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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 23:58
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0:02–0:04Alternative Definitions
0:04–0:22Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence.
0:22–0:35Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid.
0:35–0:47Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid.
0:47–0:53In the illusion, the shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component
0:53–0:58are separate, the first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid
0:58–1:03cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension, objecthood with respect to
1:03–1:07the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct.
1:07–1:12In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect
1:12–1:17to pot and cloth differs, both definitions apply properly.
1:17–1:22But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate
1:22–1:24from accepted entities.
1:24–1:29When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood
1:29–1:35may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not.
1:35–1:40Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known,
1:40–1:45the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended.
1:45–1:50Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather,
1:50–1:55it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition.
1:55–2:00Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition,
2:00–2:04a special nature of being related to that cognition.
2:04–2:09This specific objecthood is not self-evident nearly from general cognition of the thing.
2:09–2:14Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to
2:14–2:19the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific
2:19–2:28objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition.
2:28–2:32Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can
2:32–2:37the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition
2:37–2:41is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status or objecthood
2:41–2:46too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition.
2:46–2:49additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows.
2:50–2:55In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is
2:55–2:59inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of
2:59–3:04the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once
3:04–3:10ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific
3:10–3:15objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and
3:15–3:19and the nature of the absence or inheritance unknown, one may still doubt, is the object
3:19–3:24of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot.
3:24–3:27This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general
3:27–3:31cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition.
3:31–3:34Therefore Udaya Nakharya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature
3:34–3:41of cognition becomes objecthood.
3:41–3:45Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition,
3:45–3:50two are pot absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificon cognition, there is pot absence on
3:50–3:54the ground, therefore a specific object head of pot absence distinct from the ground should
3:54–3:58be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificon cognition.
3:58–4:04This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot absence and ground, can also
4:04–4:09apprehend the object hood of pot absence. If another object hood over and above this
4:09–4:14objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualific and cognition, infinite regress follows.
4:16–4:20The difference between qualifier, qualific and cognition and collective cognition may arise
4:20–4:23sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects,
4:23–4:28and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity
4:28–4:32according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object,
4:32–4:35because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object.
4:35–4:41Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section.
4:41–4:54The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension.
4:54–4:59Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible.
4:59–5:02Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical.
5:02–5:07No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition.
5:07–5:12Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in the definition of valid
5:12–5:16cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition.
5:18–5:22Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire
5:22–5:26for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness as mode,
5:26–5:29because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver.
5:30–5:33This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason.
5:33–5:40The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion.
5:40–5:49Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver.
5:49–5:59In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver.
5:59–6:03Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition.
6:04–6:07The defect of lacking an example in the inference.
6:07–6:13Object hood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted.
6:13–6:21If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell.
6:21–6:34Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished.
6:34–6:44Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition, and, it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference.
6:44–6:52One activity cannot be generalized here if one is removed even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having
6:52–6:58Silvaness as mode would be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition.
6:59–7:02The Neyayaka establishment of invalid cognition.
7:03–7:12The Neyayaka replies that activity toward the shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity.
7:12–7:16activity, silver, as qualificant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell
7:16–7:19from desire for a shell.
7:19–7:23Being activity toward the desired object is not an extraneous condition, because activity
7:23–7:26hood itself is a distinct reason here.
7:26–7:31Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualificant of a cognition
7:31–7:35that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from
7:35–7:40desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition
7:40–7:46of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid
7:46–7:52cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as veritical cognition of silver does.
7:53–7:58If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or
7:58–8:04unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the
8:04–8:09subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the
8:09–8:14In the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established
8:14–8:20as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained.
8:20–8:25Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier
8:25–8:29and the shell as qualificand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the
8:29–8:33shell, the substrate of absence of silverness.
8:33–8:38Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being
8:38–8:43produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like.
8:44–8:48An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its
8:48–8:55qualificant regularly produces activity. The Prabhākara view, non-apprehension of
8:55–9:02difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhākara says that a specifically
9:02–9:08invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell
9:08–9:13is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered
9:13–9:20desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Neayaka himself accepts non-apprehension
9:20–9:25of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from
9:25–9:32a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition
9:32–9:37accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be
9:37–9:41stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver
9:41–9:46objecthood or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes
9:46–9:52difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver
9:52–9:57and shell should arise from an object cognition such as this shell is silver not from non-apprehension
9:57–10:01of difference otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension
10:01–10:06of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the
10:06–10:11the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not
10:11–10:16apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition of identity with unknown silver
10:16–10:18is impossible.
