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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:07The following discussion is principally based upon two subjects,
0:07–0:111, the inference of God, a logical proof of God's existence,
0:11–0:17and 2, the doctrine of the power to burn, which concerns causation and the rejection of an additional power.
0:17–0:23Let us understand both subjects in simple terms.
0:24–0:27The inference of God, proof of God's existence.
0:29–0:32In this section, the existence of God as the maker of the world
0:32–0:36is established on the logical foundations of Gaya philosophy.
0:37–0:43The fundamental argument, the visible world, earth, water, mountains, and all similar things,
0:43–0:46has been produced by some maker because these things are products.
0:47–0:52Just as a pot is a product whose maker is a potter, God is the maker of the product that is the
0:52–0:58world. The prima facie opponent's objection, the opponent argues that a maker has a body and acts
0:58–1:03through that body. If God is the maker of the world, God too must be embodied, but a body is
1:03–1:09impermanent and perishable. Moreover, there is no direct proof that this world was made by a single
1:09–1:15maker. The Naya Yaka's definitive reply, the Naya Yaka's refute this objection. According to them,
1:15–1:20God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, eternal desire, and eternal effort.
1:21–1:26These three qualities are everlasting in God. God does not require a human body to create the
1:26–1:30world, through knowledge and effort, and by means of unseen merit and demerit, God imparts
1:30–1:36motion to the atoms and brings about creation. On this basis, a single omniscient and omnipotent
1:36–1:42God is established. The doctrine of the power to burn, a theory of cause and effect.
1:44–1:49This section presents the celebrated debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning power
1:49–1:55as an unseen capacity. It is explained through the example of fire's capacity to burn.
1:56–2:02The Mzaka view, when a hand is placed in fire, the experience of burning occurs.
2:02–2:07Yet if a special jewel, such as a moonstone, or a mantra is present nearby, the fire does
2:07–2:08not burn.
2:08–2:13The Neayaka refutation, the absence of an inhibitor, the Neayakas reject this doctrine
2:13–2:16of an unseen power.
2:16–2:20They argue that there is no need to postulate an additional power in fire, in accordance
2:20–2:24with the principle of theoretical economy.
2:24–2:28Fire alone is the principal cause of burning.
2:28–2:32The role of the inhibitor, the Neayakas hold that the presence of the jewel is an inhibitor
2:32–2:34or obstacle.
2:34–2:39An effect occurs only when its cause fire is present and the inhibitor, the jewel,
2:39–2:40is absent.
2:40–2:45If the jewel is present, the effect of burning does not occur, if it is absent, burning
2:45–2:47occurs.
2:47–2:53The postulation of any additional power is therefore unnecessary.
2:53–3:00In the inference of God, the world is a product and must therefore have a maker, God, who
3:00–3:06is a disembodied being endowed with eternal cognition, desire, and effort.
3:06–3:10In the theory of power, no additional unseen power, in his in an object, in effect occurs
3:10–3:14through the presence of the cause and the absence of an obstacle, that is, the absence
3:14–3:16of an inhibitor.
3:16–3:21The establishment of God through inference, a logical analysis of how Gangesu Upadyaya
3:21–3:26establishes an omniscient and disembodied God through the inference, earth, sprouts, and similar
3:26–3:32things or products, and whatever is a product must have a maker. The power to burn in the
3:32–3:38inhibitor, what is fire's power to burn? How do jewels, mantras, and similar things function
3:38–3:43as inhibitors, and how is the absence of an inhibitor treated as a cause of the effect?
3:44–3:50These questions are examined logically. Analysis of technical terminology,
3:50–3:54the meaning and use in the text of complex gnyaia terms such as pervasion, subject,
3:54–3:58probandum, reason, extraneous condition, and mutual dependence.
4:00–4:04The principal constituents required to establish an inference in gnyaia philosophy
4:04–4:10are the subject, the probandum, and the reason. Let us understand these three terms,
4:10–4:13together with pervasion, in the context of the original text.
4:13–4:19Probandom, the matter or property to be established.
4:19–4:23In the inference of God, the probandom is being produced by a maker, the state of having
4:23–4:26an agent as one's producer.
