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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Detected language: en (0.997373)
Duration: 21:45
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0:02–0:07A complex absence of non-manifestness is a cause of perception.
0:08–0:14The Siddhantan says, in the manifestation produced by contact with fire of colors delimited by whiteness and the like,
0:14–0:19it is impossible to accept lesser and greater extension of one and the same universal,
0:19–0:23therefore the manifestness residing in colors must be diverse.
0:23–0:28If merely manifest color is called the cause, there will be no recurrent cause.
0:28–0:41Hence the aggregate of absences of all universals of non-manifestness that are pervaded by whiteness and the like should be the cause of perception of color in the rest, otherwise recurrent perception of color would be impossible.
0:41–0:51In the same way, in perception of touch and the like, the aggregate of absences of the relevant universals of non-manifestness should be accepted as the cause.
0:51–0:57The second alternative is not to regard manifestness or non-manifestness as a universal.
0:57–1:04Possession of a universal pervaded by colorhood may be manifestness, and its absence non-manifestness.
1:04–1:12In perceptible white color there are universals such as greater whiteness and greatest whiteness, in the color of vapor, the eye, and the like.
1:12–1:21There is only general whiteness, because there is no proof establishing a special universal pervaded by whiteness there, and superior whiteness is absent.
1:21–1:29It cannot be said that colourhood itself establishes a universal pervaded by whiteness and therefore that universal should be the cause of perception.
1:30–1:40Once colourhood is accepted through economy as the cause, perception of white colour is established, causal status of a special universal pervaded by whiteness is then unnecessary.
1:41–1:45Similarly, general touchhood alone suffices in perception of touch.
1:45–1:51Nor is it established that manifestness together with magnitude is a cause of perception of color,
1:51–1:55because air of extremely great magnitude is not perceived.
1:55–1:59Inhibitors of Perception
1:59–2:05Objection, fire present in a roasting pot shirt and sunlight illuminating a pot situated in water
2:05–2:09ought to be perceived, because the pot shirt and water are perceptible and therefore possess
2:09–2:14manifest color. Their particular conjunction cannot be called an inhibitor, because water and
2:14–2:18and poachered themselves are revealed by light, if that very conjunction were inhibitory,
2:18–2:22both fire conjoined with the poachered and sunlight conjoined with water would become
2:22–2:24imperceptible.
2:24–2:29If differences of conjunction are regarded as generated by universals, they would overlap,
2:29–2:34because in both cases conjunction may be produced by motion on either side.
2:34–2:38To accept many conjunctions like high and low tones is cumbersome, to regard each
2:38–2:43individual conjunction is different destroys recurrence.
2:43–2:48Reply, sunlight situated in water is in fact perceived, but because both water and light
2:48–2:53are extremely transparent, they are not distinctly seen as separate.
2:53–2:57From the part of a roasting potchard conjoined with fire there arises a particular fire whose
2:57–3:02color is non-manifest but whose touch is manifest.
3:02–3:06When a part of fire with manifest color enters extremely boiling oil, the fire is sometimes
3:06–3:09perceived.
3:09–3:14It is not accepted that curd is produced from curd atoms can join with milk.
3:14–3:19Curd is a substance produced after destruction of milk, as with curdled milk, its material
3:19–3:22causes are the material causes of milk.
3:22–3:29Therefore this example does not defeat the causal status of manifest color.
3:29–3:32Magnitude is also a cause of perception.
3:32–3:37Objection, fire possessing manifest color does not possess manifest touch, cognition
3:37–3:41of heat there arises by a rule concerning another fire conjoined with heat. The causal
3:41–3:46conditions of manifest color and manifest touch in hot fire appear mutually incompatible.
3:46–3:52Reply, the undefeated recognition, the very fire that I saw is what I am touching, and
3:52–3:58both seeing and touching establish both color and touch in fire. Firehood is not an inhibitor
3:58–4:02of production of touch, production and non-production of a quality arise from differences
4:02–4:08in efficient causes. Firehood pervaded by substancehood is present in fire possessing
4:08–4:14manifest color and touch. Manifest color and touch coexist in water and earth, the apparent
4:14–4:20conflict in light is merely produced by a difference of efficient causes.
4:20–4:24Magnitude related to manifest color and possession of many substances appear equally present
4:24–4:29through positive and negative concomitance in one substance, nevertheless only magnitude
4:29–4:34regulates perception of substance, and economy favors this view.
4:34–4:38In a heap of cotton, compactness increases magnitude without increasing the number of
4:38–4:43parts, and clarity of perception also increases.
4:43–4:47One should not accept possession of many substances as the cause merely because a distant mass
4:47–4:50of hair is perceived through possession of many substances or conjunction of similar
4:50–4:54hairs without an increase in the number of parts.
