MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part15_RadioPlay.mp4

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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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asr-draft
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en (0.998356)
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21:20
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  1. 0:02–0:34आप्संस मेथी इंझव़ड, बगड नाटक आप्रहेंचन ज़द नाटक नाटक नाटक नदष्ट़द नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाट
  2. 0:34–0:42If the auxiliary in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished.
  3. 0:42–0:48Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion.
  4. 0:48–0:55That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension.
  5. 0:55–1:01If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence.
  6. 1:01–1:06If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension,
  7. 1:06–1:10the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted.
  8. 1:12–1:16Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be,
  9. 1:16–1:19air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air.
  10. 1:20–1:25Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the
  11. 1:25–1:31pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it. If the answer is, because absence of the pot is
  12. 1:31–1:36not there, then cognition of absence produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be
  13. 1:36–1:41accepted as perceptual and sensory. If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the
  14. 1:41–1:46inhibitor, then absence of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence.
  15. 1:48–1:51Refutation of the repetition concerning non-apprehension
  16. 1:51–1:59The msaka again says, after kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether mikra was inside.
  17. 2:00–2:04Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of mikra,
  18. 2:04–2:09mikra was not in the house. This cognition of past absence is not memory,
  19. 2:09–2:13because when he saw the house he did not remember mikra and therefore had no prior
  20. 2:13–2:19experience of mikra's absence. Since mikra's absence is experienced through non-apprehension
  21. 2:19–2:26without any operation of a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions of absence as well.
  22. 2:27–2:36A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands might-riss absence.
  23. 2:37–2:39The Neayaka replies,
  24. 2:39–2:43unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence.
  25. 2:43–2:48Non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive in a distant house is impossible.
  26. 2:48–2:53If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because
  27. 2:53–2:58non-apprehension is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension.
  28. 2:58–3:04Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro in its unknown form produce cognition of
  29. 3:04–3:09microzapsons, a MMSACA view apprehension is super sensible, and therefore microzapsons
  30. 3:09–3:13cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
  31. 3:15–3:19Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark.
  32. 3:21–3:26Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house as qualified by an
  33. 3:26–3:29eligible micro produces cognition of microzapsons in the house.
  34. 3:30–3:34Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as,
  35. 3:34–3:39was Micra in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as Micra was in the house at
  36. 3:39–3:44some time, should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced.
  37. 3:45–3:50Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect.
  38. 3:51–3:56A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the
  39. 3:56–4:01like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible Micra,
  40. 4:01–4:06which is naturally a means of knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument
  41. 4:06–4:09consists in the totality of defects belonging to its causes.
  42. 4:10–4:15Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature,
  43. 4:15–4:19like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it.
  44. 4:20–4:25Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge,
  45. 4:25–4:30because cognition of micro's absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an
  46. 4:30–4:36an eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge. Non-recollection
  47. 4:36–4:41of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition
  48. 4:41–4:48of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence
  49. 4:48–4:53is perceptual. Objection, non-recollection of an eligible
  50. 4:53–4:57mitra is not known by the mind, because there is no apprehensive relation between
  51. 4:57–5:01a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitra is not eligible for a sense organ.
  52. 5:01–5:06Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifierhood
  53. 5:06–5:11belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation.
  54. 5:11–5:15Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is not produced by an inferential
  55. 5:15–5:18mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ.
  56. 5:18–5:23The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence
  57. 5:23–5:26cognition of absence is perceptual.
  58. 5:26–5:30It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential mark.
  59. 5:30–5:34How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise?
  60. 5:34–5:38Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential
  61. 5:38–5:42mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark.
  62. 5:42–5:46A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra,
  63. 5:46–5:50uses non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark.
  64. 5:50–5:54Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes
  65. 5:54–5:58only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding mere non-recollection.
  66. 6:00–6:05Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark.
  67. 6:06–6:10The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house,
  68. 6:10–6:14because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features
  69. 6:14–6:19comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so,
  70. 6:19–6:22there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot.
  71. 6:22–6:28Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception
  72. 6:28–6:35section of the Tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
  73. 6:35–6:39The Theory of Absence
  74. 6:39–6:45The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tathasintmai.
  75. 6:45–6:50Mtsaka Prima facey view, absence is positive in nature.
  76. 6:50–6:54The Mtsaka says, the absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from
  77. 6:54–6:59the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very
  78. 6:59–7:03locus in which the counter positive is not present.
  79. 7:03–7:07Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should
  80. 7:07–7:12be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation
  81. 7:12–7:18called qualifierhood or self-linking relation for cognition of absence.
  82. 7:18–7:22of the earlier Neayakas.
  83. 7:22–7:27The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this
  84. 7:27–7:30ground occurs in direct experience.
  85. 7:30–7:35This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would occur on
  86. 7:35–7:37ground possessing a pot.
