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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.994665)
Duration: 22:18
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:06Konjunction-Kam-inherence is the cause.
0:06–0:12Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherent in an object conjoined with the sense.
0:12–0:16Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object,
0:16–0:21because inherent in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like.
0:21–0:26It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again.
0:26–0:31Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances
0:31–0:36such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception
0:36–0:39of other substances such as whole objects.
0:39–0:43Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent
0:43–0:46in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone.
0:46–0:51A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor,
0:51–0:54conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception
0:54–0:55of odor.
0:55–1:00Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might
1:00–1:03be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor.
1:03–1:07A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with
1:07–1:09the sense, which is unacceptable.
1:09–1:14Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance
1:14–1:17of the odor is present as a qualifier.
1:17–1:21If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with
1:21–1:26the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would
1:26–1:31produce perception of the odor of cloth.
1:31–1:34Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause.
1:34–1:39Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause perception
1:39–1:43of odor, while inherence merely delimits causality.
1:43–1:46This view is equivalent to the view that inherence in a conjoined object is the
1:46–1:51cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth.
1:51–1:55is the argument sound that inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction
1:55–2:00nor inherence nor both. On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a
2:00–2:04combination of conjunction and inherence, inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded
2:04–2:08as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction in calling this
2:08–2:12relation conjunction come inherence, nor does calling it something more conflict
2:12–2:18with Naya. The Nayayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inherence
2:18–2:23and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction
2:23–2:25cum inheritance.
2:25–2:29This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue
2:29–2:35cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like.
2:35–2:41Conjunction cum inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal.
2:41–2:44The objection that color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance
2:44–2:48residing in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound.
2:48–2:53Though inherent in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color,
2:53–2:56taste, and the like is apprehended through inherence of those qualities in the conjoined
2:56–2:58object.
2:58–3:05Nor is similarity among colors apprehended merely through similarity among substances.
3:05–3:09Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable,
3:09–3:13therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect
3:13–3:19relation. Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ.
3:21–3:26Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by
3:26–3:33recurrent cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color
3:33–3:39prove the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the
3:39–3:45eye because that would overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the like
3:45–3:52is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense
3:52–3:59faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue
3:59–4:05and yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or
4:05–4:09substances composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance.
4:10–4:15Hence the consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible.
4:16–4:24It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty.
4:24–4:30If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universal such as colorness,
4:30–4:36one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities, mutual dependence would then follow.
4:36–4:42Nor is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument.
4:42–4:53Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste, or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense.
4:53–5:01Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness.
5:01–5:06Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness because it overextends to yellowness.
5:07–5:11Further objection that individual colors are one.
5:12–5:22Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color.
5:23–5:29It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would become a universal.
5:29–5:36A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance.
5:36–5:44The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to individual blueness.
5:44–5:52Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from difference between two colors.
5:52–5:58In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion.
5:58–6:05Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their production and destruction.
6:05–6:11Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one,
6:11–6:16and comparative cognition such as this is sweeter would be impossible.
6:16–6:22Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the cause.
6:22–6:25Sound inheres an auditory space.
6:25–6:31If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously apprehended.
6:31–6:36It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended,
6:36–6:42because there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there.
6:42–6:49Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended.
6:49–6:56Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent.
6:56–7:02Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational.
7:02–7:11Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality.
7:11–7:17A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating
7:17–7:22cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception.
7:22–7:29Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality.
7:29–7:32Establishing Inherence as the Cause
7:32–7:35The prima facie objection is unsound.
7:35–7:39Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form
7:39–7:41of inheritance.
7:41–7:46It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also
7:46–7:48be apprehended.
7:48–7:54The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity.
7:54–7:59Conjunction with the ear cavity specify substrate hood described by inheritance.
7:59–8:05The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere.
8:05–8:09Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear is apprehended,
8:09–8:14One delimited by absence of such conjunction is not.
8:14–8:18Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not
8:18–8:23by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited
8:23–8:25by hand conjunction.
8:25–8:30Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended
8:30–8:32everywhere.