4:54–4:58Possession of many substances can be a cause through inherent, not through conjunction.
4:58–5:02Rather than treating conjunction of similar parts in a distant object as its auxiliary,
5:02–5:07it is simpler to treat that conjunction as an auxiliary to magnitude.
5:07–5:11Nor is it the case that possession of manifest color and magnitude are merely natural eligibility
5:11–5:15for perception of substance, not causes, like starford.
5:15–5:19Excellence of perception depends upon excellence of manifest color and magnitude, therefore
5:19–5:21both are causes.
5:21–5:25Absence of excellence in a cause does not invariably accompany absence of the effect,
5:25–5:28so the example of starford does not apply.
5:28–5:32In visual perception of substance, possession of manifest color and magnitude are both object-located
5:32–5:39causes, as common recurrent properties, they delimit causal status.
5:39–5:44B of the theory of perception of air.
5:44–5:49Prima-facie view air is perceptible, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception
5:49–5:52of substance.
5:52–5:56The Prima-facie objector says, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception
5:56–6:00of substance, because air is perceived even without manifest color.
6:00–6:04Inference, air is perceptible, because while possessing magnitude it is the locus of manifest
6:04–6:06touch, like a pot.
6:06–6:11The fact that hot vapor is perceptible does not make the reason deviant.
6:11–6:15Possession of manifest touch together with magnitude establishes tactile perceptibility,
6:15–6:18possession of manifest color does not.
6:18–6:22Nor is possession of manifest color an extraneous condition pervading both the
6:22–6:26probandum delimited by a property of the subject and the probandum delimited
6:26–6:32by the reason, because it does not establish tactile perceptibility. After operation of
6:32–6:38the tactile sense organ there is a direct experience, the air is blowing. Even if touch is not
6:38–6:43apprehended as a reason, perceptibility of a pot is not destroyed, therefore this experience
6:43–6:47cannot be explained merely as inference of air from touch.
6:47–6:51If touch were inferred, the cognition would be there is touch and air, not air is hot
6:51–6:57or air is cold. Sometimes, even when touch is not distinctly understood, there is the
6:57–7:03direct experience, the air is cold. There is no proof that this cognition arises only after
7:03–7:08air has first been inferred as a reason for cognition of a cold substance, nor does perception
7:08–7:14of a particular quality involve superimposition of an opposed quality.
7:14–7:20Nor is visual imperceptibility an inhibitor of tactile perceptibility. The eye cognizes
7:20–7:25substance alone and the skin touch, if the skin cognizes touch together with its substrate,
7:25–7:29it can also cognize touch together with its substrate in air.
7:29–7:33The rule that substance is apprehended only when number, magnitude, and the like belonging
7:33–7:39to it or apprehended does not hold in every individual perception of substance.
7:39–7:43Cloth on one's back is known by touch even when its number and magnitude are not
7:43–7:48understood, in blowing air, touch on the body and sometimes number, magnitude, and
7:48–7:52The like are also experienced.
7:52–7:55Conclusion Air is imperceptible.
7:55–7:59The Siddhantan says that air is not perceptible.
7:59–8:03In perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest
8:03–8:10color together with magnitude is a cause, it is improper to abandon a possible cause.
8:10–8:14Neither possession of a produced special quality apprehensible by an external sense organ
8:14–8:19and north possession of a special quality co-located with resultant magnitude is the
8:19–8:23cause, otherwise a yellow substance in the tongue, manifest bitter taste, and a fragrant
8:23–8:28substance carried by air would also have to be perceived.
8:28–8:34Prima-facy rejoinder, possession of manifest touches sufficient.
8:34–8:38The Prima-facy objecta replies, possession of manifest color is not a cause of perception
8:38–8:43of substance, otherwise the yellow substance situated in the eye would be perceived.
8:43–8:46Alternatively, possession of manifest touch may be accepted as the cause in perception
8:46–8:48of air.
8:48–8:52On this view array will not become imperceptible, because array is a fiery substance and its
8:52–8:57perceptibility depends upon manifest color, just as perception of hot vapor does.
8:57–9:01How are conjunction, disjunction, and motion in the rays of a blue jewel and the like
9:01–9:03known?
9:03–9:07They are not perceived in moonbeams and the like.
9:07–9:10Array of a blue jewel is devoid of color in an earlier place and colored in a later
9:10–9:16place, from this, conjunction and disjunction of its substrate are inferred.
9:16–9:20Such inference as possible just as movement of air is inferred after general touch has
9:20–9:23been perceived in air.
9:23–9:27Smoke and vapor are not objects of the tactile sense, therefore even without manifest color
9:27–9:30they are objects of visual perception.
