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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.963717)

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1. 0:04–0:13Section 4. The doctrine that the self is not known, proof of the self's unreality and its refutation.
2. 0:13–0:18Let there be no self, because the self is not known.
3. 0:18–0:19No.
4. 0:19–0:29Total non-cognition of the self is itself doubtful, and failure to be known by a particular person applies even to knowable things.
5. 0:29–0:37Can this defect in the proof be removed by adding the qualification not known despite being knowable?
6. 0:37–0:38No.
7. 0:38–0:46The Buddhist and the materialist as well, does not accept the self as knowable or perceptible at all.
8. 0:46–0:50If he did, the dispute would end.
9. 0:50–0:58But Nya, Vaika philosophers regard the self as knowable and perceptible, so how is the proof defective?
10. 0:58–1:06No. This is an independent inference of the Buddhist based on his own accepted view.
11. 1:06–1:19If the opponent suddenly changed his position and denied the perceptibility of the self, the inference would collapse because the reason would no longer be present in the subject.
12. 1:19–1:33Again, if the opponent accepted the self as perceptible yet also admitted that it is not perceived, the reason might somehow remain present in the subject, but this is impossible.
13. 1:33–1:39Perceptibility is a property that entails perception of the perceptible object.
14. 1:39–1:53This is the essence of the refutation. Its fuller development may be worked out by following the method used earlier in refuting arguments such as an unreal object is indestructible.
15. 1:53–1:57Proof of the reality of the self and its defense.
16. 1:57–2:01But what is the proof of the self's existence?
17. 2:01–2:03Certainly Perception.
18. 2:03–2:10The awareness I exist is the direct experience of every living being.
19. 2:10–2:22This awareness can be neither objectless nor doubtful in its object because it is not produced by words and is not sublated by any opposing cognition.
20. 2:22–2:26Nor is it produced by a reason in an inference.
21. 2:26–2:32Even a person who has no cognition of any reason possesses self-awareness.
22. 2:32–2:39Nor is it memory, what was never previously experienced cannot be remembered.
23. 2:39–2:47It is also improper to say that this is beginningless, objectless cognition produced by a beginningless tendency.
24. 2:47–2:54The same could be said about ordinary cognitions of blue, yellow and the like.
25. 2:54–3:02If self-awareness can be made unreliable by calling it the result of a beginningless tendency,
26. 3:02–3:08on what basis can cognition of blue, yellow, and the rest be trusted?
27. 3:08–3:10Conclusion of the Proof
28. 3:10–3:17For this reason, the pointless supposition that cognition arises from a supernatural beginningless
29. 3:17–3:24tendency must be abandoned, and some external cause or ground of self-cognition must
30. 3:24–3:31be admitted. This ground may be the statement of a trustworthy or untrustworthy person,
31. 3:31–3:39a valid or invalid reason, or veridical or illusory perception. Since the first and second
32. 3:39–3:45grounds do not apply to cognitions of blue and the light, such cognition falls under
33. 3:45–3:53the third, so does self-cognition. If self-cognition arises after a non-conceptual cognition
34. 3:53–4:01of the Self, its perceptual object is real. If it arises from illusory perception, somewhere
35. 4:01–4:08beneath it there must be a veridical non-conceptual cognition, consequently, it will indirectly
36. 4:08–4:15poses a real object. Objection that the Self is unreal because it is not known by the
37. 4:15–4:22external senses and its refutation. The fact that the Self is not known by the external
38. 4:22–4:30senses does not make self-cognition groundless or objectless. If it did, cognition of intellect
39. 4:30–4:38or consciousness would also become groundless and objectless. If the self-awareness of consciousness
40. 4:38–4:44is the basis of its reality, then in the case of the self to the mental perception of
41. 4:44–4:52the self is proof. There is therefore no difference between the two cases. Refutation of the
42. 4:52–4:59the objection that the body may be the object of self-cognition. Can the body be the object
43. 4:59–5:08of self-cognition? No. If the body, senses, intellect, or their aggregate, without any
44. 5:08–5:15qualification were the object of self-cognition, any person's body, senses, and so forth could
45. 5:15–5:23become the object of anyone's self-cognition, anyone could regard any body as his own. If
46. 5:23–5:29it is said that self-cognition takes as its object only the body related to oneself, the
47. 5:29–5:37meaning of one's own must be clarified. For a thing to be one's own means not to be
48. 5:37–5:45different from oneself. Therefore, when a person knows his self, the cognition, I exist
49. 5:45–5:53arises because knower and known are identical. For this reason pots and the like, which can
50. 5:53–6:00never know themselves, cannot become the object of self-cognition. If this is so, then in
51. 6:00–6:06your Buddhist view to self-cognition will be merely a superimposition upon the body,
52. 6:06–6:11because the body is different from the experiencer.
53. 6:11–6:18of the objection that consciousness is the self. But is self-experience not vertical with
54. 6:18–6:26respect to consciousness? No. Consciousness is experienced as an activity, and the agent
55. 6:26–6:34of the activity is experienced as wholly distinct from it. Just as in the experience I cut,
56. 6:34–6:41So in the experience I know, the agent is experienced as the cause of the action.
57. 6:41–6:48Do blue, yellow, and the like appear as forms of cognition in cognitions of blue and yellow,
58. 6:48–6:54while selfhood appears in consciousness as its form and nature?
59. 6:54–7:01Then the status of the form of the known object and the form of cognition would be the same.
60. 7:01–7:06Just as blue is different from the cognition of blue, the self would be different from
61. 7:06–7:12self cognition, our purpose of establishing the difference between self and consciousness
62. 7:12–7:15would thus be fulfilled.
63. 7:15–7:20Should the preceding cognition that is the material cause of self cognition then be
64. 7:20–7:24regarded as appearing in the form of the self.
65. 7:24–7:30If cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like are causes of self cognition, then just
66. 7:30–7:37as these cognitions respectively make blue and yellow their forms, those forms too should
67. 7:37–7:45appear in self-cognition. A qualified object cannot appear unless its form appears. Should
68. 7:45–7:51a stream of activating cognitions, distinct from the stream of object cognitions, then
69. 7:51–7:57be the knowing self, serving as the material cause of self-cognition and called by us
70. 7:57–8:04store consciousness. Then accept the knower as a beginningless and endless self that
71. 8:04–8:11is the material cause of the activating cognitions. Yet whether this self is itself a stream of
72. 8:11–8:18cognitions or an entity distinct from that stream remains to be determined, this question
73. 8:18–8:26has already been sufficiently considered. Inferential proof of the self. But what inference
74. 8:26–8:30establishes the existence of the Self.
75. 8:30–8:33The answer is recognition.
76. 8:33–8:39Yet it has not been established that recognition of a permanent Self is veridical, if it is
77. 8:39–8:45false, it opposes the unity of the Self, and if mere ordinary recognition is taken
78. 8:45–8:51as the reason, the reason deviates because recognition of the unity of a burning flame
79. 8:51–8:53is false.
80. 8:53–9:00No, the objector has failed to understand the intended meaning of the reason.
81. 9:00–9:04Ordinary recognition is not intended here.
82. 9:04–9:07What then is intended?
83. 9:07–9:12An invariable successive relation between cause and effect.
84. 9:12–9:17No that too appears opposed to the unity of the self.
85. 9:17–9:20We do not say that either.
86. 9:20–9:26What is intended, then, is the determinate cognition that the earlier and later cognitions
87. 9:26–9:30were produced by one and the same agent.
88. 9:30–9:36Could this cognition not arise merely because the earlier cognition is the material cause
89. 9:36–9:38of the later cognition?
90. 9:38–9:44No, a philosophically coherent material cause relation of this kind between cognitions
91. 9:44–9:49is not admitted on the doctrine of permanence.
92. 9:49–9:55Even on the momentarist view, the mere fact that one cognition is similar in nature to
93. 9:55–10:00another and is produced from it does not constitute material causation.
94. 10:00–10:06Otherwise, the teacher's cognition and the pupil's cognition too would become connected
95. 10:06–10:10by a material-caused relation.
96. 10:10–10:13Objection to the proof and its answer.
97. 10:13–10:17Could ignorance of the difference among the objects of recognition be added to the
98. 10:17–10:24definition previously given, and that itself be taken as a new definition of the material
99. 10:24–10:32cause-effect relation, the difference between the teachers and pupils' cognitions is known.
100. 10:32–10:39No. In the present case there is no ignorance of the differences among the distinct cognitions,
101. 10:39–10:46therefore their unity is not recognized at all. But is there not in this case also
102. 10:46–10:53ignorance of the differences among the bodies from which the separate cognitions arise?
103. 10:53–11:00If so, a newborn infant has not even a faint awareness of its former body, therefore it
104. 11:00–11:05has neither knowledge nor ignorance of the difference between the present and former
105. 11:05–11:12bodies. Yet the present body is regarded as causally connected with the former body,
106. 11:12–11:19How could the infant remember the taste of its mother's milk on the basis of a previous experience?
107. 11:19–11:29Moreover, the pot and pot sherds would not stand in a cause-effect relation because they are always known as distinct objects.
