MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode07_cartoon.mp4

Collection

Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.98356)

Duration

1:04:05

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Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:04–0:06The answer continued.
2. 0:06–0:33The earlier objection, that if capacity, and its result were respectively uniform, the object would either be known with all its qualities or not known at all, would be appropriate only if cognition of all the objects qualities depended solely on the object itself, solely on cognition of the object, or solely on the causal complex producing cognition of the object.
3. 0:34–0:37In fact, this is not so.
4. 0:37–0:42Implicit refutation of a possible Buddhist argument.
5. 0:42–0:46The preceding criticism refutes another possible argument,
6. 0:46–0:51a crooked method like twisting one's waist to touch one's ear.
7. 0:51–0:57The argument is this, if, because the object and its qualities are distinct,
8. 0:57–1:03inferential or verbal cognition of an object does not necessarily entail inferential or
9. 1:03–1:10inferential or verbal cognition of its qualities, the same should hold in-sense cognition.
10. 1:10–1:16When the object is known by a sense, its qualities should not necessarily be known through the
11. 1:16–1:18sense.
12. 1:18–1:24Non-Buddhists accept this possibility in all cases where the causal complex producing
13. 1:24–1:29cognition of the known object's specific qualities is absent, because different
14. 1:29–1:37means of valid cognition poses their own specific powers. An inferential reason has the capacity
15. 1:37–1:44to produce valid cognition of its invariable concomitance with the probandom, the power
16. 1:44–1:50of a word is limited by convention, and for a sense organ to operate, presence of the
17. 1:50–1:58object is also required. It is not the case that merely because an object is related
18. 1:58–2:04to a means of valid cognition, it must become validly known, otherwise any cognition of
19. 2:04–2:11any object could arise. The correct rule is this, if an object is known by a means of
20. 2:11–2:18valid cognition only through cognition of some of its qualities, then when those qualities
21. 2:18–2:25are not known the object too is not known, or no quality is known. Thus the preceding
22. 2:25–2:32possibility that when there is no inferential or verbal cognition of an object's qualities
23. 2:32–2:40there is no cognition of the object either establishes only what is already accepted.
24. 2:40–2:44This is the essence of the entire argument.
25. 2:44–2:47Objection to the preceding answer.
26. 2:47–2:54The objection is this, if inferential reasons, words, and objects of the senses were of
27. 2:54–3:00the same nature like the objects of the right and left eyes, the forms of cognition produced
28. 3:00–3:09by these means would not differ. But they do differ. In verbal and inferential cognition,
29. 3:09–3:15an object does not appear in the same form as in perceptual cognition, where the object
30. 3:15–3:22appears self-defined, clear, and definitely determined in such conditions as place and
31. 3:22–3:30time. In indirect cognition, the object appears distinguished from dissimilar things but as
32. 3:30–3:37if non-different from similar things, indistinct, and without direct acquaintance. This difference
33. 3:37–3:43among cognitions cannot be explained merely by difference among the means of cognition.
34. 3:43–3:50A means or cause of cognition does not produce a difference in the form of cognition. Nor
35. 3:50–3:57can one cognition be regarded as endowed with two different forms. Therefore the previously
36. 3:57–4:05stated invariable concomitance, whatever is a common object of both existence and non-existence
37. 4:05–4:13is related to exclusion of others, is established. It may be formulated as an inference thus,
38. 4:13–4:19a special cognition opposed to perceptual cognition of an object does not have that
39. 4:19–4:26same object as its object, just as cognition of cloth does not take the object of cognition
40. 4:26–4:33of a pot as its own. Conceptual perception concerning a cow is opposed to non-conceptual
41. 4:33–4:40perception of it, therefore its object must be wholly different from the object of non-conceptual
42. 4:40–4:42perception.
43. 4:42–4:50to the objection. This reply too is defective. The stated invariable concomitance deviates
44. 4:50–4:57in mutually opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth. One side of the cloth is painted
45. 4:57–5:04and the other unpainted and the two sides are apprehended by different cognitions.
46. 5:04–5:10A blue cloth as it appears in a person's cognition at one time does not for that
47. 5:10–5:17reason fail to appear as blue in a later cognition of the same person or in another person's
48. 5:17–5:24cognition. It may be objected that the cognitions are not mutually opposed in the respect that
49. 5:24–5:31determines the identity of their object, the respect that determines their opposition also
50. 5:31–5:37determines difference of their objects. Here the cognitions are opposed in the forms
51. 5:37–5:44of painted and unpainted, but as cognitions of a blue object they may still have one
52. 5:44–5:46and the same object.
53. 5:46–5:52The same reply can be given in the case of inferential and verbal cognition.
54. 5:52–5:58So far as the individual cow endowed with cowness is concerned, they share the same
55. 5:58–6:05object as perception, but they do not share perceptions object regarding the spatiotemporal
56. 6:05–6:12determination of the individual cow. Therefore the reason alleged above to prove that inference
57. 6:12–6:18and verbal cognition have an object different from perception is absent from the subject,
58. 6:18–6:26in reality, the object of all these cognitions is the same cow. We already accept that indirect
59. 6:26–6:33cognition does not share perceptions object so far as spatiotemporal determination of
60. 6:33–6:40the individual is concerned, proof of this establishes only what was already established.
61. 6:40–6:48We do not hold that everything appearing in perception also appears in indirect cognition.
62. 6:48–6:51A question and its answer.
63. 6:51–6:57How then, does the distinction between clear and unclear cognition arise concerning an
64. 6:57–7:03individual that is the substrate of a universal and the light?
65. 7:03–7:07No such intrinsic distinction really arises.
66. 7:07–7:14The more of an object's qualities are apprehended, the clearer its cognition is considered, the
67. 7:14–7:19fewer are apprehended, the less clear it is considered.
68. 7:19–7:26Such clarity and lack of clarity are experienced respectively in cognition of near and distant
69. 7:26–7:31objects, not when no object at all is known.
70. 7:31–7:36A new form of the preceding question and its answer.
71. 7:36–7:43It may be objected that cognition of increasingly distant objects has not been established as
72. 7:43–7:49related to real objects, therefore those cognitions to fall within the subject of the earlier
73. 7:49–7:56inference intended to prove that indirect cognition does not apprehend real objects.
74. 7:56–8:03But this view is contradicted by the reflexive perceptual cognition, I now directly perceive
75. 8:03–8:07the very thing that I had previously inferred.
76. 8:07–8:14If an object and its qualities were non-different, ignorance of any quality could cause ignorance
77. 8:14–8:17of the qualified object.
78. 8:17–8:22But because quality and object are known to be different, the preceding inference
79. 8:22–8:26is contradicted by the evidence of that reflexive cognition.
80. 8:26–8:30Even if there is doubt concerning the distinction between
81. 8:30–8:34object and quality, the defect of suspected deviation in the
82. 8:34–8:37reason cannot be avoided.
83. 8:37–8:41Differences among separate cognitions of the same object can
84. 8:41–8:45also be explained by failure to apprehend some of its
85. 8:45–8:47qualities.
86. 8:47–8:50Justification of the answer.
87. 8:50–8:56If objects known as distant and increasingly distant are not identical,
88. 8:56–9:02which among them is the real and determinate object of the different cognitions,
89. 9:02–9:06is the thing actually apprehended itself the real object?
90. 9:06–9:16Yes, but this apprehension never occurs by suppressing the qualities under which the object appeared in earlier cognitions.
91. 9:16–9:30An object such as a teak tree appears in cognitions of an increasingly near object under the qualities of reality, substancehood, earthhood, treehood and so forth.
92. 9:30–9:35In later cognition it is not apprehended as devoid of those qualities.
93. 9:35–9:41Objection based on the criterion of successful activity and the answer.
94. 9:41–9:51Among many cognitions, should only that cognition be regarded as valid which prompts successful activity concerning the object?
95. 9:51–10:06No. If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not rejected, how is it to be determined toward which particular object among the different objects known successively the successful activity was directed?
96. 10:06–10:14It may be answered that there is no such determinant, but at that place there are not many complex
97. 10:14–10:22activities, only one activity related to one object and therefore the known object is one
98. 10:22–10:29and only one of the many cognitions accords with that object and is valid.
99. 10:29–10:35If so, how is it determined which cognition accords with the object?
100. 10:35–10:39If this cannot be decided, uncertainty reappears.
101. 10:39–10:47Even ordinary, uncomplicated successful activity is not produced by one object alone, it arises
102. 10:47–10:54from an aggregate of causes, because only a causal aggregate produces an effect.
103. 10:54–11:00For this reason, successful activity cannot be regarded as produced by a single series
104. 11:00–11:07of momentary entities, no successful activity is necessarily connected with only one momentary
105. 11:07–11:15series. Is the principal casualty of a seed as seed known through positive and negative
106. 11:15–11:21concomitance for a particular successful activity, so that the observed object is determined
107. 11:21–11:29to be a seed and nothing else. If so, the substance hood, earth hood, tree hood, and
108. 11:29–11:35Other properties of an object seen from afar are also effective in different successful
109. 11:35–11:41activities, therefore they too must be accepted as apprehended.
110. 11:41–11:49The observed object functions as a cause in producing many different successful activities.
111. 11:49–11:55Examination of the answer that directness and indirectness are not properties of the
112. 11:55–11:57object of cognition.
113. 11:57–11:59No.
114. 11:59–12:06Dignities and Directness are not properties including the object of cognition.
115. 12:06–12:08Properties of cognition are of two kinds.
116. 12:08–12:12First, properties determined by the object.
117. 12:12–12:18Second, distinct generic properties such as being perceptual, being inferential and
118. 12:18–12:20being recollective.
119. 12:20–12:26In the first kind, differences in object determination produce differences among cognitions.
120. 12:26–12:33This difference arises from difference among the objects of cognition, that is, from denial
121. 12:33–12:35of their identity.
122. 12:35–12:42But differences among cognitions arising from generic properties, such as perceptuality and
123. 12:42–12:48inferentiality are not of this kind, they result from differences among the respective
124. 12:48–12:50causes of cognition.
125. 12:50–12:56Such is the condition of verbal, inferential, and recollective cognition.
126. 12:56–13:02You can prevent a sense organ from producing the same kind of perceptual cognition concerning
127. 13:02–13:09different objects such as pot and cloth, while sense organ and inferential reason successively
128. 13:09–13:17produce distinct perceptual and inferential cognitions concerning one and the same object.
129. 13:17–13:23Whether the objects are identical or different, different causes of cognition determine the
130. 13:23–13:26production of its different forms.
