kr should denote effort.

Reply: usages such as "a sprout arose from the seed", "pleasure arose", and "a sprout arose from the garland" occur without reference to effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 4/6

Effort is not necessitated by derivation of the word "agent".

If the root kr denoted effort and the suffix trc denoted agency, the mutual relation between effort and agency would not be established.

No usage of agent is expected in things lacking both production by effort and agency; therefore the meaning of "agent" is determined by conventional assignment.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 5/6

The root ‘kṛ’ expresses action alone, while ‘tṛc’ expresses its locus—on this view, the word ‘agent’ would mean merely the locus of an action.

Like the word ‘object’, ‘agent’ should also be regarded as a term whose reference is fixed by convention.

If both the tiṅ suffix and ‘karoti’ expressed effort, then in ‘he makes an effort to cook’ or ‘he performs the act of cooking’ two efforts, their mutual relation, and redundancy would have to be admitted.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Bhāṭṭa thesis: operation rather than effort · 6/6

Nor are two such efforts found in usages such as ‘one’, ‘two’, ‘many’, and ‘he desires’.

KEY INSIGHT

The Bhāṭṭas analyze finite verbs through karoti, reject double efforts, and argue for an operation that can occur without consciousness.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Two-effort alternatives and primary usage · 1/5

Therefore the Bhāṭṭas hold that the tiṅ suffix denotes an operation conducive to the meaning of the root.

Since such an operation is possible in both sentient and insentient agents, the use of the finite verb in both cases is primary.

Some scholars propose that the meaning of the tiṅ suffix is a second effort distinct from the effort understood from the root; just as a second number or a second desire may be admitted in cases such as ‘one’, ‘two’, or ‘desire’.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation has primary application to sentient and insentient cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Two-effort alternatives and primary usage · 2/5

But this is not proper, for no second effort is experienced in usages such as ‘karoti’.

If two efforts are held to be distinct, it may be objected that, in the case of the qualified meaning, one effort remains unrelated.

But where difference is established, a relation between the two efforts would have to be supplied—as in ‘he makes an effort to cook’.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation has primary application to sentient and insentient cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Two-effort alternatives and primary usage · 3/5

One cannot merely assert difference and leave one effort unrelated.

Another proposal is that tiṅ, when added after a root whose meaning is other than effort, expresses effort; in ‘yatate’—‘he makes an effort’—the root itself denotes effort, so no second effort is conveyed.

In usages with an insentient agent, tiṅ may be secondary, or may express only conduciveness to effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation has primary application to sentient and insentient cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Two-effort alternatives and primary usage · 4/5

First-person and second-person suffixes indicate sentient agents; these forms do not occur with insentient agents.

But this proposal too is inconsistent.

There is no contradiction in taking the finite verb as primary in usages with an insentient agent; its meaning is operation, and there is no reason to regard that meaning as secondary.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation has primary application to sentient and insentient cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Two-effort alternatives and primary usage · 5/5

The very operation that is present in both sentient and insentient agents should be accepted as the primary meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

Objections to positing a second effort lead to the Bhāṭṭa claim that operation has primary application to sentient and insentient cases.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Bhatta View

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does the finite ending tiṅ primarily express?

The Ācārya approach

- In “he cooks,” the finite ending expresses the conscious effort of the agent.
- The verb is analyzed through “pākaṃ karoti,” an act of cooking performed by someone.
- With an insentient subject such as a moving chariot, a non-effort operation is understood by secondary usage.

The Bhāṭṭa approach

- The root kṛ and tiṅ refer to action or operation, not invariably to conscious effort.
- Sleeping, knowing, moving, and the arising of a sprout put pressure on an effort-only reading.
- A single operation meaning keeps finite verbs primary with conscious and insentient agents.

The debate concerns the lexical function of the suffix, not the mere existence of effort in particular situations.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Essential conclusions · Finite Verbs: The Ācārya and Bhāṭṭa Views

Ācārya

Tiṅ is tied to the conscious agent's effort.

Bhāṭṭa

Tiṅ denotes operation conducive to what the root expresses.

Test cases

Chariot, knowledge, sleep, making effort and cooking.

Open issue


Can Nyāya recover effort without multiplying semantic powers?

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Nyāya against operation · economy of denotation · Ratnakośa bhāvanā · tense as a part of verbal meaning

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Finite Verbs: Effort, Operation and Productivity

1

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or po

2

The Naiyāyika defence of effort

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warr

3

Why effort must be denoted

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can

4

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbers

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa answers · 1/5

An objection may be raised: if operation is the meaning of the finite verb, then since sleep caused by the fatigue of a journey may be

an operation conducive to cooking in the case of a sleeping person, the expression ‘he cooks’ would also become appropriate of him.

Reply: the meaning is not any operation in general, but a particular operation conducive to a specific result or to the meaning of the root.

KEY INSIGHT

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or postulation could make the agent’s effort intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa answers · 2/5

Sleep is not the particular operation conducive to cooking.

On the theory of effort too, the defect could arise that one may say ‘he cooks’ of a person making an effort conducive to pounding rice; hence effort too must be understood as specifically conducive to the particular root-meaning.

Opponents of the Bhāṭṭas say: if mere operation is the meaning of tiṅ, how is the effort conducive to cooking understood in ‘Caitra cooks’?

KEY INSIGHT

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or postulation could make the agent’s effort intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa answers · 3/5

Neither the suffix nor the root-meaning can secondarily signify effort.

An operation may occur even without effort; ordinarily an agent possesses effort, but that does not ensure cognition of a particular effort.

The Bhāṭṭas reply that the specific root-meaning, such as the act of cooking, can yield effort by postulation.

KEY INSIGHT

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or postulation could make the agent's effort intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa answers · 4/5

Since the action cannot be accomplished without effort, effort is understood on the basis of this relation.

A further objection is that if ‘Caitra cooks’ is analyzed as ‘he is the locus of an effort conducive to cooking’, tiṅ also expresses the agent.

Reply: this analysis is not a list of lexical meanings but an elucidation of the speaker’s intention; the agent is obtained there from another source.

KEY INSIGHT

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or postulation could make the agent’s effort intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objections to operation and the Bhāṭṭa answers · 5/5

Even when effort alone is accepted as the meaning, ‘he cooks’ is analyzed in terms of a locus of effort; therefore the mention of the locus in the analysis does not prove that the locus is denoted by tiṅ.

In insentient usages such as ‘the chariot moves’ and ‘space remains’, neither productive bhāvanā nor conscious effort is understood.

Since a relation between productive bhāvanā and the root-meaning is impossible in such cases, the operational meaning of tiṅ may there be regarded as secondary or figurative.

KEY INSIGHT

Cooking and sleep cases examine how a root-specific operation, inference or postulation could make the agent’s effort intelligible.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 1/6

We Naiyāyikas say that in ‘Caitra cooks’ it is precisely the effort conducive to cooking that is understood.

For the sake of economy, effort should be accepted as the denoted meaning of tiṅ; operationhood, being an additional adventitious property, is more cumbersome as the denoted meaning.

The objection is that, in order to preserve primary usage in cases with an insentient agent such as ‘the chariot moves’, operation alone should be accepted as the denoted meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 2/6

But merely because primary usage can thereby be preserved, it is not proper to abandon the more economical meaning, effort.

In insentient usages cognition of operation can arise by secondary signification or by some other semantic function.

That meaning should be accepted as the locus of denotative power which makes the acquisition of that power simple and economical.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 3/6

In sentient usages there is regular cognition of effort, whereas insentient usages are comparatively secondary.

