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Episode2_Part7_RadioPlay.mp4

Collection

Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

Status

asr-draft

Human verified

No

Editorial review

not-reviewed

ASR model

small

Detected language

en (0.995)

Duration

20:39

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Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

1. 0:02–0:06आपसंष of error is not a cause.
2. 0:06–0:08अपसंष of error is not a cause.
3. 0:08–0:10अपसंष of error is not a cause.
4. 0:10–0:12अपसंष of error is not a cause.
5. 0:12–0:14अपसंष of error is not a cause.
6. 0:14–0:16अपसंष of error is not a cause.
7. 0:16–0:18अपसंष of error is not a cause.
8. 0:18–0:20अपसंष of error is not a cause.
9. 0:20–0:22अपसंष of error is not a cause.
10. 0:22–0:24अपसंष of error is not a cause.
11. 0:24–0:26अपसंष of error is not a cause.
12. 0:26–0:28अपसंष of error is not a cause.
13. 0:28–0:30अपसंष of error is not a cause.
14. 0:30–0:34cause, correct cognition of sentence meaning alone cause is valid cognition from ordinary
15. 0:34–0:40sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless.
16. 0:40–0:43A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are
17. 0:43–0:47absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning.
18. 0:47–0:50Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition
19. 0:50–0:54in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause
20. 0:54–0:56of that inference.
21. 0:56–1:01Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of
22. 1:01–1:05defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition.
23. 1:05–1:11Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition.
24. 1:11–1:16It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness
25. 1:16–1:20and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause
26. 1:20–1:24is needlessly complex.
27. 1:24–1:29is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge, moreover, when causality
28. 1:29–1:36is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of such complexity does not arise.
29. 1:36–1:40Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal
30. 1:40–1:43faultlessness in them.
31. 1:43–1:46It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block
32. 1:46–1:50the causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in
33. 1:50–1:56both Vedic and ordinary speech absence of defects or faultlessness alone causes valid cognition.
34. 1:57–2:01Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness.
35. 2:02–2:07This too is untenable. The opposing inhibitor can be refuted.
36. 2:08–2:13A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of there is a pot,
37. 2:13–2:17a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to a Buddhist
38. 2:17–2:22kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted as valid merely
39. 2:22–2:28from absence of a speaker's defect. Such sentences, not depending on another means such as inference,
40. 2:28–2:34would then become like the Veda. Consideration of the objection that the statements of a
41. 2:34–2:42mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot are not valid. An objection arises, on the naiyayika view,
42. 2:42–2:46how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver, or a parrot be valid or authoritative
43. 2:46–2:51when they are not produced from merit. It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a
44. 2:51–2:56sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of the
45. 2:56–3:01speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference
46. 3:01–3:06proving their invalidity would be contradicted. Some teachers say that the utterances of the
47. 3:06–3:11mistaken person and deceiver lack semantic fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to
48. 3:11–3:16the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound.
49. 3:17–3:22A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking
50. 3:22–3:26some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the
51. 3:26–3:30non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance
52. 3:30–3:36of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot
53. 3:36–3:40produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind.
54. 3:41–3:43This too is unsound.
55. 3:43–3:51When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied.
56. 3:52–4:00When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced.
57. 4:01–4:06On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke,
58. 4:06–4:10that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as the mark.
59. 4:11–4:14nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire,
60. 4:14–4:17for recognition takes the same fire as its object.
61. 4:18–4:21In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow,
62. 4:21–4:24it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom,
63. 4:24–4:27identity with another substancehood cannot be superimposed.
64. 4:28–4:32Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation.
65. 4:33–4:36Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous,
66. 4:36–4:40the inference remains valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom.
67. 4:41–4:44The traditionalists reply
68. 4:45–4:54The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause.
69. 4:55–5:05Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition of sentence meaning.
70. 5:05–5:11meaning. Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the
71. 5:11–5:13utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda.
72. 5:15–5:18It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false
73. 5:18–5:22statements disappear, because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God.
74. 5:23–5:28This objection is unsound. A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent,
75. 5:28–5:33cannot be an object of God's cognition. If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious
76. 5:33–5:37mark, the cause of God's inference is only the correct cognition of the existence of the
77. 5:37–5:41genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the probandom fire, not the false component of the mark.
78. 5:42–5:43This is the traditionalist view.
79. 5:45–5:50The Neyayaka reply, semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits.
80. 5:52–5:56The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of
81. 5:56–6:00sentence meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition.
82. 6:00–6:06For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct
83. 6:06–6:12cognition of that fitness, are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error,
84. 6:12–6:17negligence or deception, correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning
85. 6:17–6:23is sublated. Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance can
86. 6:23–6:27base a meaning different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting
87. 6:27–6:33expressing and cognition of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming
88. 6:33–6:38to the speech of a trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present
89. 6:38–6:39there.
90. 6:39–6:44It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, how he exists, would be valid even
91. 6:44–6:48in the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend vayu, while the hearer, through an
92. 6:48–6:53error about the speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition
93. 6:53–6:57of fitness favorable to the lion's sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition
94. 6:57–7:03of a lion would be valid. Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted. But if