131. 13:26–13:32If causal determination of cognition is denied, difference of causes will no longer determine
132. 13:32–13:39difference of effects and differences among effects will become accidental.
133. 13:39–13:45What decisive proof shows that directness or perceptuality and indirectness are generic
134. 13:45–13:53properties rather than accidental marks dependent on the relation of cognition to its object.
135. 13:53–13:55Experience itself is the proof.
136. 13:55–14:04impersexual, inferential, recollective, and other cognitions, directness, indirectness, recollectiveness,
137. 14:04–14:09and the like do not appear together with their respective objects.
138. 14:09–14:17In cognition of fire, forms such as this has fire or that had fire appear, the property
139. 14:17–14:21of the cognition is not an object there.
140. 14:21–14:27But in reflexive cognition of these cognitions the different properties appear and therefore
141. 14:27–14:33we say I infer this, I see this, and I remember this.
142. 14:33–14:38Why then is the object of cognition called indirect or direct?
143. 14:38–14:45This usage is of the same kind as calling an object the subject of inference, perception
144. 14:45–14:47or memory.
145. 14:47–14:51of the second proof of the theory of Apoha.
146. 14:51–14:58The second reason advanced for Apoha was, whatever grounds uniform discourse concerning objects
147. 14:58–15:04wholly different by nature has the form of exclusion of others.
148. 15:04–15:09This reason suffers from doubtful invariable comcomitance.
149. 15:09–15:15A positive property too can explain and ground uniform discourse.
150. 15:15–15:20The facts are these, uniform discourse is not costless.
151. 15:20–15:26It does not arise from the activity of many different objects or qualities, nor does it
152. 15:26–15:32arise merely from absence of relation to many objects, for such assumptions would produce
153. 15:32–15:37overextension or incorrect uniform discourse.
154. 15:37–15:44By elimination, therefore, it follows that such discourse occurs because many objects
155. 15:44–15:50are related to one generic property. What defect is there in accepting that the basis
156. 15:50–15:58of uniform discourse is that one positive entity? Then the invariable concomitance with the negative
157. 15:58–16:05entity in the form of exclusion previously proposed by the Buddhist would not remain.
158. 16:05–16:12The inconsistencies that arise from treating negative exclusion as the basis of discourse
159. 16:12–16:20have already been shown. Let this imaginative restlessness therefore end here.
160. 16:20–16:28Examination of another defense of the theory of a poha. The concept of a poha or exclusion
161. 16:28–16:35does not generate motivation toward action either. If it did, a person would know one
162. 16:35–16:41object yet act toward a wholly different object, producing inconsistency between cognition
163. 16:41–16:49and action. Can this inconsistency be removed by complex conceptual cognition? Then what
164. 16:49–16:57is this complex conceptual cognition? Is it cognition of an unreal exclusion as a qualifier
165. 16:57–17:05of a real object? Is it cognition of the identity of unreal exclusion and a real object? Or
166. 17:05–17:11Is it cognition produced by a natural disposition toward a real object?
167. 17:11–17:15Refutation of the first and second alternatives
168. 17:15–17:19The first alternative is untenable.
169. 17:19–17:25According to Buddhism, the real particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.
170. 17:25–17:28The second is also untenable.
171. 17:28–17:35A real object is a particular individual, verbal and other conceptual cognitions have
172. 17:35–17:43no relation to it. A particular individual is not the object of linguistic convention.
173. 17:43–17:50Thus conceptual cognition and a real object are mutually unrelated like the eye and cognition
174. 17:50–17:57of taste. If the object of the complex cognition is common, reality cannot appear in it because
175. 17:57–18:02reality has the nature of a particular individual.
176. 18:02–18:09Refutation of the Third Alternative The Third Alternative is untenable.
177. 18:09–18:15There would then be no necessary correspondence between motivation toward action and verbal
178. 18:15–18:21cognition concerning the object of action because failure to apprehend the difference
179. 18:21–18:28between unreal exclusion and a real object is everywhere available as a cause.
180. 18:28–18:35In complex conceptual cognition of a cow, is the difference between cow and non-cow not
181. 18:35–18:41unknown and thus cognition of the cow therefore not motivate toward a non-cow.
182. 18:41–18:46Very well, but are these non-cows known or unknown?
183. 18:46–18:53If known, real non-cows cannot be known as different from the cow, because all real particulars
184. 18:53–19:01lie beyond conceptual cognition, consequently, failure to apprehend difference is not available.
185. 19:01–19:08If the non-cows are unknown, their difference too is unknown, and consideration of difference
186. 19:08–19:10becomes impossible.
187. 19:10–19:15Difference cannot be known when its counter term is unknown.
188. 19:15–19:21If knowledge of the counter term is not necessary for cognition of difference, the cow concept
189. 19:21–19:29may be known as different from the real particular cow in exactly the same way as from non-cows,
190. 19:29–19:33because both differences are equally differences.
191. 19:33–19:38It may be replied that the cow concept is not known as different from the real cow
192. 19:38–19:44because its conceptual cognition follows non-conceptual cognition of the cow.
193. 19:44–19:50This is not so with non-caus, since conceptual cognition of the cow does not follow non-conceptual
194. 19:50–19:53cognition of non-caus.
195. 19:53–19:56The difficulty in this answer is this.
196. 19:56–20:02If the stated difference is a real property, unreal exclusion cannot be known as possessing
197. 20:02–20:09difference from a real object, because difference is real while exclusion is unreal.
198. 20:09–20:15If difference is not different from the different object, then because the nature of a different
199. 20:15–20:22object is not determined by any counter term, exclusion can be known as different from
200. 20:22–20:24every object.
201. 20:24–20:29Only cognition of the identity of exclusion with some object could prevent it from being
202. 20:29–20:36known as different from that object, but exclusion is not identical with anything,
203. 20:36–20:39nor is it known to be so.
204. 20:39–20:45Because exclusion, because it has the form of negation, poses no nature of its own and
205. 20:45–20:50therefore no difference as part of its nature?
206. 20:50–20:51No.
207. 20:51–20:58Then one exclusion, such as the cow concept, would not differ from non-cows either, because
208. 20:58–21:04difference from non-cows and difference from cows are alike in not constituting the concept's
209. 21:04–21:06nature.
210. 21:06–21:13Even the concept of exclusion, though possessing no nature of its own, appear as having a distinctive
211. 21:13–21:17nature and as different from certain real objects.
212. 21:17–21:24If so, we ask, with respect to the real object with which it is regarded as identical, does
213. 21:24–21:30exclusion appear without nature, or as identical with that real object?
214. 21:30–21:37Whether the first alternative, exclusion either remains wholly unknown because it has no mark
215. 21:37–21:43distinguishing it from anything or it is known only as natureless.
216. 21:43–21:48Thus the necessary correspondence between conceptual cognition and subsequent action
217. 21:48–21:55arise because conceptual cognition possesses the instrumentality of non-conceptual cognition.
218. 21:55–22:00Then what does possessing instrumentality mean?
219. 22:00–22:07It cannot mean having the same object as non-conceptual cognition, because conceptual cognition cannot
220. 22:07–22:13take the real object of non-conceptual cognition as its object.
221. 22:13–22:19Nor can it mean superimposition upon conceptual cognition of the generic property of non-conceptual
222. 22:19–22:21cognition.
223. 22:21–22:27Conceptual cognition is true with respect to its own object and therefore neither erroneous
224. 22:27–22:34nor conceptually afflicted. Its object appears in a form expressible by words because it
225. 22:34–22:42is conceptual, hence it cannot become the ground of superimposition. If the object did not
226. 22:42–22:50appear in word expressible form, its cognition would not be conceptual. Once the object appears
227. 22:50–22:56and is known in this way, false superimposition upon it is impossible.
228. 22:56–22:59Another defense and its refutation.
229. 22:59–23:07Nor can the truth of non-conceptual cognition be superimposed upon conceptual cognition.
230. 23:07–23:12If this truth does not necessarily include the object of cognition,
231. 23:12–23:20the necessary identity of object between conceptual cognition and motivation toward action cannot be explained.
232. 23:20–23:27If truth includes the ultimately real object, conceptual cognition too will take it as an
233. 23:27–23:35object because cognition of its own truth is impossible without apprehending the real object.
234. 23:35–23:42If truth includes an unreal object, no motivation from cognition toward the unreal object will
235. 23:42–23:44arise.
236. 23:44–23:51that an unreal object should appear as real is wholly impossible because the unreal nature
237. 23:51–23:55of a real object is directly inconsistent.
238. 23:55–23:59A third defense and its refutation.
239. 23:59–24:05This instrumentality cannot be failure to apprehend the difference of conceptual cognition
240. 24:05–24:10either from itself or from non-conceptual cognition.
241. 24:10–24:17Cognition is self-aware as cognition, therefore its distinctive nature cannot be confused
242. 24:17–24:25with the nature of non-conceptual cognition. The object of conceptual cognition is unreal,
243. 24:25–24:32therefore no real difference can exist as the counter term of that unreal object. This
244. 24:32–24:39alternative has already been refuted. Nor does the directness of non-conceptual cognition
245. 24:39–24:46qualify conceptual cognition. Because every cognition is self-aware regarding its own
246. 24:46–24:54object, it is direct to itself. The object of conceptual cognition is not direct. Even
247. 24:54–25:01if all objects were treated as direct, because the objects of cognitions differ, cognition
248. 25:01–25:08of one object could not motivate action toward another. Examination of generous account
249. 25:08–25:14of the casualty of conceptual cognition in relation to action.
250. 25:14–25:20Do some conceptual cognitions by their very nature motivate action toward a real object
251. 25:20–25:23that is not even their object?
252. 25:23–25:29Who is responsible for the strange nature they have received from their causes?
253. 25:29–25:36If so, we ask, does cognition produce motivation toward the real object without any connection
254. 25:36–25:37to it?
255. 25:37–25:43Or is cognition by nature connected to the real object without any other connection?
256. 25:43–25:52Or is the production of discourse concerning the real object itself the connection between cognition and the real object?
257. 25:52–25:59The first alternative overextends, any cognition could motivate toward any real object.
258. 25:59–26:10Under the second, nature explains a relation between cognition and the real object, but this natural relation is precisely the cognition-object relation.
259. 26:11–26:19Ordinary usage does not regard the relation between cognition and its object as different from a natural relation.
