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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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asr-draft

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No

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not-reviewed

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small

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en (0.973917)

Duration

53:05

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Open preserved recording

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1. 0:04–0:07Refutation of the First Alternative
2. 0:07–0:11The first alternative is untenable.
3. 0:11–0:18If a causal object is capable of production in every place, it should produce everywhere.
4. 0:18–0:21If it is incapable, it should produce nowhere.
5. 0:21–0:27It may be objected that although causes have the same nature everywhere,
6. 0:27–0:33they have acquired from their own causes the distinctive feature of producing the effect
7. 0:33–0:40only at the place of the effect, and no question of subject or counter-instance can arise regarding
8. 0:40–0:49this fact. Yes, this is possible. But why, then, do you Buddhists not understand precisely the same
9. 0:49–0:56point, although causes have the same nature at all times, they produce the effect only when
10. 0:56–1:02the aggregate of auxiliary causes is present, and they have acquired this distinctive feature from
11. 1:02–1:05their own causes.
12. 1:05–1:08Refutation of the second alternative.
13. 1:08–1:12The second alternative is also untenable.
14. 1:12–1:18If an object were regarded as unitary even though opposed properties were directly seen
15. 1:18–1:25to coexist in it, the practice of distinguishing objects would become costless.
16. 1:25–1:31Moreover, the reason called opposition, having thus deviated from the probandom, could not
17. 1:31–1:36infer difference even after being qualified by time.
18. 1:36–1:39Refutation of the third alternative.
19. 1:39–1:44The third alternative is likewise untenable.
20. 1:44–1:50If the defining mark of opposition is present in a substrate or object, even a thousand
21. 1:50–1:54contrary proofs cannot remove that opposition.
22. 1:54–2:01If no such mark exists, the nature of opposition must be examined.
23. 2:01–2:13The opposition consists into things within one substrate excluding one another in such a way that affirming or denying one necessarily denies or affirms the other.
24. 2:13–2:17No such opposition exists in the present case.
25. 2:17–2:27Production at one place opposes non-production at that same place because affirmation of the former denies the latter.
26. 2:27–2:38But production at one place does not oppose non-production at another because affirmation of the former does not negate the latter.
27. 2:38–2:50Non-production of a particular object elsewhere or production of another object there is not the absence of that object's production at its own place.
28. 2:50–2:56Its real non-production is the absence of production at its own place.
29. 2:56–3:11If this is so, then in the case of production and non-production by one object at different times, the absence of this defining mark of opposition has almost already been established.
30. 3:11–3:14You Buddhists should remember this point.
31. 3:14–3:22Proposal of a second pair of inferences to establish the coexistence of opposed properties.
32. 3:22–3:29Thus, even if the conditional inferences are admitted, they do not establish the coexistence
33. 3:29–3:31of a post properties.
34. 3:31–3:37But may the following affirmative inference be accepted, whatever produces a particular
35. 3:37–3:44effect at any time necessarily produces it throughout its entire period of existence,
36. 3:44–3:50just as a sound wave that is not immediately destroyed produces other sound waves throughout
37. 3:50–3:57its existence? And may the following negative inference likewise be accepted, whatever does
38. 3:57–4:04not produce a particular thing at some time never produces it, just as a stone never produces
39. 4:04–4:12a sprout and a seed in a granary never produces a sprout? If these inferences are valid, we
40. 4:12–4:19ask, do these proofs concern the class of objects or individual objects? Objection that
41. 4:19–4:26the inferences are defective. Under the first alternative, that these inferences concern
42. 4:26–4:33a class of objects, both are appreciated by a deviating reason, because there is no invariable
43. 4:33–4:40concomitance between reason and probandom. Under the second, that they concern one particular
44. 4:40–4:48individual, both are appreciated by an inconclusive reason. For a cause's complete failure to
45. 4:48–4:55produce anything results from its total incapacity, while a capable causes necessary production
46. 4:55–5:01results from its being joined with its auxiliary causes.
47. 5:01–5:08Refutation of another pair of inferences. The preceding refutation also defeats another
48. 5:08–5:15pair of inferences of this kind. Whatever is productive is something newly arisen,
49. 5:15–5:22motion which produces separation as soon as it arises. And whatever is not productive
50. 5:22–5:31immediately upon arising is never productive, like a piece of stone with respect to a sprout.
51. 5:31–5:38Like the earlier pair, these inferences to suffer from deviating and inconclusive reasons.
52. 5:38–5:47refutation of the third explanation of incompatibility. The third alternative is also incorrect. On
53. 5:47–5:54that assumption, artificiality and impermanence and the like would have to be regarded as
54. 5:54–6:00mutually opposed merely because they are different from each other. Objection that
55. 6:00–6:08the aggregation of auxiliary causes is incompatible. Let it then be admitted that a causes
56. 6:08–6:14conjunction and non conjunction with the same auxiliary cause are mutually incompatible.
57. 6:14–6:22No, this too cannot be accepted, no rational alternative account of such incompatibility
58. 6:22–6:30is possible. To clarify, the possible alternatives are these, the auxiliary cause and its absence,
59. 6:30–6:37as mutually related terms, are opposed because each is the very negation of the other,
60. 6:37–6:44an existing auxiliary object is opposed to its absence and therefore is not the counter positive
61. 6:44–6:51of that absence or wherever an auxiliary cause is present at a given time, its absence exists
62. 6:51–6:58nowhere at that time or the auxiliary cause and its absence do not coexist in the same place
63. 6:58–7:06or the two do not occur in the same place and time or finally both are not present
64. 7:06–7:12at the same time in relation to one and the same region of space.
65. 7:12–7:17Refutation of the various forms of incompatibility.
66. 7:17–7:24The first form is untenable because we do not accept that one positive entity is the negation
67. 7:24–7:27of another positive entity.
68. 7:27–7:34The second is also untenable because we reject the doctrine that an effect exists eternally.
69. 7:34–7:42The third is incorrect because only an object's prior absence and posterior absence are not
70. 7:42–7:49regarded as contemporaneous with it, its absolute absence or mutual absence can coexist with
71. 7:49–7:50it.
72. 7:50–7:53The fourth is also untenable.
73. 7:53–7:59It would be possible only if the necessary coexistence of conjoined or related objects
74. 7:59–8:03were established, but it is not.
75. 8:03–8:09If this necessary coexistence were proved on the basis of incompatibility between an
76. 8:09–8:16object and its absence, mutual dependence would result, coexistence would be established
77. 8:16–8:23after incompatibility was established, while incompatibility would be established after
78. 8:23–8:28necessary coexistence was proved through the argument for momentariness based on the
79. 8:28–8:31difference of each auxiliary.
80. 8:31–8:35No other proof of this necessity exists.
81. 8:35–8:42Moreover, conjunction and non-conjunction of auxiliary causes arise from the presence or
82. 8:42–8:48absence of their respective efficient causes, and these efficient causes are available only
83. 8:48–8:52on particular occasion.
84. 8:52–8:58Incompatibility is not established even indirectly by saying that an object is destroyed by
85. 8:58–9:05by its own nature or requires no other cause to destroy it, because this assertion is itself
86. 9:05–9:07unproved.
87. 9:07–9:12Whether destruction of objects is necessary will be discussed later.
88. 9:12–9:19The fifth alternative is also untenable, because we never maintain that the same auxiliary
89. 9:19–9:26cause is both present and absent in the same place and at the same time.
90. 9:26–9:32based on the non-pervasive occurrence of aggregation and its refutation.
91. 9:32–9:39It may be said that Nya-Vaika philosophers regard aggregation as a property caused by
92. 9:39–9:45the conjunction of auxiliary causes different from them and occurring non-pervasively, then
93. 9:45–9:54one object, though existing at one place and time, may fail to occur in some of its parts.
94. 9:54–10:00On the other hand, if aggregation is non-different from the things constituting it, then for
95. 10:00–10:07one who accepts persistence, separately existing causes such as seed, water, earth, and heat
96. 10:07–10:15would, in their combined state, remain non-different from those same things, consequently, each
97. 10:15–10:19cause should produce the combined effect, the sprout.
98. 10:19–10:27Further, if aggregation were pervasive, a cloth red only in one part should appear wholly red,
99. 10:27–10:33and a sound produced at one place should spread throughout all space.
100. 10:33–10:39It is therefore proper to regard conjoined things as different from those same things
101. 10:39–10:41in their unconjoined state.
102. 10:41–10:48A pot, for example, is a group of conjoined atoms and is wholly different from those
103. 10:48–10:56atoms in their separate state. But the facts are not so. Even in the case of momentary
104. 10:56–11:02atoms, the inconsistency stated above cannot be avoided.
