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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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asr-draft

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en (0.99643)

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23:26

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1. 0:02–0:14Objection. How can a universal such as cowhood or sweetness serve as a reason in an inference of mutual difference, since cognitions, this is a cow and this is cowwood, are not separate?
2. 0:14–0:20Reply, an individual cow delimited by cowwood through inheritance itself serves as the reason.
3. 0:20–0:28The experienced cowwood is present in all individual cows and differs from non-cows, does not generate infinite regress.
4. 0:28–0:32Therefore a universal or intermediate property can serve as a reason.
5. 0:33–0:37With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
6. 0:39–0:42Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection,
7. 0:42–0:46cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause.
8. 0:48–0:5214. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view,
9. 0:52–0:57a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises,
10. 0:57–1:01Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by fire
11. 1:01–1:06in cognition of subject propertyhood and the form's smoke or light is a property of the mountain.
12. 1:07–1:11On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
13. 1:12–1:17In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject
14. 1:17–1:21propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless,
15. 1:21–1:25Gaegia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards
16. 1:25–1:28substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
17. 1:29–1:31Otherness from that is not the reason.
18. 1:33–1:3715. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason.
19. 1:37–1:41But such otherness from that is not a delimiter of pervasion because it
20. 1:41–1:44creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation.
21. 1:44–1:48Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood.
22. 1:48–1:5516. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire.
23. 1:55–1:59In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire.
24. 1:59–2:03Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless.
25. 2:03–2:14The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smoke hood or light hood.
26. 2:14–2:20appropriate property to limiting perversion by fire, smokehood or lighthood.
27. 2:20–2:23Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual.
28. 2:23–2:29Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception,
29. 2:29–2:31not inference.
30. 2:31–2:37Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension
31. 2:37–2:42of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition's smoke or light pervaded by fire is present
32. 2:42–2:44on the mountain.
33. 2:44–2:48Your perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier,
34. 2:48–2:52qualifical relation are decisive.
35. 2:52–2:57Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception.
36. 2:57–3:02It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless
37. 3:02–3:06qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke
38. 3:06–3:10or light is pervaded by fire.
39. 3:10–3:12But this objection is untenable.
40. 3:12–3:16Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier,
41. 3:16–3:19through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitants it assists
42. 3:19–3:23direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire.
43. 3:23–3:27Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, the cause of the inference,
44. 3:27–3:31there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light
45. 3:31–3:34pervaded by fire occurs in the subject.
46. 3:34–3:39In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition smoke or light is pervaded
47. 3:39–3:43by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection, therefore
48. 3:43–3:49cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference.
49. 3:49–3:54Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire.
50. 3:54–3:5919. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself
51. 3:59–4:03the delimiter of the smoke hood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by
52. 4:03–4:08fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated
53. 4:08–4:11in all smokes.
54. 4:11–4:14But there is no evidence for this view.
55. 4:14–4:19A general perversion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual
56. 4:19–4:24or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke
57. 4:24–4:26is apprehended.
58. 4:26–4:31Without cognition of these individual pervasions, subsumptive reflection concerning general
59. 4:31–4:33pervasion is impossible.
60. 4:33–4:37Therefore, when smokehood and pervasion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on
61. 4:37–4:42the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause
62. 4:42–4:47of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition
63. 4:47–4:53does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified
64. 4:53–4:59subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality
65. 4:59–5:05is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition. Whether or not an effect arises,
66. 5:05–5:09A substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself a...
67. 5:09–5:14Even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified subsumptive reflection
68. 5:14–5:19with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of perversion.
69. 5:19–5:23Just as, concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends perversion with
70. 5:23–5:28the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so subsumptive
71. 5:28–5:34reflection concerning the mountain smokes perversion by fire is possible.
72. 5:34–5:39is not a separate means of knowledge.
73. 5:39–5:44Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association
74. 5:44–5:48generated by thought, like poetic imagination, substantive reflection is possible on the
75. 5:48–5:54basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion.
76. 5:54–5:59Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge.
77. 5:59–6:05The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent.
78. 6:05–6:1022. The view is unacceptable that the perversion of all individual smokes by fire is known
79. 6:10–6:14through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular
80. 6:14–6:21mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted,
81. 6:21–6:25cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood,
82. 6:25–6:31and the necessity of substantive reflection would become obscure.
83. 6:31–6:35of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as
84. 6:35–6:41a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex.
85. 6:41–6:45Viridical perception of fire is impossible.
86. 6:45–6:4623.