  87. 7:37–7:42Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness
  88. 7:42–7:47distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted.
  89. 7:47–7:51If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement, there
  90. 7:51–7:55is absence of a pot on the ground, becomes unnecessary.
  91. 7:55–8:00And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containerness of absence and the containership
  92. 8:00–8:05of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would be impossible.
  93. 8:05–8:10Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus.
  94. 8:10–8:14A particular entity is the locus of absence.
  95. 8:14–8:20Objection, the Naya Yaka who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence,
  96. 8:20–8:25because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this ground.
  97. 8:25–8:29Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground.
  98. 8:29–8:33That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur
  99. 8:33–8:38on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be, ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual
  100. 8:38–8:43dependence, and it cannot be, ground-possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction.
  101. 8:43–8:47absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus.
  102. 8:47–8:52Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty
  103. 8:52–8:55locus qualified by absence of a pot.
  104. 8:55–9:00This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent,
  105. 9:00–9:04nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot
  106. 9:04–9:10is the locus of its own single counter positive.
  107. 9:10–9:13and perceptibility of an additional absence.
  108. 9:13–9:16Question, where is absence?
  109. 9:16–9:20Reply, wherever it is experienced.
  110. 9:20–9:22Again, where is it experienced?
  111. 9:22–9:26Reply, wherever it actually exists.
  112. 9:26–9:31There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence
  113. 9:31–9:35of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of
  114. 9:35–9:38individual cows.
  115. 9:38–9:44of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot. Before the time of pot absence
  116. 9:44–9:49there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing
  117. 9:49–9:54absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the
  118. 9:54–10:00time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents
  119. 10:00–10:04a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from
  120. 10:04–10:10the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object
  121. 10:10–10:15of cognition of absence, is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the
  122. 10:15–10:20experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground.
  123. 10:20–10:24Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground,
  124. 10:24–10:27otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely
  125. 10:27–10:33of ground. The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition
  126. 10:33–10:37merely of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity Agnoma
  127. 10:37–10:42is cognition of both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage
  128. 10:42–10:47concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said
  129. 10:47–10:52that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward,
  130. 10:52–10:56that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground
  131. 10:56–11:02possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense
  132. 11:02–11:06contact from cognition of pot-possessing ground produced by sense contact through a difference
  133. 11:06–11:12in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence. Usage concerning ground alone
  134. 11:12–11:18also occurs with respect to pot-possessing ground. Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground
  135. 11:18–11:23is the grounds possession of absence of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct
  136. 11:23–11:29from the ground. The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence.
  137. 11:29–11:35Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter-positive pot or by something
  138. 11:35–11:39pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot.
  139. 11:39–11:43Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also
  140. 11:43–11:48be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot.
  141. 11:48–11:51Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the
  142. 11:51–11:56Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence,
  143. 11:56–11:59though it is not separately cognized.
  144. 11:59–12:03The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is absence
  145. 12:03–12:06of a pot, has already been refuted.
  146. 12:06–12:10Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter-positive, cognition of the
  147. 12:10–12:14ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter-positive.
  148. 12:14–12:18Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter-positive, but cognition of
  149. 12:18–12:20absence is not.
  150. 12:20–12:24The claim, cognition of the visible counter-positive is needed only for usage concerning absence,
  151. 12:24–12:29absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience.
  152. 12:29–12:33Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object.
  153. 12:33–12:37If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were
  154. 12:37–12:41absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection
  155. 12:41–12:46of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place,
  156. 12:46–12:50outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it.
  157. 12:50–12:55Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, and
  158. 12:55–13:00since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear.
  159. 13:00–13:05If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot
  160. 13:05–13:10has been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formerly
  161. 13:10–13:12possessed the pot?
  162. 13:12–13:16Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground, is itself proof
  163. 13:16–13:19of an additional absence of the pot.
  164. 13:19–13:25The Bhakra view, cognition of the ground itself is absence.
  165. 13:25–13:30The Nayayika objects, on the Memsaka view usage concerning absence is impossible, because cognition
  166. 13:30–13:34of absence and cognition of the empty lock has depend upon one another.
  167. 13:34–13:37The Prabhikara replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing
  168. 13:37–13:42ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot.
  169. 13:42–13:47Merely because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot,
  170. 13:47–13:52cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically distinct from
  171. 13:52–13:56cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot.
  172. 13:57–14:01An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground.
  173. 14:02–14:07In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never
  174. 14:07–14:12arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing
  175. 14:12–14:16the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence.
  176. 14:17–14:29Coreferential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated.
  177. 14:29–14:42On the Neyayaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus.
