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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:06CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW
0:06–0:12Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition.
0:12–0:18Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object.
0:18–0:24Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion.
0:24–0:29Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion.
0:29–0:35Ordinary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating
0:35–0:39this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction.
0:39–0:43Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from
0:43–0:48illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity.
0:49–0:53It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
0:54–0:58This is not correct. Validity as qualified cognition hood is a cognition that takes
0:58–1:02as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate
1:02–1:07and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent,
1:07–1:12this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-luminosity
1:12–1:17illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible
1:17–1:21even in the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically
1:21–1:25produced merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would
1:25–1:30likewise have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion.
1:30–1:34The Neo Prabhupra View.
1:34–1:39The Neo Prabhupramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent
1:39–1:40difference.
1:40–1:46Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known.
1:46–1:50Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition
1:50–1:56of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
1:56–2:02Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known
2:02–2:06in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence.
2:07–2:12Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising.
2:13–2:18Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation,
2:18–2:21therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect.
2:21–2:27Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes,
2:27–2:30non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference.
2:31–2:35The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object,
2:35–2:37it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
2:38–2:41In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect.
2:42–2:46Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two
2:46–2:49alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of
2:49–2:55of an existent difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity.
2:55–2:58Gangesa's Conclusion
2:58–3:03Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound.
3:03–3:07Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity, it
3:07–3:11is pointless to call something else validity.
3:11–3:16If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from
3:16–3:19the cognitive aggregate would be impossible.
3:19–3:24For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference
3:24–3:27is absent, nor was it remembered earlier.
3:27–3:32Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension
3:32–3:36of a non-existent difference.
3:36–3:40This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation
3:40–3:44and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation.
3:44–3:49If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, doubt
3:49–3:53about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even
3:53–3:56in an unhabituated state.
3:56–4:01Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity, is a specific
4:01–4:05cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property
4:05–4:09consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation.
4:09–4:13Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent
4:13–4:18difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
4:18–4:21Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception
4:21–4:23of a distinguishing feature.
4:23–4:28Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established.
4:28–4:34Here ends the theory of the production of validity.
4:34–4:38The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge.
4:38–4:42The definition of Prama.
4:42–4:49Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Prama, validity is not a universal.
4:49–4:54What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is
4:54–5:01cognitive validity. It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal,
5:01–5:07as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual
5:07–5:13cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition is this cognition valid or
5:13–5:18not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference,
5:18–5:23therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal,
5:24–5:27it would overlap with perceptuality.
5:27–5:32The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the causes
5:32–5:37of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity.
5:37–5:42If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous
5:42–5:46and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear
5:46–5:50and the defect of non-recurrence would arise.
5:50–5:54Therefore validity is not a universal.
5:54–6:01The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component.
6:01–6:06If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular
6:06–6:11component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every
6:11–6:13part of its substrates.
6:13–6:17In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is silver, the
6:17–6:22shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity and invalidity
6:22–6:26are experienced according to the difference of components.
6:26–6:32A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference.
6:32–6:36It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component, like memory,
6:36–6:39it should have the same status in both components.
6:39–6:44Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience,
6:44–6:47but that definition will be refuted below.
6:47–6:50Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition
6:50–6:55does not establish validity as a universal.
6:55–6:57Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively
6:57–7:00occurrent.
7:00–7:05It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence of validity
7:05–7:08reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively
7:08–7:10occurrent properties.
7:10–7:11By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively
7:11–7:14occurrent is not pervasively occurrent, and what is pervasively
7:14–7:19occurrent is not non-pervasively occurrent, as restricted, validity and its absence
7:19–7:24may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively occurant.
7:24–7:29This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist
7:29–7:33in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a
7:33–7:38tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different
7:38–7:41objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them.
7:41–7:45Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve
7:45–7:50the problem, because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver
7:50–7:55is also present. Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively
7:55–7:59occurrent properties is incoherent.
7:59–8:05Absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter.
