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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
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Detected language: en (0.997637)
Duration: 23:42
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:10An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances.
0:10–0:23A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandom is possible.
0:23–0:29Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the ablative case
0:29–0:33which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative provision, does not state
0:33–0:38the probandom, and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the
0:38–0:43inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition.
0:43–0:47This definition also applies to the purely negative reason if, possessing affirmative
0:47–0:52provision is replaced by, devoid of affirmative provision.
0:52–0:57In a Nyaya statement one should say merely because of smoke, not because of possessing
0:57–0:58smoke.
0:58–1:02Use of the possessive suffix mad up is pointless.
1:02–1:08The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent.
1:08–1:1016.
1:10–1:13Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally
1:13–1:18perceptible while devoid of universalhood, but qualifier, possessing universalhood,
1:18–1:22cannot be related to reason status expressed by the ablative case, because universalhood
1:22–1:28is constrained by the genitive case. This objection is not sound. Within the property,
1:28–1:32being externally perceptible, the qualifier, possessing universalhood, can be connected
1:32–1:37through collocation expressed by the locative case, hence the semantically fit relation
1:37–1:42is established with reason status expressed by the ablative case.
1:42–1:47Definition of the example. 17. After the reason statement, the
1:47–1:53expectancy arises, how is this reason a cause of inference? It is therefore necessary to state
1:53–2:00first the perversion and then subject propertyhood. Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood,
2:00–2:03the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason.
2:05–2:09The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific
2:09–2:14perversion residing in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes a cause of
2:14–2:18the sentence cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark.
2:20–2:25The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition of the
2:25–2:29perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion relation
2:29–2:35of the absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason. From this, separate definitions
2:35–2:41of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. A sentence nearly expressing an
2:41–2:45instance does not become an example simply because it is a member of Nyaya, since the
2:45–2:51use of an instance is only a customary practice, not a universal rule.
2:51–2:55The probation statement, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood
2:55–2:59even though no instance is named.
2:59–3:03An alternative definition of the example.
3:03–3:07The particular expression denoting the specified provision and the cognition of
3:07–3:11provision produced by a sentence cannot alone be called the example, because such
3:11–3:18a definition would overextend to the application statement as well. Some scholars say that
3:18–3:24the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application. This is the general definition
3:24–3:29of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or negative provision is added,
3:29–3:33the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained.
3:35–3:41Repetition of the relative pronoun. The teachers hold that in the sentence,
3:41–3:46whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, repetition of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent
3:46–3:53deviation of the reason from the probandom. But where the provision of reason by probandom is known
3:53–4:00through co-location, repetition of the relative pronoun is unnecessary. In purely affirmative
4:00–4:05inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the reason from the probandom
4:05–4:12does not arise, this is our view. Repetition occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with
4:12–4:17the correlative pronoun. A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative
4:17–4:22pronouns bearing different case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning
4:22–4:27retained in the mind without violating linguistic rules.
4:27–4:31Defective examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions, devoid of the
4:31–4:35probandom, devoid of the reason.
4:35–4:39Devoid of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus, possessing an unstated affirmative
4:39–4:44provision, presenting affirmative provision in reverse, possessing an unstated negative
4:44–4:49provision, and presenting negative provision in reverse.
4:49–4:52Definition of the application.
4:52–4:5820. After the example statement has been uttered, the following expectancy arises,
4:58–5:02the provision has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in
5:02–5:04the subject or not?
5:04–5:08The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason
5:08–5:14pervaded by the probandum is displayed. In general, the application is that member of
5:14–5:19Nyaya which produces the cognition that generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential
5:19–5:26mark, the cause of inferential cognition. The application has two special definitions.
5:27–5:32First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a
5:32–5:38reason pervaded by the probandum. Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of
5:38–5:42the subject endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the
5:42–5:49absence of the probandom. For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so to this mountain
5:49–5:54produces the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire.