105. 11:02–11:08Suppose, according to the Buddhist view, that an atom arising on the east is covered by another
106. 11:08–11:16atom situated on the west. The question is, is it also covered on the east, not covered,
107. 11:16–11:23For both covered and uncovered, under the first alternative, the atom would be invisible
108. 11:23–11:31on both east and west. Under the second, it would be visible in both directions. Under
109. 11:31–11:38the third, the same difficulty of inconsistency reappears because one and the same atom would
110. 11:38–11:46have to be regarded as both covered and uncovered by the same object. Reply to the view that
111. 11:46–11:53a conjoined object differs from the separate objects. Can the inconsistency concerning
112. 11:53–12:00atoms just stated not be removed by some other means, such as accepting different determinants
113. 12:00–12:08of conjunction and non-conjunction? It can, but what is that means? It is the acceptance
114. 12:08–12:14of different determinants. Inconsistency would arise if an atom conjoined with
115. 12:14–12:21Another atom in a certain direction were also disjoint from it in that very direction but
116. 12:21–12:24that is not the case here.
117. 12:24–12:30Very well if the same principle is accepted regarding conjunction and conjoined objects
118. 12:30–12:33where does any defect remain?
119. 12:33–12:40In this way the negative invariable concomitance dependent upon positive invariable concomitance
120. 12:40–12:42is also refuted.
121. 12:42–12:49A special defect in negative invariable concomitance based on unreal terms.
122. 12:49–12:55An additional defect in establishing negative invariable concomitance is that there is no
123. 12:55–13:01valid proof for accepting the reality of subject, reason and example.
124. 13:01–13:08No means of valid cognition can have an unreal object if it could, its object would no longer
125. 13:08–13:10be unreal.
126. 13:10–13:17But if an unreal object cannot become the subject of any statement or practice, does not the
127. 13:17–13:23opponent who states this generate a self-contradiction in his own utterance?
128. 13:23–13:24He does.
129. 13:24–13:31Yet one may reply by asking, does exposing self-contradiction in the opponent's statement
130. 13:31–13:35provide any valid proof of an unreal object?
131. 13:35–13:41Or is the denial that meaningful discourse about an unreal object is possible itself
132. 13:41–13:42being denied?
133. 13:42–13:50Or, finally, must it be admitted that meaningless discourse about unreal objects is necessarily
134. 13:50–13:52to be accepted?
135. 13:52–13:58A negative answer to the first question, and an affirmative answer to the second.
136. 13:58–14:02The answer to the first question is no.
137. 14:02–14:08Even if the Buddhist position contains a thousand self-contradictions, no valid perception or
138. 14:08–14:15inference can establish the reality of an enduring object, its failure to produce successively
139. 14:15–14:23or simultaneously, or the reality of the hairs horn used as an example in the inference.
140. 14:23–14:29If such proof could be offered, there would be no occasion for fruitless debate on the
141. 14:29–14:31matter.
142. 14:31–14:37During the second question, trustworthy persons hold that even the statement denying discourse
143. 14:37–14:40about unreal objects is improper.
144. 14:40–14:44This view naturally leads to silence.
145. 14:44–14:48What else can be done in such circumstances?
146. 14:48–14:54Where a statement is wholly irrational, silence is best.
147. 14:54–14:59Buddhists too should consider whether, during discussion of an unintelligible matter, it
148. 14:59–15:04It is better to remain mute or to continue speaking.
149. 15:04–15:10Reply to the objection that the opponent did not remain silent on this matter.
150. 15:10–15:16But although you, the opponent, knew that this course about unreal objects is impossible,
151. 15:16–15:24you did not remain silent, you expressly denied that this course about unreal objects is possible.
152. 15:24–15:26What is the answer?
153. 15:26–15:29Yes, this is true.
154. 15:29–15:36But just as you Buddhists discuss unreal objects in order to prevent acceptance of a view contrary
155. 15:36–15:43to your own statement, so we non-Buddhists, while searching for a proof of momentariness,
156. 15:43–15:49engage in discussion that is self-contradictory and therefore invalid.
157. 15:49–15:55Its sole purpose is to prevent irrational assertions concerning unreal objects.
158. 15:55–16:02If you view both kinds of statement impartially, we too shall say nothing against you.
159. 16:02–16:08Refutation of the Third Alternative Regarding the Third Alternative,
160. 16:08–16:14the Buddhist should be asked, who established the rule that irrational conduct or assertion
161. 16:14–16:17must necessarily be accepted?
162. 16:17–16:21Is it because such usage is firmly established?
163. 16:21–16:27No irrationality and firm establishment cannot coexist.
164. 16:27–16:32Can such usage somehow become established through ignorance or error?
165. 16:32–16:33No.
166. 16:33–16:39If it in the other two forms of debate called Jalpa and Vita, the Buddhists' opponent
167. 16:39–16:46need only examine the proof for the Buddhists' claims, in these forms of debate the opponent
168. 16:46–16:51is not concerned to present opposition of his own.
169. 16:51–16:57He therefore cannot be charged with self-contradiction in his statements.
170. 16:57–17:04The Buddhist cannot answer his opponent's demand with a rational statement for such an attempt
171. 17:04–17:06would go against him.
172. 17:06–17:13If he relies only on irrational statements in order to answer, he proves himself guilty
173. 17:13–17:19by his own mouth because he thereby admits that the view he advances is irrational or
174. 17:19–17:27unsupported. If he gives no answer and remains silent, he incurs the fault of ignorance.
175. 17:28–17:36Discourse about unreal objects is self-contradictory. If merely accepting such discourse could remove
176. 17:36–17:44self-contradiction, it might be accepted, but it cannot. The statements, an unreal object is
177. 17:44–17:51is not the subject of any kind of discourse and it is the subject of negative discourse
178. 17:51–17:58are not mutually consistent. Objection to the preceding view and its answer. But where
179. 17:58–18:04would the self-contradiction remain if unreal objects were held to be beyond the reach
180. 18:04–18:12only of affirmative statement or practice? No, this solution is impossible. One would
181. 18:12–18:19then ask, is there or is there not something said to lie wholly beyond both affirmative
182. 18:19–18:21and negative discourse?
183. 18:21–18:28Either possible answer to this question generates self-contradiction within itself.
184. 18:28–18:34In either case, the subject of discourse would necessarily be unreal, because a real
185. 18:34–18:39object cannot lie beyond the reach of all discourse.
186. 18:39–18:46Apply to the objection that negative discourse about an unreal object is proper.
187. 18:46–18:52If an unreal object can be the subject of negative discourse, why can it not be the subject of
188. 18:52–18:55affirmative discourse?
189. 18:55–19:01A rational basis for discourse is equally absent in both cases.
190. 19:01–19:06But is the absence of the power of speech in the son of a barren woman not established
191. 19:06–19:13by his insentions even though his power of speech cannot be established by any reason?
192. 19:13–19:21No. Sun Hood 2 is present in the son of a barren woman and on that basis his power of speech
193. 19:21–19:30may be established. After all, it is not that the son of a barren woman is no son.
194. 19:30–19:36If it were, your own statement about him would become self-contradictory.
195. 19:36–19:41Can it not be said that the statement is simply meaningless, and that the son of a barren
196. 19:41–19:44woman is not really a son?
197. 19:44–19:52No, then, insentions to would not be a property of the son of a barren woman.
198. 19:52–19:58Incentions is spoken of as a positive property distinct from consciousness, and such a property
199. 19:58–20:05cannot reside in an unreal object. Could the word be understood merely as the denial of
200. 20:05–20:12consciousness, and must this denial be accepted as present in the son of a barren woman?
201. 20:12–20:20No. In another context, the word son could equally be understood merely as denial of
202. 20:20–20:26non-sonhood, and that denial could be accepted as present in the son of a barren woman
203. 20:26–20:29in precisely the same way.
204. 20:29–20:35Reply to the objection that properties may be imputed to an unreal object.
205. 20:35–20:42The mere denial of non-sunhood has no capacity to produce an action or cognition.
206. 20:42–20:48If it contains within itself no effective and recognizable property, how can it serve
207. 20:48–20:52as the reason in an inference?
208. 20:52–20:59well, precisely the same criticism applies, when insentience is made the reason.
209. 20:59–21:05Can it be said that among negative entities only that can function as a reason whose
210. 21:05–21:11negation is affected by objects different from it, for example, a so-cutriness is negated
211. 21:11–21:18by everything except an aso-cutry, whereas the son of a barren woman is negated both
212. 21:18–21:25by nonsense such as pots and by sons such as devdatta and therefore cannot function as
213. 21:25–21:34a reason. Very well, the insentions of a barren woman's son is of exactly the same kind. The
214. 21:34–21:40son of a barren woman is excluded just as much by conscious persons such as devdatta
215. 21:40–21:45as by insentions, thumps, thorns and the light.
216. 21:45–21:51The refutation of the view that a false cognition of the absence of speech power is possible
217. 21:51–21:54in an unreal object.
