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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:05RECUTATION OF THE VIEW OF SOME THINKERS
0:05–0:1115. This view of certain teachers is also untenable.
0:11–0:22In the case of the reason smoke, the reason's non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandim is not found, because smoke occurs in a kitchen, while the kitchen is distinct from the fiery mountain.
0:22–0:29Provision also cannot be the non-occurrence of the reason in a place distinct from every locus of the probandum,
0:29–0:33because all loci of fire are distinct from each separate locus of fire.
0:33–0:39Furthermore, all such definitions of Provision would involve the defect of self-dependence,
0:39–0:47because reasonhood, probandumhood, and the status of what is taken as reason and probandum are themselves to be determined only through Provision.
0:47–0:52Probandomhood cannot be regarded as the object had approved or as being the object of a desire
0:52–0:56to prove, because neither state is present in the fire of a kitchen that has already
0:56–0:58been established.
0:58–1:02Nor is the argument tenable that another person, namely the pupil, knows only pervasion in
1:02–1:06general, otherwise, how could he establish that these definitions fail to establish
1:06–1:10inference, for example, through under extension.
1:10–1:13Without descriptive knowledge of the nature of pervasion that establishes inference
1:13–1:18for himself, the pupil cannot enter into an inquiry concerning the nature of pervasion.
1:18–1:22Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tattvasant Mai composed by
1:22–1:28Sri Gadjoptia, the Prima-Facey discussion concerning pervasion comes to an end.
1:28–1:33The Prima-Facey account of pervasion is concluded.
1:33–1:38The Definitive Definition of Pervasion.
1:38–1:42Siddhanta Laka 16.
1:42–1:46Here we, the proponents of the established conclusion, state the Definitive Definition
1:46–1:51of perversion based on an invariable relation.
1:51–1:54Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation is
1:54–2:00not delimited by the delimiter of that counter-positiveness which is determined by an absolute absence
2:00–2:05that is collocated with the reason but not collocated with its own counter-positive.
2:05–2:10Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapa-Sint-Ma'i composed
2:10–2:16by Sri Gajyapthiya, the definitive definition of perversion comes to an end.
2:16–2:22The definitive definition of perversion is a definition of perversion in general.
2:22–2:2317.
2:23–2:29Gagia now clarifies that the definitive characteristic of perversion is a characteristic of perversion
2:29–2:34in general, because it includes the absence of the probandom universal.
2:34–2:38Although a particular fire occurring elsewhere, such as in a kitchen, may be the counter-positive
2:38–2:43of the absolute absence of the particular fire occurring on the Smoky Mountain, the
2:43–2:47The counter-positiveness determined by such an absence of a particular fire is not delimited
2:47–2:50by the universal firehood.
2:50–2:54For the absolute absence of fire in general expressed by there is no fire is neither
2:54–2:58cognized nor established in the locus of smoke.
2:58–3:03The absence of fire in general, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by the universal
3:03–3:08firehood, is entirely distinct from the absence of a particular fire, which determines
3:08–3:12counter-positiveness delimited by particular firehood.
3:12–3:18Otherwise, once the absence of all familiar particular colors in air were cognized, and
3:18–3:22once it were cognized that air is distinct from the loci of all familiar colors, general
3:22–3:27doubts such as, is there color in air or not, and is air a locus of color or not, would
3:27–3:31become impossible, because the collection of the absences of all particular colors
3:31–3:34in air would already have been ascertained.
3:34–3:40Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasintmai, the examination
3:40–3:45of the absence of the Probandan universal comes to an end.
3:45–3:50The absence of a universal is concluded.
3:50–3:51Pervasion of a Particular Reason
3:51–3:54Vovaipte
3:54–3:5618.
3:56–4:01Alternatively, pervasion may be described as the collocation of a Particular Reason
4:01–4:03with a Particular Probandum.
4:03–4:08This particular probandom is not the counter-positive of its own absolute absence occurring in the
4:08–4:15locus of the reason, and that absolute absence does not occur in the locus of its own counter-positive.
4:15–4:20Or pervasion is the collocation of a particular reason with a particular probandom whose locus
4:20–4:25is not the counter-positive of the mutual absence of the locus of the probandom occurring
4:25–4:28in the locus of the reason.
4:28–4:32Or pervasion is the state in which the reason occurs in the locus of the probandom
4:32–4:36and is not the counter positive of a mutual absence occurring in the locus of the reason.
4:37–4:42Fire occurring in another locus is only the counter positive of the absolute absence of
4:42–4:47the fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Similarly, the locus of fire
4:47–4:51situated elsewhere is only the counter positive of the mutual absence of the locus of fire
4:51–4:57that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Therefore smoke and fire occurring
4:57–5:01and different loci cannot pervade each other.
