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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:06नाटक आप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन
0:06–0:12Intrinsic apprehension of cognitive validity may be understood in three ways,
0:12–0:15being apprehensible by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions,
0:15–0:19being apprehensible by the means that apprehends every substrate of validity,
0:19–0:23or being apprehensible by a produced cognition that is not produced by another produced cognition
0:23–0:28taking the same validity as its object. Extrinsic apprehension of validity means
0:28–0:32being apprehensible without the stated aggregate. Under this definition,
0:32–0:36even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost,
0:36–0:40because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that
0:40–0:46takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may
0:46–0:51also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a
0:51–0:55body is valid because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and
0:55–1:00feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes
1:00–1:04another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with
1:04–1:07with respect to a body.
1:07–1:14Refutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body
1:14–1:16This answer also refutes the following objection.
1:16–1:20In the inference that this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect
1:20–1:24to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an
1:24–1:28indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring
1:28–1:29exclusion.
1:29–1:33Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body
1:33–1:38cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such
1:38–1:44a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body.
1:44–1:47If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is
1:47–1:52the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate
1:52–1:55of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes
1:55–2:00a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct
2:00–2:05from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason.
2:05–2:10If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified
2:10–2:14reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid
2:14–2:18of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object
2:18–2:22bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar.
2:22–2:26Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object
2:26–2:31avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood,
2:31–2:36and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available.
2:36–2:41Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes bodyhood its mode and a substrate
2:41–2:46of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with
2:46–2:51hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood
2:51–2:55delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being
2:55–2:58body cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an
2:58–3:04objective void of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood.
3:04–3:09This reason establishes the validity of cognition.
3:09–3:14Refutation of the Prabhācāra Objection of Infinite Regress
3:14–3:18The Prabhākāra or Guru Party may say, a cognition whose validity has already been
3:18–3:21determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity
3:21–3:25of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress.
3:25–3:30can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity,
3:30–3:34for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore
3:34–3:38let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of
3:38–3:42another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine
3:42–3:46its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through
3:46–3:50another cognition in order to determine its object.
3:50–3:54The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore
3:54–3:59its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected
3:59–4:03that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine
4:03–4:08the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object
4:08–4:13arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of
4:13–4:17an object clear as an amelaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity
4:17–4:21arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the
4:21–4:25object produces unwavering activity.
4:25–4:28But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to
4:28–4:32doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a
4:32–4:36person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition
4:36–4:39dependent upon a determination of validity.
4:39–4:43Therefore inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been
4:43–4:46apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the
4:46–4:50defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent.
4:50–4:54If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its
4:54–4:57validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity.
4:57–5:02Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the
5:02–5:04validity of the object cognition.
5:04–5:09Avoidance of infinite regress
5:09–5:12There is no infinite regress in this way.
5:12–5:16Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of
5:16–5:19the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not
5:19–5:23remembered, or because some distinct object has already been obtained.
5:23–5:27On the contrary, infinite regressorizes in the bar view, because cognition's validity
5:27–5:31is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition.
5:31–5:35In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in
5:35–5:39the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot
5:39–5:42be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate.
5:42–5:46It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another
5:46–5:50and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress.
5:50–5:56Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the
5:56–6:00first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established,
6:00–6:05and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about
6:05–6:09the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity
6:09–6:12has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains.
6:12–6:18Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition,
6:18–6:23the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress.
6:23–6:25But this view is not correct.
6:25–6:29If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because
6:29–6:33the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty
6:33–6:37about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about
6:37–6:39the object alone.
6:39–6:43It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object
6:43–6:46of cognition, causes activity.
6:46–6:50If it is asked how doubt about the first cognition's validity again raises doubt about an object
6:50–6:54already determined, one should consult experience.
6:54–6:57Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognition's validity or invalidity
6:57–6:59causes doubt about the object.
6:59–7:03The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about
7:03–7:07validity and produces doubt concerning the object.
7:07–7:14Misaka objection and Naoyaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference.
7:14–7:18Some Misaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and
7:18–7:22perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is
7:22–7:27an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished.
7:27–7:30The Naoyaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require
7:30–7:34cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all
7:34–7:37inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason
7:37–7:42and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound,
7:42–7:46because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason,
7:46–7:50and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise,
7:50–7:53since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative.
7:54–7:58The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about
7:58–8:02invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object.
