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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.998597)

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23:14

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1. 0:02–0:08Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the pro-bandom.
2. 0:08–0:1740. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a pro-bandom to be established by the reason being Mitra's son.
3. 0:17–0:26If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be pro-banda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise.
4. 0:26–0:32The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as pro-banda.
5. 0:32–0:44In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire.
6. 0:45–0:57But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition.
7. 0:57–1:01Doubtful extraneous condition
8. 1:01–1:0841. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous
9. 1:08–1:13condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable
10. 1:13–1:18consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection
11. 1:18–1:23is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces
12. 1:23–1:28doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom, a certain extraneous condition produces acetamin
13. 1:28–1:31of deviation.
14. 1:31–1:37Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
15. 1:37–1:4342, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered.
16. 1:43–1:47An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground
17. 1:47–1:51that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom,
18. 1:51–1:56Otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended
19. 1:56–2:02by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons.
20. 2:02–2:06Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength.
21. 2:06–2:0743.
22. 2:07–2:11It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason
23. 2:11–2:14has greater strength.
24. 2:14–2:18Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single
25. 2:18–2:22reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many
26. 2:22–2:26reasons free from such a condition.
27. 2:26–2:30Provision and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not
28. 2:30–2:37strength, because inference arises from a single perversion and a single subject propertyhood.
29. 2:37–2:42Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition.
30. 2:42–2:4344.
31. 2:43–2:47If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness
32. 2:47–2:51produced by cognition of the absence of the probandom would not remain an extraneous
33. 2:51–2:56condition because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reason's presence
34. 2:56–3:03in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous
35. 3:03–3:09condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition
36. 3:09–3:17produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment
37. 3:17–3:19of perversion.
38. 3:19–3:2445. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, it does not
39. 3:24–3:29pervade what pervades the probandom, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition
40. 3:29–3:34of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded
41. 3:34–3:38does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not
42. 3:38–3:43arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous
43. 3:43–3:47condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it does not on that ground alone
44. 3:47–3:52for within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons.
45. 3:52–3:56Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject.
46. 3:56–3:5846.
47. 3:58–4:01It is not the case that cognition of the reasons pervasion cannot arise while there
48. 4:01–4:07is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by something that pervades the probandom.
49. 4:07–4:11Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates
50. 4:11–4:13from the probandom.
51. 4:13–4:18Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition
52. 4:18–4:24of perversion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom.
53. 4:24–4:30Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason.
54. 4:30–4:3747, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation.
55. 4:37–4:41Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous
56. 4:41–4:46This condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandum.
57. 4:46–4:51The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same.
58. 4:51–4:55Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason
59. 4:55–5:00is pervaded by the probandum, therefore the defect of having a different subject does
60. 5:00–5:02not arise.
61. 5:02–5:09An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason.
62. 5:09–5:13conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
63. 5:16–5:21If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished
64. 5:21–5:25reason or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted.
65. 5:26–5:31Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion
66. 5:31–5:36of the probandom. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon
67. 5:36–5:42ascertainment that it pervades the probandom and fails to pervade the reason.
68. 5:42–5:49Alternative view. 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the
69. 5:49–5:54probandom and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that
70. 5:54–5:59the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent.
71. 5:59–6:03The objection is untenable but, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus
72. 6:03–6:07is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would
73. 6:07–6:12be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded
74. 6:12–6:16as an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous
75. 6:16–6:21conditions although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the
76. 6:21–6:25like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would
77. 6:25–6:28eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade
78. 6:28–6:33the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring
79. 6:33–6:37in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason.
80. 6:37–6:41Thus the established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous
81. 6:41–6:45condition comes to an end.
82. 6:45–6:47Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions
83. 6:47–6:5050.
84. 6:50–6:54Apparent extraneous conditions are now described.
