MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part6_RadioPlay.mp3

Collection

Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.993833)

Duration

21:06

Source

Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:02–0:06DOCTRIN, VALIDITY IS PRODUCED BY AMERIT
2. 0:06–0:12The Neayaka replies that, on the Msokka view, invalid cognition too would in the same way
3. 0:12–0:16have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not
4. 0:16–0:20extrinsically from any additional defect.
5. 0:20–0:25For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or
6. 0:25–0:31uncommon causes of cognition, no separate defect could be a cause of its production.
7. 0:31–0:35It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding
8. 0:35–0:40to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition.
9. 0:40–0:45Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature
10. 0:45–0:49and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects.
11. 0:49–0:53An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should
12. 0:53–0:58valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause?
13. 0:58–1:04Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension,
14. 1:04–1:09In similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals.
15. 1:09–1:15Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive
16. 1:15–1:17to production of the effect and recurrent.
17. 1:17–1:23Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also
18. 1:23–1:26be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
19. 1:26–1:32Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous
20. 1:32–1:35to the clay that causes a pot.
21. 1:35–1:41Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental.
22. 1:41–1:46An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and
23. 1:46–1:50this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot
24. 1:50–1:54cognition, hence there is no causal deviation.
25. 1:54–1:58Therefore the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by
26. 1:58–2:03a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous
27. 2:03–2:10to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general
28. 2:10–2:14is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting
29. 2:14–2:19its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition, does
30. 2:19–2:26not suffer from proving what is already established. This recurring cause must be conducive to
31. 2:26–2:32producing the effect. The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition,
32. 2:32–2:36a recurrent cause must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition.
33. 2:37–2:42The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and is
34. 2:42–2:49produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot. To explain heterogeneity
35. 2:49–2:55among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted. An effect of the class of pot
36. 2:55–3:00cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this contact is heterogeneous to the cause
37. 3:00–3:05of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so there is no deviation in the causal relation.
38. 3:06–3:11Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the
39. 3:11–3:16cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition
40. 3:16–3:21establishes the effect hood of cognition. Nor does the following inference prove what is
41. 3:21–3:27already established, valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience,
42. 3:27–3:32because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. The reason is that the
43. 3:32–3:37Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid cognition in general.
44. 3:39–3:42Examples and justification of other inferences.
45. 3:44–3:49Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effected, because, like invalidity, it is a
46. 3:49–3:55property residing in all effects without obstruction. But a complex property such as blue pot hood
47. 3:55–4:01does not delimit effect hood because it is nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents,
48. 4:01–4:06blueness and pot hood. There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and
49. 4:06–4:12similar properties as delimiters of effect hood. Granted that in the case of a blue pot the
50. 4:12–4:17recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen
51. 4:17–4:23would cease to be a cause of effects in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid
52. 4:23–4:29cognition must be admitted in the production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal
53. 4:29–4:34valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct
54. 4:34–4:39from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognition hood,
55. 4:39–4:43because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood.
56. 4:43–4:47This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect.
57. 4:47–5:03It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion, like pot hood.
58. 5:03–5:10Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause.
59. 5:10–5:17Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect to determining a causality delimited
60. 5:17–5:22is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition,
61. 5:22–5:27because it is a property delimiting effect to an absent from visual illusion, like pothood.
62. 5:27–5:33Again, being a non-eternal deritical cognition of silver delimits an effect to determining
63. 5:33–5:37a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of
64. 5:37–5:42invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent
65. 5:42–5:48from an illusion of silver, like pothood. Without this regulator, the rule would become
66. 5:48–5:52impossible that visual cognition of silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does
67. 5:52–5:58not make non-silverness absent from silver its mode. Although the causal aggregates are alike
68. 5:58–6:03in both situations, valid cognition is produced extrinsically by a distinct cause.
69. 6:03–6:10refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes
70. 6:10–6:14of validity and invalidity.
71. 6:14–6:18The men's aca objects that in the inference whose probandom is, being produced by a cause
72. 6:18–6:22different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid
73. 6:22–6:24cognition is an extraneous condition.