5:01–5:07Provision exists only between that particular smoke and that particular fire which are co-located.
5:07–5:11It should not be objected that the pervasion of smoke in general by fire in general would
5:11–5:14thereby become impossible.
5:14–5:19For all particular smokes are pervaded by all particular fires, consequently smoke
5:19–5:23in general is also pervaded by fire in general.
5:23–5:28The pervasion by a particular fire co-located with a particular smoke is likewise intended
5:28–5:31to belong to that very particular smoke.
5:31–5:36Again, particular individuals that arise and perish at the same time are regarded as mutually
5:36–5:40pervasive.
5:40–5:43Justification of the special definition.
5:43–5:4419.
5:44–5:47In the inference, this possesses conjunction because it exists.
5:47–5:52The absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the pro-bandom, is not co-located
5:52–5:57with its counter positive, it occurs in action, the locus of the reason existence, but its
5:57–6:02counter positive conjunction does not occur in action. Therefore the first special definition
6:02–6:07is overextended. Hence being delimited by the delimiter of the
6:07–6:12absence of collocation with the counter positive may be taken as a qualifier of the absolute
6:12–6:18absence employed in the definition of perversion. In action, the absence of conjunction,
6:18–6:23is, the absence of the probandom is delimited only by the delimiter of the absence of collocation
6:23–6:27with its counter-positive, conjunction.
6:27–6:31Nor should it be objected that in the inference, this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey
6:31–6:35because it is a tree, the mutual absence of the locus of conjunction with the monkey
6:35–6:38is only non-pervasively occurring.
6:38–6:43For a veridical cognition concerning identity with the locus of conjunction with the
6:43–6:48monkey, that is, the absence of difference from it is possible.
6:48–6:53Even without cognition of a relation of pervaded and pervader between reason and probandom,
6:53–6:57conjunction with a monkey is in fact that very probandom which is cognized as related,
6:57–7:00it need not be known as a pervader.
7:00–7:04Therefore, in the Baha'vrihi compound of the definition, the meaning of the genitive
7:04–7:09case is merely the relation cognized as real, not a cognized pervadingness, hence
7:09–7:14pervasion itself does not become part of the definition of pervasion.
7:14–7:18The special definition of perversion containing the word itself is also not defective through
7:18–7:21lack of a common factor.
7:21–7:26For what is to be defined as precisely the non-common perversion of a particular individual
7:26–7:32reason, the question which perversion belongs to which reason, confirms this point.
7:32–7:37Removal of the inapplicability of the definitions.
7:37–7:3820.
7:38–7:42It may now be objected, both cognitions, in the locus of smoke there are neither
7:42–7:47fire nor a lake, and the locus of smoke is the locus of neither fire nor a lake, are possible.
7:48–7:52Therefore the absolute absence of fire and the mutual absence of the locus of fire,
7:52–7:57determining counter-positiveness delimited by the property of pervading occurrence,
7:57–8:02occur in the locus of smoke. How, then, can the pervasion of the reason be determined by
8:02–8:06these two definitions employing absolute absence and mutual absence?
8:06–8:13This objection, however, is not sound. We do not admit such an absolute absence or mutual absence.
8:13–8:19Even if they were admitted, only the lake and the fiery lake would be the counter positives of those two absences,
8:19–8:22fire and the lockers of fire would not be their counter positives.
8:22–8:29Revision of the teacher's definition, perversion is freedom from an extraneous condition.
8:29–8:3621. Giving due importance to the notion of freedom from an extraneous condition in the
8:36–8:41discussion of pervasion, Gajia revises the teacher's definition, Tathasintmai, Part 2,
8:41–8:46Chapter 2, Section 10, and incorporates the very freedom from an extraneous condition
8:46–8:51into the definition of pervasion. Alternatively, the pervasion of the reason
8:51–8:56by the probandum is the reason's freedom from an extraneous condition. This freedom
8:56–9:01from an extraneous condition is the collocation of reason and probandom that is collocated
9:01–9:04with the absolute absence of water and the like.
9:04–9:08The counter-positiveness of that absolute absence of water and the like is delimited
9:08–9:13by waterhood and similar delimiters, and that counter-positiveness is in turn determined
9:13–9:18by the absolute absence of water and the like collocated with the reason.
9:18–9:22It should not be objected that on this account pervasion would have to be admitted
9:22–9:28even in a false reason attended by an extraneous condition, such as fire. In the conditional
9:28–9:32inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the probandum smoke is not co-located
9:32–9:36with the absence of conjunction with wet fuel, and that absence of conjunction with
9:36–9:40wet fuel is in turn the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the
9:40–9:47reason fire. For an extraneous condition always pervades the probandum.
