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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.997319)
Duration: 20:46
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33अबसंश अव आवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर �
0:33–0:38cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects
0:38–0:43becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because
0:43–0:47those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even
0:47–0:51the MMSARC could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case
0:51–0:56of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause of that inference.
0:56–1:01Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence
1:01–1:07of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda
1:07–1:13only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that
1:13–1:17the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore
1:17–1:22positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly
1:22–1:28complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge,
1:28–1:32Moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of
1:32–1:36such complexity does not arise.
1:36–1:41Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness
1:41–1:43in them.
1:43–1:47It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author blocked the
1:47–1:51causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic
1:51–1:57and ordinary speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition.
1:57–2:03Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness.
2:03–2:05This too is untenable.
2:05–2:08The opposing inhibitor can be refuted.
2:08–2:12A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there
2:12–2:17is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to
2:17–2:21a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted
2:21–2:25as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect.
2:25–2:30sentences not depending on another means such as inference would then become like the Veda.
2:32–2:36Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person,
2:36–2:43deceiver or parrot are not valid. An objection arises on the Nayayika view,
2:43–2:47how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver or a parrot be valid or authoritative
2:47–2:52when they are not produced from merit. It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such
2:52–2:56a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of
2:56–3:01of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence,
3:01–3:05an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted.
3:05–3:09Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic
3:09–3:14fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker,
3:14–3:20an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot
3:20–3:24is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its
3:24–3:29object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning,
3:29–3:33and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot.
3:34–3:39It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence meaning
3:39–3:46but only an awareness of sounds of that kind. This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate
3:46–3:52of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, the experience of verbal cognition
3:52–3:58cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced
3:58–4:01by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced.
4:03–4:07On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke,
4:07–4:11that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as
4:11–4:16the mark. Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for
4:16–4:21recognition takes the same fire as its object. In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one
4:21–4:26individual cow, it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom, identity
4:26–4:31with another substancehood cannot be superimposed. Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood
4:31–4:36is known through superimposition of the relation. Therefore, though the qualitative component
4:36–4:40of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid because there is no illusion
4:40–4:43of absence of the probandom.
4:43–4:50The traditionalists reply. The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken
4:50–4:55person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause.
4:56–5:01Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person,
5:01–5:06and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition
5:06–5:12of sentence meaning. Amsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to
5:12–5:15treat the utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda.
5:15–5:21It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements
5:21–5:25disappear, because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God.
5:25–5:27This objection is unsound.
5:27–5:32A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition.
5:32–5:36If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference
5:36–5:40is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the
5:40–5:44probandom fire, not the false component of the mark.
5:44–5:47This is the traditionalist view.
5:47–5:54The Neyayaka reply, Semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits.
5:54–5:59The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence
5:59–6:03meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition.
6:03–6:08For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness, and the other conditions, or correct
6:08–6:12cognition of that fitness, are the merit.
6:12–6:17In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception, correct cognition
6:17–6:21of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated.
6:21–6:26Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning
6:26–6:30different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition
6:30–6:33of fitness is absent.
6:33–6:37But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is
6:37–6:42valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there.
6:42–6:46It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even
6:46–6:48in the sense of a lion.
6:48–6:52The speaker may intend Vyuh, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention,
6:52–6:56understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to
6:56–6:58the lion's sense may be present.
6:58–7:01Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid.
7:01–7:05Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted.
7:05–7:09But if the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended
7:09–7:14by the speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in
7:14–7:19the sense of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition
7:19–7:25of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid cognition.
7:25–7:31The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda.
7:31–7:35Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is
7:35–7:39accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also
7:39–7:42be accepted as a merit in the Veda.
7:42–7:46The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person,
7:46–7:50because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning,
7:50–7:52like the sentence, bring the cow.
7:52–7:56This inference establishes God as the speaker.
7:56–7:58This objection is unsound.
7:58–8:01The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent
8:01–8:06correct cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably
8:06–8:13present as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless.
8:13–8:17A further objection in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as a cause
8:17–8:21of authoritative utterance. How then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda without
8:21–8:25such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition
8:25–8:29of its meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person
8:29–8:33will understand the sentence meaning from these words.
8:33–8:37There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause.
8:37–8:41That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting
8:41–8:45the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the
8:45–8:48separate cause of the use of each word.
8:48–8:52Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as
8:52–8:55the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary.
8:55–8:58The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's correct cognition of sentence
8:58–9:02meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore
9:02–9:04cause it in the Veda too.
9:04–9:08The Nayaika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence
9:08–9:12meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity, the speaker's own cognition of sentence
9:12–9:15meaning does not cause the use of the word group.
9:15–9:20The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions.
9:20–9:23Intention is not a merit.
9:23–9:27It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the
9:27–9:29object of a speaker's intention.
9:29–9:34is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary
9:34–9:38people like us cannot obtain super-sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters
9:38–9:42the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention
9:42–9:47to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda,
9:47–9:52mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda
9:52–9:56with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or
9:56–10:01cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of
10:01–10:06God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit.
10:07–10:13This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of MMA with
10:13–10:17Mechran essay with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the
10:17–10:23intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic
10:23–10:29meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands
10:29–10:34the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless
10:34–10:39succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then
10:39–10:45separately accept God? Objection, how can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention
10:45–10:49of communicating a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that
10:49–10:55meaning. Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech
10:55–11:00and its meaning could not be determined. Answer, this is unsound. In the beginningless cycle of
11:00–11:04the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of Vedic meanings based on study of
11:04–11:08the six Vedgas and the like, and at some time must have recited the Vedic with the intention
11:08–11:13of communicating those meanings. That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered
11:13–11:16it with intention.
11:16–11:23The Prabhākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced.
11:23–11:28The Prabhākramsakas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete causal
11:28–11:31aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known.
11:31–11:37Veridicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause
11:37–11:41of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition.
11:41–11:45This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither
11:45–11:48merit nor absence of defect.
11:48–11:53There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own
11:53–11:55nature.
11:55–12:00Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition
12:00–12:02is equally cognition.
12:02–12:07The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that
12:07–12:10it produces contrary activity.
12:10–12:15Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition,
12:15–12:19this is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically
12:19–12:22by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate?
12:22–12:27Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid.
12:27–12:30Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary conduct.
12:30–12:34Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property
12:34–12:39and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically
12:39–12:43through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect
12:43–12:47produced non-apprehension of non-relation, or through relation to a defect after cognition
12:47–12:52has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise
12:52–12:57there would be deviation in invalid cognition. Invalidity as the causality of contrary
12:57–13:01activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the
13:01–13:06complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition.
13:06–13:10and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition because there is deviation there.
13:10–13:14Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate,
13:14–13:19not from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate
13:19–13:24of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a
13:24–13:29non-existent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an
13:29–13:35unrelated non-existent object. Varidicality is intrinsically known.
13:37–13:42Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect
13:42–13:43causes invalidity.
13:43–13:48Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity.
13:48–13:51Answer, this is unsound.
13:51–13:55One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a non-existent object, depend
13:55–13:59on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object
13:59–14:03it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition.
14:03–14:07With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect
14:07–14:08and absence of defect.
14:08–14:13Therefore, defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity
14:13–14:16and invalidity.
14:16–14:19Cognitive validity is the condition of taking its object a thing possessing the qualifier
14:19–14:23mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing
14:23–14:24in the thing.
14:24–14:29As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically
14:29–14:32delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form
14:32–14:36of taking as object the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness.
14:36–14:42No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof.
14:42–14:46An alternative Prabhupāda view.
14:46–14:50Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive
14:50–14:54aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing
14:54–14:58validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity.
14:58–15:02A person acts after determining an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination
15:02–15:08of the object alone. It may be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on
15:08–15:13knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object
15:13–15:17as this thing has the form of silver rises in direct determination of the object, why
15:17–15:22then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity
15:22–15:27is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
15:27–15:36The Prabhakara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity, is not determination of the object.
15:36–15:41Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object either.
15:41–15:46Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination.
15:46–15:53A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite regress.
15:53–15:58The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect
15:58–16:03also produces regress if only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines
16:03–16:05the validity of the first.
16:05–16:09Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first, and
16:09–16:13a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second.
16:13–16:17Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object.
16:17–16:21Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own
16:21–16:25validity, the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity.
16:26–16:30Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is
16:30–16:35intrinsically known. When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition,
16:35–16:39a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress.
16:40–16:43The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity.
16:44–16:48After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs.
16:48–16:54To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object,
16:54–16:58the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive validity,
16:58–17:02even the Naya Yuka accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is
17:02–17:07intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara conclusion.