8:05–8:09The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a
8:09–8:13mode, and making a property present in the qualificand a mode, may respectively delimit
8:13–8:18the occurrence of validity and absence of validity. Answer, these conditions may explain
8:18–8:24the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity.
8:24–8:28It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate of validity
8:28–8:31or its absence.
8:31–8:37Recutation of the Prabhācāra view The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition
8:37–8:41apprehending an object not previously apprehended, or the condition of being valid cognition
8:41–8:47established by ordinary usage is validity. This view is unacceptable. In the immediately
8:47–8:51repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition, this is a post, there
8:51–8:55is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet the later cognition can
8:55–8:59be veridical. The Prabhikara may say that perception
8:59–9:03apprehends a present object, since the post qualified by each present moment was not
9:03–9:08previously apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instance are super sensible,
9:08–9:12is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour.
9:12–9:15Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant,
9:15–9:20and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning too a new object is not apprehended at every moment.
9:20–9:26Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity.
9:26–9:33Veridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud.
9:33–9:37Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity.
9:37–9:42Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property
9:42–9:47such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too.
9:47–9:51Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity, because
9:51–9:55these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because they
9:55–10:01depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence.
10:01–10:05Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition
10:05–10:10opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive.
10:10–10:14Corroborated experientiality can occur in illusion too.
10:14–10:18If validity is defined as experientiality producing successful activity, cognitions
10:18–10:22met with indifference are excluded, and, success, must again be defined through valid
10:22–10:24cognition.
10:24–10:28Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an unreal object
10:28–10:32is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest its
10:32–10:36experience would equally occur in illusion.
10:36–10:40Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence in the qualific
10:40–10:44and is not Pramahud.
10:44–10:48It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as mode of property that
10:48–10:53is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualific and.
10:53–10:58But this definition does not apply to veridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction
10:58–11:01is non pervasively a current.
11:01–11:06If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current, it overextends
11:06–11:11to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of
11:11–11:15absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current.
11:15–11:20A definition based on neutral absence also fails.
11:20–11:23Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively a current because they have
11:23–11:27distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top.
11:27–11:33The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former
11:33–11:36blackness because the times differ.
11:36–11:41Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute or mutual absence remains stable
11:41–11:46without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters.
11:46–11:51Objecthood is a special mode of qualification.
11:51–11:55Experience that does not make his mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not
11:55–11:57Pramahood.
11:57–12:03In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualificon may occur as modes.
12:03–12:08Nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualifcans,
12:08–12:13then the condition that the property be absent from the qualificon becomes pointless, and
12:13–12:17because all modes do not reside in a single qualificon the definition will not apply
12:17–12:20to collective cognition.
12:20–12:23The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition
12:23–12:26is the delimiter of objecthood.
12:26–12:30In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited
12:30–12:34by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable
12:34–12:36silverness.
12:36–12:40Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future
12:40–12:42objects.
12:42–12:46Objecthood is a special qualitative relation between cognition and object, a special relational
12:46–12:48property of its own.
12:48–12:52A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that,
12:52–12:57knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that
12:57–13:02a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate
13:02–13:07must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot,
13:07–13:11involving an instrumental relation through pothood, would be impossible.
13:11–13:17Motehood 2 is one kind of this special relation, not mere objecthood.
13:17–13:22Experience whose mode is co-located with objecthood is not valid cognition.
13:22–13:27It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is collocated with object hood,
13:27–13:30or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode.
13:30–13:34This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies
13:34–13:38to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this, and the
13:38–13:42mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate.
13:42–13:47If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality
13:47–13:51must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless.
13:52–13:58A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not
13:58–14:04exclude the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect
14:04–14:11either. Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located
14:11–14:18elsewhere is not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid
14:18–14:23when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood.
14:24–14:29In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one
14:29–14:35qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason
14:35–14:39the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as,
14:39–14:45this is both silver and shell. It is contradictory to say that objecthood
14:45–14:49delimited by a sublating property is also undelimited by that same property.