Hence effort is the object of denotative power and operation is a figurative meaning.

It is not proper to say that operation must be accepted as the meaning in order to preserve the primary status of tiṅ in insentient usages, otherwise the other semantic functions would collapse.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 4/6

With effort remaining the primary meaning, secondary signification to operation is possible in the special context.

For this reason the view that ‘tiṅ, denoting operation, when used after a root expresses an operation qualified by effort’ is refuted.

For the sake of economy, effort alone is the primary meaning; operation is obtained either from the root-meaning or through secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 5/6

A further objection is that effort is not the meaning of tiṅ, because the cognition of effort from ‘Caitra cooks’ can be inferred from the act of cooking.

Reply: present effort is not invariably inferable from the act of cooking; a relation to cooking is possible even through past or future effort.

Regular cognition of present effort cannot be obtained without tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Naiyāyika defence of effort · 6/6

It may be said that the action denoted by the root is connected with the present time, and therefore tiṅ can serve merely to express presentness; but present effort is not automatically cognized from the root-action.

Hence it is proper to accept effort as the denoted meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

Gangeśa argues that the consistent cognition of effort in sentient usages warrants taking it as the primary meaning; insentient examples are secondary.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Reply to the Objection against Operation as the Meaning

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 1/6

It is proposed that after the verbal cognition ‘Caitra is the locus of a present operation conducive to cooking’,

there arises the inference ‘Caitra is the locus of a present effort conducive to cooking’; therefore tiṅ may continue to denote operation.

But in the case of a sentient person such as Maitra, cognition of a present operation cannot arise without prior cognition of present effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 2/6

If tiṅ is taken to denote operation, an operation devoid of effort may also be present; in that case an inference to present effort would be deviant.

An operation, once produced by effort, may continue for some time even after the effort has ceased.

Hence present effort cannot invariably be inferred from present operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 3/6

For the sake of economy, present effort should be taken as the directly denoted meaning of tiṅ; the double assumption of denotation of operation plus inference of present effort is unnecessary.

In usages with an insentient agent, tiṅ may generate cognition of operation either through secondary signification or through a mistaken apprehension of its denotative power.

In ‘the chariot moves’, the operation of motion is clearly understood; once the impossibility of conscious effort is recognized, tiṅ is used secondarily in the sense of operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 4/6

It should not be said that this arrangement adds another assumption.

Taking effort as primary in sentient usages and secondary signification to operation in insentient usages is economical; taking operation as primary and inferring present effort in every sentient usage is more cumbersome.

Otherwise the expression ‘he cooks’ would not be confined to the time when effort exists, because the operation can remain even after the effort.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 5/6

Hence the present-tense tiṅ, like the optative suffix, expresses effort in general as qualified by the relevant time.

This also refutes the elders' view that the operation conducive to the result is the meaning of the root and number is the meaning of tiṅ.

In 'Caitra cooks' and 'the chariot moves', an operation conducive to the root-meaning is related respectively to a sentient and an insentient agent;

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why effort must be denoted · 6/6

but in ‘cooks’ the effort conducive to cooking cannot be obtained from the root-meaning by secondary signification.

Therefore effort should be accepted as the denoted meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

The source challenges attempts to infer present effort from an action that can have past or future causal relations.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Denotation of Effort Is Necessary

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 1/9

According to the author of the Ratnakośa, operation is the meaning of the root and the act of production is the meaning of the finite suffix.

This act of production itself is called productivity or bhāvanā.

‘Pacati’—‘he cooks’—is analyzed as ‘pākaṃ karoti’—‘he produces cooking’.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 2/9

The production of the act of cooking denoted by the root is possible in both sentient and insentient agents; hence the finite suffix has a primary use in both kinds of cases.

In ‘yatate’—‘he makes an effort’—and ‘jānāti’—‘he knows’—the implicit meanings may be taken respectively as ‘he produces effort’ and ‘he produces knowledge’.

Nevertheless the productive act or effort is not an independent additional primary meaning of tiṅ; the finite suffix expresses only production.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 3/9

A secondary use is possible only where the primary meaning can be predominant; in ‘he makes an effort’, the meaning of tiṅ is productivity and effort is the root-meaning.

In ‘he makes a pot’, the meaning of the root ‘kṛ’ is simply the act of production.

For this reason, the answer ‘he cooks’ to the general question ‘what does he do?’ expresses a particular productive act.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 4/9

In ‘Caitra produces’, the production denoted by the root is related to Caitra; the meaning of tiṅ is not related to a second production.

But for this very reason the view of the author of the Ratnakośa is also refuted.

If productivity is taken as the meaning of tiṅ, an act of production additional to the action denoted by the root must be admitted; the more economical theory that takes effort as the meaning is simpler.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 5/9

In usages such as ‘pacati’, effort is cognized; therefore, for the sake of economy, effort alone is the denoted meaning of the tiṅ suffix.

Productivity is not the meaning, because compared with effort it is an adventitious and more cumbersome property.

Present effort conducive to cooking cannot be obtained from any other means.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 6/9

In sentient-agent usages such as ‘Caitra knows’, ‘desires’, and ‘makes an effort’, Caitra is cognized as the locus of knowledge, desire, or effort, not as their producer.

Otherwise one could also properly say ‘it knows’ of insentient causes of knowledge such as words and sense organs, which is contrary to experience.

Even after the statement ‘he knows the pot’, the doubt ‘is the pot known or not?’ may be possible; this shows that a knower is not merely a producer.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 7/9

Words and the like, though causes of knowledge, are not called knowers.

Thus the meaning of tiṅ is effort.

In ‘he cooks’, ‘he will cook’, and ‘he has cooked’, respectively present, future, and past effort is understood.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 8/9

Presentness, futurity, and pastness too are expressed by the finite suffix; definite cognition of them is not obtainable by another means.

In ‘he knows’, ‘desires’, ‘makes an effort’, and ‘sleeps’, the root-meanings—knowledge, desire, effort, and sleep—are related to Caitra; the effort denoted by tiṅ separately indicates the agent’s activity.

In insentient usages such as ‘the chariot moves’, since effort is impossible, tiṅ is secondarily used in the sense of operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Ratnakośa productivity view and its refutation · 9/9

The chariot is cognized only as the locus of an operation conducive to motion.

Thus the productivity theory of the author of the Ratnakośa is refuted; effort alone is the primary meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

The proposal that tiṅ means producing the root-action is criticized as cumbersome; the conclusion connects effort with present, past and future use.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The View of the Author of the Ratnakośa

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Operation, productivity, or effort?

Rival strategies

- Operation can be restricted to an act conducive to a particular root-result, rather than any activity at all.
- The Bhāṭṭa account may derive cognition of effort through postulation from the action.
- The Ratnakośa account proposes production or bhāvanā as the finite-ending meaning.

Gangeśa's determination

- The regular cognition of effort in "Caitra cooks" favours a direct effort-denotation on grounds of economy.
- Present effort is not reliably inferred from an operation compatible with past or future effort.
- The productivity theory adds an unnecessary act beyond the action already conveyed by the root.

The translated argument tests candidate meanings against ordinary verb use and semantic economy.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Finite Verbs: Effort, Operation and Productivity

Operation

The Bhāṭṭa proposal is defended through restricted action and postulation.

Effort

Nyāya makes effort primary in sentient-agent usage.

Productivity

Ratnakośa's additional productive act is rejected as cumbersome.