4:26–4:32Subject, the locus or matter in which the probandom is to be established.
4:32–4:36In the original text, earth, a sprout, and similar things are treated as subjects in
4:36–4:40which the existence of a maker, God is established.
4:40–4:46Reason, the mark or ground on the basis of which the probandom is established.
4:46–4:50In the inference of God, being a product is the reason.
4:50–4:56Perversion, the unbroken and universal relation between reason and probandom.
4:56–5:01One form presented in the text is, wherever producthood occurs, there is production by
5:01–5:05one who knows the material cause of that product.
5:05–5:11We shall next discuss the defects of an extraneous condition and mutual dependence.
5:11–5:15Before doing so, however, it is necessary to see whether these basic terms have become
5:15–5:17clear.
5:17–5:23Consider the common inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there.
5:23–5:28What are the subject, pro-bandem, and reason in this inference?
5:28–5:32This familiar example, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there,
5:32–5:36makes the three principal constituents of Nyaya inference clear.
5:36–5:43Subject, the mountain, because it is the locus in which the probandum, fire, is being established.
5:43–5:49Probandum, fire, the property, or matter to be established on the mountain.
5:49–5:55Reason, smoke, the ground or mark on the basis of which fire is established on the mountain.
5:55–6:01On this basis, one can understand how an inference is constructed in Nyayalogic.
6:01–6:08The text then introduces two further complex terms, extraneous condition and mutual dependence.
6:08–6:17Let us understand and detail these two exceptionally important and difficult technical terms of Nabhya Nyaya, Upadi and Añonayas Rea.
6:17–6:23Upadi, conditional limitation or conditional defect.
6:23–6:30What is inupity? In Nyaelogic, and upity is a defect that gives rise to doubt concerning the
6:30–6:37perversion or universal rule between the reason and the probandum. In simple terms, it is a concealed
6:37–6:42restrictive condition that is invariably connected with the probandum but not invariably connected
6:42–6:48with the reason. Consequently, the inference from the reason to the probandum proves erroneous.
6:49–6:51Example from the original text
6:51–6:58Inference, earth and similar objects are produced by a maker because they are products.
6:58–7:03Here producthood is the reason and being produced by a maker is the pro-bandam.
7:03–7:07Objection in the form of an upadi, the prima facie opponent argues that, being produced through
7:07–7:10a body, is an extraneous condition.
7:10–7:14Wherever something is produced by a maker, the opponent claims, it is necessarily produced
7:14–7:18through a body, as pots and cloth are made by embodied agents such as potters.
7:18–7:23Yet this property of being produced through a body does not invariably accompany the reason,
7:23–7:27producthood, because God is disembodied, a body is therefore not indispensable to the
7:27–7:29production of the earth.
7:29–7:34The definitive reply, Nayakas such as Gangesu Upadyaya established that being produced
7:34–7:40through a body does not pervade the pro-bandam and therefore cannot be a genuine Upadi.
7:40–7:44Mere production by a maker is sufficient for establishing the pro-bandam, embodiment
7:44–7:48is not necessary.
7:48–7:55mutual dependence, anionis rea circular dependency or mutual interdependence.
7:55–7:57What is mutual dependence?
7:57–8:01When two things or arguments depend upon each other in such a manner that the second is
8:01–8:06required to establish the first and the first to establish the second, the defect of mutual
8:06–8:10dependence or circular reasoning arises.
8:10–8:15In this defect, neither proposition can easily serve as a foundation because each looks
8:15–8:18to the other for its proof.
8:18–8:21Examples from the original text
8:21–8:26First context, the inference of God, a neutral adjudicator is in doubt between the inferences
8:26–8:28of the proponent and the opponent.
8:28–8:31If it is said that the proponent's inference causes doubt about the opponent's and that
8:31–8:36the opponent's inference causes doubt about the proponent's, mutual dependence results,
8:36–8:39because the establishment of the first requires the second and the establishment
8:39–8:42of the second requires the first.
8:42–8:48context, the subjects of a sprout and the earth, if God is first inferred in relation to the sprout and then, on that basis,
8:48–8:54inferred in relation to the earth, or if the inference concerning the sprout is made only after the inference concerning the earth,
8:55–8:59each inference becomes dependent upon the other, producing the defect of mutual dependence.
9:01–9:03The distinction in brief.
9:04–9:10A newpity is an additional condition or restriction that defeats the relation between the reason and the probandom.
9:10–9:17Mutual dependence is a logical circle in which the argument turns around and returns to its starting point.
9:18–9:26In the Tatmasintmai, the two subjects of the nature of God and the power to burn are founded upon profound logical doctrines of Gaya philosophy.
9:27–9:34The nature of God, according to the Nayayakas, God is the maker of the entire world, including the earth and other things.
9:34–9:41and other things. God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, desire, and effort. Unlike
9:41–9:46individual selves, God does not perform bodily operations through hands and feet.
9:48–9:53The doctrine of the power to burn, the msakhas maintain that fire possesses an unseen power to
9:53–9:58burn, which is arrested when an inhibitor such as a jewel or mantret is present. The
9:58–10:03Neayakas reject this account and, instead of admitting an additional power, treat the absence
10:03–10:07of an inhibitor as a cause of burning.
10:07–10:12Let us understand in greater depth, on the basis of the Tattva Sintmai, the Nayayaka account
10:12–10:14of the nature of God.
10:14–10:19In this work, Gangesa Upadyaya does not treat God as an ordinary entity but establishes
10:19–10:24God upon a supremely logical and philosophical foundation.
10:24–10:30According to the original text, the chief characteristics of God are as follows.
10:30–10:35An omniscient and disembodied maker, in the Nayakavu, God is the efficient cause or maker
10:35–10:39of the whole world, including the earth.
10:39–10:43Unlike human beings, God is disembodied and performs no bodily operation through hands
10:43–10:45or feet.
10:45–10:50At the same time, God is omniscient and knows all things.
10:50–10:55Eternal cognition, desire, and effort, three distinctive qualities immediate cognition,
10:55–10:59the desire to act, and effort, exist eternally in God.
10:59–11:04These three qualities directly cause the creation of the world.
11:04–11:10Freedom from worldly defects, God is unlike an individual worldly self.
11:10–11:14God undergoes neither pleasure nor pain and possesses neither ignorance nor any form of
11:14–11:16error.
11:16–11:20Although knowing all things, God is never deluded.
11:20–11:24Originator of the Veda and language, at the beginning of creation, the Veda and
11:24–11:28the convention governing ordinary words such as pot, the relation between language
11:28–11:35meaning are established through God's desire and effort. An important philosophical question arises
11:35–11:42here. Since God is disembodied and lacks a physical body, hands, feet, and bodily operations, then.
11:43–11:48According to the Neayakas, God has no need of a physical body or hands,
11:48–11:52because the process of divine creation is wholly different from human production.
11:53–11:56The text explains that God is the efficient cause of the world.
11:56–12:03A human being requires bodily operations through hands and feet to perform a task, but God creates
12:03–12:10solely through eternal cognition, desire to act, and effort. God's eternal effort is so powerful that,
12:10–12:16without any physical organ, it can set atoms and the unseen karmic forces of living beings into
12:16–12:22motion. Although the supreme self is devoid of bodily operations, this effort causes products
12:22–12:28such as the earth. God's cognition is connected with the specific and successive complex of causes,
12:28–12:33including unseen merit and demerit, related to earth and other effects, and the world is
12:33–12:39produced in accordance with divine desire. Now that it has been explained how God creates
12:39–12:45through desire and effort, another question calls for consideration. Since God is complete and has
12:45–12:50no pleasure, pain, or physical need, why does God create a world filled with diversity without
12:50–12:56any personal purpose. What does the original text say on this matter?
12:56–13:02The prima facie opponent raises precisely this doubt, if God has no pleasure, pain, or purpose,
13:02–13:06why create the world? If it is said that God creates out of compassion, then only happy
13:06–13:12beings and heaven should be produced, not suffering beings and hell. If the world's diversity
13:12–13:16is attributed to the individual acts of living beings, their merit and demerit, then karma
13:16–13:20would have to be supreme, what need would there be for God?