8:32–8:35The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not
8:35–8:37arise.
8:37–8:41does not reside in its substrate through another inheritance, but it occurs pervasively through
8:41–8:47intrinsic relation as qualificative status. Even if inheritance of sound is admitted everywhere,
8:47–8:51absence of sound is apprehended in many places.
8:51–8:57Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal,
8:57–9:02because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited
9:02–9:07by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the
9:07–9:12ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with
9:12–9:18Macron, one would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear.
9:18–9:21Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters
9:21–9:26produces infinitely many auditory senses and over extends to the omnipresence of sound
9:26–9:30locations, the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition
9:30–9:34of instruments such as the VA with Macron S substrates is established, but it is
9:34–9:38groundless complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct
9:38–9:42sound series in infinitely many directions.
9:42–9:47The reply that nearby and distant persons experience differences of loud and soft sound,
9:47–9:53thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound.
9:53–9:59One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed.
9:59–10:03When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear
10:03–10:09opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the year opening is covered.
10:11–10:15The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the year is the auditory sense.
10:17–10:23The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the year opening,
10:23–10:28because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense.
10:28–10:36Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception.
10:36–10:40Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body as a sense faculty, the experience
10:40–10:44I hear the sound of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space
10:44–10:46to be the auditory sense.
10:46–10:52V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception.
10:52–10:57V.A. with Macron S are infinitely many, not all-pervasive, and are not common causes
10:57–10:59of sound perception.
10:59–11:03V-A with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense
11:03–11:09faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V-A with Macron.
11:09–11:13How then arises the cognition sound is in the V-A with Macron.
11:13–11:19It is unnecessary to apprehend the V-A with Macron as the substrate of every sound.
11:19–11:23The V-A with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly
11:23–11:28assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is
11:28–11:33not the inhering cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate.
11:33–11:37Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds.
11:37–11:43Objection, if irrelimited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the
11:43–11:47opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously.
11:47–11:51The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one
11:51–11:55because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory.
11:56–12:00Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound.
12:00–12:07If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable.
12:07–12:12Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity.
12:12–12:20If either limited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by mitra becomes the object of recognition such as,
12:20–12:23I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before.
12:24–12:28A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes,
12:28–12:32otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound.
12:32–12:37Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of
12:37–12:43sounds, hence sound series must be accepted. The manner of sound production.
12:45–12:49One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region,
12:49–12:53Otherwise, sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person.
12:53–12:57The initial sound, conjoined with the pervasive gross element air,
12:57–13:00produces one subsequent sound in every direction.
13:01–13:05An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction,
13:05–13:10thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider
13:10–13:15region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place.
13:15–13:22Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first,
13:22–13:28apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of
13:28–13:34air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds
13:34–13:40in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds.
13:40–13:44for the cadambasphere model.
13:44–13:49Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions?
13:49–13:54Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences,
13:54–13:57many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere.
13:57–14:01It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike,
14:01–14:05near difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects.
14:05–14:09Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates
14:09–14:12and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate.
14:13–14:18Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same.
14:19–14:23Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of
14:23–14:30prior absence and destruction of previous color. There is no regulator requiring one prior absence
14:30–14:36and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere. Prior absence of odor
14:36–14:41deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate
14:41–14:46in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the
14:46–14:48taste of water.
14:48–14:54Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant.
14:54–15:00Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes.
15:00–15:05Alternatively, though prior absences alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors
15:05–15:10such as fragrance and stench arise at different times from special conjunctions with fire.
15:11–15:16Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be deviation,
15:16–15:22similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must be
15:22–15:28accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is
15:28–15:32not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is
15:32–15:37unsound. Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators
15:37–15:42are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general
15:42–15:48cause. It is not true that one causal aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production
15:48–15:51of an effect results from absence of its aggregate.
15:51–15:56The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly
15:56–16:01complex. Co-existence of non-production of the effect with an inherent cause qualified
16:01–16:06by destruction establishes only the existent and hearing cause as cause, coexistence itself
16:06–16:10does not regulate causality.