260. 26:19–26:27relation. Even philosophers who admit cognition of an object whose real or unreal character
261. 26:27–26:33is inexplicable cannot proceed without this natural relation, the matter will be discussed
262. 26:33–26:40later. The third alternative plainly involves self-dependence, because a rational ground
263. 26:40–26:47is being sought for the practice of acting toward a real object, while that very practice
264. 26:47–26:50is then called the ground.
265. 26:50–26:55Defense and refutation of the view that a concept can lead to action.
266. 26:55–27:01Can a concept motivate action toward a real object unrelated to itself in the same way
267. 27:01–27:06that the capacity of a cause produces an effect not yet arising?
268. 27:06–27:13Yes, but the casualty of a cause's capacity must still be rigidly restricted to objects
269. 27:13–27:17possessing a particular generic nature.
270. 27:17–27:23Otherwise, cognition of a flame would motivate action toward water as well.
271. 27:23–27:27Objection to the answer and its refutation.
272. 27:27–27:33Thus conceptual cognition whose form determines burning capacity cause action toward real fire,
273. 27:33–27:41while a generic or accidental property such as cognition would determines the cognition's casualty?
274. 27:41–27:42No.
275. 27:42–27:51If so, cognition directed toward the shine of a cluster of diamonds resembling fire would not motivate action toward it,
276. 27:51–27:58because such cognition possesses only the capacity to motivate action toward fire.
277. 27:58–28:03Does the shine of the diamond not itself appear as fire?
278. 28:03–28:10It does, but its capacity to generate action does not depend only on appearance.
279. 28:10–28:22If it did, conceptual cognition of unreal fire would not motivate action toward real fire because real fire does not appear in the cognition.
280. 28:22–28:35Therefore either accept that real fire appears in conceptual cognition or deny that the casualty of fire cognition can motivate toward anything apart from fire.
281. 28:35–28:45refutation of generous view that identity of form between the object of cognition and the object of action is the regulator.
282. 28:45–29:01The preceding refutation also defeats the view that identity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object toward which action is directed regulates the relation between cognition and the real object.
283. 29:01–29:11For action is also directed toward an object that does not possess the same desired form as the object of cognition.
284. 29:11–29:21If identity of an undesired form is also regarded as sufficient to regulate the cognition relation, irregularity results.
285. 29:21–29:27Denial of identity of form between cognition and its object.
286. 29:27–29:31In a doctrine accepting the reality of the external world,
287. 29:31–29:36the required identity of form between cognition and its object is impossible,
288. 29:36–29:42because the respective causal complexes of cognition and object are wholly different.
289. 29:43–29:46If their causal complexes were the same,
290. 29:46–29:48only one of two things,
291. 29:48–29:50insentions or consciousness,
292. 29:50–29:51would exist in the world.
293. 29:51–30:01Could one specific difference among causes produce a difference in their natures even when the causal complex is otherwise the same?
294. 30:01–30:07No. In reality, the two arise from different causal complexes.
295. 30:07–30:13Identity of causal complexes cannot be inferred from similarity of effects.
296. 30:13–30:22effects. External fire, for example, is directly seen to cause external smoke, but internal
297. 30:22–30:29cognition of smoke is not seen to arise from fire, because it does not invariably accompany
298. 30:29–30:37fire. It cannot be said that cognition of smoke, like smoke itself, arises from fire,
299. 30:37–30:44from an invisible fire, for the same cause cannot be visible in one context and invisible
300. 30:44–30:47in another.
301. 30:47–30:50Another Objection to the preceding view.
302. 30:50–30:56If blueness or some other quality is the generic mark of cognition of blue, how can it attach
303. 30:56–31:00to the object of cognition rather than to cognition?
304. 31:00–31:06If it is a quality of the object, how can it qualify cognition?
305. 31:06–31:11Nearly the entire discussion of this issue has already occurred in connection with the
306. 31:11–31:15defect of inter-mixture of Universals.
307. 31:15–31:22The Buddhist must therefore accept that cognition motivates action toward its own object and
308. 31:22–31:25that this object may be real.
309. 31:25–31:31This conclusion must be forced upon him even by pressing a sandal against his throat,
310. 31:31–31:35for there is no other way.
311. 31:35–31:42of the alternative that cognition apprehends its own form. Then cognition should motivate
312. 31:42–31:49action toward its own form, which is known as qualifying cognition together with itself,
313. 31:49–31:56because cognition is self-aware. A person turns toward that form and ultimately reaches
314. 31:56–32:03the real object, just as one who turns toward the glitter of a stone ultimately reaches
315. 32:03–32:11the stone. No. This is not a correct account of how action arises from cognition, because
316. 32:11–32:19no one acts toward what yields no desired and important result. The conceptual form is just
317. 32:19–32:27such a fruitless thing. Nor can the conceptual form be superimposed upon an external real
318. 32:27–32:32object because the real object is unrelated to the concept.
319. 32:32–32:38Externality or objecthood cannot be superimposed upon the form either.
320. 32:38–32:45The form is itself illuminated by the self-luminosity of cognition therefore there is no occasion
321. 32:45–32:49for false superimposition upon it.
322. 32:49–32:54In the example of acting toward the glitter of a diamond, the person acts because of
323. 32:54–32:59the false cognition that the glitter is the diamond.
324. 32:59–33:03Without this error, the action would not arise.
325. 33:03–33:08Thus the Buddhist example to contains a fallacious reason.
326. 33:08–33:12Another objection to the Sautrantika view.
327. 33:12–33:18On the doctrine that the form alone is the object, there is no valid proof establishing
328. 33:18–33:23the reality of an external object not apprehended by cognition.
329. 33:23–33:30If the appearance of different forms at different times in separate cognitions is treated as
330. 33:30–33:36a reason proving external reality, that reason deviates, and epileptic sees forms that do
331. 33:36–33:40not exist in the external world.
332. 33:40–33:44Examination of the proof from successful activity
333. 33:44–33:51Even successful activity offered as proof of an external real object, if known, is
334. 33:51–33:58itself constituted by a particular form, external reality is not established by it.
335. 33:58–34:05Just as the unreal hair like form appearing to an epileptic has no external object, so
336. 34:05–34:11a form of successful activity produced by some extraordinary latent impression may lack
337. 34:11–34:14any objective ground.
338. 34:14–34:20Thus no invariable concomitance is established between externality and the production of
339. 34:20–34:28successful activity, because the contrary case cannot be excluded. To accept both that
340. 34:28–34:36external objects are real, and that cognition possesses their form is merely childish. Examination
341. 34:36–34:42of the Vadhika view that a real object is the object of conceptual cognition. Then
342. 34:42–34:49let the external particular real object itself be regarded as the object of conceptual
343. 34:49–34:57cognition. Although the object in its own form is not the subject of any linguistic convention
344. 34:57–35:03and is therefore ineffable, it may acquire a common form through an indirect relation
345. 35:03–35:11of excluding others and thereby become definitely expressible. Just as one individual cow excludes
346. 35:11–35:20non-caus, so do other cows. Very well, then we ask, what is this so-called non-cau? Is
347. 35:20–35:27it whatever differs from one cow, or whatever lacks the property that qualifies a cow?
348. 35:27–35:34Criticism of the first proposed meaning of non-cau. If the first meaning is accepted,
349. 35:34–35:40another cow different from one particular cow cannot be known or spoken of as a cow,
350. 35:40–35:48by being different from the first cow it does not exclude non-cows. Moreover, on this meaning
351. 35:48–35:55a non-cow too would be known as a cow, a horse, which is a non-cow, excludes buffaloes, elephants
352. 35:55–36:03and all other things different from a particular cow. Does not a horse also exclude the cow,
353. 36:03–36:10just as it excludes other non-cows? It does, but the cow intended by the word cow
354. 36:10–36:18also excludes another cow. Nevertheless it is a cow. No, the fact is that if exclusion of
355. 36:18–36:26non-cows itself is the cowness of a cow, that cowness is also present in a horse. If cowness
356. 36:26–36:33is something more than this, explain it clearly. Criticism of the second meaning of non-cow.
357. 36:33–36:44If the second meaning of non-kao is accepted, exclusion of non-kaos will mean exclusion of what lacks the property qualifying a kao.
358. 36:44–36:50But such exclusion is identical with an object endowed with kaunas.
359. 36:50–36:54An objection by Dharmakrity and its answer.
360. 36:54–37:08Then let individual objects that appear similar be regarded as the common form of all individuals of that class, without troubling to establish exclusion of others as the common form.
361. 37:08–37:14But this is impossible, because there is no identity of form.
362. 37:14–37:22Their identity is not real, because different individuals poses mutually incompatible properties.
363. 37:22–37:31Nor is their identity merely conceptual, grey, yellow, and other individual cows are directly
364. 37:31–37:35perceived as having different forms.
365. 37:35–37:41Can the properties of objects in one class be imagined as mutually identical?
366. 37:41–37:42No.
367. 37:42–37:47There is no property distinct from the qualified object.
368. 37:47–37:54If a distinct property is admitted, the dispute ends immediately.
369. 37:54–37:58Examination of Dharmakriti's view of universals.
370. 37:58–38:05Then let the argument be this, different particular real objects are endowed with the capacity
371. 38:05–38:09to produce cognition of their similarity.
372. 38:09–38:15Objects possessing this capacity, if the similarity concerns cows, are called cows,
373. 38:15–38:19Real objects lacking it are called non-caus.
374. 38:19–38:25Individuals receive this capacity from their respective causes, therefore its reality cannot
375. 38:25–38:27be questioned.
376. 38:27–38:34If a universal is accepted to explain cognition of similarity, another universal applying to
377. 38:34–38:41all universals must be accepted to explain cognition of similarity among the universals
378. 38:41–38:43themselves.
379. 38:43–38:51Likewise, another universal must be accepted to determine the inheritance of the universal in individuals.
380. 38:51–38:58Thus accepting a universal to explain cognition of similarity leads to infinite regresses,
381. 38:58–39:01one upward and one downward.
382. 39:02–39:04Refutation of the preceding view.
383. 39:04–39:19If uniform discourse can be explained from individuals wholly different from one another without any auxiliary cause, discourse of difference can equally be explained from a single identical object.
384. 39:19–39:26In both views the imagination of a natural capacity in individuals is alike.
385. 39:26–39:38But if so, cognition of identity will either never arise anywhere or if it arises, will be costless, both consequences are improper.
386. 39:38–39:47The same difficulty applies to the other view, discourse of difference will either not arise or will be costless.
387. 39:47–39:57Therefore, just as one object produces discourse of identity, different objects produce only discourse of difference.
388. 39:57–40:03The capacity of objects to produce discourse is regulated in this way.
389. 40:03–40:06Resolution of the infinite rigorous.