  178. 14:42–14:48But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot,
  179. 14:48–14:54otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it sufficient to distinguish
  180. 14:54–14:57it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence,
  181. 14:57–15:00because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence,
  182. 15:00–15:07this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate
  183. 15:07–15:13particularity of absence and locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the
  184. 15:13–15:17ground that is the object of cognition, cognition of absence of a pot would be a
  185. 15:17–15:21cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator, no
  186. 15:21–15:25separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say
  187. 15:25–15:29that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of
  188. 15:29–15:32possession of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground.
  189. 15:32–15:36But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no
  190. 15:36–15:42pot here before, is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable.
  191. 15:42–15:45The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is
  192. 15:45–15:48merely a difference in the natures of their objects.
  193. 15:48–15:53If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result.
  194. 15:53–15:57It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing
  195. 15:57–16:01ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions
  196. 16:01–16:04on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity.
  197. 16:04–16:09Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing
  198. 16:09–16:14an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus.
  199. 16:14–16:18When the counter-positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve
  200. 16:18–16:24as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus.
  201. 16:24–16:28The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the
  202. 16:28–16:33locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence.
  203. 16:33–16:38of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing
  204. 16:38–16:40ground is absence.
  205. 16:40–16:46Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object. On the Prabhikara
  206. 16:46–16:50view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition of absence and cognition
  207. 16:50–16:52of the locus differ?
  208. 16:52–16:56Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal
  209. 16:56–17:00conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise
  210. 17:00–17:03in a stream of cognition.
  211. 17:03–17:07Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of
  212. 17:07–17:09a pot.
  213. 17:09–17:13The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards
  214. 17:13–17:17the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature
  215. 17:17–17:20of the locus of absence.
  216. 17:20–17:25In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs.
  217. 17:25–17:29The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground, compels even the
  218. 17:29–17:33Naya Yaka to accept a difference of nature. The only distinction is that the Naya Yaka
  219. 17:33–17:37calls this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it
  220. 17:37–17:40the nature of the locus.
  221. 17:40–17:44Objection. How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing
  222. 17:44–17:49ground later become different from it? Reply, the Naya Yaka who establishes mutual absence
  223. 17:49–17:53through undefeated co-referential negation cannot avoid this situation across different
  224. 17:53–17:55times either.
  225. 17:55–18:00and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. When
  226. 18:00–18:04empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground
  227. 18:04–18:08possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it.
  228. 18:08–18:13How can both neutral absence and its absence occur in ground delimited by pot and absence
  229. 18:13–18:18of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and
  230. 18:18–18:23its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference.
  231. 18:23–18:28Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on
  232. 18:28–18:33the ground, are possible through a defect, owing to the defect, difference from pot possessing
  233. 18:33–18:36ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot possessing ground and the
  234. 18:36–18:39cognition are not ascertained.
  235. 18:39–18:44If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent
  236. 18:44–18:46usage concerning absence?
  237. 18:46–18:51The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it
  238. 18:51–18:57It is difficult to establish one universal absenceshood in diverse absences.
  239. 18:57–19:02A proper definition of absenceshood is impossible.
  240. 19:02–19:06Absenceshood cannot be called a universal, one universal and the form of absenceshood
  241. 19:06–19:10cannot pervade mutually different absences.
  242. 19:10–19:15Opposition to a positive entity is not absenceshood, because opposition itself would be determined
  243. 19:15–19:19by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature
  244. 19:19–19:22of the locus.
  245. 19:22–19:29Because counter-positiveness itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter-positive
  246. 19:29–19:35of absence of an absence, that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself.
  247. 19:35–19:40Nor is, the state of possessing a counter-positive, absencehood, for inheritance, and similarity
  248. 19:40–19:42also have counter-positives.
  249. 19:42–19:46If it is called, the nature residing in an opposed object, there is overextension
  250. 19:46–19:50to cognition and the like, and the word, nature, in the sense of its own form, is
  251. 19:50–19:51not recurrent.
  252. 19:51–19:57Nor is lack of existence, absencehood, because lack itself is an absence.
  253. 19:57–20:02Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence.
  254. 20:02–20:07One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation
  255. 20:07–20:09to another absence.
  256. 20:09–20:13Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence in
  257. 20:13–20:18universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence
  258. 20:18–20:23to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus.
  259. 20:23–20:29If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates
  260. 20:29–20:31self-dependence.
  261. 20:31–20:34If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the
  262. 20:34–20:39locus is mutual absence, self-dependence again follows.
  263. 20:39–20:43Determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence.
  264. 20:43–20:48If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished
  265. 20:48–20:55even on the Nayakavu. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence?
  266. 20:55–21:00Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because
  267. 21:00–21:06existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one and the same absence
  268. 21:06–21:10of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were eternal, usage concerning absence
  269. 21:10–21:15of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence
  270. 21:15–21:16and the like would be inconsistent.