17:09–17:13Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the
17:13–17:18cognitive aggregate. Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form,
17:18–17:24Is this cognition valid or not, would be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted.
17:24–17:27Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise?
17:27–17:30Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity.
17:30–17:34Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition
17:34–17:38does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here.
17:38–17:41Answer, this objection is unsound.
17:41–17:47In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature.
17:47–17:53The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition
17:53–17:57without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension
17:57–18:02of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces
18:02–18:06doubt about validity extrinsically and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it.
18:08–18:12The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality which is
18:12–18:17distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause,
18:17–18:20therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate.
18:21–18:26Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive
18:26–18:32aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination
18:32–18:36of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the
18:36–18:42cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Naya Yaka
18:42–18:47himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from
18:47–18:51experientiality, because memory would be a counter-example.
18:51–18:55In scholastic usage, experience and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because
18:55–19:00of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means
19:00–19:05of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression.
19:05–19:12Refutation of the Prabhakara view Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view.
19:12–19:17establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity,
19:17–19:21causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this.
19:21–19:25Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object.
19:25–19:29In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the
19:29–19:33object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt
19:33–19:36about cognitive validity.
19:36–19:40If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object
19:40–19:44validity will equally be present in illusion because illusion has the form of two opposing
19:44–19:49cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion-like
19:49–19:54cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering activity, activity arises
19:54–20:00from cognition excluded from illusion. Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity
20:00–20:05arises because the validity of the object is determined. There is only doubt whether
20:05–20:08the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition.
20:08–20:14This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition,
20:14–20:19activity arises. Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt
20:19–20:25concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity. Therefore only
20:25–20:29determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity.
20:30–20:34Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion
20:34–20:39and activity sometimes fails despite its presence. Treating object validity together with absence
20:39–20:42of doubt about the object as the cause is needlessly complex.

Plain text

अबसंश अव आवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर अवर � cognition from ordinary sentences, separately positing absence of error and the other defects becomes pointless. A trustworthy person too does not compose a sentence merely because those defects are absent, without correct cognition of sentence meaning. Otherwise even the MMSARC could not explain the inference to the speaker's valid cognition in the case of an ordinary sentence, because mere absence of defects is not the cause of that inference. Alternatively, grant that because absence of a delimiter is involved, both absence of defect and merit cause valid perceptual cognition. Even so, in the case of the Veda only merit is established as the cause of valid cognition. It should not be said that the Veda possesses the directly available merit of eternal faultlessness and that therefore positing the unseen eternal cognition of an omniscient person as a cause is needlessly complex. Complexity is no defect in a fruitful postulate established by a means of knowledge, Moreover, when causality is apprehended the result is not yet present, so awareness of such complexity does not arise. Ordinary utterances are not eternal, and it is therefore impossible to posit eternal faultlessness in them. It may further be said that inhibitors such as failure to remember the author blocked the causality of the merit consisting in cognition of sentence meaning, hence in both Vedic and ordinary speech absence of defects, or faultlessness alone, causes valid cognition. Though the Veda has no speaker, its eternality establishes its faultlessness. This too is untenable. The opposing inhibitor can be refuted. A sentence of a mistaken or deceptive person who says there is cloth instead of, there is a pot, a sentence accidentally true, an erroneous statement such as I should bow to a Buddhist kaitya, and the utterance of a parrot or child would all have to be accepted as valid merely from absence of a speaker's defect. sentences not depending on another means such as inference would then become like the Veda. Consideration of the objection that the statements of a mistaken person, deceiver or parrot are not valid. An objection arises on the Nayayika view, how can the sentences of a mistaken person, a deceiver or a parrot be valid or authoritative when they are not produced from merit. It is not a satisfactory reply merely to say that such a sentence is invalid because it is not produced from merit or because it is not the object of of the speaker's intention. Since these sentences have the same meaning as a valid sentence, an inference proving their invalidity would be contradicted. Some teachers say that the utterances of the mistaken person and deceive a lack-semantic fitness. Fitness is an unsublated relation to the sentence meaning known by the speaker, an object of error is sublated. This view is unsound. A sentence such as, the pot is not in its substrate, does not produce error by taking some different object as its object. On an economical definition, fitness is merely the non-sublation of sentence meaning, and such non-sublation may be present in an utterance of a mistaken person or parrot. It may also be said that the speech of a child or parrot produces no cognition of sentence meaning but only an awareness of sounds of that kind. This too is unsound. When the complete aggregate of expectancy, fitness, and the other conditions is present, the experience of verbal cognition cannot be denied. When such sentence cognition corresponds to the truth of an experience produced by trustworthy testimony, its validity too is experienced. On the Memsaka view, when an inference concerning fire arises from an illusion of smoke, that inference would be invalid because it was not produced by veridical cognition of smoke as the mark. Nor can it be said that the object of this inference is some different fire, for recognition takes the same fire as its object. In inferring substancehood from cowhood in one individual cow, it is also impossible to make a different substancehood the probandom, identity with another substancehood cannot be superimposed. Parvasion of cowhood by that very substancehood is known through superimposition of the relation. Therefore, though the qualitative component of the mark is erroneous, the inference remains valid because there is no illusion of absence of the probandom. The traditionalists reply. The traditionalists reply that, in the utterances of a mistaken person, deceiver, or parrot, only God's correct cognition of sentence meaning is the cause. Like the Veda, these statements are uttered as authoritative statements of a trustworthy person, and correct cognition of sentence meaning in general causes the effect consisting in cognition of sentence meaning. Amsaka who makes absence of defects the cause is likewise compelled to treat the utterances of parrots and the like is equal to the Veda. It may be objected that on this view the categories of fallacious reasons and false statements disappear, because all speech will ultimately be taken as uttered by God. This objection is unsound. A false sentence meaning, being nonexistent, cannot be an object of God's cognition. If a valid inference sometimes arises from a fallacious mark, the cause of God's inference is only the correct cognition of the existence of the genuine mark, smoke pervaded by the probandom fire, not the false component of the mark. This is the traditionalist view. The Neyayaka reply, Semantic fitness and correct cognition of fitness are merits. The Neyayaka replies that, in ordinary speech, the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not the merit or cause of valid verbal cognition. For reasons of economy and necessity, semantic fitness, and the other conditions, or correct cognition of that fitness, are the merit. In an uncorroborated sentence produced by error, negligence, or deception, correct cognition of fitness is absent because the sentence meaning is sublated. Sometimes, through lack of acuity of hearing, an uncorroborated utterance conveys a meaning different from that intended by the speaker, there too the merit consisting in cognition of fitness is absent. But a sentence expressing a meaning conforming to the speech of a trustworthy person is valid, therefore cognition of fitness must be present there. It may be said that on this view the ambiguous sentence, Harry exists, would be valid even in the sense of a lion. The speaker may intend Vyuh, while the hearer, through an error about the speaker's intention, understands a lion, or even without such an error, cognition of fitness favorable to the lion's sense may be present. Then the expressed cognition of a lion would be valid. Answer, the possibility of such a case is itself accepted. But if the sentence, Harry exists, did not produce valid cognition of the object intended by the speaker, conventional usage would not recognize it as authoritative testimony in the sense of a lion. Therefore, in both Vedic and non-Vedic speech, only correct cognition of fitness and the other conditions is the merit, that is, the cause of valid cognition. The speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is not a merit in the Veda. Objection, in ordinary practice the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as the cause of authoritative linguistic usage, therefore such cognition must also be accepted as a merit in the Veda. The Nayaika inference would be, the Veda was composed by an independently veridical person, because it is authoritative speech furnished with correct cognition of sentence meaning, like the sentence, bring the cow. This inference establishes God as the speaker. This objection is unsound. The authoritativeness of a sentence is possible even without a speaker's antecedent correct cognition of sentence meaning, the necessary conditions such as fitness are invariably present as is correct cognition of fitness. Therefore establishing God as speaker is pointless. A further objection in ordinary language cognition of sentence meaning is accepted as a cause of authoritative utterance. How then is authoritative utterance possible in the Veda without such cognition? Answer, the speaker uses a sentence with the purpose that cognition of its meaning is required for the prompted person's activity and that the prompted person will understand the sentence meaning from these words. There is no need initially to make the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning a cause. That cognition is not the cause of using the complete collection of words constituting the sentence, as with the words of a parrot, sentence formation is possible through the separate cause of the use of each word. Thus cognition of sentence meaning itself is unnecessary, and establishing God as the speaker of the Veda is also unnecessary. The Prima-Facey theorist again says that the speaker's correct cognition of sentence meaning causes the use of an authoritative sentence in