390. 40:06–40:16If only one object produces discourse of identity, how is discourse of difference concerning different universals to be explained?
391. 40:16–40:23The answer is, in the same way as discourse of difference concerning the one moon.
392. 40:23–40:26Is that discourse not false?
393. 40:26–40:32Yes, let discourse of difference among universals also be false.
394. 40:32–40:37In both cases, contrary proof is equally available.
395. 40:37–40:42Then let discourse of identity concerning all cases,
396. 40:42–40:46including individuals of one class be regarded as false.
397. 40:47–40:52If so, the scores of difference may also be regarded as false.
398. 40:53–40:58But successful activities are mutually different how then can this be?
399. 40:59–41:05Very well, but just as the identity and difference of successful activities
400. 41:05–41:10establish the identity and difference of the individuals producing them,
401. 41:10–41:22Why not understand that the similarity and dissimilarity of the activities established the identity and difference of universals residing in those individuals?
402. 41:22–41:28Are the similarity and dissimilarity of successful activities themselves not real?
403. 41:28–41:34Then difference among the activities may equally be called false.
404. 41:34–41:42If one says, let it be so, attachment to the reality of external objects must be abandoned.
405. 41:42–41:50If one then says, that is precisely my intention, an answer will be given later.
406. 41:50–41:53Another proof of Universal's.
407. 41:53–42:02Suppose we do not infer the identity and difference of the objects producing cognitions of similarity and dissimilarity.
408. 42:02–42:16Even so, the knowledge that one cognition is true and another erroneous is possible only if one kind of cause produces true cognition and another kind produces false cognition.
409. 42:16–42:28A specific kind of effect depends upon a specific kind of cause otherwise the distinctiveness of an effect produced by a causal complex would be accidental.
410. 42:28–42:35Without accepting this generic determination of the effect by its cause, explaining uniform
411. 42:35–42:42discourse concerning different individuals through a series of errors is merely ridiculous.
412. 42:42–42:48Individuals appear one because there is an illusion of their similarity and this illusion
413. 42:48–42:55arises from an illusion of unity among previous cognitions of the individuals.
414. 42:55–43:01If, as stated earlier, different individuals themselves can produce cognition of their
415. 43:01–43:08similarity or identity and thereby produce the required collective cognition, the explanation
416. 43:08–43:12through a chain of errors is futile.
417. 43:12–43:19Therefore, even for discourse involving erroneous superimposition, there must be some universal
418. 43:19–43:25as the object of the superimposition, for example, erroneousness.
419. 43:25–43:30This is impossible without accepting the reality of universals.
420. 43:30–43:37The view that a poha is established on the basis of proof against universals.
421. 43:37–43:43Then let a poha be regarded as established because there is proof against the reality
422. 43:43–43:45of universals.
423. 43:45–43:46No.
424. 43:46–43:53If uniform discourse cannot be explained otherwise, how can there be proof against universals
425. 43:53–44:01and the like. Otherwise a reason such as identity or essential nature necessarily established
426. 44:01–44:08by decisive proof opposing the contrary position could be removed merely by a doubtful opposing
427. 44:08–44:15proof. Buddhists should therefore abandon the game of seeking contrary proofs and explain
428. 44:15–44:24uniform discourse. Since there is no other means, they cannot do so. Presentation of possible
429. 44:24–44:33proofs against universals. There is no powerful proof against the reality of universals. If
430. 44:33–44:40there were, it would oppose either the universal itself or cognition of the universal. A proof
431. 44:40–44:47Opposing the universal would consist either in ignorance of its nature or in knowing the
432. 44:47–44:52universal as endowed with mutually incompatible properties.
433. 44:52–44:58Refutation of the First Alternative The First Alternative is untenable because
434. 44:58–45:01it cannot be established.
435. 45:01–45:08We have begun an inquiry into the form of similarity among known objects, not into
436. 45:08–45:16to a form unknown or unapprehended, therefore the universal cannot be regarded as unknown.
437. 45:16–45:22Can it be said that we deny cognition of the universal only in perception, not in conceptual
438. 45:22–45:29cognition, and that only those whose vision is covered by the dense darkness of false cognition
439. 45:29–45:35of similarity generated by linguistic convention accept the reality of universals, while we
440. 45:35–45:37do not?
441. 45:37–45:44Is it not also true that flights of imagination have no limit and therefore prove the reality
442. 45:44–45:46of nothing?
443. 45:46–45:47No.
444. 45:47–45:54Cognition of a universal occurs even without recollection or cognition of a word.
445. 45:54–45:57Objection to the preceding reply.
446. 45:57–46:03Even without cognition of a linguistic convention, does the latent impression of knowing that
447. 46:03–46:07convention produce cognition of the universal?
448. 46:07–46:14If so, one must ask whether the latent impression of knowing a general convention produces cognition
449. 46:14–46:22of the universal in the absence of one and the same designated object or in its presence.
450. 46:22–46:29The first alternative is wholly impossible. Just as the word go is applied to different
451. 46:29–46:35cows possessing due laps, through separate conventions the same word is also applied
452. 46:35–46:42to heaven, the eye, an arrow, water, a thunderbolt, and other things.
453. 46:42–46:49Then the latent impression of knowing the conventions of this word should produce a collective cognition
454. 46:49–46:54in which all these different things poses one common property.
455. 46:54–46:57Is this acceptable?
456. 46:57–47:02Accepting it would mean that the person sees no common form among individual cows possessing
457. 47:02–47:10delabs, but sees a common form among the ten holy different kinds of things stated above.
458. 47:10–47:14What can be said about such a person?
459. 47:14–47:18His eyes must surely be exceedingly beautiful.
460. 47:18–47:21Answer to the preceding objection.
461. 47:21–47:24Can the other side not raise the same objection?
462. 47:24–47:30The Buddhist critic sees no common nature among the holy different things stated above,
463. 47:30–47:38sees one among individuals possessing due lapse. Yes, he can, but the usage based on knowledge
464. 47:38–47:43of a general linguistic convention cannot be denied.
465. 47:43–47:50Objection to the answer and its resolution. Even so, at most this will establish that
466. 47:50–47:57conceptual cognition takes a universal as its object, how is it established that non-conceptual
467. 47:57–48:06cognition apprehends a universal? Answer, conceptual cognition takes a real object as its object,
468. 48:06–48:13and the object of non-conceptual cognition is identical with that of conceptual cognition.
469. 48:13–48:20How does conceptual cognition take a universal as its object? Because words, latent impressions,
470. 48:20–48:27and all other possible factors have already been rejected as determinants of the object
471. 48:27–48:36of a real object for conceptual cognition. This is the final answer. Now please be silent.
472. 48:36–48:44A question and its answer. If a universal exists, why is it not seen as present in the empty
473. 48:44–48:51space between two individuals? Because the cause of the universal's appearance, the individual
474. 48:51–48:59is absent between the two individuals. Another question and its answer. Just as juju fruits
475. 48:59–49:06placed in a vessel are seen as different from the vessel, why is a universal not seen as
476. 49:06–49:12different from the individuals that are its substrates? If being seen as different means
477. 49:12–49:19being seen in a different place, the universal is not seen in this way because its place
478. 49:19–49:27is the same as that of the individuals. If it means being seen in a distinct form, the
479. 49:27–49:34universal certainly is so seen. If individual and universal were one, an individual seen
480. 49:34–49:41as unconjoined with another individual would not be seen as endowed with the universal
481. 49:41–49:46because the two individuals are mutually unconjoined.
482. 49:46–49:50consideration of the second alternative stated earlier.
483. 49:50–49:57The second alternative stated above is also not opposed to the universal.
484. 49:57–50:03All objections connected with it can be removed in the same manner as objections against the
485. 50:03–50:06reality of a whole object.
486. 50:06–50:11But how can a universal be related to an individual not yet born?
487. 50:11–50:17It neither leaves its present substrate and travels to the later individual nor is it
488. 50:17–50:22born together with that later individual.
489. 50:22–50:27Very well, how do you know that the universal is not already present in the place where
490. 50:27–50:30the new individual is born?
491. 50:30–50:36If the universal is present there, would space at that place not also become endowed
492. 50:36–50:39with universals such as Kaunas?
493. 50:39–50:41No.
494. 50:41–50:47Soon after the individual is produced, the universal does not enter into an inherent
495. 50:47–50:51relation with space and the like.
496. 50:51–50:57The individual related to the universal is never unrelated to it.
497. 50:57–51:02What inconsistency, then, is there in the view that before the new individual arises
498. 51:02–51:09the universal is not in that place, but as soon as the individual arises the universal
499. 51:09–51:17inheres in it, the discussion of the relation between universal and individual continued.
500. 51:17–51:24It may be objected that the individual merely reveals the universal, the universal does not
501. 51:24–51:26inherit in the individual.
502. 51:26–51:33Therefore discourse of the universal's inheritance in an individual is secondary.
503. 51:33–51:39If the universal exists in the place before the individual is produced, space would be
504. 51:39–51:42endowed with the universal.
505. 51:42–51:49Very well if so, the movement, production, destruction, and so forth of the individual
506. 51:49–51:56as revealer would be sufficient to explain such discourse concerning the universal.
507. 51:56–52:02Dharmakriti's objection that the universal neither approaches nor leaves any individual
508. 52:02–52:09and yet is regarded as inhering in past, present, and future individuals would then have no
509. 52:09–52:11occasion.
510. 52:11–52:18Like an archer who misses the target and shouts to conceal his failure, Dharmakrity makes
511. 52:18–52:22pointless noise through this objection.
512. 52:22–52:26Examination and Criticism of Dharmakritya's Objection
513. 52:26–52:31Let us clarify Dharmakritya's Irrelevant Objection.
514. 52:31–52:38It is first said that a universal neither goes toward individuals nor withdraws from them,
515. 52:38–52:43then the possibility is raised whether the universal inheres in the place that will be
516. 52:43–52:47occupied by a future individual.
517. 52:47–52:51What relation is there between these two statements?
518. 52:51–52:57If the reasoning is that although universals exist at all places and times, they cannot
519. 52:57–53:04be related to an individual that does not exist, the answer is that an object's natural existence
520. 53:04–53:12or non-existence depends upon no other object, only its relation or non-relation depends upon
521. 53:12–53:19another. The criticism continued. When the future individual does not yet exist,
522. 53:19–53:27what does it mean to say the universal is not there? It means only that the universal
523. 53:27–53:31is not related to the non-existent individual.
524. 53:31–53:34Yes, this is precisely the meaning.
