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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:04Gageeos conclusion
0:06–0:16Eight, Gageeos concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition or not.
0:16–0:26A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition, is the qualifcant.
0:26–0:32But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its complete causal complex is absent.
0:32–0:36Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like are cognized, a doubt such as,
0:36–0:40is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible.
0:40–0:44Consequently the Niyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is
0:44–0:49reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reasoned smoke and all individuals
0:49–0:53of the probandom fire, and cognition of smoke's pervasion by fire means cognizing
0:53–0:57that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire.
0:57–1:04The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded.
1:04–1:117. The theory of the extraneous condition.
1:13–1:17Aplodhibita. Introduction.
1:19–1:241. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reason's deviation from the probandom,
1:24–1:29therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be ascertained.
1:30–1:34For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter.
1:34–1:43definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that
1:43–1:49pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason.
1:51–1:56But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition
1:56–2:02that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defect of mutual dependence arises
2:02–2:07in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of perversion,
2:07–2:13and cognition of perversion causes cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition.
2:13–2:18An alternative definition of an extraneous condition.
2:18–2:193.
2:19–2:22Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows.
2:22–2:26Its perversion of the probandum is the state in which it is not the counter positive
2:26–2:30of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the probandum, and
2:30–2:34its non-pervasion of the reason is the state in which it is the counter-positive of an
2:34–2:39absolute absence of the probandom occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other
2:39–2:45words, an extraneous condition is the counter-positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus
2:45–2:49of the reason, but not the counter-positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus
2:49–2:52of the probandom.
2:52–2:57But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous
2:57–3:02condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades
3:02–3:09a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being produced
3:09–3:16by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected that possession
3:16–3:21of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the subject
3:21–3:26property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which pervades
3:26–3:32the probandum darkness delimited by the reason property being mitra sun, are not extraneous conditions,
3:32–3:38so the foregoing definition need not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that
3:38–3:44produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandum. In the inference air is perceptible
3:44–3:49because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the
3:49–3:54inference the crow is dark because it is mitra sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are
3:54–3:59are regarded in logic as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition
3:59–4:05that the reason deviates from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness.
4:05–4:09If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded
4:09–4:15as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine.
4:15–4:20Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended.
4:20–4:24In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property
4:24–4:28of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition,
4:28–4:34yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension
4:34–4:41and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition.
4:43–4:48Five, it may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because
4:48–4:52it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies the
4:52–4:57reason. That is, the reason is stated as being distinct from what is other than the
4:57–5:01subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished.
5:02–5:07But, mountain is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs on
5:07–5:11the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative inference.
5:12–5:18This objection is untenable. In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced,
5:18–5:21subject otherness occurring in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat,
5:21–5:25the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an
5:25–5:29extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom.
5:30–5:35It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result.
5:36–5:41For generic subject otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom
5:41–5:46cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject mountain. Therefore the expression
5:46–5:51the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on the mountain must be
5:51–5:55regarded as an extraneous condition.
5:55–6:01An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition.
6:01–6:026.
6:02–6:05A second definition may be proposed as follows.
6:05–6:09What is other than the subject occurring in the subject and actually pervading the
6:09–6:12probandom is an extraneous condition.
6:12–6:16Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous
6:16–6:21condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the
6:21–6:26probandom is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the
6:26–6:28probandom.
6:28–6:33Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness.
6:33–6:38If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates
6:38–6:42doubt about the probandom and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions
6:42–6:46in general would disappear.
6:46–6:51refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added.
6:53–7:037. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition.
7:04–7:15Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced.
7:16–7:19But this proposal is untenable.
7:19–7:25Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance,
7:25–7:31because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances.
7:31–7:37Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood,
7:37–7:42contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished.
7:42–7:48Subject Otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the reason.
7:48–7:55When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandom and the subject becomes possible.
7:55–8:05Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present.
8:05–8:10For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition.
8:10–8:14The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of
8:14–8:19the probandam and the counter instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous
8:19–8:21condition.
8:21–8:26Refutation of the objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
8:26–8:32Eight, the objection that subject otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition
8:32–8:36because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating
8:36–8:39rejoinder known as a jati is rejected.
8:39–8:43subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom,
8:43–8:48therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect.
8:48–8:53This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness
8:53–8:56from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness
8:56–8:59must be regarded as the extraneous condition.
