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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:06विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:06–0:08विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:08–0:10विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:10–0:12विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:12–0:14विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक।
0:14–0:19who knows it says, the animal that resembles a cow is a gavaia.
0:19–0:24Perception and recollection, when the person later sees such an animal in a forest, the
0:24–0:27instructive statement is recalled.
0:27–0:32Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this animal is the referent
0:32–0:34of the word gavaia.
0:34–0:41This determinant cognition is called upamiti, and its means is called comparison or upamana.
0:41–0:47The section contains a major debate between Sakas and Nayayakas concerning similarity.
0:47–0:53According to them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category.
0:53–0:59According to the text, does the Nayayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view?
0:59–1:06Is similarity an independent category, or merely the presence of certain common properties?
1:06–1:10According to the comparison section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly
1:10–1:15rejects the claim that similarity is an autonomous or separately existing category.
1:16–1:23The Neayaka position is as follows. Not a separate category, similarity is neither an
1:23–1:30independent entity nor a distinct ontological class. Possession of common properties, similarity
1:30–1:34is not a separate thing but merely the presence or possession in one object of several properties
1:34–1:40common to another related object. For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties
1:40–1:42common to a cow.
1:42–1:49According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity.
1:49–1:53When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than
1:53–1:55the presence of shared properties.
1:55–2:00Thus, the Govaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form, and these
2:00–2:03give rise to the cognition of similarity.
2:03–2:09Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity.
2:09–2:13When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow in the instruction what resembles a cow
2:13–2:19as a gavaia is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination, this animal
2:19–2:21is a gavaia.
2:21–2:26The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called
2:26–2:29upamiti, the result of upamana.
2:29–2:34When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination
2:34–2:39arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia.
2:39–2:43The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of the
2:43–2:48relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word.
2:48–2:53The person understands that the word Gavaaya applies to that animal on account of a distinctive
2:53–2:56ground, Gavaayahud.
2:56–2:59An important question arises here.
2:59–3:03Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and
3:03–3:07verbal testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Nayayakas regard it as a wholly
3:07–3:12distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception or
3:12–3:14testimony.
3:14–3:17This is a very important question.
3:17–3:22The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal
3:22–3:28testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons.
3:28–3:32Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then
3:32–3:37a person who had never heard the instruction, a Gavaya resembles a cow, would also come
3:37–3:43to know the word gavaia merely by seeing the animal. This does not happen.
3:43–3:48Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement,
3:48–3:52a person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon
3:52–3:59hearing the instruction, even without seeing the animal. This too is impossible.
3:59–4:04Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through
4:04–4:08the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process of
4:08–4:14a distinct kind. In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the
4:14–4:20relation between the word and its meaning. This cognition of similarity, distinct from
4:20–4:26both testimony and perception, is therefore the means of knowledge called comparison.
4:26–4:31Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life.
4:31–4:38a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name. Instruction, a friend says,
4:38–4:45broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color is deep green. Perception and recollection,
4:45–4:50several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees a green vegetable resembling
4:50–4:58cauliflower. On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered. Comparative cognition is conclusion,
4:58–5:03The person then determines, this green vegetable is the referent of the word broccoli.
5:05–5:08Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's statement,
5:08–5:11the person has fully learned the meaning of the new word broccoli.
5:12–5:16This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge.
5:17–5:20Suppose a child has never seen a zebra.
5:21–5:25Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse,
5:25–5:27but its body has black and white stripes.
5:27–5:34Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and sees a striped,
5:34–5:36horse-like animal.
5:36–5:40The teacher's statement is then recalled.
5:40–5:45Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra.
5:45–5:51Through resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra.
5:51–5:57This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life.
5:57–6:01The final part of the comparison section makes an important point.
6:01–6:06Suppose someone gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal
6:06–6:10that does not resemble a cow is not a gavaia.
6:10–6:15According to the work, even a negative instructional statement such as an animal unlike a cow is
6:15–6:19not a gavaia fully assists in understanding the meaning of a new word through the cognition
6:19–6:21of similarity.