218. 21:54–22:01Is it not possible to have merely an illusory cognition of the absence of speech power separated
219. 22:01–22:07from any real object so that the cognition the son of a barren woman is a speaker may
220. 22:07–22:08arise?
221. 22:08–22:15Yes, it is possible, but then who can deny an equally illusory cognition of an unreal
222. 22:15–22:22object end out with speech power, that too must be regarded as possible.
223. 22:22–22:29But speech power is agency in the act of speaking, how can this reside in an unreal object wholly
224. 22:29–22:32devoid of capacity?
225. 22:32–22:38Very well, but then how can absence of speech power reside in an unreal object when it is
226. 22:38–22:45treated in the same manner as agency in acts other than speaking? Is the absence of the
227. 22:45–22:52capacity to speak not compatible with the absence of all capacity, and can it therefore reside
228. 22:52–23:00in an unreal object? We then ask, by what valid proof is it established that the son
229. 23:00–23:08of a barren woman lacks all capacity? If the answer is from his unreality, we ask again,
230. 23:08–23:11How is his unreality established?
231. 23:11–23:15The answer will be, from his lack of all capacity.
232. 23:15–23:23Clearly, this Buddhist disputant behaves like an insolvent deptor who repeatedly evades repaying
233. 23:23–23:25his honorable creditors.
234. 23:25–23:31The Buddhist likewise continues to argue in circles, failing to understand that the
235. 23:31–23:37fault of mutual dependence contaminates his entire reasoning.
236. 23:37–23:41Another subsidiary objection and its refutation.
237. 23:41–23:47Is the absence of all capacity in an unreal object not established by its inability to
238. 23:47–23:51produce either successively or simultaneously?
239. 23:51–23:53No.
240. 23:53–23:59Even if this incapacity of the unreal object were established, the reasoning would not
241. 23:59–24:05stop there, through intervening inferences it would advance and then circle back to
242. 24:05–24:13the same incapacity. Moreover, by the positive reason called sunhood, we could establish
243. 24:13–24:20at once the unreal objects power of speech, successive and simultaneous productivity, reality
244. 24:20–24:28and so forth. There would then be no occasion to establish that it lacks successive or simultaneous
245. 24:28–24:37productivity. And if this absence is not established, how could its unreality be proved? Without
246. 24:37–24:43such proof, the possibility of establishing the absence of speech power in an unreal object
247. 24:43–24:51is exceedingly slight. It must therefore be admitted that all discourse is regulated
248. 24:51–25:00by valid grounds. When those grounds are violated, only disorder results. An example of the disorder
249. 25:00–25:08produced by irrational statements. If Dev Dutta has not been seen, no one can ask without
250. 25:08–25:16shamelessness whether he is fair or dark. Even if someone asks such a question, and
251. 25:16–25:20listener answers, he is not fair without determining who the
252. 25:20–25:26referent of the pronoun he is, another person may equally say, he
253. 25:26–25:31is not dark. Nothing would be known from such statements,
254. 25:31–25:35because lack of proof and mutual contradiction are equally
255. 25:35–25:40present in both answers. Examination and refutation of the
256. 25:40–25:46The objection that discourse is determined merely by cognition.
257. 25:46–25:53Is it only that which is unknowable that cannot become the subject of a statement or discourse?
258. 25:53–26:00Cognitions of things such as a tortoise's hair, although false, certainly occur.
259. 26:00–26:05A cognition in the form of a tortoise's hair cannot arise without apprehending some
260. 26:05–26:08particular object.
261. 26:08–26:14Is there a rule that only what is validly knowable can be spoken of?
262. 26:14–26:17No, this is improper.
263. 26:17–26:23We ask, is the cognition this is a hair's horn an erroneous cognition, or a cognition
264. 26:23–26:26of an absent object?
265. 26:26–26:29The first alternative does not favor you.
266. 26:29–26:36If it were true, there would be one object in which the error occurs and another object
267. 26:36–26:43as which it is mistakenly taken. The substrate of the error would then exist at the place
268. 26:43–26:50where the cognition arose, while that as which it was taken would exist elsewhere. In this
269. 26:50–26:56way the Nya position becomes predominant. The second alternative cannot be maintained
270. 26:56–27:04either. There would be no cause capable of producing cognition of an unreal object.
271. 27:04–27:10a sense organ produces cognition of its object only with the necessary cooperation of that
272. 27:10–27:18object. A defective inference or fallacious reason and a false sentence, produce only
273. 27:18–27:25erroneous cognition of their respective objects. If these means produced cognition of something
274. 27:25–27:32that was not their object, expressions such as hair's horn would also produce cognition
275. 27:32–27:38of a tortoise's hair and the like, because there would then be nothing to regulate the
276. 27:38–27:46meaning of a word. Account and examination of what regulates word meaning. The principle
277. 27:46–27:52regulating or determining the meaning of a word is either linguistic convention or the
278. 27:52–27:59word's own natural power. The first alternative is unacceptable in the case of the expression
279. 27:59–28:06hairs horn, simply because the object with which the convention is supposed to be established
280. 28:06–28:13is utterly unknowable. If knowledge of the convention must precede knowledge of the object through
281. 28:13–28:19the word, while knowledge of the convention itself depends upon knowing the designated
282. 28:19–28:26object, circularity results, knowledge of the object follows knowledge of the convention,
283. 28:26–28:31And knowledge of the convention follows knowledge of the designated object.
284. 28:31–28:38If the meaning of the whole expression, here's Horn depends only upon knowledge of the meanings
285. 28:38–28:45of its components, Hare, and Horn, those separate meanings cannot be ignored.
286. 28:45–28:52It must be admitted that the distinct meanings of both words appear jointly in the meaning
287. 28:52–28:54of the whole expression.
288. 28:54–29:01Then its meaning reduces merely to an error in which one thing is taken as another.
289. 29:01–29:08If the component words do not contribute their respective meanings to the whole expression,
290. 29:08–29:14there will be no rule of meaning, a word will also convey objects with which it has no
291. 29:14–29:16conventional relation.
292. 29:16–29:23If the words own nature is held to regulate its meaning, an untrained person, just like
293. 29:23–29:30one trained in linguistic usage should understand the correct meaning immediately upon hearing
294. 29:30–29:32the word.
295. 29:32–29:38Examination and refutation of the view that latent impressions regulate word meaning.
296. 29:38–29:44Do certain extraordinary latent impressions regulate the meaning of words?
297. 29:44–29:51If so, one must ask, is the latent impression alone the cause of cognition of an unreal
298. 29:51–29:59object or does something else cooperate with it? The first alternative is impossible otherwise
299. 29:59–30:05because the impression remains continuously present, cognitions of a hare's horn and the
300. 30:05–30:13like would arise perpetually since no other cause would be required. Can it be said that
301. 30:13–30:19cognition arises only occasionally because revival of the latent impression occurs only
302. 30:19–30:22Occasionally, no.
303. 30:22–30:29We then ask, is this revival assisted by some external factor or is it merely the maturation
304. 30:29–30:32of a series of similar impressions?
305. 30:32–30:38Under the first alternative, the original view that the latent impression alone produces
306. 30:38–30:43cognition of an unreal object cannot stand.
307. 30:43–30:49After the second, if maturation also depends upon the cooperation of something other than
308. 30:49–30:55the impression, the first alternative remains impossible as before.
309. 30:55–31:01If maturation depends only upon causes within its own series, the doctrine of the reality
310. 31:01–31:08of external objects falls into danger, because the differences among distinct cognitions
311. 31:08–31:15This could be explained solely by different maturations of internal impressions.
312. 31:15–31:20Cognitions of yellow, blue, and so forth could likewise be regarded as arising from the
313. 31:20–31:24maturation of different impressions.
314. 31:24–31:30If the second alternative to the initial question is accepted, namely, that the latent
315. 31:30–31:36impression is only one cause among several, the other causes besides the impression
316. 31:36–31:43must be named. Those causes will suffer from the same defect already shown in the case
317. 31:43–31:50of false perception and other erroneous cognitions. Refutation of the view that a conventional
318. 31:50–31:57relation between the expression, hairs horn and an unreal object can be known. It cannot
319. 31:57–32:04be known that expressions such as hairs horn are conventionally connected with unreal
320. 32:04–32:12objects. To make this clear, the hearer does not know the cognition of the person who establishes
321. 32:12–32:17the conventional meaning of the expression, hairs, horn, therefore the object of that
322. 32:17–32:26cognition is also unknown to the hearer. Consequently, the hearer cannot enter another person's
323. 32:26–32:32cognition, know the unreal object occurring there, and thereby learn the convention.
324. 32:32–32:39Nor is there any distinctive activity connected with an unreal object from which the unreal
325. 32:39–32:46object could first be inferred and its conventional relation with the word then known.
