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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:32आपसंष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आ�
0:32–0:37meaning alone causes valid cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of
0:37–0:41error and the other defects becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose
0:41–0:45a sentence merely because those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence
0:45–0:50meaning. Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain the inference to the speaker's
0:50–0:54valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects
0:54–0:56is not the cause of that inference.
0:56–1:01Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence
1:01–1:07of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda
1:07–1:12only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that
1:12–1:17the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore
1:17–1:22positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly
1:22–1:28complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge,
1:28–1:32Moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of
1:32–1:36such complexity does not arise.
1:36–1:40Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness
1:40–1:43in them.
1:43–1:46It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block the
1:46–1:51causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic
1:51–1:57and ordinary speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition.
1:57–2:02Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness.
2:02–2:05This too is untenable.
2:05–2:08The opposing inhibitor can be refuted.
2:08–2:12A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there
2:12–2:17is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow
2:17–2:21to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted
2:21–2:25as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect.
2:25–2:29Each sentences, not depending on another means such as inference, would then become like
2:29–2:32the Veda.
2:32–2:37Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot
2:37–2:40are not valid.
2:40–2:44An objection arises, on the Nayayika view, how can the sentences of a mistaken person,
2:44–2:49a deceiver, or a parrot be valid or authoritative when they are not produced from merit?
2:49–2:53It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a sentence is invalid because
2:53–2:58it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of the speaker's intention.
2:58–3:01Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference proving their
3:01–3:04invalidity would be contradicted.
3:04–3:08Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic
3:08–3:10fitness.
3:10–3:13Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an
3:13–3:16object of error is sublated.
3:16–3:17This view is unsound.
3:17–3:21A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by
3:21–3:26taking some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely
3:26–3:30the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance
3:30–3:36of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot
3:36–3:40produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind.
3:41–3:48This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions
3:48–3:54is present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition
3:54–3:59corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is
3:59–4:06experienced. On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke,
4:06–4:10that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as
4:10–4:15the mark. Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for
4:15–4:18for recognition takes the same fire as its object.
4:18–4:21In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow,
4:21–4:23it is also impossible to make a different substancehood
4:23–4:26the probandom, identity with another substancehood
4:26–4:28cannot be superimposed.
4:28–4:30Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood
4:30–4:33is known through superimposition of the relation.
4:33–4:35Therefore, though the qualitative component
4:35–4:37of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid
4:37–4:40because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom.
4:42–4:44The traditionalists reply,
4:45–4:51The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot,
4:51–4:55only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause.
4:55–5:00Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy
5:00–5:04person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting
5:04–5:07in cognition of sentence meaning.
5:07–5:11Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the
5:11–5:15utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda.
5:15–5:19It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements
5:19–5:23disappear because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God.
5:23–5:26This objection is unsound.
5:26–5:31A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition.
5:31–5:34If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference
5:34–5:38is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the
5:38–5:43probandom fire, not the false component of the mark. This is the traditionalist view.
5:45–5:50The Neyayaka reply, semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits.
5:52–5:57The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence
5:57–6:02meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition. For reasons of economy and
6:02–6:08necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct cognition of that fitness,
6:08–6:14are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception,
6:14–6:18correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated.
6:19–6:24Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning
6:24–6:28different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition
6:28–6:33of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a
6:33–6:38trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there.
6:39–6:44It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even in
6:44–6:49the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend Vyuh, while the hearer, through an error about the
6:49–6:53speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness
6:53–6:58favorable to the lion sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid.
6:58–7:04answer the possibility of such a case is itself accepted but if the sentence
7:04–7:08Harry exists did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by
7:08–7:11the speaker conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative
7:11–7:15testimony in the sense of a lion therefore in both Vedic and non Vedic
7:15–7:18speech only correct cognition of fitness and the other conditions is the
7:18–7:24merit that is the cause of valid cognition the speakers correct cognition
7:24–7:28of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda.
7:28–7:33Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted
7:33–7:37as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted
7:37–7:39as a merit in the Veda.
7:39–7:43The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical
7:43–7:48person because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning,
7:48–7:50like the sentence, bring the cow.
7:50–7:53This inference establishes God as the speaker.
7:53–7:55This objection is unsound.
7:55–7:59The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct
7:59–8:04cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present,
8:04–8:06as is correct cognition of fitness.
8:06–8:10Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless.
8:10–8:14A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted
8:14–8:17as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible
8:17–8:19in the Veda without such cognition?
8:19–8:24Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required
8:24–8:28for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence
8:28–8:30meaning from these words.
8:30–8:35There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause.
8:35–8:38That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting
8:38–8:42the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the
8:42–8:45separate cause of the use of each word.
8:45–8:49Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as
8:49–8:54the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the
8:54–8:58speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence
8:58–9:03in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayayika replies that
9:03–9:06the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted
9:06–9:10person and that person's activity. The speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not
9:10–9:14cause the use of the word group. The causes of word use are fitness and the other
9:14–9:17conditions.