13:20–13:25The Neyayaka presents the following definitive solution.
13:25–13:29Creation is the object of God's natural desire, the entire world falls within the scope of
13:29–13:31divine desire.
13:31–13:37God's cognition and desire are not motivated by personal interest, pleasure, or pain.
13:37–13:41Direction of unseen karmic results When God's cognition is connected with the
13:41–13:46specific unseen karmic result of living beings and the relevant causal complex, God
13:46–13:50God creates or dissolves the world according to divine desire.
13:50–13:54The diversity is therefore caused by karma, but a conscious divine will is required to
13:54–13:58direct that karma toward its results.
13:58–14:03Natural operation, God's eternal cognition is neither causeless nor purposeless, it
14:03–14:07naturally produces the world, just as the self is said to produce pleasure and ether
14:07–14:09to produce sound.
14:09–14:14Thus, Gaya philosophy treats God as free from worldly desire yet as the regulator of
14:14–14:21fruits of action. This brings clarity to the profound discussion of God's nature in agency.
14:22–14:28The doctrine of the power to burn is a celebrated controversy between Nyaya and Mme with Makron
14:28–14:34as a with Makron. The Memsaka Prima facee view holds that fire possesses a super sensible and
14:34–14:40unseen power to burn. To establish this, it presents a specific example in paragraph 115
14:40–14:42of the original text.
14:42–14:47Ordinarily, when a hand comes into contact with fire, it burns and the experience of
14:47–14:49burning arises.
14:49–14:54But if a particular jewel or mantra, called an inhibitor, is present, the hand does not
14:54–14:57burn despite the presence of fire.
14:57–15:02When the jewel is removed, fire burns the hand once again.
15:02–15:07On the basis of this illustration, what reason do the msakkas give for the hands not burning
15:07–15:10in the presence of the jewel or mantra?
15:10–15:15What effect does the jewel have upon fire's unseen power to burn?
15:15–15:20According to themsakas, the jewel, or mantra is an inhibitor.
15:20–15:24When the jewel is placed near the fire, its influence destroys the unseen power to burn
15:24–15:27or renders that power unproductive.
15:27–15:32Because the power has been destroyed or obstructed, contact between fire and hand does not produce
15:32–15:35the experience of burning.
15:35–15:40When the jewel is removed, the power returns to the fire and the hand burns.
15:40–15:46The Neyayaka Gangesa Upadyaya, however, rejects the doctrine of an unseen power.
15:46–15:51He says that no additional and imperceptible power need be admitted in fire, because doing
15:51–15:56so introduces needless theoretical multiplication.
15:56–16:02To explain the event, the Neyayakas present the doctrine of the absence of an inhibitor.
16:02–16:07In the Neyayaka view, the real cause of the experience of burning, in relation to the
16:07–16:12jewel, is the absence of the inhibitor, the absence of the obstructing jewel.
16:12–16:17They argue that an effect requires a complete causal complex.
16:17–16:21The causal complex for burning consists not merely of fire but of fire together with
16:21–16:26the absence of an inhibitor, namely the absence of the jewel.
16:26–16:30The Neyayakas explain the process as follows.
16:30–16:35When the hand comes into contact with fire and no jewel is present, the absence of the
16:35–16:40inhibitor is present, the causal complex is complete, and the hand burns.
16:40–16:46When the jewel, the inhibitor, is present, the jewel's absence is no longer present.
16:46–16:51The causal complex is therefore incomplete, and the hand does not burn despite the presence
16:51–16:53of fire.
16:53–16:58In this manner, the Neayakas explain the process merely by treating an absence,
16:58–17:03non-presence as a cause, without producing or destroying any new power.
17:03–17:09Nyaya philosophy places great importance upon theoretical economy and seeks to avoid postulating
17:09–17:12new super-sensible entities.
17:12–17:17If fire together with the absence of an inhibitor suffices to establish the effect of burning,
17:17–17:21what logical defect, according to Nyaya, would arise from admitting with themsaka's
17:21–17:22a new unseen power in fire?

Plain text

The following discussion is principally based upon two subjects, 1, the inference of God, a logical proof of God's existence, and 2, the doctrine of the power to burn, which concerns causation and the rejection of an additional power. Let us understand both subjects in simple terms. The inference of God, proof of God's existence. In this section, the existence of God as the maker of the world is established on the logical foundations of Gaya philosophy. The fundamental argument, the visible world, earth, water, mountains, and all similar things, has been produced by some maker because these things are products. Just as a pot is a product whose maker is a potter, God is the maker of the product that is the world. The prima facie opponent's objection, the opponent argues that a maker has a body and acts through that body. If God is the maker of the world, God too must be embodied, but a body is impermanent and perishable. Moreover, there is no direct proof that this world was made by a single maker. The Naya Yaka's definitive reply, the Naya Yaka's refute this objection. According to them, God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, eternal desire, and eternal effort. These three qualities are everlasting in God. God does not require a human body to create the world, through knowledge and effort, and by means of unseen merit and demerit, God imparts motion to the atoms and brings about creation. On this basis, a single omniscient and omnipotent God is established. The doctrine of the power to burn, a theory of cause and effect. This section presents the celebrated debate between Sakas and Neayakas concerning power as an unseen capacity. It is explained through the example of fire's capacity to burn. The Mzaka view, when a hand is placed in fire, the experience of burning occurs. Yet if a special jewel, such as a moonstone, or a mantra is present nearby, the fire does not burn. The Neayaka refutation, the absence of an inhibitor, the Neayakas reject this doctrine of an unseen power. They argue that there is no need to postulate an additional power in fire, in accordance with the principle of theoretical economy. Fire alone is the principal cause of burning. The role of the inhibitor, the Neayakas hold that the presence of the jewel is an inhibitor or obstacle. An effect occurs only when its cause fire is present and the inhibitor, the jewel, is absent. If the jewel is present, the effect of burning does not occur, if it is absent, burning occurs. The postulation of any additional power is therefore unnecessary. In the inference of God, the world is a product and must therefore have a maker, God, who is a disembodied being endowed with eternal cognition, desire, and effort. In the theory of power, no additional unseen power, in his in an object, in effect occurs through the presence of the cause and the absence of an obstacle, that is, the absence of an inhibitor. The establishment of God through inference, a logical analysis of how Gangesu Upadyaya establishes an omniscient and disembodied God through the inference, earth, sprouts, and similar things or products, and whatever is a product must have a maker. The power to burn in the inhibitor, what is fire's power to burn? How do jewels, mantras, and similar things function as inhibitors, and how is the absence of an inhibitor treated as a cause of the effect? These questions are examined logically. Analysis of technical terminology, the meaning and use in the text of complex gnyaia terms such as pervasion, subject, probandum, reason, extraneous condition, and mutual dependence. The principal constituents required to establish an inference in gnyaia philosophy are the subject, the probandum, and the reason. Let us understand these three terms, together with pervasion, in the context of the original text. Probandom, the matter or property to be established. In the inference of God, the probandom is being produced by a maker, the state of having an agent as one's producer. Subject, the locus or matter in which the probandom is to be established. In the original text, earth, a sprout, and similar things are treated as subjects in which the existence of a maker, God is established. Reason, the mark or ground on the basis of which the probandom is established. In the inference of God, being a product is the reason. Perversion, the unbroken and universal relation between reason and probandom. One form presented in the text is, wherever producthood occurs, there is production by one who knows the material cause of that product. We shall next discuss the defects of an extraneous condition and mutual dependence. Before doing so, however, it is necessary to see whether these basic terms have become clear. Consider the common inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there. What are the subject, pro-bandem, and reason in this inference? This familiar example, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke there, makes the three principal constituents of Nyaya inference clear. Subject, the mountain, because it is the locus in which the probandum, fire, is being established. Probandum, fire, the property, or matter to be established on the mountain. Reason, smoke, the ground or mark on the basis of which fire is established on the mountain. On this basis, one can understand