85. 6:54–6:58The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
86. 6:58–7:03In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness,
87. 7:03–7:07is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom, is
88. 7:07–7:13an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is
89. 7:13–7:18an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference
90. 7:18–7:23with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness, and the like are extraneous conditions
91. 7:23–7:29of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition
92. 7:29–7:36is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandum. For example, in fire is hot
93. 7:36–7:41because it is luminous, being non-artificial is an apparent extraneous condition of a sublated
94. 7:41–7:47absence of the probandum. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition
95. 7:47–7:53of an absence of the probandum that does not pervade the subject. In earth has a beginning
96. 7:53–7:58because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous
97. 7:58–8:02condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend throughout the entire subject.
98. 8:04–8:09The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence
99. 8:09–8:15of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper
100. 8:15–8:19to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition,
101. 8:19–8:24because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of
102. 8:24–8:28alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent.
103. 8:30–8:35The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason.
104. 8:36–8:41In an inference of being without an agent, eternality and the like are apparent extraneous
105. 8:41–8:47conditions of this kind. The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition
106. 8:47–8:51consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance.
107. 8:51–8:57In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a
108. 8:57–9:04reservoir is in apparent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the
109. 9:04–9:09presence of the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference
110. 9:09–9:14of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire in a locus distinct from the mountain
111. 9:14–9:20is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to
112. 9:20–9:25a property possessing the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject.
113. 9:26–9:31In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct
114. 9:31–9:37from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition
115. 9:37–9:43is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions,
116. 9:43–9:47these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference.
117. 9:47–9:54With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end.
118. 9:56–10:01Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject.
119. 10:01–10:10Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood, is now described.
120. 10:11–10:15Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandum.
121. 10:15–10:22Probandom. Possession of a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood.
122. 10:24–10:292. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood.
123. 10:30–10:34Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference,
124. 10:34–10:38because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion,
125. 10:38–10:43but before subsumptive reflection arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased.
126. 10:43–10:50If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal coexistence,
127. 10:50–10:57it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained.
128. 10:57–11:03The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood.
129. 11:03–11:10The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood.
130. 11:10–11:17The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary.
131. 11:17–11:24Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as,
132. 11:24–11:31there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference.
133. 11:31–11:35Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood.
134. 11:35–11:40The Vedic statement, the Self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object
135. 11:40–11:44known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred.
136. 11:44–11:49The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another.
137. 11:49–11:54The bearer of a probandam desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish
138. 11:54–11:59it is subjecthood, the earlier view.
139. 11:59–12:03The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandam one wishes
140. 12:03–12:10to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandom is subjecthood.
141. 12:10–12:14A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the
142. 12:14–12:20self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible.
143. 12:20–12:23But Kasperty Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference
144. 12:23–12:27an object already known, and, one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it
145. 12:27–12:33from its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire.
146. 12:33–12:39Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view.
147. 12:39–12:42This proposal is unacceptable.
148. 12:42–12:47Like doubt about the probandom, the desire to establish it need not remain present before
149. 12:47–12:52the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark.
150. 12:52–12:56The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined.
151. 12:56–13:00A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the
152. 13:00–13:01cloud.
153. 13:01–13:05unfavorable object 2 is inferred through the force of the third substantive reflection.
154. 13:06–13:09Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference.
155. 13:10–13:13With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end.
156. 13:15–13:20Established conclusion, the entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together
157. 13:20–13:23with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject.
158. 13:26–13:31The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent
159. 13:31–13:35together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject.
160. 13:36–13:42But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject.
161. 13:44–13:48In there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state
162. 13:48–13:52consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the
163. 13:52–13:58absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been
164. 13:58–14:01established is not the subject.
165. 14:01–14:06Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing
166. 14:06–14:11evidence or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through
167. 14:11–14:15a qualified absence.
168. 14:15–14:19Subjecthood through a qualified absence.
169. 14:19–14:23When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence
170. 14:23–14:28of establishing evidence or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is
171. 14:28–14:35admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by scripture,
172. 14:35–14:40the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand
173. 14:40–14:46in the form of ascertainment of the probandom is absent. