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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.993627)
Duration: 20:05
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:13इन्वरिंष अगड, कमप्लिक मइथिली त्रन्श्लटिन, इन्वरिंष अगड, तट्दवसिंट मैज्वि,
0:13–0:18One, thus, after inference has been explained, God, the creator of the world and supreme
0:18–0:22among persons, is established through inference.
0:22–0:26God is established by the inference, earth and the other things have an agent, because
0:26–0:28they are effects, like a jar.
0:28–0:32Objection, earth and the other things are not the subject.
0:32–0:37Two, the following objection may now be raised, earth and the other entities cannot separately
0:37–0:41be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as earth cannot be
0:41–0:46denoted merely by the word, earth, and so forth. Nor can earth and the others collectively
0:46–0:50be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary
0:50–0:54delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute
0:54–0:58in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference
0:58–1:03either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form,
1:03–1:07their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's
1:07–1:12existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence.
1:13–1:15The problem of mutual dependence
1:17–1:203. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally
1:20–1:25strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that
1:25–1:29case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from the
1:29–1:33mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be
1:33–1:38presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences
1:38–1:43are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised
1:43–1:47by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would
1:47–1:51differ and the two inferences would concern different objects.
1:51–1:57Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor
1:57–2:02should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent
2:02–2:07on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be
2:07–2:13created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at
2:13–2:17the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would
2:17–2:23not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because
2:23–2:28embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and
2:28–2:34the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's
2:34–2:38effort or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent
2:38–2:43and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort
2:43–2:49and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces
2:49–2:54unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the
2:54–3:00subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being
3:00–3:05produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities.
3:06–3:10Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established,
3:10–3:13because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form.
3:15–3:17Earth alone is not the subject.
3:19–3:22Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either,
3:22–3:27because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful
3:27–3:34inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from
3:34–3:39doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the
3:39–3:44reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom is a defect of the reason.
3:45–3:49Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways,
3:49–3:53through doubt about the reason's presence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the
3:53–3:57probandom, or through doubt about the absence of the probandom in a locus possessing the reason.
3:59–4:03Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing
4:03–4:08the probandom. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference
4:08–4:11and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject.
4:11–4:246. May now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful,
4:24–4:30therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effected
4:30–4:33in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object,
4:33–4:38which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because all the causal
4:38–4:43materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore
4:43–4:48also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that very sprout. This argument,
4:48–4:54however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effect head is not a property
4:54–4:57of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential
4:57–5:02statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement,
5:02–5:06that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one
5:06–5:10One probandum in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandum depending
5:10–5:15on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence.
5:15–5:18Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and
5:18–5:20the other things as subjects.
5:20–5:25Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing
5:25–5:28the subject matter arises.
5:28–5:32By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established,
5:32–5:34but God will not be established.
5:34–5:38Even the die-ads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God,
5:38–5:43because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent.
5:43–5:47Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition,
5:47–5:50desire to act, and effort.
5:50–5:55Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort
5:55–5:59nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference
5:59–6:04to striding persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established
6:04–6:07arises.
6:07–6:10Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with
6:10–6:15direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort.
6:15–6:19If concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its
6:19–6:23object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the
6:23–6:24like.
6:24–6:29Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like.
6:29–6:35Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth.
6:35–6:39It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause
6:39–6:44of a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal
6:44–6:47status.
6:47–6:50This argument, however, is not sound.
6:50–6:54Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth
6:54–6:58are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the
6:58–7:02likened by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has
7:02–7:05already been established.
7:05–7:09Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort.
7:09–7:109.
7:10–7:14Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort.
7:14–7:18It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through
7:18–7:22effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment
7:22–7:25immediately after the productive effort.
7:25–7:28If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the
7:28–7:29jar.
7:29–7:34The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise.
7:34–7:38Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action
7:38–7:41there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar.
7:41–7:47Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition.
7:47–7:52Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause.
7:52–7:57of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning
7:57–8:02the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished.
8:04–8:08Nor should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and,
8:08–8:11when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar,
8:11–8:17conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in Kyktra is devoted to his own mother,
8:17–8:22like Maitreya. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition.
8:23–8:27Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is
8:27–8:33trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandum is established generally only when
8:33–8:37the general pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the
8:37–8:42probandum is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no
8:42–8:46additional distinct object be established.