326. 32:46–32:51Nor can this convention be known from the statement of the person who establishes it,
327. 32:51–32:58as when a trustworthy person says, an object with a neck like a conch is called a pot,
328. 32:58–33:05the convention governing the word, pot becomes known. For the meanings of all the words used
329. 33:05–33:12by a person explaining the convention of hairs horn are themselves unknown, therefore those
330. 33:12–33:21words cannot assist in understanding the conventional meaning of expressions such as hairs horn.
331. 33:21–33:27Refutation of the view that convention can be known by some other means. Nor can
332. 33:27–33:33When it be said that when a speaker uses the expression, hairs horn, the convention becomes
333. 33:33–33:39known as the meaning intended by the speaker, since the speaker could not have used the
334. 33:39–33:42expression without some intention.
335. 33:42–33:49Knowledge of convention in this form is of no use for comprehending a sentence.
336. 33:49–33:55If it were useful, then on hearing the sentence, tie the cow, one could understand
337. 33:55–34:00the intended meaning of the whole sentence and thereby learn the designated meanings
338. 34:00–34:07of the individual words even without previously knowing them. Can it be said that the object
339. 34:07–34:14designated by Haier's horn is qualityless and merely imagined, and therefore its conventional
340. 34:14–34:21relation with the word is not difficult to know? If so, the expression Haier's horn
341. 34:21–34:30could equally be conventionally connected with a tortoise, a hare, a pot, or any other object.
342. 34:30–34:36Refutation of the view that word meaning is known through individual latent impressions.
343. 34:36–34:42Would it not be proper to suppose that every person who knows the meaning of hair's horn
344. 34:42–34:48receives a presentation of the unreal object through a distinct latent impression of his
345. 34:48–34:55own and thereby understands the relation between the expression and the unreal object?
346. 34:55–34:56No.
347. 34:56–35:02The speaker and hearer would then be unable to communicate with one another, and the meaning
348. 35:02–35:09of an expression for one person would not be the same as its meaning for another.
349. 35:09–35:15No one can communicate with another through a convention created for personal use without
350. 35:15–35:22first making that convention known and without actual usage or ostensive indication, one
351. 35:22–35:29cannot make one's private convention known to another. No practical use involving the
352. 35:29–35:37meaning of hair's horn is possible as it is in the statement, tie the cow. Noor is direct
353. 35:37–35:44ostention possible here as in this animal is a horse. In the statement agaial is
354. 35:44–35:50is like a cow, the similarity of one thing is attributed to another, no such indeterminate
355. 35:50–35:55attribution of similarity is possible here either.
356. 35:55–36:02Nor can semantic coordination with words of known meaning occur, as the meaning of be
357. 36:02–36:10becomes known in the sentence, a bee draws much honey from within a fully blossomed lotus.
358. 36:10–36:13Conclusion of the preceding arguments
359. 36:13–36:20For these reasons, cognition of such things as a hair's horn cannot be cognition of an
360. 36:20–36:22unreal object.
361. 36:22–36:26If it were, nothing would exist to produce that cognition.
362. 36:26–36:34Further, if each person apprehended a different meaning of hair's horn through his own latent
363. 36:34–36:41impression, his cognition of the unreal object, like the dream of a mute person, could not
364. 36:41–36:49be communicated to another. Therefore, all such cognitions are merely erroneous cognitions.
365. 36:49–36:58Even on their basis it cannot be accepted that unreal objects are subjects of negative discourse.
366. 36:58–37:05Or suppose cognition of an unreal object does occur, even then, the absence of successive
367. 37:05–37:11and simultaneous productivity in an enduring object cannot validly be established.
368. 37:12–37:15Examination of the nature of negation or absence.
369. 37:16–37:19Let us clarify, what is this absence?
370. 37:20–37:25Is it the non-presence of an object in something different from itself,
371. 37:25–37:31as a pot is different from the floor and therefore is not on the floor while it exists elsewhere?
372. 37:31–37:38hair or is an object's absence non-different from its substrate. According to the first
373. 37:38–37:45of these two accounts, the absence in a hair's horn of successive and simultaneous productivity
374. 37:45–37:52cannot be validly known in the same way that absence of a tree on a mountain peak is known.
375. 37:52–37:59A hair's horn devoid of successive and simultaneous productivity is not known by
376. 37:59–38:05any valid cognition. Refutation of the second account of absence.
377. 38:05–38:11Nor is the alleged non-difference between a hair's horn and the absence of successive
378. 38:11–38:17and simultaneous productivity a real thing because it is not known through any valid
379. 38:17–38:26cognition. But is the absence of a pot not also validly known? It is. The absence of
380. 38:26–38:33If a pot is validly known as an entity whose nature differs from all things other than the
381. 38:33–38:35pot.
382. 38:35–38:42If it were not known in this way, we would accept no valid discourse concerning it.
383. 38:42–38:49Refutation of the objection that absence can be a subject of discourse without valid cognition.
384. 38:49–38:56A Buddhist may say that absences of familiar things can become subjects of discourse even
385. 38:56–38:59without being validly known.
386. 38:59–39:06In his view, a pot is validly established as an object whose nature is the negation of
387. 39:06–39:14its own absence or exclusion, a pot is never known as identical with its absence.
388. 39:14–39:20For this very reason, the absence of a pot can also be established as the exclusion of
389. 39:20–39:26the pot, and there is no need to accept absence as independently real.
390. 39:26–39:30No, this view is unacceptable.
391. 39:30–39:36The nature of a pot cannot be identified with exclusion of its absence.
392. 39:36–39:43Moreover, when the nature of one object is established by valid proof, the nature
393. 39:43–39:50of another object is not thereby established through the same proof. If it were, any object
394. 39:50–39:54could be established by any proof.
395. 39:54–40:01Refutation of the objection that positive and negative entities are mutual exclusions. Can
396. 40:01–40:07it be said that a pot and the absence of a pot are such that the affirmation of one
397. 40:07–40:16is the negation of the other? No. If the absence of a pot, like the pot itself, is not regarded
398. 40:16–40:23as an entity validly established, the doctrine that objects possess determinate natures cannot
399. 40:23–40:31be applied to anything. Only after an object has been validly established does one attempt
400. 40:31–40:33to establish its nature.
401. 40:33–40:40Merely imagining a nature does not establish an object endowed with that nature.
402. 40:40–40:47Buddhists themselves have proudly proclaimed the truth of this principle many times.
403. 40:47–40:53Proof that both an object and its negation must be validly established.
404. 40:53–41:00Is it not validly known that a pot has the form of excluding its own absence?
405. 41:00–41:03On your own view this cannot be so.
406. 41:03–41:07Because Buddhists do not accept the reality of absence,
407. 41:07–41:14therefore a positive object cannot have the form of negating its own absence.
408. 41:14–41:20In fact, valid cognition establishes a pot as composite or atomic.
409. 41:20–41:27If the absence of a pot were real, the pot would be known as the absence of its own absence
410. 41:27–41:31and would be validly established in that form.
411. 41:31–41:34But you do not accept this.
412. 41:34–41:39Thus a pot and its absence can be established as having natures
413. 41:39–41:46that mutually exclude one another only when both are validly established.
414. 41:46–41:52If both are not established, mutual exclusion is not established either.
415. 41:52–41:58The same rule applies to unreal objects such as a hair's horn.
416. 41:58–42:06Refutation of the objection that imagined qualifications of a reason are sufficient for inference.
417. 42:06–42:14Suppose merely imagined presence of the required qualifications in a reason were sufficient for inference.
418. 42:14–42:25Then imagined absence of reality and momentariness in the unreal object discussed above would equally fulfill the purpose of inference.
419. 42:25–42:33No, this is impossible for imagined qualifications of this kind are available everywhere.
420. 42:33–42:41It may be objected that subject, similar instance and dissimilar instance are of two kinds.
421. 42:41–42:48Those constructed merely by imagination poses an imagined presence or absence of the reason,
422. 42:48–42:55whereas those presented by valid proof poses a validly established reason or its absence.
423. 42:55–43:00This is the only difference between the two kinds.
424. 43:00–43:05Thus, in the inference, this mountain has fire because it is noible,
425. 43:05–43:13The reason nobility may be imaginatively treated as absent in an imagined substrate lacking fire,
426. 43:13–43:20but in this inference the real absence of the reason is required in a real substrate lacking fire,
427. 43:20–43:24such as a lake, and it is not found there.
428. 43:24–43:29How then, can nobility be a valid reason?
429. 43:29–43:40Similarly, in the inference sound is impermanent because it is visible, if real sound is the subject, the real presence of the reason is required in the subject.
430. 43:40–43:48But the reason called visibility is not present in the subject, sound, how can it therefore be valid?
431. 43:48–43:55Likewise, in the inference sound is eternal because it is an artificial product, the real
432. 43:55–44:03presence in the subject of the reason artificiality, which concerns real entities alone, is required,
433. 44:03–44:09and its absence in entities outside the subject must also be real.