74. 6:24–6:28It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition,
75. 6:28–6:32because naiyayika's regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject
76. 6:32–6:36of inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance.
77. 6:36–6:40The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but
78. 6:40–6:45because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both.
79. 6:45–6:49Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative
80. 6:49–6:53reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance,
81. 6:53–6:56and difference from the subject is absent there.
82. 6:56–6:59This objection is unsound.
83. 6:59–7:02Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason
84. 7:02–7:07is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot pervade
85. 7:07–7:10the probandom or make the reason deviant.
86. 7:10–7:15The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus
87. 7:15–7:20validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone.
88. 7:20–7:25A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely
89. 7:25–7:30distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like Stathwood delimiting causality.
90. 7:30–7:33This reasoning is unsound.
91. 7:33–7:38When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise,
92. 7:38–7:41but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent.
93. 7:41–7:47Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted
94. 7:47–7:49as a cause of valid cognition.
95. 7:49–7:55Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete
96. 7:55–8:00sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, invalid cognition
97. 8:00–8:02arises in their absence.
98. 8:02–8:07What prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid
99. 8:07–8:13cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition?
100. 8:13–8:16Absence of merit is not a cause.
101. 8:16–8:20Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be
102. 8:20–8:24conducive to invalid cognition whose object is non-existent.
103. 8:24–8:28Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object,
104. 8:28–8:33absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition.
105. 8:33–8:37It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent
106. 8:37–8:41object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only
107. 8:41–8:46existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects.
108. 8:46–8:50Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no
109. 8:50–8:53proof for such a rule.
110. 8:53–8:57It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent
111. 8:57–9:00object causes only valid cognition of an existent object.
112. 9:00–9:05Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition
113. 9:05–9:09of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent
114. 9:09–9:10object.
115. 9:10–9:15Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and
116. 9:15–9:19the same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence
117. 9:19–9:22cannot reside in the same substrate.
118. 9:22–9:26Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes absence of defect
119. 9:26–9:28the cause of valid cognition.
120. 9:28–9:33The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim,
121. 9:33–9:36some merits cause some valid cognitions.
122. 9:36–9:40It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily
123. 9:40–9:42arise from absence of merit.
124. 9:42–9:49Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of non-existent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects.
125. 9:49–9:59If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either.
126. 9:59–10:04Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause.
127. 10:04–10:09A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and
128. 10:09–10:13its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid
129. 10:13–10:14cognition.
130. 10:14–10:18Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid
131. 10:18–10:19cognition.
132. 10:19–10:24Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant,
133. 10:24–10:28therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition.
134. 10:28–10:32Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once
135. 10:32–10:37Once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises.
136. 10:37–10:41A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property.
137. 10:41–10:45If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion
138. 10:45–10:49in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being
139. 10:49–10:53the counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual
140. 10:53–10:58dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself.
141. 10:58–11:02If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even
142. 11:02–11:05When considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would
143. 11:05–11:08consequently be invalid rather than valid.
144. 11:08–11:12If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies
145. 11:12–11:15equally to merits.
146. 11:15–11:21Saka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition.
147. 11:21–11:26The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither
148. 11:26–11:28valid nor invalid cognition.
149. 11:28–11:34Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo
150. 11:34–11:40is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises.
151. 11:40–11:45Here absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should
152. 11:45–11:50be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well.
153. 11:50–11:54Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because
154. 11:54–12:00Because the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch.
155. 12:00–12:03It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I
156. 12:03–12:08am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a
157. 12:08–12:09merit.
158. 12:09–12:14Answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception
159. 12:14–12:17of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity
160. 12:17–12:20error does not arise.
161. 12:20–12:25It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition
162. 12:25–12:30of that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same class, and
163. 12:30–12:32not in its absence.
164. 12:32–12:37Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise
165. 12:37–12:40be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere.
166. 12:40–12:45Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair
167. 12:45–12:50located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other
168. 12:50–12:53hair of the same class.
169. 12:53–12:58Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because
170. 12:58–13:03if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid.
