MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part15_RadioPlay.mp3

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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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asr-draft
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small
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en (0.998049)
Duration
21:20
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  1. 0:02–0:34आप्संष मेथी इंझव़ड, बगड नाद्व़ज़न आप्संष नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च�
  2. 0:34–0:42If the auxiliary of the color in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished.
  3. 0:42–0:48Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion.
  4. 0:48–0:55That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension.
  5. 0:55–1:01If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence.
  6. 1:01–1:06If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension,
  7. 1:06–1:10the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted.
  8. 1:12–1:16Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be,
  9. 1:16–1:19air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air.
  10. 1:20–1:25Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the
  11. 1:25–1:29the pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it.
  12. 1:29–1:33If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced
  13. 1:33–1:39by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory.
  14. 1:39–1:43If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence
  15. 1:43–1:49of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence.
  16. 1:49–1:53of the repetition concerning non-apprehension.
  17. 1:53–1:58The msaka again says, after Kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether Mika was
  18. 1:58–2:00inside.
  19. 2:00–2:05Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Mika, Mika was not
  20. 2:05–2:07in the house.
  21. 2:07–2:11This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not
  22. 2:11–2:16remember Mika and therefore had no prior experience of Mika's absence.
  23. 2:16–2:20Since micro-absence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of
  24. 2:20–2:25a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions
  25. 2:25–2:27of absence as well.
  26. 2:27–2:31A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another
  27. 2:31–2:38person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands micro-absence.
  28. 2:38–2:43The Neayaka replies, Unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past
  29. 2:43–2:49absence, non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive and a distant house is impossible.
  30. 2:49–2:54If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension
  31. 2:54–2:59is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension.
  32. 2:59–3:04Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro, in its unknown form, produce cognition
  33. 3:04–3:09of micro's absence, a Mimsaka view apprehension is supersensible, and therefore micro's
  34. 3:09–3:13absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive.
  35. 3:15–3:22Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case,
  36. 3:22–3:27unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by an eligible micro produces
  37. 3:27–3:33cognition of micro's absence in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection
  38. 3:33–3:37were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro in the house or not, and contrary cognition
  39. 3:37–3:42such as, Micra was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection
  40. 3:42–3:47is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and
  41. 3:47–3:53contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the
  42. 3:53–3:58extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established
  43. 3:58–4:02that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible Micra, which is naturally a means of
  44. 4:02–4:09knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging
  45. 4:09–4:14to its causes. Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its
  46. 4:14–4:19own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it.
  47. 4:21–4:25Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge,
  48. 4:25–4:30because cognition of microse absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an
  49. 4:30–4:36eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge, non-recollection
  50. 4:36–4:41of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition
  51. 4:41–4:49of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence is perceptual.
  52. 4:51–4:55Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitra is not known by the mind, because there is no
  53. 4:55–5:00apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitra is not eligible
  54. 5:00–5:05for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense
  55. 5:05–5:09organ, qualifier had belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as
  56. 5:09–5:14the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is not produced
  57. 5:14–5:19by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ. The experience,
  58. 5:19–5:23I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence cognition
  59. 5:23–5:28of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential
  60. 5:28–5:34mark. How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise? Doubt
  61. 5:34–5:39in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential mark,
  62. 5:39–5:43and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark. A competent person, having
  63. 5:43–5:47once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra, uses non-recollection
  64. 5:47–5:52of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is deviant,
  65. 5:52–5:57the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object,
  66. 5:57–5:59excluding near-non-recollection.
  67. 5:59–6:06Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark.
  68. 6:06–6:10The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house,
  69. 6:10–6:15because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features comparable to mitra,
  70. 6:15–6:24it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot.
  71. 6:24–6:28Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception
  72. 6:28–6:35section of the Tattva Sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya.
  73. 6:35–6:39The Theory of Absence
  74. 6:39–6:45The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tattva Sintmai.
  75. 6:45–6:50Misaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature.
  76. 6:50–6:55The Misaka says, the absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence
  77. 6:55–7:00of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which the
  78. 7:00–7:03the counter positive is not present.
  79. 7:03–7:07Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should
  80. 7:07–7:12be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation
  81. 7:12–7:18called qualifierhood or self-linking relation for cognition of absence.
  82. 7:18–7:22Reply of the earlier Neayakas.