5:55–6:00In purely negative inference, the expression so to this earth produces the cognition,
6:00–6:04this earth possesses odor, which is the counter positive of absence of odor that
6:04–6:06that pervades the absence of difference
6:06–6:07from the other eight substances.
6:09–6:11Certain sakkas say that the use of nyaya ends
6:11–6:14with the three members thesis, reason, an example,
6:14–6:18and that application and conclusion are unnecessary.
6:18–6:21This view is not sound.
6:21–6:22The third subsumptive reflection,
6:22–6:25combining pervasion and subject propertyhood
6:25–6:29is produced by no other member, but only by the application.
6:29–6:31Although the sakka does not accept
6:31–6:32the third subsumptive reflection
6:32–6:38the cause of inferential cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application
6:38–6:46cannot be omitted. The application is necessary. 21. It should not be said that the subject
6:46–6:52propertyhood of the reason can be understood from the reason statement itself. The reason
6:52–6:56statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause of the probandom,
6:56–7:00it is not uttered to convey the presence of the reason in the subject.
7:00–7:05nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason
7:05–7:10statement. Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject
7:10–7:15propertyhood. Otherwise pervasion, the reason and subject propertyhood would all be implied
7:15–7:18by the thesis alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless.
7:20–7:24Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood
7:24–7:29on his own. Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible
7:29–7:34to understand everything unaided. The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that
7:34–7:39is, employ the application. Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible.
7:40–7:47The conclusion statement. After the application, the conclusion is stated.
7:48–7:52The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the pro-bandom on the basis of the
7:52–7:57subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood.
7:57–8:04The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound.
8:04–8:08The first four members yield cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood, but unless
8:08–8:12the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason
8:12–8:17are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition.
8:17–8:22The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences.
8:22–8:26Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion.
8:26–8:3223. An objection may be raised. Once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the
8:32–8:37reason is complete and no expectancy for another member remains. Any doubt concerning the absence
8:37–8:41of the probandom should be removed by those very members, otherwise the conclusion 2
8:41–8:47cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not a special sensory perception.
8:47–8:51Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as
8:51–8:57endowed with an established probandom. If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom
8:57–9:02and not its established status, then the ablative meaning because of such a reason cannot be related
9:02–9:08to the probandom. The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known,
9:08–9:13cognition of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason
9:13–9:18and of an equally strong counter reason. Only after the absence of a defeater and of a
9:18–9:23counter reason is known as the intended inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses
9:23–9:27this result fully.
9:27–9:32Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary.
9:32–9:36An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong
9:36–9:41counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because
9:41–9:48no means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished.
9:48–9:51This objection is not sound.
9:51–9:54The rule of pavagian is, that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something
9:54–9:58arises from cognition of that thing's absence.
9:58–10:01Therefore cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong
10:01–10:04counter-reason is necessary.
10:04–10:08It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the probandom
10:08–10:10as established.
10:10–10:15Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom from further expectancy,
10:15–10:20that is, its established status, is cognized, this cognition arises only after the
10:20–10:22the ablative relation is established.
10:22–10:29Consequently, the establishment of the probandum is known precisely from the conclusion.
10:29–10:32So refers to the reason.
10:32–10:3325.
10:33–10:37Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason
10:37–10:41side in view, not the probandum side.
10:41–10:45Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reasoned pervasion,
10:45–10:50propertyhood, absence of a defeater, and so forth.
10:50–10:53This view, however, is not sound.
10:53–11:00It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reasons nature, qualifier, or similarity.
11:00–11:05The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with therefore, so,
11:05–11:09if the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning would
11:09–11:12become disconnected.
11:12–11:17The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject in general is also unsound,
11:17–11:21because relating the subject endowed with the reason merely to a general subject would
11:21–11:23be incoherent.
11:23–11:28The alternative of similarity is likewise incoherent.
11:28–11:33In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot
11:33–11:36be apprehended in the conclusion.
11:36–11:41Objection, the relation between therefore and so would be incoherent.