9:30–9:34To regard possession of many special qualities apprehensible by external sense organs as
9:34–9:37the cause of perception of substance is a cumbersome postulate that would make
9:37–9:40moats moving in a sunbeam imperceptible.
9:40–9:43If both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are accepted
9:43–9:48as causes of perception of substance, separate causalities must be posited for visual perception
9:48–9:50of a pot and tactile perception of air.
9:50–9:54Through economy, possession of a manifest special quality that determines a particular
9:54–9:58external sense organ should be accepted as the common cause.
9:58–10:02The objection that particular perception and general perception arise from different
10:02–10:06causal complexes, and therefore one property cannot cause perceptions of substance
10:06–10:09produced by two different sense organs, is unestablished.
10:09–10:14There is no contradiction in accepting possession of manifest color as the cause of visual perception
10:14–10:19of substance and possession of manifest touch as the cause of tactile perception of substance.
10:19–10:22Therefore air is perceptible.
10:22–10:26The experience I touch is valid with respect to air.
10:26–10:30Objection, if air is a substance that is the object of immediate awareness produced
10:30–10:35by an external sense organ, how can colorless air be an object of perception?
10:35–10:39The rule is that a substance that is an object of immediate awareness produces color.
10:39–10:44Reply, a substance produces color only when it in his inner locus of color, merely being
10:44–10:48a substance that is an object of immediate awareness does not make it a producer of
10:48–10:49color.
10:49–10:53Only after color has been produced is it known in that state as, a substance that
10:53–10:55is an object of perception.
10:55–10:59Nor does it follow that if a sense organ other than the eye apprehends substance,
10:59–11:03pot would become colorless, touchless, and visually imperceptible.
11:03–11:07Although the tactile sense is an external sense organ that apprehends substance, it
11:07–11:10does not apprehend color, just as the eye does not apprehend touch, nevertheless that
11:10–11:13pot is an object of touch.
11:13–11:17With respect to air, as with a pot, a subsequent cognition, I am touching, arises, therefore
11:17–11:21air is perceptible.
11:21–11:25Manifest touch alone regulates tactile perception.
11:25–11:29It may again be said that manifest color, like manifest touch, is also a cause of
11:29–11:35tactile perceptibility, because substances possessing manifest color are seen to be perceived
11:35–11:36by touch.
11:36–11:41Reply, a sunray, though possessing manifest color, is imperceptible to touch, therefore
11:41–11:47manifest touch is necessary in tactile perception, while manifest color is purposeless.
11:47–11:52When manifest touch is present, absence of manifest color does not produce absence
11:52–11:55of tactile perceptibility.
11:55–11:59If it is said that manifestation located in touch is the cause but color is not,
11:59–12:04The reply is that both touch and its manifestation are causes, color is not.
12:04–12:10The universal's manifestness located in color and touch are only delimiters of causal status,
12:10–12:13not themselves causes.
12:13–12:17Modern view, air is imperceptible.
12:17–12:22Modern Neayakas say, manifest touch alone does not regulate tactile perception of
12:22–12:24substance.
12:24–12:28If it did, some are heat vapor, cold and hot substances carried by air, and their
12:28–12:34numbers, magnitudes, conjunctions, disjunctions, and motions would all be perceived. Number
12:34–12:39and the like residing in an eligible individual are apprehended when the appropriate conditions
12:39–12:43are present, yet no one knows the number of hot vapor is one knows a pot by touching
12:43–12:49it with the hand. If possession of manifest color alone in general were the cause of perception
12:49–12:53of substance, the number of moonbeams and the yellow substance in the eye would
12:53–12:55be perceived.
12:55–13:02Even when subtle vapor is seen, its duality, hand-sized magnitude, or motion is not understood.
13:02–13:06Therefore both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are causes
13:06–13:11and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, because they deviate
13:11–13:14from one another, here is imperceptible.
13:14–13:19In the cognition, the conch is yellow, only the yellowness of the eye appears, not
13:19–13:24yellow substance, the parts of the yellow substance are dispersed like rays.
13:24–13:28Accepting this does not violate the Neayakka doctrine.
13:28–13:31This is the modern view.
13:31–13:36View of the tradition-noir air is imperceptible.
13:36–13:40The tradition-noir says, if only possession of manifest touch, and not possession of
13:40–13:46manifest color, caused perception of substance, disjunction from an eastern place in conjunction
13:46–13:49with a northern place and a row of flying birds would not be perceived, because the
13:49–13:55massive rays in the eastern and northern places lacks manifest touch. Then the inference the
13:55–14:00row of birds is moving on the basis of the massive rays would be impossible, and inference the moon
14:00–14:04and stars are moving from conjunction and disjunction would also be obstructed.