  83. 7:22–7:27The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this
  84. 7:27–7:32ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground,
  85. 7:32–7:36otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot.
  86. 7:37–7:42Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct
  87. 7:42–7:48from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone
  88. 7:48–7:53is the empty locus, the separate statement there is absence of a pot on the ground becomes
  89. 7:53–7:59unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence
  90. 7:59–8:03and the container-ship of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would
  91. 8:03–8:10be impossible. Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus.
  92. 8:10–8:14A particular entity is the locus of absence.
  93. 8:14–8:19Objection. The Naya Yuga who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus
  94. 8:19–8:23of absence, because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this
  95. 8:23–8:29ground. Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground. That particularity
  96. 8:29–8:34cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur on pot possessing
  97. 8:34–8:39ground, it cannot be ground possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual dependence,
  98. 8:39–8:43and it cannot be ground possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction. Thus absence
  99. 8:43–8:47cannot be an entity distinct from its locus.
  100. 8:47–8:52Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty
  101. 8:52–8:55locus qualified by absence of a pot.
  102. 8:55–9:00This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent.
  103. 9:00–9:04Nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot
  104. 9:04–9:09is the locus of its own single counter positive.
  105. 9:09–9:12Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence
  106. 9:12–9:17Question, where is absence?
  107. 9:17–9:20Reply, wherever it is experienced.
  108. 9:20–9:23Again, where is it experienced?
  109. 9:23–9:27Reply, wherever it actually exists.
  110. 9:27–9:31There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence
  111. 9:31–9:35of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of
  112. 9:35–9:38individual cows.
  113. 9:38–9:43Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot.
  114. 9:43–9:48For the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed
  115. 9:48–9:51there is ground possessing absence of a pot.
  116. 9:51–9:56There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence.
  117. 9:56–10:01A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container,
  118. 10:01–10:06contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground.
  119. 10:06–10:10The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object of cognition
  120. 10:10–10:16of absence, is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the experience
  121. 10:16–10:20of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground.
  122. 10:20–10:24Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise
  123. 10:24–10:29cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground.
  124. 10:29–10:33The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely
  125. 10:33–10:37of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity
  126. 10:37–10:40agnoma is cognition of both acne and soma.
  127. 10:40–10:44Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone, because
  128. 10:44–10:47the ground alone would not be its object.
  129. 10:47–10:51If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone
  130. 10:51–10:54immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning
  131. 10:54–10:58absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot.
  132. 10:58–11:03Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition
  133. 11:03–11:08of pot possessing ground produced by sense contact through a difference in causal conditions
  134. 11:08–11:11eliminate the additional status of absence.
  135. 11:11–11:17Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot possessing ground.
  136. 11:17–11:20Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground is the ground's possession of absence of
  137. 11:20–11:26a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground.
  138. 11:26–11:31The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence.
  139. 11:31–11:35Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter-positive pot or by something
  140. 11:35–11:38pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot.
  141. 11:38–11:43Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also
  142. 11:43–11:48be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot.
  143. 11:48–11:51Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the
  144. 11:51–11:56Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence,
  145. 11:56–11:59though it is not separately cognized.
  146. 11:59–12:03The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is absence
  147. 12:03–12:06of a pot, has already been refuted.
  148. 12:06–12:10Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter-positive, cognition of the
  149. 12:10–12:14ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter-positive.
  150. 12:14–12:17Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter-positive, but
  151. 12:17–12:20cognition of absence is not.
  152. 12:20–12:24The claim, cognition of the visible counter-positive is needed only for usage concerning
  153. 12:24–12:29absence, while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience.
  154. 12:29–12:33Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object.
  155. 12:33–12:37If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were
  156. 12:37–12:41absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection
  157. 12:41–12:46of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place,
  158. 12:46–12:50outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it.
  159. 12:50–12:55Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed,
  160. 12:55–12:59and since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear.
  161. 13:00–13:05If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot has
  162. 13:05–13:10been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formally
  163. 13:10–13:15possessed the pot? Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground,
  164. 13:15–13:17is itself proof of an additional absence of the pot.
  165. 13:17–13:25Prabhācāra view, cognition of the ground itself is absence.
  166. 13:25–13:29The Nāyāyika objects, on the Memsākā view usage concerning absence is impossible, because
  167. 13:29–13:33cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lock has depend upon one another.