108. 11:29–11:35Should causation then be based upon the co-occurrence of cause and effect?
109. 11:35–11:36No.
110. 11:36–11:47On the momentarist view real co-occurrence is impossible because cause and effect both being momentary cannot be present at the same time.
111. 11:47–11:54If imagined co-occurrence is admitted it would apply to non-coexistent things as well.
112. 11:54–11:59Body and Consciousness to appear to be present together.
113. 11:59–12:03refutation of another possible objection.
114. 12:03–12:10The foregoing objections refute both definitions of the two kinds of material-cause relation.
115. 12:10–12:15One definition is held to apply to the members of a continuous series,
116. 12:15–12:19the other to discontinuous transformation.
117. 12:19–12:26The first is defined as being the object of a non-illusory cognition of unity based upon similarity
118. 12:26–12:33among the related things, the second as standing in the relation of an original form and its
119. 12:33–12:36transformation.
120. 12:36–12:39Further development of the refutation.
121. 12:39–12:45Concerning the second kind of material causation, it may now be asked, how is it determined
122. 12:45–12:52that a piece of charcoal or ash is a transformation of the original wood?
123. 12:52–12:56Why can it not be a transformation of fire?
124. 12:56–13:03The answer may be that wood becomes charcoal only after coming into contact with fire.
125. 13:03–13:10But it is equally possible that charcoal is produced from fire conjoined with wood.
126. 13:10–13:16It may then be said that the material cause of an earth elemental thing must itself
127. 13:16–13:18be earth elemental.
128. 13:18–13:21But on what ground is this certain?
129. 13:21–13:27The answer is that causation is observed to be determined by similarity within a continuous
130. 13:27–13:30momentary series.
131. 13:30–13:33But how is that established?
132. 13:33–13:39It will be said that the successive members of a series are regarded as one because of
133. 13:39–13:42a veridical cognition of similarity.
134. 13:42–13:48What then is this similarity, generic unity or coexistence?
135. 13:48–13:53Both alternatives have already been shown incoherent.
136. 13:53–13:57Thus similarity mean belonging to the same series.
137. 13:57–14:03And if belonging to the same series means that one member of the series is produced
138. 14:03–14:09from another, the efficient cause and its effect will also be related in the same
139. 14:09–14:10way.
140. 14:10–14:16If generic unity itself is the material cause relation, how can material causation
141. 14:16–14:23be determined by itself, since generic unity is being identified with that very relation?
142. 14:23–14:29Is the recognition of unity among successive cognitions itself the nature of the material
143. 14:29–14:37cause relation? No, this view entails self dependence. Another definition of material
144. 14:37–14:44causation and its refutation. Can the capacity to be recognized as one and the same thing
145. 14:44–14:52defined material causation, then the nature of this capacity must first be understood.
146. 14:52–14:59Is it some special power of the cognitions? If so, it cannot be confined to one particular
147. 14:59–15:07individual and regarded as differing from individual to individual. If one individual is capable
148. 15:07–15:14of production, other similar individuals too must necessarily be capable of production.
149. 15:14–15:20otherwise, even the productivity of a particular moment or momentary individual could not be
150. 15:20–15:27determined because the precise identification of the productive moment or momentary individual
151. 15:27–15:29is not easy.
152. 15:29–15:34All worldly practice would consequently come to a standstill, since there would be no
153. 15:34–15:39knowledge of what is beneficial or harmful.
154. 15:39–15:45The distinctive effect natures of causes would also disappear and no relation of invariable
155. 15:45–15:50concomitance between any two things could be established.
156. 15:50–15:57Nor is this capacity invariably connected with any determinate stream of cognitions,
157. 15:57–16:02no property is available that distinguishes the teacher's stream of cognitions from the
158. 16:02–16:05pupil's stream.
159. 16:05–16:11to the final statement and its refutation. Can cognitions within a particular stream
160. 16:11–16:20poses a distinctive property absent from other streams? No, no such property is known. We
161. 16:20–16:26perceive no generic difference whatsoever between the streams of cognition of teacher
162. 16:26–16:33and pupil. Could a difference exist while remaining invisible, so that the foregoing
163. 16:33–16:41reason is not sublated. No, a property residing in a visible thing cannot itself be invisible.
164. 16:41–16:47If this were admitted, familiar smoke could be regarded as possessing some invisible
165. 16:47–16:55property such as ghosthood. Then every smoke would not be an effect of fire, only some
166. 16:55–17:02particular smoke would be regarded as produced by fire, just as on the Buddhist view only
167. 17:02–17:09Only one particular momentary cognition is produced by another particular momentary cognition.
168. 17:09–17:15Under such conditions, cognition of fire in general would not arise from cognition of smoke
169. 17:15–17:17in general.
170. 17:17–17:24Can it be said that only the first smoke in a stream of smoke is an effect of fire?
171. 17:24–17:28No, even concerning that first smoke.
172. 17:28–17:35may arise whether it was produced from fire or from some invisible cause. Therefore, if
173. 17:35–17:42causes are established as generically different, corresponding generic differences must be
174. 17:42–17:49admitted in their effects even if those effects appear externally alike, because generic difference
175. 17:49–17:56among causes determines generic difference among effects. Otherwise, generic difference
176. 17:56–18:04among effects would be accidental. And if causes are generically alike but effects differ, the
177. 18:04–18:10difference among the effects establishes a generic difference among the auxiliary causes.
178. 18:10–18:18This is the rational explanation of the entire matter. If it is not accepted, the reality
179. 18:18–18:25of an afterlife cannot be established either. The stream of cognition constituting a person's
180. 18:25–18:32present life might suddenly cease without producing another stream constituting a future life.
181. 18:32–18:39Furthermore, a special kind of cognition could arise from an unconscious cause, and a special
182. 18:39–18:45kind of unconscious thing could arise from cognition, if the cause-effect relation were
183. 18:45–18:48not governed by the rule stated above.
184. 18:48–18:55Indeed, although all smoke is directly perceived as belonging to one class, one might still
185. 18:55–19:02still raise the doubt that some smoke is produced not by fire but by a ghost.
186. 19:02–19:06Another explanation of recognition and its refutation.
187. 19:06–19:14Let it then be admitted that recognition is determined by some particular auxiliary cause.
188. 19:14–19:19Very well, we call this alleged special cause the agent.
189. 19:19–19:26It may be asked, however, on what special ground this agent is regarded as one entity rather
190. 19:26–19:29than a stream of auxiliary causes.
191. 19:29–19:36The answer would be that an object produced by one agent falls outside the class of objects
192. 19:36–19:43produced by many agents, whereas a stream of momentary causes does not.
193. 19:43–19:48If it is said that the stream has some distinctive feature separating it from objects
194. 19:48–19:55produced by many agents, we must examine what precisely that feature is.
195. 19:55–20:02Only four alternatives are possible. It is the nature of an individually efficacious cognition.
196. 20:02–20:09It resembles the generic nature of an individually efficacious cognition. It depends upon some
197. 20:09–20:16particular cause for its own arising or it depends upon a stream of causes. The first
198. 20:16–20:24Alternative is impossible because a stream is not identical with any single momentary individual.
199. 20:24–20:31The second overextends because a generic property such as Cognitionhood occurs in the cognitions
200. 20:31–20:34of distinct individuals as well.
201. 20:34–20:40The fourth is indeterminate because a causal stream is equally present in the cognitions
202. 20:40–20:42of different individuals.
203. 20:42–20:52Therefore, once the other alternatives are eliminated, only the third must be accepted dependence upon a particular cause.
204. 20:52–20:59Further development and defense of a new objection to the first explanation of recognition.
205. 20:59–21:09Alternatively, even if a cause-effect relation exists, that relation alone does not determine recognition.
206. 21:09–21:19To make this clear, we ask, does the omniscient Buddha recognize his cognitions as produced by one and the same agent or not?
207. 21:19–21:29If he does, that very fact establishes both the unity of the agent of recognition and its difference from the cognitions.
208. 21:29–21:33Everyone knows that cognitions are unstable.
209. 21:33–21:40Yet even the Omniscient One cannot know the agent of recognition as momentary, because
210. 21:40–21:47he first experiences and then teaches to become an instructor and guide of seekers, he must
211. 21:47–21:51endure beyond a single moment.
212. 21:51–21:57If the Omniscient One does not recognize his cognitions as having one cause, it is clear
213. 21:57–22:02that mere causal relation does not determine recognition.
214. 22:02–22:08If one thing does not arise in the presence of another, the first cannot be called the
215. 22:08–22:10cause of the second.
216. 22:10–22:17Can it be said that the Omniscient One certainly has such recognition, but it is not veridical
217. 22:17–22:22and therefore cannot establish one agent of the cognitions?
218. 22:22–22:28Then does even the Omniscient One become deluded and have false recognition?
219. 22:28–22:34It may be said that this is a deliberately made false superimposition and is therefore
220. 22:34–22:36harmless.
221. 22:36–22:43But since the causal relation among cognitions is the same for the omniscient one and ordinary
222. 22:43–22:49people, how can the omniscient one's recognition be unknowingly false imposition while that
223. 22:49–22:51of others is not?
