MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part19_RadioPlay.mp3

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996138)
Duration: 21:14
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:04व्यु कन्सुर्णिंग दिक।
0:04–0:06विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:06–0:08विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:08–0:10विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:10–0:12विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:12–0:14विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:14–0:16विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:16–0:18विचार-विमर्श्क रेक।
0:18–0:24If, when the totality of other causes is present, near-absence of prior-absence does not produce
0:24–0:29absence of the effect, prior-absence is not a cause.
0:29–0:34When an all-pervasive mind is accepted as a sense-organ, adjuncts such as body, bodily
0:34–0:39part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, efficient causes such as sandalwood themselves
0:39–0:43explain the determinate location of pleasure and the like.
0:43–0:47Conclusion, mind is atomic.
0:47–0:51In a youngika conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects,
0:51–0:56yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises.
0:56–1:00Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is
1:00–1:03the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ.
1:03–1:09Therefore mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject establishing proof.
1:09–1:13This is also established by inference, while mitra's eye produces cognition,
1:13–1:18nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction
1:18–1:22with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because
1:22–1:26all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same
1:26–1:27time.
1:27–1:32Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise,
1:32–1:38when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow.
1:38–1:42Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception.
1:42–1:48It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition.
1:48–1:51Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when
1:51–1:54one desires to know a part.
1:54–1:58Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired
1:58–2:04sense organ, without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition.
2:04–2:09Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence.
2:09–2:15Or is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition?
2:15–2:19When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must
2:19–2:23be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost.
2:23–2:27The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit,
2:27–2:33because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively.
2:33–2:38Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects
2:38–2:42At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ.
2:42–2:46This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions
2:46–2:49prevents cognition through the other sense organs.
2:49–2:53Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible.
2:53–2:57Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of
2:57–3:03cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously.
3:03–3:10in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year,
3:10–3:14conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound.
3:15–3:20Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound.
3:21–3:27Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly.
3:29–3:31The Objection of 20 Songs
3:31–3:37Memsaka objection, if twenty songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration
3:37–3:41to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all twenty sounds
3:41–3:44and perception of all songs will arise at one time.
3:44–3:48The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot
3:48–3:53escape the fault of simultaneous cognition.
3:53–3:57Proposal of cognition of indifference
3:57–4:02When Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired
4:02–4:06noise is merely a cognition of indifference.
4:06–4:11Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition
4:11–4:13of indifference.
4:13–4:18Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard
4:18–4:20no other sound.
4:20–4:24On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise
4:24–4:30of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds.
4:30–4:33Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration.
4:33–4:40Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception
4:40–4:45of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound.
4:45–4:51Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance,
4:51–4:57cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds
4:57–5:02are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known, desire
5:02–5:08to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal.
5:08–5:15The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is
5:15–5:19incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at one time, it produces only a
5:19–5:25collective cognition in the form of noise. The Neyayaka replies, when many sounds in
5:25–5:30here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual sounds, but through the successive
5:30–5:35conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise
5:35–5:41successively. Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind.
5:43–5:48When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited
5:48–5:53by the objects. It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known,
5:53–5:57the complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct.
5:58–6:03The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously.
6:04–6:06The Objection of Five Cognitions
6:08–6:13The Memsarca says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound are
6:13–6:18are simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is
6:18–6:21more natural to regard them as simultaneous.
6:21–6:26The Nayaika replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in
6:26–6:31experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous.
6:31–6:35The alternative of five minds is rejected.
6:35–6:41The alternative, let mind be fivefold, one for each sense organ, is inconsistent.
6:41–6:47If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience
6:47–6:52would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by
6:52–6:55one person is connected.
6:55–7:00Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self.
7:00–7:05Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts
7:05–7:09The men's arc as final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic
7:09–7:13place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body
7:13–7:18and its many parts. How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands,
7:18–7:24feet, and the like in dance, or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous? Twenty
7:24–7:28efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because
7:28–7:31there is no defeating cognition.
