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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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1. 0:02–0:07Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum,
2. 0:07–0:11but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory.
3. 0:11–0:18Under this definition, a reason such as no ability in Earth is different from the other eight substances
4. 0:18–0:21because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory,
5. 0:21–0:25although no ability is not pervaded by the absence of difference.
6. 0:25–0:33Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances.
7. 0:33–0:39In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect.
8. 0:39–0:45A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the
9. 0:45–0:50probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory.
10. 0:50–0:54Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
11. 0:54–0:5633.
12. 0:56–1:00Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence
13. 1:00–1:03of the probandom is not contradiction.
14. 1:03–1:07Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom unless
15. 1:07–1:13co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known.
16. 1:13–1:17Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus
17. 1:17–1:22of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless
18. 1:22–1:27qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom.
19. 1:27–1:32Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom
20. 1:32–1:36and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum.
21. 1:37–1:42To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the pervasion of that absence by the reason
22. 1:42–1:46would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent.
23. 1:48–1:51With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends.
24. 1:53–1:56The established doctrine of the contradictory reason
25. 1:56–2:01The established doctrine is now stated.
26. 2:01–2:09Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom.
27. 2:09–2:19It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known.
28. 2:19–2:28The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of the reason's absence and of the counter positive of the probandom's absence are mutually distinct.
29. 2:28–2:38Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear.
30. 2:38–2:41Alternative definitions
31. 2:41–2:4835. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing
32. 2:48–2:53a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom,
33. 2:53–2:57not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while
34. 2:57–3:02occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence
35. 3:02–3:06while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject.
36. 3:06–3:10These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood.
37. 3:10–3:15It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons.
38. 3:15–3:20In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established,
39. 3:20–3:25the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established.
40. 3:25–3:31A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason,
41. 3:31–3:36because the uncommon reason too is fallacious and the forms just stated.
42. 3:36–3:41from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition.
43. 3:41–3:4636. An objection may be raised. Cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance
44. 3:46–3:51possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating
45. 3:51–3:54occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without
46. 3:54–3:59cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom.
47. 3:59–4:04This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed
48. 4:04–4:07with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence
49. 4:07–4:12in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the
50. 4:12–4:16reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence
51. 4:16–4:20in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established
52. 4:20–4:24by this cognition alone.
53. 4:24–4:27Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes
54. 4:27–4:32cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition
55. 4:32–4:38of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation
56. 4:38–4:43in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion.
57. 4:43–4:46Three types of contradictory reason.
58. 4:46–4:5137. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference
59. 4:51–4:55for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition
60. 4:55–4:58of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation
61. 4:58–5:01among the word meanings.
62. 5:01–5:04This argument is not sound.
63. 5:04–5:09Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction,
64. 5:09–5:13therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect.
65. 5:13–5:18Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason.
66. 5:18–5:21The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds.
67. 5:21–5:25First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
68. 5:25–5:30Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom.
69. 5:30–5:34third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom.
70. 5:35–5:40Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended,
71. 5:40–5:43because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir.
72. 5:45–5:52Justification of the three-fold division of contradictory reasons. 38, it should not
73. 5:52–5:57be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandom
74. 5:57–6:02is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason
75. 6:02–6:07is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum, a reason pervaded by the absence
76. 6:07–6:11of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces the defective
77. 6:11–6:17contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region
78. 6:17–6:21because of the absence of smoke, yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason.
79. 6:22–6:26Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes
80. 6:26–6:32perversion by the probandom, such perversion is possible even without the absence of mutual absence.
81. 6:33–6:38Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke,
82. 6:38–6:43or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive
83. 6:43–6:50reason. In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three
84. 6:50–6:55kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, direct cognition
85. 6:55–7:00of the absence of what pervades the probandom and direct cognition of something opposed to what
86. 7:00–7:07pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses
87. 7:07–7:11fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke.
88. 7:13–7:17All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers.
89. 7:17–7:21For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black
90. 7:21–7:28aloe because it possesses sharp odorless white smoke. With this, the established doctrine
91. 7:28–7:35of the contradictory reason ends. Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter reason.
92. 7:35–7:4039, a reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter reason
93. 7:40–7:45of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason because reason
94. 7:45–7:50and counter reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its
95. 7:50–7:56absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their respective
96. 7:56–8:01occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is
97. 8:01–8:06no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance.