  168. 13:33–13:37The Prabhākāra replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot-possessing
  169. 13:37–13:42ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot.
  170. 13:42–13:47Probably because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot,
  171. 13:47–13:51that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically
  172. 13:51–13:55distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence
  173. 13:55–13:57of a pot.
  174. 13:57–14:02An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground.
  175. 14:02–14:07In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive
  176. 14:07–14:12never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus
  177. 14:12–14:16possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence.
  178. 14:17–14:22Co-referential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive
  179. 14:22–14:26and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot,
  180. 14:26–14:32the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neayaka view, that very
  181. 14:32–14:36cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the
  182. 14:36–14:41cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without
  183. 14:41–14:43cognition of the locus.
  184. 14:43–14:47But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence
  185. 14:47–14:52of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot.
  186. 14:52–14:56Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as, ground functioning
  187. 14:56–15:00as the locus of absence, because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past
  188. 15:00–15:05absence, this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises.
  189. 15:05–15:11It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus.
  190. 15:11–15:15If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition
  191. 15:15–15:19of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground.
  192. 15:19–15:23If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence
  193. 15:23–15:24and ground.
  194. 15:24–15:29The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension
  195. 15:29–15:33of possession of the counter-positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground.
  196. 15:33–15:37But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before,
  197. 15:37–15:42is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable.
  198. 15:42–15:45The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is
  199. 15:45–15:48merely a difference in the natures of their objects.
  200. 15:48–15:53If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result.
  201. 15:53–15:57It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing
  202. 15:57–16:00ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct
  203. 16:00–16:04cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity.
  204. 16:04–16:09Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing
  205. 16:09–16:14an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus.
  206. 16:14–16:17When the counter-positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may
  207. 16:17–16:22serve as a non-over extensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from
  208. 16:22–16:24the locus.
  209. 16:24–16:28The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the
  210. 16:28–16:33The locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence.
  211. 16:33–16:38Difference of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing
  212. 16:38–16:41ground is absence.
  213. 16:41–16:45Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object.
  214. 16:45–16:49On the Prabhakara view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition
  215. 16:49–16:52of absence and cognition of the locus differ?
  216. 16:52–16:56Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal
  217. 16:56–17:00conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise in
  218. 17:00–17:03a stream of cognition.
  219. 17:03–17:07Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence
  220. 17:07–17:09of a pot.
  221. 17:09–17:13The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards
  222. 17:13–17:17the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature
  223. 17:17–17:20of the locus of absence.
  224. 17:20–17:25In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs.
  225. 17:25–17:29The cognition this empty ground is not now pot possessing ground, compels even the Nayayaka
  226. 17:29–17:31to accept a difference of nature.
  227. 17:31–17:35The only distinction is that the Nayayaka calls this negation mutual absence between
  228. 17:35–17:40the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it the nature of the locus.
  229. 17:40–17:41Objection.
  230. 17:41–17:45How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot possessing ground later
  231. 17:45–17:46become different from it?
  232. 17:46–17:51Reply, the Nayayaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential
  233. 17:51–17:55negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either.
  234. 17:55–18:00Difference and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory.
  235. 18:00–18:04When empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this
  236. 18:04–18:08ground possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it.
  237. 18:08–18:13How can both mutual absence and its absence occurring ground delimited by pot and absence
  238. 18:13–18:15of pot?
  239. 18:15–18:18Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and
  240. 18:18–18:23its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference.
  241. 18:23–18:28Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on
  242. 18:28–18:32the ground, or possible through a defect, owing to the defect, difference from pot
  243. 18:32–18:36possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot possessing ground and
  244. 18:36–18:39the cognition are not ascertained.
  245. 18:39–18:43If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there
  246. 18:43–18:46be recurrent usage concerning absence?
  247. 18:46–18:51The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it is difficult
  248. 18:51–18:57to establish one universal absences in diverse absences.
  249. 18:57–19:02A proper definition of absences is impossible.
  250. 19:02–19:07Absences cannot be called a universal, one universal in the form of absences cannot
  251. 19:07–19:10pervade mutually different absences.
  252. 19:10–19:14Opposition to a positive entity is not absences, because opposition itself would
  253. 19:14–19:19be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from
  254. 19:19–19:22the nature of the locus.