Tense


Tiṅ conveys distinctions of present, future and past effort.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Past and future effort · active and passive · qualifiers of number · impersonal constructions

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Finite Verbs: Tense, Number and Verbal Constructions

1

Past, present and future usages

Grammarian challenges concerning apakṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on

2

Number is related to agent or object

The text rejects an inference that the agent and object must themselves be den

3

The Nyāya grammatical proposal and obje

The competing account relates the suffix's number to a productive relation, te

4

Gangeśa's response and impersonal forms

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Past, present and future usages · 1/5

Grammarians object: ‘pacati’ is used at the time of present effort; then ‘apākṣīt’—‘he cooked’—should be used only at the time when the past effort has ceased, and ‘pakṣyati’—‘he will cook’—only at the time of the non-arising of future effort.

Such uses during the intervening period would become improper.

It cannot be said that the aggregate of past and future efforts is the meaning of tiṅ; an aggregate of efforts, unlike the group of the fixed stars, does not exist anywhere at one time.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarian challenges concerning apākṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on the relevant particular effort and its temporal status.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Past, present and future usages · 2/5

Nor is an aggregate of all present efforts possible in the present usage ‘pacati’.

The absences of past and future effort have specific efforts, not effort in general, as their counterpositives.

Another proposal is that various efforts differentiated by delimitors unconnected with the result are the meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarian challenges concerning apākṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on the relevant particular effort and its temporal status.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Past, present and future usages · 3/5

Thus ‘pacati’, ‘pakṣyati’, and ‘apākṣīt’ would respectively convey present, future, and past efforts conducive to the result.

But how is the use ‘pakṣyati’ possible before the final effort conducive to the future result has arisen?

We Naiyāyikas reply that the use of past and future forms depends not on the destruction or non-arising of an aggregate of efforts, but on the destruction or prior absence of the relevant particular effort.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarian challenges concerning apākṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on the relevant particular effort and its temporal status.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Past, present and future usages · 4/5

The cause of the present usage ‘pacati’ is the present effort itself; an aggregate of efforts is not the cause.

The temporal usages in sentient and insentient cases such as eating and motion are explained in the same way.

When a usage occurs, only the causes required for that usage are admitted; there is no need to posit an aggregate of operations or of efforts.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarian challenges concerning apākṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on the relevant particular effort and its temporal status.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Past, present and future usages · 5/5

Even for the Mīmāṃsakas, who take the root or tiṅ to denote an operation conducive to cooking, these temporal divisions are to be understood on the same principle.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarian challenges concerning apākṣīt and pakṣyati lead to a reply based on the relevant particular effort and its temporal status.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Number is related to agent or object · 1/3

The grammarians further say that number, like agent, object, and effort, must be a meaning of tiṅ.

In ‘Caitra cooks rice’ and ‘rice is cooked by Caitra’, the number expressed by tiṅ is related respectively to the agent and the object; the traditional rule is that the number expressed by tiṅ is related to what is denoted by tiṅ.

Gaṅgeśa refutes this reasoning.

KEY INSIGHT

The text rejects an inference that the agent and object must themselves be denoted by tiṅ merely because the ending expresses number.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Number is related to agent or object · 2/3

The agent's number is not a meaning of tiṅ qualified by agency; number is merely related to the agent.

If the agent itself were held to be denoted by tiṅ, the assumptions that both number and agent are denoted would become cumbersome under one and the same rule.

The same applies to the object.

KEY INSIGHT

The text rejects an inference that the agent and object must themselves be denoted by tiṅ merely because the ending expresses number.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Number is related to agent or object · 3/3

The statement ‘the number of the finite suffix belongs to the agent or the object’ means only that the number expressed by tiṅ is related to the agent or object; it does not mean that the agent and object themselves are denoted by tiṅ.

The proposal of efforts differentiated by delimitors unconnected with the result is likewise inconsistent during the intervening period of future usage, because the final effort conducive to the result has not yet arisen then.

Therefore, according to the context, a particular effort qualified by the relevant temporal distinction should be accepted as the meaning of tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

The text rejects an inference that the agent and object must themselves be denoted by tiṅ merely because the ending expresses number.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Objection concerning Past and Future Usages

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Nyāya grammatical proposal and objections · 1/4

According to the Nyāya tradition, the number expressed by the finite suffix, though lexically requiring only something countable,

becomes connected with the relatum of productive bhāvanā because the suffix and root are apprehended as a single word.

The agent or object related to the productive operation becomes the locus of number.

KEY INSIGHT

The competing account relates the suffix's number to a productive relation, tested using active, passive and insentient constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Nyāya grammatical proposal and objections · 2/4

The operation which is the meaning of the finite suffix requires the action denoted by the root.

The action requires only the bare nominal meaning; object, instrument, and the other kārakas are not loci of the action but only entities related to it.

For this reason productive bhāvanā is connected with the entity expressed by a nominative word.

KEY INSIGHT

The competing account relates the suffix's number to a productive relation, tested using active, passive and insentient constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Nyāya grammatical proposal and objections · 3/4

In ‘Caitra cooks rice’, bare Caitra is the agent; in ‘rice is cooked by Caitra’, bare rice is the object.

Since productivity is related to this nominative entity, number too is related respectively to Caitra and rice.

The objection is that in an active construction the productive operation can be connected with nominative Caitra, but in a passive construction nominative rice, being merely the object, is not the locus of the productive operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The competing account relates the suffix’s number to a productive relation, tested using active, passive and insentient constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The Nyāya grammatical proposal and objections · 4/4

If the operation were connected with rice as object, then in ‘Caitra cooks rice’ too the operation would be connected with rice and number would come to be related to the object.

Again, the operation cannot be connected with Caitra as agent because the instrumental relation expressed by the third case ending intervenes.

In an insentient-agent usage such as ‘the chariot goes to the village’, the chariot is the qualificand of the operation; in the passive ‘the village is reached by the chariot’, the village as object is the locus of the result of the operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The competing account relates the suffix’s number to a productive relation, tested using active, passive and insentient constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa’s response and impersonal forms · 1/6

Gaṅgeśa replies: in sentient usages number is related to the qualificand of effort, and in insentient usages to the qualificand of operation.

In ‘Caitra cooks rice’, Caitra is the qualificand of effort; in ‘rice is cooked by Caitra’, rice is the indirect qualificand of effort, namely the locus of the result of the operation produced by effort.

In ‘the chariot goes to the village’, the chariot is the qualificand of the operation, and in the passive construction the village is its indirect qualificand.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa's response and impersonal forms · 2/6

Thus in both active and passive constructions number is related respectively to the agent or the object.

The objection should not be raised that the qualificand of effort or operation with which number is related is not always available.

Number is related to that qualificand which is intended by the speaker through the finite suffix; this may be the qualificand of effort or of operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa’s response and impersonal forms · 3/6

In the impersonal construction ‘Caitreṇa supyate’—‘sleeping is done by Caitra’—Caitra is blocked by the instrumental relation and is not the object of the action either.

Therefore only the action of sleep denoted by the root becomes the qualificand, and number is connected with that root-meaning.

For this reason dual and plural forms are incorrect in such a construction.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa’s response and impersonal forms · 4/6

Where a countable entity is obtained by postulation, there is no need to admit a denotative power for it.

Once a countable entity in general is supplied by postulation, the speaker’s intention determines its particular identity.

The agent or object is inferred not merely because it possesses number, but because it is the principal qualificand of the sentence.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa's response and impersonal forms · 5/6

The objection is that the productive operation is connected with the nominative meaning, but why should the number of tiṅ again be connected with the number expressed by the nominative ending?

