MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part17_RadioPlay.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.992912)
Duration: 28:39
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:05विश्दाबश्द दाक्ष्द अछि।
0:05–0:11The validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is the defect.
0:11–0:1980. The established doctrine is that certainty of the absence of the probandom in the subject arises from certainty of the validity of cognition of that absence.
0:19–0:27Otherwise validity would be pointless, because if mere cognition of an object produced certainty of that object, erroneous cognition would yield the same result.
0:27–0:37Therefore, certainty of deviation or of an inhibitor arises only when the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition.
0:37–0:45Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason.
0:45–0:51Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference.
0:51–0:5881. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject
0:58–1:02did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion
1:02–1:06and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom
1:06–1:10and establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain.
1:12–1:16But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been
1:16–1:22apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason.
1:23–1:28Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known,
1:28–1:32cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise.
1:33–1:38The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the
1:38–1:44absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Near veridical cognition of the
1:44–1:49absence of the probandum and the subject is not the defect.
1:49–1:5482. Objection, veridical cognition, here the reason is present and the probandum absent,
1:54–1:58that is, cognition of deviation, should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself
1:58–2:03is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while
2:03–2:07an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference.
2:07–2:11It may again be said that the cognition, there is veridical cognition of the absence
2:11–2:16of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its
2:16–2:21own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom.
2:21–2:24Answer, this is not sound.
2:24–2:28Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence
2:28–2:32of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat.
2:32–2:35The same rule is observed in verbal cognition.
2:35–2:38Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly
2:38–2:43related to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason.
2:43–2:48In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation.
2:48–2:51Defeat is a distinct defect.
2:51–2:5283.
2:52–2:57It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom absent
2:57–3:00produces only the defect of deviation.
3:00–3:04Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty
3:04–3:10of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition
3:10–3:15of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct
3:15–3:16defect.
3:16–3:21Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence
3:21–3:25of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate
3:25–3:27defeater is needed.
3:27–3:32Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom
3:32–3:38could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom
3:38–3:44is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that
3:44–3:50absence. Thus defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason.
3:50–3:54The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted.
3:54–4:0084. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, therefore,
4:00–4:04If the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandum, there would be no cause
4:04–4:06to stop inference of fire.
4:06–4:12On this view, inferences of doolap from cowwood, odor from earthwood, and qualities from substancehood
4:12–4:17would become inexplicable, because these properties deviate from one another.
4:17–4:21The counter-positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters, do not
4:21–4:25arise in the locus of the absence.
4:25–4:29If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because
4:29–4:34they lack deviation, would needlessly establish either established or unestablished probanda.
4:36–4:43Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject
4:43–4:49possessing the absence of the probandum is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of order from
4:49–4:53earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would fail because the reason also occurs in
4:53–4:59loci possessing prior absence or destruction. In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject
4:59–5:06possessing an eternal absence of the probandom is deviation. But then no deviation would arise
5:06–5:10in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or
5:10–5:18destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary. Defeat is foundational.
5:18–5:2586. Objection. If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom,
5:25–5:29there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior
5:29–5:35absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior
5:35–5:41absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated. Answer. The counter positives of prior
5:41–5:46absence and destruction occur in the same subject, therefore both must be regarded as occurring
5:46–5:48at the same time.
5:48–5:55Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists.
5:55–6:01Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference.
6:01–6:07Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect.
6:07–6:13Eighty-seven, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason.
6:13–6:17Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference.
6:17–6:21Cognition that the probandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent
6:21–6:25renewed cognition of the probandom, successive cognitions are possible.
6:26–6:29Even after the probandom has been established by perception,
6:29–6:33inference may arise if someone desires to know that probandom through inference.
6:34–6:38A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard.
6:38–6:45A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred,
6:45–6:50but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference.
6:50–6:57Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired
6:57–7:03result, not a direct defect of inference. A post cognition is an inhibitor.
7:03–7:11It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general.
7:11–7:214. Certainty of Silverhood and this is Silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not Silver.
7:21–7:33Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veritical cognition of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow.
7:33–7:37This argument, however, is not sound.
7:37–7:44Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception.
7:44–7:50Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness and a
7:50–7:56conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum
7:56–8:01inhibits inference of the probandum. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the
8:01–8:06absence of the probandum is present, inference of the presence of the probandum cannot arise.