98. 8:06–8:13Recutation of Alternative Definitions. Prevasion and subject propertyhood in two reasons of
99. 8:13–8:19equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually
100. 8:19–8:24imposed, such strength must fail in one of them.
101. 8:24–8:28Nearly knowing the counter-reason is endowed with perversion and subject-propertyhood does
102. 8:28–8:32not make the original reason counterbalanced.
103. 8:32–8:36Cognitions of perversion and subject-propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot
104. 8:36–8:41both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject-propertyhood cannot be superimposed
105. 8:41–8:45on a reason such as audibility.
106. 8:45–8:49Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandum is present
107. 8:49–8:55in the subject, or that pervasion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject.
108. 8:55–9:00A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be
109. 9:00–9:04simultaneously present in the same locus.
110. 9:04–9:07Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by
111. 9:07–9:11the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum
112. 9:11–9:14is established.
113. 9:14–9:19can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandum
114. 9:19–9:25and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandum be called counterbalanced.
115. 9:25–9:30Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction
116. 9:30–9:35cannot consist in the presence or absence of pervasion by the probandum.
117. 9:35–9:40With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter reason ends.
118. 9:40–9:44The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason
119. 9:44–9:5241. The Established Doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the substantive reflection
120. 9:52–9:56capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence
121. 9:56–10:01of an equally strong counter-reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom
122. 10:01–10:05is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
123. 10:05–10:09Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through
124. 10:09–10:13Through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes
125. 10:13–10:15its absence.
126. 10:15–10:20Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning
127. 10:20–10:24the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection
128. 10:24–10:28belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is
129. 10:28–10:32counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
130. 10:32–10:34An objection may be raised.
131. 10:34–10:37In the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing
132. 10:37–10:43subject, propertyhood and perversion, and the opponent has not denied either. Yet the counter-reason
133. 10:43–10:47subject, propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason
134. 10:47–10:53is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance would be a defect only in inference for oneself.
135. 10:53–10:59This argument is not sound. When reason and counter-reason are both known continuously
136. 10:59–11:04as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter-reasons. When
137. 11:04–11:09When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one self
138. 11:09–11:15and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present.
139. 11:15–11:20Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary.
140. 11:20–11:2542, since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence, either
141. 11:25–11:29perversion or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence
142. 11:29–11:32constitutes the defective counterbalance.
143. 11:32–11:37It should not be said that the reasons perversion by the absence of the probandum can be certain
144. 11:37–11:41even if there is no opposition between the probandum and its absence, and therefore the
145. 11:41–11:45rule requiring absence of perversion is unnecessary.
146. 11:45–11:52If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandum.
147. 11:52–11:56Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion is necessary in the opposition
148. 11:56–12:00between probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence of perversion arises
149. 12:00–12:06after cognition of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the
150. 12:06–12:14absence of pervasion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation
151. 12:14–12:18of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness.
152. 12:18–12:2443. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded
153. 12:24–12:28by the pro-bandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject. They can occur
154. 12:28–12:33in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain,
155. 12:33–12:37doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of
156. 12:37–12:44pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning
157. 12:44–12:48their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons in one
158. 12:48–12:53subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct
159. 12:53–12:56from the other fallacious reasons.
160. 12:56–13:02Only the substantive reflection on the counter-reason causes the defect of counterbalance, by obstructing
161. 13:02–13:07the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, it prevents certainty
162. 13:07–13:10concerning the reason in the subject.
163. 13:10–13:14Absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because
164. 13:14–13:20even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter-reason is present.
165. 13:20–13:25The subsumptive reflection on the counter-reason produces the defective counterbalance through
166. 13:25–13:29cognition of the absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood.
167. 13:29–13:34Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause,
168. 13:34–13:38even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is
169. 13:38–13:39greater.
170. 13:39–13:43Objection, all inferences would be stopped.
171. 13:43–13:4844, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counterthesis each
172. 13:48–13:53obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented
173. 13:53–13:58by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing
174. 13:58–14:03the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength,
175. 14:03–14:07the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis
176. 14:07–14:11is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated.
177. 14:11–14:16This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence
178. 14:16–14:20of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its
179. 14:20–14:25complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis.
180. 14:25–14:28Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference
181. 14:28–14:32either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original
182. 14:32–14:36inference would become pointless.