8:46–8:49Influence of God, Tat the Sintmai
8:49–8:53Pervasion by the Probandom cannot be apprehended.
8:53–8:5811. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is,
8:58–9:02the status of the Probandom as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced
9:02–9:05by cognition of the particular material cause.
9:05–9:09That same pervasion of the Probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore
9:09–9:14a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible.
9:14–9:18It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause
9:18–9:22incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons
9:22–9:29like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes,
9:29–9:33and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact,
9:33–9:37cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect.
9:38–9:43Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment
9:43–9:47immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the
9:47–9:54like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something
9:54–9:59is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been
9:59–10:04refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom.
10:04–10:1012. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced,
10:10–10:15but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort
10:15–10:19concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact,
10:19–10:24is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated
10:24–10:31by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person
10:31–10:35endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause,
10:35–10:40but not being produced through generic character contact, determinant cognition,
10:40–10:46or effort generated by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being
10:46–10:51produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause,
10:51–10:55but not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future,
10:55–11:01or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition,
11:01–11:05and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future.
11:06–11:11It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort
11:11–11:16arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities.
11:16–11:23Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended.
11:23–11:32Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the probandum nor defeat of the probandum arises.
11:32–11:38Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandum
11:38–11:4413. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic cognition produced
11:44–11:49by yogic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not
11:49–11:53established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts
11:53–11:58is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandom
11:58–12:02in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent.
12:02–12:06Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent,
12:06–12:11produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire,
12:11–12:15and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit
12:15–12:21or demerit, which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can
12:21–12:25produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises.
12:27–12:31Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is
12:31–12:37intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars
12:37–12:43and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandum becomes a cause of
12:43–12:48inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have
12:48–12:53to be held to arise only from determinate cognition of perversion produced in that way.
12:54–13:00The probandum would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing
13:00–13:04what is already established does not arise.
13:04–13:1014. It may now be argued that the Probandom is established because of the reasons pervasion.
13:10–13:15The reasons pervasion has the following specific form. Wherever there is effected, there is
13:15–13:21being produced by a knower of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects
13:21–13:26in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this
13:26–13:31specific provision, the reason effect hood establishes in earth and the other subjects
13:31–13:35the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth
13:35–13:39occurs in all loci in which effect hood occurs.
13:39–13:43Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise
13:43–13:47in the inference of God.
13:47–13:50Refutation of the argument.
13:50–13:5415, this argument, however, is not sound.
13:54–13:59The question is, in what form does cognition of the perversion of the reason-effect hood
13:59–14:03arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately and each is being produced by a knower of the
14:03–14:08material cause of that particular jar, is being produced by a knower of the material
14:08–14:14cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general?
14:14–14:18Under the first alternative, the reason-effect hood deviates from the property of being
14:18–14:23produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar.
14:23–14:28Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible?
14:28–14:33The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that
14:33–14:37could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar.
14:37–14:41The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence.
14:41–14:45Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings
14:45–14:51in general, thereby removing the defective absence of pervasion by the probandom.
14:51–14:56A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference.
14:56–15:00For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he
15:00–15:02is not inside the house.
15:02–15:08Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself,
15:08–15:13while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it.
15:13–15:16In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same
15:16–15:21relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is
15:21–15:24only negative pervasion.
15:24–15:28Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established
15:28–15:31arises.
15:31–15:35Inference of God, Tatvasint Mai.
15:35–15:38The form of the inference of God.
15:38–15:4316. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this
15:43–15:48form, the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be
15:48–15:53produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because
15:53–15:56it is an effect, like a jar.
15:56–16:01Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen,
16:01–16:07the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor.
16:07–16:10This proposal, however, is not sound.
16:10–16:14The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent.
16:14–16:18Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those
16:18–16:21very cognitions and the like is not established.
16:21–16:26Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental
16:26–16:28in producing dyads.
16:28–16:33This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation
16:33–16:37is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it
16:37–16:39is an effect.
16:39–16:44Another efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyads non inherent cause, does not
16:44–16:51produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality.
16:51–16:55The nature of the reason cannot be determined.
16:55–17:00Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason effect hood is not a property
17:00–17:04in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such
17:04–17:09a property cannot be established for the opponent.
17:09–17:14Nor can the reason effected be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime,
17:14–17:18because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality
17:18–17:21of pastime cannot be established.
17:21–17:25Nor can the reason effected be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present
17:25–17:32from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property.
17:32–17:36Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence,
17:36–17:41this property deviates in the condition of destruction.
17:41–17:45Nor can effect had be the counterpositiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing
17:45–17:49existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent,
17:49–17:53while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction.
17:53–17:56An Alternative Form of the Inference of God
17:56–17:5918.
17:59–18:03Some scholars present an alternative form of the Inference of God as follows, this
18:03–18:07This jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent
18:07–18:11cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a
18:11–18:14cloth.
18:14–18:17This proposal, however, is not sound.
18:17–18:23In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental.
18:23–18:27Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal
18:27–18:32substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences,
18:32–18:36This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent
18:36–18:41unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth.
18:41–18:45And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and
18:45–18:50pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this.
18:50–18:55Direct Cognition, because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain.
18:55–18:59The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter inference,
18:59–19:04This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent
19:04–19:08cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another
19:08–19:11jar.
19:11–19:15A second alternative form of the inference.
19:15–19:1619.
19:16–19:20Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable
19:20–19:25to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object.
19:25–19:29It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind,
19:29–19:33The conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the
19:33–19:38substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation.
19:38–19:41On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur
19:41–19:46in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of
19:46–19:50all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental
19:50–19:54effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action.
19:54–19:59Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent,
19:59–20:01time that is the substratum of mental effort.

Plain text

इन्वरिंष अगड, कमप्लिक मइथिली त्रन्श्लटिन, इन्वरिंष अगड, तट्दवसिंट मैज्वि, One, thus, after inference has been explained, God, the creator of the world and supreme among persons, is established through inference. God is established by the inference, earth and the other things have an agent, because they are effects, like a jar. Objection, earth and the other things are not the subject. Two, the following objection may now be raised, earth and the other entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, earth, and so forth. Nor can earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence. The problem of mutual dependence 3. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form. Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the reason's presence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom, or through doubt about the absence of the probandom in a locus possessing the reason. Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing the probandom. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject. 6. May now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful, therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effected in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter reason arises in that very sprout. This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effect head is not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one One probandum in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandum depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises. By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established. Even the die-ads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God, because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent. Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to striding persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. If concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element earth. It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element earth, because there is deviation in their causal status. This argument, however, is not sound. Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element earth are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the likened by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already been established. Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort. 9. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition. Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause. of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in Kyktra is devoted to his own mother, like Maitreya. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition. Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandum is established generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandum is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandum is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established. Influence of God, Tat the Sintmai Pervasion by the Probandom cannot be apprehended. 11. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the Probandom as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause. That same pervasion of the Probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of pervasion in the inference of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact, cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect. Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being produced through generic character contact, determinant cognition, or effort generated by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future. It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the probandum nor defeat of the probandum arises. Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandum 13. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandom in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent, produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit, which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandum becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinate cognition of perversion produced in that way. The probandum would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14. It may now be argued that the Probandom is established because of the reasons pervasion. The reasons pervasion has the following specific form. Wherever there is effected, there is being produced by a knower of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific provision, the reason effect hood establishes in earth and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effect hood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15, this argument, however, is not sound. The question is, in what form does cognition of the perversion of the reason-effect hood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately and each is being produced by a knower of the material cause of that particular jar, is being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect, or is being produced by a knower of effects in general? Under the first alternative, the reason-effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defective absence of pervasion by the probandom. A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house. Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it. In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative pervasion. Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Inference of God, Tatvasint Mai. The form of the inference of God. 16. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form, the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect, like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor. This proposal, however, is not sound. The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent. Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established. Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing dyads. This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect. Another efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyads non inherent cause, does not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality. The nature of the reason cannot be determined. Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason effect hood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason effected be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established. Nor can the reason effected be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property. Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, this property deviates in the condition of destruction. Nor can effect had be the counterpositiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent, while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction. An Alternative Form of the Inference of God 18. Some scholars present an alternative form of the Inference of God as follows, this This jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences, This jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar, because it is an effect, like a cloth. And this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this. Direct Cognition, because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain. The proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter inference, This jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another jar. A second alternative form of the inference. 19. Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, The conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action. Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

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