8:07–8:0910 types of defeated reason
8:11–8:19Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception,
8:19–8:26for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference, for
8:26–8:34example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal
8:34–8:41testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain.
8:41–8:46A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for
8:46–8:51example, fire is not hot because it is produced.
8:51–8:56A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for
8:56–9:01example, sound is inaudible because it is a quality.
9:01–9:06A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahood is not the ground for using
9:06–9:14the word Gavaia, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing
9:14–9:19the probandom, for example, the skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch,
9:19–9:26it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason,
9:26–9:34for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire.
9:34–9:38A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the mind is
9:38–9:43omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition.
9:46–9:51A reason defeated by verbal testimony in joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma
9:51–9:57should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni-Alma sacrifice.
9:59–10:02Fallacious reasons establish incapacity to prove.
10:03–10:07Ninety, fallacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five
10:07–10:11kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the pro-bandam.
10:11–10:16By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity
10:16–10:20of the proponent's reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper
10:20–10:21replies.
10:21–10:26An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stocked merely by cognition
10:26–10:29of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reason's
10:29–10:32incapacity through fallaciousness.
10:32–10:36The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the
10:36–10:41proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice.
10:41–10:45After debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes.
10:45–10:48First, to stop inference for another.
10:48–10:53Second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponents' reason.
10:53–10:57The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second
10:57–11:02is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason.
11:02–11:07Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing
11:07–11:11that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions,
11:11–11:15obstructing inference and establishing incapacity.
11:15–11:20Perversion of incapacity in a defect is admissible.
11:20–11:27It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaia statement would be necessary to explain every defect,
11:27–11:33otherwise the proponents reasoning would not be fully established as incapable.
11:33–11:35This objection is not sound.
11:35–11:40Debate proceeds on the accepted perversion that every fallacious reason is incapable.
11:40–11:45It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular reason.
11:45–11:52Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason.
11:52–11:56It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced,
11:56–12:01the perversion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent,
12:01–12:07there is therefore no need separately to show the perversion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence.
12:07–12:10This argument too is not sound.
12:10–12:14During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable
12:14–12:17matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become
12:17–12:20disputable.
12:20–12:23Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere.
12:23–12:2992, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence
12:29–12:33of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness
12:33–12:35by impermanence.
12:35–12:38Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does
12:38–12:44not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity. Some scholars say that where proponent and
12:44–12:47opponent accept the same debating tradition, merely showing the presence of a defective
12:47–12:53reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere, use of all five members is necessary.
12:53–13:00But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable.
13:00–13:02Definition of incapacity to prove
13:02–13:0993. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject.
13:10–13:15A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the
13:15–13:21probandom in the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition
13:21–13:24of the probandom because the necessary causes are incomplete.
13:25–13:30It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject
13:30–13:35qualified by the probandum at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective
13:35–13:39reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandum arises from it,
13:39–13:44whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum arises from a valid
13:44–13:51reason. This view, however, is not sound. A valid reason too, because it previously had the
13:51–13:56form of an equally strong counter reason, may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises
13:56–14:03to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum. Thus incapacity would apply
14:03–14:10even to a valid reason. Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandum.
14:11–14:1694. Nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandum.
14:17–14:22A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandum when its defeated
14:22–14:26or contradictory status is unknown.
14:26–14:29But this view too is not sound.
14:29–14:33A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion
14:33–14:38of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status
14:38–14:42is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion.
14:42–14:47Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a reason,
14:47–14:51because a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses
14:51–14:57no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason 2 may assume a defective form.
14:58–15:03Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the
15:03–15:08probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again.
15:10–15:14Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons.
15:15–15:19Incinclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof,
15:19–15:23In conclusiveness concerning the context specific probandom would remain unestablished,
15:23–15:27and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be
15:27–15:34established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom.
15:36–15:41One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom.
15:41–15:4995. Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the
15:49–15:54context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to
15:54–15:59produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject.
16:01–16:06It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established,
16:06–16:09because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness.
16:09–16:17But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced,
16:17–16:21it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom,
16:21–16:28consequently a two would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the
16:28–16:33subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection
16:33–16:38arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of
16:38–16:42the reflection sometimes remains uncertain.
16:42–16:46Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of
16:46–16:48the absence of the probandom.