  255. 19:22–19:26Counterpositiveness determined by a positive entity is not absencehood because counterpositiveness
  256. 19:26–19:30itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter positive of absence of an
  257. 19:30–19:35absence, that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself.
  258. 19:35–19:39Nor is the state of possessing a counter positive absencehood for inheritance and
  259. 19:39–19:42similarity also have counter positives.
  260. 19:42–19:47If it is called the nature residing in an opposed object, there is overextension to cognition
  261. 19:47–19:52and the like, and the word nature in the sense of its own form is not recurrent.
  262. 19:52–19:57Nor is lack of existence absences because lack itself is an absence.
  263. 19:57–20:02Nor is absence a possession of absolute absence of existence.
  264. 20:02–20:06One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in
  265. 20:06–20:09relation to another absence.
  266. 20:09–20:14is absence a lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence in universals
  267. 20:14–20:19and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence to positive
  268. 20:19–20:23entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus.
  269. 20:23–20:28If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence
  270. 20:28–20:34and creates self dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference
  271. 20:34–20:39as the nature of the locus is neutral absence, self dependence again follows, determination
  272. 20:39–20:43of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence.
  273. 20:43–20:48If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even
  274. 20:48–20:50on the Neayaka view.
  275. 20:50–20:55What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence?
  276. 20:55–21:00Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus,
  277. 21:00–21:04because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived.
  278. 21:04–21:08Nor is one in the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it
  279. 21:08–21:13were eternal, usage concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present,
  280. 21:13–21:16and the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

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आप्संष मेथी इंझव़ड, बगड नाद्व़ज़न आप्संष नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च़ नाद्व़च� If the auxiliary of the color in air is offered as an example, the separate instrumental status of non-apprehension itself remains unestablished. Nor can the auxiliary status of cognition of the locus be established through the force of pervasion. That would make cognition of the locus indispensable to cognition of absence of color in air produced by non-apprehension. If cognition of the locus is not indispensable, non-apprehension will not produce cognition of absence. If cognition of absence is produced by an inferential mark rather than by non-apprehension, the mark must itself be non-apprehension, this alternative has already been refuted. Non-apprehension is not even an inferential mark, otherwise the inference would be, air is colorless, not, there is absence of color in air. Why does a person who remembers a pot on pot possessing ground not cognize absence of the the pot from its non-apprehension prior to seeing it. If the answer is, because absence of the pot is not there, then cognition of absence produced by an entity that is itself an absence should be accepted as perceptual and sensory. If the answer is, the pot's presence at that time is the inhibitor, then absence of the pot itself becomes the cause of cognition of absence. of the repetition concerning non-apprehension. The msaka again says, after Kaitra has come out of a house, he is asked whether Mika was inside. Recalling his experience of the house, he answers from non-apprehension of Mika, Mika was not in the house. This cognition of past absence is not memory, because when he saw the house he did not remember Mika and therefore had no prior experience of Mika's absence. Since micro-absence is experienced through non-apprehension without any operation of a sense organ, non-apprehension should be a separate means of knowledge and other cognitions of absence as well. A statement in the Tperiak also supports this view, when someone is asked about another person's existence, Kaitra, who had seen the house, then understands micro-absence. The Neayaka replies, Unknown non-apprehension is not the cause of cognition of a past absence, non-apprehension of an eligible counter positive and a distant house is impossible. If known non-apprehension is accepted, an infinite regress results, because non-apprehension is itself an absence and cognition of it would require another non-apprehension. Nor does non-apprehension of apprehension of micro, in its unknown form, produce cognition of micro's absence, a Mimsaka view apprehension is supersensible, and therefore micro's absence cannot be known from non-apprehension of apprehension of an eligible counter positive. Awareness of absence is possible through an inferential mark. Proposal, in such a case, unknown absence of recollection of the house is qualified by an eligible micro produces cognition of micro's absence in the house. Reply, if unknown absence of recollection were the cause, then doubts such as, was micro in the house or not, and contrary cognition such as, Micra was in the house at some time, should not arise while absence of recollection is present, it both are experienced. Nor is it sufficient to say that doubt and contrary cognition are produced merely by a defect. A defect that impairs only the extraordinary instrument of knowledge causes doubt and the like, no defect has been established that impairs absence of recollection of an eligible Micra, which is naturally a means of knowledge. The defective condition of an instrument