9:17–9:20is not a merit.
9:20–9:24It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object
9:24–9:26of a speaker's intention.
9:26–9:31Intention is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning.
9:31–9:34Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless
9:34–9:38God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated
9:38–9:41by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning.
9:41–9:46If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows.
9:46–9:50Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate
9:50–9:55every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition
9:55–9:57of Vedic meaning arises.
9:57–10:01In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic
10:01–10:04meanings, is established as a merit.
10:04–10:07This proposal is unsound.
10:07–10:10A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme with Mechran as it
10:10–10:15with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention
10:15–10:20of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning
10:20–10:26necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional
10:26–10:31recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession
10:31–10:36of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately
10:36–10:38except God?
10:38–10:43Objection! How can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention of communicating
10:43–10:47a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning.
10:47–10:51Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech
10:51–10:53and its meaning could not be determined.
10:53–10:56Answer, this is unsound.
10:56–10:59In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge
10:59–11:03of Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgas and the like, and at some time must
11:03–11:07have recited the Vedic with the intention of communicating those meanings.
11:07–11:13That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered with intention.
11:13–11:19The Prabhupākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced.
11:19–11:24The Prabhupākaraṃsākas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete
11:24–11:28causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known.
11:28–11:33Varidicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause
11:33–11:38of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition.
11:38–11:42This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither
11:42–11:45merit nor absence of defect.
11:45–11:51There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature.
11:51–11:56Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition
11:56–11:59is equally cognition.
11:59–12:03The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that
12:03–12:06it produces contrary activity.
12:06–12:11Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition,
12:11–12:15is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically
12:15–12:21by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition,
12:21–12:25all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary
12:25–12:29conduct. Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension
12:29–12:32of the lack of relation between property and substrate, together with non-apprehension
12:32–12:37of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically through conjunction of an additional defect
12:37–12:41with the cognitive aggregate, through defect produced non-apprehension of non-relation,
12:41–12:44or through relation to a defect after cognition has arisen.
12:44–12:47It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone.
12:47–12:52Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition.
12:52–12:56Invalidity as the causality of contrary activity is known through a sublating cognition,
12:56–12:59it is not intrinsically known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive
12:59–13:02awareness of that cognition.
13:02–13:05Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition, because there
13:05–13:07is deviation there.
13:07–13:13Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not from merit or absence of defect.
13:13–13:20Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object.
13:20–13:28Cognition of a nonexistent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated nonexistent object.
13:28–13:33Varidicality is intrinsically known.
13:33–13:37A defecter loan cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect
13:37–13:39causes invalidity.
13:39–13:44Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity.
13:44–13:47Answer, this is unsound.
13:47–13:51One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a nonexistent object, depend
13:51–13:55on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object
13:55–13:58it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition.
13:58–14:02With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect
14:02–14:08and absence of defect. Therefore defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively
14:08–14:12producing validity and invalidity. Cognitive validity is the condition of taking
14:12–14:16his object a thing possessing the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition
14:16–14:22furnished with that same qualifier residing in the thing. As self-luminous, the cognition,
14:22–14:25this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits and illuminates its
14:25–14:29validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking his object the silverness of
14:29–14:34thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible
14:34–14:38in the absence of proof.
14:38–14:41An alternative Prabhupācra view.
14:41–14:45Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive
14:45–14:49aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing
14:49–14:54validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining
14:54–14:59an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may
14:59–15:03be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on knowledge of
15:03–15:09cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as this thing
15:09–15:13has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity
15:13–15:18depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically
15:18–15:23delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
15:23–15:27The Prabhikara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently
15:27–15:31of determination of validity, is not determination of the object.
15:31–15:35Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own
15:35–15:37object either.
15:37–15:41Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination.
15:41–15:45A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity,
15:45–15:49and a third for the second, producing infinite regress.
15:49–15:53The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect
15:53–15:58also produces regressive only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines
15:58–16:03the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the
16:03–16:07validity of the first, and a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second.
16:08–16:11Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object.
16:12–16:16Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity,
16:16–16:20the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity.
16:20–16:26Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known.
16:26–16:34When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress.
16:34–16:38The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity.
16:38–16:43After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs.
16:43–16:48To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object,
16:48–16:53the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even
16:53–16:57the Naya Yuka accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically
16:57–17:00known from the cognitive aggregate.
17:00–17:02The Prabhakara conclusion
17:02–17:08Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the
17:08–17:10cognitive aggregate.
17:10–17:14When in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would
17:14–17:18be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted.
17:18–17:21Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise?
17:21–17:24Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity.
17:24–17:28Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition
17:28–17:32does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here.
17:32–17:36Answer, this objection is unsound.
17:36–17:39In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition
17:39–17:45is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such
17:45–17:49cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives
17:49–17:54and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a
17:54–17:58defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity extrinsically,
17:58–18:02and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it.
