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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:14The Saddhi section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge.
0:14–0:19It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers.
0:19–0:31It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention.
0:31–0:39In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda.
0:40–0:42Verbal Testimony and Objections
0:42–0:49What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayikas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nya-Yakas refute them?
0:50–0:52The Four Pillars of Sentence Cognition
0:52–0:58What are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention,
0:58–1:02and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them?
1:03–1:07The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal,
1:07–1:13and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
1:14–1:20To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy.
1:21–1:24Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation.
1:24–1:31The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge.
1:31–1:38An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect.
1:38–1:42They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical
1:42–1:47verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge.
1:47–1:52The Naya Yaka's, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision.
1:52–1:57They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory.
1:57–2:01They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions,
2:01–2:06aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce for ridical verbal cognition.
2:06–2:10If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that
2:10–2:13is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate
2:13–2:16conditions are absent.
2:16–2:20The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikhas subsumed verbal cognition under
2:20–2:21inference.
2:21–2:29The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory.
2:29–2:34If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established.
2:34–2:41If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words.
2:41–2:45When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates
2:45–2:48that claim through words, namely through a sentence.
2:48–2:53If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words
2:53–2:56have become a means of veridical knowledge.
2:56–3:01Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves
3:01–3:03that words are a means of knowledge.
3:03–3:07This is the self-contradiction.
3:07–3:10After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vyaka
3:10–3:12philosophy.
3:12–3:16The Vyakas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions
3:16–3:21can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge.
3:21–3:26According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison
3:26–3:30is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words,
3:30–3:34that is, the sentence meaning?
3:34–3:37According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings
3:37–3:42of different words is obtained solely through inference.
3:42–3:46They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant
3:46–3:49property is to be established.
3:49–3:54Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge,
3:54–3:58but includes verbal cognition under inference.
3:58–4:02The Vayikhas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other
4:02–4:08required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker.
4:08–4:13The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vyayakas and refute the position
4:13–4:16of the author of the Lila Vadi.
4:16–4:20According to the Neayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected
4:20–4:25word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical
4:25–4:29problem arises before that inference can even occur.
4:29–4:34The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference
4:34–4:39underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot
4:39–4:45already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason
4:45–4:51and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not
4:51–4:55understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is
4:55–5:02already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the viikas is invalid for inference.
5:02–5:08Following this refutation, the Vaikas modify their reason and make being intended to produce
5:08–5:13a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually
5:13–5:17connected meanings, the basis of inference.
5:17–5:22Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Piasa Sankati,
5:22–5:25he waters with liquid?
5:25–5:30How does the new Vaika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail?
5:30–5:33The Neyayaka argument is very precise.
5:33–5:38In their revised reason, the Vyayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing
5:38–5:42cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose
5:42–5:46mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference.
5:46–5:52In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason.
5:52–5:57The Neyayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
5:57–6:02interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person.
6:03–6:07The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows.
6:09–6:14Suppose an untrustworthy person says, payasasankati, while actually intending to convey he waters
6:14–6:20with a coconut shell. Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to
6:20–6:27communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the pro-bandom,
6:27–6:30Does this produce veridical verbal cognition?
6:30–6:37No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person.
6:39–6:46The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandom, veridical cognition in this case, must also be present.
6:47–6:51Here, however, the reason is present while the probandom is absent.
6:52–6:55The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails.
6:55–7:03In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbha-Mana-Yanum-Ti objecthood, bringing, and effort.
7:03–7:10This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly.
7:10–7:16Observe that Karmatbha-Mana-Yanum-Ti is not a complete or meaningful sentence.
7:16–7:24It is nearly a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection.
7:25–7:29The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows.
7:30–7:39Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object.
7:39–7:45object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings,
7:45–7:46is fully present.
7:47–7:53Absence of the probandom, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely
7:53–7:59from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among
7:59–8:06them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom veridical verbal
8:06–8:12cognition does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that
8:12–8:16merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition.
8:17–8:21To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the
8:21–8:26speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting
8:26–8:32argument discussed next. The Bayeca's hold that a hero understands meaning by inferring the
8:32–8:37the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct
8:37–8:42and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition
8:42–8:47of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how,
8:47–8:51on the vayaka theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence?
8:51–8:57The vayakas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot, or
8:57–9:03of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's deritical cognition or intention, is in fact absent.
9:03–9:08They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words
9:08–9:12possess sentential fitness, or the capacity to convey meaning.
9:12–9:16Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and
9:16–9:18understands the meaning.
9:18–9:23Thus, according to the Viikas, the cognition hearer rises not from a genuine inference
9:23–9:27but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention.
9:28–9:32From the Neyayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot,
9:32–9:37such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition,
9:37–9:41is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion?