525. 53:34–53:41But how does the universal become related to the individual after the latter is produced?
526. 53:41–53:45Answer, the individual has come into existence
527. 53:45–53:51and the previous absence of relation was due to the individual's non-existence.
528. 53:51–53:55The fundamental question in the objection is therefore
529. 53:55–54:01How does an individual that did not exist before come into existence later?
530. 54:01–54:07This plainly favours the doctrine that an effect pre-exists in its cause.
531. 54:08–54:13Raising such an objection is like wanting something one has not attained.
532. 54:14–54:20Objection based on the qualifier, qualified relation between universal and individual.
533. 54:20–54:30Even after this explanation, if universal and the individual possessing it are wholly different, how can they coexist?
534. 54:30–54:36Answer, etymologically, coexistence means relation to the same substrate.
535. 54:36–54:41How this opposes different objects, I do not understand.
536. 54:41–54:47But if so, would cow and horse also be called coexistent?
537. 54:47–54:53No, this is a restrictive counter example, not a contradiction.
538. 54:53–55:00For example, if one says of a certain son of Mathra, Mathra's son is dark, this does
539. 55:00–55:05not mean that all known sons of Mathra are dark.
540. 55:05–55:10Such restrictive examples are not rare.
541. 55:10–55:13Another objection and answer.
542. 55:13–55:19Even so, there must be some distinction among different objects, some coexist and others
543. 55:19–55:24do not, this distinction requires a clear account.
544. 55:24–55:31Yes, there is a distinction and it is determined by the natures of the objects.
545. 55:31–55:38Therefore only some objects are related to certain others, not all objects to all.
546. 55:38–55:45If so, may the similar appearance of individuals also be regarded as regulated simply by the
547. 55:45–55:48natures of the objects?
548. 55:48–55:49No.
549. 55:49–55:57There is no inconsistency in one object being related to many, or many objects to one.
550. 55:57–56:04But it is inconsistent for one object to generate plural usage, or for many objects to generate
551. 56:04–56:06singular usage.
552. 56:06–56:11refutation of proofs opposing cognition of universals.
553. 56:11–56:17There is no epistemological obstacle to cognition of a universal.
554. 56:17–56:24Denial of the form of universal cognition is contradicted by experience.
555. 56:24–56:30Denial that this cognition has any cause is refuted by its very occurrence.
556. 56:30–56:36Denial that its object is one thing is refuted by the fact that no coexistence of
557. 56:36–56:43incompatible properties appears in its object. Denial that the cognition possesses directness
558. 56:43–56:51rests on error because the object of cognition is itself neither direct nor indirect, cognition
559. 56:51–56:58is direct if produced by a sense and indirect otherwise. Denial that universal cognition
560. 56:58–57:05is true is refuted by the fact that a cognition cannot be called false without first establishing
561. 57:05–57:13that its object is false. Denial that the cognition is sense produced is opposed by its positive
562. 57:13–57:20and negative concomitance with the sense. Denial that it is perceptual is refuted by
563. 57:20–57:27the invariable concomitance between being sense produced and being perceptual. Defense
564. 57:27–57:35of the sense produced and perceptual character of conceptual cognition of universals. If cognition
565. 57:35–57:41of a universal, though perceptual, were not sense produced, non-conceptual cognition
566. 57:41–57:48toward sees to be sense produced. If the perceptual character of cognition depended on its following
567. 57:48–57:54a non-conceptual cognition of its object, the imagination of a beloved by a love-stricken
568. 57:54–58:01person would count as perception. Since there is no contrary proof, there is no
569. 58:01–58:07No need to regard the perceptuality of conceptual universal cognition as resulting from its
570. 58:07–58:14being an effect or instrument of an earlier non-conceptual perception.
571. 58:14–58:20If such an assumption is allowed, the contrary assumption may equally be made regarding
572. 58:20–58:22non-conceptual cognition.
573. 58:22–58:28If conceptual cognition, though not produced by a sense, were perceptual merely because
574. 58:28–58:35it is produced from non-conceptual cognition, no other kind of cognition could ever arise
575. 58:35–58:43after non-conceptual cognition. It may be asked, if a sense organ produces perceptual cognition,
576. 58:43–58:49why does it not produce conceptual cognition immediately upon contacting the object?
577. 58:49–58:56Answer, auxiliary causes such as recollection of a previously seen object are not available
578. 58:56–59:02at the moment of contact between sense and object, therefore conceptual perception does
579. 59:02–59:10not arise immediately. Although produced by the sense, this perception is expressible in
580. 59:10–59:11words.
581. 59:11–59:18Refutation of the purpose alleged for accepting the theory of a poha. Then let the theory
582. 59:18–59:26of a poha be accepted to achieve some particular purpose. Its highest purpose is surely to
583. 59:26–59:30to establish the indescribability of all objects.
584. 59:30–59:37When the entire net of conceptual constructions is removed, the mind reaches a profound and
585. 59:37–59:40pure state of complete tranquility.
586. 59:40–59:45Very well, but who will believe this groundless story?
587. 59:45–59:49Neither perception nor inference supports it.
588. 59:49–59:55As for scriptural proof, you yourselves have taught your disciples that scripture concerns
589. 59:55–1:00:03no real object. The refutation continued. No conscious person can be instructed that
590. 1:00:03–1:00:09scripture teaches nothing. The very sentence denying the validity of verbal statements
591. 1:00:09–1:00:16is itself a verbal statement. The self-contradiction in the Buddhist utterance is therefore clear.
592. 1:00:17–1:00:24If words are used to affirm and deny things, the real particular, not being the object of
593. 1:00:24–1:00:32general convention or verbal cognition is ineffable, consequently, the possibility of verbal discourse
594. 1:00:32–1:00:40about it ends. If for this reason words cannot be used to make affirmations or denials, your
595. 1:00:40–1:00:48own negative sentence is caught in self-contradiction. By denying that objects are expressible, you
596. 1:00:48–1:00:55have indirectly referred to them. In a verse summarizing objections raised by an opponent
597. 1:00:55–1:01:01against the Buddhist denial that unreal objects can be subjects of discourse, the Buddhist
598. 1:01:01–1:01:08uses the word concerning an unreal thing. The opponent says that by replacing it with
599. 1:01:08–1:01:14concerning a real thing, the same verse can demonstrate the self-contradiction of
600. 1:01:14–1:01:21the Buddhist position. What the Buddhist refers to is unreal. What his opponent refers to
601. 1:01:21–1:01:29is real. Objection to the refutation and its answer. If the verse expressing this dilemma
602. 1:01:29–1:01:35is recited before you with the word changed, you cannot even take refuge in silence as
603. 1:01:35–1:01:43we can. If we opposed discourse concerning the unreal subject, probandom, or reason in
604. 1:01:43–1:01:49In your inference, we would fall into self contradiction, but because we have no interest
605. 1:01:49–1:01:53in this game, we can remain silent.
606. 1:01:53–1:02:00Your situation is different, you must establish a positive position free from contradiction.
607. 1:02:00–1:02:07You are a partisan seeking to prove a purpose not established by perception or inference,
608. 1:02:07–1:02:12therefore you must use words to refer to ineffable objects.
609. 1:02:12–1:02:18Get this game of dispelling deep darkness with a tiny torch now end.
610. 1:02:18–1:02:22The purpose of debate in the non-Buddhist position.
611. 1:02:22–1:02:29If scripture opposed truth, the practices of persons seeking heavenly happiness and liberation
612. 1:02:29–1:02:31would be groundless.
613. 1:02:31–1:02:37Therefore only our doctrine leads to the supreme goal.
614. 1:02:37–1:02:40Criticism of generous view and conclusion.
615. 1:02:40–1:02:46From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding generous questions
616. 1:02:46–1:02:48and answers.
617. 1:02:48–1:02:52General formulates the question, what is the meaning of a word?
618. 1:02:52–1:02:58In three forms, what does a word reveal, what cognition does a word produce, and to what
619. 1:02:58–1:03:01does a word actually refer?
620. 1:03:01–1:03:08The answer to the first is exclusion of others, to the second, a real particular that excludes
621. 1:03:08–1:03:16others and to the third, nothing. These successive answers cannot stand.
622. 1:03:16–1:03:23The first answer gives a false account of linguistic convention because exclusion of other objects
623. 1:03:23–1:03:30is never the object of verbal cognition. The second gives a false account of the nature
624. 1:03:30–1:03:37of motivation toward action. One cannot reach a real particular through exclusion.
625. 1:03:37–1:03:44The third is self-contradictory because it actually refers to its own meaning otherwise it would
626. 1:03:44–1:03:47not answer the question at all.
627. 1:03:47–1:03:52The debate concerning momentariness and apoha ends here.
628. 1:03:52–1:03:58It is therefore now established that the doctrine of momentariness cannot approve the reality
629. 1:03:58–1:03:59of the self.