14:05–14:10Nor may one first infer the birds in the northeast region and then infer their conjunction and
14:10–14:16disjunction, because those regions are not perceived. Thus possession of manifest color
14:16–14:23Air alone is an indispensable cause of perception of air, and air is imperceptible.
14:23–14:26Explanation of the cognition, the air is cold.
14:26–14:32Objection, if air is knowable only by inference, how can cold touch qualify air in the illusion,
14:32–14:34the air is cold?
14:34–14:37Air is not an eligible substrate of cold touch.
14:37–14:40It is not enough to say that there is no obstruction to mentioning cold touch in
14:40–14:44cognition of air in general, because attribution of the quality to a particular air is impossible.
14:46–14:50It is also difficult to regard cold touch known by the tactile sense as superimposed upon air
14:50–14:55supplied by inference, because the mind does not directly perceive the four qualities such as
14:55–15:01touch inferred through air. Nor can cold touch be mentally superimposed upon air inferred as
15:01–15:06the cause of cognition of a cold substance, because air is inferred as not being a locus
15:06–15:12of cold touch. If air is cold as an illusion produced by an external sense organ, such an
15:12–15:18illusion would likewise arise through defect and inferential apprehension of a particular.
15:18–15:22It is not an erroneous inference produced by a fallacious reason, because cold touch
15:22–15:27is not erroneously taken as the mark of air. Nor is identity with remembered air
15:27–15:32superimposed upon the cold substance inferred from cold touch, the cognition is an
15:32–15:38awareness of cold touch with air as its qualificand. Even the attenuated illusion, this cold touch
15:38–15:44belongs to air is unestablished. It is not merely a mental cognition of cold touch like
15:44–15:50a dream illusion, because it follows the operation of the tactile sense organ.
15:50–15:54The tradition or replies, cold touch known in water in the like may, through a sensory
15:54–15:59defect, be superimposed upon inferred air as a property contrary to it, like an illusion
15:59–16:05of direction in space. By superimposing the character of being an inferential mark of air
16:05–16:11upon cold touch, the inference, this cold touch belongs to air, becomes possible. Then through
16:11–16:18mental superimposition the cognition this air is cold arises, like air is not hot. Therefore air is
16:18–16:25knowable only through inference. Establishment of the air is blowing and cold air is blowing.
16:25–16:32Objection, after operation of the tactile sense, how can one infer the air is blowing
16:32–16:36when conjunction and disjunction, which are reasons for movement, are imperceptible.
16:36–16:40If impact of air upon the body is called the reason, impact itself is a conjunction
16:40–16:42and therefore imperceptible.
16:42–16:48Reply, from a particular pleasure or pain produced by impact, impact upon the body
16:48–16:53is inferred, in that impact, production by a swift stream possessing touch is inferred,
16:53–16:56from the stream the blowing motion of air is inferred.
16:56–17:02A person who does not know this mediating process does not infer blowing.
17:02–17:08A further question, how is there one qualified inferential cognition cold air is blowing?
17:08–17:12Cognition of air qualified by cold touch is mental, while cognition of the blowing
17:12–17:16motion is inferential, there would be an overlap of kinds.
17:16–17:21Reply, the blowing motion is inferred and air remembered is qualified by cold touch,
17:21–17:27Therefore one inferential qualified cognition of air is qualified by blowing motion is possible.
17:27–17:33Cold touch and blowing motion are not jointly apprehended in air at one and the same moment.
17:33–17:38This is not faulted by cumbersomeness of postulation, because perception of both qualifiers in air
17:38–17:42is prevented by a stronger defeater.
17:42–17:46Once possession of manifest color is established as a cause and perception of substance produced
17:46–17:52by an external sense organ, possession of manifest color, pervading the probandum delimited
17:52–17:57by a property of the subject or the probandum delimited by the reason, becomes an extraneous
17:57–18:01condition of the inference proving perception of error.
18:01–18:05There is no fault of proving something else or of deviation in the qualificand, ultimately
18:05–18:10deviation of the probandum perceptibility in error and absence of the qualificand
18:10–18:12are established.
18:12–18:16Therefore error is inferrable, not perceptible.
18:16–18:19The self is perceptible, air is not.
18:19–18:25Objection, if possession of manifest colour regulates perception of substance, the self,
18:25–18:28like air, would also become imperceptible.
18:28–18:32It cannot be said that the cognition, I know, occurs without apprehension of a reason and
18:32–18:35therefore cognition of the self is not inferential.
18:35–18:39A person who does not know the self cannot have the qualified cognition, I know, hence
18:39–18:42this cognition can serve as the inferential mark.
18:42–18:47If the self were inferrable, the present tense cognition, I now know a pot, would be impossible,
18:47–18:51because the cognition of the pot would be destroyed in the third moment before inference of the
18:51–18:52self.
