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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
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Detected language: en (0.97974)
Duration: 1:04:05
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Timestamped machine output

0:04–0:06The answer continued.
0:06–0:13The earlier objection, that if capacity, and its result were respectively uniform,
0:13–0:26the object would either be known with all its qualities or not known at all, would be appropriate only if cognition of all the objects qualities depended solely on the object itself,
0:26–0:33solely on cognition of the object, or solely on the causal complex producing cognition of the object.
0:33–0:42object. In fact, this is not so. Implicit refutation of a possible Buddhist argument.
0:42–0:49The preceding criticism refutes another possible argument, a crooked method like twisting one's
0:49–0:56waist to touch one's ear. The argument is this, if, because the object and its qualities
0:56–1:03are distinct, inferential or verbal cognition of an object does not necessarily entail
1:03–1:10inferential or verbal cognition of its qualities, the same should hold in sense cognition, when
1:10–1:16the object is known by a sense, its qualities should not necessarily be known through the
1:16–1:18sense.
1:18–1:24Non-Buddhists accept this possibility in all cases where the causal complex producing
1:24–1:30cognition of the known object's specific qualities is absent, because different means
1:30–1:37of valid cognition poses their own specific powers. An inferential reason has the capacity
1:37–1:44to produce valid cognition of its invariable concomitance with the probandom, the power
1:44–1:50of a word is limited by convention, and for a sense organ to operate, presence of the
1:50–1:58object is also required. It is not the case that merely because an object is related
1:58–2:04to a means of valid cognition, it must become validly known, otherwise any cognition of any
2:04–2:12object could arise. The correct rule is this, if an object is known by a means of valid
2:12–2:18cognition only through cognition of some of its qualities, then when those qualities
2:18–2:25are not known the object too is not known, or no quality is known. Thus the preceding
2:25–2:32possibility that when there is no inferential or verbal cognition of an object's qualities
2:32–2:40there is no cognition of the object either establishes only what is already accepted.
2:40–2:44This is the essence of the entire argument.
2:44–2:47Objection to the preceding answer.
2:47–2:54The objection is this, if inferential reasons, words, and objects of the senses were of
2:54–3:00the same nature like the objects of the right and left eyes, the forms of cognition produced
3:00–3:09by these means would not differ. But they do differ. In verbal and inferential cognition,
3:09–3:15an object does not appear in the same form as in perceptual cognition, where the object
3:15–3:22appears self-defined, clear, and definitely determined in such conditions as place and
3:22–3:30time. In indirect cognition, the object appears distinguished from dissimilar things but as
3:30–3:37if non-different from similar things, indistinct and without direct acquaintance. This difference
3:37–3:43among cognitions cannot be explained merely by difference among the means of cognition.
3:43–3:50A means or cause of cognition does not produce a difference in the form of cognition.
3:50–3:57can one cognition be regarded as endowed with two different forms. Therefore the previously
3:57–4:05stated invariable concomitance, whatever is a common object of both existence and non-existence
4:05–4:13is related to exclusion of others, is established. It may be formulated as an inference thus,
4:13–4:19a special cognition opposed to perceptual cognition of an object does not have that
4:19–4:26same object as its object, just as cognition of cloth does not take the object of cognition
4:26–4:33of a pot as its own. Conceptual perception concerning a cow is opposed to non-conceptual
4:33–4:40perception of it, therefore its object must be wholly different from the object of non-conceptual
4:40–4:42perception.
4:42–4:50to the objection. This reply too is defective. The stated invariable concomitance deviates
4:50–4:57in mutually opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth. One side of the cloth is painted
4:57–5:04and the other unpainted and the two sides are apprehended by different cognitions.
5:04–5:10A blue cloth as it appears in a person's cognition at one time does not for that
5:10–5:17reason fail to appear as blue in a later cognition of the same person or in another person's
5:17–5:24cognition. It may be objected that the cognitions are not mutually opposed in the respect that
5:24–5:31determines the identity of their object, the respect that determines their opposition also
5:31–5:37determines difference of their objects. Here the cognitions are opposed in the forms
5:37–5:44of painted and unpainted, but as cognitions of a blue object they may still have one and
5:44–5:46the same object.
5:46–5:52The same reply can be given in the case of inferential and verbal cognition.
5:52–5:58So far as the individual cow endowed with cowness is concerned, they share the same
5:58–6:05object as perception, but they do not share perceptions object regarding the spatiotemporal
6:05–6:12determination of the individual cow. Therefore the reason alleged above to prove that inference
6:12–6:18and verbal cognition have an object different from perception is absent from the subject,
6:18–6:26in reality, the object of all these cognitions is the same cow. We already accept that indirect
6:26–6:32cognition does not share perceptions object so far as spatio-temporal determination
6:32–6:40of the individual is concerned, proof of this establishes only what was already established.
6:40–6:48We do not hold that everything appearing in perception also appears in indirect cognition.
6:48–6:55A question and its answer. How then, does the distinction between clear and unclear
6:55–7:01cognition arise concerning an individual that is the substrate of a universal and
7:01–7:10the light. Answer, no such intrinsic distinction really arises. The more of an object's qualities
7:10–7:16are apprehended, the clearer its cognition is considered, the fewer are apprehended,
7:16–7:24the less clear it is considered. Such clarity and lack of clarity are experienced respectively
7:24–7:31in cognition of near and distant objects, not when no object at all is known.
7:31–7:36A new form of the preceding question and its answer.
7:36–7:43It may be objected that cognition of increasingly distant objects has not been established as
7:43–7:48related to real objects, therefore those cognitions to fall within the subject of
7:48–7:56The earlier inference intended to prove that indirect cognition does not apprehend real objects.
7:56–8:01But this view is contradicted by the reflexive perceptual cognition.
8:01–8:07I now directly perceive the very thing that I had previously inferred.
8:07–8:14If an object and its qualities were non-different, ignorance of any quality could cause ignorance
8:14–8:17of the qualified object.
8:17–8:23But because quality and object are known to be different, the preceding inference is contradicted
8:23–8:27by the evidence of that reflexive cognition.
8:27–8:33Even if there is doubt concerning the distinction between object and quality, the defect of
8:33–8:39suspected deviation in the reason cannot be avoided.
8:39–8:44Differences among separate cognitions of the same object can also be explained by failure
8:44–8:48to apprehend some of its qualities.
8:48–8:51Justification of the answer.
8:51–8:57If objects known as distant and increasingly distant are not identical, which among them
8:57–9:03is the real and determinate object of the different cognitions, is the thing actually
9:03–9:06apprehended itself the real object?
9:06–9:13Yes, but this apprehension never occurs by suppressing the qualities under which
9:13–9:20the object appeared in earlier cognitions. An object such as a teak tree appears in cognitions
9:20–9:29of an increasingly near object under the qualities of reality, substancehood, earthhood, treehood,
9:29–9:36and so forth. In later cognition it is not apprehended as devoid of those qualities.
9:36–9:42Objection based on the criterion of successful activity and the answer.
9:42–9:48Even many cognitions should only that cognition be regarded as valid which prompts successful
9:48–9:51activity concerning the object.
9:51–9:53No.
9:53–9:59If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not rejected, how is it to be determined toward
9:59–10:04which particular object among the different objects known successively the successful
10:04–10:07activity was directed?
10:07–10:14It may be answered that there is no such determinant, but at that place there are not many complex
10:14–10:21activities, only one activity related to one object, and therefore the known object is
10:21–10:29one and only one of the many cognitions accords with that object and is valid.
10:29–10:35If so, how is it determined which cognition accords with the object?
10:35–10:39If this cannot be decided, uncertainty reappears.
10:39–10:47Even ordinary, uncomplicated successful activity is not produced by one object alone, it arises
10:47–10:54from an aggregate of causes, because only a causal aggregate produces an effect.
10:54–11:00For this reason, successful activity cannot be regarded as produced by a single series
11:00–11:07of momentary entities, no successful activity is necessarily connected with only one momentary
11:07–11:15series. Is the principal casualty of a seed as seed known through positive and negative
11:15–11:21concomitance for a particular successful activity, so that the observed object is
11:21–11:28determined to be a seed and nothing else. If so, the substance hood, earth hood, tree
11:28–11:34Treehood and other properties of an object seen from afar are also effective in different
11:34–11:41successful activities, therefore they too must be accepted as apprehended.
11:41–11:49The observed object functions as a cause in producing many different successful activities.
11:49–11:55Examination of the answer that directness and indirectness are not properties of the
11:55–12:03object of cognition. No. Indirectness and directness are not properties including the
12:03–12:10object of cognition. Properties of cognition are of two kinds. First, properties determined
12:10–12:17by the object. Second, distinct generic properties such as being perceptual, being inferential
12:17–12:24and being recollective. In the first kind, differences in object determination produce
12:24–12:30differences among cognitions, this difference arises from difference among the objects of
12:30–12:38cognition, that is, from denial of their identity. But differences among cognitions arising from
12:38–12:45generic properties such as perceptuality and inferentiality are not of this kind, they
12:45–12:51result from differences among the respective causes of cognition. Such is the condition
12:51–12:56of verbal, inferential, and recollective cognition.
12:56–13:02Who can prevent a sense organ from producing the same kind of perceptual cognition concerning
13:02–13:09different objects such as pot and cloth, while sense organ and inferential reasons successively
13:09–13:17produce distinct perceptual and inferential cognitions concerning one and the same object?
13:17–13:23Whether the objects are identical or different, different causes of cognition determine the
13:23–13:26production of its different forms.
13:26–13:32If causal determination of cognition is denied, difference of causes will no longer determine
13:32–13:39difference of effects and differences among effects will become accidental.
13:39–13:45What decisive proof shows that directness or perceptuality and indirectness are generic
13:45–13:53properties rather than accidental marks dependent on the relation of cognition to its object.
13:53–13:55Experience itself is the proof.
13:55–14:03Imperceptual, inferential, recollective, and other cognitions, directness, indirectness,
14:03–14:09recollectiveness, and the like do not appear together with their respective objects.
14:09–14:17In cognition of fire, forms such as this has fire or that had fire appear, the property
14:17–14:21of the cognition is not an object there.
14:21–14:27But in reflexive cognition of these cognitions the different properties appear and therefore
14:27–14:33we say I infer this, I see this and I remember this.
14:33–14:38Why then is the object of cognition called indirect or direct?
14:38–14:45This usage is of the same kind as calling an object the subject of inference, perception,
14:45–14:47or memory.
14:47–14:51Refutation of the second proof of the theory of Apoha.
14:51–14:58The second reason advanced for Apoha was, whatever grounds uniform discourse concerning
14:58–15:04objects wholly different by nature has the form of exclusion of others.
15:04–15:09This reason suffers from doubtful invariable comcomitance.
15:09–15:15A positive property too can explain and ground uniform discourse.
15:15–15:22The facts are these, uniform discourse is not costless, it does not arise from the activity
15:22–15:28of many different objects or qualities, nor does it arise merely from absence of
15:28–15:35relation to many objects, for such assumptions would produce overextension or incorrect uniform
15:35–15:42discourse. By elimination, therefore, it follows that such discourse occurs because
15:42–15:50many objects are related to one generic property. What defect is there in accepting that the
15:50–15:57basis of uniform discourse is that one positive entity? Then the invariable concomitance
15:57–16:05with the negative entity in the form of exclusion previously proposed by the Buddhist would not remain.
16:05–16:15The inconsistencies that arise from treating negative exclusion as the basis of discourse have already been shown.
16:15–16:20Let this imaginative restlessness therefore end here.
16:20–16:25Examination of another defense of the theory of a poha.
16:25–16:32The concept of a poha or exclusion does not generate motivation toward action either.
16:32–16:38If it did, a person would know one object yet act toward a wholly different object,
16:38–16:43producing inconsistency between cognition and action.
16:43–16:49Can this inconsistency be removed by complex conceptual cognition?
16:49–16:53Then what is this complex conceptual cognition?
16:53–16:59Is it cognition of an unreal exclusion as a qualifier of a real object?
16:59–17:05Is it cognition of the identity of unreal exclusion and a real object?
17:05–17:11Or is it cognition produced by a natural disposition toward a real object?
17:11–17:15Refutation of the first and second alternatives.
17:15–17:19The first alternative is untenable.
17:19–17:25According to Buddhism, the real particular does not appear in conceptual cognition.
17:25–17:28The second is also untenable.
17:28–17:37A real object is a particular individual, verbal and other conceptual cognitions have no relation to it.
17:37–17:43A particular individual is not the object of linguistic convention.
17:43–17:51Thus conceptual cognition and a real object are mutually unrelated like the eye and cognition of taste.
17:51–18:02If the object of the complex cognition is common, reality cannot appear in it because reality has the nature of a particular individual.
18:02–18:05Refutation of the Third Alternative
18:05–18:09The Third Alternative is untenable.
18:09–18:18There would then be no necessary correspondence between motivation toward action and verbal cognition concerning the object of action,
18:18–18:28because failure to apprehend the difference between unreal exclusion and a real object is everywhere available as a cause.
18:28–18:35In complex conceptual cognition of a cow, is the difference between cow and non-cow not unknown,
18:35–18:40and thus cognition of the ka therefore not motivate toward a non-kao.
18:41–18:45Very well, but are these non-kaos known or unknown?
18:46–18:51If known, real non-kaos cannot be known as different from the kao,
18:51–18:55because all real particulars lie beyond conceptual cognition,
18:55–19:00consequently, failure to apprehend difference is not available.
19:01–19:05If the non-kaos are unknown, their difference too is unknown,
19:05–19:09and consideration of difference becomes impossible.
19:09–19:14Difference cannot be known when its counter term is unknown.
19:14–19:20If knowledge of the counter term is not necessary for cognition of difference,
19:20–19:28the cow concept may be known as different from the real particular cow in exactly the same way as from non-cows,
19:28–19:32because both differences are equally differences.
19:32–19:43It may be replied that the cow concept is not known as different from the real cow because its conceptual cognition follows non-conceptual cognition of the cow.
19:43–19:52This is not so with non-cows, since conceptual cognition of the cow does not follow non-conceptual cognition of non-cows.
19:52–20:08The difficulty in this answer is this. If the stated difference is a real property, unreal exclusion cannot be known as possessing difference from a real object because difference is real while exclusion is unreal.
20:08–20:23If difference is not different from the different object, then because the nature of a different object is not determined by any counter turn, exclusion can be known as different from every object.
20:23–20:32Only cognition of the identity of exclusion with some object could prevent it from being known as different from that object,
20:32–20:39but exclusion is not identical with anything, nor is it known to be so.
20:39–20:43Does exclusion, because it has the form of negation,
20:43–20:49poses no nature of its own and therefore no difference as part of its nature?
20:49–20:50No.
20:50–21:05Then one exclusion, such as the cow concept, would not differ from non-cows either, because difference from non-cows and difference from cows are alike in not constituting the concept's nature.
21:05–21:16Can the concept of exclusion, though possessing no nature of its own, appear as having a distinctive nature and as different from certain real objects?
21:16–21:24If so, we ask, with respect to the real object with which it is regarded as identical, does
21:24–21:30exclusion appear without nature, or as identical with that real object?
21:30–21:36Under the first alternative, exclusion either remains wholly unknown because it has no
21:36–21:43mark distinguishing it from anything, or it is known only as natureless.
21:43–21:48Because the necessary correspondence between conceptual cognition and subsequent action
21:48–21:55arise because conceptual cognition possesses the instrumentality of non-conceptual cognition,
21:55–22:00then what does possessing instrumentality mean?
22:00–22:06It cannot mean having the same object as non-conceptual cognition because conceptual
22:06–22:13cognition cannot take the real object of non-conceptual cognition as its object.
22:13–22:19How can it mean superimposition upon conceptual cognition of the generic property of non-conceptual
22:19–22:21cognition?
22:21–22:27Conceptual cognition is true with respect to its own object and therefore neither erroneous
22:27–22:30nor conceptually afflicted.
22:30–22:36Its object appears in a form expressible by words because it is conceptual, hence it
22:36–22:40cannot become the ground of superimposition.
22:40–22:48If the object did not appear in word-expressible form, its cognition would not be conceptual.
22:48–22:56Once the object appears and is known in this way, false superimposition upon it is impossible.
22:56–23:00Another defense and its refutation.
23:00–23:07Nor can the truth of non-conceptual cognition be superimposed upon conceptual cognition.
23:07–23:13If this truth does not necessarily include the object of cognition, the necessary identity
23:13–23:21of object between conceptual cognition and motivation toward action cannot be explained.
23:21–23:27If truth includes the ultimately real object, conceptual cognition too will take it as an
23:27–23:33object because cognition of its own truth is impossible without apprehending the real
23:33–23:35object.
23:35–23:44If truth includes an unreal object, no motivation from cognition toward the unreal object will arise.
23:44–23:51That an unreal object should appear as real is wholly impossible because the unreal nature
23:51–23:55of a real object is directly inconsistent.
23:55–23:59A third defense and its refutation.
23:59–24:05This instrumentality cannot be failure to apprehend the difference of conceptual cognition
24:05–24:10either from itself or from non-conceptual cognition.
24:10–24:16Conceptual cognition is self-aware as cognition, therefore its distinctive nature cannot be
24:16–24:21confused with the nature of non-conceptual cognition.
24:21–24:27The object of conceptual cognition is unreal, therefore no real difference can exist as
24:27–24:36the counter term of that unreal object. This alternative has already been refuted. Nor does
24:36–24:43the directness of non-conceptual cognition qualify conceptual cognition. Because every
24:43–24:50cognition is self-aware regarding its own object, it is direct to itself. The object
24:50–24:58of conceptual cognition is not direct. Even if all objects were treated as direct, because
24:58–25:04the objects of cognitions differ, cognition of one object could not motivate action toward
25:04–25:12another. Examination of generous account of the casualty of conceptual cognition in relation
25:12–25:19to action. Do some conceptual cognitions by their very nature motivate action toward
25:19–25:23a real object that is not even their object.
25:23–25:29Who is responsible for the strange nature they have received from their causes?
25:29–25:36If so, we ask, does cognition produce motivation toward the real object without any connection
25:36–25:38to it?
25:38–25:44Or is cognition by nature connected to the real object without any other connection?
25:44–25:49What is the production of this course concerning the real object itself, the connection between
25:49–25:53cognition and the real object?
25:53–26:00The first alternative overextends, any cognition could motivate toward any real object.
26:00–26:06Under the second, nature explains a relation between cognition and the real object, but
26:06–26:11this natural relation is precisely the cognition-object relation.
26:11–26:18Ordinary usage does not regard the relation between cognition and its object as different
26:18–26:21from a natural relation.
26:21–26:27Even philosophers who admit cognition of an object whose real or unreal character is
26:27–26:33inexplicable cannot proceed without this natural relation, the matter will be discussed
26:33–26:34later.
26:34–26:40The third alternative plainly involves self dependence because a rational ground
26:40–26:45is being sought for the practice of acting toward a real object,
26:45–26:49while that very practice is then called the ground.
26:49–26:55Defense and refutation of the view that a concept can lead to action.
26:55–27:01Can a concept motivate action toward a real object unrelated to itself in the same way
27:01–27:06that the capacity of a cause produces an effect not yet arising?
27:06–27:16Yes, but the casualty of a cause's capacity must still be rigidly restricted to objects possessing a particular generic nature.
27:16–27:22Otherwise, cognition of a flame would motivate action toward water as well.
27:22–27:26Objection to the answer and its refutation.
27:26–27:33Thus conceptual cognition whose form determines burning capacity cause action toward real fire,
27:33–27:40while a generic or accidental property such as cognition hood determines the cognition's casualty?
27:40–27:41No.
27:41–27:51If so, cognition directed toward the shine of a cluster of diamonds resembling fire would not motivate action toward it,
27:51–27:57because such cognition possesses only the capacity to motivate action toward fire.
27:57–28:02Does the shine of the diamond not itself appear as fire?
28:02–28:09It does, but its capacity to generate action does not depend only on appearance.
28:09–28:17If it did, conceptual cognition of unreal fire would not motivate action toward real fire
28:17–28:22because real fire does not appear in the cognition.
28:22–28:28Therefore either accept that real fire appears in conceptual cognition
28:28–28:35or deny that the casualty of fire cognition can motivate toward anything apart from fire.
28:35–28:41Refutation of generous view that identity of form between the object of cognition
28:41–28:45and the object of action is the regulator.
28:45–29:01The preceding refutation also defeats the view that identity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object toward which action is directed regulates the relation between cognition and the real object.
29:01–29:11For action is also directed toward an object that does not possess the same desired form as the object of cognition.
29:11–29:21If identity of an undesired form is also regarded as sufficient to regulate the cognition relation, irregularity results.
29:21–29:26Denial of identity of form between cognition and its object.
29:26–29:36In a doctrine accepting the reality of the external world, the required identity of form between cognition and its object is impossible
29:36–29:42because the respective causal complexes of cognition and object are wholly different.
29:42–29:47If their causal complexes were the same, only one of two things,
29:47–29:52insentience or consciousness, would exist in the world.
29:52–29:57Could one specific difference among causes produce a difference in their natures
29:57–30:01even when the causal complex is otherwise the same?
30:01–30:03No.
30:03–30:08In reality, the two arise from different causal complexes.
30:08–30:14Identity of causal complexes cannot be inferred from similarity of effects.
30:15–30:21External fire, for example, is directly seen to cause external smoke,
30:21–30:26but internal cognition of smoke is not seen to arise from fire,
30:26–30:29because it does not invariably accompany fire.
30:29–30:45It cannot be said that cognition of smoke, like smoke itself, arises from fire, though from an invisible fire, for the same cause cannot be visible in one context and invisible in another.
30:45–30:48Another objection to the preceding view.
30:48–30:59If blueness or some other quality is the generic mark of cognition of blue, how can it attach to the object of cognition rather than to cognition?
30:59–31:04If it is a quality of the object, how can it qualify cognition?
31:04–31:14Nearly the entire discussion of this issue has already occurred in connection with the defect of intermixture of universals.
31:14–31:24The Buddhist must therefore accept that cognition motivates action toward its own object and that this object may be real.
31:24–31:33This conclusion must be forced upon him even by pressing a sandal against his throat, for there is no other way.
31:33–31:39Examination of the alternative that cognition apprehends its own form.
31:39–31:44Then cognition should motivate action toward its own form,
31:44–31:49which is known as qualifying cognition together with itself,
31:49–31:52because cognition is self-aware.
31:52–31:57A person turns toward that form and ultimately reaches the real object,
31:57–32:04just as one who turns toward the glitter of a stone ultimately reaches the stone.
32:04–32:05No.
32:05–32:10This is not a correct account of how action arises from cognition,
32:10–32:16because no one acts toward what yields no desired and important result.
32:16–32:21The conceptual form is just such a fruitless thing.
32:21–32:27Nor can the conceptual form be superimposed upon an external real object,
32:27–32:32because the real object is unrelated to the concept.
32:32–32:38Externality or objecthood cannot be superimposed upon the form either.
32:38–32:43The form is itself illuminated by the self-luminosity of cognition,
32:43–32:48therefore there is no occasion for false superimposition upon it.
32:48–32:52In the example of acting toward the glitter of a diamond,
32:52–32:58the person acts because of the false cognition that the glitter is the diamond.
32:58–33:03Without this error, the action would not arise.
33:03–33:07Thus the Buddhist example to contains a fallacious reason.
33:07–33:11Another objection to the Sothrantika view.
33:11–33:15On the doctrine that the form alone is the object,
33:15–33:23there is no valid proof establishing the reality of an external object not apprehended by cognition.
33:23–33:32If the appearance of different forms at different times in separate cognitions is treated as a reason proving external reality,
33:32–33:39that reason deviates and epileptic sees forms that do not exist in the external world.
33:39–33:44Examination of the proof from successful activity.
33:44–33:58Even successful activity offered as proof of an external real object, if known, is itself constituted by a particular form, external reality is not established by it.
33:58–34:04Just as the unreal hair like form appearing to an epileptic has no external object,
34:04–34:13so a form of successful activity produced by some extraordinary latent impression may lack any objective ground.
34:13–34:26Thus no invariable concomitance is established between externality and the production of successful activity, because the contrary case cannot be excluded.
34:26–34:35To accept both that external objects are real, and that cognition possesses their form is merely childish.
34:35–34:42Examination of the Vahadika view that a real object is the object of conceptual cognition.
34:42–34:50Then let the external particular real object itself be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition.
34:50–34:58Although the object in its own form is not the subject of any linguistic convention and is therefore ineffable,
34:58–35:08it may acquire a common form through an indirect relation of excluding others and thereby become definitely expressible.
35:08–35:14Just as one individual cow excludes non-cows, so do other cows.
35:14–35:19Very well, then we ask, what is this so-called non-cow?
35:19–35:26Is it whatever differs from one cow, or whatever lacks the property that qualifies a cow?
35:26–35:31Criticism of the first proposed meaning of non-cow.
35:31–35:37If the first meaning is accepted, another cow different from one particular cow cannot be known
35:37–35:43be known or spoken of as a cow because by being different from the first cow it does
35:43–35:52not exclude non-cows. Moreover, on this meaning a non-cow to would be known as a cow, a horse,
35:52–35:58which is a non-cow excludes buffaloes, elephants and all other things different from a particular
35:58–36:06cow. Does not a horse also exclude the cow, just as it excludes other non-cows?
36:06–36:14it does, but the cow intended by the word cow also excludes another cow. Nevertheless,
36:14–36:22it is a cow. No, the fact is that if exclusion of non-cows itself is the cowness of a cow,
36:22–36:29that cowness is also present in a horse. If cowness is something more than this, explain
36:29–36:31it clearly.
36:31–36:39of the second meaning of non-kao. If the second meaning of non-kao is accepted, exclusion
36:39–36:47of non-kaos will mean exclusion of what lacks the property qualifying a kao. But such exclusion
36:47–36:54is identical with an object endowed with kaunas. An objection by Dharmakrity and its
36:54–37:00answer. Then let individual objects that appear similar be regarded as the common
37:00–37:08form of all individuals of that class, without troubling to establish exclusion of others
37:08–37:10as the common form.
37:10–37:16But this is impossible, because there is no identity of form.
37:16–37:24Their identity is not real, because different individuals poses mutually incompatible properties.
37:24–37:31Four is their identity merely conceptual, grey, yellow, and other individual cows are
37:31–37:35directly perceived as having different forms.
37:35–37:41Can the properties of objects in one class be imagined as mutually identical?
37:41–37:43No.
37:43–37:47There is no property distinct from the qualified object.
37:47–37:54If a distinct property is admitted, the dispute ends immediately.
37:54–37:58of Dharmakriti's view of universals.
37:58–38:05Then let the argument be this, different particular real objects are endowed with the capacity
38:05–38:08to produce cognition of their similarity.
38:08–38:15Objects possessing this capacity, if the similarity concerns cows, are called cows,
38:15–38:19while objects lacking it are called non-cows.
38:19–38:27Individuals receive this capacity from their respective causes, therefore its reality cannot be questioned.
38:27–38:42If a universal is accepted to explain cognition of similarity, another universal applying to all universals must be accepted to explain cognition of similarity among the universals themselves.
38:42–38:51Likewise, another universal must be accepted to determine the inheritance of the universal in individuals.
38:51–39:01Thus accepting a universal to explain cognition of similarity leads to infinite regresses, one upward and one downward.
39:01–39:04Refutation of the preceding view.
39:04–39:13If uniform discourse can be explained from individuals wholly different from one another without any auxiliary cause,
39:13–39:19discourse of difference can equally be explained from a single identical object.
39:19–39:26In both views the imagination of a natural capacity in individuals is alike.
39:26–39:38But if so, cognition of identity will either never arise anywhere or if it arises, will be costless, both consequences are improper.
39:38–39:47The same difficulty applies to the other view, discourse of difference will either not arise or will be costless.
39:47–39:54Therefore, just as one object produces discourse of identity, different objects produce only
39:54–39:57discourse of difference.
39:57–40:03The capacity of objects to produce discourse is regulated in this way.
40:03–40:06Resolution of the Infinite Regress
40:06–40:13If only one object produces discourse of identity, how is discourse of difference
40:13–40:17concerning different universals to be explained?
40:17–40:23The answer is, in the same way as discourse of difference concerning the one moon.
40:23–40:26Is that discourse not false?
40:26–40:32Yes, let discourse of difference among universals also be false.
40:32–40:38In both cases, contrary proof is equally available.
40:38–40:44Then let discourse of identity concerning all cases, including individuals of one
40:44–40:53class be regarded as false. If so, the scores of difference may also be regarded as false.
40:53–41:01But successful activities are mutually different how then can this be? Very well, but just as
41:01–41:07the identity and difference of successful activities establish the identity and difference
41:07–41:14of the individuals producing them, why not understand that the similarity and dissimilarity
41:14–41:20of the activities established the identity and difference of universe residing in those
41:20–41:29individuals? Are the similarity and the similarity of successful activities themselves not real?
41:29–41:36Then difference among the activities may equally be called false. If one says, let it be
41:36–41:42attachment to the reality of external objects must be abandoned.
41:42–41:50If one then says, that is precisely my intention, an answer will be given later.
41:50–41:57Another Proof of Universals. Suppose we do not infer the identity and difference of the
41:57–42:02objects producing cognitions of similarity and dissimilarity.
42:02–42:16Even so, the knowledge that one cognition is true and another erroneous is possible only if one kind of cause produces true cognition and another kind produces false cognition.
42:16–42:28A specific kind of effect depends upon a specific kind of cause, otherwise the distinctiveness of an effect produced by a causal complex would be accidental.
42:28–42:41Without accepting this generic determination of the effect by its cause, explaining uniform discourse concerning different individuals through a series of errors is merely ridiculous.
42:41–42:54Individuals appear one because there is an illusion of their similarity and this illusion arises from an illusion of unity among previous cognitions of the individuals.
42:54–43:11If, as stated earlier, different individuals themselves can produce cognition of their similarity or identity and thereby produce the required collective cognition, the explanation through a chain of errors is futile.
43:11–43:19Therefore, even for discourse involving erroneous superimposition, there must be some universal
43:19–43:25as the object of the superimposition, for example, erroneousness.
43:25–43:30This is impossible without accepting the reality of universals.
43:30–43:37The view that apoha is established on the basis of proof against universals.
43:37–43:43Then let a pohabi regarded as established because there is proof against the reality of
43:43–43:45universals.
43:45–43:46No.
43:46–43:53If uniform discourse cannot be explained otherwise, how can there be proof against universals
43:53–43:55and the like?
43:55–44:02Otherwise a reason such as identity or essential nature, necessarily established by decisive
44:02–44:08proof opposing the contrary position, could be removed merely by a doubtful opposing
44:08–44:15proof. Buddhists should therefore abandon the game of seeking contrary proofs and explain
44:15–44:23uniform discourse. Since there is no other means, they cannot do so.
44:23–44:27Presentation of possible proofs against Universals
44:27–44:33Here is no powerful proof against the reality of universals.
44:33–44:40If there were, it would oppose either the universal itself or cognition of the universal.
44:40–44:46A proof opposing the universal would consist either in ignorance of its nature or in knowing
44:46–44:53the universal as endowed with mutually incompatible properties.
44:53–44:55Refutation of the First Alternative
44:55–45:01The first alternative is untenable because it cannot be established.
45:01–45:08We have begun an inquiry into the form of similarity among known objects, not into a
45:08–45:16form unknown or unapprehended, therefore the universal cannot be regarded as unknown.
45:16–45:21Can it be said that we deny cognition of the universal only in perception, not in
45:21–45:28conceptual cognition, and that only those whose vision is covered by the dense darkness of
45:28–45:34false cognition of similarity generated by linguistic convention accept the reality of
45:34–45:37universals, while we do not.
45:37–45:44Is it not also true that flights of imagination have no limit and therefore prove the reality
45:44–45:45of nothing?
45:45–45:47No.
45:47–45:53The impression of a universal occurs even without recollection or cognition of a word.
45:53–45:56Objection to the preceding reply.
45:56–46:00Even without cognition of a linguistic convention,
46:00–46:06does the latent impression of knowing that convention produce cognition of the universal?
46:06–46:13If so, one must ask whether the latent impression of knowing a general convention
46:13–46:20produces cognition of the universal in the absence of one and the same designated object
46:20–46:29or in its presence. The first alternative is wholly impossible. Just as the word go is applied
46:29–46:34to different cows possessing due laps, through separate conventions the same word is also
46:34–46:42applied to heaven, the eye, an arrow, water, a thunderbolt and other things. Then the
46:42–46:49The latent impression of knowing the conventions of this word should produce a collective cognition
46:49–46:54in which all these different things poses one common property.
46:54–46:57Is this acceptable?
46:57–47:02Accepting it would mean that the person sees no common form among individual cows possessing
47:02–47:09duelapses, but sees a common form among the ten wholly different kinds of things stated
47:09–47:10above.
47:10–47:14What can be said about such a person?
47:14–47:18His eyes must surely be exceedingly beautiful.
47:18–47:21Answer to the preceding objection.
47:21–47:24Can the other side not raise the same objection?
47:24–47:29The Buddhist critic sees no common nature among the wholly different things stated
47:29–47:34above, yet sees one among individuals possessing due lapse.
47:34–47:42Yes, he can, but the usage based on knowledge of a general linguistic convention cannot be denied.
47:42–47:46Objection to the answer and its resolution.
47:46–47:53Even so, at most this will establish that conceptual cognition takes a universal as its object,
47:53–47:59how is it established that non-conceptual cognition apprehends a universal?
47:59–48:07Answer, Conceptual cognition takes a real object as its object and the object of non-conceptual
48:07–48:13cognition is identical with that of conceptual cognition.
48:13–48:18How does conceptual cognition take a universal as its object?
48:18–48:24Because words, latent impressions and all other possible factors have already been
48:24–48:31rejected as determinants of the objecthood of a real object for conceptual cognition.
48:31–48:33This is the final answer.
48:33–48:35Now please be silent.
48:35–48:38A question and its answer.
48:38–48:45If a universal exists, why is it not seen as present in the empty space between two
48:45–48:47individuals?
48:47–48:52Because the cause of the universal's appearance, the individual is absent between the two
48:52–48:55to individuals.
48:55–48:58Another question and its answer.
48:58–49:04Just as juju fruits placed in a vessel are seen as different from the vessel, why is
49:04–49:10a universal not seen as different from the individuals that are its substrates?
49:10–49:17If being seen as different means being seen in a different place, the universal is not
49:17–49:23seen in this way because its place is the same as that of the individuals. If it means
49:23–49:32being seen in a distinct form, the universal certainly is so seen. If individual and universal
49:32–49:38were one, an individual seen as unconjoined with another individual would not be seen
49:38–49:46as endowed with the universal because the two individuals are mutually unconjoined.
49:46–49:53of the second alternative stated earlier. The second alternative stated above is also
49:53–50:00not opposed to the universal. All objections connected with it can be removed in the same
50:00–50:07manner as objections against the reality of a whole object. But how can a universal
50:07–50:14be related to an individual not yet born? It neither leaves its present substrate and
50:14–50:22travels to the later individual. Nor is it born together with that later individual.
50:22–50:27Very well, how do you know that the universal is not already present in the place where the
50:27–50:34new individual is born? If the universal is present there, would space at that place
50:34–50:43not also become endowed with universals such as Kaunas? No. Even after the individual
50:43–50:51is produced, the universal does not enter into an inherent relation with space and the like.
50:51–50:57The individual related to the universal is never unrelated to it.
50:57–51:02What inconsistency, then, is there in the view that before the new individual arises
51:02–51:09the universal is not in that place, but as soon as the individual arises the universal
51:09–51:17inheres in it, the discussion of the relation between universal and individual continued.
51:17–51:24It may be objected that the individual merely reveals the universal, the universal does not
51:24–51:26inherit in the individual.
51:26–51:33Therefore discourse of the universal's inheritance in an individual is secondary.
51:33–51:39If the universal exists in the place before the individual is produced, space would be
51:39–51:42endowed with the universal.
51:42–51:49Very well if so, the movement, production, destruction, and so forth of the individual
51:49–51:56as revealer would be sufficient to explain such discourse concerning the universal.
51:56–52:02Dharmakriti's objection that the universal neither approaches nor leaves any individual
52:02–52:11and yet is regarded as inhering in past, present, and future individuals would then have no occasion.
52:11–52:17Like an archer who misses the target and shouts to conceal his failure,
52:17–52:21Dharmakrity makes pointless noise through this objection.
52:21–52:26Examination and Criticism of Dharmakritya's Objection
52:26–52:31Let us clarify Dharmakritya's Irrelevant Objection.
52:31–52:37It is first said that a universal neither goes toward individuals nor withdraws from them,
52:37–52:43then the possibility is raised whether the universal inheres in the place that will be
52:43–52:49occupied by a future individual. What relation is there between these two statements?
52:50–52:57If the reasoning is that although universals exist at all places and times, they cannot
52:57–53:04be related to an individual that does not exist, the answer is that an object's natural existence
53:04–53:12or non-existence depends upon no other object, only its relation or non-relation depends upon
53:12–53:19another. The criticism continued. When the future individual does not yet exist,
53:19–53:27what does it mean to say the universal is not there? It means only that the universal
53:27–53:31is not related to the non-existent individual.
53:31–53:34Yes, this is precisely the meaning.
53:34–53:41But how does the universal become related to the individual after the latter is produced?
53:41–53:45Answer, the individual has come into existence
53:45–53:51and the previous absence of relation was due to the individual's non-existence.
53:51–53:55The fundamental question in the objection is therefore,
53:55–54:01How does an individual that did not exist before come into existence later?
54:01–54:08This plainly favours the doctrine that an effect pre-exists in its cause.
54:08–54:14Raising such an objection is like wanting something one has not attained.
54:14–54:21Objection based on the qualifier, qualified relation between universal and individual.
54:21–54:30Even after this explanation, if universal and the individual possessing it are wholly different, how can they coexist?
54:30–54:37Answer, etymologically, coexistence means relation to the same substrate.
54:37–54:42How this opposes different objects, I do not understand.
54:42–54:47But if so, would cow and horse also be called coexistent?
54:47–54:52No, this is a restrictive counter example, not a contradiction.
54:53–54:57For example, if one says of a certain son of Mathra,
54:58–55:04Mathra's son is dark, this does not mean that all known sons of Mathra are dark.
55:05–55:08Such restrictive examples are not rare.
55:09–55:12Another objection and answer.
55:12–55:17Even so, there must be some distinction among different objects.
55:17–55:20Some coexist and others do not.
55:20–55:23This distinction requires a clear account.
55:24–55:27Yes, there is a distinction
55:27–55:30and it is determined by the natures of the objects.
55:31–55:35Therefore only some objects are related to certain others,
55:36–55:37not all objects to all.
55:38–55:44If so, may the similar appearance of individuals also be regarded as regulated
55:44–55:47simply by the natures of the objects.
55:47–55:57No. There is no inconsistency in one object being related to many or many objects to one.
55:57–56:04But it is inconsistent for one object to generate plural usage or for many objects to generate
56:04–56:06singular usage.
56:06–56:11Refutation of Proofs opposing Cognition of Universals
56:11–56:17There is no epistemological obstacle to cognition of a universal.
56:17–56:24Denial of the form of universal cognition is contradicted by experience.
56:24–56:30Denial that this cognition has any cause is refuted by its very occurrence.
56:30–56:37Denial that its object is one thing is refuted by the fact that no coexistence of incompatible
56:37–56:41properties appears in its object.
56:41–56:47Denial that the cognition possesses directness rests on error because the object of cognition
56:47–56:54is itself neither direct nor indirect, cognition is direct if produced by a sense and indirect
56:54–57:02otherwise. Denial that universal cognition is true is refuted by the fact that a cognition
57:02–57:09cannot be called false without first establishing that its object is false. Denial that the
57:09–57:15cognition is sense produced is opposed by its positive and negative concomitance with
57:15–57:22the sense. Denial that it is perceptual is refuted by the invariable concomitance between
57:22–57:29being sense produced and being perceptual. Defense of the sense produced and perceptual
57:29–57:38character of conceptual cognition of universals. If cognition of a universal, though perceptual,
57:38–57:44were not sense produced, non-conceptual cognition toward sees to be sense produced. If the
57:44–57:50The perceptual character of cognition depended on its following a non-conceptual cognition
57:50–57:58of its object, the imagination of a beloved by a love-stricken person would count as perception.
57:58–58:05Since there is no contrary proof, there is no need to regard the perceptuality of conceptual
58:05–58:11universal cognition as resulting from its being an effect or instrument of an earlier
58:11–58:14non-conceptual perception.
58:14–58:21If such an assumption is allowed, the contrary assumption may equally be made regarding non-conceptual
58:21–58:22cognition.
58:22–58:28If conceptual cognition, though not produced by a sense, were perceptual merely because
58:28–58:35it is produced from non-conceptual cognition, no other kind of cognition could ever arise
58:35–58:38after non-conceptual cognition.
58:38–58:44It may be asked, if a sense organ produces perceptual cognition, why does it not produce
58:44–58:49conceptual cognition immediately upon contacting the object?
58:49–58:56Answer, auxiliary causes such as recollection of a previously seen object are not available
58:56–59:02at the moment of contact between sense and object, therefore conceptual perception
59:02–59:05does not arise immediately.
59:05–59:12So produced by the sense, this perception is expressible in words.
59:12–59:17Refutation of the purpose alleged for accepting the theory of a poha.
59:17–59:24Then let the theory of a poha be accepted to achieve some particular purpose.
59:24–59:30Its highest purpose is surely to establish the indescribability of all objects.
59:30–59:37When the entire net of conceptual constructions is removed, the mind reaches a profound and
59:37–59:40pure state of complete tranquility.
59:40–59:45Very well, but who will believe this groundless story?
59:45–59:49Neither perception nor inference supports it.
59:49–59:55As for scriptural proof, you yourselves have taught your disciples that scripture concerns
59:55–59:57no real object.
59:57–1:00:00The refutation continued.
1:00:00–1:00:05No conscious person can be instructed that scripture teaches nothing.
1:00:05–1:00:12The very sentence denying the validity of verbal statements is itself a verbal statement, the
1:00:12–1:00:17self-contradiction in the Buddhist utterance is therefore clear.
1:00:17–1:00:24If words are used to affirm and deny things, the real particular, not being the object
1:00:24–1:00:30of general convention or verbal cognition is ineffable, consequently, the possibility of
1:00:30–1:00:38verbal discourse about it ends. If for this reason words cannot be used to make affirmations
1:00:38–1:00:45or denials, your own negative sentence is caught in self-contradiction. By denying that
1:00:45–1:00:53objects are expressible, you have indirectly referred to them. In a verse summarizing objections
1:00:53–1:00:59raised by an opponent against the Buddhist denial that unreal objects can be subjects
1:00:59–1:01:05of discourse, the Buddhist uses the word concerning an unreal thing.
1:01:05–1:01:11The opponent says that by replacing it with concerning a real thing, the same verse can
1:01:11–1:01:16demonstrate the self-contradiction of the Buddhist position.
1:01:16–1:01:19What the Buddhist refers to is unreal.
1:01:19–1:01:23What his opponent refers to is real.
1:01:23–1:01:30to the refutation and its answer. If the words expressing this dilemma is recited before you
1:01:30–1:01:38with the word changed, you cannot even take refuge in silence as we can. If we opposed
1:01:38–1:01:45discourse concerning the unreal subject, probandom, or reason in your inference, we would fall
1:01:45–1:01:53into self-contradiction, but because we have no interest in this game, we can remain silent.
1:01:53–1:02:00Your situation is different, you must establish a positive position free from contradiction.
1:02:00–1:02:07You are a partisan seeking to prove a purpose not established by perception or inference,
1:02:07–1:02:12therefore you must use words to refer to ineffable objects.
1:02:12–1:02:18Let this game of dispelling deep darkness with a tiny torch now end.
1:02:18–1:02:22The purpose of debate in the non-Buddhist position.
1:02:22–1:02:29If scripture opposed truth, the practices of persons seeking heavenly happiness and liberation
1:02:29–1:02:31would be groundless.
1:02:31–1:02:37Therefore only our doctrine leads to the supreme goal.
1:02:37–1:02:40Criticism of generous view and conclusion.
1:02:40–1:02:46From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding generous questions
1:02:46–1:02:48and answers.
1:02:48–1:02:52Another formulates the question, what is the meaning of a word?
1:02:52–1:02:58In three forms, what does a word reveal, what cognition does a word produce, and to what
1:02:58–1:03:01does a word actually refer?
1:03:01–1:03:08The answer to the first is exclusion of others, to the second, a real particular that excludes
1:03:08–1:03:12others, and to the third, nothing.
1:03:12–1:03:16These successive answers cannot stand.
1:03:16–1:03:23The first answer gives a false account of linguistic convention because exclusion of other objects
1:03:23–1:03:27is never the object of verbal cognition.
1:03:27–1:03:33The second gives a false account of the nature of motivation toward action.
1:03:33–1:03:37One cannot reach a real particular through exclusion.
1:03:37–1:03:44The third is self-contradictory because it actually refers to its own meaning otherwise
1:03:44–1:03:47it would not answer the question at all.
1:03:47–1:03:52The debate concerning momentariness and apoha ends here.
1:03:52–1:03:58It is therefore now established that the doctrine of momentariness cannot approve the reality
1:03:58–1:03:59of the self.

Plain text

The answer continued. The earlier objection, that if capacity, and its result were respectively uniform, the object would either be known with all its qualities or not known at all, would be appropriate only if cognition of all the objects qualities depended solely on the object itself, solely on cognition of the object, or solely on the causal complex producing cognition of the object. object. In fact, this is not so. Implicit refutation of a possible Buddhist argument. The preceding criticism refutes another possible argument, a crooked method like twisting one's waist to touch one's ear. The argument is this, if, because the object and its qualities are distinct, inferential or verbal cognition of an object does not necessarily entail inferential or verbal cognition of its qualities, the same should hold in sense cognition, when the object is known by a sense, its qualities should not necessarily be known through the sense. Non-Buddhists accept this possibility in all cases where the causal complex producing cognition of the known object's specific qualities is absent, because different means of valid cognition poses their own specific powers. An inferential reason has the capacity to produce valid cognition of its invariable concomitance with the probandom, the power of a word is limited by convention, and for a sense organ to operate, presence of the object is also required. It is not the case that merely because an object is related to a means of valid cognition, it must become validly known, otherwise any cognition of any object could arise. The correct rule is this, if an object is known by a means of valid cognition only through cognition of some of its qualities, then when those qualities are not known the object too is not known, or no quality is known. Thus the preceding possibility that when there is no inferential or verbal cognition of an object's qualities there is no cognition of the object either establishes only what is already accepted. This is the essence of the entire argument. Objection to the preceding answer. The objection is this, if inferential reasons, words, and objects of the senses were of the same nature like the objects of the right and left eyes, the forms of cognition produced by these means would not differ. But they do differ. In verbal and inferential cognition, an object does not appear in the same form as in perceptual cognition, where the object appears self-defined, clear, and definitely determined in such conditions as place and time. In indirect cognition, the object appears distinguished from dissimilar things but as if non-different from similar things, indistinct and without direct acquaintance. This difference among cognitions cannot be explained merely by difference among the means of cognition. A means or cause of cognition does not produce a difference in the form of cognition. can one cognition be regarded as endowed with two different forms. Therefore the previously stated invariable concomitance, whatever is a common object of both existence and non-existence is related to exclusion of others, is established. It may be formulated as an inference thus, a special cognition opposed to perceptual cognition of an object does not have that same object as its object, just as cognition of cloth does not take the object of cognition of a pot as its own. Conceptual perception concerning a cow is opposed to non-conceptual perception of it, therefore its object must be wholly different from the object of non-conceptual perception. to the objection. This reply too is defective. The stated invariable concomitance deviates in mutually opposed cognitions of the same blue cloth. One side of the cloth is painted and the other unpainted and the two sides are apprehended by different cognitions. A blue cloth as it appears in a person's cognition at one time does not for that reason fail to appear as blue in a later cognition of the same person or in another person's cognition. It may be objected that the cognitions are not mutually opposed in the respect that determines the identity of their object, the respect that determines their opposition also determines difference of their objects. Here the cognitions are opposed in the forms of painted and unpainted, but as cognitions of a blue object they may still have one and the same object. The same reply can be given in the case of inferential and verbal cognition. So far as the individual cow endowed with cowness is concerned, they share the same object as perception, but they do not share perceptions object regarding the spatiotemporal determination of the individual cow. Therefore the reason alleged above to prove that inference and verbal cognition have an object different from perception is absent from the subject, in reality, the object of all these cognitions is the same cow. We already accept that indirect cognition does not share perceptions object so far as spatio-temporal determination of the individual is concerned, proof of this establishes only what was already established. We do not hold that everything appearing in perception also appears in indirect cognition. A question and its answer. How then, does the distinction between clear and unclear cognition arise concerning an individual that is the substrate of a universal and the light. Answer, no such intrinsic distinction really arises. The more of an object's qualities are apprehended, the clearer its cognition is considered, the fewer are apprehended, the less clear it is considered. Such clarity and lack of clarity are experienced respectively in cognition of near and distant objects, not when no object at all is known. A new form of the preceding question and its answer. It may be objected that cognition of increasingly distant objects has not been established as related to real objects, therefore those cognitions to fall within the subject of The earlier inference intended to prove that indirect cognition does not apprehend real objects. But this view is contradicted by the reflexive perceptual cognition. I now directly perceive the very thing that I had previously inferred. If an object and its qualities were non-different, ignorance of any quality could cause ignorance of the qualified object. But because quality and object are known to be different, the preceding inference is contradicted by the evidence of that reflexive cognition. Even if there is doubt concerning the distinction between object and quality, the defect of suspected deviation in the reason cannot be avoided. Differences among separate cognitions of the same object can also be explained by failure to apprehend some of its qualities. Justification of the answer. If objects known as distant and increasingly distant are not identical, which among them is the real and determinate object of the different cognitions, is the thing actually apprehended itself the real object? Yes, but this apprehension never occurs by suppressing the qualities under which the object appeared in earlier cognitions. An object such as a teak tree appears in cognitions of an increasingly near object under the qualities of reality, substancehood, earthhood, treehood, and so forth. In later cognition it is not apprehended as devoid of those qualities. Objection based on the criterion of successful activity and the answer. Even many cognitions should only that cognition be regarded as valid which prompts successful activity concerning the object. No. If the objects of the earlier cognitions are not rejected, how is it to be determined toward which particular object among the different objects known successively the successful activity was directed? It may be answered that there is no such determinant, but at that place there are not many complex activities, only one activity related to one object, and therefore the known object is one and only one of the many cognitions accords with that object and is valid. If so, how is it determined which cognition accords with the object? If this cannot be decided, uncertainty reappears. Even ordinary, uncomplicated successful activity is not produced by one object alone, it arises from an aggregate of causes, because only a causal aggregate produces an effect. For this reason, successful activity cannot be regarded as produced by a single series of momentary entities, no successful activity is necessarily connected with only one momentary series. Is the principal casualty of a seed as seed known through positive and negative concomitance for a particular successful activity, so that the observed object is determined to be a seed and nothing else. If so, the substance hood, earth hood, tree Treehood and other properties of an object seen from afar are also effective in different successful activities, therefore they too must be accepted as apprehended. The observed object functions as a cause in producing many different successful activities. Examination of the answer that directness and indirectness are not properties of the object of cognition. No. Indirectness and directness are not properties including the object of cognition. Properties of cognition are of two kinds. First, properties determined by the object. Second, distinct generic properties such as being perceptual, being inferential and being recollective. In the first kind, differences in object determination produce differences among cognitions, this difference arises from difference among the objects of cognition, that is, from denial of their identity. But differences among cognitions arising from generic properties such as perceptuality and inferentiality are not of this kind, they result from differences among the respective causes of cognition. Such is the condition of verbal, inferential, and recollective cognition. Who can prevent a sense organ from producing the same kind of perceptual cognition concerning different objects such as pot and cloth, while sense organ and inferential reasons successively produce distinct perceptual and inferential cognitions concerning one and the same object? Whether the objects are identical or different, different causes of cognition determine the production of its different forms. If causal determination of cognition is denied, difference of causes will no longer determine difference of effects and differences among effects will become accidental. What decisive proof shows that directness or perceptuality and indirectness are generic properties rather than accidental marks dependent on the relation of cognition to its object. Experience itself is the proof. Imperceptual, inferential, recollective, and other cognitions, directness, indirectness, recollectiveness, and the like do not appear together with their respective objects. In cognition of fire, forms such as this has fire or that had fire appear, the property of the cognition is not an object there. But in reflexive cognition of these cognitions the different properties appear and therefore we say I infer this, I see this and I remember this. Why then is the object of cognition called indirect or direct? This usage is of the same kind as calling an object the subject of inference, perception, or memory. Refutation of the second proof of the theory of Apoha. The second reason advanced for Apoha was, whatever grounds uniform discourse concerning objects wholly different by nature has the form of exclusion of others. This reason suffers from doubtful invariable comcomitance. A positive property too can explain and ground uniform discourse. The facts are these, uniform discourse is not costless, it does not arise from the activity of many different objects or qualities, nor does it arise merely from absence of relation to many objects, for such assumptions would produce overextension or incorrect uniform discourse. By elimination, therefore, it follows that such discourse occurs because many objects are related to one generic property. What defect is there in accepting that the basis of uniform discourse is that one positive entity? Then the invariable concomitance with the negative entity in the form of exclusion previously proposed by the Buddhist would not remain. The inconsistencies that arise from treating negative exclusion as the basis of discourse have already been shown. Let this imaginative restlessness therefore end here. Examination of another defense of the theory of a poha. The concept of a poha or exclusion does not generate motivation toward action either. If it did, a person would know one object yet act toward a wholly different object, producing inconsistency between cognition and action. Can this inconsistency be removed by complex conceptual cognition? Then what is this complex conceptual cognition? Is it cognition of an unreal exclusion as a qualifier of a real object? Is it cognition of the identity of unreal exclusion and a real object? Or is it cognition produced by a natural disposition toward a real object? Refutation of the first and second alternatives. The first alternative is untenable. According to Buddhism, the real particular does not appear in conceptual cognition. The second is also untenable. A real object is a particular individual, verbal and other conceptual cognitions have no relation to it. A particular individual is not the object of linguistic convention. Thus conceptual cognition and a real object are mutually unrelated like the eye and cognition of taste. If the object of the complex cognition is common, reality cannot appear in it because reality has the nature of a particular individual. Refutation of the Third Alternative The Third Alternative is untenable. There would then be no necessary correspondence between motivation toward action and verbal cognition concerning the object of action, because failure to apprehend the difference between unreal exclusion and a real object is everywhere available as a cause. In complex conceptual cognition of a cow, is the difference between cow and non-cow not unknown, and thus cognition of the ka therefore not motivate toward a non-kao. Very well, but are these non-kaos known or unknown? If known, real non-kaos cannot be known as different from the kao, because all real particulars lie beyond conceptual cognition, consequently, failure to apprehend difference is not available. If the non-kaos are unknown, their difference too is unknown, and consideration of difference becomes impossible. Difference cannot be known when its counter term is unknown. If knowledge of the counter term is not necessary for cognition of difference, the cow concept may be known as different from the real particular cow in exactly the same way as from non-cows, because both differences are equally differences. It may be replied that the cow concept is not known as different from the real cow because its conceptual cognition follows non-conceptual cognition of the cow. This is not so with non-cows, since conceptual cognition of the cow does not follow non-conceptual cognition of non-cows. The difficulty in this answer is this. If the stated difference is a real property, unreal exclusion cannot be known as possessing difference from a real object because difference is real while exclusion is unreal. If difference is not different from the different object, then because the nature of a different object is not determined by any counter turn, exclusion can be known as different from every object. Only cognition of the identity of exclusion with some object could prevent it from being known as different from that object, but exclusion is not identical with anything, nor is it known to be so. Does exclusion, because it has the form of negation, poses no nature of its own and therefore no difference as part of its nature? No. Then one exclusion, such as the cow concept, would not differ from non-cows either, because difference from non-cows and difference from cows are alike in not constituting the concept's nature. Can the concept of exclusion, though possessing no nature of its own, appear as having a distinctive nature and as different from certain real objects? If so, we ask, with respect to the real object with which it is regarded as identical, does exclusion appear without nature, or as identical with that real object? Under the first alternative, exclusion either remains wholly unknown because it has no mark distinguishing it from anything, or it is known only as natureless. Because the necessary correspondence between conceptual cognition and subsequent action arise because conceptual cognition possesses the instrumentality of non-conceptual cognition, then what does possessing instrumentality mean? It cannot mean having the same object as non-conceptual cognition because conceptual cognition cannot take the real object of non-conceptual cognition as its object. How can it mean superimposition upon conceptual cognition of the generic property of non-conceptual cognition? Conceptual cognition is true with respect to its own object and therefore neither erroneous nor conceptually afflicted. Its object appears in a form expressible by words because it is conceptual, hence it cannot become the ground of superimposition. If the object did not appear in word-expressible form, its cognition would not be conceptual. Once the object appears and is known in this way, false superimposition upon it is impossible. Another defense and its refutation. Nor can the truth of non-conceptual cognition be superimposed upon conceptual cognition. If this truth does not necessarily include the object of cognition, the necessary identity of object between conceptual cognition and motivation toward action cannot be explained. If truth includes the ultimately real object, conceptual cognition too will take it as an object because cognition of its own truth is impossible without apprehending the real object. If truth includes an unreal object, no motivation from cognition toward the unreal object will arise. That an unreal object should appear as real is wholly impossible because the unreal nature of a real object is directly inconsistent. A third defense and its refutation. This instrumentality cannot be failure to apprehend the difference of conceptual cognition either from itself or from non-conceptual cognition. Conceptual cognition is self-aware as cognition, therefore its distinctive nature cannot be confused with the nature of non-conceptual cognition. The object of conceptual cognition is unreal, therefore no real difference can exist as the counter term of that unreal object. This alternative has already been refuted. Nor does the directness of non-conceptual cognition qualify conceptual cognition. Because every cognition is self-aware regarding its own object, it is direct to itself. The object of conceptual cognition is not direct. Even if all objects were treated as direct, because the objects of cognitions differ, cognition of one object could not motivate action toward another. Examination of generous account of the casualty of conceptual cognition in relation to action. Do some conceptual cognitions by their very nature motivate action toward a real object that is not even their object. Who is responsible for the strange nature they have received from their causes? If so, we ask, does cognition produce motivation toward the real object without any connection to it? Or is cognition by nature connected to the real object without any other connection? What is the production of this course concerning the real object itself, the connection between cognition and the real object? The first alternative overextends, any cognition could motivate toward any real object. Under the second, nature explains a relation between cognition and the real object, but this natural relation is precisely the cognition-object relation. Ordinary usage does not regard the relation between cognition and its object as different from a natural relation. Even philosophers who admit cognition of an object whose real or unreal character is inexplicable cannot proceed without this natural relation, the matter will be discussed later. The third alternative plainly involves self dependence because a rational ground is being sought for the practice of acting toward a real object, while that very practice is then called the ground. Defense and refutation of the view that a concept can lead to action. Can a concept motivate action toward a real object unrelated to itself in the same way that the