7:31–7:35Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous.
7:35–7:40Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action.
7:40–7:45The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by
7:45–7:47that desire.
7:47–7:51Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body
7:51–7:53and its parts.
7:53–7:59If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts
7:59–8:03delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance
8:03–8:08are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body.
8:08–8:11Thus the Atomic Mind is established.
8:11–8:16The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established
8:16–8:21as apprehensible by the Atomic Mind, the definition of perception is not under-extended
8:21–8:24in perceptions of pleasure and the like.
8:24–8:28Here ends the theory of the Atomicity of Mind in the perception section of the
8:28–8:32Tatthasintmai.
8:32–8:37The Theory of Subsequent Cognition.
8:37–8:43The saka objecting cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:43–8:48The msaka says, a present first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known, a second
8:48–8:54mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it.
8:54–8:59The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself.
8:59–9:04Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition.
9:04–9:07Absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence
9:07–9:14of the first cognition. Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
9:14–9:18Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such
9:18–9:23as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time
9:23–9:27of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative
9:27–9:34concomitance of subsequent cognition. Cognition has itself as its object.
9:34–9:39Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable of producing
9:39–9:43usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed.
9:43–9:47Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition
9:47–9:51is required for usage concerning desire and the like.
9:51–9:55It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which
9:55–9:59usage is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise
9:59–10:01from a second cognition.
10:01–10:05The men's arc a replies that the first cognition is itself its own object.
10:05–10:09A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself as
10:09–10:11its object.
10:11–10:15Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is
10:15–10:17no mutual dependence.
10:17–10:21Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective,
10:21–10:25the power of usage, inherent, and the like should be accepted as its own nature,
10:25–10:29otherwise an infinite regress follows.
10:29–10:34Self objectivity is a special nature of cognition.
10:34–10:38The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference.
10:38–10:43How can cognition itself be its own object under identity, is unsound.
10:43–10:47Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective
10:47–10:49cognition.
10:49–10:53Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is
10:53–10:56possible without dependence on a relation.
10:56–11:00cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition
11:00–11:05produces usage concerning itself. What is the nature of this special nature?
11:06–11:11Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot
11:11–11:16be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience.
11:17–11:22The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe it.
11:22–11:29Self-objectivity is self-luminosity.
11:29–11:32It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second mental
11:32–11:37cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first cognition possible
11:37–11:39without a second?
11:39–11:43Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental
11:43–11:45cognition.
11:45–11:49Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness.
11:49–11:53A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning
11:53–11:58the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence,
11:58–12:01so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted.
12:01–12:05In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior
12:05–12:10toward silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect.
12:10–12:13Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non-apprehension of difference from
12:13–12:17remembered silver cores activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal
12:17–12:23status. Thus cognition self objectivity means its self luminosity or capacity to
12:23–12:28produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is
12:28–12:31ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object
12:31–12:34would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition itself
12:34–12:41had been its own object. The theory of tripartite perception. Proponents of
12:41–12:45A tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does not require
12:45–12:51a second mental cognition aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition.
12:51–12:55Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition.
12:55–12:59Every cognition of the form I know this simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition
12:59–13:00and known.
13:00–13:04The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of
13:04–13:09action, therefore cognition has a tripartite form.
13:09–13:13consistency of being illuminated by another.
13:13–13:18The Nayayika objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent
13:18–13:22cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward.
13:22–13:26The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leuminosity
13:26–13:31of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome.
13:31–13:35Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the
13:35–13:40nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition.
13:40–13:44Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition,
13:44–13:48because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions.
13:48–13:52The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another
13:52–13:57cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result.
13:57–14:00Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition,
14:00–14:05an infinite regress arises in knowing the property, cognition is not mental.
14:05–14:09pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of
14:09–14:12an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is
14:12–14:15unavoidable.
14:15–14:20FALT IN THE INFERENCE OF MENTAL PERCEPTUALITY
14:20–14:24The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the self,
14:24–14:29like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted
14:29–14:32as mental an infinite regress follows.
14:32–14:36Other inferences are also possible, cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition
14:36–14:41produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception.
14:41–14:45If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished,
14:45–14:49because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established.
14:49–14:53The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus, because
14:53–14:56cognition is self-luminous.
14:56–15:02Both objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself.
15:02–15:06This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by
15:06–15:11contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself.
15:11–15:15Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and
15:15–15:19the like and is fruitless.
15:19–15:24Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual.
15:24–15:27The simple first cognition is self-luminous.
15:27–15:30Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an
15:30–15:36object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition.
15:36–15:41Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self-objectivity
15:41–15:45or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature.
15:45–15:50Cognition produced by sense-object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual.
15:50–15:54Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in
15:54–15:56the self.
15:56–16:00The perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different
16:00–16:04sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive object is fixed
16:04–16:08merely by the relevant sensory cause.
16:08–16:15Naoyaka Refutation of Self-Luminosity The Naoyaka replies, perception does not
16:15–16:19establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition, because ordinary experience
16:19–16:24takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver.
16:24–16:30arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by experience.
16:30–16:35The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, rises after the first cognition, this experience
16:35–16:38cannot be discarded.
16:38–16:41Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite
16:41–16:45regress, because not every cognition must be known again.
16:45–16:48Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a
16:48–16:50subsequent cognition.
16:50–16:54Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof
16:54–16:58of the form, I know every cognition.
16:58–17:02Cognition is not its own object.
17:02–17:05Agency is being the in hearing locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of
17:05–17:09the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being
17:09–17:12the meaning of a verbal root.
17:12–17:15In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its
17:15–17:20own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object.
17:20–17:25Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears.
17:25–17:29Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore
17:29–17:32cannot qualify the first cognition.
17:32–17:36It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of
17:36–17:40the word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self.
17:40–17:44Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition
17:44–17:49thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact
17:49–17:52producing cognition of itself and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to
17:52–17:57itself. The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense-contact, because
17:57–18:02it is produced by contact with mind, it is mental.
18:02–18:06Inference establishing subsequent cognition
18:06–18:11The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first
18:11–18:15cognition produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it
18:15–18:20is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because
18:20–18:24it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of
18:24–18:26the self, and is not produced by itself.
18:26–18:30Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus
18:30–18:35of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition.
18:35–18:40Knownness or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition.
18:40–18:44When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory is
18:44–18:47present, subsequent cognition arises.
18:47–18:51When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present,
18:51–18:55the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate
18:55–18:59subsequent cognitions simultaneously.
18:59–19:06Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition
19:06–19:10point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced by the eye,
19:10–19:15because it is not in contact with the eye. The Nayaika says that the Pervasian cognition,
19:15–19:19the first cognition is knowable and is the object of a second mental cognition,
19:19–19:23makes the first cognition an object of subsequent cognition through contact in the form of knownness.
19:24–19:28God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects.
19:29–19:33The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition
19:33–19:38creates an infinite regress is unsound. Through a mental perception that establishes its subject,
19:38–19:43the first cognition becomes an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external
19:43–19:48sense organ. It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known.
19:49–19:52When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual
19:52–19:57cause for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent cognition can be
19:57–20:00inhibited.
20:00–20:05Necessary Knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity.
20:05–20:09The men's arka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition
20:09–20:14is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self,
20:14–20:17every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-luminous.
20:17–20:20Reply, no such pervasion is established.
20:20–20:25If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite
20:25–20:27chain arises.
20:27–20:31can self-luminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense organ
20:31–20:32is perceived.
20:32–20:37If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order
20:37–20:41is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated
20:41–20:45cause, the rule of causality is destroyed.
20:45–20:49Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another
20:49–20:52inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would
20:52–20:54not be avoided.
20:54–20:58If the speaker's desire, no self-liminosity, or inhibition by perception of another object
20:58–21:02is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition.
21:02–21:06Therefore elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of
21:06–21:10cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

Plain text

व्यु कन्सुर्णिंग दिक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। विचार-विमर्श्क रेक। If, when the totality of other causes is present, near-absence of prior-absence does not produce absence of the effect, prior-absence is not a cause. When an all-pervasive mind is accepted as a sense-organ, adjuncts such as body, bodily part, and locus of operation are unnecessary, efficient causes such as sandalwood themselves explain the determinate location of pleasure and the like. Conclusion, mind is atomic. In a youngika conclusion, many sense organs remain related to their respective objects, yet at one time cognition of only one object through one sense organ arises. Mind, whose non-conjunction prevents many cognitions from arising simultaneously, is the successive assisting regulator of each sense organ. Therefore mind is atomic, all-pervasiveness is defeated by subject establishing proof. This is also established by inference, while mitra's eye produces cognition, nose, tongue, skin, and ear, although conjoined with their respective objects, lack the conjunction with mind required to produce perceptions of all those objects simultaneously, because all the sense organs do not produce their respective perceptions at one and the same time. Among many sense organs, one sense organ should be taken as the subject, otherwise, when the entire causal complex is present, simultaneous cognition would follow. Desire to know is not a direct cause of perception. It is insufficient to say that desire to know a particular object causes the sequence of cognition. Cognition of undesired objects also occurs, and cognition of cloth may arise even when one desires to know a part. Desire to know indirectly assists by producing effort that directs mind toward the desired sense organ, without attention of mind it is not a direct cause of perceptual cognition. Merit and demerit are not the sole regulators of sequence. Or is it correct that delay caused by unseen merit and demerit prevents simultaneous cognition? When all conditions except conjunction with mind are present, the unseen factor too must be present, otherwise the causal status of mind would be lost. The sequence of cognition of particular objects is not determined only by merit and demerit, because cognitions of both desired and undesired things are experienced successively. Particular conjunction with mind and cognition of many objects At one time mind enters a particular conjunction with one sense organ. This conjunction produces particular cognition of an object, absence of other conjunctions prevents cognition through the other sense organs. Since mind is atomic, conjunction with many sense organs at one time is impossible. Thus experiences such as hearing a song while watching it dance are aggregates of cognitions arising in extremely rapid succession, not simultaneously. in conjunction of sense organ and mind. Although many sounds in here in the year, conjunction with mind does not occur in the same manner in the year as delimited by each sound. Desire to know and concentration connect mind with the year as delimited by a particular sound. Therefore cognition of the desired song is clear, while other sounds are known as noise or indistinctly. The Objection of 20 Songs Memsaka objection, if twenty songs are sung together and there is desire and concentration to know all of them, mind will be conjoined with the ear as delimited by all twenty sounds and perception of all songs will arise at one time. The causal conditions of each song are present, therefore the doctrine of atomic mind cannot escape the fault of simultaneous cognition. Proposal of cognition of indifference When Nayaka reply, clear cognition arises of a desired sound, while cognition of undesired noise is merely a cognition of indifference. Even in the case of 20 songs, cognition of the remaining songs may be treated as cognition of indifference. Themsaka says that this postulation is unnecessary, experiences apart from this sound I heard no other sound. On the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind too, a cumbersome consequence would arise of accepting indifferent cognition of all undesired sounds. Determinant causal status of desire to know and concentration. Conclusion, desire to know and concentration are not generally auxiliary causes of perception of a desired sound or inhibitors of perception of an undesired sound. Only when many sounds coexist do they respectively function, through positive and negative concomitance, cause an inhibitor with respect to desired and undesired sounds. In noise, many sounds are known generally, but individual universals such as k-hood and g-hood are not known, desire to know a particular sound causes clear apprehension of its particular universal. The ear is capable of apprehending many sounds. Some teachers say that the ear is incapable of apprehending many individual sounds at one time, it produces only a collective cognition in the form of noise. The Neyayaka replies, when many sounds in here in one ear, its capacity does apprehend individual sounds, but through the successive conjunctions of mind and the specificity