18:52–18:56This objection can be answered by a gross temporal adjunct, just as from seeing a pot as activity
18:56–18:59one infers, the potter is making a pot.
18:59–19:02Conclusion, the self is perceptible.
19:02–19:06The recognition, I who saw the pot and the very one touching it, directly presents
19:06–19:08the identity of the self.
19:08–19:12This is not merely an inference that, I, the locus of cognition of the pot produced
19:12–19:16by the tactile sense, I am identical with the locus of visual cognition because in such
19:16–19:21recognition the eye itself is the object of its cognition, just as eye is the locus of
19:21–19:25cognition. If the eye form were imperceptible, the inferential mark itself would become
19:25–19:28imperceptible.
19:28–19:32To infer the self first from cognition, then infer ownership by the self and cognition,
19:32–19:38and finally infer in the self-objecthood for eye cognition is an unnecessary sequence.
19:38–19:42The recognition eye who saw the pot and the very one touching it occurs even in a person
19:42–19:46who does not know such a procedure.
19:46–19:50There is no such recognition with respect to air.
19:50–19:54Air that is blown backward is continuously moving and is not cognized again, the cognition
19:54–19:59the air that blew behind is now blowing ahead is not a direct recognition of numerical
19:59–20:03identity but only an inference of substancehood belonging to the same kind.
20:03–20:08Thus the conclusion is, air is not perceived by an external sense organ, because it is a
20:08–20:12colorless substance, like ether.
20:12–20:16Nor will being the locus of manifest touch, which pervades the probandum occurring in the
20:16–20:20reason, be an extraneous condition, because manifest touch is not the reason in the
20:20–20:25original inference, hence that property cannot become an extraneous condition pervading
20:25–20:27the probandum.
20:27–20:33Thus ends the theory of perception of air.
20:33–20:37See, the theory that gold is fiery.
20:37–20:44If possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause, gold will be imperceptible.
20:44–20:49Again, if possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause of immediate awareness
20:49–20:53of substance produced by an external sense organ, the fiery substance gold will not be
20:53–20:59perceptible, for, as an array, touch and fiery gold is non-manifest.
20:59–21:05Its color is indeed manifest, but the supporting yellow color overwhelms it.
21:05–21:10means relation to a stronger color of the same kind.
21:10–21:13Therefore the manifest color of gold can be overwhelmed even when the yellow color is
21:13–21:16not apprehended in darkness.
21:16–21:21It cannot be said that even overwhelmed fire is perceived in darkness, that gold therefore
21:21–21:26ought to be perceived, and that a second fire cannot be accepted to reveal fire.
21:26–21:31A substance is visually perceived only when its color is perceived.
21:31–21:35Since the real color of gold is overwhelmed by yellow color it is not perceived, and in
21:35–21:40the absence of rays the supporting yellow color too is not perceived, therefore gold remains
21:40–21:41imperceptible.

Plain text

A complex absence of non-manifestness is a cause of perception. The Siddhantan says, in the manifestation produced by contact with fire of colors delimited by whiteness and the like, it is impossible to accept lesser and greater extension of one and the same universal, therefore the manifestness residing in colors must be diverse. If merely manifest color is called the cause, there will be no recurrent cause. Hence the aggregate of absences of all universals of non-manifestness that are pervaded by whiteness and the like should be the cause of perception of color in the rest, otherwise recurrent perception of color would be impossible. In the same way, in perception of touch and the like, the aggregate of absences of the relevant universals of non-manifestness should be accepted as the cause. The second alternative is not to regard manifestness or non-manifestness as a universal. Possession of a universal pervaded by colorhood may be manifestness, and its absence non-manifestness. In perceptible white color there are universals such as greater whiteness and greatest whiteness, in the color of vapor, the eye, and the like. There is only general whiteness, because there is no proof establishing a special universal pervaded by whiteness there, and superior whiteness is absent. It cannot be said that colourhood itself establishes a universal pervaded by whiteness and therefore that universal should be the cause of perception. Once colourhood is accepted through economy as the cause, perception of white colour is established, causal status of a special universal pervaded by whiteness is then unnecessary. Similarly, general touchhood alone suffices in perception of touch. Nor is it established that manifestness together with magnitude is a cause of perception of color, because air of extremely great magnitude is not perceived. Inhibitors of Perception Objection, fire present in a roasting pot shirt and sunlight illuminating a pot situated in water ought to be perceived, because the pot shirt and water are perceptible and therefore possess manifest color. Their particular conjunction cannot be called an inhibitor, because water and and poachered themselves are revealed by light, if that very conjunction were inhibitory, both fire conjoined with the poachered and sunlight conjoined with water would become imperceptible. If differences of conjunction are regarded as generated by universals, they would overlap, because in both cases conjunction may be produced by motion on either side. To accept many conjunctions like high and low tones is cumbersome, to regard each individual conjunction is different destroys recurrence. Reply, sunlight situated in water is in fact perceived, but because both water and light are extremely transparent, they are not distinctly seen as separate. From the part of a roasting potchard conjoined with fire there arises a particular fire whose color is non-manifest but whose touch is manifest. When a part of fire