6:21–6:26Although the statement is negative, the speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate
6:26–6:31the similarity between a Gavaia and a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by
6:31–6:36an indirect route, toward the same similarity through which the hearer grasps the words
6:36–6:38referent.
6:38–6:44With this subject, the comparison section of the Tattva Sintmai comes to an end.
6:44–6:49The text is a profound philosophical analysis of the manner in which comparison or similarity
6:49–6:51cognition operates.
6:51–6:56Gangesa Upadyaya refutes the views of other schools, especially the Mtsakhas, and of earlier
6:56–7:02scholars within his own tradition, and establishes the Navya-Naya position.
7:02–7:08The principal philosophical points of the entire discussion are as follows.
7:08–7:12The nature of similarity, the Mtsakhas regard similarity as an independent category distinct
7:12–7:15from the seven accepted categories.
7:15–7:18Gangesa refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession,
7:18–7:22one object, of properties common to another.
7:22–7:26Difference from inference, some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could be known
7:26–7:29through inference or presumption.
7:29–7:33Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of
7:33–7:35knowledge.
7:35–7:40The result of comparison, earlier Neayakas such as Janta by held that the result of
7:40–7:45comparison is nearly understanding, this animal is a Gavaia.
7:45–7:49According to Gangesa, however, its true result is the determination that the semantic power
7:49–7:54and referent of the word Gavaia resides in Gavaiavud, the universal, and not merely in
7:54–7:57one particular animal.
7:57–8:02Let us first understand the dispute between Gangesa and the earlier Neayakas concerning
8:02–8:05the final result of comparison.
8:05–8:09This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaaya.
8:09–8:101.
8:10–8:15The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jatabah, when a person sees the animal in the forest,
8:15–8:20the conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the word gavaaya.
8:20–8:27Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal.
8:27–8:282.
8:28–8:33Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word gavaaya
8:33–8:37were restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second gavaaya encountered
8:37–8:40in the forest the next day.
8:40–8:45Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the determination that the
8:45–8:50semantic power or referent of the word gavya resides not in one animal but in gavyahood,
8:50–8:54the universal, or common property.
8:54–8:59In simple terms, the person learns not merely the name of one animal but that every animal
8:59–9:02possessing gavyahood is called a gavya.
9:02–9:07By the same principle, the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located
9:07–9:14in applehood, the common property of all apples. If only one particular red apple were accepted
9:14–9:18as apple, it would be impossible to call a green or yellow specimen seen the next day an apple.
9:19–9:25Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaia is not one particular animal but the
9:25–9:31universal gavaiahood. Inference requires prior knowledge of a perversion or universal rule
9:31–9:37in order to cognize something new. Thus, to infer fire from smoke, one must already know
9:37–9:43that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. When a person sees the animal in the forest
9:43–9:48and learns the meaning of the word gavaia, does the person already possess a pervasion
9:48–9:52cognition such as whatever resembles a cow is the referent of the word gavaia, or does
9:52–9:58the comparison arise directly after hearing the instruction and seeing the animal?
9:58–10:02The logical process is as follows.
10:02–10:06The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form
10:06–10:09differs in certain respects.
10:09–10:13The instructive statement is then recalled.
10:13–10:17The important point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of
10:17–10:22a pervasion such as wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent.
10:22–10:28The meaning is grasped directly through the conjunction of the instruction and perception.
10:28–10:33After seeing the animal and recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion, this animal
10:33–10:38is the referent of the word gavaya, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one
10:38–10:42animal but extends to the entire universal gavayahood.
10:42–10:47This is the final result of comparison, upamiti.
10:47–10:51That is, the person understands that the word gavaya applies to the particular animal
10:51–10:56seen in the forest and that its referent is Gavaiahood, the universal.
10:56–11:011. Why is comparison different from perception?
11:01–11:06If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving
11:06–11:11any instruction, can the name Gavaia be known merely by sight?