224. 22:51–22:57Is recognition different because the omniscient one apprehends the differences among the
225. 22:57–23:04cognitions while ordinary people do not. No ordinary people to understand the differences
226. 23:04–23:11among object cognitions. Do ordinary people know only the differences among objects and
227. 23:11–23:18not among cognitions? No they to understand cognitions as distinct.
228. 23:18–23:24Repetition of cognitions is known even when the differences among their objects are not
229. 23:24–23:32clear. If, despite knowledge of difference, identity in the form of cognition is superimposed
230. 23:32–23:38upon the cognitions, then, because they are earth elemental, recognition of unity should
231. 23:38–23:47also occur between a tree and a stump, a stump and charcoal, and charcoal and ash.
232. 23:47–23:52Consideration and refutation of the objection that recognition arises from ignorance of
233. 23:52–23:59store consciousness. Let the explanation then be that ignorance of the several store consciousnesses
234. 23:59–24:07causes recognition. No. On this view store consciousness would either be wholly different
235. 24:07–24:13from the object directed cognitions associated with eye consciousness or it would be some
236. 24:13–24:19accidental eye consciousness included within the stream of object directed cognition.
237. 24:19–24:23The first alternative is impossible.
238. 24:23–24:29To distinct streams of eye consciousness, one object directed and the other self directed
239. 24:29–24:32are never experienced.
240. 24:32–24:39Even if such two streams were admitted, there would be no causal relation between them,
241. 24:39–24:45consequently, no relation would exist between the objects of the two recognitions either.
242. 24:45–24:52That is, the I recognized in the object directed form would be different from the I recognized
243. 24:52–24:55in the self directed form.
244. 24:55–25:01If, despite the absence of causal relation, the objects of both recognize, can it be
245. 25:01–25:07said that only store consciousness and not object directed cognition is the material
246. 25:07–25:14cause, so the defect of one entity residing in many substrates does not arise?
247. 25:14–25:15No.
248. 25:15–25:21If so, object directed cognition could not even be the efficient cause of another object
249. 25:21–25:27directed cognition, because in the Buddhist view efficient causation is invariably connected
250. 25:27–25:34with material causation, whatever is the material cause of one thing is also the efficient
251. 25:34–25:36cause of something else.
252. 25:36–25:43If this rule is not accepted, some member of a stream may remain merely an efficient
253. 25:43–25:49cause without being the material cause of the next member, consequently, the stream would
254. 25:49–25:56terminate at that fruitless member. All cognitions are alike insofar as they are cognitions,
255. 25:56–26:04therefore, if one is fruitless, similar cognitions in other streams will also be fruitless.
256. 26:04–26:11If this consequence is accepted, the final member of every stream, being fruitless,
257. 26:11–26:17will be regarded as unreal, and if the final member is unreal, its predecessor too will
258. 26:17–26:24be fruitless and unreal. In this way the entire stream becomes unreal.
259. 26:24–26:32What a marvelous device for establishing causation as the basis of recognition. If, in order
260. 26:32–26:38to preserve the efficient casualty of store consciousness, it is held that store consciousness
261. 26:38–26:44is the material cause of a third cognition distinct from both object directed and self-directed
262. 26:44–26:52cognition, the cognitions of one stream, not being causally related to one another, cannot
263. 26:52–26:54become the objects of recognition.
264. 26:54–27:00Furthermore, each store consciousness would be regarded as the material cause of some
265. 27:00–27:07cognition outside its own stream, consequently, infinitely many new streams of cognition
266. 27:07–27:14would have to be admitted in the world. In summary, if object-directed cognition is not
267. 27:14–27:21the material cause of any cognition, it cannot be an efficient cause either and becomes wholly
268. 27:21–27:29fruitless. If it produces a cognition outside its own stream, an infinite regress follows,
269. 27:29–27:36and since there is no causal relation between store consciousness and these external cognitions,
270. 27:36–27:40They too cannot become objects of recognition.
271. 27:40–27:47If both kinds of cognition are regarded as material causes of object-directed cognition,
272. 27:47–27:53one entity must be admitted to reside in many substrates.
273. 27:53–27:56Refutation of the second alternative above.
274. 27:56–28:00The second alternative is also untenable.
275. 28:00–28:06If accepted, ignorance of difference concerning this second kind of cognition would
276. 28:06–28:13relate either to its own nature or to the nature of its object. If it relates to the cognition's
277. 28:13–28:19own nature, it will either be confined to the first eye consciousness alone or include the
278. 28:19–28:27object directed cognitions as well. The first alternative will not work. The sentence
279. 28:27–28:35is I myself knew before, I myself know now, and I myself shall know later express a person's
280. 28:35–28:41cognition of himself. And they relate to three different times, this would be impossible
281. 28:41–28:48without cognition of difference. If the temporal states of the self can somehow be known as
282. 28:48–28:54the object of eye-consciousness, the object of recognition should be that very self,
283. 28:54–29:01not the object directed cognitions. It has already been stated that there is no ignorance
284. 29:01–29:06of the differences among the object-directed cognitions.
285. 29:06–29:12Nor is there ignorance of difference concerning the object of this cognition.
286. 29:12–29:22If such ignorance is admitted, the object will be either a form of cognition, some other thing, or an unreal thing.
287. 29:22–29:27The first alternative has already been shown unacceptable.
288. 29:27–29:31The Buddhist himself does not accept the second.
289. 29:31–29:38And whoever accepts such an external thing will accept its multiplicity on the basis of the
290. 29:38–29:41co-appearance of opposed properties.
291. 29:41–29:49If such co-appearance does not occur, the object will not be regarded as many.
292. 29:49–29:53Refutation of the third among the foregoing alternatives.
293. 29:53–29:57The third alternative too is incoherent.
294. 29:57–30:03The real object of eye consciousness has already been established.
295. 30:03–30:09Even if eye consciousness were regarded as objectless, it would not help establish the
296. 30:09–30:13ignorance of difference required for recognition.
297. 30:13–30:20It has already been stated that false superimposition of identity or erroneous cognition requires
298. 30:20–30:27ignorance of one among six possible kinds of difference, but not one of them is available
299. 30:27–30:29in the present case.
300. 30:29–30:37The six kinds are real difference, unreal difference, difference whose reality is superimposed,
301. 30:37–30:45difference whose unreality is superimposed, non-coexistent difference and indefinable difference.
302. 30:45–30:53development of another proof of the unity of the agent. Alternatively, one may ask, on
303. 30:53–30:59your view, does a former experience produce its later memory, or does a latent impression
304. 30:59–31:06produced by the experience do so? If the impression does, is it invisible or directly
305. 31:06–31:14established? If invisible, is there one impression persisting until memory arises, or a stream
306. 31:14–31:22of momentary members. If directly established, is it the stream of cognition continuing after
307. 31:22–31:29the experience, something different from that stream, or a special feature of the stream?
308. 31:29–31:35Concerning this special feature, one must again ask whether it is merely the property of
309. 31:35–31:40being produced from the experience, or the property of being generically different from
310. 31:40–31:49the stream of the experiencer. Of these alternatives, the first is incoherent because an unborn thing
311. 31:49–31:57and a wholly destroyed thing are equally inactive. An experience wholly destroyed as soon as it
312. 31:57–32:04arises cannot produce a memory much later. Apart from the stream of cognition following
313. 32:04–32:11the experience, no directly observable effect of the experience appears, the admission of
314. 32:11–32:19a separate entity is contradicted by its non-apprehension. Nor can the proposed special feature be merely
315. 32:19–32:27the property of being produced from the experience. It is not the case that only seed deliberately
316. 32:27–32:33be sown by a labourer in a field germinates while seed accidentally dropped there does
317. 32:33–32:40not. Similarly, either an experience of yellow or an experience of blue could produce the
318. 32:40–32:47stream of cognition normally held to arise from experience of blue. There would then
319. 32:47–32:55be no specificity among causes. Consequently, what was not experienced could be remembered
320. 32:55–32:59and what was experienced might not be remembered.
321. 32:59–33:03Objection to the foregoing and its refutation.
322. 33:03–33:10Can it be held that, just as seed produced from rice again produces only rice seed,
323. 33:10–33:17so a cognition of blue produced from cognition of yellow may generate memory of the yellow object,
324. 33:17–33:23and in this manner causation between cognition and memory remains regulated?
325. 33:23–33:24No.
326. 33:24–33:31For example, if off to Pigeons, one blue-grey and the other white, the blue-grey one is
327. 33:31–33:38regularly fed milk and the white one blackberry juice, thereof spring may respectively become
328. 33:38–33:40white and blue-grey.
329. 33:40–33:46Thus the mere fact of being produced from something does not determine the nature
330. 33:46–33:48of what follows.
331. 33:48–33:54Analogies from other things may be found for the view that a stream of cognition
332. 33:54–34:00continuing after an experience of blue can poses a feature distinguishing it from a
333. 34:00–34:07stream lacking blue cognition. The fruit of an emblic tree watered with milk later becomes
334. 34:07–34:14sweet, cotton seed irrigated with lac-dye abandons its whiteness, acquires a red color, and
335. 34:14–34:23transmits that color to the flower. But cognition and memory are not like this. Crystal, though
336. 34:23–34:29Though placed near a hibiscus or another flower, does not acquire its color and retains its
337. 34:29–34:37whiteness, similarly, cognition, though affected by its object, remains merely cognition.
338. 34:37–34:43If the Buddhist says that all object forms are present in cognition, some clear and
339. 34:43–34:49some indistinct, then despite blind faith in his own school's doctrine opposing the
340. 34:49–34:58coexistence of contradictory properties, he has lost all fear of accepting that very coexistence.
341. 34:58–35:06One entity cannot be simultaneously clear and unclear. I see no meaning in calling indistinct
342. 35:06–35:10that which is self-luminous by its very nature.
343. 35:10–35:17Refutation of the final alternative above. Even if cognition is regarded as formless,
344. 35:17–35:22It is certainly clear with respect to all its objects.
345. 35:22–35:29Things with respect to which cognition is not clear are not its objects at all.
346. 35:29–35:36If indistinct things to are regarded as objects of cognition, the distinction between object
347. 35:36–35:39and non-object becomes indeterminate.
348. 35:39–35:46The coexistence of clarity and indistinctness can be admitted only in a composite thing.
349. 35:46–35:49This has already been examined.
350. 35:49–35:55Therefore, only the final alternative remains, an invisible latent impression produced by
351. 35:55–35:59experience produces memory.
352. 35:59–36:02But this impression cannot be a stream.
353. 36:02–36:10If it were a stream, its effect, memory, would arise within that very stream of impressions,
354. 36:10–36:14because memory would be related to that stream alone.
355. 36:14–36:21The self included within the stream of activating cognitions would then not acquire memory or
356. 36:21–36:25recognition through the awakening of the impression.
357. 36:25–36:31If the impression and its effect resided in different substrates, one person could remember
358. 36:31–36:34another person's experience.
359. 36:34–36:40If it is said that the impression produces memory in a stream having the same material
360. 36:40–36:46cause as its own material cause and that the stream of object directed cognition including
361. 36:46–36:53the self is of this kind, a stream of impressions produced by cognition of a yellow object would
362. 36:53–36:57also produce memory of a blue object.
363. 36:57–37:04Therefore, however unwelcome it may seem, one must accept that an impression produces
364. 37:04–37:12memory only in its own material cause, there is no other solution. Thus, because memory
365. 37:12–37:18of an experience occurs at a time different from that experience, the persistence of the
366. 37:18–37:26impression and of its material cause is established by itself and cannot be denied.
367. 37:26–37:31Objection to the foregoing view and its refutation, nor can the Buddhist view admit
368. 37:31–37:39a permanent and invisible impression. If such an impression is cognitive in nature, it cannot
369. 37:39–37:48be invisible because Buddhists regard all cognition as self-luminous. If it is different from cognition,
370. 37:48–37:55cognition cannot be its material cause. If the impression is regarded as a distinct stream
371. 37:55–38:02of invisible cognition, memory, pleasure, pain, and the like would also be included within
372. 38:02–38:09that stream and become invisible. Therefore, memory of the kind described above certainly
373. 38:09–38:17arises from some cause if it were costless, its arising would be unregulated. Yet being
374. 38:17–38:24caused is incompatible with arising from many causes. Therefore, from the absence
375. 38:24–38:30of being caused in a thing having many causes, the concomitance is established that being
376. 38:30–38:38caused accompanies arising from one cause. Under this account, a positive example of
377. 38:38–38:45the two terms of the concomitance is also found in the movement of a dancer's eyebrow.
378. 38:45–38:49Recognition of the eyebrow movement or of the aggregate of a tom's constituting
379. 38:49–38:58the eyebrow as the same is not based upon ignorance. But this recognition must be qualified as
380. 38:58–39:06follows, no property opposed to the object's nature occurs in it. Without this qualification,
381. 39:06–39:11the reason would deviate in a recognition such as the child whom you saw before is the
382. 39:11–39:18very person whom I see now, because recognition of personal unity here is not an unfailing
383. 39:18–39:26ground of real unity. Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its answer.
384. 39:26–39:32Does the qualification above not apply to the body because the body itself is conscious?
385. 39:32–39:40No. The body is not conscious because it is a body, has a determinate shape, is a material
386. 39:40–39:46entity, and possesses qualities such as color, smell, and taste.
387. 39:46–39:52Who can the arrangement or organization of the five great elements be conscious, because
388. 39:52–39:59this arrangement does not remain the same from day to day, if consciousness belonged to it,
389. 39:59–40:04an experience from one day would be forgotten the next.
390. 40:04–40:09Consciousness is not confined to separate limbs of the body either.
391. 40:09–40:16If it were, when a hand, foot, or other limb were cut off, the experience of that severed
392. 40:16–40:23limb could not be remembered. If the body itself were conscious, a newborn infant could not
393. 40:23–40:30make its first movement because no effort is possible in the absence of desire and a
394. 40:30–40:37version. Desire cannot arise until there is recognition that a certain object produces
395. 40:37–40:45a desired result. Such recognition cannot arise without memory of the invariable concomitance
396. 40:45–40:52between that object and its agreeable result, yet the infant has not experienced that relation in
397. 40:52–41:01this life. The body that experienced the concomitance belonged to a previous life, once that body had
398. 41:01–41:06become ashes, another body taking its place could not remember the previous experience.
399. 41:07–41:14But in this life the causal relation between experience and the initiation of action
400. 41:14–41:22is clearly established. Therefore, without experience no initiation of action would occur,
401. 41:22–41:29otherwise action would become unregulated. For the same reason, the senses too are not
402. 41:29–41:37conscious. We apprehend one and the same object through both seeing and touching. The mind
403. 41:37–41:452 is not conscious because it is inferred only as an instrument. Thus the foregoing concomitance
404. 41:45–41:54is established and the reality of a self that passes from one birth to another is also established.
405. 41:54–42:01This self is beginningless because it is itself devoid of desire while worriedly production
406. 42:01–42:08is understood to involve an agent possessing desire. It is also endless because a real
407. 42:08–42:15and beginningless entity is indestructible. The self is an eternal substance but has no
408. 42:15–42:22determinate shape. It is formless because it is motionless. It is motionless because it
409. 42:22–42:30is eternal, is available in our inward perception and is the substrate of perceptible qualities.
410. 42:30–42:34Reduction in support of the foregoing conclusion.
411. 42:34–42:39The following reductioes support the foregoing conclusion.
412. 42:39–42:46If the self had a beginning, its first initiation of action could never occur.
413. 42:46–42:53If it had an end, its existence could not persist despite being beginningless.
414. 42:53–42:57If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities.
415. 42:57–43:04If it were not all pervasive, fire, air, and the like would become motionless.
416. 43:04–43:11Motion cannot arise merely through the body's conjunction with fire, air, and the like.
417. 43:11–43:18Such motion occurs through the motion of some moving entity, but no such medium is available
418. 43:18–43:21in the present case.
419. 43:21–43:24Space conjoined with the body is itself motionless.
420. 43:24–43:28Therefore its conjunction cannot set anything in motion.
421. 43:29–43:32If a motionless thing produced motion,
422. 43:32–43:34every kind of motion could arise.
423. 43:35–43:39If an eternal entity possessed determinate shape,
424. 43:39–43:43it could not be the substrate of qualities perceptible to us,
425. 43:43–43:48an eternal entity with determinate shape and specific qualities
426. 43:48–43:50would produce other objects as well.
427. 43:51–43:54If an eternal entity possessed motion,
428. 43:54–43:59it would possess determinate shape. This is the essence of
429. 43:59–44:06philosophical teaching on the matter. Some say that the self is atomic in dimension like
430. 44:06–44:11the mind, because it is the substrate of conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause
431. 44:11–44:18of cognition. An objection is that the scriptural statement, the self is subtler than the
432. 44:18–44:25The subtle opposes the all-pervasiveness of the self and contradicts the inference.
433. 44:25–44:29But this objection is not sustainable.
434. 44:29–44:35If the self were not all-pervasive, the mind could not be atomic in dimension.
435. 44:35–44:41The ordered succession of all activity is possible because conjunction between self
436. 44:41–44:45and mind occurs successively.
437. 44:45–44:51When the quoted Upaniadic statement is cited, its first portion, in which the self is said
438. 44:51–44:56to be greater than the great, has been omitted.
439. 44:56–45:01Objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its rejoinder.
440. 45:01–45:07Let the objection then be this, even though the self has been established as real, it should
441. 45:07–45:09still be abandoned.
442. 45:09–45:15A person who possesses awareness of selfhood becomes attached to what benefits him and
443. 45:15–45:20ours or hostile toward what harms him.
444. 45:20–45:25Attachment and aversion are the roots of bondage in sasra.
445. 45:25–45:32One who has no cognition of the self has no cognition of benefit or harm either, therefore
446. 45:32–45:38he will neither love nor hate anyone and will not be caught in sasra.
447. 45:38–45:46Thus, just as a forest dwelling expert in poisons is constantly intent upon removing poison,
448. 45:46–45:52the seeker of liberation should remain constantly engaged in establishing non-self.
449. 45:52–45:55No, this is not the correct view.
450. 45:55–46:02A person without awareness of the self cannot become a seeker of liberation at all.
451. 46:02–46:10In the absence of self-knowledge, no one will desire release from suffering or attainment of happiness.
452. 46:10–46:20The desire to obtain heavenly pleasure or liberation remains in a person only so long as he strives toward these goals.
453. 46:20–46:26When desire ceases, both effort and its result cease.
454. 46:26–46:31This view of non-self will only strengthen atheistic tendencies,
455. 46:31–46:41and those tendencies will produce innumerable destructive consequences filled with uncontrolled craving for objects of sensory pleasure.
456. 46:41–46:48Were this not so, how could one climb onto the roof of one's house and fearlessly proclaim,
457. 46:48–46:52as long as we live, let us enjoy pleasure?
458. 46:52–47:01As for the statement that a person loves, what benefits him and hates what harms him, it is certainly true.
459. 47:01–47:08One who regards liberation as beneficial will become attached to its causes, seek them out,
460. 47:08–47:18and obtain the desired result by hating or remaining indifferent to the causes that obstruct liberation, there is no other way.
461. 47:18–47:27One who regards enjoyment as beneficial will likewise remove obstacles and obtain enjoyment.
462. 47:27–47:31The delvated have mistaken their true benefit for harm.
463. 47:31–47:44Even in veterinary practice one does not observe anyone becoming fond of what he regards as harmful to himself or turning away from what he regards as beneficial.
464. 47:44–47:50A second objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its refutation.
465. 47:50–47:57But even apart from the foregoing, should the self not be abandoned like the senses and the rest,
466. 47:57–48:00because it is the basis of suffering?
467. 48:00–48:07Yes, in the form in which it is the basis of suffering, it should certainly be abandoned.
468. 48:07–48:12The self qualified by limiting agents produces suffering.
469. 48:12–48:18But why should the self not be abandoned even in its unqualified state?
470. 48:18–48:22No, that is neither possible nor fruitful.
471. 48:22–48:29Abandonment of the self cannot mean its destruction because the self is eternal.
472. 48:29–48:34Nor can it mean separation from it because it is all-pervasive.
473. 48:34–48:37Nor is non-apprehension of its abandonment.
474. 48:37–48:44The more one tries to avoid self-knowledge, the more awareness of the self increases.
475. 48:44–48:49Can one avoid self-awareness by remaining indifferent to it?
476. 48:49–48:57Surely we have remained indifferent to this matter for so long, yet self-awareness has not ceased.
477. 48:57–49:01Such an effort is also fruitless.
478. 49:01–49:06Abandonment of the qualified self is necessary for the destruction of suffering,
479. 49:06–49:11But for what result would the unqualified self be abandoned?
480. 49:11–49:15From fear that it might again become qualified?
481. 49:15–49:20No, there is no ground for such a fear.
482. 49:20–49:25Why then, contemplate the unqualified self continuously?
483. 49:25–49:30Because continuous meditation upon it brings liberation.
484. 49:30–49:34What is the nature of contemplation of the self?
485. 49:34–49:36Discriminative knowledge.
486. 49:36–49:38Discrimination from what?
487. 49:39–49:42From non-self entities such as the body.
488. 49:43–49:47Proof of discriminative knowledge of self and non-self.
489. 49:48–49:55Both inference and scripture prove that discriminative knowledge of self and non-self is necessary.
490. 49:56–50:04For one who mistakes the non-self for the self, the body becomes the beginning and end of existence.
491. 50:04–50:14Attached to the body, he intensely craves all the things of the world that provide bodily pleasure and hates unpleasant things.
492. 50:14–50:22But one who knows the self as an independent entity is not affected by this attachment and aversion.
493. 50:22–50:33A person who has abandoned all limitations has no attachment to offspring or wealth because they do not serve his true welfare.
494. 50:33–50:37Nothing can cut, dry, or burn the self.
495. 50:37–50:43It lies beyond the scope of scriptural injunction and prohibition.
496. 50:43–50:52Scriptural commands apply only when a person is limited by birth, caste, age, property, and sacraments.
497. 50:52–50:59Therefore, the false cognition that mistakes non-self for self is the cause of bondage in Satsara.
498. 50:59–51:03Right knowledge removes this false awareness.
499. 51:03–51:14That right knowledge arises successively through hearing scriptural statements, reflecting upon them, continuous meditation, and the like.
500. 51:14–51:21When the causes of attachment and aversion have been removed, their effects to are destroyed.
501. 51:21–51:28Accumulated merit and demerit are exhausted through the experience of their fruits.
502. 51:28–51:33This is the essence of the proof of the foregoing thesis.
503. 51:33–51:37Scriptural proof of the foregoing view.
504. 51:37–51:42The essence of scripture is contained in the Upaniadic statement cited above
505. 51:42–51:49and in other statements saying that neither good nor evil touches the December-died entity.
506. 51:49–51:56But is scripture not unreliable because statements concerning the unreality of the world are false,
507. 51:56–52:00distinct doctrines mutually contradict one another,
508. 52:00–52:04and repetitive passages contain needless duplication?
509. 52:04–52:06No.
510. 52:06–52:10Scriptural statements have different intentions.
511. 52:10–52:13Statements calling the world false intend
512. 52:13–52:19that the seeker of liberation know the self as transcending the world and its objects.
513. 52:19–52:22Statements of non-dual truth intend
514. 52:22–52:28Intend that knowledge of the independent self brings liberation.
515. 52:28–52:34Statements that appear repetitive intend to convey the difficulty of knowing the self.
516. 52:34–52:40Statements describing the self as beyond the mind intend the abandonment of all external
517. 52:40–52:42effort.
518. 52:42–52:49Statements calling the self bliss intend that the self alone is to be known.
519. 52:49–52:55calling primordial nature conscious, aim to teach the necessity of meditation for realization
520. 52:55–53:03of the self. Just as a forest dweller accustomed to dealing with venomous creatures strives
521. 53:03–53:09to restore consciousness to a person rendered unconscious by a snake bite, so the practitioner
522. 53:09–53:15of the self strives for the realization of self-consciousness. Statements supporting
523. 53:15–53:22skya theories of primordial nature and the light should be interpreted in the same manner.
524. 53:22–53:29If such an interpretation is not accepted, on what ground can it be said that Kapila
525. 53:29–53:36understands scripture better than Germany? And if both are learned in scripture, why
526. 53:36–53:40do their interpretations of it differ so greatly?
527. 53:40–53:44Proof of the authority of scripture
528. 53:44–53:47What proves the authority of scripture?
529. 53:47–53:51Its being the instruction of a trustworthy being.
530. 53:51–53:54Is this fact not unestablished?
531. 53:54–53:55No.
532. 53:55–54:01The reality of a trustworthy being who is the creator of the world is established by
533. 54:01–54:03inference.
534. 54:03–54:10The inference is, this world, whose production is disputed, has an agent, because it is
535. 54:10–54:10an effect.

Plain text

Section 4. The doctrine that the self is not known, proof of the self's unreality and its refutation. Let there be no self, because the self is not known. No. Total non-cognition of the self is itself doubtful, and failure to be known by a particular person applies even to knowable things. Can this defect in the proof be removed by adding the qualification not known despite being knowable? No. The Buddhist and the materialist as well, does not accept the self as knowable or perceptible at all. If he did, the dispute would end. But Nya, Vaika philosophers regard the self as knowable and perceptible, so how is the proof defective? No. This is an independent inference of the Buddhist based on his own accepted view. If the opponent suddenly changed his position and denied the perceptibility of the self, the inference would collapse because the reason would no longer be present in the subject. Again, if the opponent accepted the self as perceptible yet also admitted that it is not perceived, the reason might somehow remain present in the subject, but this is impossible. Perceptibility is a property that entails perception of the perceptible object. This is the essence of the refutation. Its fuller development may be worked out by following the method used earlier in refuting arguments such as an unreal object is indestructible. Proof of the reality of the self and its defense. But what is the proof of the self's existence? Certainly Perception. The awareness I exist is the direct experience of every living being. This awareness can be neither objectless nor doubtful in its object because it is not produced by words and is not sublated by any opposing cognition. Nor is it produced by a reason in an inference. Even a person who has no cognition of any reason possesses self-awareness. Nor is it memory, what was never previously experienced cannot be remembered. It is also improper to say that this is beginningless, objectless cognition produced by a beginningless tendency. The same could be said about ordinary cognitions of blue, yellow and the like. If self-awareness can be made unreliable by calling it the result of a beginningless tendency, on what basis can cognition of blue, yellow, and the rest be trusted? Conclusion of the Proof For this reason, the pointless supposition that cognition arises from a supernatural beginningless tendency must be abandoned, and some external cause or ground of self-cognition must be admitted. This ground may be the statement of a trustworthy or untrustworthy person, a valid or invalid reason, or veridical or illusory perception. Since the first and second grounds do not apply to cognitions of blue and the light, such cognition falls under the third, so does self-cognition. If self-cognition arises after a non-conceptual cognition of the Self, its perceptual object is real. If it arises from illusory perception, somewhere beneath it there must be a veridical non-conceptual cognition, consequently, it will indirectly poses a real object. Objection that the Self is unreal because it is not known by the external senses and its refutation. The fact that the Self is not known by the external senses does not make self-cognition groundless or objectless. If it did, cognition of intellect or consciousness would also become groundless and objectless. If the self-awareness of consciousness is the basis of its reality, then in the case of the self to the mental perception of the self is proof. There is therefore no difference between the two cases. Refutation of the the objection that the body may be the object of self-cognition. Can the body be the object of self-cognition? No. If the body, senses, intellect, or their aggregate, without any qualification were the object of self-cognition, any person's body, senses, and so forth could become the object of anyone's self-cognition, anyone could regard any body as his own. If it is said that self-cognition takes as its object only the body related to oneself, the meaning of one's own must be clarified. For a thing to be one's own means not to be different from oneself. Therefore, when a person knows his self, the cognition, I exist arises because knower and known are identical. For this reason pots and the like, which can never know themselves, cannot become the object of self-cognition. If this is so, then in your Buddhist view to self-cognition will be merely a superimposition upon the body, because the body is different from the experiencer. of the objection that consciousness is the self. But is self-experience not vertical with respect to consciousness? No. Consciousness is experienced as an activity, and the agent of the activity is experienced as wholly distinct from it. Just as in the experience I cut, So in the experience I know, the agent is experienced as the cause of the action. Do blue, yellow, and the like appear as forms of cognition in cognitions of blue and yellow, while selfhood appears in consciousness as its form and nature? Then the status of the form of the known object and the form of cognition would be the same. Just as blue is different from the cognition of blue, the self would be different from self cognition, our purpose of establishing the difference between self and consciousness would thus be fulfilled. Should the preceding cognition that is the material cause of self cognition then be regarded as appearing in the form of the self. If cognitions of blue, yellow, and the like are causes of self cognition, then just as these cognitions respectively make blue and yellow their forms, those forms too should appear in self-cognition. A qualified object cannot appear unless its form appears. Should a stream of activating cognitions, distinct from the stream of object cognitions, then be the knowing self, serving as the material cause of self-cognition and called by us store consciousness. Then accept the knower as a beginningless and endless self that is the material cause of the activating cognitions. Yet whether this self is itself a stream of cognitions or an entity distinct from that stream remains to be determined, this question has already been sufficiently considered. Inferential proof of the self. But what inference establishes the existence of the Self. The answer is recognition. Yet it has not been established that recognition of a permanent Self is veridical, if it is false, it opposes the unity of the Self, and if mere ordinary recognition is taken as the reason, the reason deviates because recognition of the unity of a burning flame is false. No, the objector has failed to understand the intended meaning of the reason. Ordinary recognition is not intended here. What then is intended? An invariable successive relation between cause and effect. No that too appears opposed to the unity of the self. We do not say that either. What is intended, then, is the determinate cognition that the earlier and later cognitions were produced by one and the same agent. Could this cognition not arise merely because the earlier cognition is the material cause of the later cognition? No, a philosophically coherent material cause relation of this kind between cognitions is not admitted on the doctrine of permanence. Even on the momentarist view, the mere fact that one cognition is similar in nature to another and is produced from it does not constitute material causation. Otherwise, the teacher's cognition and the pupil's cognition too would become connected by a material-caused relation. Objection to the proof and its answer. Could ignorance of the difference among the objects of recognition be added to the definition previously given, and that itself be taken as a new definition of the material cause-effect relation, the difference between the teachers and pupils' cognitions is known. No. In the present case there is no ignorance of the differences among the distinct cognitions, therefore their unity is not recognized at all. But is there not in this case also ignorance of the differences among the bodies from which the separate cognitions arise? If so, a newborn infant has not even a faint awareness of its former body, therefore it has neither knowledge nor ignorance of the difference between the present and former bodies. Yet the present body is regarded as causally connected with the former body, How could the infant remember the taste of its mother's milk on the basis of a previous experience? Moreover, the pot and pot sherds would not stand in a cause-effect relation because they are always known as distinct objects. Should causation then be based upon the co-occurrence of cause and effect? No. On the momentarist view real co-occurrence is impossible because cause and effect both being momentary cannot be present at the same time. If imagined co-occurrence is admitted it would apply to non-coexistent things as well. Body and Consciousness to appear to be present together. refutation of another possible objection. The foregoing objections refute both definitions of the two kinds of material-cause relation. One definition is held to apply to the members of a continuous series, the other to discontinuous transformation. The first is defined as being the object of a non-illusory cognition of unity based upon similarity among the related things, the second as standing in the relation of an original form and its transformation. Further development of the refutation. Concerning the second kind of material causation, it may now be asked, how is it determined that a piece of charcoal or ash is a transformation of the original wood? Why can it not be a transformation of fire? The answer may be that wood becomes charcoal only after coming into contact with fire. But it is equally possible that charcoal is produced from fire conjoined with wood. It may then be said that the material cause of an earth elemental thing must itself be earth elemental. But on what ground is this certain? The answer is that causation is observed to be determined by similarity within a continuous momentary series. But how is that established? It will be said that the successive members of a series are regarded as one because of a veridical cognition of similarity. What then is this similarity, generic unity or coexistence? Both alternatives have already been shown incoherent. Thus similarity mean belonging to the same series. And if belonging to the same series means that one member of the series is produced from another, the efficient cause and its effect will also be related in the same way. If generic unity itself is the material cause relation, how can material causation be determined by itself, since generic unity is being identified with that very relation? Is the recognition of unity among successive cognitions itself the nature of the material cause relation? No, this view entails self dependence. Another definition of material causation and its refutation. Can the capacity to be recognized as one and the same thing defined material causation, then the nature of this capacity must first be understood. Is it some special power of the cognitions? If so, it cannot be confined to one particular individual and regarded as differing from individual to individual. If one individual is capable of production, other similar individuals too must necessarily be capable of production. otherwise, even the productivity of a particular moment or momentary individual could not be determined because the precise identification of the productive moment or momentary individual is not easy. All worldly practice would consequently come to a standstill, since there would be no knowledge of what is beneficial or harmful. The distinctive effect natures of causes would also disappear and no relation of invariable concomitance between any two things could be established. Nor is this capacity invariably connected with any determinate stream of cognitions, no property is available that distinguishes the teacher's stream of cognitions from the pupil's stream. to the final statement and its refutation. Can cognitions within a particular stream poses a distinctive property absent from other streams? No, no such property is known. We perceive no generic difference whatsoever between the streams of cognition of teacher and pupil. Could a difference exist while remaining invisible, so that the foregoing reason is not sublated. No, a property residing in a visible thing cannot itself be invisible. If this were admitted, familiar smoke could be regarded as possessing some invisible property such as ghosthood. Then every smoke would not be an effect of fire, only some particular smoke would be regarded as produced by fire, just as on the Buddhist view only Only one particular momentary cognition is produced by another particular momentary cognition. Under such conditions, cognition of fire in general would not arise from cognition of smoke in general. Can it be said that only the first smoke in a stream of smoke is an effect of fire? No, even concerning that first smoke. may arise whether it was produced from fire or from some invisible cause. Therefore, if causes are established as generically different, corresponding generic differences must be admitted in their effects even if those effects appear externally alike, because generic difference among causes determines generic difference among effects. Otherwise, generic difference among effects would be accidental. And if causes are generically alike but effects differ, the difference among the effects establishes a generic difference among the auxiliary