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आप्संस मेथी इंझव़ड, बगड नाटक आप्रहेंचन ज़द नाटक नाटक नाटक नदष्ट़द नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाट If the auxiliary in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished. Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion. That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension. If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence. If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension, the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted. Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be, air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air. Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it. If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory. If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence. Refutation of the repetition concerning non-apprehension The msaka again says, after kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether mikra was inside. Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of mikra, mikra was not in the house. This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not remember mikra and therefore had no prior experience of mikra's absence. Since mikra's absence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions of absence as well. A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands might-riss absence. The Neayaka replies, unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence. Non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive in a distant house is impossible. If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension. Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro in its unknown form produce cognition of microzapsons, a MMSACA view apprehension is super sensible, and therefore microzapsons cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house as qualified by an eligible micro produces cognition of microzapsons in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as, was Micra in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as Micra was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible Micra, which is naturally a means of knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging to its causes. Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it. Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge, because cognition of micro's absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an an eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge. Non-recollection of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence is perceptual. Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitra is not known by the mind, because there is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitra is not eligible for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifierhood belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is not produced by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ. The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence cognition of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential mark. How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise? Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark. A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra, uses non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding mere non-recollection. Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark. The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house, because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot. Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception section of the Tathasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The Theory of Absence The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tathasintmai. Mtsaka Prima facey view, absence is positive in nature. The Mtsaka says, the absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which the counter positive is not present. Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation called qualifierhood or self-linking relation for cognition of absence. of the earlier Neayakas. The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement, there is absence of a pot on the ground, becomes unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containerness of absence and the containership of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would be impossible. Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus. A particular entity is the locus of absence. Objection, the Naya Yaka who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence, because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this ground. Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground. That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur on pot-possessing ground, it cannot be, ground-possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual dependence, and it cannot be, ground-possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction. absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus. Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty locus qualified by absence of a pot. This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent, nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot is the locus of its own single counter positive. and perceptibility of an additional absence. Question, where is absence? Reply, wherever it is experienced. Again, where is it experienced? Reply, wherever it actually exists. There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of individual cows. of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot. Before the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence, is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground. Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground. The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity Agnoma is cognition of both Agni and Soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition of pot-possessing ground produced by sense contact through a difference in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence. Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot-possessing ground. Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground is the grounds possession of absence of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence. Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter-positive pot or by something pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot. Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot. Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence, though it is not separately cognized. The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is absence of a pot, has already been refuted. Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter-positive, cognition of the ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter-positive. Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter-positive, but cognition of absence is not. The claim, cognition of the visible counter-positive is needed only for usage concerning absence, absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience. Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object. If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place, outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it. Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, and since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear. If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot has been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formerly possessed the pot? Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground, is itself proof of an additional absence of the pot. The Bhakra view, cognition of the ground itself is absence. The Nayayika objects, on the Memsaka view usage concerning absence is impossible, because cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lock has depend upon one another. The Prabhikara replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot. Merely because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot, cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot. An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground. In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence. Coreferential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neyayaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus. But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as ground functioning as the locus of absence, because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of possession of the counter positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground. But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before, is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable. The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is merely a difference in the natures of their objects. If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result. It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity. Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus. When the counter-positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve as a non- overextensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus. The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence. of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing ground is absence. Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object. On the Prabhikara view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition of absence and cognition of the locus differ? Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise in a stream of cognition. Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of a pot. The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature of the locus of absence. In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs. The cognition this empty ground is not now pot-possessing ground, compels even the Naya Yaka to accept a difference of nature. The only distinction is that the Naya Yaka calls this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it the nature of the locus. Objection. How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot-possessing ground later become different from it? Reply, the Naya Yaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either. and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. When empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it. How can both neutral absence and its absence occur in ground delimited by pot and absence of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference. Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on the ground, are possible through a defect, owing to the defect, difference from pot possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained. If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent usage concerning absence? The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it It is difficult to establish one universal absenceshood in diverse absences. A proper definition of absenceshood is impossible. Absenceshood cannot be called a universal, one universal and the form of absenceshood cannot pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive entity is not absenceshood, because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus. Because counter-positiveness itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter-positive of absence of an absence, that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself. Nor is, the state of possessing a counter-positive, absencehood, for inheritance, and similarity also have counter-positives. If it is called, the nature residing in an opposed object, there is overextension to cognition and the like, and the word, nature, in the sense of its own form, is not recurrent. Nor is lack of existence, absencehood, because lack itself is an absence. Nor is absencehood possession of absolute absence of existence. One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation to another absence. Nor is absencehood lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence in universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus. If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates self-dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the locus is mutual absence, self-dependence again follows. Determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence. If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even on the Nayakavu. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence? Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one and the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were eternal, usage concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

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