11:11–11:15Inference requires previously established knowledge of perversion, as in the relation
11:15–11:18between fire and smoke.
11:18–11:22No such pervasion cognition is required to understand the word gavaia upon seeing the
11:22–11:23animal.
11:23–11:27Recollection of the instructional statement together with the perception of similarity
11:27–11:31reveals the relation between word and meaning.
11:31–11:35Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition
11:35–11:39differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means
11:39–11:42of knowledge?
11:42–11:46Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition
11:46–11:52distinct from both perception and inference. Different from perception, merely seeing
11:52–11:56a wild animal cannot reveal that its name is Gavaia or that it is the referent of that
11:56–12:02word. Perception can display form and features but not the relation between a name and its
12:02–12:07meaning. Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or
12:07–12:13pervasion, as in the relation of smoke and fire. In comparison, however, without any
12:13–12:19Any prior universal rule, a person understands the referent merely by seeing similarity and
12:19–12:23recalling the instruction.
12:23–12:25Conclusion
12:25–12:29The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and the perception
12:29–12:34of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference.
12:34–12:38Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called
12:38–12:40comparison.
12:40–12:44perception, inference, and verbal testimony.
12:44–12:51In Nyaya philosophy, these three are among the most primary and important means of acquiring knowledge.
12:51–12:55Perception, Pratyaka
12:55–13:00Meaning, Prati, before, Blasaka, I, or, Sense Faculty.
13:00–13:08The direct cognition produced through contact between a sense faculty, I, ear, nose, tongue, or skin, and an object is called Perception.
13:08–13:12Naya regards it as the foremost means of knowledge.
13:12–13:20Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes, or smelling the fragrance of a flower through the nose, is perceptual cognition of the object.
13:20–13:24Inference, Anumana
13:24–13:29The word Anumana signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition.
13:29–13:37On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision, cognition of an unobserved probandom arises.
13:37–13:44Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes, there is fire on the mountain.
13:44–13:49The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire.
13:49–13:53Verbal testimony, sabda.
13:53–14:03Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text.
14:03–14:07Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact,
14:07–14:10but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge.
14:12–14:14Example, an experienced physician says,
14:14–14:17this medicine cures fever, and one takes it.
14:18–14:21The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony.
14:23–14:26Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone,
14:26–14:30it is raining very heavily in Putnamow, and the hearer accepts the statement as true.
14:30–14:35Which of the three means perception, inference, or testimony is being used?
14:35–14:42The friend is truthful and apta, and the hero relies solely upon what the friend has said.
14:42–14:48Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy.
14:48–14:54Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are
14:54–15:01principally present. True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate
15:01–15:08knowledge of the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded. Truthfulness, the person
15:08–15:13must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is, without alteration, deceit, or fraud.
15:15–15:20Impartiality, the person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal interest that
15:20–15:22that could influence the statement.
15:23–15:26A statement made by a person possessing all three qualities
15:26–15:29is accepted as verbal testimony.
15:29–15:31According to the sage Godama,
15:31–15:33such a trustworthy person may be a seer,
15:33–15:35an aria, or a mleka,
15:35–15:37provided these qualities are present.
15:38–15:40Now consider an example.
15:41–15:43Suppose there is a highly renowned physician
15:43–15:45who possesses accurate medical knowledge,
15:45–15:47but who accepts a bride
15:47–15:49from a particular pharmaceutical company
15:49–15:55prescribes that company's medicine. Under Nyaya's three conditions, should the physician statement
15:55–16:03at that time be accepted as fully valid verbal testimony? No. At that time, the physician
16:03–16:09statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony. Although the physician possesses
16:09–16:13accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the bride makes the physician act from
16:13–16:20self-interest and destroys impartiality. According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly
16:20–16:26free from attachment, hatred, personal greed, and self-interest. If greed is present in the speaker's
16:26–16:33mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative. Now that the four means of knowledge, perception,
16:33–16:38inference, comparison, and verbal testimony have been understood, an interesting question
16:38–16:43arises concerning the truth of cognition, related to the previously identified topic of truth and
16:43–16:51error. Cognition obtained through perception is not always 100% true. At times, the sense
16:51–16:58faculties lead us into error. Nyaya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, a prama,
16:58–17:05or illusion. Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this.