8:03–8:07When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the
8:07–8:12object. Some Naya Yikas say that even the Memsaka admits that doubt about invalidity
8:12–8:17sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition,
8:17–8:21whose validity has been established, but a sacrifice... It may be objected that in
8:21–8:25unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the
8:25–8:29validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference
8:29–8:34determining its validity? Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice
8:34–8:39is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second,
8:39–8:44distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity
8:44–8:49has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object,
8:49–8:54produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not
8:54–8:58useless, by preventing doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity.
8:58–9:06Nayayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not.
9:08–9:12Some Nayayakas, including the Kasperti, say that the validity of an inference free from any
9:12–9:17suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate.
9:18–9:21This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object
9:21–9:26possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity.
9:26–9:32Because of perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference.
9:32–9:37Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded,
9:37–9:41and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity.
9:41–9:49In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity.
9:49–9:55Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises.
9:55–10:01In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition
10:01–10:07of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it is cloth.
10:07–10:11Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first
10:11–10:17cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition.
10:17–10:21Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my
10:21–10:27body, extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated
10:27–10:32reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is
10:32–10:40determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited
10:40–10:44by a mode that is the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand,
10:44–10:49cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically
10:49–10:55through another means. Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in
10:55–11:00body cognition in the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone,
11:00–11:06free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination
11:06–11:11of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity.
11:11–11:15The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence
11:15–11:21of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward
11:21–11:26water with the greatest speed and immediacy, the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly
11:26–11:32known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section
11:32–11:39of the tat the sintma composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya. The theory of the production
11:39–11:49of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the
11:49–11:53first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced
11:53–11:59intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid
11:59–12:03cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become
12:03–12:10valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If
12:10–12:13it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a
12:13–12:17defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a
12:17–12:24specifically valid cognition, would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate.
12:25–12:32Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate.
12:34–12:39A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent,
12:39–12:44the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the same cognitive aggregate were present,
12:44–12:48cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise.
12:48–12:54Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity,
12:54–12:59is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates
12:59–13:04of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists
13:04–13:09apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in
13:09–13:13in producing a specific effect would disappear.
13:13–13:19The Memsaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly
13:19–13:23The Memsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of
13:23–13:27the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as
13:27–13:32two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other.
13:32–13:36It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent,
13:36–13:40a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent
13:40–13:45effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot
13:45–13:50be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects,
13:50–13:54is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue pot hood and pot cognition hood.
13:56–14:01The author of the Kusumunjali may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive
14:01–14:06cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition,
14:06–14:10it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound.
14:11–14:15Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by
14:15–14:20the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and
14:20–14:25contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that
14:25–14:29does not produce cognition in general, the probandom is again contradicted,
14:29–14:33and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition.
14:33–14:39Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either.
14:39–14:46If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one
14:46–14:51cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established.
14:51–14:56Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of
14:56–15:01cognition in general be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established
15:01–15:07and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid
15:07–15:13cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific
15:13–15:19cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between
15:19–15:26their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a
15:26–15:31cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject,
15:31–15:36the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established,
15:36–15:40and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes
15:40–15:50unestablished. Refutation of other inferences. Nor is the following probandom admissible,
15:50–15:55valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect
15:55–15:59different from the causality delimited by effecthood delimited by cognitionhood.
16:00–16:05Cognitionhood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effecthood.
16:07–16:11Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends
16:11–16:17on a cause delimits effecthood, cognitionhood is such a property. The qualifier, unproduced,
16:17–16:21is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as
16:21–16:23space and does not depend on a cause.
16:23–16:28Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting
16:28–16:33effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause,
16:33–16:35cognition hood is not such a property.
16:35–16:39If the probandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities,
16:39–16:43the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established,
16:43–16:47since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces
16:47–16:50cognition of its own type.
16:50–16:54This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which
16:54–16:59is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it
16:59–17:03is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood.
17:03–17:07Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit
17:07–17:09effect hood.
17:09–17:13The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition
17:13–17:17hood of non-eternal entities delimits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood
17:17–17:20and similar properties.
17:20–17:25It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect arising
17:25–17:30from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition.
17:30–17:32This is unsound.
17:32–17:36Jaundice and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object,
17:36–17:41therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition.
17:41–17:45If a pot is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition.