with manifest color enters extremely boiling oil, the fire is sometimes perceived. It is not accepted that curd is produced from curd atoms can join with milk. Curd is a substance produced after destruction of milk, as with curdled milk, its material causes are the material causes of milk. Therefore this example does not defeat the causal status of manifest color. Magnitude is also a cause of perception. Objection, fire possessing manifest color does not possess manifest touch, cognition of heat there arises by a rule concerning another fire conjoined with heat. The causal conditions of manifest color and manifest touch in hot fire appear mutually incompatible. Reply, the undefeated recognition, the very fire that I saw is what I am touching, and both seeing and touching establish both color and touch in fire. Firehood is not an inhibitor of production of touch, production and non-production of a quality arise from differences in efficient causes. Firehood pervaded by substancehood is present in fire possessing manifest color and touch. Manifest color and touch coexist in water and earth, the apparent conflict in light is merely produced by a difference of efficient causes. Magnitude related to manifest color and possession of many substances appear equally present through positive and negative concomitance in one substance, nevertheless only magnitude regulates perception of substance, and economy favors this view. In a heap of cotton, compactness increases magnitude without increasing the number of parts, and clarity of perception also increases. One should not accept possession of many substances as the cause merely because a distant mass of hair is perceived through possession of many substances or conjunction of similar hairs without an increase in the number of parts. Possession of many substances can be a cause through inherent, not through conjunction. Rather than treating conjunction of similar parts in a distant object as its auxiliary, it is simpler to treat that conjunction as an auxiliary to magnitude. Nor is it the case that possession of manifest color and magnitude are merely natural eligibility for perception of substance, not causes, like starford. Excellence of perception depends upon excellence of manifest color and magnitude, therefore both are causes. Absence of excellence in a cause does not invariably accompany absence of the effect, so the example of starford does not apply. In visual perception of substance, possession of manifest color and magnitude are both object-located causes, as common recurrent properties, they delimit causal status. B of the theory of perception of air. Prima-facie view air is perceptible, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception of substance. The Prima-facie objector says, possession of manifest color does not regulate perception of substance, because air is perceived even without manifest color. Inference, air is perceptible, because while possessing magnitude it is the locus of manifest touch, like a pot. The fact that hot vapor is perceptible does not make the reason deviant. Possession of manifest touch together with magnitude establishes tactile perceptibility, possession of manifest color does not. Nor is possession of manifest color an extraneous condition pervading both the probandum delimited by a property of the subject and the probandum delimited by the reason, because it does not establish tactile perceptibility. After operation of the tactile sense organ there is a direct experience, the air is blowing. Even if touch is not apprehended as a reason, perceptibility of a pot is not destroyed, therefore this experience cannot be explained merely as inference of air from touch. If touch were inferred, the cognition would be there is touch and air, not air is hot or air is cold. Sometimes, even when touch is not distinctly understood, there is the direct experience, the air is cold. There is no proof that this cognition arises only after air has first been inferred as a reason for cognition of a cold substance, nor does perception of a particular quality involve superimposition of an opposed quality. Nor is visual imperceptibility an inhibitor of tactile perceptibility. The eye cognizes substance alone and the skin touch, if the skin cognizes touch together with its substrate, it can also cognize touch together with its substrate in air. The rule that substance is apprehended only when number, magnitude, and the like belonging to it or apprehended does not hold in every individual perception of substance. Cloth on one's back is known by touch even when its number and magnitude are not understood, in blowing air, touch on the body and sometimes number, magnitude, and The like are also experienced. Conclusion Air is imperceptible. The Siddhantan says that air is not perceptible. In perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest color together with magnitude is a cause, it is improper to abandon a possible cause. Neither possession of a produced special quality apprehensible by an external sense organ and north possession of a special quality co-located with resultant magnitude is the cause, otherwise a yellow substance in the tongue, manifest bitter taste, and a fragrant substance carried by air would also have to be perceived. Prima-facy rejoinder, possession of manifest touches sufficient. The Prima-facy objecta replies, possession of manifest color is not a cause of perception of substance, otherwise the yellow substance situated in the eye would be perceived. Alternatively, possession of manifest touch may be accepted as the cause in perception of air. On this view array will not become imperceptible, because array is a fiery substance and its perceptibility depends upon manifest color, just as perception of hot vapor does. How are conjunction, disjunction, and motion in the rays of a blue jewel and the like known? They are not perceived in moonbeams and the like. Array of a blue jewel is devoid of color in an earlier place and colored in a later place, from this, conjunction and disjunction of its substrate are inferred. Such inference as possible just as movement of air is inferred