17:05–17:10Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope
17:10–17:15lying on the road to be a snake. The eye and the object, the rope, are present, but darkness
17:15–17:18causes the cognition to be erroneous.
17:18–17:24Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert,
17:24–17:27but nothing is found upon approaching it.
17:27–17:31A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in a glass filled with water appears bent
17:31–17:37when viewed from outside. These circumstances show that although perception is a principal
17:37–17:43source of cognition, it may produce error under defective conditions such as poor light, excessive
17:43–17:47distance, or limitations of the sense faculties.
17:47–17:50This leads to a new situation.
17:50–17:55If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake, how can it be established
17:55–17:57that it is really a rope rather than a snake?
17:57–18:01What should be done to test the cognition's validity?
18:01–18:06Neyaya offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error,
18:06–18:12the capacity for successful activity. The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the
18:12–18:18action connected with it. If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to
18:18–18:23drink but finds no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion.
18:24–18:30Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake. If a rope in darkness appears to be
18:30–18:35a snake. What immediate practical measures can a person take to ascertain the truth?
18:36–18:41One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to see whether the
18:41–18:47object moves. If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope in the torchlight,
18:47–18:53the cognition of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends. If it raises its hood,
18:53–18:58the cognition is shown to be true and the person should flee. In this manner, the truth of
18:58–19:03cognition is tested through the success or failure of action.
19:03–19:08Besides Nyayas' four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal
19:08–19:14testimony, there is another well-known Indian school, the Karvaka philosophy.
19:14–19:19Of the four means, the Karvaka's accept only one, perception.
19:19–19:23Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the senses
19:23–19:30eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin is true. They therefore completely reject inference, comparison,
19:30–19:36and verbal testimony as sources of true knowledge. An important issue now arises.
19:37–19:41Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant mountain, fire is inferred there,
19:41–19:47and that this is a valid means of knowledge. Carvaka philosophy does not regard even this as
19:47–19:53absolutely certain. The Carvaca's central argument is that knowledge obtained through inference
19:53–19:59is not always 100% certain and therefore cannot be accepted as an infallible means of knowledge.
20:00–20:05According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances.
20:06–20:08Consider several practical examples.
20:10–20:15Smoke or fog? Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is
20:15–20:22inferred. On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust. The inference
20:22–20:26was completely wrong.
20:26–20:30Inference from past to future. The Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together
20:30–20:34in a kitchen does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be
20:34–20:41accompanied by fire. We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases.
20:41–20:46clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty.
20:46–20:49This raises a serious question.
20:49–20:53If we accept the Carvaca claim that knowledge obtained through inference has no value and
20:53–20:57only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect would this have upon everyday
20:57–20:59life?
20:59–21:05Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable.
21:05–21:12If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible.
21:12–21:16Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy hunger
21:16–21:19and is not poisonous.
21:19–21:23We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood.
21:23–21:28If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all.
21:28–21:33Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at
21:33–21:39the destination. We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall
21:39–21:46arrive safely. Taking medicine when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will
21:46–21:51cure us. We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach.
21:53–21:58Understanding another person's emotions from someone's face, smile, or tears,
21:58–22:04we infer that the person is happy or sad. The emotion within cannot be directly perceived.
22:05–22:10It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot be
22:10–22:15sustained in practical life. No worldly activity could continue without inference.
22:16–22:21Here Nyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition.
22:23–22:27Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most
22:27–22:34important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering. According to Nyaya, the most
22:34–22:40fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false cognition, ignorance or avidya. In
22:40–22:45his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire
22:45–22:47chain of suffering.
22:47–22:531. False cognition, the first cause. It consists in taking a thing to be what it
22:53–22:57is not, for example, treating the body itself as the self, or seeking complete happiness
22:57–22:59in material objects.