how an inference is constructed in Nyayalogic. The text then introduces two further complex terms, extraneous condition and mutual dependence. Let us understand and detail these two exceptionally important and difficult technical terms of Nabhya Nyaya, Upadi and Añonayas Rea. Upadi, conditional limitation or conditional defect. What is inupity? In Nyaelogic, and upity is a defect that gives rise to doubt concerning the perversion or universal rule between the reason and the probandum. In simple terms, it is a concealed restrictive condition that is invariably connected with the probandum but not invariably connected with the reason. Consequently, the inference from the reason to the probandum proves erroneous. Example from the original text Inference, earth and similar objects are produced by a maker because they are products. Here producthood is the reason and being produced by a maker is the pro-bandam. Objection in the form of an upadi, the prima facie opponent argues that, being produced through a body, is an extraneous condition. Wherever something is produced by a maker, the opponent claims, it is necessarily produced through a body, as pots and cloth are made by embodied agents such as potters. Yet this property of being produced through a body does not invariably accompany the reason, producthood, because God is disembodied, a body is therefore not indispensable to the production of the earth. The definitive reply, Nayakas such as Gangesu Upadyaya established that being produced through a body does not pervade the pro-bandam and therefore cannot be a genuine Upadi. Mere production by a maker is sufficient for establishing the pro-bandam, embodiment is not necessary. mutual dependence, anionis rea circular dependency or mutual interdependence. What is mutual dependence? When two things or arguments depend upon each other in such a manner that the second is required to establish the first and the first to establish the second, the defect of mutual dependence or circular reasoning arises. In this defect, neither proposition can easily serve as a foundation because each looks to the other for its proof. Examples from the original text First context, the inference of God, a neutral adjudicator is in doubt between the inferences of the proponent and the opponent. If it is said that the proponent's inference causes doubt about the opponent's and that the opponent's inference causes doubt about the proponent's, mutual dependence results, because the establishment of the first requires the second and the establishment of the second requires the first. context, the subjects of a sprout and the earth, if God is first inferred in relation to the sprout and then, on that basis, inferred in relation to the earth, or if the inference concerning the sprout is made only after the inference concerning the earth, each inference becomes dependent upon the other, producing the defect of mutual dependence. The distinction in brief. A newpity is an additional condition or restriction that defeats the relation between the reason and the probandom. Mutual dependence is a logical circle in which the argument turns around and returns to its starting point. In the Tatmasintmai, the two subjects of the nature of God and the power to burn are founded upon profound logical doctrines of Gaya philosophy. The nature of God, according to the Nayayakas, God is the maker of the entire world, including the earth and other things. and other things. God is disembodied and possesses eternal cognition, desire, and effort. Unlike individual selves, God does not perform bodily operations through hands and feet. The doctrine of the power to burn, the msakhas maintain that fire possesses an unseen power to burn, which is arrested when an inhibitor such as a jewel or mantret is present. The Neayakas reject this account and, instead of admitting an additional power, treat the absence of an inhibitor as a cause of burning. Let us understand in greater depth, on the basis of the Tattva Sintmai, the Nayayaka account of the nature of God. In this work, Gangesa Upadyaya does not treat God as an ordinary entity but establishes God upon a supremely logical and philosophical foundation. According to the original text, the chief characteristics of God are as follows. An omniscient and disembodied maker, in the Nayakavu, God is the efficient cause or maker of the whole world, including the earth. Unlike human beings, God is disembodied and performs no bodily operation through hands or feet. At the same time, God is omniscient and knows all things. Eternal cognition, desire, and effort, three distinctive qualities immediate cognition, the desire to act, and effort, exist eternally in God. These three qualities directly cause the creation of the world. Freedom from worldly defects, God is unlike an individual worldly self. God undergoes neither pleasure nor pain and possesses neither ignorance nor any form of error. Although knowing all things, God is never deluded. Originator of the Veda and language, at the beginning of creation, the Veda and the convention governing ordinary words such as pot, the relation between language meaning are established through God's desire and effort. An important philosophical question arises here. Since God is disembodied and lacks a physical body, hands, feet, and bodily