11:41–11:4726, an objection may be raised when so refers to the various intended features of the reason,
11:47–11:52therefore cannot be related to a general qualifier of the probandom.
11:52–11:56If in the opponent's statement therefore so therefore is also held to connect with
11:56–12:01the contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results.
12:01–12:07The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason.
12:07–12:12Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation
12:12–12:15beyond the knownness of the reason.
12:15–12:19On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason, therefore is connected with the
12:19–12:21qualified probandom.
12:21–12:26In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent, the established status of the probandom
12:26–12:30impermanence is specifically cognized in sound.
12:30–12:34Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandum impermanence.
12:34–12:39The matter stated as probandum in the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion by establishing
12:39–12:41its relation to the reason.
12:41–12:46Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members.
12:46–12:4727.
12:47–12:51Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members of Nyaya.
12:51–12:54They possess none of the characteristics of a member of Nyaya.
12:54–12:59Their use in Nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement of the
12:59–13:04number of members. Questions such as, does it possess fire, or how does smoke indicate
13:04–13:11fire, are not universally necessary, they are useful only in special contexts.
13:11–13:18With this, the section on the members of Nyaya in the Inference Division of Tatvassant Mayans.
13:18–13:26Fallacious reasons. Fallacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory,
13:26–13:29therefore they are explained here.
13:29–13:32general definition of a fallacious reason.
13:33–13:472. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of valid cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition, obstructs inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inference is fallacious reasonhood.
13:47–13:53For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance, substancehood
13:53–13:57is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the veridical
13:57–14:02cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood.
14:02–14:06An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition
14:06–14:11of the reason becomes an obstruction to inference as fallacious reasonhood.
14:11–14:15In the faulty inference, the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the
14:15–14:21cognition concerning the reason fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire
14:21–14:27is fallacious. According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs
14:27–14:33inferential cognition is fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain
14:33–14:38possesses smoke. When the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs
14:38–14:44inference of fire. These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general.
14:45–14:48Fallacious reasons as grounds of defeat will be discussed later.
14:50–14:57The general definitions include the fallacious reasons. In some contexts an uncommon reason
14:57–15:02and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons, cognition of them
15:02–15:09obstructs inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason and an equally
15:09–15:13strong counter-reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only perceptual and
15:13–15:19verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition obstructs
15:19–15:25cognitions of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious reasons.
15:28–15:32For, according to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions a defeated
15:32–15:37reason and an equally strong counter-reason do not prevent the production of cognition,
15:37–15:43but merely render the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however, these two defects of a
15:43–15:50reason prevent the very production of cognition. Phalacious reasons are of five kinds, one,
15:50–15:56deviating or inconclusive, two, contradictory, three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason,
15:56–16:02four, unestablished, and, five, defeated. The five corresponding defects are deviation,
16:02–16:06contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment, and defeat.
16:08–16:11With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends.
16:12–16:15The deviating or inconclusive reason.
16:17–16:23Five, a deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive.
16:24–16:28The definition that which establishes both the pro-bandom and its absences deviating does
16:28–16:33not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish both
16:33–16:38the probandom and its absence, nor can it make both doubtful.
16:38–16:43Nor is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general
16:43–16:49definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions.
16:49–16:54A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs
16:54–16:58in neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandum
16:58–17:02and its absence and produces doubt.
17:02–17:07Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the probandum and its
17:07–17:09absence.
17:09–17:14One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render both indeterminate.
17:14–17:19Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and invariable connection
17:19–17:25with both pro-bandom and its absence are found respectively only in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons.
17:27–17:30The ancient scholar's definition of deviation.
17:32–17:37The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject
17:37–17:42propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed
17:42–17:45alternatives that produces doubt concerning the pro-bandom.
17:45–17:52But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent or not, is itself neither the object of cognition
17:52–17:55of subject-propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting two opposed alternatives.
17:55–18:00Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced out respectively because of a current
18:00–18:05in both similar and counter instances, absence from both, and invariable connection with
18:05–18:08both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom.