14:50–14:55Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes
14:55–15:00his motive property not residing where objecthood resides likewise overextends to an illusion
15:00–15:05containing a shellless component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively
15:05–15:11a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition.
15:11–15:20avoidance of under extension or failure of application. Some scholars say that validity
15:20–15:26and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory
15:26–15:31and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in
15:31–15:37the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make
15:37–15:42mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes
15:42–15:48is moda property not co-located with objecthood is illusion and experience distinct from it is valid
15:48–15:54also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable no ability is imagined not to reside in
15:54–16:00objecthood the definition will not apply. In illusion objecthood together with silverness
16:00–16:06resides in real silver therefore merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood cognition of silver
16:06–16:11in a shell would have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition
16:11–16:19results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not
16:19–16:26admissible. If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver, with
16:26–16:31silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition the shell is silver will not be
16:31–16:37valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component,
16:37–16:41for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component.
16:41–16:47If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in the
16:47–16:52qualificative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. Superimposed
16:52–16:57identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of
16:57–17:02the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifiers in the
17:02–17:06objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as
17:06–17:09simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component.
17:11–17:13Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:15–17:20The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a
17:20–17:25qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood
17:25–17:31also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, noability is the mode,
17:31–17:36imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition
17:36–17:38will not apply to that valid cognition.
17:39–17:44The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the
17:44–17:49like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter-positive of an absence
17:49–17:53is delimited by the property delimiting counter-positiveness, the condition,
17:53–17:57undilimited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form
17:57–18:02from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends to illusion and under
18:02–18:07extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of Prama
18:07–18:19in the perception section. The established definition of Prama. An experience having a mode in what
18:19–18:26actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of the doctrine says, experience or cognition of an
18:26–18:33entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is
18:33–18:36valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property.
18:38–18:42Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid,
18:42–18:47or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that
18:47–18:53property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity.
18:54–18:58Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate,
18:58–19:04cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode.
19:06–19:11Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition.
19:13–19:17God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualifikan form,
19:17–19:22he knows the qualifikan of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property separately as
19:22–19:28a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from both valid and
19:28–19:34invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling it inexpressible
19:34–19:39in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and
19:39–19:46universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness
19:46–19:50resides in the shell, and invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made a mode in
19:50–19:56the shell where silverness is absent. But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and
19:56–20:01cloth is not invalid in its qualifical components, pothood or clothhood is not manifested as
20:01–20:07a mode in the substrate of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid
20:07–20:15cognition, only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition
20:15–20:18of non-pervasively-occurrent presence and absence.
20:18–20:24Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively-occurrent positive entity such as conjunction and of
20:24–20:28its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualifcant,
20:28–20:33single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top.
20:34–20:39Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts, the root
20:39–20:44and top. Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part in
20:44–20:49which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction.
20:50–20:57Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump. Before firing,
20:57–21:02A pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has been fired red,
21:02–21:08the cognition this pot is now black is invalid. Use in this definition of relational expressions
21:08–21:13such as in the manner and at the time in which is not a defect of failed generalization.
21:14–21:19The litity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific
21:19–21:28substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition. The view of others. Other scholars
21:28–21:32say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity.
21:32–21:38Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component.
21:38–21:44Nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined.
21:44–21:48Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness, is valid cognition
21:48–21:54concerning silver, while experience of silverness in a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness,
21:54–21:58is invalid cognition concerning silver.
21:58–22:03On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition
22:03–22:06with its specific object causes unwavering activity.
22:06–22:10If specific objecthood belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid
22:10–22:14cognition may be defined as, experience that does not make as mode a property absent from
22:14–22:17the substrate of objecthood.
22:17–22:21Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode co-located with objecthood
22:21–22:25may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid.