9:47–9:51The co-location of the reason with the probandum that deviates from everything from
9:51–9:55which the reason itself deviates has been called the reasons freedom from an extraneous
9:55–9:59condition by the earlier teachers.
9:59–10:05An alternative definition of freedom from an extraneous condition.
10:05–10:0622.
10:06–10:10Alternatively, the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition is merely the state in
10:10–10:14which the reason is not co-located with an absolute absence whose counter positive
10:14–10:20is not the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the probandom.
10:20–10:24In the conditional inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the reason fire
10:24–10:29is co-located with the absolute absence of the extraneous condition, conjunction with
10:29–10:30wet fuel.
10:30–10:34This absence of the extraneous condition is not the counter positive of the absolute
10:34–10:39absence occurring in the locus of the probandum smoke, because conjunction with wet fuel
10:39–10:43does not pervade the reason fire.
10:43–10:48Possession of the form of the delimiter of relatedness is pervasion.
10:48–10:5423. Another alternative description of perversion may be given as follows. The perversion of a
10:54–10:59particular reason is its relatedness to a particular probandom, that is, the collocation
10:59–11:03of the particular reason with the particular probandom, in which the reason possesses the
11:03–11:08property delimiting net relatedness, in other words, the property delimiting collocation
11:08–11:14with the particular probandom. For example, in the inference, the mobbin has fire because
11:14–11:19it has smoke, the particular perversion of smoke is relatedness to fire, that is, the co-location
11:19–11:24of smoke with fire, because smoke possesses smokehood, which delimits relatedness to fire,
11:24–11:30and smoke in general is related only to fire. But in the inference, the mountain has smoke
11:30–11:34because it has fire, the particular perversion of fire is not relatedness to smoke, because
11:34–11:39fire does not possess firehood is the delimiter of relatedness to smoke, firing general is
11:39–11:46also related to what is smokeless. It should be noted that an over-pervasive property cannot
11:46–11:52delimit relatedness. Over-pervasive properties such as conjunction and no ability are not
11:52–11:57experienced as delimiters of relatedness to the probandom, that is, of the collocation of smoke
11:57–12:03with fire. By contrast, firehood produced by conjunction with wet fuel is the delimiter,
12:03–12:07in the reason fire, of relatedness to smoke, and that firehood alone is pervaded.
12:07–12:13being delimited by the delimiter of collocation with that is pervasion.
12:13–12:2324, or it may be said that the reason is an entity whose nature is delimited by the delimiter of collocation with the probandem, such a reason is pervaded by that probandem.
12:23–12:32In the sound inference, the mountain has fire because it has smoke, the collocation of smoke with fire is delimited by smokehood, therefore the reason smoke is pervaded.
12:32–12:37But in the inference with an extraneous condition, the mountain has smoke because it has fire,
12:37–12:42the collocation of fire with smoke is delimited only by the extraneous condition, conjunction
12:42–12:48with wet fuel, and not by firehood, therefore the reason fire cannot be pervaded.
12:48–12:49For reasons
12:49–12:54Adah-eva-katuya
12:54–12:58The Prabhakras advance the following propositions.
12:58–13:041. For this reason namely, because in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter
13:04–13:10of reasonhood is not the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, Tathasintmai, Part 2, Chapter
13:10–13:162, Section 23, a qualifying property of the reason that, although delimiting reasonhood,
13:16–13:20differs from the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, delimits the intended
13:20–13:25reasons relation to the probandom, that is the extraneous condition of the reason.
13:25–13:312. For this reason, in the inference, this possesses cowwood because it possesses horsehood,
13:31–13:35no such qualifying property is found in an extraneous condition such as possession of
13:35–13:40a do-lap. Therefore the assured characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of
13:40–13:46pervading the probandum delimited by the reason while not itself pervading the reason.
13:46–13:51In an inference with a deviant reason, the probandum and the absence of the probandum
13:51–13:56are mutually opposed in one and the same locus, hence, without a difference between the locus
13:56–14:01of the probandum and the locus of its absence, it is impossible to regard the reason as related
14:01–14:06both to the probandum and to its absence. Therefore the extraneous condition delimits
14:06–14:12relatedness to the probandum. Consequently, in an inference with a deviant reason, that
14:12–14:16qualifying property which pervades the probandum delimited by the reason but does not
14:16–14:20not pervade the reason is the extraneous condition.
14:20–14:263. For this reason, an extraneous condition necessarily occurs in the reason in an inference
14:26–14:28with a deviant reason.