434. 44:09–44:16Negative invariable concomitance is not established through imagined qualifications.
435. 44:16–44:22In both preceding inferences, the real presence of the respective reason in the subject and
436. 44:22–44:27its real absence in the counter instance are unavailable.
437. 44:27–44:30How then could the reason be valid?
438. 44:30–44:35The opponent replies that these are meaningless statements.
439. 44:35–44:42It cannot be maintained that, without any regulator, imagination supplies the required
440. 44:42–44:48qualifications of a reason in an inference concerning an unreal subject, yet prevents
441. 44:48–44:55the lack of required qualifications in a valid reason within a valid inference.
442. 44:55–45:02Because imagination cannot be distinguished from reality, even real smoke used as a reason
443. 45:02–45:08to infer fire on a mountain could not establish fire, since the imagined presence of smoke
444. 45:08–45:13could be accepted in a fireless tortoise's hair.
445. 45:13–45:19Can it be said that when the necessary qualification is actually present in the reason, what harm
446. 45:19–45:23is caused by the imagined presence of a defect?
447. 45:23–45:30Yes, but then, in an inference concerning an unreal subject, when the necessary qualification
448. 45:30–45:37is actually absent from the reason, what benefit arises from imagining its presence?
449. 45:37–45:42It may be replied that the two cases are not alike.
450. 45:42–45:49In the first, smoke as a reason is real, while the substrate in which its absence is alleged,
451. 45:49–45:55a tortoise's hair is unreal, their natures are therefore incompatible.
452. 45:55–46:01In the second, both the hair's horn and the absence of successive or simultaneous
453. 46:01–46:09productivity are unreal, so there is no incompatibility between their natures. But is imagined
454. 46:09–46:16smoke also real, so that its nature is opposed to the unreal tortoises' hair? The answer
455. 46:16–46:24will be that the smoke present on the mountain is certainly real. Then the absence of smoke
456. 46:24–46:30present in water is also real and would be incompatible with the nature of a tortoise's
457. 46:30–46:38hair. This establishes that just as an imagined absence of a necessary qualification does not
458. 46:38–46:44create a fallacious reason, so an imagined presence of a necessary qualification in a
459. 46:44–46:52reason does not make an inference valid. Thus the stated negative invariable concomitance
460. 46:52–46:59is not established. Examination of a new proof of momentariness based on the necessity
461. 46:59–47:06of destruction. Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction establish that destruction is
462. 47:06–47:14costless and let its costlessness establish momentariness. No, this is impossible. None
463. 47:14–47:21of the various accounts of the necessity of destruction can be rationally defended. This
464. 47:21–47:26necessity may be understood in the following forms. Destruction is non-different from
465. 47:26–47:34From the destroyed object, destruction is unreal, destruction is produced by its counter positive,
466. 47:34–47:41destruction pervades its counter positive, or the very nature of destruction is non-existence.
467. 47:41–47:44The first alternative is untenable.
468. 47:44–47:50The destroyed object and its destruction cannot be treated as non-different.
469. 47:50–47:56If they were, the multiplicity of the world would disappear.
470. 47:56–48:03offered for the non-difference of destruction and the destroyed object and its refutation.
471. 48:03–48:10Is an object's incapacity to produce an effect at another time its very non-existence, and
472. 48:10–48:16is this nothing other than its nature as incapable with reference to that other time?
473. 48:16–48:18No.
474. 48:18–48:23Incapacity at another time or moment is itself momentariness.
475. 48:23–48:29Thus the Buddhist attempts to prove one unestablished doctrine, the non-difference of an object and
476. 48:29–48:35its destruction by another unestablished doctrine, momentariness.
477. 48:35–48:39Who could refute reasoning of such a kind?
478. 48:39–48:42The refutation continued.
479. 48:42–48:49If an object's non-existence at another place, and time is its own very nature, this would
480. 48:49–48:54amount to saying that the object is present at that place and time.
481. 48:54–49:01Alternatively, if the object's absence is not present at another place and time in the
482. 49:01–49:07same way that the object itself is not present there, the result would again be that the
483. 49:07–49:13object itself is present at that other place and time.
484. 49:13–49:18But can an object incapable of producing at a place and time different from its
485. 49:18–49:25own productive time exist at that place and time? Is existence not the same as productive
486. 49:25–49:34capacity? Yes, but what is this productive capacity? Is it, at its own time, incapacity
487. 49:34–49:40to produce an effect belonging to another time? Or is it incapacity at another time
488. 49:40–49:43to produce its own effect?
489. 49:43–49:50of the first of the two latter alternatives. Under the first alternative, the object would
490. 49:50–49:57be non-existent even at its own time, because even then it is admitted to be incapable of
491. 49:57–50:05producing an effect belonging to another time. Is it not that, because it is incapable of
492. 50:05–50:12producing an effect of another time, the object is unreal with respect to that effect?
493. 50:12–50:18But what magic formula allows a real object at its own time to be considered unreal with
494. 50:18–50:24respect to an effect of a time at which it cannot produce smoke.
495. 50:24–50:30For example, does not become non-existent with respect to a donkey merely because it does
496. 50:30–50:33not produce a donkey.
497. 50:33–50:34Why not?
498. 50:34–50:41Because mere incapacity to produce some effect does not deprive an object of its nature.
499. 50:41–50:44Refutation of the second alternative
500. 50:45–50:54Under the second alternative, if incapacity resides at a time different from the object's time, how can it be non-different from the object?
501. 50:55–51:09If it resides at the time when the object occurs, the object would be non-existent at its own time and existent at another, because the incapacity does not reside at that other time.
502. 51:09–51:17It is therefore established that an object possesses only a positive nature or existence,
503. 51:17–51:21non-existence is wholly different from this nature.
504. 51:21–51:28Why would a discerning person not feel ashamed upon hearing that existence and non-existence
505. 51:28–51:33are non-different and together constitute the nature of an object?
506. 51:33–51:38Refutation of the second explanation of the necessity of non-existence.
507. 51:38–51:47To Dharmakriti's statement, there is no non-existence or destruction different from an existent object,
508. 51:47–51:53one may at the qualification determinate, supplied by Prajakara, and formulate the view that
509. 51:53–52:00an object with a determinate nature has no non-existence distinct from itself.
510. 52:00–52:06But this is merely another expression of the doctrine of momentariness, which has
511. 52:06–52:13already been adequately criticized. It is like syrup that has run from the palm to the elbow
512. 52:13–52:20and can no longer be licked. Just as syrup on the elbow cannot be licked, it is improper
513. 52:20–52:27to raise again the repeatedly discussed subject of momentariness. Or suppose non-existence
514. 52:27–52:35is incapable and therefore indeterminate, what relation has this to its being costless?
515. 52:35–52:41One may answer, how can an entity in the form of absence be produced?
516. 52:41–52:48The reply is, in the same way that it exists within the limits of place and time.
517. 52:48–52:51But how is that possible?
518. 52:51–52:58The answer will be, otherwise the absence of a pot would exist nowhere and never or everywhere
519. 52:58–52:59and always.