ordinary speech and must therefore cause it in the Veda too. The Nayaika replies that the purpose of the speaker's utterance is cognition of sentence meaning by the prompted person and that person's activity, the speaker's own cognition of sentence meaning does not cause the use of the word group. The causes of word use are fitness and the other conditions. Intention is not a merit. It may be proposed that the Veda is valid only concerning the meaning that is the object of a speaker's intention. is the utterance of words with a desire to communicate a particular meaning. Ordinary people like us cannot obtain super-sensible knowledge of Vedic meaning unless God utters the Veda, then ordinary human recitation of the Veda cannot be motivated by an intention to communicate Vedic meaning. If knowledge of Vedic meaning arises only from the Veda, mutual dependence follows. Therefore God, who knows all Vedic meanings, utters the Veda with the desire to communicate every meaning, this divine intention is the merit or cause, and from it valid cognition of Vedic meaning arises. In this way the independent cognition of God, the substrate of valid cognition of all Vedic meanings, is established as a merit. This proposal is unsound. A teacher who knows Vedic sentence meaning with the aid of MMA with Mechran essay with Mechran, the Vedgas, and all other means recites the Veda with the intention of communicating its meaning. Therefore a teacher possessing correct knowledge of Vedic meaning necessarily has an intention concerning each meaning. A later teacher understands the intentional recitation of an earlier teacher and apprehends Vedic meaning, thus a beginningless succession of intentions belonging to earlier and earlier teachers is established. Why then separately accept God? Objection, how can a later teacher recite the Vedic with the intention of communicating a particular meaning if the earlier teacher who recited it did not know that meaning. Without an eternal speaker's intention, the Vedic would not remain authoritative speech and its meaning could not be determined. Answer, this is unsound. In the beginningless cycle of the world, some teacher must have possessed knowledge of Vedic meanings based on study of the six Vedgas and the like, and at some time must have recited the Vedic with the intention of communicating those meanings. That recitation alone establishes that the Vedic has been uttered it with intention. The Prabhākara view, validity is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced. The Prabhākramsakas say that cognitive validity is intrinsically produced by the complete causal aggregate of cognition and intrinsically known. Veridicality, which resides equally in experience and memory and serves as a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, is the validity of a means of cognition. This validity is produced from the aggregate of cognition in general and awaits neither merit nor absence of defect. There is no deviation in the causal relation, because all cognition is valid in its own nature. Only activity can be false, cognition itself is not sublated, for the sublating cognition is equally cognition. The name invalidity is applied to cognition only under the extraneous condition that it produces contrary activity. Objection, if validity is the validity of a means of cognition, how is the cognition, this is silver, rising in a shell invalid, and how is its invalidity produced extrinsically by a defect distinct from the cognitive aggregate? Answer, invalidity is not the nature of cognition, all cognition is valid. Invalidity is the capacity to prompt contrary conduct. Such invalidity, consisting in non-apprehension of the lack of relation between property and substrate, together with non-apprehension of the absence of unity, is produced extrinsically through conjunction of an additional defect with the cognitive aggregate, through defect produced non-apprehension of non-relation, or through relation to a defect after cognition has arisen. It is not intrinsically produced by the cognitive aggregate alone. Otherwise there would be deviation in invalid cognition. Invalidity as the causality of contrary activity is known through a sublating cognition, it is not intrinsically known from the complete aggregate of cognition or through reflexive awareness of that cognition. and absence of defect do not cause the nature of cognition because there is deviation there. Cognitive validity is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate, not from merit or absence of defect. Even a sublating cognition regarded as the substrate of invalidity is valid in the component concerning its own substrate object. Cognition of a non-existent object is produced by a defect, a sense faculty has no capacity to apprehend an unrelated non-existent object. Varidicality is intrinsically known. Objection, a defect alone cannot cause invalidity, a cognitive aggregate dependent on the defect causes invalidity. Correspondingly, a cognitive aggregate dependent on absence of defect should cause validity. Answer, this is unsound. One and the same cognitive aggregate can, with respect to a non-existent object, depend on a defect and produce invalid cognition, while with respect to an existent object it can be independent of defect and produce valid cognition. With respect to one and the same cognition, one aggregate cannot depend on both defect and absence of defect. Therefore, defect and absence of defect are unnecessary in respectively producing validity and invalidity. Cognitive validity is the condition of taking its object a thing possessing the qualifier mentioned in the cognition, or of being cognition furnished with that same qualifier residing in the thing. As self-luminous, the cognition, this is silver, determines its object and intrinsically delimits and illuminates its validity as the truth of cognition, in the form of taking as object the silverness of the thing or the substrate of silverness. No additional validity distinct from this truth is admissible in the absence of proof. An alternative Prabhupāda view. Alternatively, whether cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, extrinsically known from absence of defect, or not known at all, describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of