87. 6:46–6:51In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual
88. 6:51–6:55through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta.
89. 6:55–7:00But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier,
90. 7:00–7:06Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression.
91. 7:06–7:11In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known,
92. 7:11–7:16hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance
93. 7:16–7:18of an impression.
94. 7:18–7:22But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property
95. 7:22–7:27of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by
96. 7:27–7:30an impression alone.
97. 7:30–7:34is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom.
98. 7:34–7:40Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in
99. 7:40–7:43mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even
100. 7:43–7:47though the mountain fire is not directly perceived.
101. 7:47–7:52Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of
102. 7:52–7:57both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both
103. 7:57–8:01perceived together. Therefore the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through
104. 8:01–8:05sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection.
105. 8:07–8:15Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation
106. 8:15–8:21between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand,
107. 8:21–8:25and sense-contact are all causes of veritical qualified perception.
108. 8:25–8:30In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the Smokofire
109. 8:30–8:33provision and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain.
110. 8:34–8:39The Smokofire provision is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular
111. 8:39–8:45smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises.
112. 8:46–8:49But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ,
113. 8:49–8:53therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire.
114. 8:55–8:59Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood.
115. 9:01–9:0626. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an
116. 9:06–9:11indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded by fire
117. 9:11–9:16is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference,
118. 9:16–9:22there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through
119. 9:22–9:26subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses
120. 9:26–9:32smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive
121. 9:32–9:40reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark,
122. 9:40–9:44the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through
123. 9:44–9:51generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand
124. 9:51–9:55perversion at the level of the universal in first fire from an individual smoke.
125. 9:56–10:00Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark.
126. 10:01–10:07Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire,
127. 10:07–10:12is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark and is the cause of inference.
128. 10:14–10:18Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is subsumptive reflection,
129. 10:18–10:25Another view. 28. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is cognition that the
130. 10:25–10:31probandom pervades the property of the subject. The probandom's pervadingness means not being
131. 10:31–10:35the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason,
132. 10:35–10:39and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom.
133. 10:40–10:45According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason,
134. 10:45–10:50separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandems pervadingness are not required.
135. 10:51–10:57In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandems pervadingness.
136. 10:59–11:04But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint
137. 11:04–11:09cognition of pervasion by the probandem, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something
138. 11:09–11:14pervaded by the probandem. Definition of pervadingness
139. 11:14–11:2029. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause
140. 11:20–11:25of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection. Since the collocation
141. 11:25–11:29of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred.
142. 11:30–11:35Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to
143. 11:35–11:40the collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject.
144. 11:40–11:46If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness.
145. 11:46–11:53In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence of the
146. 11:53–11:59probandom, it is not collocation with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific
147. 11:59–12:04collocation with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not
148. 12:04–12:08already been established in the subject, only the relation of pervasion is known.
149. 12:08–12:16A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable. When fire is not in contact with a sense organ,
150. 12:16–12:21subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the
151. 12:21–12:28regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. Rule concerning the subject as qualifficand.
152. 12:28–12:3430. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as
153. 12:34–12:39subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain,
154. 12:39–12:42cannot become the principal qualificant in the inferential cognition, there is fire on
155. 12:42–12:46the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is
156. 12:46–12:51not seen to become the principal qualificant in the resulting cognition.
157. 12:51–12:54It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal
158. 12:54–12:58qualificant in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the
159. 12:58–13:03qualificans of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ.
160. 13:03–13:08For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the man
161. 13:08–13:10is staff-bearing.
162. 13:10–13:15The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the substantive reflection fire pervades
163. 13:15–13:20smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference
164. 13:20–13:23the mountain is the qualificand.
165. 13:23–13:27There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the
166. 13:27–13:31qualificand of the resulting cognition.
167. 13:31–13:36subsumptive reflection concerning the reason's presence and the subject produces an inference in
168. 13:36–13:40which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificand.
169. 13:42–13:47Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of
170. 13:47–13:54inference. Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason
171. 13:54–13:57regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause.
172. 13:57–14:03Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of pervasion, but subsumptive reflection including
173. 14:03–14:08the reasons pervasion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause.
174. 14:08–14:13Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent
175. 14:13–14:14causality.
176. 14:14–14:19If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense
177. 14:19–14:23contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause.
178. 14:23–14:28The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition
179. 14:28–14:33of smoke but from the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
180. 14:33–14:38The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire
181. 14:38–14:42qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time
182. 14:42–14:46of substantive reflection is unnecessary.
183. 14:46–14:50The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and substantive
184. 14:50–14:52reflection its operation.