16:10–16:14Even without accepting inheritance in the inherent and apprehension of soundness, the
16:14–16:18universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals
16:18–16:23such as colorness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition
16:23–16:32of perception and the perception section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
16:32–16:38The theory of inheritance, inheritance is an apprehensive relation.
16:38–16:44Prima-facie view, inheritance is not an apprehensive relation.
16:44–16:47Prima-facie view, inheritance has not been established, therefore inheritance cannot
16:47–16:52be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the
16:52–16:53like.
16:53–16:57Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between
16:57–17:01qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of inheritance as an
17:01–17:03apprehensive relation.
17:03–17:08The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced
17:08–17:13as mutually related by inheritance, such qualify cognition and corresponding usage are impossible
17:13–17:18in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of inheritance must be accepted.
17:18–17:23The prima facie objecta, however, says that from the experience of related things inheritance
17:23–17:26itself does not appear as a qualifier, because inheritance has not previously been
17:26–17:27cognized.
17:27–17:31An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way
17:31–17:36that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is.
17:36–17:40Nor does inheritance appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the
17:40–17:42form, I know inheritance.
17:42–17:46The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as its object
17:46–17:51the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound.
17:51–17:54In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example
17:54–17:59arises, as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible.
17:59–18:04merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro bands, the rest of the subject becomes
18:04–18:09pointless. Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite,
18:09–18:13when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results.
18:14–18:17A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance,
18:17–18:21because it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object,
18:21–18:25otherwise the cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent.
18:25–18:30Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as,
18:30–18:35the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented.
18:35–18:39Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective
18:39–18:46reality of that relation. Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground
18:46–18:50is known as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would
18:50–18:54be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized.
18:55–19:01Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot.
19:01–19:10The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance.
19:10–19:18A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not been established here as a possible relation.
19:18–19:23Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general.
19:23–19:29If this means the capacity to make known and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established.
19:30–19:37Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can't.
19:38–19:45Nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition.
19:45–19:57In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inheritance.
19:57–20:05Nor can the qualification, conforming to the pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it.
20:05–20:10Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example.
20:10–20:17The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected.
20:17–20:29In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence.
20:29–20:39Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists either in a distinct quality hood or is fixed by most of the cases.
20:40–20:44and the like. But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to
20:44–20:47regard the relation as a part of the objecthood of cognition.
20:48–20:53Objection, some of what you say may be true. Nevertheless the following argument proves the
20:53–20:59existence of inheritance. Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a whole in its parts,
20:59–21:03a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class
21:03–21:08in its individuals, as in, the cloth is in the threads, the white color is in the cloth,
21:08–21:12motion is in this object, and cloth hood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct
21:12–21:18relation between container and contained. Reason, these are both truth-conforming cognitions and
21:18–21:23cognitions of the form, is in this. Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in
21:23–21:29the bowl, which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction. Prima-facy objecta, no.
21:30–21:34Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there is
21:34–21:39absence of a pot. Do not again add the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof,
21:39–21:44for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because the
21:44–21:48relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct
21:48–21:53container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production,
21:53–21:57as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the
21:57–22:01cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition,
22:01–22:05As in a pot's assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that the
22:05–22:10contained entity has an indispensable dependence. This dependence is a self-linking relation.