14:28–14:33Otherwise, nearly because of deviation, a deviant reason could be regarded as non-indicative,
14:33–14:37that is, unpervaded, and the inference of an extraneous condition, this reason is
14:37–14:42attended by an extraneous condition because it is deviant, would become pointless and
14:42–14:44unnecessary.
14:44–14:494. For this reason, in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of
14:49–14:56reasonhood is not the sole delimiter of relatedness to the probandom. Hence a co-extensive property,
14:56–15:00which alone is the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, appears to occur in the
15:00–15:06intended reason. Therefore, in a deviant reason, a co-extensive property is the extraneous
15:06–15:11condition, just as a hibiscus flower is regarded as an extraneous condition in relation
15:11–15:13to a crystal.
15:13–15:18Now the characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the reasons relation
15:18–15:21to the probandom while not pervading the reason.
15:21–15:26But a qualifying property that is not co-extensive with both reason and probandom cannot be
15:26–15:31the denotation of the word extraneous condition, because the ground for applying that word
15:31–15:34to such a meaning is absent.
15:34–15:38The vitiating power of an extraneous condition consists in its causing cognition
15:38–15:40of deviation.
15:40–15:45If the state of causing cognition of deviation cannot be regarded as the nature of extraneous
15:45–15:50conditionhood, otherwise, both a purposeless property pervading the probandum and a deviant
15:50–15:56property pervading the probandum would have to be regarded as extraneous conditions.
15:56–16:02The discussion of pervasion is concluded.
16:02–16:103. Means of apprehending pervasion.
16:10–16:14Vyaptigrahopaya.
16:14–16:18Prima-facy view, repeated observation is not a cause.
16:18–16:201.
16:20–16:24The Prabhakras hold the following view here, cognition of such provision does not arise
16:24–16:29from repeatedly observing the concomitance of reason and probandham, because each separate
16:29–16:33observation is not a cause of cognition of either the reason or the probandham.
16:33–16:38Moreover, these transient acts, which perish in a mere moment, cannot possess
16:38–16:43any unifying factor capable of joining all the observations together at a single moment.
16:44–16:50The Neayaka may now propose that an impression produced by repeated observation of the concomitance
16:50–16:55of reason and probandom, assisted by a sense organ, is the means of cognizing pervasion,
16:55–17:00since in the case of recognition a sense organ is accepted as a cooperative cause of an impression.
17:01–17:06But this proposal is untenable. An impression is accepted as a cause only of memory and
17:06–17:10and recognition concerning the same object. How, then, could an impression
17:10–17:13assisted by a sense organ produce cognition of pervasion in the form of
17:13–17:18concomitance between different objects? Otherwise, memory and recognition of
17:18–17:21different objects would also arise from one another's impressions, and the
17:21–17:24unacceptable consequence would follow that a jar is recognized through the
17:24–17:26impression of a cloth.
17:26–17:31Repeated observation of a relation cannot be defined.
17:31–17:372. Furthermore, repeated observation of the relation between reason and probandim can
17:37–17:41be described neither as observation of the same reason with the same probandim and many
17:41–17:47loci, nor as observation of many reasons with many probanda, nor as many observations of
17:47–17:49reason and probandim.
17:49–17:53Under the first alternative, repeated observation would be observation of reason and probandim
17:53–17:59and many loci, under the second, observation of many reasons and many probanda, and
17:59–18:03and under the third, many observations of the same reason and probandom.
18:03–18:08Consequently, under the first alternative cognition that colorhood is pervaded by tastehood would
18:08–18:13have to arise, under the second, cognition that substancehood is pervaded by jarhood
18:13–18:17would have to arise, and under the third, cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire
18:17–18:21would have to arise merely from continuous observation of smoke and fire in the same
18:21–18:23locus, a single kitchen.
18:23–18:29Moreover, if repeated observation means three or four observations, no uninterrupted succession
18:29–18:33of those observations is established.
18:33–18:37Not only that, in the inference, this is made of Earth because it can be scratched with
18:37–18:42iron, even after Earthhood and scratchability by iron have been observed together hundreds
18:42–18:48of times, the perversion of the reason by the probandom is not cognized.
18:48–18:54Repetitive observation assisted by hypothetical reasoning is not a means of cognizing perversion.
18:54–18:553.
18:55–19:01The Neyayaka may argue that repeated observation of the reasons concomitance with the probandom,
19:01–19:06assisted by hypothetical reasoning, is the means of cognizing perversion.
19:06–19:10But we Prabhakaraj reply that if the observation of concomitance assisted by the required
19:10–19:15hypothetical reasoning is accepted as the means of cognizing perversion, what purpose
19:15–19:19is served by repeated observation of concomitance.