Plain text

विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। विश्चिछ नाटक विचार-विमर्शक रेक। who knows it says, the animal that resembles a cow is a gavaia. Perception and recollection, when the person later sees such an animal in a forest, the instructive statement is recalled. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the person then determines, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia. This determinant cognition is called upamiti, and its means is called comparison or upamana. The section contains a major debate between Sakas and Nayayakas concerning similarity. According to them Sakas, similarity is an entirely distinct category. According to the text, does the Nayayaka Gangesa Upadyaya refute this view? Is similarity an independent category, or merely the presence of certain common properties? According to the comparison section of the Tathasintmai, Gangesa Upadyaya explicitly rejects the claim that similarity is an autonomous or separately existing category. The Neayaka position is as follows. Not a separate category, similarity is neither an independent entity nor a distinct ontological class. Possession of common properties, similarity is not a separate thing but merely the presence or possession in one object of several properties common to another related object. For example, a Govaya or Wild Ox possesses many properties common to a cow. According to Gangesa Upadyaya, no additional entity need be postulated to account for similarity. When we perceive likeness between two objects, that likeness is really nothing more than the presence of shared properties. Thus, the Govaya shares with the cow such features as horns, hooves, and bodily form, and these give rise to the cognition of similarity. Treating similarity as a separate entity merely increases unnecessary complexity. When the animal in the forest is seen to resemble a cow in the instruction what resembles a cow as a gavaia is recalled, the process of comparison produces the new determination, this animal is a gavaia. The new fact ultimately ascertained through this entire process of comparison is called upamiti, the result of upamana. When the person sees the animal in the forest and recalls the instruction, the determination arises, this animal is the referent of the word gavaia. The result is not merely the identification of one animal, it is true knowledge of the relation between a word and its meaning, the semantic power of the word. The person understands that the word Gavaaya applies to that animal on account of a distinctive ground, Gavaayahud. An important question arises here. Since the cognition is produced through both perception, the seeing of the animal, and verbal testimony, the hearing of the instruction, why do the Nayayakas regard it as a wholly distinct means of knowledge called comparison rather than subsuming it under perception or testimony. This is a very important question. The Neayakas, especially the earlier Neayakas, do not subsume it under perception or verbal testimony but treat it as an independent means for the following reasons. Not merely perception, if the determination arose only from seeing the animal, then a person who had never heard the instruction, a Gavaya resembles a cow, would also come to know the word gavaia merely by seeing the animal. This does not happen. Not merely verbal testimony, if the cognition arose solely from the instructive statement, a person would possess complete knowledge of the animal and its name immediately upon hearing the instruction, even without seeing the animal. This too is impossible. Different from a mere combination of the two, the cognition of similarity produced through the conjunction of recollecting the instruction and perceiving the animal is a process of a distinct kind. In it, the person goes beyond testimony and perception to understand the relation between the word and its meaning. This cognition of similarity, distinct from both testimony and perception, is therefore the means of knowledge called comparison. Let us understand it through an ordinary example from modern life. a person has never seen broccoli and does not know its name. Instruction, a friend says, broccoli looks very much like cauliflower, but its color is deep green. Perception and recollection, several days later, the person goes to a vegetable market and sees a green vegetable resembling cauliflower. On seeing it, the friend's statement is remembered. Comparative cognition is conclusion, The person then determines, this green vegetable is the referent of the word broccoli. Through the resemblance to cauliflower and the friend's statement, the person has fully learned the meaning of the new word broccoli. This is a precise modern example of comparison as a means of knowledge. Suppose a child has never seen a zebra. Instruction, the teacher says, a zebra looks exactly like a horse, but its body has black and white stripes. Perception and recollection, several days later, the child visits a zoo and sees a striped, horse-like animal. The teacher's statement is then recalled. Comparative cognition is conclusion, the child determines, this animal is a zebra. Through resemblance to a horse, the child understands the meaning