after general touch has been perceived in air. Smoke and vapor are not objects of the tactile sense, therefore even without manifest color they are objects of visual perception. To regard possession of many special qualities apprehensible by external sense organs as the cause of perception of substance is a cumbersome postulate that would make moats moving in a sunbeam imperceptible. If both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are accepted as causes of perception of substance, separate causalities must be posited for visual perception of a pot and tactile perception of air. Through economy, possession of a manifest special quality that determines a particular external sense organ should be accepted as the common cause. The objection that particular perception and general perception arise from different causal complexes, and therefore one property cannot cause perceptions of substance produced by two different sense organs, is unestablished. There is no contradiction in accepting possession of manifest color as the cause of visual perception of substance and possession of manifest touch as the cause of tactile perception of substance. Therefore air is perceptible. The experience I touch is valid with respect to air. Objection, if air is a substance that is the object of immediate awareness produced by an external sense organ, how can colorless air be an object of perception? The rule is that a substance that is an object of immediate awareness produces color. Reply, a substance produces color only when it in his inner locus of color, merely being a substance that is an object of immediate awareness does not make it a producer of color. Only after color has been produced is it known in that state as, a substance that is an object of perception. Nor does it follow that if a sense organ other than the eye apprehends substance, pot would become colorless, touchless, and visually imperceptible. Although the tactile sense is an external sense organ that apprehends substance, it does not apprehend color, just as the eye does not apprehend touch, nevertheless that pot is an object of touch. With respect to air, as with a pot, a subsequent cognition, I am touching, arises, therefore air is perceptible. Manifest touch alone regulates tactile perception. It may again be said that manifest color, like manifest touch, is also a cause of tactile perceptibility, because substances possessing manifest color are seen to be perceived by touch. Reply, a sunray, though possessing manifest color, is imperceptible to touch, therefore manifest touch is necessary in tactile perception, while manifest color is purposeless. When manifest touch is present, absence of manifest color does not produce absence of tactile perceptibility. If it is said that manifestation located in touch is the cause but color is not, The reply is that both touch and its manifestation are causes, color is not. The universal's manifestness located in color and touch are only delimiters of causal status, not themselves causes. Modern view, air is imperceptible. Modern Neayakas say, manifest touch alone does not regulate tactile perception of substance. If it did, some are heat vapor, cold and hot substances carried by air, and their numbers, magnitudes, conjunctions, disjunctions, and motions would all be perceived. Number and the like residing in an eligible individual are apprehended when the appropriate conditions are present, yet no one knows the number of hot vapor is one knows a pot by touching it with the hand. If possession of manifest color alone in general were the cause of perception of substance, the number of moonbeams and the yellow substance in the eye would be perceived. Even when subtle vapor is seen, its duality, hand-sized magnitude, or motion is not understood. Therefore both possession of manifest color and possession of manifest touch are causes and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, because they deviate from one another, here is imperceptible. In the cognition, the conch is yellow, only the yellowness of the eye appears, not yellow substance, the parts of the yellow substance are dispersed like rays. Accepting this does not violate the Neayakka doctrine. This is the modern view. View of the tradition-noir air is imperceptible. The tradition-noir says, if only possession of manifest touch, and not possession of manifest color, caused perception of substance, disjunction from an eastern place in conjunction with a northern place and a row of flying birds would not be perceived, because the massive rays in the eastern and northern places lacks manifest touch. Then the inference the row of birds is moving on the basis of the massive rays would be impossible, and inference the moon and stars are moving from conjunction and disjunction would also be obstructed. Nor may one first infer the birds in the northeast region and then infer their conjunction and disjunction, because those regions are not perceived. Thus possession of manifest color Air alone is an indispensable cause of perception of air, and air is imperceptible. Explanation of the cognition, the air is cold. Objection, if air is knowable only by inference, how can cold touch qualify air in the illusion, the air is cold? Air is not an eligible substrate of cold touch. It is not enough to say that there is no obstruction to mentioning cold touch in cognition of air in general, because attribution of the quality to a particular air is impossible. It is also difficult to regard cold touch known by the tactile sense as superimposed upon air supplied by inference, because the mind does not directly perceive the four qualities such as touch inferred through air. Nor can cold touch be mentally superimposed upon air inferred as the cause of cognition of a cold substance, because air is inferred as not being a locus of cold touch. If air is cold as an illusion produced by an external sense organ, such an illusion would likewise arise through defect and inferential apprehension of a particular. It is not an erroneous inference produced by a fallacious reason, because cold touch is not erroneously taken as the mark of air. Nor