consists in the totality of defects belonging to its causes. Distance in the like do not intrinsically obstruct the eye, a defect of its own nature, like a magical gem obstructing fire's burning power, alone obstructs it. Even so, this proposal leaves non-apprehension unestablished as a means of knowledge, because cognition of microse absence is readily explained by unknown non-recollection of an eligible mitra. Therefore non-apprehension is not a separate means of knowledge, non-recollection of an eligible mitra known by the mind is the already accepted inferential mark, and cognition of mitra's absence is possible from that mark alone. Conclusion and cognition of absence is perceptual. Objection, non-recollection of an eligible mitra is not known by the mind, because there is no apprehensive relation between a sense organ and absence, and absence of mitra is not eligible for a sense organ. Reply, once cognition of absence is established as produced by a sense organ, qualifier had belonging to an object related to the sense organ is accepted as the apprehensive relation. Cognition of absence of color and the like in air is not produced by an inferential mark, therefore it is established as produced by a sense organ. The experience, I know absence of a pot, is not produced by an inferential mark, hence cognition of absence is perceptual. It has already been refuted that knownness is the inferential mark. How then do doubt concerning absence and error concerning presence arise? Doubt in an inferential cognition of absence arises from doubt concerning the inferential mark, and an opposite inference arises from error concerning the mark. A competent person, having once ascertained the eligible recollection of the known mitra, uses non-recollection of an eligible mitra as the inferential mark. Since mere non-recollection is deviant, the inquirer's concentrated reflection takes only qualified non-recollection as its object, excluding near-non-recollection. Thus non-recollection of the eligible counter-positive mitra is used only as an inferential mark. The complete inference is, at that time there was absence of mitra in the house, because although the house is remembered as possessing dimensions and other features comparable to mitra, it is not remembered as qualified by mitra, wherever this is so, there is absence of that thing, as on ground possessing absence of a pot. Thus ends the theory that non-apprehension is not a means of knowledge and the perception section of the Tattva Sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya. The Theory of Absence The theory of absence and the perception section of the Tattva Sintmai. Misaka Prima Facey View, Absence is Positive in Nature. The Misaka says, the absence of an entity is not a separate reality distinct from the existence of the empty locus, absence is in fact the positive nature of the very locus in which the the counter positive is not present. Therefore only conjunction and the other relations that produce cognition of the locus should be apprehensive relations, there is no need to accept an additional apprehensive relation called qualifierhood or self-linking relation for cognition of absence. Reply of the earlier Neayakas. The earlier Neayaka replies, the undefeated negative cognition, there is no pot on this ground occurs in direct experience. This cognition cannot concern merely the ground, otherwise the same cognition would occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor can it be called merely cognition of an empty locus, because no absolute emptiness distinct from ground possessing absence of a pot can be accepted. If it is said that the ground alone is the empty locus, the separate statement there is absence of a pot on the ground becomes unnecessary. And if absence and its locus are wholly identical, the containness of absence and the container-ship of the ground, that is, their container-contained relation, would be impossible. Therefore absence is an entity distinct from its locus. A particular entity is the locus of absence. Objection. The Naya Yuga who accepts an additional absence must also accept a locus of absence, because absence is experienced as delimited by a particular place, on this ground. Some particularity grounded in absence will then reside in the ground. That particularity cannot be the ground alone, otherwise absence of a pot would also occur on pot possessing ground, it cannot be ground possessing absence of a pot, otherwise there is mutual dependence, and it cannot be ground possessing a pot, otherwise there is contradiction. Thus absence cannot be an entity distinct from its locus. Reply, the locus of absence is not merely the nature of the ground, but a distinct empty locus qualified by absence of a pot. This particular locus is not recurrent in the form of a universal but non-recurrent. Nevertheless a non-recurrent locus can be the locus of one absence, just as one pot is the locus of its own single counter positive. Existence and perceptibility of an additional absence Question, where is absence? Reply, wherever it is experienced. Again, where is it experienced? Reply, wherever it actually exists. There is no fault in this answer, otherwise there would be no need to accept the existence of universals such as conus either, since usage could be explained on the basis of individual cows. Absence of a pot is in the ground when the ground possesses absence of a pot. For the time of pot absence there is ground possessing a pot, after the pot is destroyed there is ground possessing absence of a pot. There is no third intermediate time between the time of presence and the time of absence. A cognition such as, there is no pot on this ground, clearly presents a container, contained relation, therefore absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The explanation, the ground is not the locus