of the new word zebra. This process of comparison operates continually in everyday life. The final part of the comparison section makes an important point. Suppose someone gives a negative rather than a positive instruction, such as, an animal that does not resemble a cow is not a gavaia. According to the work, even a negative instructional statement such as an animal unlike a cow is not a gavaia fully assists in understanding the meaning of a new word through the cognition of similarity. Although the statement is negative, the speaker's indirect intention is still to communicate the similarity between a Gavaia and a cow. The negative sentence therefore points, by an indirect route, toward the same similarity through which the hearer grasps the words referent. With this subject, the comparison section of the Tattva Sintmai comes to an end. The text is a profound philosophical analysis of the manner in which comparison or similarity cognition operates. Gangesa Upadyaya refutes the views of other schools, especially the Mtsakhas, and of earlier scholars within his own tradition, and establishes the Navya-Naya position. The principal philosophical points of the entire discussion are as follows. The nature of similarity, the Mtsakhas regard similarity as an independent category distinct from the seven accepted categories. Gangesa refutes this and establishes that similarity is merely the possession, one object, of properties common to another. Difference from inference, some scholars held that the meaning of a new word could be known through inference or presumption. Gangesa rejects these accounts and treats comparison as a wholly independent means of knowledge. The result of comparison, earlier Neayakas such as Janta by held that the result of comparison is nearly understanding, this animal is a Gavaia. According to Gangesa, however, its true result is the determination that the semantic power and referent of the word Gavaia resides in Gavaiavud, the universal, and not merely in one particular animal. Let us first understand the dispute between Gangesa and the earlier Neayakas concerning the final result of comparison. This is a highly innovative idea of Navya Nyaaya. 1. The view of earlier Neayakas such as Jatabah, when a person sees the animal in the forest, the conclusion is, this particular animal standing before me is the meaning of the word gavaaya. Thus, they regard the result of comparison merely as identifying one individual animal. 2. Gangesa Upadyaya's refutation and position, Gangesa argues that if the word gavaaya were restricted to that one animal, what would the person call a second gavaaya encountered in the forest the next day. Accordingly, for Gangesa the actual result of comparison is the determination that the semantic power or referent of the word gavya resides not in one animal but in gavyahood, the universal, or common property. In simple terms, the person learns not merely the name of one animal but that every animal possessing gavyahood is called a gavya. By the same principle, the semantic power or meaning of the word apple must be located in applehood, the common property of all apples. If only one particular red apple were accepted as apple, it would be impossible to call a green or yellow specimen seen the next day an apple. Gangesa therefore holds that the referent of the word gavaia is not one particular animal but the universal gavaiahood. Inference requires prior knowledge of a perversion or universal rule in order to cognize something new. Thus, to infer fire from smoke, one must already know that wherever there is smoke, there is fire. When a person sees the animal in the forest and learns the meaning of the word gavaia, does the person already possess a pervasion cognition such as whatever resembles a cow is the referent of the word gavaia, or does the comparison arise directly after hearing the instruction and seeing the animal? The logical process is as follows. The person goes to the forest and sees an animal whose body resembles a cow although its form differs in certain respects. The instructive statement is then recalled. The important point is that the person does not require any prior formal cognition of a pervasion such as wherever similarity is present, the word has that referent. The meaning is grasped directly through the conjunction of the instruction and perception. After seeing the animal and recalling the instruction, the person reaches the conclusion, this animal is the referent of the word gavaya, and understands that the referent is not restricted to one animal but extends to the entire universal gavayahood. This is the final result of comparison, upamiti. That is, the person understands that the word gavaya applies to the particular animal seen in the forest and that its referent is Gavaiahood, the universal. 