95. 7:03–7:08the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by the
96. 7:08–7:12speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in the sense
97. 7:12–7:17of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition
98. 7:17–7:20of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid
99. 7:20–7:23cognition.
100. 7:23–7:28The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda.
101. 7:28–7:33Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted
102. 7:33–7:37as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted
103. 7:37–7:39as a merit in the Veda.
104. 7:39–7:43The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical
105. 7:43–7:47person because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence
106. 7:47–7:50meaning, like the sentence, bring the cow.
107. 7:50–7:53This inference establishes God as the speaker.
108. 7:53–7:55This objection is unsound.
109. 7:55–7:59The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct
110. 7:59–8:04cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present,
111. 8:04–8:07as is correct cognition of fitness.
112. 8:07–8:10Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless.
113. 8:10–8:14A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted
114. 8:14–8:17as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible
115. 8:17–8:20in the Veda without such cognition?
116. 8:20–8:24Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required
117. 8:24–8:28for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence
118. 8:28–8:30meaning from these words.
119. 8:30–8:35There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause.
120. 8:35–8:38That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting
121. 8:38–8:42the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the
122. 8:42–8:45separate cause of the use of each word.
123. 8:45–8:49Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the
124. 8:49–8:54speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's
125. 8:54–8:58correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary
126. 8:58–9:03speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayayika replies that the purpose of the
127. 9:03–9:07speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted person and that person's
128. 9:07–9:11activity, the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group.
129. 9:12–9:15The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions.
130. 9:15–9:20Intention is not a merit.
131. 9:20–9:24It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object
132. 9:24–9:26of a speaker's intention.
133. 9:26–9:31Intention is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning.
134. 9:31–9:34Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless
135. 9:34–9:38God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated
136. 9:38–9:41by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning.
137. 9:41–9:46If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows.
138. 9:46–9:50Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate
139. 9:50–9:55every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition
140. 9:55–9:57of Vedic meaning arises.
141. 9:57–10:00In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of
142. 10:00–10:04all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit.
143. 10:04–10:07This proposal is unsound.
144. 10:07–10:10A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme with Mechron as it
145. 10:10–10:16with Mekron, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention of communicating
146. 10:16–10:21its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning necessarily
147. 10:21–10:26has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional
148. 10:26–10:31recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession
149. 10:31–10:37of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately
150. 10:37–10:39accept God.
151. 10:39–10:43Objection. How can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention of communicating
152. 10:43–10:47a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning?
153. 10:47–10:51Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech
154. 10:51–10:53and its meaning could not be determined.
155. 10:53–10:56Answer. This is unsound.
156. 10:56–10:59In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge
157. 10:59–11:03of Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgas and the like, and at some
158. 11:03–11:08time must have recited the Veda with the intention of communicating those meanings. That recitation
159. 11:08–11:11alone establishes that the Veda has been uttered with intention.
160. 11:12–11:17The Prabhupāda view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced.
161. 11:19–11:23The Prabhupāda-Kramsakas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the
162. 11:23–11:29complete causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known. Veridicality,
163. 11:29–11:34which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause of unwavering
164. 11:34–11:40activity, is the validity of a means of cognition. This validity is produced from the aggregate of
165. 11:40–11:46cognition in general and awaits neither merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the
166. 11:46–11:53causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false,
167. 11:53–11:57cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition is equally cognition.
168. 11:57–12:04The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that it produces
169. 12:04–12:10contrary activity. Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the
170. 12:10–12:14cognition, this is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced
171. 12:14–12:19extrinsically by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not
172. 12:19–12:25the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt
173. 12:25–12:27Contrary Conduct
174. 12:27–12:31Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property and
175. 12:31–12:35substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically
176. 12:35–12:39through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect
177. 12:39–12:43produced non-apprehension of non-relation, or through relation to a defect after cognition
178. 12:43–12:44has arisen.
179. 12:44–12:47It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone.
180. 12:47–12:52Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition.
181. 12:52–12:56as the causality of contri-activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically
182. 12:56–13:02known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition.
183. 13:02–13:05Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition, because there is
184. 13:05–13:10deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not
185. 13:10–13:15from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate
186. 13:15–13:20of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition
187. 13:20–13:24of a non-existent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to
188. 13:24–13:28apprehend an unrelated non-existent object.
189. 13:28–13:32Varidicality is intrinsically known.
190. 13:32–13:37Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect
191. 13:37–13:39causes invalidity.
192. 13:39–13:44Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity.
193. 13:44–13:47Answer, this is unsound.
194. 13:47–13:51One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a non-existent object, depend
195. 13:51–13:55on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object it
196. 13:55–13:58can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition.