22:11–22:15That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

Plain text

Konjunction-Kam-inherence is the cause. Objection, let perception of a whole object arise through inherent in an object conjoined with the sense. Then there is no need to regard sense conjunction as a cause of perception of the whole object, because inherent in the conjoined object has already been accepted as the cause of perception of color and the like. It is improper to assign a new causal efficacy to the same conjunction again. Answer, sense conjunction has already been accepted as causing perception of substances such as the self, by parsimony, that same conjunction may be accepted as causing perception of other substances such as whole objects. Because of externally sensed perception of a substance or whole object is not inherent in a conjoined object but sense conjunction alone. A further objection, inherent in a conjoined object does not produce perception of odor, conjunction of the sense with the substance that is the substrate of odor causes perception of odor. Thus, when the sense is conjoined with the substrate of the odor substrate, odor might be perceived without inheritance in the substrate of odor. A future odor too would then be perceived merely by residing in a pop conjoined with the sense, which is unacceptable. Answer, conjunction of the sense with the substrate of odor is a cause only when inheritance of the odor is present as a qualifier. If inheritance is treated merely as an adventitious qualifier, conjunction with the substrate of the odor substrate is not a cause, otherwise conjunction with a pot would produce perception of the odor of cloth. Conjunction with what inheres in itself is not the cause. Proposal, let conjunction of the sense with the substance in which odor inheres cause perception of odor, while inherence merely delimits causality. This view is equivalent to the view that inherence in a conjoined object is the cause and conjunction the delimiter, like the two edges of one cloth. is the argument sound that inherence in a conjoined object can be regarded as neither conjunction nor inherence nor both. On the Nayayika view, a mediated relation is nothing more than a combination of conjunction and inherence, inherence in a conjoined object may be regarded as the indirect relation of the sense to odor. There is no contradiction in calling this relation conjunction come inherence, nor does calling it something more conflict with Naya. The Nayayaka replies that the sense faculty, its conjunction, and inherence and the substrate of that conjunction together constitute the indirect contact called conjunction cum inheritance. This must be admitted to explain recurrent perception of the universal blueness in blue cloth, blue leather, blue blankets, and the like. Conjunction cum inheritance in the inherent is the cause, and color-ness is a universal. The objection that color-ness and the like are not perceived without the inheritance residing in color and the like in hearing in a conjoined object is unsound. Though inherent in color and the like is not perceived as such, similarity among color, taste, and the like is apprehended through inherence of those qualities in the conjoined object. Nor is similarity among colors apprehended merely through similarity among substances. Separate perception of color and the like through a perceptual relation is unobjectionable, therefore there is no need to make similarity among qualities arise through an indirect relation. Similarity of color and taste is apprehended even when the substances differ. Colorness, tasteness, sweetness, odorness, fragrance, and the like are universals established by recurrent cognition. Recurrent cognitions such as this is a blue color and this is a yellow color prove the universal colorness. Color cannot be defined merely as what is apprehensible by the eye because that would overextend to yellow color. Inference of super sensible colors and the like is possible only through universals such as colorness. Objection that the color of a sense faculty would also be apprehensible. On the Neayaka view, individual colors such as blue and yellow are eternal and sense perceptible. Since the eye, nose, and other senses or substances composed of fire or earth, their color is identical with the color of a substance. Hence the consequence arises that the color of a sense faculty too should be apprehensible. It is contradictory to say that one and the same color is manifest as the color of a substance but unmanifest as the color of a sense faculty. If differences among qualities are perceived through mutually opposed universal such as colorness, one must infer differences among the senses that apprehend those qualities, mutual dependence would then follow. Nor is it established that every color is apprehensible through a special instrument. Prima-facie view, first infer a luminous sense faculty that does not manifest odor, taste, or touch, then establish that blue, yellow, and the like are apprehended by that luminous sense. Answer, even without first establishing the sense faculty, recurrent cognition of color and taste establishes universals such as colorness and blueness. Being apprehensible by the eye is not blueness because it overextends to yellowness. Further objection that individual colors are one. Blue, red, and other individual colors may be regarded as one because, although difference appears among different black objects, recognition of identity apprehends a single black color. It should not be said that blueness, being eternal and residing in many individuals, would become a universal. A universal is manifested