183. 14:36–14:39Refutation of the objection.
184. 14:39–14:43No, this objection is not sound.
185. 14:43–14:49The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason.
186. 14:49–14:53It has already been stated that pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength
187. 14:53–14:56of a reason.
188. 14:56–15:00A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence
189. 15:00–15:01of the pro-bandom.
190. 15:01–15:06A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements.
191. 15:06–15:09Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should
192. 15:09–15:12always be stopped.
193. 15:12–15:16of doubt is not the seed of the defect.
194. 15:16–15:21Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom
195. 15:21–15:25and its absence are uncommon reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom
196. 15:25–15:30is the cause of the defective counterbalance.
197. 15:30–15:32This view is not sound.
198. 15:32–15:37A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately, if the two are
199. 15:37–15:43treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance.
200. 15:43–15:48Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced
201. 15:48–15:52out, the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning
202. 15:52–15:57the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance.
203. 15:57–16:03This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom
204. 16:03–16:09are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously.
205. 16:09–16:15Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors.
206. 16:15–16:1647.
207. 16:16–16:21The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences
208. 16:21–16:25of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt.
209. 16:25–16:30The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced doubt,
210. 16:30–16:34hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced doubt concerning the
211. 16:34–16:40probandum. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt.
212. 16:40–16:43Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of
213. 16:43–16:47the probandum is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time
214. 16:47–16:50cognition of the absence of the probandum arises, the complete causal
215. 16:50–16:53complex for inference concerning the probandum would have to be regarded as
216. 16:53–17:01destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the
217. 17:01–17:07absence of the probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum. But two counterbalanced
218. 17:07–17:12reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum
219. 17:12–17:18must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition
220. 17:18–17:23of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is,
221. 17:23–17:27inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence
222. 17:27–17:32of the probandom is not itself the obstruction.
223. 17:32–17:36It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons
224. 17:36–17:41establishing the probandom and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom.
225. 17:41–17:45The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the
226. 17:45–17:51probandom, although neither reason separately produces doubt.
227. 17:51–17:55Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view
228. 17:55–18:01this view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of probandom are mutually
229. 18:01–18:06opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence
230. 18:06–18:11of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence
231. 18:11–18:15of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently, cognition of
232. 18:15–18:19the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes
233. 18:19–18:24cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded
234. 18:24–18:28as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition.
235. 18:28–18:30Definitions of the fallacious reasons
236. 18:30–18:3849. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating
237. 18:38–18:43or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative
238. 18:43–18:49concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result.
239. 18:49–18:54A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom.
240. 18:54–18:59Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition
241. 18:59–19:02of the absence of the probandom.
242. 19:02–19:07In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of
243. 19:07–19:11knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason
244. 19:11–19:12itself.
245. 19:12–19:17In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture
246. 19:17–19:22of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect.
247. 19:22–19:27In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result
248. 19:27–19:31distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is
249. 19:31–19:33the result.
250. 19:33–19:38In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial
251. 19:38–19:42of its subject propertyhood, is the result.
252. 19:42–19:45The result of a counterbalanced reason.
253. 19:45–19:5150. Encounterbalance as with audibility and produce-ness, neither absence of perversion
254. 19:51–19:55nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reasons
255. 19:55–20:00perversion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is
256. 20:00–20:06not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning
257. 20:06–20:12the probandom the result, because reason and counter-reason are not separately applied.
258. 20:12–20:14This result is nearly the inquiry.
259. 20:14–20:17How is the reality to be ascertained?
260. 20:17–20:22Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason and the subject,
261. 20:22–20:27which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom, constitute
262. 20:27–20:30the characteristic of counterbalance.
263. 20:30–20:34When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom,
264. 20:34–20:39no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only
265. 20:39–20:43the reason's perversion by the probandum is ascertained.
266. 20:43–20:46The prakharasama produces inquiry.
267. 20:46–20:4851.
268. 20:48–20:50An objection may be raised.
269. 20:50–20:53Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like.
270. 20:53–20:58This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning
271. 20:58–20:59the probandum.
272. 20:59–21:03How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing the absence
273. 21:03–21:07of the probandum without doubt concerning the probandum?
274. 21:07–21:10This argument is not sound.
275. 21:10–21:15In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises,
276. 21:15–21:18it arises only when a counter-reason is present.