17:45–17:49The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning
17:49–17:53a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between
17:53–17:56individual causes.
17:56–18:00Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view
18:00–18:04It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is delimited
18:04–18:08by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous
18:08–18:10to invalid cognition.
18:10–18:14If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood
18:14–18:18is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition.
18:18–18:21But this inference suffers from proving what is already established.
18:22–18:25Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property
18:25–18:29absent from invalid cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that
18:29–18:34contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties.
18:35–18:38The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition
18:38–18:41generates identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless.
18:41–18:47It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking
18:47–18:52either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid.
18:53–18:57Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception,
18:57–19:02because, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition.
19:03–19:06But these inferences too prove what is already established.
19:07–19:10The uncommon, individual sense-object contact producing valid cognition
19:10–19:14does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory
19:14–19:17perception.
19:17–19:22This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary
19:22–19:28cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition.
19:28–19:32When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the
19:32–19:37person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of
19:37–19:42a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects
19:42–19:47such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition.
19:47–19:52But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer
19:52–19:57of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving
19:57–19:59what is already established recurs.
19:59–20:04Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited
20:04–20:09by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition.
20:09–20:13Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such
20:13–20:15as valid perceptions.
20:15–20:20Causes such as sense-object contact do not form a recurrent class.
20:20–20:23Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal
20:23–20:25of causeness.
20:25–20:29Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the
20:29–20:33The property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing
20:33–20:37only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar.
20:37–20:40Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity
20:40–20:44in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Sri Gangesopad Haya.

Plain text

नाटक आप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन अप्रहेंचिन Intrinsic apprehension of cognitive validity may be understood in three ways, being apprehensible by the aggregate that apprehends first cognitions, being apprehensible by the means that apprehends every substrate of validity, or being apprehensible by a produced cognition that is not produced by another produced cognition taking the same validity as its object. Extrinsic apprehension of validity means being apprehensible without the stated aggregate. Under this definition, even if validity is apprehended by the mind, its extrinsic apprehension is not lost, because validity is apprehended by another cognition produced from a cognition that takes the cognition of validity as its object. After a purely negative inference, validity may also be inferred through an affirmative inference of the same kind. Example, this cognition of a body is valid because it is cognition of a body with respect to a substrate possessing hands and feet, like cognition of one's own body. The reason is not deviant in cognition that takes another bearer of hands and feet as its object, because that too is valid cognition with with respect to a body. Refutation of objections to the reason in the inference concerning cognition of a body This answer also refutes the following objection. In the inference that this body cognition is valid because it is body cognition with respect to a substrate of hands and feet, being the substrate of hands and feet cannot be an indicative mark of the reason, because there is no available indicated item requiring exclusion. Nor can it qualify the reason, body cognition, through objecthood, because being body cognition making the status of a substrate of hands and feet its mode is deviant. Such a property is not familiar even in the example consisting in the cognition, this is a body. If being the substrate of hands and feet is treated as a qualifier of the body that is the object of cognition, the reason being body cognition that takes as object a substrate of hands and feet will be deviant, because an illusion of a body also in fact takes a substrate of hands and feet as its object. Nor can the qualifier, while being distinct from cognition as a body in an object devoid of hands and feet be attached to the reason. If the locative phrase in an object devoid of hands and feet means objecthood, the qualified reason will mean being body cognition distinct from body cognition taking an object devoid of hands and feet as its object, but because body cognition regularly takes as its object bodyhood devoid of hands and feet, the reason would become unfamiliar. Nor will the qualifier not functioning as body cognition with respect to an object avoid of hands and feet, work, in the instrumental construction to the meaning would be objecthood, and the same defect of unfamiliarity would recur. No other suitable qualifier is available. Answer, the reason is, being body cognition that makes bodyhood its mode and a substrate of hands and feet it's qualifcant. In an illusion of a body, the body furnished with hands and feet itself becomes the mode, so the reason is not deviant. And if objecthood delimits both modehood and qualificandhood, the reason will be stated thus, being body cognition free from being cognition that makes