capacity of a cause produces an effect not yet arising? Yes, but the casualty of a cause's capacity must still be rigidly restricted to objects possessing a particular generic nature. Otherwise, cognition of a flame would motivate action toward water as well. Objection to the answer and its refutation. Thus conceptual cognition whose form determines burning capacity cause action toward real fire, while a generic or accidental property such as cognition hood determines the cognition's casualty? No. If so, cognition directed toward the shine of a cluster of diamonds resembling fire would not motivate action toward it, because such cognition possesses only the capacity to motivate action toward fire. Does the shine of the diamond not itself appear as fire? It does, but its capacity to generate action does not depend only on appearance. If it did, conceptual cognition of unreal fire would not motivate action toward real fire because real fire does not appear in the cognition. Therefore either accept that real fire appears in conceptual cognition or deny that the casualty of fire cognition can motivate toward anything apart from fire. Refutation of generous view that identity of form between the object of cognition and the object of action is the regulator. The preceding refutation also defeats the view that identity between the form of the object of cognition and the form of the object toward which action is directed regulates the relation between cognition and the real object. For action is also directed toward an object that does not possess the same desired form as the object of cognition. If identity of an undesired form is also regarded as sufficient to regulate the cognition relation, irregularity results. Denial of identity of form between cognition and its object. In a doctrine accepting the reality of the external world, the required identity of form between cognition and its object is impossible because the respective causal complexes of cognition and object are wholly different. If their causal complexes were the same, only one of two things, insentience or consciousness, would exist in the world. Could one specific difference among causes produce a difference in their natures even when the causal complex is otherwise the same? No. In reality, the two arise from different causal complexes. Identity of causal complexes cannot be inferred from similarity of effects. External fire, for example, is directly seen to cause external smoke, but internal cognition of smoke is not seen to arise from fire, because it does not invariably accompany fire. It cannot be said that cognition of smoke, like smoke itself, arises from fire, though from an invisible fire, for the same cause cannot be visible in one context and invisible in another. Another objection to the preceding view. If blueness or some other quality is the generic mark of cognition of blue, how can it attach to the object of cognition rather than to cognition? If it is a quality of the object, how can it qualify cognition? Nearly the entire discussion of this issue has already occurred in connection with the defect of intermixture of universals. The Buddhist must therefore accept that cognition motivates action toward its own object and that this object may be real. This conclusion must be forced upon him even by pressing a sandal against his throat, for there is no other way. Examination of the alternative that cognition apprehends its own form. Then cognition should motivate action toward its own form, which is known as qualifying cognition together with itself, because cognition is self-aware. A person turns toward that form and ultimately reaches the real object, just as one who turns toward the glitter of a stone ultimately reaches the stone. No. This is not a correct account of how action arises from cognition, because no one acts toward what yields no desired and important result. The conceptual form is just such a fruitless thing. Nor can the conceptual form be superimposed upon an external real object, because the real object is unrelated to the concept. Externality or objecthood cannot be superimposed upon the form either. The form is itself illuminated by the self-luminosity of cognition, therefore there is no occasion for false superimposition upon it. In the example of acting toward the glitter of a diamond, the person acts because of the false cognition that the glitter is the diamond. Without this error, the action would not arise. Thus the Buddhist example to contains a fallacious reason. Another objection to the Sothrantika view. On the doctrine that the form alone is the object, there is no valid proof establishing the reality of an external object not apprehended by cognition. If the appearance of different forms at different times in separate cognitions is treated as a reason proving external reality, that reason deviates and epileptic sees forms that do not exist in the external world. Examination of the proof from successful activity. Even successful activity offered as proof of an external real object, if known, is itself constituted by a particular form, external reality is not established by it. Just as the unreal hair like form appearing to an epileptic has no external object, so a form of successful activity produced by some extraordinary latent impression may lack any objective ground. Thus no invariable concomitance is established between externality and the production of successful activity, because the contrary case cannot be excluded. To accept both that external objects are real, and that cognition possesses their form is merely childish. Examination of the Vahadika view that a real object is the object of conceptual cognition. Then let the external particular real object itself be regarded as the object of conceptual cognition. Although the object in its own form is not the subject of any linguistic convention and is therefore ineffable, it may acquire a common form through an indirect relation of excluding others and thereby become definitely expressible. Just as one individual cow excludes non-cows, so do other cows. Very well, then we ask, what is this so-called non-cow? Is it whatever differs from one cow, or whatever lacks the property that qualifies a cow? Criticism of the first proposed meaning of non-cow. If the first meaning is accepted, another cow different from one particular cow cannot be known be known or spoken of as a cow because by being different from the first cow it does not exclude non-cows. Moreover, on this meaning a non-cow to would be known as a cow, a horse, which is a non-cow excludes buffaloes, elephants and all other things different from a particular cow. Does not a horse also exclude the cow, just as it excludes other non-cows? it does, but the cow intended by the word cow also excludes another cow. Nevertheless, it is a cow. No, the fact is that if exclusion of non-cows itself is the cowness of a cow, that cowness is also present in a horse. If cowness is something more than this, explain it clearly. of the second meaning of non-kao. If the second meaning of non-kao is accepted, exclusion of non-kaos will mean exclusion of what lacks the property qualifying a kao. But such exclusion is identical with an object endowed with kaunas. An objection by Dharmakrity and its answer. Then let individual objects that appear similar be regarded as the common form of all individuals of that class, without troubling to establish exclusion of others as the common form. But this is impossible, because there is no identity of form. Their identity is not real, because different individuals poses mutually incompatible properties. Four is their identity merely conceptual, grey, yellow, and other individual cows are directly perceived as having different forms. Can the properties of objects in one class be imagined as mutually identical? No. There is no property distinct from the qualified object. If a distinct property is admitted, the dispute ends immediately. of Dharmakriti's view of universals. Then let the argument be this, different particular real objects are endowed with the capacity to produce cognition of their similarity. Objects possessing this capacity, if the similarity concerns cows, are called cows, while objects lacking it are called non-cows. Individuals receive this capacity from their respective causes, therefore its reality cannot be questioned. If a universal is accepted to explain cognition of similarity, another universal applying to all universals must be accepted to explain cognition of similarity among the universals themselves. Likewise, another universal must be accepted to determine the inheritance of the universal in individuals. Thus accepting a universal to explain cognition of similarity leads to infinite regresses, one upward and one downward. Refutation of the preceding view. If uniform discourse can be explained from individuals wholly different from one another without any auxiliary cause, discourse of difference can equally be explained from a single identical object. In both views the imagination of a natural capacity in individuals is alike. But if so, cognition of identity will either never arise anywhere or if it arises, will be costless, both consequences are improper. The same difficulty applies to the other view, discourse of difference will either not arise or will be costless. Therefore, just as one object produces discourse of identity, different objects produce only discourse of difference. The capacity of objects to produce discourse is regulated in this way. Resolution of the Infinite Regress If only one object produces discourse of identity, how is discourse of difference concerning different universals to be explained? The answer is, in the same way as discourse of difference concerning the one moon. Is that discourse not false? Yes, let discourse of difference among universals also be false. In both cases, contrary proof is equally available. Then let discourse of identity concerning all cases, including individuals of one class be regarded as false. If so, the scores of difference may also be regarded as false. But successful activities are mutually different how then can this be? Very well, but just as the identity and difference of successful activities establish the identity and difference of the individuals producing them, why not understand that the similarity and dissimilarity of the activities established the identity and difference of universe residing in those individuals? Are the similarity and the similarity of successful activities themselves not real? Then difference among the activities may equally be called false. If one says, let it be attachment to the reality of external objects must be abandoned. If one then says, that is precisely my intention, an answer will be given later. Another Proof of Universals. Suppose we do not infer the identity and difference of the objects producing cognitions of similarity and dissimilarity. Even so, the knowledge that one cognition is true and another erroneous is possible only if one kind of cause produces true cognition and another kind produces false cognition. A specific kind of effect depends upon a specific kind of cause, otherwise the distinctiveness of an effect produced by a causal complex would be accidental. Without accepting this generic determination of the effect by its cause, explaining uniform discourse concerning different individuals through a series of errors is merely ridiculous. Individuals appear one because there is an illusion of their similarity and this illusion arises from an illusion of unity among previous cognitions of the individuals. If, as stated earlier, different individuals themselves can produce cognition of their similarity or identity and thereby produce the required collective cognition, the explanation through a chain of errors is futile. Therefore, even for discourse involving erroneous superimposition, there must be some universal as the object of the superimposition, for example, erroneousness. This is impossible without accepting the reality of universals. The view that apoha is established on the basis of proof against universals. Then let a pohabi regarded as established because there is proof against the reality of universals. No. If uniform discourse cannot be explained otherwise, how can there be proof against universals and the like? Otherwise a reason such as identity or essential nature, necessarily established by decisive proof opposing the contrary position, could be removed merely by a doubtful opposing proof. Buddhists should therefore abandon the game of seeking contrary proofs and explain uniform discourse. Since there is no other means, they cannot do so. Presentation of possible proofs against Universals Here is no powerful proof against the reality of universals. If there were, it would oppose either the universal itself or cognition of the universal. A proof opposing the universal would consist either in ignorance of its nature or in knowing the universal as endowed with mutually incompatible properties. Refutation of the First Alternative The first alternative is untenable because it cannot be established. We have begun an inquiry into the form of similarity among known objects, not into a form unknown or unapprehended, therefore the universal cannot be regarded as unknown. Can it be said that we deny cognition of the universal only in perception, not in conceptual cognition, and that only those whose vision is covered by the dense darkness of false cognition of similarity generated by linguistic convention accept the reality of universals, while we do not. Is it not also true that