185. 14:52–15:00No separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause.
186. 15:00–15:08The proponent of the established conclusion replies that extraordinary causality belongs precisely to subsumptive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause.
187. 15:08–15:13The inferential mark is not the cause of inference.
188. 15:13–15:1832. The proponent of the established conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even
189. 15:18–15:23when past and future individual smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual
190. 15:23–15:29smoke itself is not the extraordinary cause of inference. The prior presence or operation
191. 15:29–15:35of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the
192. 15:35–15:40cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore
193. 15:40–15:46cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual
194. 15:46–15:49itself, are decisive.
195. 15:49–15:53Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark.
196. 15:53–15:5433.
197. 15:54–15:59The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of
198. 15:59–16:03past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason.
199. 16:03–16:08When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior
200. 16:08–16:14absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain
201. 16:14–16:20because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present
202. 16:20–16:25time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke is the reason incurs the defect of
203. 16:25–16:31a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke but substantive
204. 16:31–16:36reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular
205. 16:36–16:40Subsubtive-reflection in general is the cause of inference in general.
206. 16:40–16:46Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference.
207. 16:46–16:57Proposal, the validity of subsumptive-reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
208. 16:57–17:02reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
209. 17:02–17:10Reply, substantive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke.
210. 17:10–17:14Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause.
211. 17:14–17:19From the cognition of pervasion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the substantive
212. 17:19–17:24reflection smoke situated on the mountain as pervaded by fire arises, this substantive
213. 17:24–17:28reflection alone is the cause of inference.
214. 17:28–17:32Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its
215. 17:32–17:36operation.
216. 17:36–17:40Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it
217. 17:40–17:44has no separate operation, cognition of perversion is the extraordinary cause, and
218. 17:44–17:49subsumptive reflection is its operation.
219. 17:49–17:53But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises
220. 17:53–17:57as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter,
221. 17:57–18:01subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference.
222. 18:02–18:07The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an
223. 18:07–18:11effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection.
224. 18:13–18:17With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
225. 18:19–18:20Purely Affirmative Inference
226. 18:20–18:27Definition of purely affirmative inference.
227. 18:27–18:33Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative.
228. 18:33–18:38An inference in which the probandom has no counter-instance is purely affirmative.
229. 18:38–18:44Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable.
230. 18:44–18:48Nameability has no counter-instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a
231. 18:48–18:52the locus of the absence of nameability is impossible.
232. 18:52–18:55Objection to the definition.
233. 18:55–19:00Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether,
234. 19:00–19:03therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible.
235. 19:03–19:08Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property
236. 19:08–19:12would not remain purely affirmative.
237. 19:12–19:15Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable,
238. 19:15–19:24The probandom will be purely affirmative, and if unnamability is regarded as distinct from the unnamable, the probandom will be indeterminate.
239. 19:24–19:30Therefore this inference does not establish that namability is purely affirmative.
240. 19:30–19:36An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject.
241. 19:36–19:42Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative.
242. 19:42–19:44defect in the alternative definition.
243. 19:46–19:55It cannot be said that being the counter positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type.
244. 19:56–19:58Both are knowable in a generalized form.
245. 20:00–20:07Only the perversion of a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative.
246. 20:07–20:15Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative.
247. 20:16–20:20The absolute absence that destroys a quality is not purely affirmative.
248. 20:21–20:30For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere.
249. 20:30–20:36occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the
250. 20:36–20:42absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum
251. 20:42–20:47there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum,
252. 20:47–20:53the very locus of the quality no longer exists. Therefore the absolute absence destroying
253. 20:53–21:00equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative.
254. 21:02–21:09Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as
255. 21:09–21:14its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the
256. 21:14–21:21destruction of ether. Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive,
257. 21:21–21:25The absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property.
258. 21:25–21:31Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence.
259. 21:32–21:36With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end.
260. 21:38–21:41Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion.
261. 21:43–21:48Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated
262. 21:48–21:50absolute absence is purely affirmative.
263. 21:50–22:07The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative.
264. 22:07–22:19In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated absolute absences.
265. 22:19–22:23Knowability is purely affirmative.
266. 22:23–22:31Objection, knowability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized.
267. 22:31–22:44Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, object of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized.
268. 22:45–22:49A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual.
269. 22:50–22:57In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance.
270. 22:57–23:06At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted.
271. 23:06–23:11Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word.