197. 13:58–14:02With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect
198. 14:02–14:04and absence of defect.
199. 14:04–14:08Therefore defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity
200. 14:08–14:11and invalidity.
201. 14:11–14:14Cognitive validity is the condition of taking as object a thing possessing the
202. 14:14–14:17the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that
203. 14:17–14:20same qualifier residing in the thing.
204. 14:20–14:25As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits
205. 14:25–14:29and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking as object
206. 14:29–14:32the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness.
207. 14:32–14:35No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of
208. 14:35–14:38proof.
209. 14:38–14:39An Alternative Prabhupra View
210. 14:39–14:45Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive
211. 14:45–14:50aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing validity
212. 14:50–14:55is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining an object,
213. 14:55–14:58activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone.
214. 14:59–15:03It may be said that determination of an object as, this thing is so, depends on
215. 15:03–15:09knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as,
216. 15:09–15:12This thing has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object,
217. 15:12–15:16why then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity?
218. 15:17–15:21Because validity is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the
219. 15:21–15:25cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara further says,
220. 15:25–15:29grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity,
221. 15:29–15:33is not determination of the object. Then a second cognition dependent on the validity
222. 15:33–15:38of the first could not determine its own object either. Therefore describing validity is
223. 15:38–15:43pointless from the standpoint of object determination. A second cognition of validity would be needed
224. 15:43–15:47to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite
225. 15:47–15:51regress. The view that validity is extrinsically
226. 15:51–15:55known or produced from merit or absence of defect also produces regress if only a second
227. 15:55–15:59cognition whose validity has previously been known determines the validity of the first.
228. 15:59–16:04Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first,
229. 16:04–16:08And a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second.
230. 16:08–16:12Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object.
231. 16:12–16:16Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity,
232. 16:16–16:21the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity.
233. 16:21–16:25Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object
234. 16:25–16:27is intrinsically known.
235. 16:27–16:30When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second
236. 16:30–16:35cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress.
237. 16:35–16:39The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity.
238. 16:39–16:44After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs.
239. 16:44–16:48To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing
240. 16:48–16:52the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive
241. 16:52–16:56validity, even the Niyayika accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object
242. 16:56–17:00validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
243. 17:00–17:02The Prabhakara conclusion
244. 17:02–17:08Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive
245. 17:08–17:10aggregate.
246. 17:10–17:14Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would
247. 17:14–17:18be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted.
248. 17:18–17:21Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise?
249. 17:21–17:24Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity.
250. 17:24–17:28Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition
251. 17:28–17:31does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here.
252. 17:33–17:38Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or
253. 17:38–17:43falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition
254. 17:43–17:48is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of
255. 17:48–17:52distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct
256. 17:52–17:57alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt
257. 17:57–18:01about validity extrinsically, and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it.
258. 18:02–18:06The Prima-Facey theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality,
259. 18:06–18:11which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause,
260. 18:11–18:14therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate.
261. 18:15–18:19Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the
262. 18:19–18:25cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is
263. 18:25–18:29determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced
264. 18:29–18:35from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The
265. 18:35–18:40Nayaika himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object,
266. 18:40–18:45not merely from experientiality, because memory would be a counter example. In scholastic
267. 18:45–18:49etic usage, experience, and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence
268. 18:49–18:52from independence upon a latent impression.
269. 18:52–18:56Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on an
270. 18:56–18:59impression.
271. 18:59–19:03Recutation of the Prabhakara view
272. 19:03–19:06Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view.
273. 19:06–19:09Experience establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt
274. 19:09–19:15about that validity, causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this.
275. 19:15–19:18Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object.
276. 19:18–19:22In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the
277. 19:22–19:27object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt
278. 19:27–19:29about cognitive validity.
279. 19:29–19:34If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object validity
280. 19:34–19:38will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form of two opposing cognitions
281. 19:38–19:41whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object.
282. 19:41–19:49Therefore an illusion like cognition such as this is silver does not produce unwavering activity activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion
283. 19:50–19:56Objection in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises because the validity of the object is determined
284. 19:57–20:02There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition
285. 20:02–20:08This doubt inhibits unwavering activity when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition activity arises
286. 20:08–20:13Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning
287. 20:13–20:18something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity.
288. 20:18–20:24Therefore only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity.
289. 20:24–20:27Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion
290. 20:27–20:31and activity sometimes fails despite its presence.
291. 20:31–20:34Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the
292. 20:34–20:36course is needlessly complex.