flights of imagination have no limit and therefore prove the reality of nothing? No. The impression of a universal occurs even without recollection or cognition of a word. Objection to the preceding reply. Even without cognition of a linguistic convention, does the latent impression of knowing that convention produce cognition of the universal? If so, one must ask whether the latent impression of knowing a general convention produces cognition of the universal in the absence of one and the same designated object or in its presence. The first alternative is wholly impossible. Just as the word go is applied to different cows possessing due laps, through separate conventions the same word is also applied to heaven, the eye, an arrow, water, a thunderbolt and other things. Then the The latent impression of knowing the conventions of this word should produce a collective cognition in which all these different things poses one common property. Is this acceptable? Accepting it would mean that the person sees no common form among individual cows possessing duelapses, but sees a common form among the ten wholly different kinds of things stated above. What can be said about such a person? His eyes must surely be exceedingly beautiful. Answer to the preceding objection. Can the other side not raise the same objection? The Buddhist critic sees no common nature among the wholly different things stated above, yet sees one among individuals possessing due lapse. Yes, he can, but the usage based on knowledge of a general linguistic convention cannot be denied. Objection to the answer and its resolution. Even so, at most this will establish that conceptual cognition takes a universal as its object, how is it established that non-conceptual cognition apprehends a universal? Answer, Conceptual cognition takes a real object as its object and the object of non-conceptual cognition is identical with that of conceptual cognition. How does conceptual cognition take a universal as its object? Because words, latent impressions and all other possible factors have already been rejected as determinants of the objecthood of a real object for conceptual cognition. This is the final answer. Now please be silent. A question and its answer. If a universal exists, why is it not seen as present in the empty space between two individuals? Because the cause of the universal's appearance, the individual is absent between the two to individuals. Another question and its answer. Just as juju fruits placed in a vessel are seen as different from the vessel, why is a universal not seen as different from the individuals that are its substrates? If being seen as different means being seen in a different place, the universal is not seen in this way because its place is the same as that of the individuals. If it means being seen in a distinct form, the universal certainly is so seen. If individual and universal were one, an individual seen as unconjoined with another individual would not be seen as endowed with the universal because the two individuals are mutually unconjoined. of the second alternative stated earlier. The second alternative stated above is also not opposed to the universal. All objections connected with it can be removed in the same manner as objections against the reality of a whole object. But how can a universal be related to an individual not yet born? It neither leaves its present substrate and travels to the later individual. Nor is it born together with that later individual. Very well, how do you know that the universal is not already present in the place where the new individual is born? If the universal is present there, would space at that place not also become endowed with universals such as Kaunas? No. Even after the individual is produced, the universal does not enter into an inherent relation with space and the like. The individual related to the universal is never unrelated to it. What inconsistency, then, is there in the view that before the new individual arises the universal is not in that place, but as soon as the individual arises the universal inheres in it, the discussion of the relation between universal and individual continued. It may be objected that the individual merely reveals the universal, the universal does not inherit in the individual. Therefore discourse of the universal's inheritance in an individual is secondary. If the universal exists in the place before the individual is produced, space would be endowed with the universal. Very well if so, the movement, production, destruction, and so forth of the individual as revealer would be sufficient to explain such discourse concerning the universal. Dharmakriti's objection that the universal neither approaches nor leaves any individual and yet is regarded as inhering in past, present, and future individuals would then have no occasion. Like an archer who misses the target and shouts to conceal his failure, Dharmakrity makes pointless noise through this objection. Examination and Criticism of Dharmakritya's Objection Let us clarify Dharmakritya's Irrelevant Objection. It is first said that a universal neither goes toward individuals nor withdraws from them, then the possibility is raised whether the universal inheres in the place that will be occupied by a future individual. What relation is there between these two statements? If the reasoning is that although universals exist at all places and times, they cannot be related to an individual that does not exist, the answer is that an object's natural existence or non-existence depends upon no other object, only its relation or non-relation depends upon another. The criticism continued. When the future individual does not yet exist, what does it mean to say the universal is not there? It means only that the universal is not related to the non-existent individual. Yes, this is precisely the meaning. But how does the universal become related to the individual after the latter is produced? Answer, the individual has come into existence and the previous absence of relation was due to the individual's non-existence. The fundamental question in the objection is therefore, How does an individual that did not exist before come into existence later? This plainly favours the doctrine that an effect pre-exists in its cause. Raising such an objection is like wanting something one has not attained. Objection based on the qualifier, qualified relation between universal and individual. Even after this explanation, if universal and the individual possessing it are wholly different, how can they coexist? Answer, etymologically, coexistence means relation to the same substrate. How this opposes different objects, I do not understand. But if so, would cow and horse also be called coexistent? No, this is a restrictive counter example, not a contradiction. For example, if one says of a certain son of Mathra, Mathra's son is dark, this does not mean that all known sons of Mathra are dark. Such restrictive examples are not rare. Another objection and answer. Even so, there must be some distinction among different objects. Some coexist and others do not. This distinction requires a clear account. Yes, there is a distinction and it is determined by the natures of the objects. Therefore only some objects are related to certain others, not all objects to all. If so, may the similar appearance of individuals also be regarded as regulated simply by the natures of the objects. No. There is no inconsistency in one object being related to many or many objects to one. But it is inconsistent for one object to generate plural usage or for many objects to generate singular usage. Refutation of Proofs opposing Cognition of Universals There is no epistemological obstacle to cognition of a universal. Denial of the form of universal cognition is contradicted by experience. Denial that this cognition has any cause is refuted by its very occurrence. Denial that its object is one thing is refuted by the fact that no coexistence of incompatible properties appears in its object. Denial that the cognition possesses directness rests on error because the object of cognition is itself neither direct nor indirect, cognition is direct if produced by a sense and indirect otherwise. Denial that universal cognition is true is refuted by the fact that a cognition cannot be called false without first establishing that its object is false. Denial that the cognition is sense produced is opposed by its positive and negative concomitance with the sense. Denial that it is perceptual is refuted by the invariable concomitance between being sense produced and being perceptual. Defense of the sense produced and perceptual character of conceptual cognition of universals. If cognition of a universal, though perceptual, were not sense produced, non-conceptual cognition toward sees to be sense produced. If the The perceptual character of cognition depended on its following a non-conceptual cognition of its object, the imagination of a beloved by a love-stricken person would count as perception. Since there is no contrary proof, there is no need to regard the perceptuality of conceptual universal cognition as resulting from its being an effect or instrument of an earlier non-conceptual perception. If such an assumption is allowed, the contrary assumption may equally be made regarding non-conceptual cognition. If conceptual cognition, though not produced by a sense, were perceptual merely because it is produced from non-conceptual cognition, no other kind of cognition could ever arise after non-conceptual cognition. It may be asked, if a sense organ produces perceptual cognition, why does it not produce conceptual cognition immediately upon contacting the object? Answer, auxiliary causes such as recollection of a previously seen object are not available at the moment of contact between sense and object, therefore conceptual perception does not arise immediately. So produced by the sense, this perception is expressible in words. Refutation of the purpose alleged for accepting the theory of a poha. Then let the theory of a poha be accepted to achieve some particular purpose. Its highest purpose is surely to establish the indescribability of all objects. When the entire net of conceptual constructions is removed, the mind reaches a profound and pure state of complete tranquility. Very well, but who will believe this groundless story? Neither perception nor inference supports it. As for scriptural proof, you yourselves have taught your disciples that scripture concerns no real object. The refutation continued. No conscious person can be instructed that scripture teaches nothing. The very sentence denying the validity of verbal statements is itself a verbal statement, the self-contradiction in the Buddhist utterance is therefore clear. If words are used to affirm and deny things, the real particular, not being the object of general convention or verbal cognition is ineffable, consequently, the possibility of verbal discourse about it ends. If for this reason words cannot be used to make affirmations or denials, your own negative sentence is caught in self-contradiction. By denying that objects are expressible, you have indirectly referred to them. In a verse summarizing objections raised by an opponent against the Buddhist denial that unreal objects can be subjects of discourse, the Buddhist uses the word concerning an unreal thing. The opponent says that by replacing it with concerning a real thing, the same verse can demonstrate the self-contradiction of the Buddhist position. What the Buddhist refers to is unreal. What his opponent refers to is real. to the refutation and its answer. If the words expressing this dilemma is recited before you with the word changed, you cannot even take refuge in silence as we can. If we opposed discourse concerning the unreal subject, probandom, or reason in your inference, we would fall into self-contradiction, but because we have no interest in this game, we can remain silent. Your situation is different, you must establish a positive position free from contradiction. You are a partisan seeking to prove a purpose not established by perception or inference, therefore you must use words to refer to ineffable objects. Let this game of dispelling deep darkness with a tiny torch now end. The purpose of debate in the non-Buddhist position. If scripture opposed truth, the practices of persons seeking heavenly happiness and liberation would be groundless. Therefore only our doctrine leads to the supreme goal. Criticism of generous view and conclusion. From the preceding criticism, the following conclusion emerges regarding generous questions and answers. Another formulates the question, what is the meaning of a word? In three forms, what does a word reveal, what cognition does a word produce, and to what does a word actually refer? The answer to the first is exclusion of others, to the second, a real particular that excludes others, and to the third, nothing. These successive answers cannot stand. The first answer gives a false account of linguistic convention because exclusion of other objects is never the object of verbal cognition. The second gives a false account of the nature of motivation toward action. One cannot reach a real particular through exclusion. The third is self-contradictory because it actually refers to its own meaning otherwise it would not answer the question at all. The debate concerning momentariness and apoha ends here. It is therefore now established that the doctrine of momentariness cannot approve the reality of the self.

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