1. Why is comparison different from perception? If a person merely goes to the forest and sees the animal, without previously receiving any instruction, can the name Gavaia be known merely by sight? Inference requires previously established knowledge of perversion, as in the relation between fire and smoke. No such pervasion cognition is required to understand the word gavaia upon seeing the animal. Recollection of the instructional statement together with the perception of similarity reveals the relation between word and meaning. Considering these two points, how would one explain in one's own words that this cognition differs from perception and inference and therefore constitutes an independent means of knowledge? Comparison is an independent means of knowledge because it yields a kind of cognition distinct from both perception and inference. Different from perception, merely seeing a wild animal cannot reveal that its name is Gavaia or that it is the referent of that word. Perception can display form and features but not the relation between a name and its meaning. Different from inference, inference requires a previously known fixed rule or pervasion, as in the relation of smoke and fire. In comparison, however, without any Any prior universal rule, a person understands the referent merely by seeing similarity and recalling the instruction. Conclusion The holy new cognition produced through the conjunction of instruction and the perception of similarity cannot be fully classified either as perception or as inference. Gangesa Upadyaya therefore treats it as an independent means of knowledge called comparison. perception, inference, and verbal testimony. In Nyaya philosophy, these three are among the most primary and important means of acquiring knowledge. Perception, Pratyaka Meaning, Prati, before, Blasaka, I, or, Sense Faculty. The direct cognition produced through contact between a sense faculty, I, ear, nose, tongue, or skin, and an object is called Perception. Naya regards it as the foremost means of knowledge. Example, seeing fire burning on a stove with one's eyes, or smelling the fragrance of a flower through the nose, is perceptual cognition of the object. Inference, Anumana The word Anumana signifies a cognition arising after a prior cognition. On the basis of an observed reason and a previously known provision, cognition of an unobserved probandom arises. Example, when smoke is seen rising from a distant mountain, one concludes, there is fire on the mountain. The governing provision is, wherever there is smoke, there is fire. Verbal testimony, sabda. Meaning, cognition obtained from the statement of a trustworthy, authoritative, and truthful person, called an apta, or from an authoritative text. Here one neither directly perceives nor independently infers the fact, but accepts the statement of an expert or text as a means of knowledge. Example, an experienced physician says, this medicine cures fever, and one takes it. The source of the cognition is the physician's verbal testimony. Suppose a close and truthful friend says by telephone, it is raining very heavily in Putnamow, and the hearer accepts the statement as true. Which of the three means perception, inference, or testimony is being used? The friend is truthful and apta, and the hero relies solely upon what the friend has said. Let us discuss the characteristics of a trustworthy person in Nyaya philosophy. Nyaya maintains that a person is trustworthy only when the following three qualities are principally present. True knowledge or expertise, the person must possess complete and accurate knowledge of the subject, and must be neither ignorant nor deluded. Truthfulness, the person must desire to communicate the knowledge exactly as it is, without alteration, deceit, or fraud. Impartiality, the person must be free from attachment, hatred, and personal interest that that could influence the statement. A statement made by a person possessing all three qualities is accepted as verbal testimony. According to the sage Godama, such a trustworthy person may be a seer, an aria, or a mleka, provided these qualities are present. Now consider an example. Suppose there is a highly renowned physician who possesses accurate medical knowledge, but who accepts a bride from a particular pharmaceutical company prescribes that company's medicine. Under Nyaya's three conditions, should the physician statement at that time be accepted as fully valid verbal testimony? No. At that time, the physician statement should not be accepted as valid verbal testimony. Although the physician possesses accurate knowledge of the illness and medicine, the bride makes the physician act from self-interest and destroys impartiality. According to Nyaya, a trustworthy speaker must be wholly free from attachment, hatred, personal greed, and self-interest. If greed is present in the speaker's mind, the statement ceases to be authoritative. Now that the four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony have been understood, an interesting question arises concerning the truth of cognition, related to the previously identified topic of truth and error. Cognition obtained through perception is not always 100% true. At times, the sense faculties lead us into error. Nyaya calls such false cognition invalid cognition, a prama, or illusion. Several celebrated philosophical and practical examples illustrate this. Mistaking a rope for a snake, in the darkness of night, one suddenly takes a straight rope lying on the road to be a snake. The eye and the object, the rope, are present, but darkness causes the cognition to be