causes. This is the rational explanation of the entire matter. If it is not accepted, the reality of an afterlife cannot be established either. The stream of cognition constituting a person's present life might suddenly cease without producing another stream constituting a future life. Furthermore, a special kind of cognition could arise from an unconscious cause, and a special kind of unconscious thing could arise from cognition, if the cause-effect relation were not governed by the rule stated above. Indeed, although all smoke is directly perceived as belonging to one class, one might still still raise the doubt that some smoke is produced not by fire but by a ghost. Another explanation of recognition and its refutation. Let it then be admitted that recognition is determined by some particular auxiliary cause. Very well, we call this alleged special cause the agent. It may be asked, however, on what special ground this agent is regarded as one entity rather than a stream of auxiliary causes. The answer would be that an object produced by one agent falls outside the class of objects produced by many agents, whereas a stream of momentary causes does not. If it is said that the stream has some distinctive feature separating it from objects produced by many agents, we must examine what precisely that feature is. Only four alternatives are possible. It is the nature of an individually efficacious cognition. It resembles the generic nature of an individually efficacious cognition. It depends upon some particular cause for its own arising or it depends upon a stream of causes. The first Alternative is impossible because a stream is not identical with any single momentary individual. The second overextends because a generic property such as Cognitionhood occurs in the cognitions of distinct individuals as well. The fourth is indeterminate because a causal stream is equally present in the cognitions of different individuals. Therefore, once the other alternatives are eliminated, only the third must be accepted dependence upon a particular cause. Further development and defense of a new objection to the first explanation of recognition. Alternatively, even if a cause-effect relation exists, that relation alone does not determine recognition. To make this clear, we ask, does the omniscient Buddha recognize his cognitions as produced by one and the same agent or not? If he does, that very fact establishes both the unity of the agent of recognition and its difference from the cognitions. Everyone knows that cognitions are unstable. Yet even the Omniscient One cannot know the agent of recognition as momentary, because he first experiences and then teaches to become an instructor and guide of seekers, he must endure beyond a single moment. If the Omniscient One does not recognize his cognitions as having one cause, it is clear that mere causal relation does not determine recognition. If one thing does not arise in the presence of another, the first cannot be called the cause of the second. Can it be said that the Omniscient One certainly has such recognition, but it is not veridical and therefore cannot establish one agent of the cognitions? Then does even the Omniscient One become deluded and have false recognition? It may be said that this is a deliberately made false superimposition and is therefore harmless. But since the causal relation among cognitions is the same for the omniscient one and ordinary people, how can the omniscient one's recognition be unknowingly false imposition while that of others is not? Is recognition different because the omniscient one apprehends the differences among the cognitions while ordinary people do not. No ordinary people to understand the differences among object cognitions. Do ordinary people know only the differences among objects and not among cognitions? No they to understand cognitions as distinct. Repetition of cognitions is known even when the differences among their objects are not clear. If, despite knowledge of difference, identity in the form of cognition is superimposed upon the cognitions, then, because they are earth elemental, recognition of unity should also occur between a tree and a stump, a stump and charcoal, and charcoal and ash. Consideration and refutation of the objection that recognition arises from ignorance of store consciousness. Let the explanation then be that ignorance of the several store consciousnesses causes recognition. No. On this view store consciousness would either be wholly different from the object directed cognitions associated with eye consciousness or it would be some accidental eye consciousness included within the stream of object directed cognition. The first alternative is impossible. To distinct streams of eye consciousness, one object directed and the other self directed are never experienced. Even if such two streams were admitted, there would be no causal relation between them, consequently, no relation would exist between the objects of the two recognitions either. That is, the I recognized in the object directed form would be different from the I recognized in the self directed form. If, despite the absence of causal relation, the objects of both recognize, can it be said that only store consciousness and not object directed cognition is the material cause, so the defect of one entity residing in many substrates does not arise? No. If so, object directed cognition could not even be the efficient cause of another object directed cognition, because in the Buddhist view efficient causation is invariably connected with material causation, whatever is the material cause of one thing is also the efficient cause of something else. If this rule is not accepted, some member of a stream may remain merely an efficient cause without being the material cause of the next member, consequently, the stream would terminate at that fruitless member. All cognitions are alike insofar as they are cognitions, therefore, if one is fruitless, similar cognitions in other streams will also be fruitless. If this consequence is accepted, the final member of every stream, being fruitless, will be regarded as unreal, and if the final member is unreal, its predecessor too will be fruitless and unreal. In this way the entire stream becomes unreal. What a marvelous device for establishing causation as the basis of recognition. If, in order to preserve the efficient casualty of store consciousness, it is held that store consciousness is the material cause of a third cognition distinct from both object directed and self-directed cognition, the cognitions of one stream, not being causally related to one another, cannot become the objects of recognition. Furthermore, each store consciousness would be regarded as the material cause of some cognition outside its own stream, consequently, infinitely many new streams of cognition would have to be admitted in the world. In summary, if object-directed cognition is not the material cause of any cognition, it cannot be an efficient cause either and becomes wholly fruitless. If it produces a cognition outside its own stream, an infinite regress follows, and since there is no causal relation between store consciousness and these external cognitions, They too cannot become objects of recognition. If both kinds of cognition are regarded as material causes of object-directed cognition, one entity must be admitted to reside in many substrates. Refutation of the second alternative above. The second alternative is also untenable. If accepted, ignorance of difference concerning this second kind of cognition would relate either to its own nature or to the nature of its object. If it relates to the cognition's own nature, it will either be confined to the first eye consciousness alone or include the object directed cognitions as well. The first alternative will not work. The sentence is I myself knew before, I myself know now, and I myself shall know later express a person's cognition of himself. And they relate to three different times, this would be impossible without cognition of difference. If the temporal states of the self can somehow be known as the object of eye-consciousness, the object of recognition should be that very self, not the object directed cognitions. It has already been stated that there is no ignorance of the differences among the object-directed cognitions. Nor is there ignorance of difference concerning the object of this cognition. If such ignorance is admitted, the object will be either a form of cognition, some other thing, or an unreal thing. The first alternative has already been shown unacceptable. The Buddhist himself does not accept the second. And whoever accepts such an external thing will accept its multiplicity on the basis of the co-appearance of opposed properties. If such co-appearance does not occur, the object will not be regarded as many. Refutation of the third among the foregoing alternatives. The third alternative too is incoherent. The real object of eye consciousness has already been established. Even if eye consciousness were regarded as objectless, it would not help establish the ignorance of difference required for recognition. It has already been stated that false superimposition of identity or erroneous cognition requires ignorance of one among six possible kinds of difference, but not one of them is available in the present case. The six kinds are real difference, unreal difference, difference whose reality is superimposed, difference whose unreality is superimposed, non-coexistent difference and indefinable difference. development of another proof of the unity of the agent. Alternatively, one may ask, on your view, does a former experience produce its later memory, or does a latent impression produced by the experience do so? If the impression does, is it invisible or directly established? If invisible, is there one impression persisting until memory arises, or a stream of momentary members. If directly established, is it the stream of cognition continuing after the experience, something different from that stream, or a special feature of the stream? Concerning this special feature, one must again ask whether it is merely the property of being produced from the experience, or the property of being generically different from the stream of the experiencer. Of these alternatives, the first is incoherent because an unborn thing and a wholly destroyed thing are equally inactive. An experience wholly destroyed as soon as it arises cannot produce a memory much later. Apart from the stream of cognition following the experience, no directly observable effect of the experience appears, the admission of a separate entity is contradicted by its non-apprehension. Nor can the proposed special feature be merely the property of being produced from the experience. It is not the case that only seed deliberately be sown by a labourer in a field germinates while seed accidentally dropped there does not. Similarly, either an experience of yellow or an experience of blue could produce the stream of cognition normally held to arise from experience of blue. There would then be no specificity among causes. Consequently, what was not experienced could be remembered and what was experienced might not be remembered. Objection to the foregoing and its refutation. Can it be held that, just as seed produced from rice again produces only rice seed, so a cognition of blue produced from cognition of yellow may generate memory of the yellow object, and in this manner causation between cognition and memory remains regulated? No. For example, if off to Pigeons, one blue-grey and the other white, the blue-grey one is regularly fed milk and the white one blackberry juice, thereof spring may respectively become white and blue-grey. Thus the mere fact of being produced from something does not determine the nature of what follows. Analogies from other things may be found for the view that a stream of cognition continuing after an experience of blue can poses a feature distinguishing it from a stream lacking blue cognition. The fruit of an emblic tree watered with milk later becomes sweet, cotton seed irrigated with lac-dye abandons its whiteness, acquires a red color, and transmits that color to the flower. But cognition and memory are not like this. Crystal, though Though placed near a hibiscus or another flower, does not acquire its color and retains its whiteness, similarly, cognition, though affected by its object, remains merely cognition. If the Buddhist says that all object forms are present in cognition, some clear and some indistinct, then despite blind faith in his own school's doctrine opposing the coexistence of contradictory properties, he has lost all fear of accepting that very coexistence. One entity cannot be simultaneously clear and unclear. I see no meaning in calling indistinct that which is self-luminous by its very nature. Refutation of the final alternative above. Even if cognition is regarded as formless, It is certainly clear with respect to all its objects. Things with respect to which cognition is not clear are not its objects at all. If indistinct things to are regarded as objects of cognition, the distinction between object and non-object becomes indeterminate. The coexistence of clarity and indistinctness can be admitted only in a composite thing. This has already been examined. Therefore, only the final alternative remains, an invisible latent impression produced by experience produces memory. But this impression cannot be a