Plain text

Refutation of the First Alternative The first alternative is untenable. If a causal object is capable of production in every place, it should produce everywhere. If it is incapable, it should produce nowhere. It may be objected that although causes have the same nature everywhere, they have acquired from their own causes the distinctive feature of producing the effect only at the place of the effect, and no question of subject or counter-instance can arise regarding this fact. Yes, this is possible. But why, then, do you Buddhists not understand precisely the same point, although causes have the same nature at all times, they produce the effect only when the aggregate of auxiliary causes is present, and they have acquired this distinctive feature from their own causes. Refutation of the second alternative. The second alternative is also untenable. If an object were regarded as unitary even though opposed properties were directly seen to coexist in it, the practice of distinguishing objects would become costless. Moreover, the reason called opposition, having thus deviated from the probandom, could not infer difference even after being qualified by time. Refutation of the third alternative. The third alternative is likewise untenable. If the defining mark of opposition is present in a substrate or object, even a thousand contrary proofs cannot remove that opposition. If no such mark exists, the nature of opposition must be examined. The opposition consists into things within one substrate excluding one another in such a way that affirming or denying one necessarily denies or affirms the other. No such opposition exists in the present case. Production at one place opposes non-production at that same place because affirmation of the former denies the latter. But production at one place does not oppose non-production at another because affirmation of the former does not negate the latter. Non-production of a particular object elsewhere or production of another object there is not the absence of that object's production at its own place. Its real non-production is the absence of production at its own place. If this is so, then in the case of production and non-production by one object at different times, the absence of this defining mark of opposition has almost already been established. You Buddhists should remember this point. Proposal of a second pair of inferences to establish the coexistence of opposed properties. Thus, even if the conditional inferences are admitted, they do not establish the coexistence of a post properties. But may the following affirmative inference be accepted, whatever produces a particular effect at any time necessarily produces it throughout its entire period of existence, just as a sound wave that is not immediately destroyed produces other sound waves throughout its existence? And may the following negative inference likewise be accepted, whatever does not produce a particular thing at some time never produces it, just as a stone never produces a sprout and a seed in a granary never produces a sprout? If these inferences are valid, we ask, do these proofs concern the class of objects or individual objects? Objection that the inferences are defective. Under the first alternative, that these inferences concern a class of objects, both are appreciated by a deviating reason, because there is no invariable concomitance between reason and probandom. Under the second, that they concern one particular individual, both are appreciated by an inconclusive reason. For a cause's complete failure to produce anything results from its total incapacity, while a capable causes necessary production results from its being joined with its auxiliary causes. Refutation of another pair of inferences. The preceding refutation also defeats another pair of inferences of this kind. Whatever is productive is something newly arisen, motion which produces separation as soon as it arises. And whatever is not productive immediately upon arising is never productive, like a piece of stone with respect to a sprout. Like the earlier pair, these inferences to suffer from deviating and inconclusive reasons. refutation of the third explanation of incompatibility. The third alternative is also incorrect. On that assumption, artificiality and impermanence and the like would have to be regarded as mutually opposed merely because they are different from each other. Objection that the aggregation of auxiliary causes is incompatible. Let it then be admitted that a causes conjunction and non conjunction with the same auxiliary cause are mutually incompatible. No, this too cannot be accepted, no rational alternative account of such incompatibility is possible. To clarify, the possible alternatives are these, the auxiliary cause and its absence, as mutually related terms, are opposed because each is the very negation of the other, an existing auxiliary object is opposed to its absence and therefore is not the counter positive of that absence or wherever an auxiliary cause is present at a given time, its absence exists nowhere at that time or the auxiliary cause and its absence do not coexist in the same place or the two do not occur in the same place and time or finally both are not present at the same time in relation to one and the same region of space. Refutation of the various forms of incompatibility. The first form is untenable because we do not accept that one positive entity is the negation of another positive entity. The second is also untenable because we reject the doctrine that an effect exists eternally. The third is incorrect because only an object's prior absence and posterior absence are not regarded as contemporaneous with it, its absolute absence or mutual absence can coexist with it. The fourth is also untenable. It would be possible only if the necessary coexistence of conjoined or related objects were established, but it is not. If this necessary coexistence were proved on the basis of incompatibility between an object and its absence, mutual dependence would result, coexistence would be established after incompatibility was established, while incompatibility would be established after necessary coexistence was proved through the argument for momentariness based on the difference of each auxiliary. No other proof of this necessity exists. Moreover, conjunction and non-conjunction of auxiliary causes arise from the presence or absence of their respective efficient causes, and these efficient causes are available only on particular occasion. Incompatibility is not established even indirectly by saying that an object is destroyed by by its own nature or requires no other cause to destroy it, because this assertion is itself unproved. Whether destruction of objects is necessary will be discussed later. The fifth alternative is also untenable, because we never maintain that the same auxiliary cause is both present and absent in the same place and at the same time. based on the non-pervasive occurrence of aggregation and its refutation. It may be said that Nya-Vaika philosophers regard aggregation as a property caused by the conjunction of auxiliary causes different from them and occurring non-pervasively, then one object, though existing at one place and time, may fail to occur in some of its parts. On the other hand, if aggregation is non-different from the things constituting it, then for one who accepts persistence, separately existing causes such as seed, water, earth, and heat would, in their combined state, remain non-different from those same things, consequently, each cause should produce the combined effect, the sprout. Further, if aggregation were pervasive, a cloth red only in one part should appear wholly red, and a sound produced at one place should spread throughout all space. It is therefore proper to regard conjoined things as different from those same things in their unconjoined state. A pot, for example, is a group of conjoined atoms and is wholly different from those atoms in their separate state. But the facts are not so. Even in the case of momentary atoms, the inconsistency stated above cannot be avoided. Suppose, according to the Buddhist view, that an atom arising on the east is covered by another atom situated on the west. The question is, is it also covered on the east, not covered, For both covered and uncovered, under the first alternative, the atom would be invisible on both east and west. Under the second, it would be visible in both directions. Under the third, the same difficulty of inconsistency reappears because one and the same atom would have to be regarded as both covered and uncovered by the same object. Reply to the view that a conjoined object differs from the separate objects. Can the inconsistency concerning atoms just stated not be removed by some other means, such as accepting different determinants of conjunction and non-conjunction? It can, but what is that means? It is the acceptance of different determinants. Inconsistency would arise if an atom conjoined with Another atom in a certain direction were also disjoint from it in that very direction but that is not the case here. Very well if the same principle is accepted regarding conjunction and conjoined objects where does any defect remain? In this way the negative invariable concomitance dependent upon positive invariable concomitance is also refuted. A special defect in negative invariable concomitance based on unreal terms. An additional defect in establishing negative invariable concomitance is that there is no valid proof for accepting the reality of subject, reason and example. No means of valid cognition can have an unreal object if it could, its object would no longer be unreal. But if an unreal object cannot become the subject of any statement or practice, does not the opponent who states this generate a self-contradiction in his own utterance? He does. Yet one may reply by asking, does exposing self-contradiction in the opponent's statement provide any valid proof of an unreal object? Or is the denial that meaningful discourse about an unreal object is possible itself being denied? Or, finally, must it be admitted that meaningless discourse about unreal objects is necessarily to be accepted? A negative answer to the first question, and an affirmative answer to the second. The answer to the first question is no. Even if the Buddhist position contains a thousand self-contradictions, no valid perception or inference can establish the reality of an enduring object, its failure to produce successively or simultaneously, or the reality of the hairs horn used as an example in the inference. If such proof could be offered, there would be no occasion for fruitless debate on the matter. During the second question, trustworthy persons hold that even the statement denying discourse about unreal objects is improper. This view naturally leads to silence. What else can be done in such circumstances? Where a statement is wholly irrational, silence is best. Buddhists too should consider whether, during discussion of an unintelligible matter, it It is better to remain mute or to continue speaking. Reply to the objection that the opponent did not remain silent on this matter. But although you, the opponent, knew that this course about unreal objects is impossible, you did not remain silent, you expressly denied that this course about unreal objects is possible. What is the answer? Yes, this is true. But just as you Buddhists discuss unreal objects in order to prevent acceptance of a view contrary to your own statement, so we non-Buddhists, while searching for a proof of momentariness, engage in discussion that is self-contradictory and therefore invalid. Its sole purpose is to prevent irrational assertions concerning unreal objects. If you view both kinds of statement impartially, we too shall say nothing against you. Refutation of the Third Alternative Regarding the Third Alternative, the Buddhist should be asked, who established the rule that irrational conduct or assertion must necessarily be accepted? Is it because such usage is firmly established? No irrationality and firm establishment cannot coexist. Can such usage somehow become established through ignorance or error? No. If it in the other two forms of debate called Jalpa and Vita, the Buddhists' opponent need only examine the proof for the Buddhists' claims, in these forms of debate the opponent is not concerned to present opposition of his own. He therefore cannot be charged with self-contradiction in his statements. The Buddhist cannot answer his opponent's demand with a rational statement for such an attempt would go against him. If he relies only on irrational statements in order to answer, he proves himself guilty by his own mouth because he thereby admits that the view he advances is irrational or unsupported. If he gives no answer and remains silent, he incurs the fault of ignorance. Discourse about unreal objects is self-contradictory. If merely accepting such discourse could remove self-contradiction, it might be accepted, but it cannot. The statements, an unreal object is is not the subject of any kind of discourse