18:08–18:11The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are
18:11–18:15knowable because they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar
18:15–18:20because it is this object, a sometimes faultless. A person's failure to understand such a faultless
18:20–18:25reason is a defect of that person's ignorance, not of the reason. Otherwise even faultless
18:25–18:29uses of common reasons and equally strong counter reasons would have to be treated
18:29–18:32as fallacious owing to ignorance.
18:32–18:34Refutation of under extension
18:34–18:417. An objection may be raised, the foregoing definition of deviation does not include
18:41–18:45a common reason. In the inferences, this object is identical with this object
18:45–18:49because it is knowable, and sound is impermanent because it is either sound or something else,
18:49–18:53the common reason is not present in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore
18:53–18:58appears contradictory. This objection is not sound. Even if the
18:58–19:03common reason is not cognized as a property in the subject, cognition of the universality
19:03–19:07of the individual reason and the demonstration of that universality can obstruct both inference
19:07–19:11for oneself and inference for another. To establish the defect of a common reason,
19:11–19:16the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood and commoness must be demonstrated,
19:16–19:19the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect of the reason.
19:20–19:25The ancient scholars reject this objection of under extension, saying that common reasons such as
19:25–19:29no ability or being sound or something else are not situated in the subject as endowed with the
19:29–19:34probandom and therefore appear contradictory, nevertheless, the generality of the individual
19:34–19:39reason and its demonstration obstruct inference. The commoness of a common reason consists in
19:39–19:43the occurrence of the reason in both similar and counter instances, this is its defect.
19:45–19:48Refutation of the argument for an alternative definition.
19:50–19:558. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject and
19:55–19:59undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating.
20:00–20:05Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness are
20:05–20:11where respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive
20:11–20:17reasons, these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes.
20:17–20:21A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating, but the special
20:21–20:26conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be separately
20:26–20:29explained below.
20:29–20:34Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness,
20:34–20:39These three relations of deviation opposed to inference occur separately in common, uncommon,
20:39–20:42and non-exclusive reasons respectively.
20:42–20:46A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense, but
20:46–20:51the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not mutually
20:51–20:53intermixed.
20:53–21:00The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained below.
21:00–21:04Reason for rejecting the alternative definition.
21:04–21:099. Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such as
21:09–21:14commonness, uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of
21:14–21:20the foregoing forms of deviation. Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless
21:20–21:27in the definition of a deviating reason. For the same reason, the following definitions
21:27–21:31are also rejected, a fallacious reason not pervaded by the probandom, when it is
21:31–21:36pervaded by the absence of the probandum, or a reason occurring only in a subject distinct
21:36–21:42from similar instances endowed with the probandum. In the first definition, not pervaded by the
21:42–21:48probandum is an unnecessary qualifier, in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known.
21:49–21:53These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason,
21:53–21:57as in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound.
21:57–22:0810. Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both
22:08–22:12similar and counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason.
22:13–22:19These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason.
22:20–22:24When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as a
22:24–22:28similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as,
22:28–22:33All knowable things are impermanent because here no separate similar or counter instance is established.
22:33–22:38And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is improperly
22:38–22:47included in the definition. Refutation of yet another definition. 11, nor is either of the
22:47–22:52following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring only in counter instances
22:52–22:57distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or a reason occurring only in
22:57–23:03similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter instances. The first formulation
23:03–23:07does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends to a faultless common reason, the
23:07–23:14second becomes intermixed with contradictory and uncommon reasons. The definition present in the
23:14–23:19subject, distinct from a contradictory reason, and devoid of a relation-assisting inference
23:19–23:25likewise contains pointless qualifiers. The successive refutation of these definitions
23:25–23:30establishes that no single recurrent definition covering all deviating reasons is possible.
23:31–23:34Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects.
23:36–23:39With this, the prima facie discussion of deviation ends.