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The answer continued. The earlier objection, that if capacity, and its result were respectively uniform, the object would either be known with all its qualities or not known at all, would be appropriate only if cognition of all the objects qualities depended solely on the object itself, solely on cognition of the object, or solely on the causal complex producing cognition of the object. In fact, this is not so. Implicit refutation of a possible Buddhist argument. The preceding criticism refutes another possible argument, a crooked method like twisting one's waist to touch one's ear. The argument is this, if, because the object and its qualities are distinct, inferential or verbal cognition of an object does not necessarily entail inferential or inferential or verbal cognition of its qualities, the same should hold in-sense cognition. When the object is known by a sense, its qualities should not necessarily be known through the sense. Non-Buddhists accept this possibility in all cases where the causal complex producing cognition of the known object's specific qualities is absent, because different means of valid cognition poses their own specific powers. An inferential reason has the capacity to produce valid cognition of its invariable concomitance with the probandom, the power of a word is limited by convention, and for a sense organ to operate, presence of the object is also required. It is not the case that merely because an object is related to a means of valid cognition, it must become validly known, otherwise any cognition of any object could arise. The correct rule is this, if an object is known by a means of valid cognition only through cognition of some of its qualities, then when those qualities are not known the object too is not known, or no quality is known. Thus the preceding possibility that when there is no inferential or verbal cognition of an object's qualities there is no cognition of the object either establishes only what is already accepted. This is the essence of the entire argument. Objection to the preceding answer. The objection is this, if inferential reasons, words, and objects of the senses were of the same nature like the objects of the right and left eyes, the forms of cognition produced by these means would not differ. But they do differ. In verbal and inferential cognition, an object does not appear in the same form as in perceptual cognition, where the object appears self-defined, clear, and definitely determined in such conditions as place and time. In indirect cognition, the object appears distinguished from dissimilar things but as if non-different from similar things, indistinct, and without direct acquaintance. This difference among cognitions cannot be explained merely by difference among the means of cognition. A means or cause of cognition does not produce a difference in the form of cognition. Nor can one cognition be regarded as endowed with two different forms. Therefore the previously stated invariable concomitance, whatever is a common object of both existence and non-existence is related to exclusion of others, is established. It may be formulated as an inference thus, a special cognition opposed to perceptual cognition of an object does not have that same object as its object, just as cognition of cloth does not take the object of cognition of a pot as its own. Conceptual perception concerning a cow is opposed to non-conceptual perception of it, therefore its object must be wholly different from the object of non-conceptual perception. to the objection. This reply too is defective. The stated invariable concomitance deviates in mutually opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth. One side of the cloth is painted and the other unpainted and the two sides are apprehended by different cognitions. A blue cloth as it appears in a person's cognition at one time does not for that reason fail to appear as blue in a later cognition of the same person or in another person's cognition. It may be objected that the cognitions are not mutually opposed in the respect that determines the identity of their object, the respect that determines their opposition also determines difference of their objects. Here the cognitions are opposed in the forms of painted and unpainted, but as cognitions of a blue object they may still have one and the same object. The same reply can be given in the case of inferential and verbal cognition. So far as the individual cow endowed with cowness is concerned, they share the same object as perception, but they do not share perceptions object regarding the spatiotemporal determination of the individual cow. Therefore the reason alleged above to prove that inference and verbal cognition have an object different from perception is absent from the subject, in reality, the object of all these cognitions is the same cow. We already accept that indirect cognition does not share perceptions object so far as spatiotemporal determination of the individual is concerned, proof of this establishes only what was already established. We do not hold that everything appearing in perception also appears in indirect cognition. A question and its answer. How then, does the distinction between clear and unclear cognition arise concerning an individual that is the substrate of a universal and the light? No such intrinsic distinction really arises. The more of an object's qualities are apprehended, the clearer its cognition is considered, the fewer are apprehended, the less clear it is considered. Such clarity and lack of clarity are experienced respectively in cognition of near and distant objects, not when no object at all is known. A new form of the preceding question and its answer. It may be objected that cognition of increasingly distant objects has not been established as related to real objects, therefore those cognitions to fall within the subject of the earlier inference intended to prove that indirect cognition does not apprehend real objects. But this view is contradicted by the reflexive perceptual cognition, I now directly perceive the very thing that I had previously inferred. If an object and its qualities were non-different, ignorance of any quality could cause ignorance of the qualified object. But because quality and object are known to be different, the preceding inference is contradicted by the evidence of that reflexive cognition. Even if there is doubt concerning the distinction between object and quality, the defect of suspected deviation in the reason cannot be avoided. Differences among separate cognitions of the same object can also be explained by failure to apprehend some of its qualities. Justification of the answer. If objects known as distant and increasingly distant are not identical, which among them is the real and determinate object of the different cognitions, is the thing actually apprehended itself the real object? Yes, but this apprehension never occurs by suppressing the qualities under which the object appeared in earlier cognitions. An object such as a teak tree appears in cognitions of an increasingly near object under the qualities of reality, substancehood, earthhood, treehood and so forth. In later cognition it is not apprehended as devoid of those qualities. Objection based on the criterion of successful activity and the answer. Among many cognitions, should only that cognition be regarded as valid which prompts successful activity concerning the object? No. If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not rejected, how is it to be determined toward which particular object among the different objects known successively the successful activity was directed? It may be answered that there is no such determinant, but at that place there are not many complex activities, only one activity related to one object and therefore the known object is one and only one of the many cognitions accords with that object and is valid. If so, how is it determined which cognition accords with the object? If this cannot be decided, uncertainty reappears. Even ordinary, uncomplicated successful activity is not produced by one object alone, it arises from an aggregate of causes, because only a causal aggregate produces an effect. For this reason, successful activity cannot be regarded as produced by a single series of momentary entities, no successful activity is necessarily connected with only one momentary series. Is the principal casualty of a seed as seed known through positive and negative concomitance for a particular successful activity, so that the observed object is determined to be a seed and nothing else. If so, the substance hood, earth hood, tree hood, and Other properties of an object seen from afar are also effective in different successful activities, therefore they too must be accepted as apprehended. The observed object functions as a cause in producing many different successful activities. Examination of the answer that directness and indirectness are not properties of the object of cognition. No. Dignities and Directness are not properties including the object of cognition. Properties of cognition are of two kinds. First, properties determined by the object. Second, distinct generic properties such as being perceptual, being inferential and being recollective. In the first kind, differences in object determination produce differences among cognitions. This difference arises from difference among the objects of cognition, that is, from denial of their identity. But differences among cognitions arising from generic properties, such as perceptuality and inferentiality are not of this kind, they result from differences among the respective causes of cognition. Such is the condition of verbal, inferential, and recollective cognition. You can prevent a sense organ from producing the same kind of perceptual cognition concerning different objects such as pot and cloth, while sense organ and inferential reason successively produce distinct perceptual and inferential cognitions concerning one and the same object. Whether the objects are identical or different, different causes of cognition determine the production of its different forms. If causal determination of cognition is denied, difference of causes will no longer determine difference of effects and differences among effects will become accidental. What decisive proof shows that directness or perceptuality and indirectness are generic properties rather than accidental marks dependent on the relation of cognition to its object. Experience itself is the proof. impersexual, inferential, recollective, and other cognitions, directness, indirectness, recollectiveness, and the like do not appear together with their respective objects. In cognition of fire, forms such as this has fire or that had fire appear, the property of the cognition is not an object there. But in reflexive cognition of these cognitions the different properties appear and therefore we say I infer this, I see this, and I remember this. Why then is the object of cognition called indirect or direct? This usage is of the same kind as calling an object the subject of inference, perception or memory. of the second proof of the theory of Apoha. The second reason advanced for Apoha was, whatever grounds uniform discourse concerning objects wholly different by nature has the form of exclusion of others. This reason suffers from doubtful invariable comcomitance. A positive property too can explain and ground uniform discourse. The facts are these, uniform discourse is not costless. It does not arise from the activity of many different objects or qualities, nor does it arise merely from absence of relation to many objects, for such assumptions would produce overextension or incorrect uniform discourse. By elimination, therefore, it follows that such discourse occurs because many objects are related to one generic property. What defect is there in accepting that the basis of uniform discourse is that one positive entity? Then the invariable concomitance with the negative entity in the form of exclusion previously proposed by the Buddhist would not remain. The inconsistencies that arise from treating negative exclusion as the basis of discourse have already been shown. Let this imaginative restlessness therefore end here. Examination of another defense of the theory of a poha. The concept of a poha or exclusion does not generate motivation toward action either. If it did, a person would know one object yet act toward a wholly different object, producing inconsistency between cognition and action. Can this inconsistency be removed by complex conceptual cognition? Then what is this complex conceptual cognition? Is it cognition of an unreal exclusion as a qualifier of a real object? Is it cognition of the identity of unreal exclusion and a real object? Or Is it cognition produced by a natural disposition toward a real object? Refutation of the first and second alternatives The first alternative is untenable. According to Buddhism, the real particular does not appear in conceptual cognition. The second is also untenable. A real object is a particular individual, verbal and other conceptual cognitions have no relation to it. A particular individual is not the object of linguistic convention. Thus conceptual cognition and a real object are mutually unrelated like the eye and cognition of taste. If the object of the complex cognition is common, reality cannot appear in it because reality has the nature of a particular individual. Refutation of the Third Alternative The Third Alternative is untenable. There would then be no necessary correspondence between motivation toward action and verbal cognition concerning the object of action because failure to apprehend the difference between unreal exclusion and a real object is everywhere available as a cause. In complex conceptual cognition of a cow, is the difference between cow and non-cow not unknown and thus cognition of the cow therefore not motivate toward a non-cow. Very well, but are these non-cows known or unknown? If known, real non-cows cannot be known as different from the cow, because all real particulars lie beyond conceptual cognition, consequently, failure to apprehend difference is not available. If the non-cows are unknown, their difference too is unknown, and consideration of difference becomes impossible. Difference cannot be known when its counter term is unknown. If knowledge of the counter term is not necessary for cognition of difference, the cow concept may be known as different from the real particular cow in exactly the same way as from non-cows, because both differences are equally differences. It may be replied that the cow concept is not known as different from the real cow because its conceptual cognition follows non-conceptual cognition of the cow. This is not so with non-caus, since conceptual cognition of the cow does not follow non-conceptual cognition of non-caus. The difficulty in this answer is this. If the stated difference is a real property, unreal exclusion cannot be known as possessing difference from a real object, because difference is real while exclusion is unreal. If difference is not different from the different object, then because the nature of a different object is not determined by any counter term, exclusion can be known as different from every object. Only cognition of the identity of exclusion with some object could prevent it from being known as different from that object, but exclusion is not identical with anything, nor is it known to be so. Because exclusion, because it has the form of negation, poses no nature of its own and therefore no difference as part of its nature? No. Then one exclusion, such as the cow concept, would not differ from non-cows either, because difference from non-cows and difference from cows are alike in not