its mode of bodyhood residing in an objective void of hands, feet, and the like, while lacking the counter-positiveness of objecthood. This reason establishes the validity of cognition. Refutation of the Prabhācāra Objection of Infinite Regress The Prabhākāra or Guru Party may say, a cognition whose validity has already been determined by another cognition cannot be of the nature that determines the validity of another cognition, for otherwise there would be infinite regress. can a cognition whose validity is now being determined determine another cognition's validity, for then its validity would have to be intrinsically determined from its causal aggregate. Therefore let only a cognition whose validity has not been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition. Then an initial cognition of unapprehended validity can determine its object, what need is there to determine the validity of that first cognition through another cognition in order to determine its object. The Nayaika replies that a first cognition is sometimes observed to be invalid, therefore its object cannot always be determined merely from its causal aggregate. It may be objected that the first inference of validity 2 is sometimes found invalid, how then can it determine the validity of the first cognition? Answer, we do not say that certainty of the object arises only from determining the validity of the first cognition. In cognition of an object clear as an amelaka fruit placed on the palm, when no doubt about invalidity arises, the first cognition alone determines the object, and that certainty of the object produces unwavering activity. But in an unhabituated state, when doubt about a cognition's invalidity gives rise to doubt about the object and removes certainty concerning it, everyone experiences that a person does not act unwaveringly until the object has been determined by a cognition dependent upon a determination of validity. Therefore inferential and other cognitions whose own validity has not previously been apprehended determine the validity of another cognition, because in them the defect consisting in doubt about invalidity is absent. If doubt about invalidity also arises in the cognition of validity, determination of its validity determines the validity of that cognition of validity. Thus, so long as validity is doubted, determination of the object occurs through determining the validity of the object cognition. Avoidance of infinite regress There is no infinite regress in this way. Doubt about validity is not inevitable, because no cognition of the validity of the final cognition is present, because the second alternative of doubt is not remembered, or because some distinct object has already been obtained. On the contrary, infinite regressorizes in the bar view, because cognition's validity is apprehended through an inference concerning that cognition. In the Guru MMA with Macron essay with Macron view too, validity is included neither in the nature of cognition nor cognition in the nature of validity, therefore it cannot be apprehended from cognition's own causal aggregate. It must consequently be apprehended through an inference by elimination or another and the validity of that means must again be apprehended through another means, producing regress. Some scholars say that activity is possible merely from determining the validity of the first cognition, the validity of that determination need not in turn be established, and so there is no infinite regress. They also say that it is not improper for doubt about the object to arise because the validity of the first cognition is doubtful, but once validity has been established, no doubt about the validity of the first cognition remains. Otherwise, even after validity had been intrinsically apprehended from the causal aggregate of cognition, the experienced doubt about validity would generate infinite regress. But this view is not correct. If doubt about the first cognition's validity does not produce doubt about the object because the object is already certain, determination of validity becomes useless for certainty about the object, unwavering activity would be possible from the initial certainty about the object alone. It has never been said that validity determination by itself, apart from doubt about the object of cognition, causes activity. If it is asked how doubt about the first cognition's validity again raises doubt about an object already determined, one should consult experience. Experience itself establishes that doubt about a cognition's validity or invalidity causes doubt about the object. The state of being an object of cognition itself assumes the form of doubt about validity and produces doubt concerning the object. Misaka objection and Naoyaka reply concerning the validity of the members of inference. Some Misaka's object that if the validity of cognitions of the reason, subject, and perversion belonging to an inference is again determined by other cognitions, there is an infinite regress, but if their validity is not determined, the reason is unestablished. The Naoyaka may say that cognitions of the reason and the rest do not require cognition of their own validity in order to determine their objects, otherwise all inference would disappear, since every school regards determinations of the reason and the rest as intrinsically dependent on their own causes. But this answer is not sound, because doubt about the validity of cognition of the reason produces doubt about the reason, and when cognition of the reason is absent, doubt about validity cannot arise, since there is no occasion for the opposing alternative. The Nayaika replies that, in the absence of the blemish consisting in doubt about invalidity, cognition of the reason and the other members by itself determines the object. When that blemish is present, the stated means, inference, causes certainty about the object. Some Naya Yikas say that even the Memsaka admits that doubt about invalidity sometimes arises in a first cognition and sometimes does not. The first cognition, whose validity has been established, but a sacrifice... It may be objected that in unwavering activity toward a sacrifice requiring great wealth and labour, determination of the validity of the first sacrificial cognition is fruitless, why then pursue