Plain text

आपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. अपसंष of error is not a cause. cause, correct cognition of sentence meaning alone cause is valid cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even the memsaka could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause of that inference. Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly complex. is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge, moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of such complexity does not arise. Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness in them. It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author block the causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic and ordinary speech absence of defects or faultlessness alone causes valid cognition. Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness. This too is untenable. The opposing inhibitor can be refuted. A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of there is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect. Such sentences, not depending on another means such as inference, would then become like the Veda. Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot are not valid. An objection arises, on the naiyayika view, how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver, or a parrot be valid or authoritative when they are not produced from merit. It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted. Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceiver lack semantic fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind. This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced. On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke, that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as the mark. nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for recognition takes the same fire as its object. In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow, it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom, identity with another substancehood cannot be superimposed. Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation. Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom. The traditionalists reply The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause. Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition of sentence meaning. meaning. Aṃsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda. It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements disappear, because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God. This objection is unsound. A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition. If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the probandom fire, not the false component of the mark. This is the traditionalist view. The Neyayaka reply, semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits. The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition. For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness and the other conditions, or correct cognition of that fitness, are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence or deception, correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated. Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance can base a meaning different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting expressing and cognition of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there. It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, how he exists, would be valid even in the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend vayu, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to the lion's sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid. Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted. But if the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by the speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in the sense of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid cognition. The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda. Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted as a merit in the Veda. The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning, like the sentence, bring the cow. This inference establishes God as the speaker. This objection is unsound. The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present, as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless. A further objection, in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as a cause of authoritative utterance, how then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda without such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence meaning from these words. There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause. That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the separate cause of the use of each word. Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayayika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity, the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group. The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions. Intention is not a merit. It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object of a speaker's intention. Intention is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit. This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of Mme with Mechron as it with Mekron, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately accept God. Objection. How can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention of communicating a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning? Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech and its meaning could not be determined. Answer. This is unsound. In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of Vedic meanings based on study of the Sixth Vedgas and the like, and at some time must have recited the Veda with the intention of communicating those meanings. That recitation alone establishes that the Veda has been uttered with intention. The Prabhupāda view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced. The Prabhupāda-Kramsakas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known. Veridicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition. This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition is equally cognition. The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that it produces contrary activity. Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition, this is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt Contrary Conduct Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect produced non-apprehension of non-relation, or through relation to a defect after cognition has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition. as the causality of contri-activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition. Defect and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition, because there is deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a non-existent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated non-existent object. Varidicality is intrinsically known. Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect causes invalidity. Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity. Answer, this is unsound. One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a non-existent object, depend on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition. With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect and absence of defect. Therefore defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity and invalidity. Cognitive validity is the condition of taking as object a thing possessing the the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing in the thing. As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking as object the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof. An Alternative Prabhupra View Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may be said that determination of an object as, this thing is so, depends on knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as, This thing has the form of silver, rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity, is not determination of the object. Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object either. Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination. A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite regress. The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect also produces regress if only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first, And a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second. Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object. Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity, the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity. Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known. When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress. The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity. After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs. To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even the Niyayika accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara conclusion Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, would be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted. Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise? Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity. Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here. Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity extrinsically, and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality, which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause, therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate. Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Nayaika himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from experientiality, because memory would be a counter example. In scholastic etic usage, experience, and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression. Recutation of the Prabhakara view Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view. Experience establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity, causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this. Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object. In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt about cognitive validity. If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object validity will equally be present in illusion, because illusion has the form of two opposing cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion like cognition such as this is silver does not produce unwavering activity activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion Objection in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises because the validity of the object is determined There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition This doubt inhibits unwavering activity when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition activity arises Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity. Therefore only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity. Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion and activity sometimes fails despite its presence. Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the course is needlessly complex.

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