and it is the subject of negative discourse are not mutually consistent. Objection to the preceding view and its answer. But where would the self-contradiction remain if unreal objects were held to be beyond the reach only of affirmative statement or practice? No, this solution is impossible. One would then ask, is there or is there not something said to lie wholly beyond both affirmative and negative discourse? Either possible answer to this question generates self-contradiction within itself. In either case, the subject of discourse would necessarily be unreal, because a real object cannot lie beyond the reach of all discourse. Apply to the objection that negative discourse about an unreal object is proper. If an unreal object can be the subject of negative discourse, why can it not be the subject of affirmative discourse? A rational basis for discourse is equally absent in both cases. But is the absence of the power of speech in the son of a barren woman not established by his insentions even though his power of speech cannot be established by any reason? No. Sun Hood 2 is present in the son of a barren woman and on that basis his power of speech may be established. After all, it is not that the son of a barren woman is no son. If it were, your own statement about him would become self-contradictory. Can it not be said that the statement is simply meaningless, and that the son of a barren woman is not really a son? No, then, insentions to would not be a property of the son of a barren woman. Incentions is spoken of as a positive property distinct from consciousness, and such a property cannot reside in an unreal object. Could the word be understood merely as the denial of consciousness, and must this denial be accepted as present in the son of a barren woman? No. In another context, the word son could equally be understood merely as denial of non-sonhood, and that denial could be accepted as present in the son of a barren woman in precisely the same way. Reply to the objection that properties may be imputed to an unreal object. The mere denial of non-sunhood has no capacity to produce an action or cognition. If it contains within itself no effective and recognizable property, how can it serve as the reason in an inference? well, precisely the same criticism applies, when insentience is made the reason. Can it be said that among negative entities only that can function as a reason whose negation is affected by objects different from it, for example, a so-cutriness is negated by everything except an aso-cutry, whereas the son of a barren woman is negated both by nonsense such as pots and by sons such as devdatta and therefore cannot function as a reason. Very well, the insentions of a barren woman's son is of exactly the same kind. The son of a barren woman is excluded just as much by conscious persons such as devdatta as by insentions, thumps, thorns and the light. The refutation of the view that a false cognition of the absence of speech power is possible in an unreal object. Is it not possible to have merely an illusory cognition of the absence of speech power separated from any real object so that the cognition the son of a barren woman is a speaker may arise? Yes, it is possible, but then who can deny an equally illusory cognition of an unreal object end out with speech power, that too must be regarded as possible. But speech power is agency in the act of speaking, how can this reside in an unreal object wholly devoid of capacity? Very well, but then how can absence of speech power reside in an unreal object when it is treated in the same manner as agency in acts other than speaking? Is the absence of the capacity to speak not compatible with the absence of all capacity, and can it therefore reside in an unreal object? We then ask, by what valid proof is it established that the son of a barren woman lacks all capacity? If the answer is from his unreality, we ask again, How is his unreality established? The answer will be, from his lack of all capacity. Clearly, this Buddhist disputant behaves like an insolvent deptor who repeatedly evades repaying his honorable creditors. The Buddhist likewise continues to argue in circles, failing to understand that the fault of mutual dependence contaminates his entire reasoning. Another subsidiary objection and its refutation. Is the absence of all capacity in an unreal object not established by its inability to produce either successively or simultaneously? No. Even if this incapacity of the unreal object were established, the reasoning would not stop there, through intervening inferences it would advance and then circle back to the same incapacity. Moreover, by the positive reason called sunhood, we could establish at once the unreal objects power of speech, successive and simultaneous productivity, reality and so forth. There would then be no occasion to establish that it lacks successive or simultaneous productivity. And if this absence is not established, how could its unreality be proved? Without such proof, the possibility of establishing the absence of speech power in an unreal object is exceedingly slight. It must therefore be admitted that all discourse is regulated by valid grounds. When those grounds are violated, only disorder results. An example of the disorder produced by irrational statements. If Dev Dutta has not been seen, no one can ask without shamelessness whether he is fair or dark. Even if someone asks such a question, and listener answers, he is not fair without determining who the referent of the pronoun he is, another person may equally say, he is not dark. Nothing would be known from such statements, because lack of proof and mutual contradiction are equally present in both answers. Examination and refutation of the The objection that discourse is determined merely by cognition. Is it only that which is unknowable that cannot become the subject of a statement or discourse? Cognitions of things such as a tortoise's hair, although false, certainly occur. A cognition in the form of a tortoise's hair cannot arise without apprehending some particular object. Is there a rule that only what is validly knowable can be spoken of? No, this is improper. We ask, is the cognition this is a hair's horn an erroneous cognition, or a cognition of an absent object? The first alternative does not favor you. If it were true, there would be one object in which the error occurs and another object as which it is mistakenly taken. The substrate of the error would then exist at the place where the cognition arose, while that as which it was taken would exist elsewhere. In this way the Nya position becomes predominant. The second alternative cannot be maintained either. There would be no cause capable of producing cognition of an unreal object. a sense organ produces cognition of its object only with the necessary cooperation of that object. A defective inference or fallacious reason and a false sentence, produce only erroneous cognition of their respective objects. If these means produced cognition of something that was not their object, expressions such as hair's horn would also produce cognition of a tortoise's hair and the like, because there would then be nothing to regulate the meaning of a word. Account and examination of what regulates word meaning. The principle regulating or determining the meaning of a word is either linguistic convention or the word's own natural power. The first alternative is unacceptable in the case of the expression hairs horn, simply because the object with which the convention is supposed to be established is utterly unknowable. If knowledge of the convention must precede knowledge of the object through the word, while knowledge of the convention itself depends upon knowing the designated object, circularity results, knowledge of the object follows knowledge of the convention, And knowledge of the convention follows knowledge of the designated object. If the meaning of the whole expression, here's Horn depends only upon knowledge of the meanings of its components, Hare, and Horn, those separate meanings cannot be ignored. It must be admitted that the distinct meanings of both words appear jointly in the meaning of the whole expression. Then its meaning reduces merely to an error in which one thing is taken as another. If the component words do not contribute their respective meanings to the whole expression, there will be no rule of meaning, a word will also convey objects with which it has no conventional relation. If the words own nature is held to regulate its meaning, an untrained person, just like one trained in linguistic usage should understand the correct meaning immediately upon hearing the word. Examination and refutation of the view that latent impressions regulate word meaning. Do certain extraordinary latent impressions regulate the meaning of words? If so, one must ask, is the latent impression alone the cause of cognition of an unreal object or does something else cooperate with it? The first alternative is impossible otherwise because the impression remains continuously present, cognitions of a hare's horn and the like would arise perpetually since no other cause would be required. Can it be said that cognition arises only occasionally because revival of the latent impression occurs only Occasionally, no. We then ask, is this revival assisted by some external factor or is it merely the maturation of a series of similar impressions? Under the first alternative, the original view that the latent impression alone produces cognition of an unreal object cannot stand. After the second, if maturation also depends upon the cooperation of something other than the impression, the first alternative remains impossible as before. If maturation depends only upon causes within its own series, the doctrine of the reality of external objects falls into danger, because the differences among distinct cognitions This could be explained solely by different maturations of internal impressions. Cognitions of yellow, blue, and so forth could likewise be regarded as arising from the maturation of different impressions. If the second alternative to the initial question is accepted, namely, that the latent impression is only one cause among several, the other causes besides the impression must be named. Those causes will suffer from the same defect already shown in the case of false perception and other erroneous cognitions. Refutation of the view that a conventional relation between the expression, hairs horn and an unreal object can be known. It cannot be known that expressions such as hairs horn are conventionally connected with unreal objects. To make this clear, the hearer does not know the cognition of the person who establishes the conventional meaning of the expression, hairs, horn, therefore the object of that cognition is also unknown to the hearer. Consequently, the hearer cannot enter another person's cognition, know the unreal object occurring there, and thereby learn the convention. Nor is there any distinctive activity connected with an unreal object from which the unreal object could first be inferred and its conventional relation with the word then known. Nor can this convention be known from the statement of the person who establishes it, as when a trustworthy person says, an object with a neck like a conch is called a pot, the convention governing the word, pot becomes known. For the meanings of all the words used by a person explaining the convention of hairs horn are themselves unknown, therefore those words cannot assist in understanding the conventional meaning of expressions such as hairs horn. Refutation of the view that convention can be known by some other means. Nor can When it be said that when a speaker uses the expression, hairs horn, the convention becomes known as the meaning intended by the speaker, since the speaker could not have used the expression without some intention. Knowledge of convention in this form is of no use for comprehending a sentence. If it were useful, then on hearing the sentence, tie the cow, one could understand the intended meaning of the whole sentence and thereby learn the designated meanings of the individual words even without previously knowing them. Can it be said that the object designated by Haier's horn is qualityless and merely imagined, and therefore its conventional relation with the word is not difficult to know? If so, the expression Haier's horn could equally be conventionally connected with a tortoise, a hare, a pot, or any other object. Refutation of the view that word meaning is known through individual latent impressions. Would it not be proper to suppose that every person who knows the meaning of hair's horn receives a presentation of the unreal object through a distinct latent impression of his own and thereby understands the relation between the expression and the unreal object? No. The speaker and hearer would then be unable to communicate with one another, and the meaning of an expression for one person would not be the same as its meaning for another. No one can communicate with another through a convention created for personal