Plain text

An affirmative negative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances, but not in counter instances. A purely affirmative reason is a reason statement that occurs both in the subject and in similar instances and for which no counter instance serving as a locus of the absence of the probandom is possible. Alternatively, a purely affirmative reason is an expression containing the ablative case which produces cognition of a reason endowed with affirmative provision, does not state the probandom, and produces a verbal cognition assisting the subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. This definition also applies to the purely negative reason if, possessing affirmative provision is replaced by, devoid of affirmative provision. In a Nyaya statement one should say merely because of smoke, not because of possessing smoke. Use of the possessive suffix mad up is pointless. The use of external perceptibility devoid of universalhood is not incoherent. 16. Some scholars object that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is externally perceptible while devoid of universalhood, but qualifier, possessing universalhood, cannot be related to reason status expressed by the ablative case, because universalhood is constrained by the genitive case. This objection is not sound. Within the property, being externally perceptible, the qualifier, possessing universalhood, can be connected through collocation expressed by the locative case, hence the semantically fit relation is established with reason status expressed by the ablative case. Definition of the example. 17. After the reason statement, the expectancy arises, how is this reason a cause of inference? It is therefore necessary to state first the perversion and then subject propertyhood. Since perversion precedes subject propertyhood, the example statement first expresses the perversion of the reason. The example is an expression that produces cognition of perversion as a relation, a specific perversion residing in the reason is pervaded, cognition of which then becomes a cause of the sentence cognition that produces subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark. The general definition of an affirmative negative example includes both cognition of the perversion relation of the probandom by the reason and cognition of the perversion relation of the absence of the probandom by the absence of the reason. From this, separate definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. A sentence nearly expressing an instance does not become an example simply because it is a member of Nyaya, since the use of an instance is only a customary practice, not a universal rule. The probation statement, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, retains examplehood even though no instance is named. An alternative definition of the example. The particular expression denoting the specified provision and the cognition of provision produced by a sentence cannot alone be called the example, because such a definition would overextend to the application statement as well. Some scholars say that the example is a sentence that produces expectancy for the application. This is the general definition of an example, when a specific reference to affirmative or negative provision is added, the special definitions of affirmative and negative examples are obtained. Repetition of the relative pronoun. The teachers hold that in the sentence, whatever possesses smoke possesses fire, repetition of the relative pronoun whatever is made to prevent deviation of the reason from the probandom. But where the provision of reason by probandom is known through co-location, repetition of the relative pronoun is unnecessary. In purely affirmative inference, even without repetition, the problem of deviation of the reason from the probandom does not arise, this is our view. Repetition occurs only with the relative pronoun, not with the correlative pronoun. A correlative pronoun can apprehend the meanings expressed by relative pronouns bearing different case endings, thus a word uttered once expresses the meaning retained in the mind without violating linguistic rules. Defective examples are of five kinds on account of the following divisions, devoid of the probandom, devoid of the reason. Devoid of both probandom and reason, devoid of a locus, possessing an unstated affirmative provision, presenting affirmative provision in reverse, possessing an unstated negative provision, and presenting negative provision in reverse. Definition of the application. 20. After the example statement has been uttered, the following expectancy arises, the provision has been understood, but is the pervaded reason property present in the subject or not? The application is then stated, by which the subject propertyhood of the reason pervaded by the probandum is displayed. In general, the application is that member of Nyaya which produces the cognition that generates the third subsumptive reflection on the inferential mark, the cause of inferential cognition. The application has two special definitions. First, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject qualified by a reason pervaded by the probandum. Second, that member of Nyaya which produces cognition of the subject endowed with the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the absence of the probandom. For example, in affirmative inference, the expression so to this mountain produces the third subsumptive reflection, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire. In purely negative inference, the expression so to this earth produces the cognition, this earth possesses odor, which is the counter positive of absence of odor that that pervades the absence of difference from the other eight substances. Certain sakkas say that the use of nyaya ends with the three members thesis, reason, an example, and that application and conclusion are unnecessary. This view is not sound. The third subsumptive reflection, combining pervasion and subject propertyhood is produced by no other member, but only by the application. Although the sakka does not accept the third subsumptive reflection the cause of inferential cognition, other scholars do accept it as such, therefore the application cannot be omitted. The application is necessary. 