The nominative ending too expresses number; there would thus be double expression of number.

Reply: because of grammatical co-reference, the same number is expressed redundantly by both the nominative ending and tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gangeśa’s response and impersonal forms · 6/6

In ‘Caitra is staff-bearing’, Caitra’s singularity is redundantly expressed by both words; otherwise the number of tiṅ could not be related to Caitra.

The grammarians too must accept the same arrangement in usages such as ‘the person desirous of rice should cook’; the optative and the nominative word express the same number.

This matter will be considered in detail later.

KEY INSIGHT

The argument relates number to what effort or operation qualifies and analyzes Caitreṇa supyate and co-reference of two numerical endings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Nyāya Tradition: Number Is Related to the Qualificand of Effort

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

How does a finite verb's number find its locus?

The difficulty

- Caitra cooks rice: number relates to the agent, while in "rice is cooked by Caitra" it relates to the object.
- A single suffix cannot simply denote both an agent and an object without multiplying assumptions.
- The impersonal "Caitreṇa supyate" does not behave like an ordinary agent- or object-number construction.

The source analysis

- Gangeśa connects number with the relevant qualificand of effort in sentient examples or operation in insentient ones.
- An indirect qualificand can be the object in passive constructions, as locus of the resultant state.
- Speaker intention and conventional rules determine the specific relation; some numerical agreement is redundant.

Number agreement is not by itself evidence that the agent and object are lexical meanings of tiṅ.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Finite Verbs: Tense, Number and Verbal Constructions

Time

Past and future forms concern particular, temporally qualified effort.

Active–passive

Number can relate to different arguments of the same verbal action.

Impersonal

The sleep construction tests the limits of ordinary number assignment.

Denotation


Related agency or objecthood is distinct from denoting the entities themselves.

The following presentation continues the translated Śabda section.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Agent versus agency · Navya-Nyāya co-reference · active and passive endings · formal close

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The opposing arguments and conclusions in Gangeśa's translated text.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Finite Verbs: Agency, Objecthood and the Final Doctrine

1

Why the agent itself is not denoted by

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined wi

2

Navya-Naiyāyika structure of number

The analysis links suffixal number to nominative meanings and tests impersonal

3

Agency, passive objecthood and the form

The stated final position distinguishes an active ending's agency and a passiv

Order follows the English translated book, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 1/6

It is proposed that the agent itself is denoted by the finite suffix, because in ‘Caitra cooks’ the co-reference of the nominative word and the finite suffix appears to rest on agency.

Without denotation of the agent, a relation of sameness of reference seems inexplicable.

But this view is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 2/6

In ‘the cloth is blue’, ‘Caitra cooks’, and ‘rice is cooked’, co-reference consists merely in expression of the same number, not in denotation of the very same meaning.

Two words with different grounds of denotation can express the same number.

In ‘the person desirous of rice should cook’, the optative expresses effort or the state of being a means, not the agent; nevertheless there is numerical co-reference with the nominative person.

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 3/6

If the agent were the meaning of tiṅ, the state of being a means to the desired result would remain unrelated to the agent.

Analyzing ‘pacati’ as ‘he is the locus of effort conducive to cooking’ does not make the agent the meaning of tiṅ.

The agent is available from another source; the analysis merely clarifies the speaker’s intention.

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 4/6

If ‘pacati’ expresses a locus of effort, the cooking denoted by the root cannot be related to effort as its object or produced result merely by that fact;

by the syntactic rule the meaning of one part of a word is connected with that of another part.

In ‘rājapuruṣa’, the king expressed by one member is related to the man expressed by the other; but because effort is already a property residing in the agent, no renewed relation of effort to the agent need be supplied.

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 5/6

The relation of cooking and the locus of effort is of the form ‘cooking is produced by the locus of effort’ or ‘the locus of effort produces cooking’; it is not that ‘cooking is the object of effort’ or ‘effort is the agent of cooking’.

Hence it is unnecessary to take the agent as denoted by tiṅ.

The objection is that if agent and object are not meanings of tiṅ, why are the instrumental ending in an active construction and the accusative ending in a passive construction prohibited?

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why the agent itself is not denoted by tiṅ · 6/6

Incorrect forms such as ‘Caitreṇa pacati odanam’ or ‘Caitraḥ pacyate odanam’ would become possible.

Reply: the rules governing case endings state that when the number of the agent or object is expressed by tiṅ, the instrumental or accusative ending of that kāraka is not used.

The incorrect expressions are excluded simply because they are grammatically nonstandard; there is no need to regard tiṅ as denoting agent or object.

KEY INSIGHT

Co-reference, syntactic relations and case-ending restrictions are examined without equating the finite suffix’s meaning with the person or thing.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Agent Is Not the Meaning of Tiṅ

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Navya-Naiyāyika structure of number · 1/3

According to the Navya-Naiyāyikas, a nominal case ending connects its number with the nominal-stem meaning, while a finite suffix connects its number with the meaning of the nominative word.

This number is apprehended as connected with the nominative meaning as a consequence of verbal cognition.

In an active construction the nominative meaning is the agent; in a passive construction it is the object.

KEY INSIGHT

The analysis links suffixal number to nominative meanings and tests impersonal constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conclusion of the Navya-Naiyāyikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Navya-Naiyāyika structure of number · 2/3

In the impersonal construction ‘Caitreṇa supyate’ there is no nominative word; therefore the number of tiṅ is not related to any countable entity.

It cannot be said that in an impersonal construction number is connected with the sleep denoted by the root.

There may be many instances of sleep, yet ‘supyate’ remains singular; dual and plural tiṅ forms are not used.

KEY INSIGHT

The analysis links suffixal number to nominative meanings and tests impersonal constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conclusion of the Navya-Naiyāyikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Navya-Naiyāyika structure of number · 3/3

Hence the Navya-Naiyāyikas conclude that the relation of number to agent or object is a structural rule governing tiṅ.

KEY INSIGHT

The analysis links suffixal number to nominative meanings and tests impersonal constructions.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conclusion of the Navya-Naiyāyikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Agency, passive objecthood and the formal conclusion · 1/2

We, the proponents of the final doctrine, say that in the passive ‘rice is cooked by Caitra’ and ‘the village is reached by the chariot’,

rice and the village are objects; they possess the state of being loci of a result produced by an action residing elsewhere.

This objecthood, in the form of being the locus of the result, is denoted by the finite suffix, since it is not obtained from the accusative or any other source there.

KEY INSIGHT

The stated final position distinguishes an active ending’s agency and a passive ending’s objecthood from the nominally denoted agent and object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conclusion of the Navya-Naiyāyikas

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Agency, passive objecthood and the formal conclusion · 2/2

In the active ‘Caitra cooks rice’, agent and object are obtained from the nominal meanings and case endings; in the passive, objecthood is expressed by the finite suffix.

Thus in an active construction agency and in a passive construction objecthood are respectively meanings of the finite suffix; the agent and object themselves are meanings of the nominal words.

Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

KEY INSIGHT

The stated final position distinguishes an active ending’s agency and a passive ending’s objecthood from the nominally denoted agent and object.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Conclusion of the Navya-Naiyāyikas; Thus ends the Doctrine of Finite Verbs in the Verbal-Testimony Section

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does tiṅ express the actor, or a property of acting?

Incorrect identification

- Co-reference of nominative and finite forms does not prove that both words name the very same agent.
- Paraphrasing “he cooks” as the locus of effort need not add the locus to the suffix’s direct meaning.
- Restrictions on accusative or instrumental endings are explained by grammatical rules.