use without first making that convention known and without actual usage or ostensive indication, one cannot make one's private convention known to another. No practical use involving the meaning of hair's horn is possible as it is in the statement, tie the cow. Noor is direct ostention possible here as in this animal is a horse. In the statement agaial is is like a cow, the similarity of one thing is attributed to another, no such indeterminate attribution of similarity is possible here either. Nor can semantic coordination with words of known meaning occur, as the meaning of be becomes known in the sentence, a bee draws much honey from within a fully blossomed lotus. Conclusion of the preceding arguments For these reasons, cognition of such things as a hair's horn cannot be cognition of an unreal object. If it were, nothing would exist to produce that cognition. Further, if each person apprehended a different meaning of hair's horn through his own latent impression, his cognition of the unreal object, like the dream of a mute person, could not be communicated to another. Therefore, all such cognitions are merely erroneous cognitions. Even on their basis it cannot be accepted that unreal objects are subjects of negative discourse. Or suppose cognition of an unreal object does occur, even then, the absence of successive and simultaneous productivity in an enduring object cannot validly be established. Examination of the nature of negation or absence. Let us clarify, what is this absence? Is it the non-presence of an object in something different from itself, as a pot is different from the floor and therefore is not on the floor while it exists elsewhere? hair or is an object's absence non-different from its substrate. According to the first of these two accounts, the absence in a hair's horn of successive and simultaneous productivity cannot be validly known in the same way that absence of a tree on a mountain peak is known. A hair's horn devoid of successive and simultaneous productivity is not known by any valid cognition. Refutation of the second account of absence. Nor is the alleged non-difference between a hair's horn and the absence of successive and simultaneous productivity a real thing because it is not known through any valid cognition. But is the absence of a pot not also validly known? It is. The absence of If a pot is validly known as an entity whose nature differs from all things other than the pot. If it were not known in this way, we would accept no valid discourse concerning it. Refutation of the objection that absence can be a subject of discourse without valid cognition. A Buddhist may say that absences of familiar things can become subjects of discourse even without being validly known. In his view, a pot is validly established as an object whose nature is the negation of its own absence or exclusion, a pot is never known as identical with its absence. For this very reason, the absence of a pot can also be established as the exclusion of the pot, and there is no need to accept absence as independently real. No, this view is unacceptable. The nature of a pot cannot be identified with exclusion of its absence. Moreover, when the nature of one object is established by valid proof, the nature of another object is not thereby established through the same proof. If it were, any object could be established by any proof. Refutation of the objection that positive and negative entities are mutual exclusions. Can it be said that a pot and the absence of a pot are such that the affirmation of one is the negation of the other? No. If the absence of a pot, like the pot itself, is not regarded as an entity validly established, the doctrine that objects possess determinate natures cannot be applied to anything. Only after an object has been validly established does one attempt to establish its nature. Merely imagining a nature does not establish an object endowed with that nature. Buddhists themselves have proudly proclaimed the truth of this principle many times. Proof that both an object and its negation must be validly established. Is it not validly known that a pot has the form of excluding its own absence? On your own view this cannot be so. Because Buddhists do not accept the reality of absence, therefore a positive object cannot have the form of negating its own absence. In fact, valid cognition establishes a pot as composite or atomic. If the absence of a pot were real, the pot would be known as the absence of its own absence and would be validly established in that form. But you do not accept this. Thus a pot and its absence can be established as having natures that mutually exclude one another only when both are validly established. If both are not established, mutual exclusion is not established either. The same rule applies to unreal objects such as a hair's horn. Refutation of the objection that imagined qualifications of a reason are sufficient for inference. Suppose merely imagined presence of the required qualifications in a reason were sufficient for inference. Then imagined absence of reality and momentariness in the unreal object discussed above would equally fulfill the purpose of inference. No, this is impossible for imagined qualifications of this kind are available everywhere. It may be objected that subject, similar instance and dissimilar instance are of two kinds. Those constructed merely by imagination poses an imagined presence or absence of the reason, whereas those presented by valid proof poses a validly established reason or its absence. This is the only difference between the two kinds. Thus, in the inference, this mountain has fire because it is noible, The reason nobility may be imaginatively treated as absent in an imagined substrate lacking fire, but in this inference the real absence of the reason is required in a real substrate lacking fire, such as a lake, and it is not found there. How then, can nobility be a valid reason? Similarly, in the inference sound is impermanent because it is visible, if real sound is the subject, the real presence of the reason is required in the subject. But the reason called visibility is not present in the subject, sound, how can it therefore be valid? Likewise, in the inference sound is eternal because it is an artificial product, the real presence in the subject of the reason artificiality, which concerns real entities alone, is required, and its absence in entities outside the subject must also be real. Negative invariable concomitance is not established through imagined qualifications. In both preceding inferences, the real presence of the respective reason in the subject and its real absence in the counter instance are unavailable. How then could the reason be valid? The opponent replies that these are meaningless statements. It cannot be maintained that, without any regulator, imagination supplies the required qualifications of a reason in an inference concerning an unreal subject, yet prevents the lack of required qualifications in a valid reason within a valid inference. Because imagination cannot be distinguished from reality, even real smoke used as a reason to infer fire on a mountain could not establish fire, since the imagined presence of smoke could be accepted in a fireless tortoise's hair. Can it be said that when the necessary qualification is actually present in the reason, what harm is caused by the imagined presence of a defect? Yes, but then, in an inference concerning an unreal subject, when the necessary qualification is actually absent from the reason, what benefit arises from imagining its presence? It may be replied that the two cases are not alike. In the first, smoke as a reason is real, while the substrate in which its absence is alleged, a tortoise's hair is unreal, their natures are therefore incompatible. In the second, both the hair's horn and the absence of successive or simultaneous productivity are unreal, so there is no incompatibility between their natures. But is imagined smoke also real, so that its nature is opposed to the unreal tortoises' hair? The answer will be that the smoke present on the mountain is certainly real. Then the absence of smoke present in water is also real and would be incompatible with the nature of a tortoise's hair. This establishes that just as an imagined absence of a necessary qualification does not create a fallacious reason, so an imagined presence of a necessary qualification in a reason does not make an inference valid. Thus the stated negative invariable concomitance is not established. Examination of a new proof of momentariness based on the necessity of destruction. Then let the necessary occurrence of destruction establish that destruction is costless and let its costlessness establish momentariness. No, this is impossible. None of the various accounts of the necessity of destruction can be rationally defended. This necessity may be understood in the following forms. Destruction is non-different from From the destroyed object, destruction is unreal, destruction is produced by its counter positive, destruction pervades its counter positive, or the very nature of destruction is non-existence. The first alternative is untenable. The destroyed object and its destruction cannot be treated as non-different. If they were, the multiplicity of the world would disappear. offered for the non-difference of destruction and the destroyed object and its refutation. Is an object's incapacity to produce an effect at another time its very non-existence, and is this nothing other than its nature as incapable with reference to that other time? No. Incapacity at another time or moment is itself momentariness. Thus the Buddhist attempts to prove one unestablished doctrine, the non-difference of an object and its destruction by another unestablished doctrine, momentariness. Who could refute reasoning of such a kind? The refutation continued. If an object's non-existence at another place, and time is its own very nature, this would amount to saying that the object is present at that place and time. Alternatively, if the object's absence is not present at another place and time in the same way that the object itself is not present there, the result would again be that the object itself is present at that other place and time. But can an object incapable of producing at a place and time different from its own productive time exist at that place and time? Is existence not the same as productive capacity? Yes, but what is this productive capacity? Is it, at its own time, incapacity to produce an effect belonging to another time? Or is it incapacity at another time to produce its own effect? of the first of the two latter alternatives. Under the first alternative, the object would be non-existent even at its own time, because even then it is admitted to be incapable of producing an effect belonging to another time. Is it not that, because it is incapable of producing an effect of another time, the object is unreal with respect to that effect? But what magic formula allows a real object at its own time to be considered unreal with respect to an effect of a time at which it cannot produce smoke. For example, does not become non-existent with respect to a donkey merely because it does not produce a donkey. Why not? Because mere incapacity to produce some effect does not deprive an object of its nature. Refutation of the second alternative Under the second alternative, if incapacity resides at a time different from the object's time, how can it be non-different from the object? If it resides at the time when the object occurs, the object would be non-existent at its own time and existent at another, because the incapacity does not reside at that other time. It is therefore established that an object possesses only a positive nature or existence, non-existence is wholly different from this nature. Why would a discerning person not feel ashamed upon hearing that existence and non-existence are non-different and together constitute the nature of an object? Refutation of the second explanation of the necessity of non-existence. To Dharmakriti's statement, there is no non-existence or destruction different from an existent object, one may at the qualification determinate, supplied by Prajakara, and formulate the view that an object with a determinate nature has no non-existence distinct from itself. But this is merely another expression of the doctrine of momentariness, which has already been adequately criticized. It is like syrup that has run from the palm to the elbow and can no longer be licked. Just as syrup on the elbow cannot be licked, it is improper to raise again the repeatedly discussed subject of momentariness. Or suppose non-existence is incapable and therefore indeterminate, what relation has this to its being costless? One may answer, how can an entity in the form of absence be produced? The reply is, in the same way that it exists within the limits of place and time. But how is that possible? The answer will be, otherwise the absence of a pot would exist nowhere and never or everywhere and always.

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