operations, then. According to the Neayakas, God has no need of a physical body or hands, because the process of divine creation is wholly different from human production. The text explains that God is the efficient cause of the world. A human being requires bodily operations through hands and feet to perform a task, but God creates solely through eternal cognition, desire to act, and effort. God's eternal effort is so powerful that, without any physical organ, it can set atoms and the unseen karmic forces of living beings into motion. Although the supreme self is devoid of bodily operations, this effort causes products such as the earth. God's cognition is connected with the specific and successive complex of causes, including unseen merit and demerit, related to earth and other effects, and the world is produced in accordance with divine desire. Now that it has been explained how God creates through desire and effort, another question calls for consideration. Since God is complete and has no pleasure, pain, or physical need, why does God create a world filled with diversity without any personal purpose. What does the original text say on this matter? The prima facie opponent raises precisely this doubt, if God has no pleasure, pain, or purpose, why create the world? If it is said that God creates out of compassion, then only happy beings and heaven should be produced, not suffering beings and hell. If the world's diversity is attributed to the individual acts of living beings, their merit and demerit, then karma would have to be supreme, what need would there be for God? The Neyayaka presents the following definitive solution. Creation is the object of God's natural desire, the entire world falls within the scope of divine desire. God's cognition and desire are not motivated by personal interest, pleasure, or pain. Direction of unseen karmic results When God's cognition is connected with the specific unseen karmic result of living beings and the relevant causal complex, God God creates or dissolves the world according to divine desire. The diversity is therefore caused by karma, but a conscious divine will is required to direct that karma toward its results. Natural operation, God's eternal cognition is neither causeless nor purposeless, it naturally produces the world, just as the self is said to produce pleasure and ether to produce sound. Thus, Gaya philosophy treats God as free from worldly desire yet as the regulator of fruits of action. This brings clarity to the profound discussion of God's nature in agency. The doctrine of the power to burn is a celebrated controversy between Nyaya and Mme with Makron as a with Makron. The Memsaka Prima facee view holds that fire possesses a super sensible and unseen power to burn. To establish this, it presents a specific example in paragraph 115 of the original text. Ordinarily, when a hand comes into contact with fire, it burns and the experience of burning arises. But if a particular jewel or mantra, called an inhibitor, is present, the hand does not burn despite the presence of fire. When the jewel is removed, fire burns the hand once again. On the basis of this illustration, what reason do the msakkas give for the hands not burning in the presence of the jewel or mantra? What effect does the jewel have upon fire's unseen power to burn? According to themsakas, the jewel, or mantra is an inhibitor. When the jewel is placed near the fire, its influence destroys the unseen power to burn or renders that power unproductive. Because the power has been destroyed or obstructed, contact between fire and hand does not produce the experience of burning. When the jewel is removed, the power returns to the fire and the hand burns. The Neyayaka Gangesa Upadyaya, however, rejects the doctrine of an unseen power. He says that no additional and imperceptible power need be admitted in fire, because doing so introduces needless theoretical multiplication. To explain the event, the Neyayakas present the doctrine of the absence of an inhibitor. In the Neyayaka view, the real cause of the experience of burning, in relation to the jewel, is the absence of the inhibitor, the absence of the obstructing jewel. They argue that an effect requires a complete causal complex. The causal complex for burning consists not merely of fire but of fire together with the absence of an inhibitor, namely the absence of the jewel. The Neyayakas explain the process as follows. When the hand comes into contact with fire and no jewel is present, the absence of the inhibitor is present, the causal complex is complete, and the hand burns. When the jewel, the inhibitor, is present, the jewel's absence is no longer present. The causal complex is therefore incomplete, and the hand does not burn despite the presence of fire. In this manner, the Neayakas explain the process merely by treating an absence, non-presence as a cause, without producing or destroying any new power. Nyaya philosophy places great importance upon theoretical economy and seeks to avoid postulating new super-sensible entities. If fire together with the absence of an inhibitor suffices to establish the effect of burning, what logical defect, according to Nyaya, would arise from admitting with themsaka's a new unseen power in fire?

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