activity. A person acts after determining an object, activity is possible from the necessary determination of the object alone. It may be said that determination of an object as this thing is so, depends on knowledge of cognitive validity. But this is not correct. General cognition of the object as this thing has the form of silver rises in direct determination of the object, why then should activity depend on extrinsic knowledge of the cognition's validity? Because validity is intrinsically delimited in cognition, it is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara further says, grant that the first cognition of an object, independently of determination of validity, is not determination of the object. Then a second cognition dependent on the validity of the first could not determine its own object either. Therefore describing validity is pointless from the standpoint of object determination. A second cognition of validity would be needed to determine the first cognition's validity, and a third for the second, producing infinite regress. The view that validity is extrinsically known or produced from merit or absence of defect also produces regress if only a second cognition whose validity has previously been known determines the validity of the first. Therefore a second cognition of unknown validity determines the validity of the first, and a third cognition of unknown validity determines that of the second. Likewise, cognition of an unknown object determines the object. Without separately apprehending its cognition, object cognition can determine its own validity, the dispute concerns only the self-manifestation of cognitive validity. Even the Nayaika accepts that the validity of cognition as the validity of the object is intrinsically known. When there is a desire to know the validity of the first cognition, a second cognition of unknown validity determines it, hence there is no regress. The validity of an unknown object is likewise determined through identity. After cognition arises, no doubt of the form, is the object thus or not, occurs. To the question how object cognition can determine its own validity without knowing the object, the answer is that the dispute concerns the self-manifestation of cognitive validity, even the Naya Yuka accepts that cognitive validity in the form of object validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhakara conclusion. Objection, on the Prabhakara view, cognitive validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Then in an unhabituated state doubt of the form, Is this cognition valid or not, would be impossible, because what is intrinsically determined cannot be doubted. Doubt about an object, is it thus or otherwise? Arises from suspicion of the objects in validity. Consequently, merely seeing an amalaka fruit placed on the palm through object cognition does not determine the validity of the object, there is deviation here. Answer, this objection is unsound. In repeated cognition there is no doubt about truth or falsity, because all cognition is true in its own nature. The only doubt is whether a cognition is valid or not. Such cognition is sometimes one cognition without clear apprehension of distinct alternatives and sometimes two cognitions with apprehension of distinct alternatives. Doubt whether a defect is present among the causes of cognition produces doubt about validity extrinsically and determinant cognition of one alternative destroys it. The prima facie theorist again says that valid cognition is experientiality which is distinct from memory. In memory, a latent impression appears as the uncommon cause, therefore memory is not intrinsically known from its own aggregate. Correspondingly, valid cognition too will not be intrinsically produced or known from the cognitive aggregate. The Prabhikara gives the final reply, the validity useful in activity is determination of the validity of the object, it is intrinsically known and intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Defining it as experientiality is needlessly complex. The Naya Yaka himself infers cognitive validity from correspondence between cognition and object, not merely from experientiality, because memory would be a counter-example. In scholastic usage, experience and memory are respectively called valid and invalid because of independence from independence upon a latent impression. Valid experience is called a means of valid cognition because it does not depend on an impression. Refutation of the Prabhakara view Some massakas refute the Prabhakara view. establishes that determination of cognitive validity alone, not doubt about that validity, causes unwavering activity, the Naya Yaka 2 accepts this. Such cognitive validity is not the validity of the object. In an unhabituated cognition, self-luminosity or recognition may make the validity of the object known as determined, but this does not produce unwavering activity, only doubt about cognitive validity. If the rule is accepted that every cognition is in fact valid, determination of object validity will equally be present in illusion because illusion has the form of two opposing cognitions whose difference is undetermined both in nature and object. Therefore an illusion-like cognition such as, this is silver, does not produce unwavering activity, activity arises from cognition excluded from illusion. Objection, in such a case no doubt about cognitive validity arises because the validity of the object is determined. There is only doubt whether the cognition is two cognitions with an unknown difference or one qualified cognition. This doubt inhibits unwavering activity, when it is removed by a contrary qualified cognition, activity arises. Answer, the general rule is that if doubt and determination of absence of doubt concerning something inhibit activity, determination of that thing causes activity. Therefore only determination of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion causes activity. Determination of object validity is not the cause, because it is also present in illusion and activity sometimes fails despite its presence. Treating object validity together with absence of doubt about the object as the cause is needlessly complex.

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