16:48–16:54Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference.
16:54–16:58Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits
16:58–17:01inference.
17:01–17:0696, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical
17:06–17:10cognition that inhibits inferential cognition. An erroneous cognition of deviation and the
17:10–17:15like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance
17:15–17:19and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-reason
17:19–17:25inhibits inference. This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous
17:25–17:30cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit
17:30–17:35inference. And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that
17:35–17:40error would have to be treated as an inhibitor, which is unacceptable.
17:40–17:46Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandom is an inhibitor.
17:46–17:5197. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the
17:51–17:56probandom, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and
17:56–18:01that this cognition alone is veritical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason
18:01–18:06itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor. Cognition that it produces
18:06–18:11the absence of the probandum is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity
18:11–18:16and non-establishment. Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect
18:16–18:21in either of the two components of a counterbalanced reason, pervasion or subject propertyhood,
18:21–18:26be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons
18:26–18:32and non-reasons. Nor should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located
18:32–18:38in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect. When such a general property is known to deviate
18:38–18:43from the pro-bandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the pro-bandom in general.
18:44–18:48In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter-reason,
18:48–18:54which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them,
18:54–18:59inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under
18:59–19:06non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular
19:06–19:13inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition
19:13–19:20concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not incapacity. For example,
19:20–19:25This particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject,
19:25–19:30an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness,
19:30–19:36like another cognition of inconclusiveness. Such an inference may sometimes be established
19:36–19:41because of an illusion concerning the reason, but an inference concerning that same subject and
19:41–19:47probandom, for the same person and at the same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person's
19:47–19:53specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity.
19:53–19:59Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandom and subject.
19:59–20:0499. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning
20:04–20:10the subject and probandom. The radical cognition of a true probandom may sometimes arise even
20:10–20:17from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that actually
20:17–20:22has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of fire may arise,
20:22–20:28this cognition concerning fire is veritical even though the reason employed is defective.
20:28–20:33It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One in the
20:33–20:38same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single
20:38–20:43fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of
20:43–20:49smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire
20:49–20:55from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion
20:55–20:57is veridical.
20:57–21:02Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition.
21:02–21:06Presence and absence do not both occur in one locus, nevertheless, the general property
21:06–21:10of no ability applies to both presence and absence.
21:10–21:15Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may
21:15–21:22arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier.
21:22–21:26Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor.
21:26–21:31100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the
21:31–21:37probandem. If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire
21:37–21:42determines inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is
21:42–21:45necessarily present there.
21:45–21:50Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently
21:50–21:54identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire
21:54–21:58in numerous reasons. Then inference of fire for many reasons would become wholly
21:58–21:59invalid.
21:59–22:01Answer, not so.
22:01–22:09Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible.
22:09–22:18Identity with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore the stated overextension does not arise.
22:18–22:22The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition.
22:22–22:28101. It may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition,
22:28–22:32because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of
22:32–22:36cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference,
22:36–22:39like mountainhood and the probandom itself.
22:39–22:44A qualificative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition
22:44–22:48of the other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier.
22:48–22:56Therefore, inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke.
22:57–23:00Cessation of inferential cognition is possible.
23:02–23:11Objection, once the provision of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity for inferential cognition of the probandom fire to terminate.
23:11–23:16nor can it be accepted that only a substantive reflection whose object is
23:16–23:20narrower than the object of cognition of the probandom causes inference because
23:20–23:24this would introduce needless prolixity nor is it sound to say that inference
23:24–23:27does not arise because of an object other than the probandom since
23:27–23:31substantive reflection is the final cause of inference the causal complex of
23:31–23:34inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should
23:34–23:39therefore necessarily produce its result answer this objection is not
23:39–23:44sound. Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops
23:44–23:48the flow of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible.
23:49–23:51Validity of inferential cognition
23:53–23:58103, an objection may be raised. In this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason,
23:58–24:03validity may remain on the side of the probandom. How then can the reason possess incapacity?
24:03–24:08Let incapacity be admitted. But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there,
24:08–24:13how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke? Why should only fire produced by conjunction with
24:13–24:19moist fuel and not other fire be held to pervade smoke? It should not be said that fire in general
24:19–24:24pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel.
24:25–24:29Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known,
24:29–24:33but since smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid.
24:33–24:37Therefore smoke is said to be accidentally present there.
24:37–24:43In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire.
24:43–24:49Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor,
24:49–24:52the probandom fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke,
24:52–24:57but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason
24:57–25:03smoke is not true. According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there,
25:03–25:07Inference of the probandum fire will be true.
25:07–25:11Incapacity, the decisive view.
25:11–25:15104, here we present our decisive view.
25:15–25:27The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject.
25:27–25:39For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce cognition of the probandom in the subject.
25:40–25:53It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject.
25:53–25:58subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like,
25:58–26:03cognition of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason.
26:03–26:09Consequently, the defect of treating the probandom is unestablished or unproved because the
26:09–26:15counter-positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided.
26:15–26:20Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition
26:20–26:22of inferential cognition.
26:22–26:28105. Alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the
26:28–26:32object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing
26:32–26:37or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious
26:37–26:41reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential
26:41–26:44cognition because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another
26:44–26:47fallacious reason.
26:47–26:50It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits
26:50–26:54inferential cognition is in fact simply in conclusiveness and the like, in the mode of
26:54–26:57being an object of cognition.
26:57–27:01But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object
27:01–27:05of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous
27:05–27:07condition becomes an object of inference.
27:07–27:11For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property
27:11–27:15delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as, water.
27:15–27:18capacity and capacity to prove conclusion.
27:20–27:23106, the view of other scholars is as follows. In the case of
27:23–27:27inconclusive, defeated and contradictory reasons, the
27:27–27:29condition of not being pervaded in the case of a reason whose
27:29–27:32pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being
27:32–27:34inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in
27:34–27:38nature, counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the
27:38–27:41condition of being at a specific time, the object of
27:41–27:43cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all
27:43–27:45these constitute the condition of not.
27:45–27:49establishing or proving the pro-bandom in the subject.
27:49–27:56It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the pro-bandom would be incoherent.
27:56–28:01The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the pro-bandom.
28:01–28:09It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form,
28:09–28:14a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious.
28:14–28:20Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya,
28:20–28:24the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the
28:24–28:28probandum in capacity, ends.
28:28–28:33The inference division ends, through the section on defeat.
28:33–28:34Appendix 3
28:34–28:36Thank you.

Plain text

विश्दाबश्द दाक्ष्द अछि। The validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is the defect. 80. The established doctrine is that certainty of the absence of the probandom in the subject arises from certainty of the validity of cognition of that absence. Otherwise validity would be pointless, because if mere cognition of an object produced certainty of that object, erroneous cognition would yield the same result. Therefore, certainty of deviation or of an inhibitor arises only when the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition. Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason. Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference. 81. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandom and establish the probandom, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain. But such cognition of the absence of the probandom, whose invalidity has not been apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason. Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise. The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Near veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum and the subject is not the defect. 82. Objection, veridical cognition, here the reason is present and the probandum absent, that is, cognition of deviation, should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference. It may again be said that the cognition, there is veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. Cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom, therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat. The same rule is observed in verbal cognition. Veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object, being indirectly related to the reason, obstructs inference, therefore it is a fallacious reason. In general, known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation. Defeat is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect. Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater is needed. Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence. Thus defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason. The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted. 84. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, therefore, If the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandum, there would be no cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doolap from cowwood, odor from earthwood, and qualities from substancehood would become inexplicable, because these properties deviate from one another. The counter-positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly establish either established or unestablished probanda. Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandum is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of order from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction. In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary. Defeat is foundational. 86. Objection. If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom, there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated. Answer. The counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject, therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time. Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists. Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference. Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect. Eighty-seven, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason. Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference. Cognition that the probandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent renewed cognition of the probandom, successive cognitions are possible. Even after the probandom has been established by perception, inference may arise if someone desires to know that probandom through inference. A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard. A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred, but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference. Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct defect of inference. A post cognition is an inhibitor. It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general. 4. Certainty of Silverhood and this is Silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not Silver. Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veritical cognition of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow. This argument, however, is not sound. Only opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception. Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness and a conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum inhibits inference of the probandum. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum is present, inference of the presence of the probandum cannot arise. 10 types of defeated reason Such a defeated reason is of 10 kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain. A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for example, fire is not hot because it is produced. A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the probandom, for example, sound is inaudible because it is a quality. A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahood is not the ground for using the word Gavaia, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the probandom, for example, the skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire. A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition. A reason defeated by verbal testimony in joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni-Alma sacrifice. Fallacious reasons establish incapacity to prove. Ninety, fallacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the pro-bandam. By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity of the proponent's reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper replies. An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stocked merely by cognition of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reason's incapacity through fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice. After debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes. First, to stop inference for another. Second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponents' reason. The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons incapable nature as a fallacious reason. Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions, obstructing inference and establishing incapacity. Perversion of incapacity in a defect is admissible. It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaia statement would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents reasoning would not be fully established as incapable. This objection is not sound. Debate proceeds on the accepted perversion that every fallacious reason is incapable. It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular reason. Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason. It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced, the perversion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the perversion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence. This argument too is not sound. During debate, cognition of the pervasion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become disputable. Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere. 92, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the pervasion of producedness by impermanence. Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does not accept the pervasion of a defect by incapacity. Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition, merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere, use of all five members is necessary. But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable. Definition of incapacity to prove 93. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject. A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the probandom in the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandom because the necessary causes are incomplete. It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandum arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum arises from a valid reason. This view, however, is not sound. A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter reason, may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandum. Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason. Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandum. 94. Nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandum. A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandum when its defeated or contradictory status is unknown. But this view too is not sound. A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion. Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a reason, because a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason 2 may assume a defective form. Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again. Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons. Incinclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof, In conclusiveness concerning the context specific probandom would remain unestablished, and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom. One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom. 95. Some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject. It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established, because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness. But this view too is not sound. Before a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced, it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom, consequently a two would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain. Nor is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom. Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference. Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inference. 96, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inferential cognition. An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-reason inhibits inference. This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference. And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor, which is unacceptable. Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandom is an inhibitor. 97. It should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the probandom, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and that this cognition alone is veritical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor. Cognition that it produces the absence of the probandum is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment. Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced reason, pervasion or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Nor should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect. When such a general property is known to deviate from the pro-bandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the pro-bandom in general. In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter-reason, which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them, inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not incapacity. For example, This particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness. Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason, but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person's specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity. Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandom and subject. 99. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the subject and probandom. The radical cognition of a true probandom may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of fire may arise, this cognition concerning fire is veritical even though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One in the same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical. Inference is also valid in both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition. Presence and absence do not both occur in one locus, nevertheless, the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence. Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier. Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor. 100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandem. If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily present there. Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in numerous reasons. Then inference of fire for many reasons would become wholly invalid. Answer, not so. Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible. Identity with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore the stated overextension does not arise. The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition. 101. It may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition, because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference, like mountainhood and the probandom itself. A qualificative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier. Therefore, inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke. Cessation of inferential cognition is possible. Objection, once the provision of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity for inferential cognition of the probandom fire to terminate. nor can it be accepted that only a substantive reflection whose object is narrower than the object of cognition of the probandom causes inference because this would introduce needless prolixity nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other than the probandom since substantive reflection is the final cause of inference the causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should therefore necessarily produce its result answer this objection is not sound. Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible. Validity of inferential cognition 103, an objection may be raised. In this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom. How then can the reason possess incapacity? Let incapacity be admitted. But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke? Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel and not other fire be held to pervade smoke? It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel. Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known, but since smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid. Therefore smoke is said to be accidentally present there. In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire. Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, the probandom fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true. According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, Inference of the probandum fire will be true. Incapacity, the decisive view. 104, here we present our decisive view. The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject. For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so forth, does not produce cognition of the probandom in the subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject. subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like, cognition of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason. Consequently, the defect of treating the probandom is unestablished or unproved because the counter-positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided. Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition. 105. Alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason. It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition is in fact simply in conclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an object of cognition. But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous condition becomes an object of inference. For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as, water. capacity and capacity to prove conclusion. 106, the view of other scholars is as follows. In the case of inconclusive, defeated and contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded in the case of a reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in nature, counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition of being at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all these constitute the condition of not. establishing or proving the pro-bandom in the subject. It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the pro-bandom would be incoherent. The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the pro-bandom. It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tattvasintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the probandum in capacity, ends. The inference division ends, through the section on defeat. Appendix 3 Thank you.

← Transcript index