10:18–10:21Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause
10:21–10:28Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow,
10:28–10:32not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object,
10:32–10:35he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white
10:35–10:40conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be
10:40–10:45made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object
10:45–10:49does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference.
10:50–10:54Therefore the naiyayika too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of
10:54–10:58activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not
10:58–11:02prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not
11:02–11:07prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with macron SA with macron and NIA views.
11:09–11:14Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object
11:14–11:21is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference
11:21–11:26from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver
11:26–11:31is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier
11:31–11:35veridical cognition of the difference between a Western and Eastern place, a subsequent defect
11:35–11:39produced cognition, the West is not different from the East, does not take that difference as its
11:39–11:43object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity.
11:45–11:49Objection, on this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause,
11:49–11:53because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the
11:53–11:58shell. Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as
11:58–12:03silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension
12:03–12:09of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent
12:09–12:14cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness
12:14–12:19takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as
12:19–12:24related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking
12:24–12:29both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell,
12:29–12:33there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent
12:33–12:37impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness.
12:39–12:41Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition.
12:44–12:48Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately
12:48–12:52remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together.
12:52–12:58Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different
12:58–13:03times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed alternatives
13:03–13:06remembered at two different times.
13:06–13:11It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or
13:11–13:13a person?
13:13–13:17Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at
13:17–13:20the time of cognition of both alternatives.
13:20–13:25Another failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because
13:25–13:30through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence.
13:30–13:34After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire
13:34–13:39does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion,
13:39–13:44however, activity also does not arise.
13:44–13:47Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke
13:47–13:52may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake.
13:53–13:59The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently
13:59–14:03remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore
14:03–14:07neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required.
14:09–14:14If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark,
14:14–14:18The perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ.
14:19–14:24In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means,
14:24–14:30in the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension
14:30–14:38of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an
14:38–14:42independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver.
14:42–14:47Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the
14:47–14:53cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative
14:53–14:58expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, and invalid cognition would again become unavoidable.
15:00–15:04If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal,
15:04–15:08then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not
15:08–15:14withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension
15:14–15:19of different causes withdraw, in the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition
15:19–15:26is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver. Activity towards silver
15:26–15:31and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one
15:31–15:36such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively
15:36–15:41arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended.
15:43–15:46Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell, would have to be admitted.
15:47–15:52Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects.
15:54–15:59The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand.
16:02–16:06Some partial MSAKs say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition,
16:06–16:11which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension.
16:12–16:17Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established,
16:17–16:23being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition,
16:23–16:28thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference.
16:29–16:33In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted.
16:33–16:38The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver is its
16:38–16:43mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell.
16:43–16:48If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a
16:48–16:53collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition,
16:53–16:56when the shell is the qualificant, silver cannot be the qualificant.
16:56–17:01Cognition making silver is its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine
17:01–17:06of cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid,
17:06–17:10unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain
17:10–17:15liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical
17:15–17:20cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in
17:20–17:25a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect free cognition lack of
17:25–17:29confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned
17:29–17:33Naiyayika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition.
17:33–17:37When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible
17:37–17:40through any means?
17:40–17:45Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension
17:45–17:50If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established?
17:50–17:54If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamika theory of apprehension of the
17:54–17:57unreal must be accepted.
17:57–18:01No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available.
18:01–18:05The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause
18:05–18:12invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively.
18:12–18:17Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required
18:17–18:22fitness or markhood is absent, only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an
18:22–18:26unapprehended non-relation arises there.
18:26–18:30The recognition like view that the eye apprehends remembered silverness in a shell has already
18:30–18:34been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects.
18:34–18:38Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory
18:38–18:42defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect.
18:42–18:45A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is
18:45–18:50not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been
18:50–18:54digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by
18:54–18:57forest fire is destroyed.
18:57–19:03may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition
19:03–19:08with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by
19:08–19:14veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory
19:14–19:22of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion
19:22–19:29of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition
19:29–19:35the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is
19:35–19:41cognition like veridical cognition. In reality this is merely non-apprehension, ignorance of difference.
19:42–19:47The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and,
19:47–19:52because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the
19:52–19:58shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood
19:58–20:04delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness, cognition hood resides only in cognition, like
20:04–20:10veridical cognition hood. The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue,
20:10–20:14produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the
20:14–20:19producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition.