21. It should not be said that the subject propertyhood of the reason can be understood from the reason statement itself. The reason statement fulfills the expectancy for the nature of the reason as the cause of the probandom, it is not uttered to convey the presence of the reason in the subject. nor should it be said that subject propertyhood is implicitly known from the opponent's reason statement. Until the meaning of the reason statement is settled, it cannot imply subject propertyhood. Otherwise pervasion, the reason and subject propertyhood would all be implied by the thesis alone, and the other members of Naya would become pointless. Nor is it sound to say that the opponent will understand pervasion and subject propertyhood on his own. Neither proponent nor opponent is omniscient, it is not universally possible to understand everything unaided. The opponent must himself perform his proper task, that is, employ the application. Otherwise a mission of the other members too would become admissible. The conclusion statement. After the application, the conclusion is stated. The conclusion is the sentence that produces cognition of the pro-bandom on the basis of the subsumptive reflection generated by cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood. The question, what is the purpose of the conclusion, is not sound. The first four members yield cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood, but unless the absence of a defeating reason and the absence of an equally strong counter reason are ascertained, those four members do not culminate in inferential cognition. The conclusion completes the inference by conveying these absences. Objection, there is no expectancy for the conclusion. 23. An objection may be raised. Once pervasion and subject property had been expressed, the reason is complete and no expectancy for another member remains. Any doubt concerning the absence of the probandom should be removed by those very members, otherwise the conclusion 2 cannot remove that doubt, since the conclusion is not a special sensory perception. Nor should it be said that the conclusion removes doubt by expressing the subject as endowed with an established probandom. If the conclusion states only the nature of the probandom and not its established status, then the ablative meaning because of such a reason cannot be related to the probandom. The answer is that even after pervasion and subject propertyhood are known, cognition of the probandom does not arise because of the possibility of a defeating reason and of an equally strong counter reason. Only after the absence of a defeater and of a counter reason is known as the intended inferential cognition obtained, the conclusion expresses this result fully. Knowledge of the absence of defeaters and the like is necessary. An objection may be raised, the actual absence of a defeating reason and an equally strong counter reason may assist inferential cognition, but not cognition of their absence, because no means for such cognition is available and its semantic relation is also unestablished. This objection is not sound. The rule of pavagian is, that which does not arise in the presence of cognition of something arises from cognition of that thing's absence. Therefore cognition of the absence of a defeating reason and of the absence of an equally strong counter-reason is necessary. It should not be said that the ablative meaning of therefore is unrelated to the probandom as established. Through the relation expressed by the ablative, the probandom's freedom from further expectancy, that is, its established status, is cognized, this cognition arises only after the the ablative relation is established. Consequently, the establishment of the probandum is known precisely from the conclusion. So refers to the reason. 25. Some scholars say that in therefore, so, the correlative pronoun so has the reason side in view, not the probandum side. Therefore draws the conclusion after considering all forms of the reasoned pervasion, propertyhood, absence of a defeater, and so forth. This view, however, is not sound. It is unclear whether so refers to the previously stated reasons nature, qualifier, or similarity. The application begins with so to this, whereas the conclusion begins with therefore, so, if the same reason side were intended in both places, the sentence meaning would become disconnected. The alternative that the subject of the reason is the subject in general is also unsound, because relating the subject endowed with the reason merely to a general subject would be incoherent. The alternative of similarity is likewise incoherent. In inferences of identity and in purely affirmative inferences, similarity among subjects cannot be apprehended in the conclusion. Objection, the relation between therefore and so would be incoherent. 