8:59–9:03Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable
9:03–9:07of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it
9:07–9:11certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition.
9:11–9:18The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation.
9:18–9:22It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandum
9:22–9:27through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum,
9:27–9:32therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation.
9:32–9:35But the absence of subject otherness is not a means of establishing the absence
9:35–9:41of the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance.
9:41–9:47Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation
9:47–9:52after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum.
9:52–9:57Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground
9:57–10:02that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established
10:02–10:07is pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition
10:07–10:12that pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both
10:12–10:17reason and extraneous condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes
10:17–10:23only one side. For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason
10:23–10:28pervaded by the probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous
10:28–10:32condition that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum.
10:33–10:38Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in
10:38–10:43establishing the probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces
10:43–10:48cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seed of vitiation.
10:49–10:53An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason.
10:53–11:01It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting
11:01–11:04an equally strong counter reason.
11:04–11:07This objection is untenable.
11:07–11:10If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no
11:10–11:14occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing
11:14–11:18an equally strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another
11:18–11:22equally strong counter reason against an inference already possessing one.
11:22–11:27Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter-reason, the defect
11:27–11:32of subject-otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference
11:32–11:37fire is not hot because it is produced, would not qualify as an extraneous condition either,
11:37–11:42because denial of the probandom through subject-otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence
11:42–11:45of the probandom.
11:45–11:49Objection to treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition.
11:49–11:5411. It may be said that the rule concerning subject-otherness as an extraneous condition
11:54–11:59does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated
11:59–12:03inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject-otherness is not an
12:03–12:06extraneous condition.
12:06–12:10Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom
12:10–12:16is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced,
12:16–12:21fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness
12:21–12:24does not apply directly.
12:24–12:26But this objection does not stand.
12:26–12:30If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no
12:30–12:34property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject
12:34–12:38fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition.
12:38–12:43Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases.
12:43–12:48Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition.
12:48–12:5312, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs in a part
12:53–12:57of the mountain, substance or distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being the
12:57–13:01substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both
13:01–13:06lake and mountain qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as there is fire on
13:06–13:10the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke.
13:10–13:15In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon pseudo-reason cannot
13:15–13:19persist, and an equally strong counter-reason also arises from the counter-positive of the
13:19–13:24absence of subject-otherness occurring in the subject-mountain.
13:24–13:28The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong
13:28–13:34counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason
13:34–13:36and becomes a defect.
13:36–13:41Both the relation between reason and probandum and that between probandum and extraneous condition
13:41–13:45oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment of
13:45–13:50perversion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the
13:50–13:52probandum.
13:52–13:56In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason
13:56–13:59deviates from the probandum.
13:59–14:03Such defect is fully present in subject otherness as well.
14:03–14:08Udayanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about
14:08–14:11deviation.
14:11–14:15One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that
14:15–14:19all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the
14:19–14:25foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject-otherness
14:25–14:27as well.
14:27–14:30Udayanakarya's definition of an extraneous condition
14:30–14:3813. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition,
14:38–14:43the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is unsuitable.
14:44–14:50Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous
14:50–14:54condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong
14:54–15:01counter reason. The qualifier co-extensive with the probandom in the definition is entirely
15:01–15:05pointless, because it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an
15:05–15:11extraneous condition, that is, its causation of cognition of deviation.
15:11–15:18An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, first proposal.
15:18–15:1914.
15:19–15:22It may be proposed that the property which prompts both the affirmative and negative
15:22–15:26concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition.
15:26–15:29A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the
15:29–15:34probandum's affirmative and negative concomitance because the probandum may remain in the absence
15:34–15:39of that property and the absence of the probandum may remain in its presence. Under this definition,
15:39–15:41subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition.
15:42–15:49But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance
15:49–15:53of the probandum means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition
15:53–15:59that the reason deviates from the probandum. This condition consists solely in pervading
15:59–16:05the probandum while not pervading the reason. Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum
16:05–16:08serves no purpose in producing the defect and is therefore pointless.
16:10–16:15An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal.
16:17–16:2215. Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is
16:22–16:27reflected upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition
16:27–16:31of redness in a crystal because the hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal.
16:31–16:36Similarly, the probandom pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous
16:36–16:41condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is the extraneous
16:41–16:45condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire.
16:46–16:50The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because it
16:50–16:55is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded
16:55–16:59that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition.
17:01–17:03Use of the word extraneous condition.