by an aggregate of parts, while an individual color resides in the whole substance. The relation of broader and narrower extension found between the whole cow and its universal is not appropriate to individual blueness. Comparative cognition such as this is bluer than that arises not from identity but from difference between two colors. In a fired pot, blue color is destroyed and red color arises, this is not illusion. Although inheritance remains one, difference of colors is perceived in cognition of their production and destruction. Otherwise individual qualities such as sweet and sour tastes and fragrance and stench would all become one, and comparative cognition such as this is sweeter would be impossible. Conclusion of the prima facie view that inheritance is not the cause. Sound inheres an auditory space. If inherents were the relation causing perception of sound, all sounds would be continuously apprehended. It cannot be said that only sound delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity is apprehended, because there is no difference between the ear cavity and space, if there were, sound would not in here there. Therefore only sound fit for a particular person is apprehended by that person, unfit sound is never apprehended. Fitness for a particular person is not the nature of sound, for then the nature of sound would not be recurrent. Nor is fitness a universal of sound, because a universal is not relational. Relationality is neither limitation nor no ability through cognition of a counter positive, it is either causality or a delimiter of causality. A universal is not a component of a causal aggregate, though it may be a cooperating cause, nevertheless it may be accepted as a common cause of all sound perception. Thus fitness of sound in general is not recurrent like fitness of equality. Establishing Inherence as the Cause The prima facie objection is unsound. Sound is perceptible, and therefore its perception must arise through contact in the form of inheritance. It does not follow that, because inheritance is all pervasive, sounds elsewhere would also be apprehended. The contact is the specific inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear cavity. Conjunction with the ear cavity specify substrate hood described by inheritance. The experience sound is here, not there establishes that sound does not travel everywhere. Sound in a substrate of inheritance delimited by conjunction with the ear is apprehended, One delimited by absence of such conjunction is not. Substratehood of hand conjunction is delimited through inheritance by hand conjunction, not by its absence, therefore one conjunction is apprehended only in the location delimited by hand conjunction. Otherwise, if hand conjunction were not a delimiter, conjunction would be apprehended everywhere. The objection that inherent would thereby become non-pervasively occurant does not arise. does not reside in its substrate through another inheritance, but it occurs pervasively through intrinsic relation as qualificative status. Even if inheritance of sound is admitted everywhere, absence of sound is apprehended in many places. Proposal that space delimited by the VA with Macron is the auditory sense. Proposal, because of the unsublated experience sound is in the VA with Macron, space delimited by the VA with Macron should be the auditory sense, not merely space delimited by the ear cavity. Otherwise instead of experiencing sound is not in the ear but in the VA with Macron, one would experience sound is only in the opening of the ear. Against the objection that accepting infinitely many VA with Macron S and other delimiters produces infinitely many auditory senses and over extends to the omnipresence of sound locations, the Prima-Facey theorist replies, complexity is justified because cognition of instruments such as the VA with Macron S substrates is established, but it is groundless complexity to treat only space delimited by the ear opening as the cause of distinct sound series in infinitely many directions. The reply that nearby and distant persons experience differences of loud and soft sound, thereby establishing distinct sound series and distinct auditory fields, is unsound. One sound series is possible when loudness is not apprehended because softness is superimposed. When there is no contact with air, intervening sound is not produced, uncovering the ear opening causes perception. Hence sound is not apprehended when the year opening is covered. The Neayaka reply, space delimited by the year is the auditory sense. The preceding view is unsound. Sound is apprehended in space delimited by the year opening, because the opening is the delimiter, only ear delimited space is the auditory sense. Space is eternal and all-pervasive and therefore serves as the common basis of sound perception. Only a perceptual instrument can join with the body as a sense faculty, the experience I hear the sound of the V.A. with Macron through the ear proves ear-delimited space to be the auditory sense. V.A. with Macron-delimited space is not an instrument of sound perception. V.A. with Macron S are infinitely many, not all-pervasive, and are not common causes of sound perception. V-A with Macron delimited space is not conjoined with the body and therefore is not a sense faculty, nor is there an experience I hear sound through the V-A with Macron. How then arises the cognition sound is in the V-A with Macron. It is unnecessary to apprehend the V-A with Macron as the substrate of every sound. The V-A with Macron is apprehended as a secondary substrate because it indirectly assists the production of sound, just as in