The final distinction

- In an active construction the agency associated with the action is expressed by the verbal ending.
- In passive “rice is cooked,” the suffix expresses objecthood, the condition of receiving the result of another action.
- The agent and object as entities remain meanings of their respective nominal words.

Gangeśa distinguishes the role (agency/objecthood) from the individual agent or object.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Finite Verbs: Agency, Objecthood and the Final Doctrine

Co-reference

Shared number does not entail shared lexical denotation.

Navya-Nyāya

Number is linked structurally to the nominative expression.

Final position

Active agency and passive objecthood can be suffixal meanings.

Next doctrine


Finite Verbs ends; the separate Doctrine of Verbal Roots follows.

The Doctrine of Finite Verbs ends here; the separate Doctrine of Verbal Roots follows.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Cooking · going · offering · results versus operations · present and past usage

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The source arguments, objections, replies and determinations.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Verbal Roots: Maṇḍana's Result-Only Account

1

The result-only theory of verbal roo

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conju

2

Tense and the operation–result divid

Challenges about current and completed activity test whether a root may

3

Objecthood and secondary significati

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes s

The sequence follows the complete English translation, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result-only theory of verbal roots · 1/5

According to Maṇḍanācārya, only the result is the meaning of a verbal root.

For the sake of economy, the root ‘pac’ means only the result consisting in the softening of food; the operation consisting in heating from below, which produces this result, is more cumbersome and is therefore not the root-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conjunction, death, offering and changes in ownership.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result-only theory of verbal roots · 2/5

The meaning of the root ‘gam’ is conjunction with a subsequent region, that of ‘pat’ is conjunction with a lower region, and that of ‘tyaj’ is the result consisting in disjunction from the prior region.

Motion or vibration, which produces these results, is not the root-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conjunction, death, offering and changes in ownership.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result-only theory of verbal roots · 3/5

The meaning of the root ‘han’ is the result consisting in death; striking and other operations conducive to death are more cumbersome and are therefore not the root-meaning.

The meaning of the root ‘yaj’ is the result consisting in the destruction of ownership produced by relinquishment intended for a deity.

KEY INSIGHT

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conjunction, death, offering and changes in ownership.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result-only theory of verbal roots · 4/5

The operation of relinquishment itself is not the root-meaning.

The meaning of ‘hu’, the root of offering, is the result consisting in the projection of a substance toward a deity.

KEY INSIGHT

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conjunction, death, offering and changes in ownership.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The result-only theory of verbal roots · 5/5

The meaning of the root ‘dā’ is the result consisting either in the destruction of the donor’s ownership following acceptance by the recipient, or in the production of ownership in the recipient.

The operation of relinquishing ownership is not the root-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Maṇḍana explains roots by their effects: cooked softness, regional conjunction, death, offering and changes in ownership.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tense and the operation–result divide · 1/4

The objection is that the result remains after the operation has ceased; then only present-tense usages such as ‘cooks’, ‘goes’, and ‘gives’ would be possible even after the operation had ceased,

and past-tense expressions such as ‘has cooked’, ‘went’, and ‘gave’ would not be properly explained.

KEY INSIGHT

Challenges about current and completed activity test whether a root may express the result alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tense and the operation–result divide · 2/4

Maṇḍana replies that the presentness of the operation is expressed by the finite suffix.

Once the operation has ceased, a present-tense suffix is no longer used; the past-tense form is used in accordance with the accomplishment of the result.

KEY INSIGHT

Challenges about current and completed activity test whether a root may express the result alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tense and the operation–result divide · 3/4

A further objection is that if only the result is the root-meaning, the expression ‘space goes’ should be legitimate, since space can be the locus of the result, conjunction, produced by the operation of motion.

KEY INSIGHT

Challenges about current and completed activity test whether a root may express the result alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Tense and the operation–result divide · 4/4

Maṇḍana says that a present-tense finite verb is used only of an agent possessing the operation and during the time of that operation; therefore such an expression about space is not standard.

KEY INSIGHT

Challenges about current and completed activity test whether a root may express the result alone.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objecthood and secondary signification · 1/5

The objection is: if the result alone is the root-meaning, why is rice the object in ‘rice is cooked’?

A grain of rice is an object because it is the locus of the result, softness, produced by an operation residing elsewhere; hence objecthood is explained.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes secondary signification for an incomplete action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objecthood and secondary signification · 2/5

Objecthood means this: that entity in which there resides a result produced by an operation located in a locus distinct from the object is an object.

Such an operation may be either the root-meaning or the meaning of the finite suffix.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes secondary signification for an incomplete action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objecthood and secondary signification · 3/5

When the result has not yet arisen, or when the expression ‘cooking is taking place’ is used during the operation, secondary signification to the operation must be accepted in the

word ‘cooking’; for the sake of economy, softening alone is its primary meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes secondary signification for an incomplete action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objecthood and secondary signification · 4/5

In ‘he knows’, ‘desires’, ‘makes an effort’, ‘exists’, and ‘remains’, respectively knowledge, desire, effort, existence, and continuance are the meanings of the roots.

A result produced by knowledge and the rest, or an operation conducive to such a result, is not the root-meaning; the person is cognized merely as the locus of knowledge and the rest.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes secondary signification for an incomplete action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Objecthood and secondary signification · 5/5

Maṇḍana's reply is that objecthood is established through being the locus of the result.

Rice is an object because it is the locus of the result, softness, produced by the cooking operation.

In 'cooking is occurring', when the result has not arisen, the operation is obtained by secondary signification.

KEY INSIGHT

The reply locates objecthood in the receiver of the result and invokes secondary signification for an incomplete action.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Does the root denote the achieved result or the operation?

Maṇḍana's account

- The root pac primarily denotes the softening of food; heating is its productive operation.
- Roots for motion, striking and gifting are analysed through resulting conjunction, death or changed ownership.
- Present activity is obtained through the finite ending; the root need not directly denote the operation.

The stated difficulties

- A result may persist after the operation ends; tense then needs an independent explanation.
- Insentient subjects and the classification of the object test an effect-only definition.
- "Cooking is occurring" before food softens requires secondary signification of the operation.

The dispute concerns primary root meaning, not whether operations and results both exist.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Verbal Roots: Maṇḍana's Result-Only Account

Primary meaning

Maṇḍana holds the root denotes the result.

Activity and time

Finite endings and secondary use carry the ongoing operation.

Objecthood

The object is the locus of the operation-produced result.

Next argument


Nyāya uses injunction and purposeful effort to challenge the result-only account.

The following presentation continues in the source order.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Optative sentences · action as means · cooking and kṛṣṇala · motion, offering and gifting

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The source arguments, objections, replies and determinations.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Verbal Roots: The Naiyāyika Determination

1

An operation is an attainable means

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity t

2

Pac means heating capable of alterat

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation f

3

Motion, abandonment and ritual opera

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent co

4

Formal close of the roots doctrine

The translated Verbal Roots section states its ending before the separat

The sequence follows the complete English translation, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

An operation is an attainable means · 1/5

We Naiyāyikas say that in optative usages such as ‘the person who desires rice should cook’, the finite suffix expresses both the state of being accomplishable through effort and the state of being a means to the desired result.

This cognition produces activity directed toward the action denoted by the root.

KEY INSIGHT

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity to an operation conducive to an intended result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

An operation is an attainable means · 2/5

A result cannot itself be a means to that result.