an inference determining its validity? Answer, once the validity of the first cognition, sacrifice is a means to heaven, has been established, no doubt about invalidity arises in a second, distinct cognition having the same sacrifice as its object. Consequently, although its validity has not been separately apprehended, that second cognition, a certainty concerning its object, produces unwavering activity. Thus determination of the validity of the first cognition is not useless, by preventing doubt about invalidity it assists unwavering activity. Nayayaka conclusion, inference is intrinsically valid, but habituated reflexive awareness is not. Some Nayayakas, including the Kasperti, say that the validity of an inference free from any suspicion of error concerning invalidity is intrinsically determined from its own causal aggregate. This means that reflexive awareness determines inference as cognition of fire in an object possessing smoke, and being such a cognition of fire is invariably connected with validity. Because of perception of a distinguishing feature, no doubt about invalidity arises in inference. Thus, because the validity of inference is intrinsically determined, doubt about invalidity is excluded, and certainty about the object alone produces unwavering activity. In fact, if validity is held to be extrinsically apprehended, determination of validity itself is not a cause of activity. Reflex of awareness is invariably related to validity, so no doubt about its validity arises. In the absence of cognition no one experiences, I know a pot, and when there is a first cognition of a pot, no reflex of awareness arises in the form, I know it is cloth. Even in illusion, reflex of awareness states silverness and the like as modes of the first cognition, and in fact silverness is indeed a mode of that first cognition. Some say that, at the time of a habituated reflex of awareness such as this is my body, extremely effective unwavering activity is observed, therefore the validity of habituated reflexive awareness is intrinsically determined, whereas in an unhabituated state validity is determined extrinsically. This view is unsound. Cognitive validity, namely, not being delimited by a mode that is the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand, cannot be intrinsically determined, its determination must occur extrinsically through another means. Because reflexive awareness apprehends the specification consisting in body cognition in the substrate of hands, feet, and the like, the first cognition alone, free from doubt about invalidity, immediately produces activity. Therefore determination of the validity of the first cognition is not directly a cause of activity. The immediate presence of the conditions for inferring validity depends on the presence of the first cognition's own causal aggregate. A thirsty person does not always act toward water with the greatest speed and immediacy, the water's capacity to quench thirst is directly known. Thus ends the theory of apprehension and the theory of validity in the perception section of the tat the sintma composed by the illustrious Gangesopadhyaya. The theory of the production of validity. The Neayaka view, validity is produced extrinsically. The validity of the first cognition is produced extrinsically by another cause, it is not produced intrinsically by the causal aggregate of cognition alone. Otherwise an invalid cognition too, being produced by a cognitive causal aggregate, would become valid. And if that does not follow, a valid cognition too could not be valid. If it is said that invalid cognition arises through the intrusion of a defect into the cognitive aggregate, then an invalid cognition too, like a specifically valid cognition, would be a special kind of valid cognition merely because it is produced by a cognitive aggregate. Therefore the distinguishing causes of valid and invalid cognition must respectively be a merit and a defect residing in the cognitive aggregate. A further objection, when neither valid nor invalid cognition arises because merit and defect are absent, the cognitive causal aggregate itself must be absent, for if one and the same cognitive aggregate were present, cognition in general devoid of validity and invalidity should arise. Answer, cognition in general, as a generic effect devoid of the specifications validity and invalidity, is no separate effect. The general aggregate for cognition includes within itself the aggregates of the specific cognitions, valid and invalid. No general cognitive causal aggregate exists apart from the aggregate of a specific cognition. Otherwise the need for a specific cause in in producing a specific effect would disappear. The Memsaka Objection to the Inference of the Author of the Kusumun Jelly The Memsaka objects that valid and invalid cognitions, though produced by aggregates of the same kind, may differ from one another and possess contrary properties, just as two pots or twin children produced by aggregates of the same kind differ from each other. It should not be said that, because recurrent usage shows validity to be recurrent, a recurrent cause must be accepted for valid cognition in general, since a recurrent effect cannot arise from non-recurrent causes. Validity is an extrinsic condition, so it cannot be established as the delimiter of effect hood. Being a property residing only in effects, is likewise deviant in such specific properties as blue pot hood and pot cognition hood. The author of the Kusumunjali may say, valid cognition is produced by a special cognitive cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. But this inference is unsound. Valid cognition is included in cognition in general, and must therefore be produced by the cause of cognition in general, thus the probandom is absent from the subject and contradiction results. If it is held that valid cognition is produced by a cause that does not produce cognition in general, the probandom is again contradicted, and such a property is not established in the example in valid cognition. Since the probandom contains a pointless qualifier, exclusion is not established either. If valid cognition is inferred to be produced by a cause distinct from the cause of some one cognition or from the causes of all cognitions, the defect is proving what is