19:19–19:24It cannot be said that hypothetical reasoning does not arise without repeated observation
19:24–19:26of reason and probandom.
19:26–19:31A person skilled in pervasion can reason hypothetically upon seeing reason and probandom together
19:31–19:36for the first time, hence repeated observation is wholly unnecessary.
19:36–19:41Moreover, hypothetical reasoning assisted by repeated observation cannot itself be
19:41–19:46regarded as the means of cognizing perversion, because hypothetical reasoning itself rests
19:46–19:53upon cognition of perversion, leading to infinite regress. The Neayaka may say here that a newborn
19:53–19:57infant acquires cognition of perversion and makes an inference, and from that inference
19:57–20:01arise movement towards suckling and withdrawal from other things, all this occurs without
20:01–20:06hypothetical reasoning, so accepting hypothetical reasoning as a means of cognizing perversion
20:06–20:12does not lead to infinite regress. But we Prabhakaraj reply, because deviation is observed in
20:12–20:18some cases, hypothetical reasoning would be incapable of producing cognition of perversion,
20:18–20:21therefore it cannot be accepted as a means of cognizing perversion.
20:22–20:27It should also be noted here that being produced by hypothetical reasoning is no
20:27–20:31intermediate common property occurring in cognitions of perversion produced by hypothetical
20:31–20:37reasoning. Therefore that very hypothetical reasoning cannot be regarded as a means of
20:37–20:46cognizing perversion. Generic character contact is not a means of cognizing perversion. For,
20:46–20:51the Neayakas now say, in the inference of many probanda by many reasons, cognition of all the
20:51–20:56probanda and all the reasons in one locus is obtained only through generic character contact,
20:56–21:01therefore that pervasive contact delimited by a universal alone should be the means of
21:01–21:06cognizing pervasion, that is, of cognizing the reason's non-occurrence without the probandom.
21:07–21:12Moreover, the generic forms of reason and probandom cannot be cognized from a single joint observation,
21:12–21:17therefore repeated observation of the reason with the probandom is necessary for cognizing pervasion.
21:19–21:25But this argument is untenable. For the sake of economy, cognition of the universal alone is
21:25–21:30regarded as the pervasive contact, the known individual possessing the universal is not
21:30–21:36regarded as the pervasive contact. Therefore repeated observation is not necessary for
21:36–21:39cognition of pervasion.
21:39–21:43Nor can it be said that a second and third joint observation are required to remove
21:43–21:47doubt that the co-presence of reason and probandom and one locus is accidental, a mere
21:47–21:52cro-an-palm coincidence. For even after a second and third joint observation of
21:52–21:58reason and probandom in one locus, doubt about accidental co-presence cannot be removed.

Plain text

RECUTATION OF THE VIEW OF SOME THINKERS 15. This view of certain teachers is also untenable. In the case of the reason smoke, the reason's non-occurrence in a place distinct from the locus of the probandim is not found, because smoke occurs in a kitchen, while the kitchen is distinct from the fiery mountain. Provision also cannot be the non-occurrence of the reason in a place distinct from every locus of the probandum, because all loci of fire are distinct from each separate locus of fire. Furthermore, all such definitions of Provision would involve the defect of self-dependence, because reasonhood, probandumhood, and the status of what is taken as reason and probandum are themselves to be determined only through Provision. Probandomhood cannot be regarded as the object had approved or as being the object of a desire to prove, because neither state is present in the fire of a kitchen that has already been established. Nor is the argument tenable that another person, namely the pupil, knows only pervasion in general, otherwise, how could he establish that these definitions fail to establish inference, for example, through under extension. Without descriptive knowledge of the nature of pervasion that establishes inference for himself, the pupil cannot enter into an inquiry concerning the nature of pervasion. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tattvasant Mai composed by Sri Gadjoptia, the Prima-Facey discussion concerning pervasion comes to an end. The Prima-Facey account of pervasion is concluded. The Definitive Definition of Pervasion. Siddhanta Laka 16. Here we, the proponents of the established conclusion, state the Definitive Definition of perversion based on an invariable relation. Perversion is the collocation of the reason with the probandom, but this collocation is not delimited by the delimiter of that counter-positiveness which is determined by an absolute absence that is collocated with the reason but not collocated with its own counter-positive. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapa-Sint-Ma'i composed by Sri Gajyapthiya, the definitive definition of perversion comes to an end. The definitive definition of perversion is a definition of perversion in general. 17. Gagia now clarifies that the definitive characteristic of perversion is a characteristic of perversion in general, because it includes the absence of the probandom universal. Although a particular fire occurring elsewhere, such as in a kitchen, may be the counter-positive of the absolute absence of the particular fire occurring on the Smoky Mountain, the The counter-positiveness determined by such an absence of a particular fire is not delimited by the universal firehood. For the absolute absence of fire in general expressed by there is no fire is neither cognized nor established in the locus of smoke. The absence of fire in general, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by the universal firehood, is entirely distinct from the absence of a particular fire, which determines counter-positiveness delimited by particular firehood. Otherwise, once the absence of all familiar particular colors in air were cognized, and once it were cognized that air is distinct from the loci of all familiar colors, general doubts such as, is there color in air or not, and is air a locus of color or not, would become impossible, because the collection of the absences of all particular colors in air would already have been ascertained. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference section of the Tapasintmai, the examination of the absence of the Probandan universal comes to an end. The absence of a universal is concluded. Pervasion of a Particular Reason Vovaipte 18. Alternatively, pervasion may be described as the collocation of a Particular Reason with a Particular Probandum. This particular probandom is not the counter-positive of its own absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, and that absolute absence does not occur in the locus of its own counter-positive. Or pervasion is the collocation of a particular reason with a particular probandom whose locus is not the counter-positive of the mutual absence of the locus of the probandom occurring in the locus of the reason. Or pervasion is the state in which the reason occurs in the locus of the probandom and is not the counter positive of a mutual absence occurring in the locus of the reason. Fire occurring in another locus is only the counter positive of the absolute absence of the fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Similarly, the locus of fire situated elsewhere is only the counter positive of the mutual absence of the locus of fire that occurs in the locus of smoke situated elsewhere. Therefore smoke and fire occurring and different loci cannot pervade each other. Provision exists only between that particular smoke and that particular fire which are co-located. It should not be objected that the pervasion of smoke in general by fire in general would thereby become impossible. For all particular smokes are pervaded by all particular fires, consequently smoke in general is also pervaded by fire in general. The pervasion by a particular fire co-located with a particular smoke is likewise intended to belong to that very particular smoke. Again, particular individuals that arise and perish at the same time are regarded as mutually pervasive. Justification of the special definition. 19. In the inference, this possesses conjunction because it exists. The absence of conjunction, that is, the absence of the pro-bandom, is not co-located with its counter positive, it occurs in action, the locus of the reason existence, but its counter positive conjunction does not occur in action. Therefore the first special definition is overextended. Hence being delimited by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with the counter positive may be taken as a qualifier of the absolute absence employed in the definition of perversion. In action, the absence of conjunction, is, the absence of the probandom is delimited only by the delimiter of the absence of collocation with its counter-positive, conjunction. Nor should it be objected that in the inference, this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree, the mutual absence of the locus of conjunction with the monkey is only non-pervasively occurring. For a veridical cognition concerning identity with the locus of conjunction with the monkey, that is, the absence of difference from it is possible. Even without cognition of a relation of pervaded and pervader between reason and probandom, conjunction with a monkey is in fact that very probandom which is cognized as related, it need not be known as a pervader. Therefore, in the Baha'vrihi compound of the definition, the meaning of the genitive case is merely the relation cognized as real, not a cognized pervadingness, hence pervasion itself does not become part of the definition of pervasion. The special definition of perversion containing the word itself is also not defective through lack of a common factor. For what is to be defined as precisely the non-common perversion of a particular individual reason, the question which perversion belongs to which reason, confirms this point. Removal of the inapplicability of the definitions. 20. It may now be objected, both cognitions, in the locus of smoke there are neither fire nor a lake, and the locus of smoke is the locus of neither fire nor a lake, are possible. Therefore the absolute absence of fire and the mutual absence of the locus of fire, determining counter-positiveness delimited by the property of pervading occurrence, occur in the locus of smoke. How, then, can the pervasion of the reason be determined by these two definitions employing absolute absence and mutual absence? This objection, however, is not sound. We do not admit such an absolute absence or mutual absence. Even if they were admitted, only the lake and the fiery lake would be the counter positives of those two absences, fire and the lockers of fire would not be their counter positives. Revision of the teacher's definition, perversion is freedom from an extraneous condition. 21. Giving due importance to the notion of freedom from an extraneous condition in the discussion of pervasion, Gajia revises the teacher's definition, Tathasintmai, Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 10, and incorporates the very freedom from an extraneous condition into the definition of pervasion. Alternatively, the pervasion of the reason by the probandum is the reason's freedom from an extraneous condition. This freedom from an extraneous condition is the collocation of reason and probandom that is collocated with the absolute absence of water and the like. The counter-positiveness of that absolute absence of water and the like is delimited by waterhood and similar delimiters, and that counter-positiveness is in turn determined by the absolute absence of water and the like collocated with the reason. It should not be objected that on this account pervasion would have to be admitted even in a false reason attended by an extraneous condition, such as fire. In the conditional inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the probandum smoke is not co-located with the absence of conjunction with wet fuel, and that absence of conjunction with wet fuel is in turn the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason fire. For an extraneous condition always pervades the probandum. The co-location of the reason with the probandum that deviates from everything from which the reason itself deviates has been called the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition by the earlier teachers. An alternative definition of freedom from an extraneous condition. 