Without the employment of a means, the result is not directly accomplished by effort; it is accomplished when effort produces an operation functioning as the means.

Therefore the object of activity is not the result to be accomplished but the operation that serves as a means to the result.

KEY INSIGHT

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity to an operation conducive to an intended result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

An operation is an attainable means · 3/5

An operation such as heating from below accomplishes the result consisting in softening; the operation itself is produced by effort as a means to the desired result.

The optative expresses the accomplishability of this operation and its state of being a means to the desired result.

KEY INSIGHT

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity to an operation conducive to an intended result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

An operation is an attainable means · 4/5

The objection is that cognition of being accomplishable through effort is the cause of activity; therefore a result accomplishable through effort may be taken as the root-meaning.

Reply: the cognition of accomplishability through effort concerns the operation; the result is accomplished not directly by effort but through the operation.

KEY INSIGHT

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity to an operation conducive to an intended result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

An operation is an attainable means · 5/5

Therefore the roots ‘yaj’, ‘gam’, ‘pac’, ‘hu’, and ‘dā’ express not results but operations conducive to results.

Since activity toward action is impossible with respect to a mere result, the theory that only the result is the root-meaning is inconsistent.

KEY INSIGHT

Naiyāyika treatment of optatives ties the practical object of activity to an operation conducive to an intended result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Doctrine of Verbal Roots

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pac means heating capable of alteration · 1/5

In this context the meaning of the root ‘pac’ is the operation consisting in heating from below.

This operation is invariably connected with alteration of color, taste, smell, or touch.

KEY INSIGHT

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation from softness as its eventual result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pac means heating capable of alteration · 2/5

Within the operation of cooking, the general property of producing alteration is delimited by a particular class; otherwise heating from below would merely produce heat and there would be no distinctive character of cooking.

Thus the capacity to produce changes of color and the like determines the distinctive character of the cooking operation.

KEY INSIGHT

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation from softness as its eventual result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pac means heating capable of alteration · 3/5

The result, softness, is neither a qualifier of the root-meaning ‘pac’ nor an adventitious indicator of it.

In ordinary usage there is no need to exclude any part of the operation of heating from below; the operation itself is the meaning of cooking.

KEY INSIGHT

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation from softness as its eventual result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pac means heating capable of alteration · 4/5

In the Vedic usage ‘cook the kṛṣṇala’, the operation of heating from below occurs even though the kṛṣṇala does not become soft; hence if softness were taken as the root-meaning, the usage would be inexplicable.

There is no difficulty if operation is accepted as the meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation from softness as its eventual result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Pac means heating capable of alteration · 5/5

Alternatively, the result may be regarded as an adventitious indicator; even then the basic root-meaning is only the operation of heating from below capable of producing alteration.

Although softness does not arise in the kṛṣṇala, there remains the capacity for alteration of color.

KEY INSIGHT

The kṛṣṇala counterexample distinguishes the denoted heating operation from softness as its eventual result.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 1/6

The denoted meaning of the root ‘gam’ is a particular operation of motion.

Motion generally produces conjunction with a subsequent region, but since all motion has this feature its distinctiveness must not thereby disappear;

the particular motion is determined by a delimitor consisting in the production of conjunction and disjunction.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 2/6

The root ‘tyaj’ means the general act of abandonment; its distinctive character is indicated by its producing the result consisting in disjunction from a prior region.

Cognition of abandonment serves as the basis of the usage ‘tyajati’.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 3/6

The root ‘pat’ means a particular downward falling; the result consisting in conjunction with a lower region is merely its indicator, not the primary root-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 4/6

The roots ‘yaj’, ‘hu’, and ‘dā’ mean particular operations of relinquishment preceded by a determination—offering to a deity, casting an oblation, or giving to a recipient, together with the resolve ‘this is no longer mine’.

The specific object, deity, or recipient determines the particularity of the operation.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 5/6

Destruction of the donor’s ownership, production of ownership in the recipient, or relinquishment of ownership for the deity are merely results that indicate the particular determination;

there is no need to posit a separate denotative power in the root for each result.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Motion, abandonment and ritual operations · 6/6

Thus not the result but a particular operation conducive to the result is the denoted meaning of a verbal root.

KEY INSIGHT

Gam, tyaj, pat, yaj, hu and dā denote specific operations; subsequent conjunction or changes of ownership indicate their kind.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · The Meaning of the Root ‘Pac’

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Formal close of the roots doctrine

Thus ends the Doctrine of Verbal Roots in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Śrī Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

KEY INSIGHT

The translated Verbal Roots section states its ending before the separate Preverbs discussion.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Formal conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Why make operation the root's denotative meaning?

Result-only reading

- Pac means softness, and motion roots denote location changes that result from moving.
- The intended result can occur only after an operation has been undertaken.
- The optative "should cook" must still motivate a person to perform an attainable action.

Naiyāyika reading

- A root denotes an effort-attainable operation that serves as the means to a desired result.
- Pac denotes heating from below capable of altering a substance, not softness itself.
- Gam, pat, tyaj, yaj, hu and dā each designate contextually specified operations.

The operation is the object of practical activity; the result identifies its purpose or distinctive effect.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Verbal Roots: The Naiyāyika Determination

Practical activity

An optative directs effort toward a means, rather than an already achieved result.

Cooking test

Heating kṛṣṇala counts as cooking without softening it.

Root classes

Motion, falling, relinquishing and gifting name operations.

Siddhānta


The root denotes an operation conducive to its particular result.

The following presentation continues in the source order.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Pra · vi · abhi · pratiṣṭhate · semantic qualification and the Naiyāyika rule

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The source arguments, objections, replies and determinations.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Preverbs: Indication, Power and Speaker Intention

1

Are preverbs indicative or denotativ

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that in

2

The limits of intention-only explana

The opponents test whether a preverb merely reveals speaker intention or

3

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids t

4

Alternative interpretation and forma

Context or remembered meaning can reveal the intended specialized root s

The sequence follows the complete English translation, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 1/8

According to the grammarians, preverbs are merely indicative, not denotative.

Their indicative function consists either in helping one understand the speaker's intention toward a particular meaning of the root,

or in helping one acquire the denotative power of the root, together with the preverb, for that particular meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 2/8

Because treating the same meaning as repeatedly denoted would create redundancy, the preverb itself is not held to denote the root-meaning.

The objection is that in ‘prajayati’ excellence is understood, in ‘vijayate’ intensification, and in ‘abhigacchati’ direction and proximity.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 3/8

These meanings are obtained by positive and negative concomitance with the presence and absence of the preverb; therefore denotative power must be admitted in the preverb.

It may further be said that in ‘pratiṣṭhate’ the preverb ‘pra’ expresses excellence, so the meaning would be ‘he departs excellently’, not merely motion.

But this is not proper.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 4/8

Here ‘pra’ expresses its own meaning as delimited by the root-meaning, and the root ‘sthā’, according to the context, expresses motion in the form of departure.

Both root and preverb may be polysemous.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 5/8

Nor is it proper to argue that polysemy is established for roots but not for preverbs, because there are many roots while ‘pra’ is a single preverb and assigning many meanings to it would be cumbersome.

A single word too can have many meanings according to context; mere numerical unity does not prevent polysemy.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 6/8

It is further said that if polysemy were not admitted in roots, the use of a preverb in a particular meaning would be as inexplicable as a polysemous word such as ‘akṣa’; nevertheless preverbs are observed to occur with particular meanings.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 7/8

Nor can it be said that a preverb expresses its meaning only when joined to a root, for then the independent use of the root would become inexplicable.