22:25–22:29In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of
22:29–22:32valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

Plain text

CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition. Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object. Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion. Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion. Ordinary non-Vedic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction. Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity. It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. This is not correct. Validity as qualified cognition hood is a cognition that takes as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent, this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-luminosity illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible even in the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion. The Neo Prabhupra View. The Neo Prabhupramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known. Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence. Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising. Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation, therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect. Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference. The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object, it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect. Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of of an existent difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity. Gangesa's Conclusion Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound. Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity, it is pointless to call something else validity. If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from the cognitive aggregate would be impossible. For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference is absent, nor was it remembered earlier. Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation. If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, doubt about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity, is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation. Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established. Here ends the theory of the production of validity. The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Prama. Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Prama, validity is not a universal. What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive validity. It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition is this cognition valid or not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity. If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal. The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component. If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components. Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience, but that definition will be refuted below. Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish validity as a universal. Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurrent. It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence of validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively occurrent properties. By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively occurrent is not pervasively occurrent, and what is pervasively occurrent is not non-pervasively occurrent, as restricted, validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively occurant. This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them. Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem, because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present. Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively occurrent properties is incoherent. Absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter. The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a mode, and making a property present in the qualificand a mode, may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity. Answer, these conditions may explain the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate of validity or its absence. Recutation of the Prabhācāra view The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended, or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage is validity. This view is unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet the later cognition can be veridical. The Prabhikara may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the post qualified by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instance are super sensible, is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning too a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity. Veridical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud. Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too. Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity, because these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because they depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence. Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive. Corroborated experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing successful activity, cognitions met with indifference are excluded, and, success, must again be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion. Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence in the qualific and is not Pramahud. It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as mode of property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualific and. But this definition does not apply to veridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction is non pervasively a current. If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current, it overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current. A definition based on neutral absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively a current because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters. Objecthood is a special mode of qualification. Experience that does not make his mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not Pramahood. In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualificon may occur as modes. Nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualifcans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualificon becomes pointless, and because all modes do not reside in a single qualificon the definition will not apply to collective cognition. The qualifcant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition is the delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable silverness. Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future objects. Objecthood is a special qualitative relation between cognition and object, a special relational property of its own. A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that, knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of, this object is known as a pot, involving an instrumental relation through pothood, would be impossible. Motehood 2 is one kind of this special relation, not mere objecthood. Experience whose mode is co-located with objecthood is not valid cognition. It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is collocated with object hood, or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode. This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this, and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate. If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, mere experientiality must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless. A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either. Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell. It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undelimited by that same property. Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes his motive property not residing where objecthood resides likewise overextends to an illusion containing a shellless component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition. avoidance of under extension or failure of application. Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes is moda property not co-located with objecthood is illusion and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable no ability is imagined not to reside in objecthood the definition will not apply. In illusion objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver therefore merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood cognition of silver in a shell would have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not admissible. If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver, with silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition the shell is silver will not be valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component. If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in the qualificative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. Superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifiers in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, noability is the mode, imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition will not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter-positive of an absence is delimited by the property delimiting counter-positiveness, the condition, undilimited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition overextends to illusion and under extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of Prama in the perception section. The established definition of Prama. An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of the doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property. Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid, or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity. Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate, cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode. Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition. God's cognition is determinate cognition in qualifier-qualifikan form, he knows the qualifikan of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property separately as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling it inexpressible in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness resides in the shell, and invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent. But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its qualifical components, pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition of non-pervasively-occurrent presence and absence. Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively-occurrent positive entity such as conjunction and of its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualifcant, single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top. Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts, the root and top. Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part in which conjunction exists is not, as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction. Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump. Before firing, A pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid. Use in this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in which is not a defect of failed generalization. The litity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition. The view of others. Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity. Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component. Nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined. Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness, is valid cognition concerning silver, while experience of silverness in a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness, is invalid cognition concerning silver. On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific objecthood belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may be defined as, experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate of objecthood. Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode co-located with objecthood may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid. In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

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