already established. Nor can valid cognition is produced by an aggregate distinct from the aggregate of cognition in general be the probandom, as before, both proving what is already established and contradiction arise. It should not be said that general valid cognition and specific valid cognition have two distinct aggregates, otherwise general valid cognition would differ from specific cognition. Difference between two causal aggregates cannot be established without difference between their effects. This refutation also rejects the view that specific cognition is produced by a cause distinct from the cause of cognition in general. If all cognitions are made the subject, the sense faculties and other causes make the inference prove what is already established, and if cognition in general is the property bearer of the probandom, the reason becomes unestablished. Refutation of other inferences. Nor is the following probandom admissible, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose causality has as its counter positive an effect different from the causality delimited by effecthood delimited by cognitionhood. Cognitionhood also resides in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit produced effecthood. Objection, the rule is that a property whose existence in an unproduced substrate depends on a cause delimits effecthood, cognitionhood is such a property. The qualifier, unproduced, is not pointless, because existence in general also resides in eternal entities such as space and does not depend on a cause. Answer, for the sake of parsimony, only that property should be regarded as delimiting effect hood whose own nature, as related to an unproduced substrate, depends upon a cause, cognition hood is not such a property. If the probandom is restricted to the validity of cognition concerning non-eternal entities, the sense faculties and the like may be inference prove what is already established, since each sense faculty is not an individual cause of cognition in general but produces cognition of its own type. This also refutes the parallel inference, validity delimits an effect hood from which is delimited a causality different from another causality, because, like in validity, it is a property directly pervaded by cognition hood. Validity is also a property residing in eternal entities and therefore cannot delimit effect hood. The reason being a property residing only in effects in the inference cognition hood of non-eternal entities delimits effect hood is deviant in blue pothood and similar properties. It may again be said, valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is a produced effect arising from a cause distinct from the cause of both valid and invalid cognition, like invalid cognition. This is unsound. Jaundice and similar defects are causes of a valid cognition concerning their own object, therefore the probandom is unfamiliar in the example, invalid cognition. If a pot is made the example, the reason is deviant through invalid cognition. The inference also proves what is already established, because valid cognition concerning a non-eternal entity is an effect produced from cognition of the difference between individual causes. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey view It may be said, valid cognition is produced by a cause whose effect hood is delimited by a property upset from invalid cognition, because, like a pot, it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition. If valid cognition were not produced by a cause whose counter-positive effect hood is determined as not collocated with invalidity, it would become invalid cognition. But this inference suffers from proving what is already established. Sense object contact itself possesses effect hood delimited by a property absent from invalid cognition, and the sense faculties and the like are causes having that contact as their counter positive, valid cognition is produced by those very sense faculties. The claim that being produced by the same individual cause as invalid cognition generates identity with invalid cognition is likewise meaningless. It may again be said, a non-eternal cognition is produced from absence of an inhibitor blocking either validity or invalidity, because, like invalid cognition, it is either valid or invalid. Or, a valid perception is produced by a cause that does not produce a lucary perception, because, like valid gustatory cognition produced by the tongue, it is a non-eternal valid cognition. But these inferences too prove what is already established. The uncommon, individual sense-object contact producing valid cognition does not inhibit invalid cognition, and that very contact also does not produce illusory perception. This also refutes the view, valid cognition is produced by a cause that inhibits its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a non-eternal cognition. When a person at a distance is mistaken for a post, repeated sense contact with the person's limbs after coming nearer is experienced both to inhibit the contrary cognition of a post and to produce valid cognition of a person, an invalid cognition, bodily defects such as jaundice and error concerning the inferential reason produce invalid cognition. But the specific sense contact generating valid cognition is itself both the producer of valid cognition and the inhibitor of invalid cognition, hence the defect of proving what is already established recurs. Consequently, no additional property in the form of an effect to a delimited by the causality of another cognition is established in valid cognition. Nor is there a distinct universal property equally residing in all valid cognitions such as valid perceptions. Causes such as sense-object contact do not form a recurrent class. Merit and defect cannot cause valid and invalid cognition merely by possessing the universal of causeness. Merithood, as the property of producing valid cognition and defecthood, as the The property of producing invalid cognition are over-pervasive, and a property producing only valid or only invalid cognition is unfamiliar. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of production within the theory of validity in the perception section of the tatvasant mai composed by Sri Gangesopad Haya.

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