saying pleasure is in the body, the body is not the inhering cause of pleasure but its secondary substrate. Avoidance of simultaneous perception of many sounds. Objection, if irrelimited space is the auditory sense, many sounds will be produced in the opening and many sounds will therefore be apprehended simultaneously. The causal aggregate of another sound cannot be called an inhibitor of perception of one because in a clamor the aggregate of other sounds is not experienced as inhibitory. Answer, a loud sound inhibits apprehension of a soft sound. If all sounds have equal loudness or softness, simultaneous apprehension of many sounds is acceptable. Failure to apprehend their difference is due to extreme similarity. If either limited space is the auditory sense, cognition of a sound belonging to the same class as one uttered by mitra becomes the object of recognition such as, I recited this section after Mitra, and I heard the same song before. A universal soundness must be accepted in sounds produced by specific causes, otherwise general cognition of sound could not be inferred from a particular sound. Perception of sounds of a VA with macron and the like is explained through a continuous series of sounds, hence sound series must be accepted. The manner of sound production. One sound does not produce a second sound in a neighboring atomic region, Otherwise, sounds of clouds and the like in space would never reach a distant person. The initial sound, conjoined with the pervasive gross element air, produces one subsequent sound in every direction. An effect produced in an all-pervasive element arises according to causal conjunction, thereafter each succeeding sound, like a wave, produces one subsequent sound over a wider region. Thus at one time only one sound is apprehended at one place. Air moves as rapidly as vision, because a later sound arises immediately after the first, apprehension is swift. Soft, softer, and softest sounds are produced by different kinds of air. On an alternative view, the first sound, like a cadamba sphere, produces 10 sounds in the 10 directions, and those 10 each produce series of 10 sounds. for the cadambasphere model. Objection, how can one and the same causal aggregate produce 10 distinct sounds in 10 directions? Answer, through assistance from different air currents or through different prior absences, many sounds are produced like a cadambasphere. It should not be said that when all causes except prior absence are alike, near difference of prior absence cannot produce difference of effects. Difference of effects arises from difference of causal aggregates and difference of prior absence itself creates a difference in the aggregate. Otherwise distinct effects such as pots would be impossible when the other causes are the same. Differences of color produced by firing are likewise established through differences of prior absence and destruction of previous color. There is no regulator requiring one prior absence and one destruction of prior color to be the same cause everywhere. Prior absence of odor deviates in taste, and prior absence of taste in odor, prior absences of odor and taste deviate in the touch of air, prior absence of color in odor, and prior absence of odor in the taste of water. Therefore only its own prior absence causes each effect, other prior absences are irrelevant. Conclusion, prior absence and inheritance in the inherent are causes. Alternatively, though prior absences alike in color, taste, and touch, distinct odors such as fragrance and stench arise at different times from special conjunctions with fire. Conjunction with fire in general does not cause color in general, otherwise there would be deviation, similarly it does not generally cause taste and the rest. Therefore prior absence must be accepted as a cause of an effect in general. The objection that prior absence in general is not a cause of an effect in general because cause and effect unknown at distinct times is unsound. Without co-operating causes the effect does not arise, but when the other co-operators are present, an already produced effect is not produced again, so prior absence is a general cause. It is not true that one causal aggregate naturally produces only one effect, non-production of an effect results from absence of its aggregate. The view that causality is obtained through coexistence with the effect is not needlessly complex. Co-existence of non-production of the effect with an inherent cause qualified by destruction establishes only the existent and hearing cause as cause, coexistence itself does not regulate causality. Even without accepting inheritance in the inherent and apprehension of soundness, the universal soundness is established by the same reasoning that establishes universals such as colorness. Thus ends the theory of contact within the theory of the definition of perception and the perception section of the tatva-sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of inheritance, inheritance is an apprehensive relation. Prima-facie view, inheritance is not an apprehensive relation. Prima-facie view, inheritance has not been established, therefore inheritance cannot be the apprehensive relation in the perception of universals, qualities, actions, and the like. Doubt as to whether a cognition such as, the cloth is white, takes the relation between qualifier and qualificant as its object obstructs the establishment of inheritance as an apprehensive relation. The respondent may say, universals, qualities, actions, and their substrates are experienced as mutually related by inheritance, such qualify cognition and corresponding usage are impossible