277. 21:18–21:24Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counterbalance produces inquiry.
278. 21:24–21:29This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason, in deviation, doubt concerning
279. 21:29–21:34the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom, whereas in counterbalance
280. 21:34–21:38only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises.
281. 21:38–21:43The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously.
282. 21:43–21:48Objection, subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time.
283. 21:48–21:52How, then, can one reason obstruct the other?
284. 21:52–21:57Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist.
285. 21:57–22:02Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection
286. 22:02–22:07on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases.
287. 22:07–22:10Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject
288. 22:10–22:16arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood.
289. 22:16–22:20It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging
290. 22:20–22:24to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections
291. 22:24–22:27can arise.
292. 22:27–22:31Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods
293. 22:31–22:34is impossible.
294. 22:34–22:37Prokharasama is not admissible.
295. 22:37–22:4253. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of
296. 22:42–22:47two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible.
297. 22:47–22:53For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance.
298. 22:53–22:58This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter-reason,
299. 22:58–23:02are impossible without recollection of both pervasions.
300. 23:02–23:05Proponent and opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

Plain text

Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum, but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory. Under this definition, a reason such as no ability in Earth is different from the other eight substances because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory, although no ability is not pervaded by the absence of difference. Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances. In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect. A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory. Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. 33. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom unless co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known. Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandum. To cognize the absence of the probandum, cognition of the pervasion of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent. With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends. The established doctrine of the contradictory reason The established doctrine is now stated. Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known. The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of the reason's absence and of the counter positive of the probandom's absence are mutually distinct. Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear. Alternative definitions 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established, the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious and the forms just stated. from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition. 36. An objection may be raised. Cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom. This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion. Three types of contradictory reason. 37. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect. Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason. The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom. third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the three-fold division of contradictory reasons. 38, it should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandom is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum, a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence of smoke, yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason. Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes perversion by the probandom, such perversion is possible even without the absence of mutual absence. Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive reason. In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the probandom and direct cognition of something opposed to what pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe because it possesses sharp odorless white smoke. With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends. Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter reason. 39, a reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason because reason and counter reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Recutation of Alternative Definitions. Prevasion and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually imposed, such strength must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter-reason is endowed with perversion and subject-propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced. Cognitions of perversion and subject-propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject-propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandum is present in the subject, or that pervasion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject. A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum is established. can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection pervaded by the absence of the probandum and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandum be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of pervasion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter-Reason 41. The Established Doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the substantive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence of an equally strong counter-reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through Through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence. Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. An objection may be raised. In the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and perversion, and the opponent has not denied either. Yet the counter-reason subject, propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance would be a defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and counter-reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter-reasons. When When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one self and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary. 42, since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence, either perversion or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defective counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons perversion by the absence of the probandum can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandum and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence of perversion is unnecessary. If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandum. Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion is necessary in the opposition between probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence of perversion arises after cognition of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of pervasion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness. 43. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by the pro-bandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject. They can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons in one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons. Only the substantive reflection on the counter-reason causes the defect of counterbalance, by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject. Absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter-reason is present. The subsumptive reflection on the counter-reason produces the defective counterbalance through cognition of the absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood. Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater. Objection, all inferences would be stopped. 44, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counterthesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponent's counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis. Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless. Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason. A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence of the pro-bandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped. of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defective counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately, if the two are treated as a single reason bearing a con joint qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance. This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously. Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors. 47. The authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt. The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced doubt, hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced doubt concerning the probandum. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandum is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the probandum arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandum would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum. But two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the probandom is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandom and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the probandom, although neither reason separately produces doubt. Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view this view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition. Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result. A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom. Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect. In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood, is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason. 50. Encounterbalance as with audibility and produce-ness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reasons perversion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter-reason are not separately applied. This result is nearly the inquiry. How is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason and the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom, constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's perversion by the probandum is ascertained. The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised. Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandum. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing the absence of the probandum without doubt concerning the probandum? This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter-reason is present. Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counterbalance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason, in deviation, doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom, whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises. The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously. Objection, subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time. How, then, can one reason obstruct the other? Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist. Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases. Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood. It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections can arise. Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible. 53. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible. For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance. This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter-reason, are impossible without recollection of both pervasions. Proponent and opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

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