9:42–9:47How does this situation assist the Neyayakas in establishing words as an independent means of
9:47–9:50knowledge distinct from inference.
9:50–9:55The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether.
9:55–10:00Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original
10:00–10:05veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition.
10:05–10:09If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly
10:09–10:14understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts.
10:14–10:19This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge
10:19–10:22in the following manner.
10:22–10:26According to the Viikas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's
10:26–10:29veritical cognition.
10:29–10:33In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the
10:33–10:38meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is
10:38–10:40impossible.
10:40–10:44If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when
10:44–10:48On the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must arise
10:48–10:54not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words.
10:54–10:58This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is
10:58–11:02an independent means of knowledge in its own right.
11:02–11:07A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning
11:07–11:12to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words,
11:12–11:18it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because
11:18–11:24certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas,
11:24–11:28the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence.
11:29–11:34A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars.
11:35–11:40Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to
11:40–11:44complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent.
11:45–11:50Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one
11:50–11:57another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity, or contiguity,
11:57–12:02the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay.
12:03–12:08Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become
12:08–12:13useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the
12:13–12:19words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features
12:19–12:24are present among those words, the hearer obtains veridical cognition on hearing them.
12:25–12:29An example is now offered to clarify these three features.
12:30–12:35If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karma,
12:35–12:37The question deserves careful thought.
12:37–12:41This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning.
12:41–12:45It principally lacks syntactic expectancy.
12:45–12:49Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions.
12:49–12:57There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another.
12:57–13:03Until expressions possess mutual expression, the verb is used to describe the meaning of the verb.
13:03–13:09Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning.
13:10–13:14The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness.
13:15–13:21The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition.
13:22–13:26Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, moninas and kati.
13:27–13:32This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but,
13:33–13:39Which principle feature, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity is absent from this sentence?
13:41–13:45Watering is possible with water or another liquid. Watering a plant or tree with fire is
13:45–13:52impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness.
13:53–13:58This raises the question, when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible,
13:58–14:04which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent.
14:05–14:11In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically
14:11–14:17contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity
14:17–14:23to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence,
14:23–14:29proximity, or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously,
14:29–14:36without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring.
14:37–14:40Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning?
14:41–14:46If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood.
14:47–14:52Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in
14:52–14:58in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously
14:58–15:04present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all
15:04–15:09the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous
15:09–15:16utterance is called proximity or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring
15:16–15:23Saint Hava, Saint Habamanaya. The word Saint Hava has two meanings, salt and horse.
15:23–15:28No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention,
15:28–15:34context, or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is
15:34–15:39asking for salt or for a horse. The Neyayakas clearly state that in the
15:39–15:44case of Pali-Semis words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular
15:44–15:49intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention
15:49–15:55frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context
15:55–16:01of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's
16:01–16:07intention is not confined to polysemus words, it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification.
16:07–16:14Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti.
16:14–16:19Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise?
16:19–16:23inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise.
16:23–16:27The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms.
16:27–16:32When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout,
16:32–16:37we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention.
16:37–16:42This process is called secondary signification or laka.
16:42–16:47Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and
16:47–16:52the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical
16:52–16:55and independent means of knowledge.
16:55–17:00This question lies at the root of a major in celebrated dispute between Nyaya and MMA
17:00–17:03with Macron essay with Macron philosophy.
17:03–17:08The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter.
17:08–17:13MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds
17:13–17:15are eternal.
17:15–17:20It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether.
17:20–17:23The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as
17:23–17:28switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there.
17:28–17:33Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal.
17:34–17:39According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time,
17:39–17:42just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks.
17:43–17:48To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternity,
17:48–17:51the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience.
17:52–17:57There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being.
17:58–18:01If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere,
18:01–18:03its character would not vary when the speaker changed.
18:04–18:08This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.
18:10–18:15The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations
18:15–18:20of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are
18:20–18:27produced and destroyed. If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether,
18:27–18:30Their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere.
18:31–18:35Yet the real difference is caused by variations in throat, palate,
18:35–18:39and articulatory airshow that sounds are not eternally manifested entities,
18:39–18:41they are produced through physical effort.
18:42–18:47M. M. Withmakran essay Withmakran takes recognition upon hearing a sound,
18:47–18:50this is that very sound ka, as evidence of eternality.
18:51–18:55According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an
18:55–18:59individual sound but the shared universal colloid present in different sounds.
19:01–19:05The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy,
19:05–19:11semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition
19:11–19:18impossible without them? According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions,
19:18–19:23or pillars, are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of
19:23–19:30meaning from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires
19:30–19:36another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gum, a pot, the expression
19:36–19:44anaya, brain, is expected. Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions
19:44–19:50to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is
19:50–19:57absent there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the
19:57–20:02utterance of the expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously.
20:03–20:08The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct
20:08–20:13meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively.