erroneous. Mirage, in intense heat, water appears at a distance on a paved road or in a desert, but nothing is found upon approaching it. A bent stick in water, a straight stick placed in a glass filled with water appears bent when viewed from outside. These circumstances show that although perception is a principal source of cognition, it may produce error under defective conditions such as poor light, excessive distance, or limitations of the sense faculties. This leads to a new situation. If a person sees an object in darkness and mistakes it for a snake, how can it be established that it is really a rope rather than a snake? What should be done to test the cognition's validity? Neyaya offers a highly practical means of distinguishing valid cognition from error, the capacity for successful activity. The truth of a cognition is tested by the success of the action connected with it. If water appears at a distance in a mirage and a person goes there to drink but finds no water, the effort fails and the cognition is shown to be an illusion. Apply this doctrine to the example of the rope and snake. If a rope in darkness appears to be a snake. What immediate practical measures can a person take to ascertain the truth? One might switch on a mobile phone torch, or throw a small stone from a distance to see whether the object moves. If it does not move when struck, or is clearly seen to be a rope in the torchlight, the cognition of a snake is shown to be erroneous and fear ends. If it raises its hood, the cognition is shown to be true and the person should flee. In this manner, the truth of cognition is tested through the success or failure of action. Besides Nyayas' four means of knowledge, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal testimony, there is another well-known Indian school, the Karvaka philosophy. Of the four means, the Karvaka's accept only one, perception. Their explicit position is that only what can be directly experienced through the senses eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin is true. They therefore completely reject inference, comparison, and verbal testimony as sources of true knowledge. An important issue now arises. Nyaya says that when smoke is seen on a distant mountain, fire is inferred there, and that this is a valid means of knowledge. Carvaka philosophy does not regard even this as absolutely certain. The Carvaca's central argument is that knowledge obtained through inference is not always 100% certain and therefore cannot be accepted as an infallible means of knowledge. According to the Carvacas, inference can prove false in many circumstances. Consider several practical examples. Smoke or fog? Suppose something resembling smoke is seen on a mountain and fire is inferred. On approaching, however, it turns out to be fog or a cloud of dust. The inference was completely wrong. Inference from past to future. The Carvacas say that observing fire and smoke together in a kitchen does not guarantee that smoke will everywhere in the universe always be accompanied by fire. We cannot guarantee future or unobserved cases. clear position is that inference yields probability, not certainty. This raises a serious question. If we accept the Carvaca claim that knowledge obtained through inference has no value and only what is seen with the eyes is true, what effect would this have upon everyday life? Consider ordinary activities in which complete dependence upon inference is unavoidable. If, following the Carvaca position, we abandon inference, all of them would become impossible. Eating food, when we eat, we infer from past experience that the food will satisfy hunger and is not poisonous. We cannot directly see it being digested and converted into blood. If we doubted every morsel and refused to infer, we could not eat at all. Travelling, when boarding a bus or train, we do not directly perceive our arrival at the destination. We infer that the driver will operate the vehicle properly and that we shall arrive safely. Taking medicine when bodily pain leads us to take medicine, we infer that it will cure us. We do not see with our eyes how the medicine works after entering the stomach. Understanding another person's emotions from someone's face, smile, or tears, we infer that the person is happy or sad. The emotion within cannot be directly perceived. It is therefore clear that the Kravaka claim that inference is entirely useless cannot be sustained in practical life. No worldly activity could continue without inference. Here Nyaya's position is vindicated, inference is a highly important means of true cognition. Having understood Nyaya's means of acquiring knowledge, let us turn to its final and most important goal, apavarga, liberation or release from suffering. According to Nyaya, the most fundamental root cause of every form of suffering is false cognition, ignorance or avidya. In his aphorisms, the sage Gautama explains how suffering arises and presents an entire chain of suffering. 1. False cognition, the first cause. It consists in taking a thing to be what it is not, for example, treating the body itself as the self, or seeking complete happiness in material objects.

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