of desire and concentration, clear cognitions arise successively. Many objects of one sense organ, successive conjunction of mind. When many objects are present in one sense organ, mind can join successively as delimited by the objects. It is not the case that once mind has conjoined with the ear, all sounds will be known, the complete causal complex in the ear as delimited by each particular sound is distinct. The atomicity of mind prevents these separate complexes from being completed simultaneously. The Objection of Five Cognitions The Memsarca says, when the five objects, color, taste, smell, touch, and sound are are simultaneously present, cognitions through the five sense organs occur rapidly, it is more natural to regard them as simultaneous. The Nayaika replies, extremely subtle temporal intervals are generally not ascertained in experience, so a group of successive cognitions appears simultaneous. The alternative of five minds is rejected. The alternative, let mind be fivefold, one for each sense organ, is inconsistent. If many minds were accepted in oneself, the unity of memory, desire, effort, and self-experience would be broken, cognitions belonging to mutually unrelated minds could not be experienced by one person is connected. Therefore only one atomic mind should be accepted in each self. Objection from simultaneous actions of bodily parts The men's arc as final objection, if mind is atomic, effort will reside in an atomic place or merely in the region of the body, not simultaneously in the regions of the body and its many parts. How then are the many varied movements of eyebrows, eyes, hands, feet, and the like in dance, or movements of 20 fingers and toes, simultaneous? Twenty efforts cannot occur together, and simultaneous action cannot be called an illusion because there is no defeating cognition. Reply 20 actions can be simultaneous. Conclusion, Desire to Act regulates the production of action. The action for which there is a desire to act is produced by an effort generated by that desire. Effort arises in the person as delimited by the body and produces actions of the body and its parts. If there is desire for 20 actions of 20 fingers and toes, the causal complexes of 20 efforts delimited by those 20 digits can be present together, the many movements of dance are likewise produced by effort delimited by the body. Thus the Atomic Mind is established. The special qualities of the self, cognition, pleasure, pain, and the like are established as apprehensible by the Atomic Mind, the definition of perception is not under-extended in perceptions of pleasure and the like. Here ends the theory of the Atomicity of Mind in the perception section of the Tatthasintmai. The Theory of Subsequent Cognition. The saka objecting cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. The msaka says, a present first cognition such as, this is a pot is itself known, a second mental cognition, that is, a subsequent cognition, is not required to reveal it. The first cognition itself causes usage concerning itself. Such usage does not follow the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Absence of usage when subsequent cognition is absent can be explained by absence of the first cognition. Therefore postulation of subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Nevertheless a second mental cognition may be accepted in usage concerning objects such as pots, one's own past and future cognitions, and cognitions of others, because at the time of usage the first cognition is absent and usage follows the positive and negative concomitance of subsequent cognition. Cognition has itself as its object. Objection, on this view desire, aversion, and the like would likewise be capable of producing usage concerning themselves, and cognition would not be needed. Reply, there is a rule that ordinary usage is produced by cognition, therefore cognition is required for usage concerning desire and the like. It may then be said that not mere cognition, but cognition of the object about which usage is made, causes usage, hence usage concerning the first cognition will arise from a second cognition. The men's arc a replies that the first cognition is itself its own object. A cognition endowed with the power appropriate to usage concerning itself takes itself as its object. Power of usage is not merely causal status but a distinct entity, therefore there is no mutual dependence. Because it is fit for usage concerning itself, the first cognition is self-objective, the power of usage, inherent, and the like should be accepted as its own nature, otherwise an infinite regress follows. Self objectivity is a special nature of cognition. The objection, the relation between object and objective cognition depends upon difference. How can cognition itself be its own object under identity, is unsound. Fitness for usage concerning itself is possible even though it is not distinct from self-objective cognition. Alternatively, self-objectivity is a special nature of cognition, a special nature is possible without dependence on a relation. cognition concerning a pot produces usage concerning the pot, self-objective cognition produces usage concerning itself. What is the nature of this special nature? Although it is difficult to define in a single word, an entity