18:02–18:06The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality, which
18:06–18:11is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause,
18:11–18:14therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate.
18:15–18:20Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive
18:20–18:25aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is
18:25–18:29determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically
18:29–18:34produced from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly
18:34–18:39complex. The Nayaika himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition
18:39–18:43and object, not merely from experientiality, because memory would be a counter-example.
18:44–18:49In scholastic usage, experience, and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because
18:49–18:54of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means
18:54–18:56of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression.
18:56–19:03Recutation of the Prabhakara view
19:03–19:06Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view.
19:06–19:10Experience establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that
19:10–19:15validity, causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this.
19:15–19:18Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object.
19:18–19:22In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the
19:22–19:27object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt about
19:27–19:33cognitive validity. If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination
19:33–19:37of object validity will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form
19:37–19:41of two opposing cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object.
19:41–19:46Therefore an illusion like cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering
19:46–19:50activity, activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion.
19:50–19:55Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises, because the validity of the
19:55–19:57object is determined.
19:57–20:00There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference
20:00–20:03or one qualified cognition.
20:03–20:08This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition,
20:08–20:09activity arises.
20:09–20:13Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning
20:13–20:18something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity.
20:18–20:24only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity.
20:24–20:27Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion
20:27–20:31and activity sometimes fails despite its presence.
20:31–20:34Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the cause is
20:34–20:35needlessly complex.

Plain text

आपसंष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आप्संष अव आ� meaning alone causes valid cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause of that inference. Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge, Moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of such complexity does not arise. Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness in them. It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block the causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic and ordinary speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition. Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness. This too is untenable. The opposing inhibitor can be refuted. A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect. Each sentences, not depending on another means such as inference, would then become like the Veda. Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot are not valid. An objection arises, on the Nayayika view, how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver, or a parrot be valid or authoritative when they are not produced from merit? It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted. Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind. This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced. On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke, that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as the mark. Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for for recognition takes the same fire as its object. In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow, it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom, identity with another substancehood cannot be superimposed. Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation. Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom. The traditionalists reply, The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause. Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition of sentence meaning. Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda. It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements disappear because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God. This objection is unsound. A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition. If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the probandom fire, not the false component of the mark. This is the traditionalist view. The Neyayaka reply, semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits. The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition. For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct cognition of that fitness, are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception, correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated. Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there. It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even in the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend Vyuh, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to the lion sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid. answer the possibility of such a case is itself accepted but if the sentence Harry exists did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by the speaker conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in the sense of a lion therefore in both Vedic and non Vedic speech only correct cognition of fitness and the other conditions is the merit that is the cause of valid cognition the speakers correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda. Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted as a merit in the Veda. The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning, like the sentence, bring the cow. This inference establishes God as the speaker. This objection is unsound. The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present, as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless. A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda without such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence meaning from these words. There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause. That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the separate cause of the use of each word. Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayayika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity. The speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group. The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions. is not a merit. It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object of a speaker's intention. Intention is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit. This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme with Mechran as it with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately except God? Objection! How can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention of communicating a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning. Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech and its meaning could not be determined. Answer, this is unsound. In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgas and the like, and at some time must have recited the Vedic with the intention of communicating those meanings. That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered with intention. The Prabhupākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced. The Prabhupākaraṃsākas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known. Varidicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition. This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition is equally cognition. The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that it produces contrary activity. Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition, is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary conduct. Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect produced non-apprehension of non-relation, or through relation to a defect after cognition has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition. Invalidity as the causality of contrary activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition. Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition, because there is deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a nonexistent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated nonexistent object. Varidicality is intrinsically known. A defecter loan cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect causes invalidity. Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity. Answer, this is unsound. One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a nonexistent object, depend on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition. With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect and absence of defect. Therefore defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity and invalidity. Cognitive validity is the condition of taking his object a thing possessing the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing in the thing. As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking his object the silverness of thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof. An alternative Prabhupācra view. Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as this thing has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity, is not determination of the object. Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object either. Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination. A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite regress. The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect also produces regressive only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first, and a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second. Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object. Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity, the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity. Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known. When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress. The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity. After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs. To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even the Naya Yuka accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara conclusion Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. When in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted. Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise? Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity. Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here. Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity extrinsically, and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it. The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality, which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause, therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate. Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Nayaika himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from experientiality, because memory would be a counter-example. In scholastic usage, experience, and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression. Recutation of the Prabhakara view Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view. Experience establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity, causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this. Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object. In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt about cognitive validity. If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object validity will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form of two opposing cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion like cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering activity, activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion. Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises, because the validity of the object is determined. There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition. This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition, activity arises. Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity. only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity. Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion and activity sometimes fails despite its presence. Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the cause is needlessly complex.

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