stream. If it were a stream, its effect, memory, would arise within that very stream of impressions, because memory would be related to that stream alone. The self included within the stream of activating cognitions would then not acquire memory or recognition through the awakening of the impression. If the impression and its effect resided in different substrates, one person could remember another person's experience. If it is said that the impression produces memory in a stream having the same material cause as its own material cause and that the stream of object directed cognition including the self is of this kind, a stream of impressions produced by cognition of a yellow object would also produce memory of a blue object. Therefore, however unwelcome it may seem, one must accept that an impression produces memory only in its own material cause, there is no other solution. Thus, because memory of an experience occurs at a time different from that experience, the persistence of the impression and of its material cause is established by itself and cannot be denied. Objection to the foregoing view and its refutation, nor can the Buddhist view admit a permanent and invisible impression. If such an impression is cognitive in nature, it cannot be invisible because Buddhists regard all cognition as self-luminous. If it is different from cognition, cognition cannot be its material cause. If the impression is regarded as a distinct stream of invisible cognition, memory, pleasure, pain, and the like would also be included within that stream and become invisible. Therefore, memory of the kind described above certainly arises from some cause if it were costless, its arising would be unregulated. Yet being caused is incompatible with arising from many causes. Therefore, from the absence of being caused in a thing having many causes, the concomitance is established that being caused accompanies arising from one cause. Under this account, a positive example of the two terms of the concomitance is also found in the movement of a dancer's eyebrow. Recognition of the eyebrow movement or of the aggregate of a tom's constituting the eyebrow as the same is not based upon ignorance. But this recognition must be qualified as follows, no property opposed to the object's nature occurs in it. Without this qualification, the reason would deviate in a recognition such as the child whom you saw before is the very person whom I see now, because recognition of personal unity here is not an unfailing ground of real unity. Objection to the foregoing conclusion and its answer. Does the qualification above not apply to the body because the body itself is conscious? No. The body is not conscious because it is a body, has a determinate shape, is a material entity, and possesses qualities such as color, smell, and taste. Who can the arrangement or organization of the five great elements be conscious, because this arrangement does not remain the same from day to day, if consciousness belonged to it, an experience from one day would be forgotten the next. Consciousness is not confined to separate limbs of the body either. If it were, when a hand, foot, or other limb were cut off, the experience of that severed limb could not be remembered. If the body itself were conscious, a newborn infant could not make its first movement because no effort is possible in the absence of desire and a version. Desire cannot arise until there is recognition that a certain object produces a desired result. Such recognition cannot arise without memory of the invariable concomitance between that object and its agreeable result, yet the infant has not experienced that relation in this life. The body that experienced the concomitance belonged to a previous life, once that body had become ashes, another body taking its place could not remember the previous experience. But in this life the causal relation between experience and the initiation of action is clearly established. Therefore, without experience no initiation of action would occur, otherwise action would become unregulated. For the same reason, the senses too are not conscious. We apprehend one and the same object through both seeing and touching. The mind 2 is not conscious because it is inferred only as an instrument. Thus the foregoing concomitance is established and the reality of a self that passes from one birth to another is also established. This self is beginningless because it is itself devoid of desire while worriedly production is understood to involve an agent possessing desire. It is also endless because a real and beginningless entity is indestructible. The self is an eternal substance but has no determinate shape. It is formless because it is motionless. It is motionless because it is eternal, is available in our inward perception and is the substrate of perceptible qualities. Reduction in support of the foregoing conclusion. The following reductioes support the foregoing conclusion. If the self had a beginning, its first initiation of action could never occur. If it had an end, its existence could not persist despite being beginningless. If it were not a substance, it would be devoid of qualities. If it were not all pervasive, fire, air, and the like would become motionless. Motion cannot arise merely through the body's conjunction with fire, air, and the like. Such motion occurs through the motion of some moving entity, but no such medium is available in the present case. Space conjoined with the body is itself motionless. Therefore its conjunction cannot set anything in motion. If a motionless thing produced motion, every kind of motion could arise. If an eternal entity possessed determinate shape, it could not be the substrate of qualities perceptible to us, an eternal entity with determinate shape and specific qualities would produce other objects as well. If an eternal entity possessed motion, it would possess determinate shape. This is the essence of philosophical teaching on the matter. Some say that the self is atomic in dimension like the mind, because it is the substrate of conjunction, which is the non-inherent cause of cognition. An objection is that the scriptural statement, the self is subtler than the The subtle opposes the all-pervasiveness of the self and contradicts the inference. But this objection is not sustainable. If the self were not all-pervasive, the mind could not be atomic in dimension. The ordered succession of all activity is possible because conjunction between self and mind occurs successively. When the quoted Upaniadic statement is cited, its first portion, in which the self is said to be greater than the great, has been omitted. Objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its rejoinder. Let the objection then be this, even though the self has been established as real, it should still be abandoned. A person who possesses awareness of selfhood becomes attached to what benefits him and ours or hostile toward what harms him. Attachment and aversion are the roots of bondage in sasra. One who has no cognition of the self has no cognition of benefit or harm either, therefore he will neither love nor hate anyone and will not be caught in sasra. Thus, just as a forest dwelling expert in poisons is constantly intent upon removing poison, the seeker of liberation should remain constantly engaged in establishing non-self. No, this is not the correct view. A person without awareness of the self cannot become a seeker of liberation at all. In the absence of self-knowledge, no one will desire release from suffering or attainment of happiness. The desire to obtain heavenly pleasure or liberation remains in a person only so long as he strives toward these goals. When desire ceases, both effort and its result cease. This view of non-self will only strengthen atheistic tendencies, and those tendencies will produce innumerable destructive consequences filled with uncontrolled craving for objects of sensory pleasure. Were this not so, how could one climb onto the roof of one's house and fearlessly proclaim, as long as we live, let us enjoy pleasure? As for the statement that a person loves, what benefits him and hates what harms him, it is certainly true. One who regards liberation as beneficial will become attached to its causes, seek them out, and obtain the desired result by hating or remaining indifferent to the causes that obstruct liberation, there is no other way. One who regards enjoyment as beneficial will likewise remove obstacles and obtain enjoyment. The delvated have mistaken their true benefit for harm. Even in veterinary practice one does not observe anyone becoming fond of what he regards as harmful to himself or turning away from what he regards as beneficial. A second objection to the necessity of self-knowledge and its refutation. But even apart from the foregoing, should the self not be abandoned like the senses and the rest, because it is the basis of suffering? Yes, in the form in which it is the basis of suffering, it should certainly be abandoned. The self qualified by limiting agents produces suffering. But why should the self not be abandoned even in its unqualified state? No, that is neither possible nor fruitful. Abandonment of the self cannot mean its destruction because the self is eternal. Nor can it mean separation from it because it is all-pervasive. Nor is non-apprehension of its abandonment. The more one tries to avoid self-knowledge, the more awareness of the self increases. Can one avoid self-awareness by remaining indifferent to it? Surely we have remained indifferent to this matter for so long, yet self-awareness has not ceased. Such an effort is also fruitless. Abandonment of the qualified self is necessary for the destruction of suffering, But for what result would the unqualified self be abandoned? From fear that it might again become qualified? No, there is no ground for such a fear. Why then, contemplate the unqualified self continuously? Because continuous meditation upon it brings liberation. What is the nature of contemplation of the self? Discriminative knowledge. Discrimination from what? From non-self entities such as the body. Proof of discriminative knowledge of self and non-self. Both inference and scripture prove that discriminative knowledge of self and non-self is necessary. For one who mistakes the non-self for the self, the body becomes the beginning and end of existence. Attached to the body, he intensely craves all the things of the world that provide bodily pleasure and hates unpleasant things. But one who knows the self as an independent entity is not affected by this attachment and aversion. A person who has abandoned all limitations has no attachment to offspring or wealth because they do not serve his true welfare. Nothing can cut, dry, or burn the self. It lies beyond the scope of scriptural injunction and prohibition. Scriptural commands apply only when a person is limited by birth, caste, age, property, and sacraments. Therefore, the false cognition that mistakes non-self for self is the cause of bondage in Satsara. Right knowledge removes this false awareness. That right knowledge arises successively through hearing scriptural statements, reflecting upon them, continuous meditation, and the like. When the causes of attachment and aversion have been removed, their effects to are destroyed. Accumulated merit and demerit are exhausted through the experience of their fruits. This is the essence of the proof of the foregoing thesis. Scriptural proof of the foregoing view. The essence of scripture is contained in the Upaniadic statement cited above and in other statements saying that neither good nor evil touches the December-died entity. But is scripture not unreliable because statements concerning the unreality of the world are false, distinct doctrines mutually contradict one another, and repetitive passages contain needless duplication? No. Scriptural statements have different intentions. Statements calling the world false intend that the seeker of liberation know the self as transcending the world and its objects. Statements of non-dual truth intend Intend that knowledge of the independent self brings liberation. Statements that appear repetitive intend to convey the difficulty of knowing the self. Statements describing the self as beyond the mind intend the abandonment of all external effort. Statements calling the self bliss intend that the self alone is to be known. calling primordial nature conscious, aim to teach the necessity of meditation for realization of the self. Just as a forest dweller accustomed to dealing with venomous creatures strives to restore consciousness to a person rendered unconscious by a snake bite, so the practitioner of the self strives for the realization of self-consciousness. Statements supporting skya theories of primordial nature and the light should be interpreted in the same manner. If such an interpretation is not accepted, on what ground can it be said that Kapila understands scripture better than Germany? And if both are learned in scripture, why do their interpretations of it differ so greatly? Proof of the authority of scripture What proves the authority of scripture? Its being the instruction of a trustworthy being. Is this fact not unestablished? No. The reality of a trustworthy being who is the creator of the world is established by inference. The inference is, this world, whose production is disputed, has an agent, because it is an effect.

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