in the case of two unrelated things, and therefore the relation of inheritance must be accepted. The prima facie objecta, however, says that from the experience of related things inheritance itself does not appear as a qualifier, because inheritance has not previously been cognized. An experience such as, these two things are inherent, is not obtained in the way that the conjunctive experience, these two things are conjoined, is. Nor does inheritance appear as an independent entity, because there is no experience of the form, I know inheritance. The argument that a qualified cognition such as, the pot is blue, takes as its object the qualifier-qualificant relation in the form of inheritance is unsound. In an inference whose pro-bands is the relation of inheritance, a counter-example arises, as in the experience, the subject is known, desired, and eligible. merely, not contradicted, is made a qualification of the pro bands, the rest of the subject becomes pointless. Nor is it proper to establish inheritance from the absence of a reason proving the opposite, when both proving and defeating reasons are absent, only doubt results. A cognition allegedly of inheritance is not a means of proving inheritance, because it has not been established that such cognition has inheritance as its object, otherwise the cognition of inheritance and inheritance itself would become mutually dependent. Objection, let it then be accepted that in a cognition of a qualified object such as, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, the relation two forms a part of what is presented. Yet this cognition is erroneous, because a defeating means of knowledge negates the objective reality of that relation. Prima-facy objector, then, for example, if the cognition, the ground is known as devoid of a pot, were false, even when there were no pot on the ground there would be no absence of a pot there, nor would that fact be cognized, although it is often cognized. Consequently linguistic practice would collapse, for we do say, the ground is known as devoid of a pot. The relation cognized in such cognitions is either conjunction or inheritance, in some contexts it is conjunction and in others inheritance. A defeating proof excludes the possibility of conjunction, while inheritance has not been established here as a possible relation. Nor can it be said that what is present here is merely relation in general. If this means the capacity to make known and the like, you incur the fault of proving what is already established. Both you and we accept that a qualifier presented as related to a qualifier can produces cognition of that qualifier can't. Nor can inheritance be accepted as the relation that invariably distinguishes cognition of a qualified object from an unqualified cognition. In cases involving cognition of absence and the like, your argument would prove precisely what you do not wish to prove, because in such cases the relation, according to your own view, is a self-linking relation, not inheritance. Nor can the qualification, conforming to the pro-bandom, be added that the relation is distinct from the things related by it. Cognition of absence and the like would again constitute a counter-example. The attempt to repair the proving reason by adding the qualification, unopposed by a defeating proof, has already been rejected. In this situation the argument would also be visiated by the fault of a misleading proving reason, because on your view cognition of a qualified object is possible even without a distinct relation in cases such as cognition of absence. Alternatively, you may say that the difference between cognition of an object qualified through a self-linking relation and cognition of one qualified through inherent consists either in a distinct quality hood or is fixed by most of the cases. and the like. But note that the very same difference remains even after one ceases to regard the relation as a part of the objecthood of cognition. Objection, some of what you say may be true. Nevertheless the following argument proves the existence of inheritance. Cognitions of the form is in this, concerning a whole in its parts, a quality in the qualified thing, an action in the agent, and a universal or natural class in its individuals, as in, the cloth is in the threads, the white color is in the cloth, motion is in this object, and cloth hood is in this cloth, establish an ontologically distinct relation between container and contained. Reason, these are both truth-conforming cognitions and cognitions of the form, is in this. Cooperative instance, the cognition, the jujupe fruit is in the bowl, which proves the existence of the relation of conjunction. Prima-facy objecta, no. Your reason has an obvious counter-example, the cognition, here on the ground there is absence of a pot. Do not again add the contrived qualification, there is no defeating proof, for that device has already been rejected. In brief, your argument is invalid because the relations mentioned by you can be accounted for without accepting any ontologically distinct container-contained relation over and above the relata. In the context of production, as in the production of cloth from threads, in the context of continuance, as in the cloths remaining in its constituent threads after production, and in the context of cognition, As in a pot's assisting in the production of its cognition, it is sufficient to say that the contained entity has an indispensable dependence. This dependence is a self-linking relation. That upon which it depends in this sense is called its substrate or container.

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