established by experience cannot be rejected, just as a particular sweetness of sugar is established by experience. The phrase special nature can indicate it, though one word cannot completely describe it. Self-objectivity is self-luminosity. It may be objected that usage concerning the first cognition arises from a second mental cognition or subsequent cognition, how then is usage concerning the first cognition possible without a second? Reply, the simple first cognition causes its usage as cognition, not as a second mental cognition. Accepting a second cognition is unnecessary cumbersomeness. A collective cognition such as, these are a pot and a cloth, produces separate usage concerning the distinct objects pot and cloth, but an aggregate of objects has no separate existence, so no separate relation of it to the collection need be accepted. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the cognition has a power to produce behavior toward silver, but behavior does not occur because that power is suppressed by a defect. Cognition of the, this, aspect of the shell and non-apprehension of difference from remembered silver cores activity, silver cognition is merely the delimiter of causal status. Thus cognition self objectivity means its self luminosity or capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This does not mean that no second cognition is ever required for usage concerning cognition, otherwise memory of an object would be impossible in the absence of an impression that cognition itself had been its own object. The theory of tripartite perception. Proponents of A tripartite perception say that the claim usage concerning cognition does not require a second mental cognition aims to establish self-luminosity of the first cognition. Perception itself is the means of knowledge or illuminator of cognition. Every cognition of the form I know this simultaneously illuminates knower, cognition and known. The self is perceived as agent, cognition as action, and the object as object of action, therefore cognition has a tripartite form. consistency of being illuminated by another. The Nayayika objects, the first cognition, this is a pot, arises first, and the subsequent cognition, I know that this is a pot, afterward. The Memsaka, however, says that usage concerning cognition is established by the self-leuminosity of the first cognition itself and that postulating subsequent cognition is cumbersome. Cognitionhood itself should be accepted as regulating self-leuminosity, otherwise the nature of cognition would remain unestablished in a simple first cognition. Knowness of the first cognition cannot serve as the reason for inferring subsequent cognition, because knownness is absent in past and future cognitions. The first perceptual cognition is not mental, otherwise, to know every cognition, another cognition would repeatedly be required and an infinite regress would result. Even if it is accepted that a second mental cognition apprehends a desired cognition, an infinite regress arises in knowing the property, cognition is not mental. pleasure and the like are called mental only in the absence of inquiry, if cognition of an inquired object is again apprehended by another cognition, an infinite regress is unavoidable. FALT IN THE INFERENCE OF MENTAL PERCEPTUALITY The inference, a simple first cognition is a momentary perceptual quality of the self, like pleasure, therefore it is mentally perceived, is unsound, because if cognition is accepted as mental an infinite regress follows. Other inferences are also possible, cognition produced by the eye is not an object of cognition produced by the eye, or, the eye does not produce cognition of a seen perception. If the first cognition is regarded as illuminated by another cognition, the locus is unestablished, because the nature of the first cognition has not previously been established. The proof that establishes cognition itself defeats establishment of the locus, because cognition is self-luminous. Both objectivity means the capacity to produce usage concerning itself. This capacity is a special nature of cognition, its contrary is neither being produced by contact with itself nor being produced by cognition of itself. Therefore an inference whose probandom is fitness to be known deviates in pots and the like and is fruitless. Cognition produced by sense object contact is perceptual. The simple first cognition is self-luminous. Usage concerning the objecthood of a previous cognition generally occurs in memory of an object in the form, this is that object, no second cognition is needed to illuminate cognition. Although the first cognition does not produce itself, it is related to itself because self-objectivity or fitness for usage concerning itself is its nature. Cognition produced by sense-object contact and independent of another cognition is perceptual. Therefore all cognitions produced by contact between self and mind are perceptual in the self. The perception may be produced by indeterminate cognition, but cognition produced by a different sense organ is not thereby called self-luminous, illumination of the cognitive object is fixed merely by the relevant sensory cause. Naoyaka Refutation of Self-Luminosity The Naoyaka replies, perception does not establish the self-luminosity of