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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 20:53
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0:02–0:33अछिष्टब्राब्राब्राब्रीम प्शिष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्
0:33–0:38of a pot, why is cognition of the counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot?
0:39–0:43Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage
0:43–0:48concerning absence of a pot. Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required
0:48–0:52only when there is a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an additional
0:52–0:56cognition of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition of a measuring
0:56–1:02unit is required for usage concerning length. When the span of a hand is delimited by a
1:02–1:06larger number, it measures length, the opposite, a smaller span, measure shortness.
1:07–1:12Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition of
1:12–1:18the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long. Similarly, on the Msoca view,
1:18–1:23although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition of a visible pot is needed
1:23–1:29for usage concerning pot absence. Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms
1:29–1:33is also useful in making them perceptible.
1:33–1:38It is not the case that when cognition of ground is destroyed, or when absence of absence
1:38–1:42of a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again.
1:42–1:46Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely
1:46–1:51the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition
1:51–1:53of empty ground.
1:53–1:57Therefore a destroyed pot does not reappear.
1:57–2:02When a dam breaks in an uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even
2:02–2:07if no human being is present, birds and other creatures cognize it.
2:07–2:11Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is, absence of error, no means of knowledge
2:11–2:15is observed within another person, from the effect in the form of usage concerning
2:15–2:20absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of the person who was
2:20–2:23the locus of that absence.
2:23–2:26When cognition of the locus of absence of error is destroyed, rebirth does not
2:26–2:30because a continuous stream of that cognition of absence of error is available.
2:31–2:34Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established,
2:34–2:39because there is no proof for it. Thus absence is the very nature of an empty lock as distinct
2:39–2:44from a lock as possessing the counter positive. In this manner the Prabhikara Prima-Facei
2:44–2:49position is established. Thus ends the Prima-Facei view in the theory of absence.
2:53–2:55The theory of absence, Neyayaka conclusion.
2:55–3:02Nayaaka conclusion An additional absence determined by a counter positive.
3:04–3:09The Nayaaka doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined by some
3:09–3:13counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth.
3:14–3:18Mere experience of an empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence.
3:18–3:22Thus cognition of absence presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity
3:22–3:26to a cow, cognition of absence depends upon cognition of its counter positive.
3:26–3:30Cognition merely of ground is possible without cognition of a counter-positive,
3:30–3:35and the counter-positive is not even an object of that cognition, therefore such cognition is not
3:35–3:42absence. If absence is not accepted as determined by a counter-positive, the question arises,
3:42–3:48of which absence is a pot the counter-positive? The Mzaka may say that the empty locus alone
3:48–3:52is absence, while cognition of the pot is required for usage absence of a pot.
3:52–3:58Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the
3:58–4:02counter positive of the absence, it is not merely the counter positive of subsequent
4:02–4:05verbal usage.
4:05–4:10Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence.
4:10–4:14There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter positive
4:14–4:18is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence.
4:18–4:22Once the object whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition
4:22–4:26of the counter positive is seen to be required. Such additional cognition is not established
4:26–4:31as a cause in general usage concerning absence, if its separate causal status were accepted
4:31–4:35in each particular usage, there would be non-recurrence. Therefore both cognition
4:35–4:39of absence and usage concerning absence are grounded in an additional absence determined
4:39–4:40by the counter positive.
4:40–4:49Examples of shortness, length and similarity. Shortness and length are special dimensions
4:49–4:54distinct from dimension in general. Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as
4:54–4:58something is measured by a hand or other measure delimited by a smaller or larger number.
4:58–5:02Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object,
5:02–5:06particular usage as short or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure.
5:07–5:13Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a gavaia,
5:13–5:17but the particular cognition the gavaia is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow.
5:17–5:21At the time of cognition merely of a gavaya,
5:21–5:24determinant usage concerning similarity to a cow does not arise.
5:24–5:31Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its counter positive is not
5:31–5:37extraordinary. Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot.
5:37–5:44Memsaka objection, use of the expression absence of a pot, is a cause of some cognition,
5:44–5:48in cognition of absence the counter positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground.
5:48–5:53Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used should
5:53–5:57itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression, absence
5:57–6:02of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter positive relation
6:02–6:07between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing a counter positive.
6:07–6:14Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence of a pot.
6:14–6:21If the ground's being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application of the expression
6:21–6:26absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an object of that expression
6:26–6:32only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression.
6:32–6:38The ground is the object of the ground, and the ground is the object of the ground.
6:38–6:42is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an
6:42–6:47object of the expression. Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application,
6:47–6:50and here absence of pothood itself is the ground of application.
6:51–6:55Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage.
6:56–6:59This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of a
6:59–7:03counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an object of that
7:03–7:08usage. The ground alone is not absence of a pot because a container-contained relation between
7:08–7:13absence of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible in an identical
7:13–7:18thing. Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded
7:18–7:23as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would be obstructed.
7:25–7:29Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence.
7:29–7:37The Msaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground
7:37–7:42is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground is understood as its locus.
7:43–7:49Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive
7:49–7:56pot, this has already been established. There are two alternatives. First, cognition of the
7:56–8:02nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence of a pot. Then no pot
8:02–8:08absence as something contained in the ground would be presented. Second, cognition in the form of
8:08–8:14negation together with the ground's character as locus may be the cause. But at that time cognition
8:14–8:19of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition of difference from it is also
8:19–8:24unavailable. If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of
8:24–8:29of pot possessing ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an oculodefect, cognition
8:29–8:33of pot possession fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence
8:33–8:36of the pot would have to be accepted there.
8:36–8:39Usage concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then
8:39–8:45no longer be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object.
8:45–8:48Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual
8:48–8:53cognition of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground
8:53–8:58possessing a pot. Cognition of ground is distinct from cognition
8:58–9:02of pot possessing ground as possible only after absence of a pot on the ground has already
9:02–9:07been ascertained through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive pot.
9:07–9:12Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment of absence is again required, a circle or
9:12–9:19mutual dependence. Impossibility of recurrent usage concerning
9:19–9:25absence. On the Mtsakavu, different empty loci and their cognitions are non-recurrent,
9:25–9:29Well then is recurrent usage of absence possible?
9:29–9:33On the Neyayakavu, on the strength of one mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent
9:33–9:39usage a pot and a like are not cloth, on the strength of one absolute absence of conus,
9:39–9:43conus is not in a pot and a like, on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the
9:43–9:47pot has been destroyed in different potchards, and on the strength of one prior absence
9:47–9:53of the pot, the pot does not exist in the potchards before its production.
9:53–9:58Thus each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction, and
9:58–10:02prior absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci.
10:02–10:06The Mtsaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms
10:06–10:09of recurrent negative usage.
10:09–10:14Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a
10:14–10:21single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence.
10:21–10:26Conjunction with a particular time is not absence.
10:26–10:30The msaka says, Let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence expressed
10:30–10:36by there is no pot on the ground now, this also establishes a container-contained relation.
10:36–10:41If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional
10:41–10:46absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted.
10:46–10:50Whatever recurrent property the nayayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in
10:50–10:54conjunction with a particular time.
10:54–10:58Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter positive
10:58–11:03pot and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence.
11:03–11:07In, there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a
11:07–11:12locus of absence, not as absence itself. If the particular time is said to
11:12–11:15reside in conjunction with that particular time,
11:15–11:19relation is impossible because of identity.
11:19–11:25What is the particular time? If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time,
11:25–11:31an additional absence has been accepted effortlessly. If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence.
11:32–11:38On the Neyayaka view one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time is only
11:38–11:44one delimiter of it. On Lhamsaka view, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground
11:44–11:49exists now, but not there is absence of a pot on the ground, because the particular time,
11:49–11:58becoming its own qualifier, produces a cognition of itself, not an absence determined by a counter-positive.
11:58–12:04Potsherds and the like would become causes of usage concerning a pot.
12:04–12:08If different loci can join with different times produce usage concerning absence of
12:08–12:12a pot on the ground, then various parts and potsherds of a pot, as delimited by
12:12–12:17a particular aggregate of parts, should likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's
12:17–12:23existence. What need would there then be to accept a separate pot or counter positive?
12:24–12:28Cognition of the counter positive would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence.
12:30–12:34Nor is the following objection established, first the pot is seen, then the hammer falls,
12:34–12:39and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive is
12:39–12:42seen, and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless.
12:43–12:47The cognition of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents an
12:47–12:52additional destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced by the
12:52–12:58hammer, both existed before the blow. If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence,
12:58–13:04how could destructionhood belong to absence? And if it could, every absence would become
13:04–13:10destruction. Nor can it be said that what destroys on the Neiajaka view the hammer blow or the ground
13:10–13:16slash cognition of ground can join with it is itself destruction on the Misaka view. Destruction
13:16–13:21is produced by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself. Destruction of the pot is
13:21–13:27experienced as determined by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer blow is not determined
13:27–13:32by the pot as counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct from its destroyer,
13:32–13:40and absence distinct from the empty locus. Qualifier hood, that is, a self-linking relation,
13:40–13:47is the apprehensive relation of absence. The men's RKS final objection, if the ground has no
13:47–13:51relation with absence, how can there be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground.
13:52–13:56If a self-linking relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self-related
13:56–14:01to absence of a pot at a crossroads, because a self-linking relation is nothing over and
14:01–14:06about the ground and the absence. If it is said that superimposing the counter positive
14:06–14:12pot on the locus and then negating it is itself the self linking relation, mutual dependence results,
14:12–14:17superimposition depends upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon
14:17–14:23superimposition. Reply, the very thickness of absence and its locus to produce a qualified
14:23–14:28cognition without any other relation is the self linking relation. Ground possessing a pot and
14:28–14:32absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly produce the cognition, there is
14:32–14:37absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension. If a separate relation
14:37–14:41were again accepted between cognition and its object, and then another relation for that
14:41–14:46relation, an infinite regress would follow. Hence Qualifyhood in the form of a self-linking
14:46–14:49relation alone should be accepted as the apprehensive relation between absence and
14:49–14:55its lockers. Thus an additional entity, absence, and its apprehensive relation,
14:55–14:58The theory of the causes of perception.
14:58–15:07The theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tat
15:07–15:08the sentmy.
15:08–15:13Ah the theory of sense, object, contact.
15:13–15:19Conjunction of object and light is a cause of visual perception.
15:19–15:25Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions.
15:25–15:28In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular
15:28–15:32object is a cause, conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause.
15:32–15:37conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. An eye situated in light does not
15:37–15:42see an object situated in darkness, whereas an eye situated in darkness can see an illuminated object.
15:43–15:48Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite the eye is illuminated.
15:49–15:52The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for apprehension
15:52–15:57of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no proof for postulating
15:57–15:59separate conditions for apprehension of the parts.
16:01–16:05If conjunction of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is accepted as the
16:05–16:09cause, why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part facing the eye as the
16:09–16:14cause? If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause, limiting
16:14–16:18the incompatibility of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension
16:18–16:23of cloth and gold or cloth and water. One would then have to accept conjunction of light
16:23–16:25and i delimited by conjunction with the pot as the cause.
16:27–16:32If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of i and pot is accepted as the cause,
16:32–16:36the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and i in the same way arises.
16:37–16:41Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light as
16:41–16:45the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of the pot.
16:45–16:48Therefore conjunction of light and i is not a separate cause.
16:48–16:53Manifest color is a cause of illumination.
16:53–17:00Other Naya Yaka say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception,
17:00–17:03conjunction of light and object is itself established as the cause.
17:03–17:09Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and conjunction with light are accepted,
17:09–17:13conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately remains the cause.
17:13–17:17The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended,
17:17–17:22extended, because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts.
17:22–17:26If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with
17:26–17:29Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative
17:29–17:33concomitance, revealing cause of perception.
17:33–17:37Prima-facie view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by
17:37–17:41firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible.
17:41–17:45If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality
17:45–17:50like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest colour are present,
17:50–17:52perceptual effect does not invariably occur.
17:52–17:57Reply, both light and manifest colour are causes.
17:57–18:02There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colourhood or manifest
18:02–18:05colourhood delimits firehood.
18:05–18:08Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel, here positive and negative
18:08–18:13concomitance cannot be established for one while excluding the other, therefore causal
18:13–18:20status must be accepted in both. View of the tradition nor, the color of the eye is also
18:20–18:26a revealer. The nor of the tradition says, in that case the color of the eye too would be a
18:26–18:31revealer, because it is the color of revealing fire. If color is a revealer, to regard manifest
18:31–18:36colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood residing in fire as an extraneous condition
18:36–18:40is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness, through economy, revealing color alone is the
18:40–18:46extraneous condition. Manifest color present in an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual
18:46–18:53illumination. A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs,
18:53–18:57and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness,
18:57–19:02because the required causes of perception are absent. Therefore recurrent properties such as
19:02–19:07colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their perception, not substancehood, and the
19:07–19:13like in substances. Otherwise apprehension of color would necessarily accompany apprehension
19:13–19:18of touch and hot vapor, and apprehension of touch a company apprehension of color in array.
19:19–19:24There is no need to accept one recurrent property common to both color and touch,
19:24–19:28causal status can be established by distinct properties residing respectively in each color
19:28–19:34and the like. When one is apprehended, the other is not, so their recurrent properties differ.
19:35–19:40There is no contradiction of higher and lower universals, the distinction of
19:40–19:44colorhood and touchhood is possible like the distinction between higher and lower tones.
19:45–19:49Thus each manifestation assists perception of its own color and the like.
19:51–19:55Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard
19:55–19:59magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately
19:59–20:03in color and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the
20:03–20:09magnitude of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically
20:09–20:13in visually apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present
20:13–20:16in the general quality magnitude.
20:16–20:22Nor is it the case that non-manifestness alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility,
20:22–20:26while perception arises through its absence.
20:26–20:30Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper
20:30–20:35to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception.
20:35–20:40To regard non-manifestness as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly
20:40–20:42cumbersome.
20:42–20:46This is the view of the tradition-noir.
20:46–20:49Ah the theory of sense, object contact, remaining portion.

Plain text

अछिष्टब्राब्राब्राब्रीम प्शिष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष् of a pot, why is cognition of the counter positive pot needed in order to know absence of a pot? Reply, cognition of the pot is required not for apprehension of absence but for usage concerning absence of a pot. Nor is it true that an additional cognition of the pot is required only when there is a desire to know absence, whether there is such desire or not, an additional cognition of the counter positive is required for usage, just as cognition of a measuring unit is required for usage concerning length. When the span of a hand is delimited by a larger number, it measures length, the opposite, a smaller span, measure shortness. Even though the measure of the hand is known together with the body, a separate cognition of the measuring unit is required for usage so many cubits long. Similarly, on the Msoca view, although cognition of empty ground is absence of a pot, cognition of a visible pot is needed for usage concerning pot absence. Inquiry into subtle entities such as hair and microorganisms is also useful in making them perceptible. It is not the case that when cognition of ground is destroyed, or when absence of absence of a pot occurs, the pot will be produced again. Absence of cognition of empty ground is not actual destruction of the ground but merely the arising of another cognition of ground, just as absence of the pot itself is cognition of empty ground. Therefore a destroyed pot does not reappear. When a dam breaks in an uninhabited place, the flowing of water is not impossible, even if no human being is present, birds and other creatures cognize it. Nor is it a fault that in the case of liberation, that is, absence of error, no means of knowledge is observed within another person, from the effect in the form of usage concerning absence of error one infers the cause in the form of cognition of the person who was the locus of that absence. When cognition of the locus of absence of error is destroyed, rebirth does not because a continuous stream of that cognition of absence of error is available. Liberation of all persons simultaneously is also not established, because there is no proof for it. Thus absence is the very nature of an empty lock as distinct from a lock as possessing the counter positive. In this manner the Prabhikara Prima-Facei position is established. Thus ends the Prima-Facei view in the theory of absence. The theory of absence, Neyayaka conclusion. Nayaaka conclusion An additional absence determined by a counter positive. The Nayaaka doctrine is that experience presents only a particular absence determined by some counter positive, as in, this is not a pot, and, this is not a cloth. Mere experience of an empty locus without a counter positive never occurs as absence. Thus cognition of absence presents the counter positive, and like cognition of similarity to a cow, cognition of absence depends upon cognition of its counter positive. Cognition merely of ground is possible without cognition of a counter-positive, and the counter-positive is not even an object of that cognition, therefore such cognition is not absence. If absence is not accepted as determined by a counter-positive, the question arises, of which absence is a pot the counter-positive? The Mzaka may say that the empty locus alone is absence, while cognition of the pot is required for usage absence of a pot. Reply, in the experience, there is no pot here, the pot is directly apprehended as the counter positive of the absence, it is not merely the counter positive of subsequent verbal usage. Usage concerning absence itself is impossible without cognition of absence. There is also no proof for the claim that an additional cognition of the counter positive is a cause of usage concerning absence but not of cognition of absence. Once the object whose absence is to be spoken of is known, no further cognition of the counter positive is seen to be required. Such additional cognition is not established as a cause in general usage concerning absence, if its separate causal status were accepted in each particular usage, there would be non-recurrence. Therefore both cognition of absence and usage concerning absence are grounded in an additional absence determined by the counter positive. Examples of shortness, length and similarity. Shortness and length are special dimensions distinct from dimension in general. Cognition of shortness or length occurs according as something is measured by a hand or other measure delimited by a smaller or larger number. Although general dimension may be known simultaneously with the object, particular usage as short or long is impossible without cognition of a particular measure. Similarly, a general appearance of similarity to a cow may accompany cognition of a gavaia, but the particular cognition the gavaia is like a cow depends upon knowing a cow. At the time of cognition merely of a gavaya, determinant usage concerning similarity to a cow does not arise. Therefore dependence of cognition of absence upon cognition of its counter positive is not extraordinary. Ground is not the basis of the expression absence of a pot. Memsaka objection, use of the expression absence of a pot, is a cause of some cognition, in cognition of absence the counter positive pot does not appear, but only empty ground. Therefore the ground with reference to which the expression, absence of a pot, is used should itself be the absence of a pot. Being the object of application of the expression, absence of a pot, produced by cognition of the pot, may constitute the counter positive relation between pot and ground, thus the ground can be regarded as possessing a counter positive. Reply, there is neither a cognition nor a usage, the ground is absence of a pot. If the ground's being absence of a pot is defined as, being the object of application of the expression absence of a pot, mutual dependence results, the ground becomes an object of that expression only when it is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression. The ground is the object of the ground, and the ground is the object of the ground. is known as absence of a pot, and it becomes absence of a pot only when it is known as an object of the expression. Linguistic application follows cognition of its ground of application, and here absence of pothood itself is the ground of application. Nor can it be said that the ground possesses a counter-positive only at the time of usage. This again creates mutual dependence, use of the expression follows possession of a counter-positive, while possession of a counter-positive follows being an object of that usage. The ground alone is not absence of a pot because a container-contained relation between absence of a pot and ground is distinctly experienced, and such a relation is impossible in an identical thing. Similarly, if the mere nature of the self distinct from the suffering self were regarded as absence of suffering, establishment of liberation as a distinct human goal would be obstructed. Cognition of ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is not absence. The Msaka again says, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is itself absence of a pot, and through a self-leaking relation the ground is understood as its locus. Reply, cognition of ground cannot be absence of a pot without determination of the counter-positive pot, this has already been established. There are two alternatives. First, cognition of the nature of the ground itself may cause usage concerning absence of a pot. Then no pot absence as something contained in the ground would be presented. Second, cognition in the form of negation together with the ground's character as locus may be the cause. But at that time cognition of pot possessing ground is unavailable, and therefore cognition of difference from it is also unavailable. If cognition of ground becomes absence of a pot merely because cognition of of pot possessing ground does not arise, then whenever, owing to an oculodefect, cognition of pot possession fails to arise on ground that does possess a pot, both pot and absence of the pot would have to be accepted there. Usage concerning the pot's existence and cognition of absence of the pot would then no longer be mutually opposed, because both would have the same ground as their object. Nor is it established that only cognition of ground known as distinct from actual cognition of pot possessing ground is absence, and such illusion never occurs on ground possessing a pot. Cognition of ground is distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground as possible only after absence of a pot on the ground has already been ascertained through non-apprehension of an eligible counter-positive pot. Thus, to establish absence, ascertainment of absence is again required, a circle or mutual dependence. Impossibility of recurrent usage concerning absence. On the Mtsakavu, different empty loci and their cognitions are non-recurrent, Well then is recurrent usage of absence possible? On the Neyayakavu, on the strength of one mutual absence from cloth there is recurrent usage a pot and a like are not cloth, on the strength of one absolute absence of conus, conus is not in a pot and a like, on the strength of one destruction of a pot, the pot has been destroyed in different potchards, and on the strength of one prior absence of the pot, the pot does not exist in the potchards before its production. Thus each of the four kinds of absence, mutual absence, absolute absence, destruction, and prior absence, grounds uniform usage in many loci. The Mtsaka's non-recurrent grounds or cognitions of grounds cannot explain the four forms of recurrent negative usage. Therefore four individual absences are established as additional entities, on the basis of a single absences they are regarded as divisions of one category, absence. Conjunction with a particular time is not absence. The msaka says, Let conjunction of the ground with a particular time be the absence expressed by there is no pot on the ground now, this also establishes a container-contained relation. If this view incurs non-recurrence, the same fault exists in the doctrine of additional absence unless a universal or extraneous condition of absencehood is admitted. Whatever recurrent property the nayayaka accepts in absences can be accepted in conjunction with a particular time. Reply, conjunction with a particular time is not determined by the counter positive pot and therefore is unfit to produce usage concerning absence. In, there is no pot on the ground now, time, like the ground, is cognized as a locus of absence, not as absence itself. If the particular time is said to reside in conjunction with that particular time, relation is impossible because of identity. What is the particular time? If it is the status of being the locus of absence in time, an additional absence has been accepted effortlessly. If it is time's own nature, there is no recurrence. On the Neyayaka view one individual absence may exist at many times, a particular time is only one delimiter of it. On Lhamsaka view, conjunction with time may produce the cognition the ground exists now, but not there is absence of a pot on the ground, because the particular time, becoming its own qualifier, produces a cognition of itself, not an absence determined by a counter-positive. Potsherds and the like would become causes of usage concerning a pot. If different loci can join with different times produce usage concerning absence of a pot on the ground, then various parts and potsherds of a pot, as delimited by a particular aggregate of parts, should likewise be taken to produce usage concerning the pot's existence. What need would there then be to accept a separate pot or counter positive? Cognition of the counter positive would stand on the same footing as cognition of absence. Nor is the following objection established, first the pot is seen, then the hammer falls, and finally a series of potchards is seen, no absence distinct from the counter positive is seen, and therefore scriptural discourse concerning absence is groundless. The cognition of destruction, the pot was destroyed by the hammer blow, directly presents an additional destruction. Neither the ground alone nor cognition of the ground is produced by the hammer, both existed before the blow. If merely the empty locus or cognition of it were absence, how could destructionhood belong to absence? And if it could, every absence would become destruction. Nor can it be said that what destroys on the Neiajaka view the hammer blow or the ground slash cognition of ground can join with it is itself destruction on the Misaka view. Destruction is produced by the blow, destruction cannot produce itself. Destruction of the pot is experienced as determined by the pot as counter positive, while the hammer blow is not determined by the pot as counter positive. Hence destruction must be distinct from its destroyer, and absence distinct from the empty locus. Qualifier hood, that is, a self-linking relation, is the apprehensive relation of absence. The men's RKS final objection, if the ground has no relation with absence, how can there be cognition, there is absence of a pot on the ground. If a self-linking relation is invoked, then ground possessing a pot would also be self-related to absence of a pot at a crossroads, because a self-linking relation is nothing over and about the ground and the absence. If it is said that superimposing the counter positive pot on the locus and then negating it is itself the self linking relation, mutual dependence results, superimposition depends upon the relation of absence, and the relation of absence depends upon superimposition. Reply, the very thickness of absence and its locus to produce a qualified cognition without any other relation is the self linking relation. Ground possessing a pot and absence of a pot located at a crossroads do not jointly produce the cognition, there is absence of a pot on this ground, therefore there is no overextension. If a separate relation were again accepted between cognition and its object, and then another relation for that relation, an infinite regress would follow. Hence Qualifyhood in the form of a self-linking relation alone should be accepted as the apprehensive relation between absence and its lockers. Thus an additional entity, absence, and its apprehensive relation, The theory of the causes of perception. The theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tat the sentmy. Ah the theory of sense, object, contact. Conjunction of object and light is a cause of visual perception. Six kinds of specific contact are causes of specific perceptions. In visual perception, conjunction of a particular light with a particular object is a cause, conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. conjunction of light with the eye is not a cause. An eye situated in light does not see an object situated in darkness, whereas an eye situated in darkness can see an illuminated object. Objection, then the whole pot should be seen even when only the side opposite the eye is illuminated. The rule, the conditions for apprehension of a whole other conditions for apprehension of its own parts, deviates in apprehension of a triad, and there is no proof for postulating separate conditions for apprehension of the parts. If conjunction of light with the object as delimited by the part facing the eye is accepted as the cause, why not accept conjunction of light and eye as delimited by the part facing the eye as the cause? If conjunction of the eye with a part conjoined with light is the cause, limiting the incompatibility of compact objects occupying the same place would obstruct apprehension of cloth and gold or cloth and water. One would then have to accept conjunction of light and i delimited by conjunction with the pot as the cause. If, on the analogy of a perforated sieve, conjunction of i and pot is accepted as the cause, the pointless consequence of accepting conjunction of light and i in the same way arises. Resolution, positive and negative concomitance establishes conjunction of object and light as the cause of perception, this single cause accounts for visual perception of the pot. Therefore conjunction of light and i is not a separate cause. Manifest color is a cause of illumination. Other Naya Yaka say, if both light and conjunction are accepted as causes of perception, conjunction of light and object is itself established as the cause. Even if both conjunction of the object as delimited by the part facing the eye and conjunction with light are accepted, conjunction of the object with light alone ultimately remains the cause. The claim that only conjunction of light with a part is the cause is overextended, extended, because general conjunction with a part also occurs in many unrelated parts. If conjunction with its own part is specified, conjunction with Manifest or visually apprehensible color of light is also, through positive and negative concomitance, revealing cause of perception. Prima-facie view, manifest color is merely the delimiter of causal status delimited by firehood, hot vapor and the like are not visually apprehensible. If both light and manifest color are accepted as causes, there is an unnecessary duality like a staff rotating together with a wheel, even when light and manifest colour are present, perceptual effect does not invariably occur. Reply, both light and manifest colour are causes. There is no deciding factor whether firehood delimits manifest colourhood or manifest colourhood delimits firehood. Unlike the example of the rotating staff and wheel, here positive and negative concomitance cannot be established for one while excluding the other, therefore causal status must be accepted in both. View of the tradition nor, the color of the eye is also a revealer. The nor of the tradition says, in that case the color of the eye too would be a revealer, because it is the color of revealing fire. If color is a revealer, to regard manifest colorhood in general or only manifest colorhood residing in fire as an extraneous condition is unnecessary owing to deviation and cumbersomeness, through economy, revealing color alone is the extraneous condition. Manifest color present in an object is an auxiliary cause of perceptual illumination. A large mass of air carrying smell, cool or hot vapor, the eye and other sense organs, and light may remain imperceptible even when nearby, like a pot in darkness, because the required causes of perception are absent. Therefore recurrent properties such as colorhood in colors and the like are causes of their perception, not substancehood, and the like in substances. Otherwise apprehension of color would necessarily accompany apprehension of touch and hot vapor, and apprehension of touch a company apprehension of color in array. There is no need to accept one recurrent property common to both color and touch, causal status can be established by distinct properties residing respectively in each color and the like. When one is apprehended, the other is not, so their recurrent properties differ. There is no contradiction of higher and lower universals, the distinction of colorhood and touchhood is possible like the distinction between higher and lower tones. Thus each manifestation assists perception of its own color and the like. Objection, it is more economical to place manifestation only in magnitude and regard magnitude as the cause of perception of substance, accepting manifestation separately in color and the like is cumbersome. Reply, smell and touch are perceived even when the magnitude of their substrate is not manifest. Therefore manifestation resides specifically in visually apprehensible or physical qualities such as color, it is not invariably present in the general quality magnitude. Nor is it the case that non-manifestness alone is a universal and the cause of imperceptibility, while perception arises through its absence. Imperceptibility results from absence of a perceptual cause, through economy it is proper to regard the universal manifestness as a positive cause of perception. To regard non-manifestness as an inhibitor and then its absence as a cause is needlessly cumbersome. This is the view of the tradition-noir. Ah the theory of sense, object contact, remaining portion.

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