17:05–17:1116. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous
17:11–17:16condition because it does not produce a defect? Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not
17:16–17:21denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent?
17:21–17:26The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces
17:26–17:31cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom. The second is also untenable because
17:31–17:36the word, extraneous condition, is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property
17:36–17:41is reflected upon another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed
17:41–17:44on the condition of gain, the word, condition, is used in the sense of a condition of
17:44–17:49profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the
17:49–17:53The word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute
17:53–17:56an opponent's inference in debate.
17:56–17:59The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the proband and while not
17:59–18:04pervading the reason, in the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this
18:04–18:06sense.
18:06–18:10An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of
18:10–18:13another decisive criterion.
18:13–18:1517.
18:15–18:18Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes
18:18–18:23the reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically
18:23–18:27pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from the probandom,
18:27–18:31because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object.
18:31–18:36For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, no ability pervades
18:36–18:40non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood, rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no
18:40–18:45ability. There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood, that is, the reason
18:45–18:51quality had deviates from the probandum non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive
18:51–18:54with the probandum is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the
18:54–18:59probandum. The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades
18:59–19:03the probandum does not deviate from the probandum.
19:03–19:08In a case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous
19:08–19:13condition. Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the
19:13–19:18the probandom but does not pervade the reason.
19:18–19:22Refutation of the Other Scholar's View
19:22–19:2818. This view also fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something
19:28–19:32pervaded by the probandom as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is
19:32–19:37economical and necessary, but this criterion too is untenable because you yourself have
19:37–19:40shown deviation in this rule.
19:40–19:45Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion
19:45–19:47of non-deviation.
19:47–19:52Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons
19:52–19:56freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to be regarded
19:56–20:00as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded by the
20:00–20:04probandom, leading to infinite regress.
20:04–20:08In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the
20:08–20:13state of pervading the probandum, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition
20:13–20:18that pervades the probandum while not pervading the reason.
20:18–20:23Cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition of pervasion,
20:23–20:27nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition from arising
20:27–20:31in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of cognition
20:31–20:33of deviation.
20:33–20:37But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely
20:37–20:42for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons causing
20:42–20:49cognition of deviation. Non-pervasion of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition.
20:51–20:5719. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property
20:57–21:01of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood,
21:01–21:05because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a
21:05–21:10probandum delimited by a property of the reason.
21:10–21:14Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility
21:14–21:19would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition.
21:19–21:24Non-audibility pervades the probandum nameability delimited by qualityhood, because the property
21:24–21:28of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade
21:28–21:31the reason knowability.
21:31–21:36non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence.
21:38–21:43This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel in
21:43–21:47the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction with
21:47–21:51wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of the reason
21:51–22:01occurring in the subject.

Plain text

Gageeos conclusion Eight, Gageeos concludes that accepting a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character neither makes the no-omniscient nor renders impossible the doubt, is Jihad the object of this cognition or not. A determinate cognition opposed to such doubt would be, the object of the cognition is a Jihad, in which Jihad is the qualifier and the Jihad, as the object of cognition, is the qualifcant. But such a determinate cognition has not yet arisen, because its complete causal complex is absent. Therefore, even while the qualifier's jahad and the like are cognized, a doubt such as, is jahad the object of this cognition or not, is possible. Consequently the Niyayika doctrine of a comprehensive relation qualified by generic character is reasonable as a means of cognizing all individuals of the reasoned smoke and all individuals of the probandom fire, and cognition of smoke's pervasion by fire means cognizing that every individual smoke is pervaded by every individual fire. The doctrine of generic character contact is concluded. 7. The theory of the extraneous condition. Aplodhibita. Introduction. 1. Cognition of an extraneous condition reveals the reason's deviation from the probandom, therefore, in that state, the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be ascertained. For this reason the extraneous condition is expounded in this chapter. definition of an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition is a property that pervades the property intended as the probandom while not pervading the property intended as the reason. But cognition that the reason is free from an extraneous condition is not the cause of cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom. Therefore no defect of mutual dependence arises in the form cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition causes cognition of perversion, and cognition of perversion causes cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of an extraneous condition. 