171. 13:03–13:07It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature
172. 13:07–13:13causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence,
173. 13:13–13:19of the distinction will cause valid cognition. Answer perception of the distinguishing feature
174. 13:19–13:24causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect not in the capacity of a merit or
175. 13:24–13:32positive operation. The M'saqa view absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality.
176. 13:34–13:38Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are
177. 13:38–13:43necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect.
178. 13:44–13:48It should not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must be
179. 13:48–13:53generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony,
180. 13:53–13:57mere non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition.
181. 13:58–14:02It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this
182. 14:02–14:07invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for
183. 14:07–14:13them to produce invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are
184. 14:13–14:18non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid
185. 14:18–14:24cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only
186. 14:24–14:29non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice,
187. 14:29–14:35being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from
188. 14:35–14:40greater intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical
189. 14:40–14:45cognition of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one
190. 14:45–14:51distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction
191. 14:51–14:55is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition,
192. 14:55–14:59it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition
193. 14:59–15:06of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection, in producing valid visual cognition,
194. 15:06–15:10the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is
195. 15:10–15:16absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect causes invalid cognition. If that same
196. 15:16–15:20defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow that a defect
197. 15:20–15:26becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. Invalid cognition, being produced by
198. 15:26–15:32contact would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging
199. 15:32–15:36to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty.
200. 15:37–15:41When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished.
201. 15:42–15:46If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both over
202. 15:46–15:48extension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence.
203. 15:50–15:55Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition
204. 15:55–16:00and in cognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present
205. 16:00–16:06in invalid cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing
206. 16:06–16:14an additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Nyayaka reply, merits are specific, not
207. 16:14–16:20recurrent. The Nyayaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally
208. 16:20–16:25in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition
209. 16:25–16:29of perversion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific
210. 16:29–16:34merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is
211. 16:34–16:39established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason
212. 16:39–16:43are specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a
213. 16:43–16:47distinguishing feature is a specific merit of perception.
214. 16:47–16:51The Memsaka proposes that only the cause of perception of the distinction should be accepted
215. 16:51–16:55as the cause of valid perception, because absence of valid perception follows from absence
216. 16:55–16:56of that cause.
217. 16:56–17:01Otherwise, why would mere perception of the distinction not arise in such a condition?
218. 17:01–17:05If it is said that requiring a further perception of distinction to produce perception of distinction
219. 17:05–17:10causes infinite regress, then, if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded
220. 17:10–17:15object, doubt about validity in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible.
221. 17:15–17:19in an object possessing hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness.
222. 17:19–17:23The Naya Yaka will ask how perception of the Paveya is possible without perception of
223. 17:23–17:25the distinction.
224. 17:25–17:29The reply is that perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual
225. 17:29–17:31arising after doubt or error.
226. 17:31–17:35On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition
227. 17:35–17:39of an individual arising after doubt or error.
228. 17:39–17:41But this proposal too is unsound.
229. 17:41–17:47Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the
230. 17:47–17:51causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions
231. 17:51–17:55of individuals arising after doubt or error.
232. 17:55–17:59Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises
233. 17:59–18:04from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction.
234. 18:04–18:08Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other
235. 18:08–18:11means of knowledge.
236. 18:11–18:16Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and
237. 18:16–18:20not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception.
238. 18:20–18:25Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate
239. 18:25–18:30is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here.
240. 18:30–18:34Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while
241. 18:34–18:38contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of
242. 18:38–18:42sublator and sublated would be impossible.
243. 18:42–18:46It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates.
244. 18:46–18:50Even invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition
245. 18:50–18:52of a post.
246. 18:52–18:57Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because
247. 18:57–19:03a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated.
248. 19:03–19:08Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the
249. 19:08–19:13sublator, here only cognition produced by the veridical perception of a distinguishing feature
250. 19:13–19:18has been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow,
251. 19:18–19:22veridical cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is
252. 19:22–19:26perceived, and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness,
253. 19:26–19:30is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion
254. 19:30–19:35causes valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features
255. 19:35–19:39as opposed as the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional
256. 19:39–19:44illusion and in the identity error, I am fair. But invalid cognition of a post arising after
257. 19:44–19:49doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs.