a simple first cognition, because ordinary experience takes the form, this is silver, not, I know this silver. arises from determination of the object, self-objectivity of the first cognition is not established by experience. The subsequent cognition, I know this silver, rises after the first cognition, this experience cannot be discarded. Accepting subsequent cognition as distinct from the first does not create an infinite regress, because not every cognition must be known again. Only a cognition that becomes an object of usage or memory is apprehended by a subsequent cognition. Since the first cognition is not established as self-luminous, it cannot become a proof of the form, I know every cognition. Cognition is not its own object. Agency is being the in hearing locus of an action, objecthood is being the locus of the result of an action or the object of an instrumental operation, actionhood is being the meaning of a verbal root. In a first cognition of the form, I know this silver, cognition itself is not its own object, because no sense object contact is available to make cognition an object. Their only cognition qualified by cognitionhood concerning, this, appears. Self-objectivity or self-luminosity of cognition has not previously been known and therefore cannot qualify the first cognition. It is not proper to call the first cognition self-objective on the ground that use of the word, cognition, is produced by an initial cognition of the self. Although the self is itself an object of the first cognition, not every cognition thereby becomes cognition of the self. The first cognition is not the locus of sense-contact producing cognition of itself and therefore does not generate an objecthood related to itself. The first cognition is perceptual because it is the locus of sense-contact, because it is produced by contact with mind, it is mental. Inference establishing subsequent cognition The inference establishing subsequent cognition is as follows, the disputed simple first cognition produced by a sense organ is not the locus of its own objecthood, because it is not the locus of sense contact that produces itself, or it is not related to itself, because it is a direct perceptual cognition, is not the locus of objecthood as a property of the self, and is not produced by itself. Conversely, the first cognition that is the object of mental perception is the locus of contact with mind and therefore can be apprehended by mental cognition. Knownness or fitness to be known does not by nature always appear in cognition. When the causal complex for mental apprehension of a cognition required in usage or memory is present, subsequent cognition arises. When rival causes for apprehension of pleasure, another object, or another cognition are present, the effect of this knowability may be arrested, therefore all cognitions do not generate subsequent cognitions simultaneously. Remaining reply concerning the inference establishing subsequent cognition point, a visual perceptual cognition is not itself the object of a cognition produced by the eye, because it is not in contact with the eye. The Nayaika says that the Pervasian cognition, the first cognition is knowable and is the object of a second mental cognition, makes the first cognition an object of subsequent cognition through contact in the form of knownness. God's cognition is likewise self-luminous because it takes all things as its objects. The Mensaka objection that illumination of the first cognition by a second cognition creates an infinite regress is unsound. Through a mental perception that establishes its subject, the first cognition becomes an object of perception even though it is not in contact with an external sense organ. It is not necessary that every subsequent cognition must itself again be known. When the causal complex for cognition of pleasure and the like or a stronger perceptual cause for another object is present, the required knowability of the subsequent cognition can be inhibited. Necessary Knowability is not the cause of self-luminosity. The men's arka objects, every cognition must be knowable, because of the pervasion, cognition is perceptual, and because cognition is an apprehensible special quality of the self, every simple first cognition should be regarded as self-luminous. Reply, no such pervasion is established. If every cognition is illuminated by a later cognition or subsequent cognition, an infinite chain arises. can self-luminosity be taken as the cause, because only an object related to a sense organ is perceived. If, though a cause is present, an effect fails because of an inhibitor, the causal order is not thereby broken, but if an effect is accepted as arising without the postulated cause, the rule of causality is destroyed. Even if self-luminosity of the first cognition were established through exclusion, another inference would be required to illuminate subsequent cognition, and the regress would not be avoided. If the speaker's desire, no self-liminosity, or inhibition by perception of another object is accepted, those conditions would apply equally to subsequent cognition. Therefore elimination of the first cognition is possible through the general contact of cognition head alone, no separate doctrine of self-liminosity is needed.

← Transcript index