22. Alternatively, the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition is merely the state in which the reason is not co-located with an absolute absence whose counter positive is not the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the probandom. In the conditional inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the reason fire is co-located with the absolute absence of the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel. This absence of the extraneous condition is not the counter positive of the absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandum smoke, because conjunction with wet fuel does not pervade the reason fire. Possession of the form of the delimiter of relatedness is pervasion. 23. Another alternative description of perversion may be given as follows. The perversion of a particular reason is its relatedness to a particular probandom, that is, the collocation of the particular reason with the particular probandom, in which the reason possesses the property delimiting net relatedness, in other words, the property delimiting collocation with the particular probandom. For example, in the inference, the mobbin has fire because it has smoke, the particular perversion of smoke is relatedness to fire, that is, the co-location of smoke with fire, because smoke possesses smokehood, which delimits relatedness to fire, and smoke in general is related only to fire. But in the inference, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the particular perversion of fire is not relatedness to smoke, because fire does not possess firehood is the delimiter of relatedness to smoke, firing general is also related to what is smokeless. It should be noted that an over-pervasive property cannot delimit relatedness. Over-pervasive properties such as conjunction and no ability are not experienced as delimiters of relatedness to the probandom, that is, of the collocation of smoke with fire. By contrast, firehood produced by conjunction with wet fuel is the delimiter, in the reason fire, of relatedness to smoke, and that firehood alone is pervaded. being delimited by the delimiter of collocation with that is pervasion. 24, or it may be said that the reason is an entity whose nature is delimited by the delimiter of collocation with the probandem, such a reason is pervaded by that probandem. In the sound inference, the mountain has fire because it has smoke, the collocation of smoke with fire is delimited by smokehood, therefore the reason smoke is pervaded. But in the inference with an extraneous condition, the mountain has smoke because it has fire, the collocation of fire with smoke is delimited only by the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, and not by firehood, therefore the reason fire cannot be pervaded. For reasons Adah-eva-katuya The Prabhakras advance the following propositions. 1. For this reason namely, because in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of reasonhood is not the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, Tathasintmai, Part 2, Chapter 2, Section 23, a qualifying property of the reason that, although delimiting reasonhood, differs from the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, delimits the intended reasons relation to the probandom, that is the extraneous condition of the reason. 2. For this reason, in the inference, this possesses cowwood because it possesses horsehood, no such qualifying property is found in an extraneous condition such as possession of a do-lap. Therefore the assured characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the probandum delimited by the reason while not itself pervading the reason. In an inference with a deviant reason, the probandum and the absence of the probandum are mutually opposed in one and the same locus, hence, without a difference between the locus of the probandum and the locus of its absence, it is impossible to regard the reason as related both to the probandum and to its absence. Therefore the extraneous condition delimits relatedness to the probandum. Consequently, in an inference with a deviant reason, that qualifying property which pervades the probandum delimited by the reason but does not not pervade the reason is the extraneous condition. 3. For this reason, an extraneous condition necessarily occurs in the reason in an inference with a deviant reason. Otherwise, nearly because of deviation, a deviant reason could be regarded as non-indicative, that is, unpervaded, and the inference of an extraneous condition, this reason is attended by an extraneous condition because it is deviant, would become pointless and unnecessary. 4. For this reason, in an inference attended by an extraneous condition the delimiter of reasonhood is not the sole delimiter of relatedness to the probandom. Hence a co-extensive property, which alone is the delimiter of relatedness to the probandom, appears to occur in the intended reason. Therefore, in a deviant reason, a co-extensive property is the extraneous condition, just as a hibiscus flower is regarded as an extraneous condition in relation to a crystal. Now the characteristic of an extraneous condition is the state of pervading the reasons relation to the probandom while not pervading the reason. But a qualifying property that is not co-extensive with both reason and probandom cannot be the denotation of the word extraneous condition, because the ground for applying that word to such a meaning is absent. The vitiating power of an extraneous condition consists in its causing cognition of deviation. If the state of causing cognition of deviation cannot be regarded as the nature of extraneous conditionhood, otherwise, both a purposeless property pervading the probandum and a deviant property pervading the probandum would have to be regarded as extraneous conditions. The discussion of pervasion is concluded. 