is identity with remembered air superimposed upon the cold substance inferred from cold touch, the cognition is an awareness of cold touch with air as its qualificand. Even the attenuated illusion, this cold touch belongs to air is unestablished. It is not merely a mental cognition of cold touch like a dream illusion, because it follows the operation of the tactile sense organ. The tradition or replies, cold touch known in water in the like may, through a sensory defect, be superimposed upon inferred air as a property contrary to it, like an illusion of direction in space. By superimposing the character of being an inferential mark of air upon cold touch, the inference, this cold touch belongs to air, becomes possible. Then through mental superimposition the cognition this air is cold arises, like air is not hot. Therefore air is knowable only through inference. Establishment of the air is blowing and cold air is blowing. Objection, after operation of the tactile sense, how can one infer the air is blowing when conjunction and disjunction, which are reasons for movement, are imperceptible. If impact of air upon the body is called the reason, impact itself is a conjunction and therefore imperceptible. Reply, from a particular pleasure or pain produced by impact, impact upon the body is inferred, in that impact, production by a swift stream possessing touch is inferred, from the stream the blowing motion of air is inferred. A person who does not know this mediating process does not infer blowing. A further question, how is there one qualified inferential cognition cold air is blowing? Cognition of air qualified by cold touch is mental, while cognition of the blowing motion is inferential, there would be an overlap of kinds. Reply, the blowing motion is inferred and air remembered is qualified by cold touch, Therefore one inferential qualified cognition of air is qualified by blowing motion is possible. Cold touch and blowing motion are not jointly apprehended in air at one and the same moment. This is not faulted by cumbersomeness of postulation, because perception of both qualifiers in air is prevented by a stronger defeater. Once possession of manifest color is established as a cause and perception of substance produced by an external sense organ, possession of manifest color, pervading the probandum delimited by a property of the subject or the probandum delimited by the reason, becomes an extraneous condition of the inference proving perception of error. There is no fault of proving something else or of deviation in the qualificand, ultimately deviation of the probandum perceptibility in error and absence of the qualificand are established. Therefore error is inferrable, not perceptible. The self is perceptible, air is not. Objection, if possession of manifest colour regulates perception of substance, the self, like air, would also become imperceptible. It cannot be said that the cognition, I know, occurs without apprehension of a reason and therefore cognition of the self is not inferential. A person who does not know the self cannot have the qualified cognition, I know, hence this cognition can serve as the inferential mark. If the self were inferrable, the present tense cognition, I now know a pot, would be impossible, because the cognition of the pot would be destroyed in the third moment before inference of the self. This objection can be answered by a gross temporal adjunct, just as from seeing a pot as activity one infers, the potter is making a pot. Conclusion, the self is perceptible. The recognition, I who saw the pot and the very one touching it, directly presents the identity of the self. This is not merely an inference that, I, the locus of cognition of the pot produced by the tactile sense, I am identical with the locus of visual cognition because in such recognition the eye itself is the object of its cognition, just as eye is the locus of cognition. If the eye form were imperceptible, the inferential mark itself would become imperceptible. To infer the self first from cognition, then infer ownership by the self and cognition, and finally infer in the self-objecthood for eye cognition is an unnecessary sequence. The recognition eye who saw the pot and the very one touching it occurs even in a person who does not know such a procedure. There is no such recognition with respect to air. Air that is blown backward is continuously moving and is not cognized again, the cognition the air that blew behind is now blowing ahead is not a direct recognition of numerical identity but only an inference of substancehood belonging to the same kind. Thus the conclusion is, air is not perceived by an external sense organ, because it is a colorless substance, like ether. Nor will being the locus of manifest touch, which pervades the probandum occurring in the reason, be an extraneous condition, because manifest touch is not the reason in the original inference, hence that property cannot become an extraneous condition pervading the probandum. Thus ends the theory of perception of air. See, the theory that gold is fiery. If possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause, gold will be imperceptible. Again, if possession of manifest touch is accepted as the cause of immediate awareness of substance produced by an external sense organ, the fiery substance gold will not be perceptible, for, as an array, touch and fiery gold is non-manifest. Its color is indeed manifest, but the supporting yellow color overwhelms it. means relation to a stronger color of the same kind. Therefore the manifest color of gold can be overwhelmed even when the yellow color is not apprehended in darkness. It cannot be said that even overwhelmed fire is perceived in darkness, that gold therefore ought to be perceived, and that a second fire cannot be accepted to reveal fire. A substance is visually perceived only when its color is perceived. Since the real color of gold is overwhelmed by yellow color it is not perceived, and in the absence of rays the supporting yellow color too is not perceived, therefore gold remains imperceptible.

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