3. Some scholars define an extraneous condition as follows. Its perversion of the probandum is the state in which it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence of the probandum occurring in a locus possessing the probandum, and its non-pervasion of the reason is the state in which it is the counter-positive of an absolute absence of the probandom occurring in a locus possessing the reason. In other words, an extraneous condition is the counter-positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the reason, but not the counter-positive of an absolute absence occurring in the locus of the probandom. But this alternative definition is untenable. It fails to include both an extraneous condition that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the subject and one that pervades a probandom delimited by a property of the reason. Possession of manifest color in being produced by vegetable cooking are extraneous conditions. For, it should not be objected that possession of manifest color, which pervades the probandom perceptibility delimited by the subject property external substancehood, and being produced by vegetable cooking, which pervades the probandum darkness delimited by the reason property being mitra sun, are not extraneous conditions, so the foregoing definition need not include them. For both are alike in causing the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandum. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, possession of manifest color, and in the inference the crow is dark because it is mitra sun, being produced by vegetable cooking, are are regarded in logic as extraneous conditions, because they respectively produce cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom perceptibility and from the probandom darkness. If possession of manifest color and being produced by vegetable cooking were not regarded as extraneous conditions, contradiction would arise in the Neayaka doctrine. Moreover, this alternative definition is also overextended. In the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the property of being distinct from what occurs in the subject mountain is not an extraneous condition, yet the definition includes it as well. Therefore the definition suffers from both under extension and over extension. Being other than what occurs in the subject must be an extraneous condition. Five, it may be objected here, in the inference, there is absence of fire on the mountain because it is distinct from what is distinct from the mountain, the word, mountain, qualifies the reason. That is, the reason is stated as being distinct from what is other than the subject and occurs on the mountain, so that generic other than otherness is not unestablished. But, mountain is a useless qualifier in this reason, therefore, being other than what occurs on the mountain, namely subject otherness, is not an extraneous condition in this negative inference. This objection is untenable. In the inference, fire is not hot because it is produced, subject otherness occurring in the subject fire is regarded as pervading non-heat, the absence of the probandom, then the unwanted consequence follows that it would not be an extraneous condition even in the counter instance of the absence of the probandom. It cannot be said that such absence of extraneous conditionhood is the desired result. For generic subject otherness is not established, and the reasons pervasion by the probandom cannot be apprehended without the qualifier, the subject mountain. Therefore the expression the subject mountain is useful, and subject otherness occurring on the mountain must be regarded as an extraneous condition. An alternative definition of subject otherness as an extraneous condition. 6. A second definition may be proposed as follows. What is other than the subject occurring in the subject and actually pervading the probandom is an extraneous condition. Suppose this definition is accepted, even then it must be admitted that an extraneous condition possesses the capacity to produce a defect, that is, because pervasion of the probandom is included within it, it produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom. Such defect producing capacity is especially present in subject otherness. If subject otherness were not regarded as an extraneous condition even though it generates doubt about the probandom and the subject, the very existence of extraneous conditions in general would disappear. refutation of the view that lacking a qualifier that excludes the counter instance should be added. 7. It may also be proposed that the state of lacking a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter instance should be added to the definition of an extraneous condition. Consequently subject otherness occurring in the subject and pervading the absence of the probandom and the subject would qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference fire is not hot because it is produced. But this proposal is untenable. Nothing can be wholly devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandom and the counter-instance, because properties such as no ability occur everywhere in the subject and in counter-instances. Moreover, if such absence of a qualifier is made a qualifier of the delimiter of extraneous conditionhood, contradiction arises whether it is established or unestablished. Subject Otherness possesses both perversion of the probandom and non-perversion of the reason. When these properties are removed from subject otherness, denial of the probandom and the subject becomes possible. Therefore, in such a state, the reason alone deviates from the probandom, and whenever the reason is deviant, an extraneous condition is necessarily present. For this reason subject otherness itself is an extraneous condition. The additional qualification, devoid of a qualifier that does not deny the presence of the probandam and the counter instance, is pointless in the definition of an extraneous condition. Refutation of the objection, subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. Eight, the objection that subject otherness should not be regarded as an extraneous condition because it destroys an inference with a doubtful probandam and thereby occasions the self-defeating rejoinder known as a jati is rejected. subject otherness is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, therefore it is not a self-defeating jati but a genuine indicator