constituting the concept's nature. Even the concept of exclusion, though possessing no nature of its own, appear as having a distinctive nature and as different from certain real objects. If so, we ask, with respect to the real object with which it is regarded as identical, does exclusion appear without nature, or as identical with that real object? Whether the first alternative, exclusion either remains wholly unknown because it has no mark distinguishing it from anything or it is known only as natureless. Thus the necessary correspondence between conceptual cognition and subsequent action arise because conceptual cognition possesses the instrumentality of non-conceptual cognition. Then what does possessing instrumentality mean? It cannot mean having the same object as non-conceptual cognition, because conceptual cognition cannot take the real object of non-conceptual cognition as its object. Nor can it mean superimposition upon conceptual cognition of the generic property of non-conceptual cognition. Conceptual cognition is true with respect to its own object and therefore neither erroneous nor conceptually afflicted. Its object appears in a form expressible by words because it is conceptual, hence it cannot become the ground of superimposition. If the object did not appear in word expressible form, its cognition would not be conceptual. Once the object appears and is known in this way, false superimposition upon it is impossible. Another defense and its refutation. Nor can the truth of non-conceptual cognition be superimposed upon conceptual cognition. If this truth does not necessarily include the object of cognition, the necessary identity of object between conceptual cognition and motivation toward action cannot be explained. If truth includes the ultimately real object, conceptual cognition too will take it as an object because cognition of its own truth is impossible without apprehending the real object. If truth includes an unreal object, no motivation from cognition toward the unreal object will arise. that an unreal object should appear as real is wholly impossible because the unreal nature of a real object is directly inconsistent. A third defense and its refutation. This instrumentality cannot be failure to apprehend the difference of conceptual cognition either from itself or from non-conceptual cognition. Cognition is self-aware as cognition, therefore its distinctive nature cannot be confused with the nature of non-conceptual cognition. The object of conceptual cognition is unreal, therefore no real difference can exist as the counter term of that unreal object. This alternative has already been refuted. Nor does the directness of non-conceptual cognition qualify conceptual cognition. Because every cognition is self-aware regarding its own object, it is direct to itself. The object of conceptual cognition is not direct. Even if all objects were treated as direct, because the objects of cognitions differ, cognition of one object could not motivate action toward another. Examination of generous account of the casualty of conceptual cognition in relation to action. Do some conceptual cognitions by their very nature motivate action toward a real object that is not even their object? Who is responsible for the strange nature they have received from their causes? If so, we ask, does cognition produce motivation toward the real object without any connection to it? Or is cognition by nature connected to the real object without any other connection? Or is the production of discourse concerning the real object itself the connection between cognition and the real object? The first alternative overextends, any cognition could motivate toward any real object. Under the second, nature explains a relation between cognition and the real object, but this natural relation is precisely the cognition-object relation. Ordinary usage does not regard the relation between cognition and its object as different from a natural relation. relation. Even philosophers who admit cognition of an object whose real or unreal character is inexplicable cannot proceed without this natural relation, the matter will be discussed later. The third alternative plainly involves self-dependence, because a rational ground is being sought for the practice of acting toward a real object, while that very practice is then called the ground. Defense and refutation of the view that a concept can lead to action. Can a concept motivate action toward a real object unrelated to itself in the same way that the capacity of a cause produces an effect not yet arising? Yes, but the casualty of a cause's capacity must still be rigidly restricted to objects possessing a particular generic nature. Otherwise, cognition of a flame would motivate action toward water as well. Objection to the answer and its refutation. Thus conceptual cognition whose form determines burning capacity cause action toward real fire, while a generic or accidental property such as cognition would determines the cognition's casualty? No. If so, cognition directed toward the shine of a cluster of diamonds resembling fire would not motivate action toward it, because such cognition possesses only the capacity to motivate action toward fire. Does the shine of the diamond not itself appear as fire? It does, but its capacity to generate action does not depend only on appearance. If it did, conceptual cognition of unreal fire would not motivate action toward real fire because real fire does not appear in the cognition. Therefore either accept that real fire appears in conceptual cognition or deny that the casualty of fire cognition can motivate toward anything apart from fire. refutation of generous view that identity of form between the object of cognition and the object of action is the regulator. The preceding refutation also defeats the view that identity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object toward which action is directed regulates the relation between cognition and the real object. For action is also directed toward an object that does not possess the same desired form as the object of cognition. If identity of an undesired form is also regarded as sufficient to regulate the cognition relation, irregularity results. Denial of identity of form between cognition and its object. In a doctrine accepting the reality of the external world, the required identity of form between cognition and its object is impossible, because the respective causal complexes of cognition and object are wholly different. If their causal complexes were the same, only one of two things, insentions or consciousness, would exist in the world. Could one specific difference among causes produce a difference in their natures even when the causal complex is otherwise the same? No. In reality, the two arise from different causal complexes. Identity of causal complexes cannot be inferred from similarity of effects. effects. External fire, for example, is directly seen to cause external smoke, but internal cognition of smoke is not seen to arise from fire, because it does not invariably accompany fire. It cannot be said that cognition of smoke, like smoke itself, arises from fire, from an invisible fire, for the same cause cannot be visible in one context and invisible in another. Another Objection to the preceding view. If blueness or some other quality is the generic mark of cognition of blue, how can it attach to the object of cognition rather than to cognition? If it is a quality of the object, how can it qualify cognition? Nearly the entire discussion of this issue has already occurred in connection with the defect of inter-mixture of Universals. The Buddhist must therefore accept that cognition motivates action toward its own object and that this object may be real. This conclusion must be forced upon him even by pressing a sandal against his throat, for there is no other way. of the alternative that cognition apprehends its own form. Then cognition should motivate action toward its own form, which is known as qualifying cognition together with itself, because cognition is self-aware. A person turns toward that form and ultimately reaches the real object, just as one who turns toward the glitter of a stone ultimately reaches the stone. No. This is not a correct account of how action arises from cognition, because no one acts toward what yields no desired and important result. The conceptual form is just such a fruitless thing. Nor can the conceptual form be superimposed upon an external real object because the real object is unrelated to the concept. Externality or objecthood cannot be superimposed upon the form either. The form is itself illuminated by the self-luminosity of cognition therefore there is no occasion for false superimposition upon it. In the example of acting toward the glitter of a diamond, the person acts because of the false cognition that the glitter is the diamond. Without this error, the action would not arise. Thus the Buddhist example to contains a fallacious reason. Another objection to the Sautrantika view. On the doctrine that the form alone is the object, there is no valid proof establishing the reality of an external object not apprehended by cognition. If the appearance of different forms at different times in separate cognitions is treated as a reason proving external reality, that reason deviates, and epileptic sees forms that do not exist in the external world. Examination of the proof from successful activity Even successful activity offered as proof of an external real object, if known, is itself constituted by a particular form, external reality is not established by it. Just as the unreal hair like form appearing to an epileptic has no external object, so a form of successful activity produced by some extraordinary latent impression may lack any objective ground. Thus no invariable concomitance is established between externality and the production of successful activity, because the contrary case cannot be excluded. To accept both that external objects are real, and that cognition possesses their form is merely childish. Examination of the Vadhika view that a real object is the object of conceptual cognition. Then let the external particular real object itself be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition. Although the object in its own form is not the subject of any linguistic convention and is therefore ineffable, it may acquire a common form through an indirect relation of excluding others and thereby become definitely expressible. Just as one individual cow excludes non-caus, so do other cows. Very well, then we ask, what is this so-called non-cau? Is it whatever differs from one cow, or whatever lacks the property that qualifies a cow? Criticism of the first proposed meaning of non-cau. If the first meaning is accepted, another cow different from one particular cow cannot be known or spoken of as a cow, by being different from the first cow it does not exclude non-cows. Moreover, on this meaning a non-cow too would be known as a cow, a horse, which is a non-cow, excludes buffaloes, elephants and all other things different from a particular cow. Does not a horse also exclude the cow, just as it excludes other non-cows? It does, but the cow intended by the word cow also excludes another cow. Nevertheless it is a cow. No, the fact is that if exclusion of non-cows itself is the cowness of a cow, that cowness is also present in a horse. If cowness is something more than this, explain it clearly. Criticism of the second meaning of non-cow. If the second meaning of non-kao is accepted, exclusion of non-kaos will mean exclusion of what lacks the property qualifying a kao. But such exclusion is identical with an object endowed with kaunas. An objection by Dharmakrity and its answer. Then let individual objects that appear similar be regarded as the common form of all individuals of that class, without troubling to establish exclusion of others as the common form. But this is impossible, because there is no identity of form. Their identity is not real, because different individuals poses mutually incompatible properties. Nor is their identity merely conceptual, grey, yellow, and other individual cows are directly perceived as having different forms. Can the properties of objects in one class be imagined as mutually identical? No. There is no property distinct from the qualified object. If a distinct property is admitted, the dispute ends immediately. Examination of Dharmakriti's view of universals. Then let the argument be this, different particular real objects are endowed with the capacity to produce cognition of their similarity. Objects possessing this capacity, if the similarity concerns cows, are called cows, Real objects lacking it are called non-caus. Individuals receive this capacity from their respective causes, therefore its reality cannot be questioned. If a universal is accepted to explain cognition of similarity, another universal applying to all universals must be accepted to explain cognition of similarity among the universals themselves. Likewise, another universal must be accepted to determine the inheritance of the universal in individuals. Thus accepting a universal to explain cognition of similarity leads to infinite regresses, one upward and one downward. Refutation of the preceding view. If uniform discourse can be explained from individuals wholly different from one another without any auxiliary cause, discourse of difference can equally be explained from a single identical object. In both views the imagination of a natural capacity in individuals is alike. But if so, cognition of identity will either never arise anywhere or if it arises, will be costless, both consequences are improper. The same difficulty applies to the other view, discourse of difference will either not arise or will be costless. Therefore, just as one object produces discourse of identity, different objects produce only discourse of difference. The capacity of objects to produce discourse is regulated in this way. Resolution of the infinite rigorous. If only one object produces discourse of identity, how is discourse of difference concerning different universals to be explained? The answer is, in the same way as discourse of difference concerning the one moon. Is that discourse not false? Yes, let discourse of difference among universals also be false. In both cases, contrary proof is equally available. Then let discourse of identity concerning all cases, including individuals of one class be regarded as false. If so, the scores of difference may also be regarded as false. But successful activities are mutually different how then can this be? Very well, but just as the identity and difference of successful activities establish the identity and difference of the individuals producing them, Why not understand that the similarity and dissimilarity of the activities established the identity and difference of universals residing in those individuals? Are the similarity and dissimilarity of successful activities themselves not real? Then difference among the activities may equally be called false. If one says, let it be so, attachment to the reality of external objects must be abandoned. If one then says, that is precisely my intention, an answer will be given later. Another proof of Universal's. Suppose we do not infer the identity and difference of the objects producing cognitions of similarity and dissimilarity. Even so, the knowledge that one cognition is true and another erroneous is possible only if one kind of cause produces true cognition and another kind produces false cognition. A specific kind of effect depends upon a specific kind of cause otherwise the distinctiveness of an effect produced by a causal complex would be accidental. Without accepting this generic determination of the effect by its cause, explaining uniform discourse