of absence but merely the object of cognition of absence, is only verbal ingenuity. It is inconsistent first to establish the experience of absence with the aid of commentary and then to call absence merely the ground. Cognition of ground possessing absence of a pot is not cognition merely of ground, otherwise cognition of ground possessing a pot would likewise be cognition merely of ground. The Memsaka may say, cognition of ground possessing a pot is not cognition merely of ground, but cognition of both ground and pot, just as cognition of the deity agnoma is cognition of both acne and soma. Reply, then this cognition could not ground usage concerning the ground alone, because the ground alone would not be its object. If it is said that such usage is based upon a second cognition concerning ground alone immediately afterward, that second cognition of ground would produce usage concerning absence of a pot even on ground possessing a pot. Nor does distinguishing cognition of ground alone produced by sense contact from cognition of pot possessing ground produced by sense contact through a difference in causal conditions eliminate the additional status of absence. Usage concerning ground alone also occurs with respect to pot possessing ground. Therefore the intended meaning of empty ground is the ground's possession of absence of a pot, and this absence must be accepted as distinct from the ground. The negative cognition is not as proof of an additional absence. Objection, let cognition of ground produced by the counter-positive pot or by something pervaded by the pot itself be absence of the pot. Reply, on ground possessing a pot, cognition of the ground produced by the pot can also be produced by other things such as cloth, therefore it is not absence of the pot. Nor can cognition of empty ground produced by the pot alone be absence, because on the Memsaka view the meaning of empty ground alone has already been taken to be absence, though it is not separately cognized. The alternative, that cognition of ground which does not take a pot as its object is absence of a pot, has already been refuted. Determination of an absence depends upon determination of its counter-positive, cognition of the ground is not in that way dependent upon cognition of the counter-positive. Cognition of a locus is possible without reference to the counter-positive, but cognition of absence is not. The claim, cognition of the visible counter-positive is needed only for usage concerning absence, while absence itself has already been cognized, contradicts experience. Usage concerning absence depends upon available cognition of the desired object. If cognition merely of ground, dependent upon recollection of the counter positive, were absence, then in darkness absence of thorns would not be understood without recollection of thorns and a traveller would be injured, and when a dam broke in an uninhabited place, outflow of water would be impossible because no person cognized it. Likewise, when cognition of the ground was destroyed, absence of the pot would be destroyed, and since absence of absence is presence of the pot, the destroyed pot would reappear. If absence is not a distinct entity, how would cognition of empty ground arise after a pot has been destroyed by a hammer blow, despite the continuing cognition of ground that formally possessed the pot? Therefore the negative cognition, there is no pot on the ground, is itself proof of an additional absence of the pot. Prabhācāra view, cognition of the ground itself is absence. The Nāyāyika objects, on the Memsākā view usage concerning absence is impossible, because cognition of absence and cognition of the empty lock has depend upon one another. The Prabhākāra replies, cognition of empty ground distinct from cognition of pot-possessing ground is itself the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot. Probably because cognition of pot possessing ground lacks cognition of possessing a pot, that cognition is not absence of the pot, cognition of empty ground is intrinsically distinct from cognition of pot possessing ground and produces usage concerning absence of a pot. An illusion of absence is in fact an illusion concerning the nature of the ground. In the case of absolute absence, cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive never arises, there, cognition of an empty locus distinct from cognition of a locus possessing the counter positive is the cause of usage concerning the opposed absence. Co-referential negation is possible through difference in the natures of the counter positive and the locus of absence, even while the ground is known as possessing a pot, the cognition the ground is not a pot is undefeated. On the Neayaka view, that very cognition of ground which is the cause of cognition of absence may be accepted as the cause of usage concerning absence, because cognition of absence cannot occur without cognition of the locus. But an unqualified cognition merely of ground is not the cause of usage concerning absence of a pot, otherwise such usage would also occur on ground possessing a pot. Nor is it sufficient to distinguish it by a difference of object as, ground functioning as the locus of absence, because even when a pot is present now, the cognition of past absence, this pot was formerly not on this ground, rises. It is impossible to accept a separate particularity of absence and locus. If absence of a pot is a qualifier of the ground that is the object of cognition, cognition of absence of a pot would be a cause of cognition of the ground. If it is merely an incidental indicator, no separate difference remains between absence and ground. The Nayaika may say that not seeing the ground as possessing a pot, that is, non-apprehension of possession of the counter-positive, is the cause of cognition of empty ground. But even while a pot is