26, an objection may be raised when so refers to the various intended features of the reason, therefore cannot be related to a general qualifier of the probandom. If in the opponent's statement therefore so therefore is also held to connect with the contextually supplied qualifier of the probandom over extension results. The answer is that so refers to the cognized form of the previously stated reason. Because therefore refers back through the correlative so, it requires no separate relation beyond the knownness of the reason. On the basis of cognition of the qualified reason, therefore is connected with the qualified probandom. In the conclusion, therefore sound is impermanent, the established status of the probandom impermanence is specifically cognized in sound. Thus there is no need to relate the meaning of therefore again to the probandum impermanence. The matter stated as probandum in the thesis is reaffirmed in the conclusion by establishing its relation to the reason. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members. 27. Doubt, purpose, and the like are not members of Nyaya. They possess none of the characteristics of a member of Nyaya. Their use in Nyaya is merely as auxiliary material, not as an enlargement of the number of members. Questions such as, does it possess fire, or how does smoke indicate fire, are not universally necessary, they are useful only in special contexts. With this, the section on the members of Nyaya in the Inference Division of Tatvassant Mayans. Fallacious reasons. Fallacious reasons assist in determining truth and attaining victory, therefore they are explained here. general definition of a fallacious reason. 2. The cognition of that factor which is the counter positive of being the object of valid cognition, that is, which consists in the absence of a cause of inferential cognition, obstructs inference, alternatively, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inference is fallacious reasonhood. For example, in the faulty inference, fire is not hot because it is a substance, substancehood is a fallacious reason, because the absence of heat, the object opposed to the veridical cognition, fire is hot, is not pervaded by substancehood. An alternative definition, the status of a reason such that, when it is known, cognition of the reason becomes an obstruction to inference as fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the mountain possesses smoke because it possesses fire, the cognition concerning the reason fire is pervaded by smoke obstructs inference, hence the reason fire is fallacious. According to the ancient scholars, the status of a reason whose cognition obstructs inferential cognition is fallacious reasonhood. In the faulty inference, the fireless mountain possesses smoke. When the absence of fire on the mountain is known, the reason smoke obstructs inference of fire. These definitions describe fallacies of reasons in general. Fallacious reasons as grounds of defeat will be discussed later. The general definitions include the fallacious reasons. In some contexts an uncommon reason and an equally strong counter reason also become fallacious reasons, cognition of them obstructs inferential cognition. It is not sound to deny that a defeated reason and an equally strong counter-reason are fallacious on the claim that they obstruct only perceptual and verbal cognition. The foregoing definitions include reasons whose cognition obstructs cognitions of those kinds. An alternative view and the division of fallacious reasons. For, according to an alternative view, in perception, and other cognitions a defeated reason and an equally strong counter-reason do not prevent the production of cognition, but merely render the produced cognition invalid. In inference, however, these two defects of a reason prevent the very production of cognition. Phalacious reasons are of five kinds, one, deviating or inconclusive, two, contradictory, three, counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, four, unestablished, and, five, defeated. The five corresponding defects are deviation, contradiction, counterbalance, non-establishment, and defeat. With this, the general account of fallacious reasons ends. The deviating or inconclusive reason. Five, a deviating or inconclusive reason is of three kinds, common, uncommon, and non-exclusive. The definition that which establishes both the pro-bandom and its absences deviating does not equally include all three kinds, because one and the same reason cannot establish both the probandom and its absence, nor can it make both doubtful. Nor is occurrence in both similar and counter instances, or absence from both, the general definition of deviation, because these properties are not sequential but occur in separate divisions. A common reason occurs in both similar and counter instances, an uncommon reason occurs in neither, and a non-exclusive reason is invariably connected with both the probandum and its absence and produces doubt. Gangesa rejects the view that a deviating reason establishes both the probandum and its absence. One and the same reason cannot establish both, nor can it render both indeterminate. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and its absence are found respectively only in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons. The ancient scholar's definition of deviation. The proposal may be made that a deviating reason is an intended reason whose cognition of subject propertyhood, becoming the object of cognition, causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives that produces doubt concerning the pro-bandom. But the doubtful statement, is sound impermanent or not, is itself neither the object of cognition of subject-propertyhood nor the cause of recollecting two opposed alternatives. Common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons produced out respectively because of a current in both similar and counter instances, absence from both, and invariable connection with both pro-bandom and absence of pro-bandom. The non-exclusive reason in the purely affirmative inference, all things are knowable because they are nameable, and the uncommon reason in, this is a jar because it is this object, a sometimes faultless. A person's failure to understand such a faultless reason is a defect of that person's ignorance, not of the reason. Otherwise even faultless uses of common reasons and equally strong counter reasons would have to be treated as fallacious owing to ignorance. Refutation of under extension 7. An objection may be raised, the foregoing definition of deviation does not include a common reason. In the inferences, this object is identical with this object because it is knowable, and sound is impermanent because it is either sound or something else, the common reason is not present in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appears contradictory. This objection is not sound. Even if the common reason is not cognized as a property in the subject, cognition of the universality of the individual reason and the demonstration of that universality can obstruct both inference for oneself and inference for another. To establish the defect of a common reason, the presence of the reason in the subject as subject propertyhood and commoness must be demonstrated, the commoness thus demonstrated constitutes the defect of the reason. The ancient scholars reject this objection of under extension, saying that common reasons such as no ability or being sound or something else are not situated in the subject as endowed with the probandom and therefore appear contradictory, nevertheless, the generality of the individual reason and its demonstration obstruct inference. The commoness of a common reason consists in the occurrence of the reason in both similar and counter instances, this is its defect. Refutation of the argument for an alternative definition. 8. The foregoing refutation also rejects the view that a reason present in the subject and undifferentiated from a deviation relation opposed to inference is deviating. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness are where respectively the distinct forms of deviation belonging to common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons, these divisions will therefore be explained without mutual intermixture of classes. A contradictory reason too can in this broad sense be called deviating, but the special conditions of the common, uncommon, and non-exclusive divisions will be separately explained below. Occurrence in both similar and counter instances, exclusion from both, and non-exclusiveness, These three relations of deviation opposed to inference occur separately in common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons respectively. A contradictory reason too may sometimes be called deviating in this broad sense, but the special characteristics of common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are not mutually intermixed. The extraneous conditions distinguishing these three will be explained below. Reason for rejecting the alternative definition. 9. Whether cognition is present or absent, knowledge of each specific property, such as commonness, uncommonness, and non-exclusiveness is necessary for recognizing the defect of the foregoing forms of deviation. Therefore the qualifier present in the subject is pointless in the definition of a deviating reason. For the same reason, the following definitions are also rejected, a fallacious reason not pervaded by the probandom, when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandum, or a reason occurring only in a subject distinct from similar instances endowed with the probandum. In the first definition, not pervaded by the probandum is an unnecessary qualifier, in the second, fallacious reasonhood is not already known. These definitions include the contradictory reason along with the common reason, as in ether is impermanent because it is the substratum of sound. 10. Neither excluded from all similar and all counter instances, nor occurring in both similar and counter instances, can be a general characteristic of a deviating reason. These formulations contain unnecessary qualifiers and fail to include the non-exclusive reason. When an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is treated as a similar instance, this definition excludes a non-exclusive inference such as, All knowable things are impermanent because here no separate similar or counter instance is established. And when the subject itself is treated as a similar instance, an uncommon reason is improperly included in the definition. Refutation of yet another definition. 11, nor is either of the following a general characteristic of deviation, a reason occurring only in counter instances distinct from the subject and not in similar instances, or a reason occurring only in similar instances distinct from the subject and not in counter instances. The first formulation does not include a non-exclusive reason and overextends to a faultless common reason, the second becomes intermixed with contradictory and uncommon reasons. The definition present in the subject, distinct from a contradictory reason, and devoid of a relation-assisting inference likewise contains pointless qualifiers. The successive refutation of these definitions establishes that no single recurrent definition covering all deviating reasons is possible. Only their separate divisions constitute the actual defects. With this, the prima facie discussion of deviation ends.

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