of defect. This refutation also disposes of the objection that, in order to prevent subject otherness from being an extraneous condition, some property distinct from subject otherness must be regarded as the extraneous condition. Even if subject otherness were not accepted as an extraneous condition, it is capable of producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom, hence it certainly possesses the capacity to be an extraneous condition. The argument that an extraneous condition is the seat of vitiation. It may be said that an extraneous condition, by establishing the absence of the probandum through its own absence, produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum, therefore it is the seat of defect or vitiation. But the absence of subject otherness is not a means of establishing the absence of the probandum, because it is excluded from both the subject and the counter instance. Nor does an extraneous condition become defective by producing yet another cognition of deviation after it has already produced cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. Moreover, an extraneous condition is not established as pervading the probandum on the ground that it does not pervade a reason pervaded by the probandum, nor is the reason established is pervaded by the probandum on the ground that it is not pervaded by an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum. The means of apprehending pervasion is the same for both reason and extraneous condition, hence there is no decisive consideration that establishes only one side. For this reason some scholars say that, just as the presence of a reason pervaded by the probandum establishes the probandum, so the exclusion of an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum establishes the absence of the probandum. Cognition of pervasion and absence of cognition of pervasion respectively assist equally in establishing the probandum and its absence. Therefore an extraneous condition produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum and is the seed of vitiation. An extraneous condition is not an equally strong counter reason. It may be objected that such an extraneous condition is in fact merely a reason constituting an equally strong counter reason. This objection is untenable. If an extraneous condition meant an equally strong counter reason, there would be no occasion to raise the defect of an extraneous condition in an inference already possessing an equally strong counter reason, just as it is inappropriate to raise yet another equally strong counter reason against an inference already possessing one. Thus, if an extraneous condition were regarded as an equally strong counter-reason, the defect of subject-otherness arising as a cause of the absence of the probandom and the inference fire is not hot because it is produced, would not qualify as an extraneous condition either, because denial of the probandom through subject-otherness is a specific cause establishing the absence of the probandom. Objection to treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition. 11. It may be said that the rule concerning subject-otherness as an extraneous condition does not apply when the probandom is absent from the subject. For example, in the sublated inference, there is fire in the lake because there is smoke, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. Failure of this rule is also seen when the reason occurs in the subject but the probandom is absent. In the inference, perceptible fire is not hot because it is produced, fireiness and the like may be extraneous conditions, but the generic rule of subject otherness does not apply directly. But this objection does not stand. If mere fire element in general is taken as the subject instead of perceptible fire, no property other than non-fireiness, being distinct from what occurs in the subject fire elementhood, can serve as an extraneous condition. Therefore subject otherness certainly is an extraneous condition in some cases. Conclusion, subject otherness is an extraneous condition. 12, the many forms of subject otherness such as being distinct from what occurs in a part of the mountain, substance or distinct from what occurs on the mountain, not being the substratum of the conjunction between lake and mountain, and being distinct from both lake and mountain qualify as extraneous conditions and inferences such as there is fire on the mountain connected with the lake because there is smoke. In the absence of these extraneous conditions, the defect of an uncommon pseudo-reason cannot persist, and an equally strong counter-reason also arises from the counter-positive of the absence of subject-otherness occurring in the subject-mountain. The pseudo-reason involving uncommonness does not obstruct the defect of an equally strong counter-reason, because cognition of uncommonness itself produces an equally strong counter-reason and becomes a defect. Both the relation between reason and probandum and that between probandum and extraneous condition oppose the similarity that causes cognition of perversion, therefore ascertainment of perversion becomes impossible and doubt instead arises that the reason deviates from the probandum. In this way an extraneous condition becomes defective by producing doubt that the reason deviates from the probandum. Such defect is fully present in subject otherness as well. Udayanakarya also supports the view that an extraneous condition produces doubt about deviation. One may refrain from treating subject-otherness as an extraneous condition out of fear that all sound inferences would thereby be destroyed, nevertheless, it must be admitted that the foregoing definitions of an extraneous condition are overextended and include subject-otherness as well. Udayanakarya's definition of an extraneous condition 13. To prevent inclusion of subject otherness and the definition of an extraneous condition, the condition while not pervading the reason, being co-extensive with the probandom is unsuitable. Subject otherness, though asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom, also qualifies as an extraneous condition because it produces cognition of deviation and the defect of an equally strong counter reason. The qualifier co-extensive with the probandom in the definition is entirely pointless, because it serves no purpose in establishing the defective character of an extraneous condition, that is, its causation of cognition of deviation. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, first proposal. 