272. 23:11–23:22Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

Plain text

Objection. How can a universal such as cowhood or sweetness serve as a reason in an inference of mutual difference, since cognitions, this is a cow and this is cowwood, are not separate? Reply, an individual cow delimited by cowwood through inheritance itself serves as the reason. The experienced cowwood is present in all individual cows and differs from non-cows, does not generate infinite regress. Therefore a universal or intermediate property can serve as a reason. With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause. 14. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form's smoke or light is pervaded by fire in cognition of subject propertyhood and the form's smoke or light is a property of the mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, Gaegia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Otherness from that is not the reason. 15. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such otherness from that is not a delimiter of pervasion because it creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood. 16. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire. Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smoke hood or light hood. appropriate property to limiting perversion by fire, smokehood or lighthood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual. Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference. Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognition's smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. Your perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualifical relation are decisive. Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception. It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitants it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire. Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, the cause of the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition smoke or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain cause subsumptive reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference. Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire. 19. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter of the smoke hood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes. But there is no evidence for this view. A general perversion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of perversion by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervasions, subsumptive reflection concerning general pervasion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and pervasion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition. Whether or not an effect arises, A substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself a... Even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified subsumptive reflection with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of perversion. Just as, concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends perversion with the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so subsumptive reflection concerning the mountain smokes perversion by fire is possible. is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination, substantive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent. 22. The view is unacceptable that the perversion of all individual smokes by fire is known through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of substantive reflection would become obscure. of the probandum fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex. Viridical perception of fire is impossible. 23. In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual through a mental impression, as in this is that very devdatta. But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, Therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone. is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and probandom. Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, pervasion by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of pervasion is impossible without direct awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together. Therefore the pervasion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection. Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualificand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualificand, and sense-contact are all causes of veritical qualified perception. In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the Smokofire provision and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The Smokofire provision is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire. Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood. 26. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression that same being pervaded by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, the role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand perversion at the level of the universal in first fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark. Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark and is the cause of inference. Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is subsumptive reflection, Another view. 28. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is cognition that the probandom pervades the property of the subject. The probandom's pervadingness means not being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandems pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandems pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex. It needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the probandem, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandem. Definition of pervadingness 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection. Since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred. Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the collocation of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject. If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness. In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, it is not collocation with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific collocation with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the subject, only the relation of pervasion is known. A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable. When fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. Rule concerning the subject as qualifficand. 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualificant in the inferential cognition, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the principal qualificant in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualificant in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificans of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man, produces the cognition, the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the substantive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand. There is no rule that the qualificand of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificand of the resulting cognition. subsumptive reflection concerning the reason's presence and the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificand. Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference. Only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference. The reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause. Objection, not mere subsumptive reflection of pervasion, but subsumptive reflection including the reasons pervasion, is the cause, therefore the reason too becomes a cause. Reply, the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection, but it has no independent causality. If every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause, every qualifier known through sense contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke but from the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke and causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of substantive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and substantive reflection its operation. No separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause. The proponent of the established conclusion replies that extraordinary causality belongs precisely to subsumptive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause. The inferential mark is not the cause of inference. 32. The proponent of the established conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even when past and future individual smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual smoke itself is not the extraordinary cause of inference. The prior presence or operation of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. Therefore cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of pervasion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark. 33. The proposal cannot be accepted but the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke is the reason incurs the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke but substantive reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular Subsubtive-reflection in general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference. Proposal, the validity of subsumptive-reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. Reply, substantive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause. From the cognition of pervasion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the substantive reflection smoke situated on the mountain as pervaded by fire arises, this substantive reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation, cognition of perversion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of perversion arises as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter, subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference. The hypothetical reasoning, if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion, it is not an operation of subsumptive reflection. With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Purely Affirmative Inference Definition of purely affirmative inference. Inferences of three kinds, purely affirmative, purely negative, and affirmative negative. An inference in which the probandom has no counter-instance is purely affirmative. Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable. Nameability has no counter-instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a the locus of the absence of nameability is impossible. Objection to the definition. Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible. Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative. Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, The probandom will be purely affirmative, and if unnamability is regarded as distinct from the unnamable, the probandom will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that namability is purely affirmative. An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative. defect in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the perversion of a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter positive of their own absolute absence, are not purely affirmative. The absolute absence that destroys a quality is not purely affirmative. For, it should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer exists. Therefore the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative. Nor is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether. Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, The absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it the absence of an absence. With this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. Hence the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated absolute absences. Knowability is purely affirmative. Objection, knowability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized. Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, object of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized. A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual. In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance. At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted. Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word. Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

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