Many roots cannot grammatically be used without a particular preverb; hence a preverb is not employed merely for grammatical well-formedness.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Are preverbs indicative or denotative? · 8/8

The conclusion is that a root requires a preverb only where the preverb functions as an indicator that makes a special meaning of the root understood.

KEY INSIGHT

Grammarians distinguish an indicator of root-meaning from a word that independently denotes excellence or proximity.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Preverbs Are Indicative, Not Denotative

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The limits of intention-only explanations · 1/4

Some scholars say that in ‘prajayati’ and ‘abhigacchati’, the roots ‘ji’ and ‘gam’ respectively express the general meanings of victory and approach;

cognition of victory or approach qualified by excellence or proximity arises merely because the preverb enables apprehension of the speaker’s intention.

Thus preverbs are only revealers of intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponents test whether a preverb merely reveals speaker intention or contributes a particular semantic qualifier.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

The limits of intention-only explanations · 2/4

This view is not proper.

If such qualifications as excellence are not denoted by the root, two kinds of cognition —a general meaning and a particular meaning—would have to be admitted simultaneously from the root.

The preverb would merely indicate the intention, but there would be no denotative element that expressed the particular meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponents test whether a preverb merely reveals speaker intention or contributes a particular semantic qualifier.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The limits of intention-only explanations · 3/4

This also refutes the following view: in ‘abhigacchati’, approach qualified by proximity is the root-meaning, so the preverb ‘abhi’ is denotative;

but in ‘pratiṣṭhate’ the root ‘sthā’ itself expresses departure, so ‘pra’ merely reveals intention.

Such an arrangement produces inconsistency among preverbs of the same kind.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponents test whether a preverb merely reveals speaker intention or contributes a particular semantic qualifier.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

The limits of intention-only explanations · 4/4

If it is said that in ‘pratiṣṭhate’ only departure opposed to arrival is the meaning of ‘pra’, then ‘sthā’ and ‘pra’ would express mutually opposed meanings.

If a preverb is taken as indicative in one place and denotative in another, no stable rule remains.

KEY INSIGHT

The opponents test whether a preverb merely reveals speaker intention or contributes a particular semantic qualifier.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power · 1/5

We Naiyāyikas say that the finite suffix relates its meaning to the root-meaning.

In ‘pratiṣṭhate’, the motion consisting in departure is the meaning of the root ‘sthā’, not of the preverb ‘pra’; otherwise the relation of the finite meaning to the action that is the root-meaning would become inexplicable.

KEY INSIGHT

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids treating the preverb as a separate denoter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power · 2/5

Therefore the root ‘sthā’ used after the preverb ‘pra’ should be admitted to possess a denotative power for departure.

‘Pra’ is the delimitor and indicator of this power, not itself the denoter.

The indicative function of a preverb consists in activating a secondary or auxiliary denotative power of the root.

KEY INSIGHT

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids treating the preverb as a separate denoter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power · 3/5

Even if excellence, direction, and proximity are admitted as meanings denoted by preverbs, a relation is possible between those meanings and the action denoted by the root as qualified by them.

KEY INSIGHT

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids treating the preverb as a separate denoter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power · 4/5

Nevertheless, for the sake of economy, it is proper to regard a preverb only as the delimitor of a power; the root, in its preverb-governed form, expresses the special meaning.

Just as in ‘prajayati’ the root ‘ji’ after ‘pra’ denotes excellent victory, so in ‘pratiṣṭhate’ the root ‘sthā’ denotes departure.

KEY INSIGHT

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids treating the preverb as a separate denoter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Naiyāyika conclusion on root-power · 5/5

If a separate denotative power is admitted in the preverb, the syntactic connection between the root-meaning and the action becomes cumbersome.

Therefore preverbs are indicative, not denotative.

KEY INSIGHT

Pra delimits a specialized denotative power of sthā or ji; this avoids treating the preverb as a separate denoter.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative interpretation and formal conclusion · 1/4

Alternatively, the conclusion is this: in ‘pratiṣṭhate’, departure opposed to arrival can be known from the root ‘sthā’ itself on the basis of the context indicating opposition.

The preverb ‘pra’ merely reveals the speaker’s intention to take the root in that meaning, because the meaning ‘departure’ is not available from any other source.

KEY INSIGHT

Context or remembered meaning can reveal the intended specialized root sense while the preverb remains indicative.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative interpretation and formal conclusion · 2/4

In ‘prajayati’, the root ‘ji’ denotes a meaning qualified by excellent victory.

The preverb ‘pra’ assists in understanding the speaker’s intention toward that particular meaning of the root.

Since the qualified meaning is obtained from the root itself, there is no need to admit a separate denotative power in the preverb.

KEY INSIGHT

Context or remembered meaning can reveal the intended specialized root sense while the preverb remains indicative.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative interpretation and formal conclusion · 3/4

Even when the special meaning is not understood from the root without the preverb, the preverb still does not denote its own meaning; it activates a special power of the root or awakens a remembered meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Context or remembered meaning can reveal the intended specialized root sense while the preverb remains indicative.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Alternative interpretation and formal conclusion · 4/4

In usages such as ‘vyatiṣete’ too, according to context, an elided or remembered root itself expresses the special meaning; the preverb remains indicative.

Thus ends the Doctrine of Preverbs in the Verbal-Testimony Section of the Tattvacintamani composed by Śrī Gaṅgeśopādhyāya.

KEY INSIGHT

Context or remembered meaning can reveal the intended specialized root sense while the preverb remains indicative.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · A Preverb Is Not Merely a Revealer of Intention; Formal conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

What does pra contribute to pratiṣṭhate?

A denotative theory

- The preverb is taken to denote excellence, direction, proximity or another qualification.
- Contrasts such as prajayati and abhigacchati seem to track the presence of a preverb.
- Different roots and preverbs must then be assigned additional separate powers.

Naiyāyika determination

- The root sthā in its preverb-governed use denotes departure, and pra indicates that power.
- In prajayati, ji can denote excellent victory when its special power is activated.
- Speaker intention, context and recalled root-meanings explain the indicative function economically.

The source prefers a root's specialized denotative power over an independent preverb meaning.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Essential conclusions · Preverbs: Indication, Power and Speaker Intention

Starting position

Preverbs are indicators, not independent denoters.

The objection

Their presence appears correlated with specific meanings.

Nyāya response

They delimit or activate a specialized power of the root.

Alternative


They may reveal the speaker's intention or a contextually recalled root-meaning.

The following presentation continues in the source order.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ENGLISH TRANSLATION · ŚABDA · VERBAL TESTIMONY



TATTVACINTĀMAṆI

Gestures and words · communicated intention · nominal relations · four means of knowledge

Tattvacintāmaṇi · actual English translation

The source arguments, objections, replies and determinations.

Appendix 5 · Śabda · Verbal Testimony

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ARGUMENT MAP

Argument map · Four Pramāṇas: The Closing Doctrine

1

Why gestures do not add a fifth pram

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures i

2

Gesture, recollection and intention

A gesture can recall word-meaning or support inference to intention with

3

Relations among nominal meanings req

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic marker

4

Conventional forms and the final enu

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation ar

The sequence follows the complete English translation, Appendix 5.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why gestures do not add a fifth pramāṇa · 1/5

The objection is that after a convention has been understood, experience or cognition arises from gestures; therefore gesture too, like words, would be a means of knowledge, and

it would be improper to recognize only four means of knowledge—perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony.