14. It may be proposed that the property which prompts both the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandom is the extraneous condition. A property occurring in fewer or more locky than the probandom cannot prompt the probandum's affirmative and negative concomitance because the probandum may remain in the absence of that property and the absence of the probandum may remain in its presence. Under this definition, subject otherness would not be an extraneous condition. But this proposal is untenable. A property prompting the affirmative and negative concomitance of the probandum means a property that produces the defect consisting in cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. This condition consists solely in pervading the probandum while not pervading the reason. Being additionally co-extensive with the probandum serves no purpose in producing the defect and is therefore pointless. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, second proposal. 15. Again it may be said that an extraneous condition is an object whose property is reflected upon another object. For example, a hibiscus flower is an extraneous condition of redness in a crystal because the hibiscus's redness is reflected upon the crystal. Similarly, the probandom pervadedness occurring in the reason smoke is reflected from the extraneous condition, conjunction with wet fuel, onto fire, therefore conjunction with wet fuel is the extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire. The capacity to produce a defect does not arise in an extraneous condition merely because it is pervaded by something, pervasion of the probandom is required. It is therefore concluded that only an object co-extensive with the probandom becomes an extraneous condition. Use of the word extraneous condition. 16. The question here is this, is an asymmetrically pervaded object not denoted by the word extraneous condition because it does not produce a defect? Or, although it does produce a defect, is it not denoted by that word because the ground for applying the term extraneous condition is absent? The first alternative is untenable because an asymmetrically pervaded object also produces cognition that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom. The second is also untenable because the word, extraneous condition, is not used only for a co-extensive object whose property is reflected upon another. For example, in the sentence, this action was performed on the condition of gain, the word, condition, is used in the sense of a condition of profit or an expected result. In a treatise, the etymology of the The word, extraneous condition, is supplied not to establish ordinary usage but to refute an opponent's inference in debate. The condition that refutes an inference is simply pervading the proband and while not pervading the reason, in the treatise, the word, extraneous condition, is used in this sense. An asymmetrically pervaded property is not an extraneous condition, the view of another decisive criterion. 17. Some other scholars hold that an extraneous condition is that whose absence opposes the reasons deviation from the probandom. But the absence of an object asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom does not oppose the reasons deviation from the probandom, because deviation occurs even in the absence of such an object. For example, in the inference, sound is non-eternal because it is a quality, no ability pervades non-eternality but not the reason qualityhood, rather, qualityhood is pervaded by no ability. There is no pervasion between non-eternality and qualityhood, that is, the reason quality had deviates from the probandum non-eternality. But the absence of an object co-extensive with the probandum is concomitant with the absence of the reasons deviation from the probandum. The inferential rule is that a property pervaded by something that pervades the probandum does not deviate from the probandum. In a case of deviation, the probandum itself ultimately qualifies as the extraneous condition. Although identical with the probandum, it pervades what is pervaded by the the probandom but does not pervade the reason. Refutation of the Other Scholar's View 18. This view also fails. It has been said that accepting being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom as the decisive criterion of the reasons non-deviation is economical and necessary, but this criterion too is untenable because you yourself have shown deviation in this rule. Being pervaded by something that pervades the probandom cannot be the decisive criterion of non-deviation. Nor can merely being pervaded by something pervaded by the probandom constitute the reasons freedom from an extraneous condition, because that very condition would have to be regarded as freedom from an extraneous condition even in the state of being pervaded by the probandom, leading to infinite regress. In the definition of pervasion, the word all is supplied as a qualifier of the state of pervading the probandum, this automatically yields the notion of an extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while not pervading the reason. Cognition of freedom from an extraneous condition need not be the cause of cognition of pervasion, nevertheless, it must be admitted that whatever prevents inferential cognition from arising in its presence is a defect in the form of a pseudo-reason and a cause of cognition of deviation. But something in whose absence inferential cognition arises is not defective merely for that reason, otherwise, opposition and the like would also become pseudo-reasons causing cognition of deviation. Non-pervasion of the reason does not constitute an extraneous condition. 19. It should further be noted that the state of pervading a probandom delimited by a property of the subject while not pervading the reason cannot constitute extraneous conditionhood, because such a state does not include an extraneous condition that pervades a probandum delimited by a property of the reason. Under this definition, in the inference sound is nameable because it is knowable, non-audibility would have to be regarded as an extraneous condition. Non-audibility pervades the probandum nameability delimited by qualityhood, because the property of sound is absent from color and the like, but in the subject sound it does not pervade the reason knowability. non-audibility would qualify as an extraneous condition of the reason and undesirable consequence. This definition also fails to include the extraneous condition conjunction with wet fuel in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, because conjunction with wet fuel does not possess pervasion of the probandom delimited by the property of the reason occurring in the subject.

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