3. Means of apprehending pervasion. Vyaptigrahopaya. Prima-facy view, repeated observation is not a cause. 1. The Prabhakras hold the following view here, cognition of such provision does not arise from repeatedly observing the concomitance of reason and probandham, because each separate observation is not a cause of cognition of either the reason or the probandham. Moreover, these transient acts, which perish in a mere moment, cannot possess any unifying factor capable of joining all the observations together at a single moment. The Neayaka may now propose that an impression produced by repeated observation of the concomitance of reason and probandom, assisted by a sense organ, is the means of cognizing pervasion, since in the case of recognition a sense organ is accepted as a cooperative cause of an impression. But this proposal is untenable. An impression is accepted as a cause only of memory and and recognition concerning the same object. How, then, could an impression assisted by a sense organ produce cognition of pervasion in the form of concomitance between different objects? Otherwise, memory and recognition of different objects would also arise from one another's impressions, and the unacceptable consequence would follow that a jar is recognized through the impression of a cloth. Repeated observation of a relation cannot be defined. 2. Furthermore, repeated observation of the relation between reason and probandim can be described neither as observation of the same reason with the same probandim and many loci, nor as observation of many reasons with many probanda, nor as many observations of reason and probandim. Under the first alternative, repeated observation would be observation of reason and probandim and many loci, under the second, observation of many reasons and many probanda, and and under the third, many observations of the same reason and probandom. Consequently, under the first alternative cognition that colorhood is pervaded by tastehood would have to arise, under the second, cognition that substancehood is pervaded by jarhood would have to arise, and under the third, cognition that smoke is pervaded by fire would have to arise merely from continuous observation of smoke and fire in the same locus, a single kitchen. Moreover, if repeated observation means three or four observations, no uninterrupted succession of those observations is established. Not only that, in the inference, this is made of Earth because it can be scratched with iron, even after Earthhood and scratchability by iron have been observed together hundreds of times, the perversion of the reason by the probandom is not cognized. Repetitive observation assisted by hypothetical reasoning is not a means of cognizing perversion. 3. The Neyayaka may argue that repeated observation of the reasons concomitance with the probandom, assisted by hypothetical reasoning, is the means of cognizing perversion. But we Prabhakaraj reply that if the observation of concomitance assisted by the required hypothetical reasoning is accepted as the means of cognizing perversion, what purpose is served by repeated observation of concomitance. It cannot be said that hypothetical reasoning does not arise without repeated observation of reason and probandom. A person skilled in pervasion can reason hypothetically upon seeing reason and probandom together for the first time, hence repeated observation is wholly unnecessary. Moreover, hypothetical reasoning assisted by repeated observation cannot itself be regarded as the means of cognizing perversion, because hypothetical reasoning itself rests upon cognition of perversion, leading to infinite regress. The Neayaka may say here that a newborn infant acquires cognition of perversion and makes an inference, and from that inference arise movement towards suckling and withdrawal from other things, all this occurs without hypothetical reasoning, so accepting hypothetical reasoning as a means of cognizing perversion does not lead to infinite regress. But we Prabhakaraj reply, because deviation is observed in some cases, hypothetical reasoning would be incapable of producing cognition of perversion, therefore it cannot be accepted as a means of cognizing perversion. It should also be noted here that being produced by hypothetical reasoning is no intermediate common property occurring in cognitions of perversion produced by hypothetical reasoning. Therefore that very hypothetical reasoning cannot be regarded as a means of cognizing perversion. Generic character contact is not a means of cognizing perversion. For, the Neayakas now say, in the inference of many probanda by many reasons, cognition of all the probanda and all the reasons in one locus is obtained only through generic character contact, therefore that pervasive contact delimited by a universal alone should be the means of cognizing pervasion, that is, of cognizing the reason's non-occurrence without the probandom. Moreover, the generic forms of reason and probandom cannot be cognized from a single joint observation, therefore repeated observation of the reason with the probandom is necessary for cognizing pervasion. But this argument is untenable. For the sake of economy, cognition of the universal alone is regarded as the pervasive contact, the known individual possessing the universal is not regarded as the pervasive contact. Therefore repeated observation is not necessary for cognition of pervasion. Nor can it be said that a second and third joint observation are required to remove doubt that the co-presence of reason and probandom and one locus is accidental, a mere cro-an-palm coincidence. For even after a second and third joint observation of reason and probandom in one locus, doubt about accidental co-presence cannot be removed.

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