258. 19:49–19:54Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively
259. 19:54–19:59of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting
260. 19:59–20:04in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition
261. 20:04–20:10of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit.
262. 20:11–20:16Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of
263. 20:16–20:21sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established.
264. 20:23–20:29That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition. Therefore perception of an individual distinction
265. 20:29–20:34opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid perceptual cognition.
266. 20:34–20:39But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction,
267. 20:39–20:41so this is not its cause.
268. 20:41–20:45Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects
269. 20:45–20:49such as an illusory mark, true subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be
270. 20:49–20:51accepted as causes.
271. 20:51–20:57Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition
272. 20:57–21:02of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

Plain text

DOCTRIN, VALIDITY IS PRODUCED BY AMERIT The Neayaka replies that, on the Msokka view, invalid cognition too would in the same way have to be produced intrinsically merely from its own uncommon causal aggregate and not extrinsically from any additional defect. For if invalid cognition, like valid cognition, were produced solely from non-recurrent or uncommon causes of cognition, no separate defect could be a cause of its production. It may be said that, even when the cognitive aggregate is present, a defect corresponding to non-perception of a distinguishing feature, jaundice, and the like produces invalid cognition. Answer, valid cognition of the same object arises from perception of the distinguishing feature and absence of jaundice and the like, but not from mere absence of defects. An efficient cause is indispensable to the production of valid cognition, why then should valid cognition not also be regarded as produced extrinsically by an additional cause? Moreover, the cause-effect relation includes regularity, because of deviation, overextension, In similar defects, regularity is not based on relations between individuals. Consequently, the cause-effect relation that accounts for regularity must be both conducive to production of the effect and recurrent. Therefore, as an invalid cognition, a recurrent cause excluding irregular effects must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. Cloth, an effect heterogeneous to a pot, is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to the clay that causes a pot. Otherwise differences among heterogeneous effects would be merely accidental. An effect belonging to the class of pot cognitions is produced by sense contact with a pot, and this contact is a cause heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, hence there is no causal deviation. Therefore the inference is established, a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition, like a pot. Thus, when a recurring cause of valid cognition in general is admitted, the inference valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause inhibiting its contrary cognition, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition, does not suffer from proving what is already established. This recurring cause must be conducive to producing the effect. The Neayaka therefore establishes that, as in invalid cognition, a recurrent cause must also be admitted in the production of valid cognition. The Neayaka says that cloth as an effect is heterogeneous to a pot as an effect and is produced from threads, a cause heterogeneous to clay, the cause of a pot. To explain heterogeneity among effects, heterogeneity among causes must be accepted. An effect of the class of pot cognition is produced by sense contact with a pot, this contact is heterogeneous to the cause of an effect heterogeneous to pot cognition, so there is no deviation in the causal relation. Hence the inference a non-eternal valid cognition is produced by a cause heterogeneous to the cause of invalid cognition, because it is an effect heterogeneous to invalid cognition establishes the effect hood of cognition. Nor does the following inference prove what is already established, valid cognition is produced by a kind of cause that inhibits experience, because, like invalid cognition, it is a produced cognition. The reason is that the Neayaka accepts a recurrent cause as the cause producing valid cognition in general. Examples and justification of other inferences. Being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits effected, because, like invalidity, it is a property residing in all effects without obstruction. But a complex property such as blue pot hood does not delimit effect hood because it is nearly an aggregate of two distinct recurrent constituents, blueness and pot hood. There is likewise an inhibitor to treating pot cognition hood and similar properties as delimiters of effect hood. Granted that in the case of a blue pot the recurrent unseen merit of the person serving food is also a cause, otherwise the unseen would cease to be a cause of effects in general. Likewise, a recurrent cause excluded from invalid cognition must be admitted in the production of non-eternal valid cognition. Being a non-eternal valid cognition is a property delimiting an effect hood that determines a causality distinct from the causality determined by an effect hood related through non-eternal cognition hood, because it pervades effect hood delimited