20:15–20:18Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions?
20:18–20:24If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity,
20:24–20:29is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in
20:29–20:33gukkar matvam nayanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it.
20:35–20:39At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in
20:39–20:44gaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation.
20:44–20:51The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according
20:51–20:56to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
20:56–21:03According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows.
21:03–21:07The non-eternality of words, the Nyayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal
21:07–21:12because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air
21:12–21:15and cease after a time, like a pot.
21:15–21:20Themsakas, by contrast, regard them as eternal.
21:20–21:24The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, Themsakas hold the
21:24–21:29Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established.
21:29–21:34The Neayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God.
21:34–21:40At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation,
21:40–21:44The Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God.
21:44–21:49The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition.
21:49–21:54If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued
21:54–21:59from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do the Nayayakas
21:59–22:02insist that it was composed by God?
22:02–22:06The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author
22:06–22:12is remembered, but the Neayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards.
22:13–22:18The Neayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons.
22:19–22:24The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes a
22:24–22:28great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are
22:28–22:34destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot
22:34–22:36not be preserved.
22:36–22:41Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself
22:41–22:45without a conscious and omniscient author.
22:45–22:49Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge
22:49–22:51of the cosmos.
22:51–22:55Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning
22:55–23:00of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered
23:00–23:05logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God.
23:05–23:10The masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution.
23:10–23:14Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless
23:14–23:20and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction.
23:20–23:24According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings is
23:24–23:25eternal.
23:25–23:29Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words
23:29–23:34and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation.
23:34–23:37Hence no divine composition is required.
23:37–23:49The msakas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds.
23:49–23:57In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence.
23:57–24:01The main Neayaka arguments are as follows.
24:01–24:09Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air.
24:09–24:13Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot.
24:13–24:20Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end.
24:20–24:27Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility
24:27–24:31that it is eternal and omnipresent.
24:31–24:36Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal
24:36–24:39quality produced by effort.
24:39–24:44At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to
24:44–24:50recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before.
24:50–24:54According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual
24:54–25:01sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as G.A. hood.
25:01–25:06Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow-wood,
25:06–25:11so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the
25:11–25:16form, this is that very G.A. arises from apprehending the common universal G.A. hood.
25:16–25:21An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains
25:21–25:25common to every member of that class.
25:25–25:30Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist
25:30–25:37Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda?
25:37–25:41When a house is constructed, bricks are made first.
25:41–25:45If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole
25:45–25:49house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal.
25:49–25:54Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words.
25:54–26:01Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort in parish.
26:01–26:09Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal.
26:09–26:13Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words,
26:13–26:17and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal.
26:19–26:25On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established
26:25–26:29entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author.
26:31–26:36At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes
26:36–26:41and composed by God. How is the M. M. A. with Macron essay with Macron claim, neither a human
26:41–26:46being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative, weakened before
26:46–26:52this Nyaya doctrine. The M. M. A. with Macron essay with Macron claim that the Veda is authorless,
26:52–26:57non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons.
26:58–27:03The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort
27:03–27:08and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal.
27:09–27:15The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by
27:15–27:21itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of
27:21–27:28the omniscient God behind the composition of the Veda is logically necessary. The doctrine of
27:28–27:33dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution,
27:33–27:37preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author.
27:39–27:43These Nyeya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Mekhran
27:43–27:47S.A. with Mekhran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless.
27:48–27:53A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution,
27:53–27:58how does the M.M.A. with Mekhran S.A. with Mekhran assertion that the relation between the word
27:58–28:03and its meaning is eternal, become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution.
28:04–28:09According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire
28:09–28:14physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed.
28:15–28:20In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between
28:20–28:23word and meaning is eternal, generates a logical contradiction.
28:23–28:29The principal points of contradiction are these.
28:29–28:33Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning
28:33–28:39is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
28:39–28:44The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
28:44–28:50the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
28:50–28:55According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution,
28:55–28:58it must have some creator or author.
28:58–29:03Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal
29:03–29:08relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
29:08–29:13According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic Dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical
29:13–29:17world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely...
29:17–29:22The principal points of contradiction are these.
29:22–29:26Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning
29:26–29:32is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
29:32–29:36The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
29:36–29:43the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
29:43–29:48According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution,
29:48–29:50it must have some creator or author.
29:50–29:55Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal
29:55–30:01relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
30:01–30:05According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches
30:05–30:11humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the Great Dissolution is as follows.
30:11–30:15The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and
30:15–30:19faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu.
30:19–30:24The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with
30:24–30:28the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered
30:28–30:32tradition and the practices of cultivated persons.
30:32–30:37Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who was considered entirely free of human error
30:37–30:43or defect as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored
30:43–30:48by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition
30:48–30:54and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative?
