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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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1. 0:02–0:07Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum,
2. 0:07–0:11but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory.
3. 0:11–0:18Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances
4. 0:18–0:21because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory,
5. 0:21–0:25although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference.
6. 0:25–0:33Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances.
7. 0:33–0:39In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect.
8. 0:39–0:49A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory.
9. 0:49–0:54Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
10. 0:54–0:5533.
11. 0:55–1:00merely establishing the absence of the probandum or producing cognition of the
12. 1:00–1:04absence of the probandum is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot
13. 1:04–1:08obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandum unless
14. 1:08–1:12collocation of the reason with the absence of the probandum is known.
15. 1:12–1:17Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated
16. 1:17–1:21in the locus of the probandum a characteristic of contradiction because
17. 1:21–1:25this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject
18. 1:25–1:31possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses
19. 1:31–1:37the probandom and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandom.
20. 1:37–1:43To cognize the absence of the probandom, cognition of the perversion of that absence by the reason
21. 1:43–1:47would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent.
22. 1:49–1:52With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends.
23. 1:52–2:02The established doctrine of the contradictory reason. The established doctrine is now stated.
24. 2:03–2:08Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter positive of an absence of the reason
25. 2:08–2:14that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known
26. 2:14–2:19only when the concomitance of the counter positives of the absence of the reason and the absence
27. 2:19–2:25of the probandom is known. The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of
28. 2:25–2:30the reasons absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct.
29. 2:31–2:35Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative
30. 2:35–2:39concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear.
31. 2:41–2:48Alternative definitions. 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the
32. 2:48–2:53following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject
33. 2:53–2:57endowed with the probandom, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the
34. 2:57–3:03probandom, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing
35. 3:03–3:08occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of
36. 3:08–3:15contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to
37. 3:15–3:20purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not
38. 3:20–3:25previously been established, the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the
39. 3:25–3:31probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed
40. 3:31–3:36with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated.
41. 3:38–3:42Absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect, repetition.
42. 3:43–3:4836, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance
43. 3:48–3:52possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating
44. 3:52–3:56occurrence, but cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without
45. 3:56–4:00cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom.
46. 4:01–4:06This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the
47. 4:06–4:10probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reasons occurrence in a counter
48. 4:10–4:15instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reasons absence
49. 4:15–4:19from a subject endowed with a probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance,
50. 4:19–4:24nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone.
51. 4:25–4:30Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition
52. 4:30–4:35of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason
53. 4:35–4:40as pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation and the
54. 4:40–4:47reason because both oppose cognition of provision. Three types of contradictory reason.
55. 4:49–4:5337. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference
56. 4:53–4:57for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness because cognition of the
57. 4:57–5:01non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word
58. 5:01–5:09meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom
59. 5:09–5:14depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect.
60. 5:15–5:19Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason.
61. 5:20–5:26The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by
62. 5:26–5:31the absence of the probandum. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades
63. 5:31–5:36the probandum. And third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades
64. 5:36–5:43the probandum. Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended,
65. 5:43–5:50because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the three-fold
66. 5:50–5:58division of contradictory reasons. 38. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a
67. 5:58–6:03reason opposed to what pervades the probandum is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is
68. 6:03–6:08not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum,
69. 6:08–6:14a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum
70. 6:14–6:20produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example there is smoke in
71. 6:20–6:24this region because of the absence of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason.
72. 6:25–6:29Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason
73. 6:29–6:34constitutes pervasion by the probandum, such pervasion is possible even without the absence
74. 6:34–6:37of mutual absence.
75. 6:37–6:41Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence
76. 6:41–6:45of smoke, or, because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the
77. 6:45–6:49deviating more inconclusive reason.
78. 6:49–6:54In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three
79. 6:54–6:58kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct
80. 6:58–7:03cognition of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of
81. 7:03–7:08something opposed to what pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire
82. 7:08–7:13in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and
83. 7:13–7:20because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through
84. 7:20–7:25qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black
85. 7:25–7:32aloe because it possesses sharp odorless white smoke. With this, the established doctrine
86. 7:32–7:36of the contradictory reason ends.
87. 7:36–7:39Prima-facie view of the equally strong counter reason.
88. 7:39–7:4439. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter
89. 7:44–7:49reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason
90. 7:49–7:54because reason and counter reason being mutually obstructive cannot establish either the probandom
91. 7:54–8:00or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their
92. 8:00–8:05respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason
93. 8:05–8:13there is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Refutation of alternative definitions.
94. 8:15–8:20Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute
95. 8:20–8:26counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail
96. 8:26–8:29in one of them.
97. 8:29–8:33Nearly knowing the counter-reason as endowed with perversion and subject-propertyhood does
98. 8:33–8:37not make the original reason counterbalanced.
99. 8:37–8:41Cognitions of perversion and subject-propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot
100. 8:41–8:46both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject-propertyhood cannot be superimposed
101. 8:46–8:50on a reason such as audibility.
102. 8:50–8:54Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandom is present
103. 8:54–9:00in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject.
104. 9:00–9:05A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be
105. 9:05–9:09simultaneously present in the same locus.
106. 9:09–9:12Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by
107. 9:12–9:16the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum
108. 9:16–9:19is established.
109. 9:19–9:24Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection, pervaded by the absence of the
110. 9:24–9:29probandum and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandum be called counterbalanced.
111. 9:30–9:34Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence,
112. 9:34–9:38and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of pervasion by the probandum.
113. 9:40–9:44With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter-reason ends.
114. 9:46–9:49The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter Reason
115. 9:51–9:5441. The Established Doctrine Is Now Stated
116. 9:55–10:09A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence of an equally strong counter reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
117. 10:10–10:20Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence.
118. 10:20–10:26Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning
119. 10:26–10:30the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection belonging
120. 10:30–10:35to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced
121. 10:35–10:37by an equally strong reason.
122. 10:37–10:42An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original
123. 10:42–10:46reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent
124. 10:46–10:48has not denied either.
125. 10:48–10:52the counter-reason subject propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties,
126. 10:52–10:56hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counter-balance would be a
127. 10:56–11:02defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and
128. 11:02–11:07counter-reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood,
129. 11:07–11:12they become mutual counter-reasons. When both are known together in this form,
130. 11:12–11:16they are fallacious in both inference for oneself and inference for another because the
131. 11:16–11:23complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or subject
132. 11:23–11:29propertyhood is necessary. 42. Since no object can be the substratum of both the
133. 11:29–11:33probandom and its absence, either perversion or subject propertyhood must be
134. 11:33–11:36absent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of
135. 11:36–11:41counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons perversion by the
136. 11:41–11:45absence of the probandom can be certain even if there is no opposition
137. 11:45–11:49between the probandom and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence
138. 11:49–11:55of perversion is unnecessary. If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason
139. 11:55–12:01could not oppose the probandum. Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion
140. 12:01–12:06is necessary in the opposition between probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence
141. 12:06–12:12of perversion arises after cognition of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this
142. 12:12–12:17cognition of the absence of perversion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect
143. 12:17–12:24of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness.
144. 12:26–12:3143. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by
145. 12:31–12:35the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the
146. 12:35–12:40same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain,
147. 12:40–12:44doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment
148. 12:44–12:48of pervadedness, not counterbalance.
149. 12:48–12:50This argument is not sound.
150. 12:50–12:54The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of
151. 12:54–12:59two opposed reasons and one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for
152. 12:59–13:04this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons.
153. 13:04–13:08Only the substantive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance,
154. 13:08–13:13by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons,
155. 13:13–13:17prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject.
156. 13:17–13:22Absence of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even
157. 13:22–13:27a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present.
158. 13:27–13:32The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance
159. 13:32–13:37through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood.
160. 13:37–13:41Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is
161. 13:41–13:46a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater.
162. 13:48–13:54Objection, all inferences would be stopped. 44, an objection may be raised, the proponents
163. 13:54–13:58thesis and the opponents counter-thesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis,
164. 13:58–14:02consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped.
165. 14:04–14:08It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponents counter-thesis is weaker,
166. 14:08–14:13it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counterthesis
167. 14:13–14:17will be stopped, and if the counterthesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be
168. 14:17–14:24completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the
169. 14:24–14:28absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its
170. 14:28–14:32complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counterthesis.
171. 14:32–14:36Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another
172. 14:36–14:40inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the
173. 14:40–14:44original inference would become pointless.
174. 14:44–14:46Refutation of the objection.
175. 14:46–14:51No, this objection is not sound.
176. 14:51–14:57The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason.
177. 14:57–15:01It has already been stated that perversion and subject-propertyhood constitute the
178. 15:01–15:04strength of a reason.
179. 15:04–15:08A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infer only when it is pervaded by the
180. 15:08–15:12absence of the probandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya
181. 15:12–15:17statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent
182. 15:17–15:21should always be stopped.
183. 15:21–15:26Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason and
184. 15:26–15:31counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon
185. 15:31–15:35reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defect
186. 15:35–15:43of counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced
187. 15:43–15:48only when known separately, if the two are treated as a single reason bearing a conjoined
188. 15:48–15:54qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason
189. 15:54–15:59and counter reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition of
190. 15:59–16:03the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the
191. 16:03–16:07defective counterbalance.
192. 16:07–16:09This view too is not sound.
193. 16:09–16:14The two inferences concerning probandum and absence of probandum are mutually opposed
194. 16:14–16:18and therefore cannot arise simultaneously.
195. 16:18–16:24Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors.
196. 16:24–16:3047, the authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate
197. 16:30–16:35inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt.
198. 16:35–16:40The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out,
199. 16:40–16:46hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandom.
200. 16:46–16:50An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt.
201. 16:50–16:53Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandom
202. 16:53–16:58is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence
203. 16:58–17:02of the probandom arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandom
204. 17:02–17:08would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47. This argument, however, is not sound.
205. 17:09–17:15Because cognition of the absence of the probandom is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandom.
206. 17:16–17:21But two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning
207. 17:21–17:25their respective probanda must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes.
208. 17:26–17:31It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandom obstructs cognition
209. 17:31–17:35concerning the probandom, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which
210. 17:35–17:42can produce cognition of the absence of the probandom, is not itself the obstruction.
211. 17:42–17:46It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons
212. 17:46–17:51establishing the probandom and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom.
213. 17:51–17:56The cognitions produced by these two reasons combine to become doubt concerning the probandom,
214. 17:56–18:01although neither reason separately produces doubt.
215. 18:01–18:08of the Ratnikosa author's view. 48. This view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable.
216. 18:09–18:14Probandom and absence of Probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the Probandom,
217. 18:14–18:19opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the Probandom. Likewise, the presence of
218. 18:19–18:23a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the Probandom opposes the presence of the Probandom.
219. 18:24–18:28Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the
220. 18:28–18:32the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom.
221. 18:32–18:36Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction
222. 18:36–18:39to the contrary cognition.
223. 18:39–18:43Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49.
224. 18:43–18:48In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results.
225. 18:48–18:52A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or
226. 18:52–18:58negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result.
227. 18:58–19:04A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom.
228. 19:04–19:12Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom.
229. 19:12–19:22In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself.
230. 19:22–19:27In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced.
231. 19:27–19:32The intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect.
232. 19:32–19:37In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason,
233. 19:37–19:43a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is the result.
234. 19:43–19:48In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason,
235. 19:48–19:51that is, denial of its subject propertyhood is the result.
236. 19:53–19:55The result of a counterbalanced reason.
237. 19:57–20:0250. Encounterbalance, as with audibility and producedness, neither absence of perversion nor
238. 20:02–20:07absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's perversion
239. 20:07–20:12and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result
240. 20:12–20:19either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result,
241. 20:19–20:22because reason and counter reason are not separately applied.
242. 20:23–20:28Its result is merely the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained?
243. 20:29–20:33Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason and the subject,
244. 20:33–20:37which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom,
245. 20:37–20:43constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as
246. 20:43–20:48pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no inquiry into the truth of the presented
247. 20:48–20:53reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's pervasion by the probandom is ascertained.
248. 20:54–21:01The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised.
249. 21:01–21:04Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like.
250. 21:04–21:10This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom.
251. 21:10–21:18How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter reason establishing the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom?
252. 21:18–21:21This argument is not sound.
253. 21:21–21:29In the absence of a counter reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter reason is present.
254. 21:29–21:35through this affirmative and negative concomitance counterbalance produces inquiry.
255. 21:35–21:40This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason in deviation.
256. 21:40–21:44Doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom whereas in
257. 21:44–21:48counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises.
258. 21:48–21:53The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously.
259. 21:53–22:00Objection subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time.
260. 22:00–22:04How, then, can one reason obstruct the other?
261. 22:04–22:09Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist.
262. 22:09–22:14Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on
263. 22:14–22:19the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases.
264. 22:19–22:23Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject
265. 22:23–22:28arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood.
266. 22:28–22:32It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging
267. 22:32–22:37to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections
268. 22:37–22:38can arise.
269. 22:38–22:44Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods
270. 22:44–22:46is impossible.
271. 22:46–22:49Prokharasama is not admissible.
272. 22:49–22:5153.
273. 22:51–22:54Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions
274. 22:54–23:00of two pervasions is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible.
275. 23:00–23:06For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance.
276. 23:06–23:08This objection is unacceptable.
277. 23:08–23:12Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible
278. 23:12–23:15without recollection of both pervasions.
279. 23:15–23:18Proponent and opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

Plain text

Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum, but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory. Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory, although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference. Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances. In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect. A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory. Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. 33. merely establishing the absence of the probandum or producing cognition of the absence of the probandum is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandum unless collocation of the reason with the absence of the probandum is known. Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandum a characteristic of contradiction because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandom. To cognize the absence of the probandom, cognition of the perversion of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent. With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends. The established doctrine of the contradictory reason. The established doctrine is now stated. Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known. The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of the reasons absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct. Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear. Alternative definitions. 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established, the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated. Absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect, repetition. 36, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating occurrence, but cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom. This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with a probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition of the reason's perversion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason as pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation and the reason because both oppose cognition of provision. Three types of contradictory reason. 37. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect. Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason. The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandum. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandum. And third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandum. Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the three-fold division of contradictory reasons. 38. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandum is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum, a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example there is smoke in this region because of the absence of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason. Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes pervasion by the probandum, such pervasion is possible even without the absence of mutual absence. Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke, or, because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating more inconclusive reason. In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the pro-bandom, direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the pro-bandom, and direct cognition of something opposed to what pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe because it possesses sharp odorless white smoke. With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends. Prima-facie view of the equally strong counter reason. 39. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason because reason and counter reason being mutually obstructive cannot establish either the probandom or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Refutation of alternative definitions. Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter-reason as endowed with perversion and subject-propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced. Cognitions of perversion and subject-propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject-propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandom is present in the subject, or that perversion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject. A reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum is established. Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection, pervaded by the absence of the probandum and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandum be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of pervasion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter-reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Equally Strong Counter Reason 41. The Established Doctrine Is Now Stated A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandom because of the presence of an equally strong counter reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence. Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a substantive reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and pervasion, and the opponent has not denied either. the counter-reason subject propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counter-balance would be a defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and counter-reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter-reasons. When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for oneself and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary. 42. Since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence, either perversion or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons perversion by the absence of the probandom can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandom and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence of perversion is unnecessary. If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandum. Nor should it be said that absence of the reasons perversion is necessary in the opposition between probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence of perversion arises after cognition of their opposition. Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of perversion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness. 43. An objection may be raised. Reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons and one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons. Only the substantive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance, by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject. Absence of perversion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present. The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defect of counterbalance through cognition of the absence of perversion or subject propertyhood. Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater. Objection, all inferences would be stopped. 44, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counter-thesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponents counter-thesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counterthesis will be stopped, and if the counterthesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counterthesis. Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless. Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that perversion and subject-propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason. A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infer only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped. Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandom is the cause of the defect of counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter reason become counterbalanced only when known separately, if the two are treated as a single reason bearing a conjoined qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandom and its absence causes the defective counterbalance. This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandum and absence of probandum are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously. Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors. 47, the authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt. The complete causal complexes for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandom. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandom is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence of the probandom arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandom would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47. This argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the probandom is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandom. But two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probanda must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandom obstructs cognition concerning the probandom, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the probandom, is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandom and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandom. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combine to become doubt concerning the probandom, although neither reason separately produces doubt. of the Ratnikosa author's view. 48. This view of the Ratnikosa authors is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of Probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the Probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the Probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the Probandom opposes the presence of the Probandom. Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition. Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result. A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom. Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced. The intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect. In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason. 50. Encounterbalance, as with audibility and producedness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's perversion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not separately applied. Its result is merely the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of perversion and cognition of the presence of the reason and the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom, constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's pervasion by the probandom is ascertained. The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised. Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter reason establishing the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom? This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter reason is present. through this affirmative and negative concomitance counterbalance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason in deviation. Doubt concerning the probandom produces a desire to know the probandom whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises. The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously. Objection subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time. How, then, can one reason obstruct the other? Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist. Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases. Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood. It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections can arise. Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods is impossible. Prokharasama is not admissible. 53. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of two pervasions is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible. For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance. This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible without recollection of both pervasions. Proponent and opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

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