by non-eternal cognition hood. This is required in order to admit a recurrent effect. It is further said that being a non-eternal valid cognition delimits an effect hood determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect hood that is absent from illusion, like pot hood. Therefore valid cognition, like a pot, is an effect produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. Similarly, being a valid visual cognition delimits an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid visual cognition, because it is a property delimiting effect to an absent from visual illusion, like pothood. Again, being a non-eternal deritical cognition of silver delimits an effect to determining a causality delimited is not delimiting the causality determined by the cause of invalid cognition concerning silver, because it is a property delimiting effect hood absent from an illusion of silver, like pothood. Without this regulator, the rule would become impossible that visual cognition of silver makes silverness present in silver its mode but does not make non-silverness absent from silver its mode. Although the causal aggregates are alike in both situations, valid cognition is produced extrinsically by a distinct cause. refutation of the extraneous condition and establishment of merit and defect as the causes of validity and invalidity. The men's aca objects that in the inference whose probandom is, being produced by a cause different from the cause of invalid cognition, the condition of being different from valid cognition is an extraneous condition. It cannot be said that mere difference from the subject is the extraneous condition, because naiyayika's regard God's cognition as valid cognition alone, while the subject of inference is that which is to be excluded from the negative instance. The property excluding the negative instance and accepted by both parties is primary, but because of complexity, a property excluding the subject cannot be primary for both. Difference from the subject is not an extraneous condition merely because a purely negative reason is uncommon, but here, in your view, God's cognition is the only positive instance, and difference from the subject is absent there. This objection is unsound. Because the contradiction involved in the negative instance blocks its possibility, the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the alleged extraneous condition cannot pervade the probandom or make the reason deviant. The Mtsaka again says that absence of defects such as jaundice causes valid cognition, thus validity arises unobstructedly and intrinsically from the cognitive aggregate alone. A follower of the Mishra view may say that absence of defect is not a cause but merely distinguishes the aggregate of valid cognition, like Stathwood delimiting causality. This reasoning is unsound. When a hibiscus flower is present, valid cognition of whiteness in a crystal does not arise, but it does arise when the hibiscus is absent. Therefore, because absence of the defect is not otherwise established, it must be accepted as a cause of valid cognition. Answer, valid cognition arises from the joint presence of all merits, including complete sense contact with most parts and perception of a distinguishing feature, invalid cognition arises in their absence. What prevents us, then, from regarding merely the presence of merits as the cause of valid cognition and absence of merit as the cause of invalid cognition? Absence of merit is not a cause. Absence of the merit producing valid cognition whose object is an existent thing cannot be conducive to invalid cognition whose object is non-existent. Under the epistemological rule that cognition takes only existent things as its object, absence of a merit producing valid cognition cannot cause invalid cognition. It may be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object can cause valid cognition of an existent object, because valid cognition takes only existent objects, whereas invalid cognition does not take only non-existent objects. Answer, on this account invalid cognition would never take an existent object, there is no proof for such a rule. It may again be said that absence of a defect producing invalid cognition of a non-existent object causes only valid cognition of an existent object. Answer, then simply admit that the merit consisting in sense object contact causes valid cognition of an existent object and absence of that merit causes invalid cognition of a non-existent object. Objection, absence of merit equally governs a particular object, therefore one and the same cognition cannot simultaneously be valid and invalid, since merit and its absence cannot reside in the same substrate. Answer, this difficulty equally afflicts the Memsaka view, which makes absence of defect the cause of valid cognition. The claim, some defects cause some invalid cognitions, parallels the Nayaika claim, some merits cause some valid cognitions. It may further be said that invalid cognition of nonexistent objects in general would necessarily arise from absence of merit. Answer, on the Memsaka view too, invalid cognition of non-existent objects in general would necessarily arise from defects. If defects need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object, absence of merit need not produce invalid cognition concerning every kind of object either. Recutation of the objection that merit is not a cause. A further objection, the merit consisting in perception of a distinguishing feature and its absence are non-recurrent, therefore they cannot respectively cause valid and invalid cognition. Let only defects such as