30:54–30:59The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine
30:59–31:03composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from
31:03–31:10defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable
31:10–31:16to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a
31:16–31:24human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according
31:24–31:29to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect.
31:29–31:39Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative.
31:39–31:49At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient?
31:49–31:51Chapter 2
31:51–31:52number two.

Plain text

The Saddhi section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge. It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers. It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention. In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda. Verbal Testimony and Objections What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayikas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nya-Yakas refute them? The Four Pillars of Sentence Cognition What are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect. They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge. The Naya Yaka's, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce for ridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayikha objection differed from this, the vayikhas subsumed verbal cognition under inference. The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established. If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words. When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge. Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction. After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayaikas confront the objection of Vyaka philosophy. The Vyakas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge. According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference. They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The Vayikhas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker. The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vyayakas and refute the position of the author of the Lila Vadi. According to the Neayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the viikas is invalid for inference. Following this refutation, the Vaikas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Piasa Sankati, he waters with liquid? How does the new Vaika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail? The Neyayaka argument is very precise. In their revised reason, the Vyayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference. In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason. The Neyayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, interpreted as, he waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person. The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows. Suppose an untrustworthy person says, payasasankati, while actually intending to convey he waters with a coconut shell. Presence of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the pro-bandom, Does this produce veridical verbal cognition? No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person. The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandom, veridical cognition in this case, must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while the probandom is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails. In this section the Nayayakas offer another example, Karmatbha-Mana-Yanum-Ti objecthood, bringing, and effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that Karmatbha-Mana-Yanum-Ti is not a complete or meaningful sentence. It is nearly a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows. Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hearer understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object. object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings, is fully present. Absence of the probandom, can the hearer obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection or expectancy among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the probandom veridical verbal cognition does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition. To refute the Bayeca theory that meaning is understood through inference from the speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument discussed next. The Bayeca's hold that a hero understands meaning by inferring the the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the vayaka theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence? The vayakas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot, or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's deritical cognition or intention, is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness, or the capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the Viikas, the cognition hearer rises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention. From the Neyayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the Neyayakas in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference. The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition. If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts. This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner. According to the Viikas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veritical cognition. In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible. If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when On the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words. This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right. A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence. A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars. Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent. Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity, or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay. Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features are present among those words, the hearer obtains veridical cognition on hearing them. An example is now offered to clarify these three features. If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, ga karma, The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual expression, the verb is used to describe the meaning of the verb. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, moninas and kati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but, Which principle feature, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity is absent from this sentence? Watering is possible with water or another liquid. Watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question, when a sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent. In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity, or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously, without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring. Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning? If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood. Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring Saint Hava, Saint Habamanaya. The word Saint Hava has two meanings, salt and horse. No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention, context, or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt or for a horse. The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of Pali-Semis words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemus words, it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification. Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Mac cross anti. Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise? inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise. The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms. When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout, we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention. This process is called secondary signification or laka. Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major in celebrated dispute between Nyaya and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy. The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter. MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there. Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks. To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for eternity, the Neayakas cite examples from direct experience. There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being. If ka were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed. This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds. The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, Their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere. Yet the real difference is caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory airshow that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort. M. M. Withmakran essay Withmakran takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound ka, as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal colloid present in different sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions, or pillars, are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gum, a pot, the expression anaya, brain, is expected. Semantic fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously. The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively. Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkar matvam nayanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in gaya philosophy as the absence of veridical cognition of a defeating relation. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows. The non-eternality of words, the Nyayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakas, by contrast, regard them as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, Themsakas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established. The Neayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God. At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation, The Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do the Nayayakas insist that it was composed by God? The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Neayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards. The Neayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons. The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes a great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot not be preserved. Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God. The masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution. Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction. According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings is eternal. Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The msakas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence. The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very sound ka that I heard before. According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as G.A. hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cow-wood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form, this is that very G.A. arises from apprehending the common universal G.A. hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal. Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words. Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort in parish. Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal. Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal. On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author. At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes and composed by God. How is the M. M. A. with Macron essay with Macron claim, neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative, weakened before this Nyaya doctrine. The M. M. A. with Macron essay with Macron claim that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons. The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal. The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind the composition of the Veda is logically necessary. The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author. These Nyeya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M.M.A. with Mekhran S.A. with Mekhran claim that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless. A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution, how does the M.M.A. with Mekhran S.A. with Mekhran assertion that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal, become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution. According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed. In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between word and meaning is eternal, generates a logical contradiction. The principal points of contradiction are these. Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic Dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely... The principal points of contradiction are these. Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the great dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the Great Dissolution is as follows. The role of God, at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons. Nyaya philosophy thus regards God, who was considered entirely free of human error or defect as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaya philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative? The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative. At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient? Chapter 2 number two.

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