seen at present, the cognition, there was no pot here before, is possible, hence this cause too is not indispensable. The distinction between cognition of empty ground and cognition of absence of a pot is merely a difference in the natures of their objects. If that difference is called mutual absence, infinite regress and self-dependence result. It may also be stated thus, cognition had belonging to cognition of pot possessing ground and cognition had belonging to cognition merely of ground produce distinct cognitions on the basis of their mutual dissimilarity. Even in the Neayaka doctrine of an additional absence, there is no separate proof establishing an eternal mutual absence between absence and its locus. When the counter-positive is present in the mind, the very nature of the locus may serve as a non-over extensive ground for understanding absence as non-different from the locus. The Neayaka himself does not accept a second absence within one absence, because the The locus is not intrinsically distinct from absence. Difference of causal conditions produces difference of cognition, ground different from pot-possessing ground is absence. Objection, difference of cognition arises from difference of object. On the Prabhakara view absence and empty locus are identical, how then can cognition of absence and cognition of the locus differ? Reply, the object is not the sole cause of difference in cognition, distinct causal conditions produce distinct cognitions, just as successive distinct cognitions arise in a stream of cognition. Alternatively, empty ground distinct from pot-possessing ground is its self-absence of a pot. The Neayaka calls that same ground the locus of absence of a pot, the Prabhakara regards the alleged difference between the absence and the empty ground merely as the nature of the locus of absence. In the absence of cognition of identity, awareness of difference occurs. The cognition this empty ground is not now pot possessing ground, compels even the Nayayaka to accept a difference of nature. The only distinction is that the Nayayaka calls this negation mutual absence between the grounds, while the Prabhakara calls it the nature of the locus. Objection. How did the empty ground that was previously non-different from pot possessing ground later become different from it? Reply, the Nayayaka who establishes mutual absence through undefeated co-referential negation cannot avoid this situation across different times either. Difference and non-difference in one lock as at different times are not mutually contradictory. When empty ground possessing absence of a pot later again possesses a pot, usage, this ground possesses a pot, necessarily applies to it. How can both mutual absence and its absence occurring ground delimited by pot and absence of pot? Cognition of the ground, as delimited by cognition of pot possessing ground and its absence, bears both difference of nature and absence of that difference. Doubt is there a pot on the ground or not, an erroneous cognition there is no pot on the ground, or possible through a defect, owing to the defect, difference from pot possessing ground and the locus and difference from cognition of pot possessing ground and the cognition are not ascertained. If the nature of ground and cognition of ground are non-recurrent, how can there be recurrent usage concerning absence? The same problem exists on the view that accepts additional absences, because it is difficult to establish one universal absences in diverse absences. A proper definition of absences is impossible. Absences cannot be called a universal, one universal in the form of absences cannot pervade mutually different absences. Opposition to a positive entity is not absences, because opposition itself would be determined by absence, the non coexistence of presence and absence is not distinct from the nature of the locus. Counterpositiveness determined by a positive entity is not absencehood because counterpositiveness itself is in the form of absence of an absence, and the counter positive of absence of an absence, that is, of a positive entity, is not again the positive entity itself. Nor is the state of possessing a counter positive absencehood for inheritance and similarity also have counter positives. If it is called the nature residing in an opposed object, there is overextension to cognition and the like, and the word nature in the sense of its own form is not recurrent. Nor is lack of existence absences because lack itself is an absence. Nor is absence a possession of absolute absence of existence. One absence is not admitted in another absence, even if admitted, it would apply only in relation to another absence. is absence a lack of cognition of existence, because cognition of existence in universals and the like may be obstructed by opposition, while the opposition of absence to positive entity is not distinct from the nature of the empty locus. If opposition is absence of coexistence, absence enters the definition of absence and creates self dependence. If it is called difference from a positive entity, and difference as the nature of the locus is neutral absence, self dependence again follows, determination of prior absence and the others also depends upon absence. If an additional difference is accepted, recurrence among absences remains unestablished even on the Neayaka view. What purpose is then served by accepting an additional absence? Nor may the existence of a pot be regarded merely as a special nature of the locus, because existence of a pot distinct from the ground is perceived. Nor is one in the same absence of a pot recurrently present everywhere, if it were eternal, usage concerning absence of a pot would occur even when a pot was present, and the division into prior absence and the like would be inconsistent.

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