jaundice and their absence respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Answer, jaundice and other defects and their absences are also non-recurrent and deviant, therefore they too cannot respectively cause invalid and valid cognition. Absence of a defect is deviant in producing valid cognition of that very defect, once Once jaundice is destroyed, veridical cognition of the defect arises. A further objection, defect could cannot be defined as one recurrent property. If defined as causing a particular illusion, it is non-recurrent, if as causing illusion in general, it is impossible because jaundice and the like are non-recurrent, if as being the counter positive of absence of a cause producing valid cognition, there is mutual dependence, and jaundice itself would become a cause of valid cognition of itself. If defined as inhibiting valid cognition other than valid cognition of itself, even When considering a correct inferential reason would become a defect, an inference would consequently be invalid rather than valid. If it is said that certain things are defects only in certain contexts, the same point applies equally to merits. Saka Objection, absence of defect alone causes valid cognition. The complete causal aggregate of cognition may be present while by itself producing neither valid nor invalid cognition. Nevertheless, when the ocular defect consisting in frog fat is present, the illusion that bamboo is a snake arises, while in its absence the valid cognition of bamboo is bamboo arises. Here absence of the defect causes valid cognition, therefore the same absence of defect should be accepted as causing valid cognition elsewhere as well. Frog fat is a defect only in relation to the eye, not to the tactile sense, because Because the tactile defect is absent, valid cognition of bamboo arises through touch. It may be said that, even when the defective impression producing the identity error, I am fair, is present, the differentiating valid cognition, this is my body, arises from a merit. Answer, because of the identity error is not a defective impression but merely non-perception of the distinguishing feature, because when the distinction is perceived the identity error does not arise. It may again be said that even without ocular contact with distant hair, valid cognition of that hair arises when there is ocular contact merely with other hair of the same class, and not in its absence. Thus ocular contact as merit causes valid cognition of distant hair, and merit should likewise be accepted as the cause of valid cognition elsewhere. Answer, such contact with hair of the same class causes valid perception only of hair located at a distance, valid cognition of nearby hair arises even without contact with other hair of the same class. Even in the case of distant hair, absence of defect must be regarded as a cause, because if an ocular defect were present the cognition of hair would be invalid. It may again be said that the merit consisting in perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition, because non-perception of the distinction is a defect and its absence, of the distinction will cause valid cognition. Answer perception of the distinguishing feature causes valid cognition in the capacity of absence of defect not in the capacity of a merit or positive operation. The M'saqa view absence of defect is the favorable cause of veridicality. Only jaundice and similar conditions that inhibit perception of the distinction are necessarily defects, non-perception of the distinction itself is not a defect. It should not be said that defects such as jaundice are non-recurrent and therefore must be generalized as inhibitors of perception of the distinction, so that, for parsimony, mere non-perception of the distinction should be made the cause of invalid cognition. It is possible to generalize jaundice and the like by saying, this defect causes this invalid cognition, otherwise their very non-generalizability would make it impossible for them to produce invalid cognition. Although production inhibiting defects such as magical gems are non-recurrent, the cause-effect relation is not there by defective, because the cause of valid cognition is the total absence of all defects. It may be said that in every invalid cognition only non-perception of the distinguishing feature is the cause, individual defects such as jaundice, being non-recurrent, lose causal status. Answer, greater intensity of illusion arises from greater intensity of defects such as jaundice. If such defects were absent, why would veridical cognition of the distinction not occur everywhere? If accidentality is avoided by saying that one distinction has no further distinction, there will be infinite regress. Perception of a distinction is neither the cause of all valid cognition nor the cause of a specific valid cognition, it deviates in both. And if perception of a distinction is made the cause of valid cognition of itself, infinite regress follows. A further objection, in producing valid visual cognition, the merit consisting in sense object contact is a cause, while in invalid cognition contact is absent because the object is absent, therefore a defect causes invalid cognition. If that same defect is made a cause of valid cognition, the undesirable consequences follow that a defect becomes a non-defect and valid cognition becomes invalid. Invalid cognition, being produced by contact would also acquire perceptuality. Answer, invalid cognition, the formal component belonging to the object is produced neither by the sense faculty alone nor by a defect of the sense faculty. When contact is absent in invalid