KEY INSIGHT

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures independently yield knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Testimony Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why gestures do not add a fifth pramāṇa · 2/5

Reply: the convention governing gestures is apprehended only through words.

A gesture, like a written sign, merely assists recollection of words; the semantic convention is established in the word.

Therefore in the determination of meaning it is verbal testimony alone that is the means of knowledge, not gesture as a separate means.

KEY INSIGHT

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures independently yield knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Testimony Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why gestures do not add a fifth pramāṇa · 3⁄5

The objection is that a deaf-mute person acts through signs without recollecting words.

Reply: one who is not acquainted with the conventional practice cannot understand a word-meaning from a gesture, nor obtain it by any other means.

Without acquisition of the convention, a gesture is mute—that is, incapable of conveying meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures independently yield knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Testimony Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why gestures do not add a fifth pramāṇa · 4/5

The behavior of a deaf-mute person is explained by positive and negative concomitance: ‘this person makes such a gesture with the intention that I engage in, or refrain from,

an action.’ From this cognition the prompter’s intention is inferred, after which engagement or refraining occurs.

KEY INSIGHT

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures independently yield knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Testimony Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Why gestures do not add a fifth pramāṇa · 5/5

This behavior is like the movement of an elephant or horse caused by the stroke of a goad or whip; there the sign is not a separate means of knowledge but merely a ground for inferring an intention.

KEY INSIGHT

The account of convention and prompted activity tests whether gestures independently yield knowledge.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Verbal Testimony Is a Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gesture, recollection and intention · 1/4

It may be said that the conventionally established gesture itself should be regarded as the cause of inferring the prompter's intention; why then is recollection of words needed?

But there is no invariable pervasion between a gesture and an intention; the same gesture can carry different intentions in different contexts.

KEY INSIGHT

A gesture can recall word-meaning or support inference to intention without becoming an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gesture Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gesture, recollection and intention · 2/4

It may further be said that inference of the prompter's intention itself causes the prompted person's activity; the same happens with words, so words too are not a separate means of knowledge.

This is not proper.

The direct experience 'I know from words' establishes words alone as a knowledge-producing means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

A gesture can recall word-meaning or support inference to intention without becoming an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gesture Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gesture, recollection and intention · 3/4

The activity of a deaf-mute person can be explained in another way without taking gesture as a distinct means of knowledge; and the capacity of gesture to produce cognition is established through the meaning recalled by means of words.

Hence gesture is not a separate means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

A gesture can recall word-meaning or support inference to intention without becoming an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gesture Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Gesture, recollection and intention · 4/4

Even if it is admitted that a gesture is not a word but produces recollection only of the word-meaning, it is still not an independent means of knowledge.

A gesture such as pointing a finger upward before setting out on a journey is, like the sound of a conch, merely a reminder of a previously fixed occasion, not a means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

A gesture can recall word-meaning or support inference to intention without becoming an independent pramāṇa.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Gesture Is Not a Separate Means of Knowledge

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 1/7

In cognition of the mutual relations among kāraka-entities, an action alone serves as the principal qualifier of the nominal meanings.

Only when they are connected with a principal meaning in the form of an action such as bringing do the meanings of nominal words unite into a single sentence-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 2/7

When unrelated nominal meanings such as cow, horse, and person are merely recollected without relation to an action, cognition of their mutual relations is impossible.

For the delimitors of particular relations such as objecthood, presentness, and futurity —respectively object, time, and the act of bringing—are not specified there.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 3/7

The objection is that particular relations such as objecthood and presentness can be apprehended from a part of the gesture, a part of a word, a case ending, or the context.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 4/7

But no part of a gesture definitely specifies objecthood and the like; context merely restricts the possible referents of the words and does not generate a qualifier determining the particular relation.

Otherwise even the utterance of unrelated nominal words without kāraka case endings would, merely through context, generate cognition of a sentence-meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 5/7

Then the case endings and suffixes that express objecthood, time, number, and the like would become useless.

There is no rule that a collection of gestures and context alone is sufficient for cognition of a particular relation while case endings and suffixes are not.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 6/7

Therefore, on the opponent's view, the case endings denoting particular kārakas would become pointless.

A further question is: if the words recollected through gestures lack case endings, how can cognition of relations among word-meanings arise?

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Relations among nominal meanings require action · 7/7

Reply: what is actually recollected is the complete word together with its case ending; no convention for a specific sentence-meaning is ever acquired in a bare general word devoid of a case ending.

KEY INSIGHT

A connected sentence-meaning requires an action and the syntactic markers that connect nominal meanings.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 1/7

The objection is that sentence cognition arises even from corrupt forms although the case endings and other elements that express relational qualifiers are not clearly present.

It cannot be said that cognition arises through recollection of corresponding correct words, because ordinary persons often do not know the correct forms.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 2/7

Reply: whatever part of a corrupt form is established in usage as expressing objecthood, time, and the like conveys the relational qualifier, just as corrupt words convey word-meanings.

Through resemblance to known inflectional forms of correct words or through tradition, the corrupt form conveys meaning.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 3/7

For this reason the following view is not proper: case endings and the like are merely auxiliary causes of cognition produced by correct words, whereas gesture,

by being an auxiliary cause that reveals the speaker’s intention, becomes an independent means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 4/7

Every means of knowledge used in an appropriate situation has its own auxiliary causes; moreover, positing a long mediation in which gesture first produces recollection of words is cumbersome.

Hence gesture is not an independent means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 5/7

Historical tradition is included under verbal testimony because it consists of statements by trustworthy persons.

Non-apprehension and postulation are included respectively in cognition of absence and in inference.

Therefore they are not separate means of knowledge.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 6/7

Thus only four means of knowledge are established: perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony.

O discerning and keen-minded scholars!

Having paid homage to you, I ask that, although these words of mine may appear dry and disconnected, you consider them graciously.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Cognition of Relations among Nominal Meanings Is Impossible without an Action

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

ŚABDA · ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Conventional forms and the final enumeration · 7/7

Thus ends the Doctrine Establishing the Validity of Four Means of Knowledge in the fourth chapter on verbal testimony of the Tattvacintamani composed by the great scholar Śrī Gaṅgeśa.

The Verbal-Testimony Section ends.

The Tattvacintamani ends.

KEY INSIGHT

Corrupt words, historical tradition, non-apprehension and postulation are placed within the four accepted means.

SOURCE TOPIC · Translation · Formal conclusion

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Must a communicating gesture count as a fifth means?

The objection

- Signs and gestures can prompt action, including when a person does not explicitly recollect words.
- A conventional gesture appears able to carry a meaning just as speech does.
- Context and gesture parts may seem sufficient to express nominal relations.

The Naiyāyika reply

- A gesture's relation to intended action is understood through convention or an inference of intention.
- Gesture can trigger recollection; its specific meanings are not independently fixed in every case.
- Action, case endings and verbal structure are required for determinate relations between nominal meanings.

The source concludes that gesture does not require a separate fifth pramāṇa.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/

Essential conclusions · Four Pramāṇas: The Closing Doctrine

Perception

The first accepted means of knowledge.

Inference

Includes arguments used to infer intentions and presumption.

Comparison

The independent means established in the Upamāna section.

Verbal testimony

Includes tradition and authoritative speech; the source closes with four pramāṇas.

The complete Tattvacintāmaṇi translation concludes here.

(C) Gajendra Thakur, Editor, Videha, First Maithili Fortnightly eJournal

at https://www.videha.co.in/ & https://videha-ejournal.github.io/videha/