20:20–20:25Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell.
20:25–20:31On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form
20:31–20:35of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either
20:35–20:40nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension
20:40–20:44expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through
20:44–20:48non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver,
20:48–20:53concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or,
20:53–20:58non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on the
20:58–21:03basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical,
21:03–21:07but cognition met within difference produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called
21:07–21:11non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in
21:11–21:17the perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is
21:17–21:23qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the
21:23–21:27The case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver,
21:27–21:31is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity.
21:31–21:35Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the objecthood
21:35–21:40of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition,
21:40–21:43this avoids overextension in the cause of activity.
21:43–21:47When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because
21:47–21:50it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition.
21:50–21:56Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too.
21:56–22:01Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the
22:01–22:03cause.
22:03–22:07It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver
22:07–22:12causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended,
22:12–22:13delimits causality.
22:13–22:17But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension
22:17–22:18of difference.
22:18–22:23Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated
22:23–22:29and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both.
22:29–22:31But this is unsound.
22:31–22:35Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can
22:35–22:40be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted.
22:40–22:45Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of
22:45–22:49activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection.
22:51–22:59Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory
22:59–23:05invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of
23:05–23:10non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that complexity disappears automatically,
23:10–23:15complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting amines.
23:15–23:20that qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof.
23:20–23:26Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition,
23:26–23:29because it too is activity, like corroborated activity.
23:29–23:39An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable.
23:39–23:45Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty 2
23:45–23:49becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition.
23:49–23:53To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest
23:53–23:54proof of the doctrine.

Plain text

Alternative Definitions Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence. Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid. Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid. In the illusion, the shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate, the first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension, objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct. In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs, both definitions apply properly. But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities. When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise, nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not. Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended. Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition. Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not self-evident nearly from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition. Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status or objecthood too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition. additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows. In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is inheritance of the pot and the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and and the nature of the absence or inheritance unknown, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot. This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udaya Nakharya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood. Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, two are pot absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificon cognition, there is pot absence on the ground, therefore a specific object head of pot absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificon cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot absence and ground, can also apprehend the object hood of pot absence. If another object hood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, qualific and cognition, infinite regress follows. The difference between qualifier, qualific and cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section. The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition. The defect of lacking an example in the inference. Object hood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition, and, it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized here if one is removed even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having Silvaness as mode would be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition. The Neyayaka establishment of invalid cognition. The Neyayaka replies that activity toward the shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity. activity, silver, as qualificant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being activity toward the desired object is not an extraneous condition, because activity hood itself is a distinct reason here. Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualificant of a cognition that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as veritical cognition of silver does. If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the In the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained. Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and the shell as qualificand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode in the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualificant regularly produces activity. The Prabhākara view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhākara says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Neayaka himself accepts non-apprehension of difference. Inferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veritable qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver objecthood or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as this shell is silver not from non-apprehension of difference otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition of identity with unknown silver is impossible. Establishing non-apprehension of difference as the cause Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore the naiyayika too must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with macron SA with macron and NIA views. Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a Western and Eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the West is not different from the East, does not take that difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity. Objection, on this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell. Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, sense contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness. Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition. Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together. Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of opposed alternatives remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or a person? Doubt occurs because the difference of post and person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives. Another failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence. After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however, activity also does not arise. Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, The perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ. In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, in the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver. Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, and invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. If mere non-apprehension of different causes withdraw, in the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver. Activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise the doubt is this silver or shell, would have to be admitted. Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects. The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand. Some partial MSAKs say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which negates false superimposition, as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension. Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference. In an illusion met with indifference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted. The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silver is its mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell. If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition, when the shell is the qualificant, silver cannot be the qualificant. Cognition making silver is its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Naiyayika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means? Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established? If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamika theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available. The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition, they produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively. Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or markhood is absent, only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition like view that the eye apprehends remembered silverness in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and I apprehend distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect. A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed. may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veridical cognition. In reality this is merely non-apprehension, ignorance of difference. The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and, because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness, cognition hood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognition hood. The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell. On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver, concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within difference produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section. Decisive view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the The case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the objecthood of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too. Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause. It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, delimits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both. But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore, when the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection. Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting amines. that qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof. Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity, like corroborated activity. An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable. Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty 2 becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition. To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof of the doctrine.

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