cognition, perceptuality is unestablished. If a defect is made the cause of perceptuality in invalid cognition, there will be both over extension to invalid inference and lack of recurrence. Nor should it be said that a merit favorable to validity is present both in valid cognition and in cognition of valid cognition, just as a defect favorable to invalidity is present in invalid cognition. Absence of defects certainly exists in valid cognition, therefore positing an additional recurrent merit is unnecessary. The Nyayaka reply, merits are specific, not recurrent. The Nyayaka replies that there is no single recurrent merit present equally in all valid cognitions. Sense contact with most parts of an object, correct cognition of perversion belonging to a reason, similarity, and cognition of sentence meaning are specific merits causing perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition respectively, this is established by positive and negative concomitants. Just as jaundice and a fallacious reason are specific defects of invalid perception and invalid inference, perception of a distinguishing feature is a specific merit of perception. The Memsaka proposes that only the cause of perception of the distinction should be accepted as the cause of valid perception, because absence of valid perception follows from absence of that cause. Otherwise, why would mere perception of the distinction not arise in such a condition? If it is said that requiring a further perception of distinction to produce perception of distinction causes infinite regress, then, if perception of the pervader is fixed upon the pervaded object, doubt about validity in human perception, as in inference, would become impossible. in an object possessing hands and the like is known through reflexive awareness. The Naya Yaka will ask how perception of the Paveya is possible without perception of the distinction. The reply is that perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. On my view too, the cause of perception of the distinction causes only valid cognition of an individual arising after doubt or error. But this proposal too is unsound. Hands, feet, lips, and the like are individual distinguishing features of each person, the causes of perceiving them are non-recurrent and therefore cannot cause all valid cognitions of individuals arising after doubt or error. Perception of the distinction pervades valid cognition, therefore valid cognition arises from a specific cause, namely perception of the distinction. Conclusion, merit is a cause, and the nature of merit in inference and the other means of knowledge. Objection, when cognition of a pervaded reason is present after doubt, only inference and not perception should arise, because the aggregate of inference is stronger than that of perception. Answer, the inferential aggregate may be stronger elsewhere, but here the perceptual aggregate is stronger, because a reflexive awareness arises in the form, I see a person here. Thus cognition known to arise from perception of a distinguishing feature sublates, while contrary cognition arising from such perception is sublated, otherwise the regularity of sublator and sublated would be impossible. It should not be said that valid cognition alone sublates. Even invalid cognition of a person arising from an illusion of hands sublates cognition of a post. Nor is only valid cognition that sublates a contrary invalid cognition a sublator, because a semblance of validity produced by illusion is like the invalid cognition that is sublated. Nor is it correct to regard only a valid cognition not otherwise established as the sublator, here only cognition produced by the veridical perception of a distinguishing feature has been called the sublator. The objection that in the illusion, the conch is yellow, veridical cognition of the conch's whiteness fails to arise even though the distinction is perceived, and therefore perception of the distinction does not cause cognition of whiteness, is unsound. Presence of a perception of the distinction opposed to the illusion causes valid cognition. Perception of the visible person's distinguishing features as opposed as the illusion of a post, the same pattern of sublation is experienced in directional illusion and in the identity error, I am fair. But invalid cognition of a post arising after doubt because a defect is present, no such perception of the distinction occurs. Moreover, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition arise not merely from absence respectively of a fallacious reason, false similarity, and false sentence meaning, merits consisting in correct reflection on the reason, correct cognition of similarity, and correct cognition of sentence meaning are established as causes. Thus valid cognition arises from merit. Valid cognition concerning the Veda also arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, hence the existence of the Lord God, the substrate of the Veda, is established. That is, merit is the cause of valid cognition. Therefore perception of an individual distinction opposed to perceptual illusion causes valid perceptual cognition. But valid cognition arising after doubt does not possess such perception of distinction, so this is not its cause. Inference and the other means likewise do not arise merely from absence of defects such as an illusory mark, true subsumptive reflection and other merits must also be accepted as causes. Similarly, valid verbal cognition arises from the merit consisting in correct cognition of sentence meaning, therefore merit is established as the cause of valid Vedic cognition as well.

← Transcript index