concerning different individuals through a series of errors is merely ridiculous. Individuals appear one because there is an illusion of their similarity and this illusion arises from an illusion of unity among previous cognitions of the individuals. If, as stated earlier, different individuals themselves can produce cognition of their similarity or identity and thereby produce the required collective cognition, the explanation through a chain of errors is futile. Therefore, even for discourse involving erroneous superimposition, there must be some universal as the object of the superimposition, for example, erroneousness. This is impossible without accepting the reality of universals. The view that a poha is established on the basis of proof against universals. Then let a poha be regarded as established because there is proof against the reality of universals. No. If uniform discourse cannot be explained otherwise, how can there be proof against universals and the like. Otherwise a reason such as identity or essential nature necessarily established by decisive proof opposing the contrary position could be removed merely by a doubtful opposing proof. Buddhists should therefore abandon the game of seeking contrary proofs and explain uniform discourse. Since there is no other means, they cannot do so. Presentation of possible proofs against universals. There is no powerful proof against the reality of universals. If there were, it would oppose either the universal itself or cognition of the universal. A proof Opposing the universal would consist either in ignorance of its nature or in knowing the universal as endowed with mutually incompatible properties. Refutation of the First Alternative The First Alternative is untenable because it cannot be established. We have begun an inquiry into the form of similarity among known objects, not into to a form unknown or unapprehended, therefore the universal cannot be regarded as unknown. Can it be said that we deny cognition of the universal only in perception, not in conceptual cognition, and that only those whose vision is covered by the dense darkness of false cognition of similarity generated by linguistic convention accept the reality of universals, while we do not? Is it not also true that flights of imagination have no limit and therefore prove the reality of nothing? No. Cognition of a universal occurs even without recollection or cognition of a word. Objection to the preceding reply. Even without cognition of a linguistic convention, does the latent impression of knowing that convention produce cognition of the universal? If so, one must ask whether the latent impression of knowing a general convention produces cognition of the universal in the absence of one and the same designated object or in its presence. The first alternative is wholly impossible. Just as the word go is applied to different cows possessing due laps, through separate conventions the same word is also applied to heaven, the eye, an arrow, water, a thunderbolt, and other things. Then the latent impression of knowing the conventions of this word should produce a collective cognition in which all these different things poses one common property. Is this acceptable? Accepting it would mean that the person sees no common form among individual cows possessing delabs, but sees a common form among the ten holy different kinds of things stated above. What can be said about such a person? His eyes must surely be exceedingly beautiful. Answer to the preceding objection. Can the other side not raise the same objection? The Buddhist critic sees no common nature among the holy different things stated above, sees one among individuals possessing due lapse. Yes, he can, but the usage based on knowledge of a general linguistic convention cannot be denied. Objection to the answer and its resolution. Even so, at most this will establish that conceptual cognition takes a universal as its object, how is it established that non-conceptual cognition apprehends a universal? Answer, conceptual cognition takes a real object as its object, and the object of non-conceptual cognition is identical with that of conceptual cognition. How does conceptual cognition take a universal as its object? Because words, latent impressions, and all other possible factors have already been rejected as determinants of the object of a real object for conceptual cognition. This is the final answer. Now please be silent. A question and its answer. If a universal exists, why is it not seen as present in the empty space between two individuals? Because the cause of the universal's appearance, the individual is absent between the two individuals. Another question and its answer. Just as juju fruits placed in a vessel are seen as different from the vessel, why is a universal not seen as different from the individuals that are its substrates? If being seen as different means being seen in a different place, the universal is not seen in this way because its place is the same as that of the individuals. If it means being seen in a distinct form, the universal certainly is so seen. If individual and universal were one, an individual seen as unconjoined with another individual would not be seen as endowed with the universal because the two individuals are mutually unconjoined. consideration of the second alternative stated earlier. The second alternative stated above is also not opposed to the universal. All objections connected with it can be removed in the same manner as objections against the reality of a whole object. But how can a universal be related to an individual not yet born? It neither leaves its present substrate and travels to the later individual nor is it born together with that later individual. Very well, how do you know that the universal is not already present in the place where the new individual is born? If the universal is present there, would space at that place not also become endowed with universals such as Kaunas? No. Soon after the individual is produced, the universal does not enter into an inherent relation with space and the like. The individual related to the universal is never unrelated to it. What inconsistency, then, is there in the view that before the new individual arises the universal is not in that place, but as soon as the individual arises the universal inheres in it, the discussion of the relation between universal and individual continued. It may be objected that the individual merely reveals the universal, the universal does not inherit in the individual. Therefore discourse of the universal's inheritance in an individual is secondary. If the universal exists in the place before the individual is produced, space would be endowed with the universal. Very well if so, the movement, production, destruction, and so forth of the individual as revealer would be sufficient to explain such discourse concerning the universal. Dharmakriti's objection that the universal neither approaches nor leaves any individual and yet is regarded as inhering in past, present, and future individuals would then have no occasion. Like an archer who misses the target and shouts to conceal his failure, Dharmakrity makes pointless noise through this objection. Examination and Criticism of Dharmakritya's Objection Let us clarify Dharmakritya's Irrelevant Objection. It is first said that a universal neither goes toward individuals nor withdraws from them, then the possibility is raised whether the universal inheres in the place that will be occupied by a future individual. What relation is there between these two statements? If the reasoning is that although universals exist at all places and times, they cannot be related to an individual that does not exist, the answer is that an object's natural existence or non-existence depends upon no other object, only its relation or non-relation depends upon another. The criticism continued. When the future individual does not yet exist, what does it mean to say the universal is not there? It means only that the universal is not related to the non-existent individual. Yes, this is precisely the meaning. But how does the universal become related to the individual after the latter is produced? Answer, the individual has come into existence and the previous absence of relation was due to the individual's non-existence. The fundamental question in the objection is therefore How does an individual that did not exist before come into existence later? This plainly favours the doctrine that an effect pre-exists in its cause. Raising such an objection is like wanting something one has not attained. Objection based on the qualifier, qualified relation between universal and individual. Even after this explanation, if universal and the individual possessing it are wholly different, how can they coexist? Answer, etymologically, coexistence means relation to the same substrate. How this opposes different objects, I do not understand. But if so, would cow and horse also be called coexistent? No, this is a restrictive counter example, not a contradiction. For example, if one says of a certain son of Mathra, Mathra's son is dark, this does not mean that all known sons of Mathra are dark. Such restrictive examples are not rare. Another objection and answer. Even so, there must be some distinction among different objects, some coexist and others do not, this distinction requires a clear account. Yes, there is a distinction and it is determined by the natures of the objects. Therefore only some objects are related to certain others, not all objects to all. If so, may the similar appearance of individuals also be regarded as regulated simply by the natures of the objects? No. There is no inconsistency in one object being related to many, or many objects to one. But it is inconsistent for one object to generate plural usage, or for many objects to generate singular usage. refutation of proofs opposing cognition of universals. There is no epistemological obstacle to cognition of a universal. Denial of the form of universal cognition is contradicted by experience. Denial that this cognition has any cause is refuted by its very occurrence. Denial that its object is one thing is refuted by the fact that no coexistence of incompatible properties appears in its object. Denial that the cognition possesses directness rests on error because the object of cognition is itself neither direct nor indirect, cognition is direct if produced by a sense and indirect otherwise. Denial that universal cognition is true is refuted by the fact that a cognition cannot be called false without first establishing that its object is false. Denial that the cognition is sense produced is opposed by its positive and negative concomitance with the sense. Denial that it is perceptual is refuted by the invariable concomitance between being sense produced and being perceptual. Defense of the sense produced and perceptual character of conceptual cognition of universals. If cognition of a universal, though perceptual, were not sense produced, non-conceptual cognition toward sees to be sense produced. If the perceptual character of cognition depended on its following a non-conceptual cognition of its object, the imagination of a beloved by a love-stricken person would count as perception. Since there is no contrary proof, there is no No need to regard the perceptuality of conceptual universal cognition as resulting from its being an effect or instrument of an earlier non-conceptual perception. If such an assumption is allowed, the contrary assumption may equally be made regarding non-conceptual cognition. If conceptual cognition, though not produced by a sense, were perceptual merely because it is produced from non-conceptual cognition, no other kind of cognition could ever arise after non-conceptual cognition. It may be asked, if a sense organ produces perceptual cognition, why does it not produce conceptual cognition immediately upon contacting the object? Answer, auxiliary causes such as recollection of a previously seen object are not available at the moment of contact between sense and object, therefore conceptual perception does not arise immediately. Although produced by the sense, this perception is expressible in words. Refutation of the purpose alleged for accepting the theory of a poha. Then let the theory of a poha be accepted to achieve some particular purpose. Its highest purpose is surely to to establish the indescribability of all objects. When the entire net of conceptual constructions is removed, the mind reaches a profound and pure state of complete tranquility. Very well, but who will believe this groundless story? Neither perception nor inference supports it. As for scriptural proof, you yourselves have taught your disciples that scripture concerns no real object. The refutation continued. No conscious person can be instructed that scripture teaches nothing. The very sentence denying the validity of verbal statements is itself a verbal statement. The self-contradiction in the Buddhist utterance is therefore clear. If words are used to affirm and deny things, the real particular, not being the object of general convention or verbal cognition is ineffable, consequently, the possibility of verbal discourse about it ends. If for this reason words cannot be used to make affirmations or denials, your own negative sentence is caught in self-contradiction. By denying that objects are expressible, you have indirectly referred to them. In a verse summarizing objections raised by an opponent against the Buddhist denial that unreal objects can be subjects of discourse, the Buddhist uses the word concerning an unreal thing. The opponent says that by replacing it with concerning a real thing, the same verse can demonstrate the self-contradiction of the Buddhist position. What the Buddhist refers to is unreal. What his opponent refers to is real. Objection to the refutation and its answer. If the verse expressing this dilemma is recited before you with the word changed, you cannot even take refuge in silence as we can. If we opposed discourse concerning the unreal subject, probandom, or reason in In your inference, we would fall into self contradiction, but because we have no interest in this game, we can remain silent. Your situation is different, you must establish a positive position free from contradiction. You are a partisan seeking to prove a purpose not established by perception or inference, therefore you must use words to refer to ineffable objects. Get this game of dispelling deep darkness with a tiny torch now end. The purpose of debate in the non-Buddhist position. If scripture opposed truth, the practices of persons seeking heavenly happiness and liberation would be groundless. Therefore only our doctrine leads to the supreme goal. Criticism of generous view and conclusion. From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding generous questions and answers. General formulates the question, what is the meaning of a word? In three forms, what does a word reveal, what cognition does a word produce, and to what does a word actually refer? The answer to the first is exclusion of others, to the second, a real particular that excludes others and to the third, nothing. These successive answers cannot stand. The first answer gives a false account of linguistic convention because exclusion of other objects is never the object of verbal cognition. The second gives a false account of the nature of motivation toward action. One cannot reach a real particular through exclusion. The third is self-contradictory because it actually refers to its own meaning otherwise it would not answer the question at all. The debate concerning momentariness and apoha ends here. It is therefore now established that the doctrine of momentariness cannot approve the reality of the self.

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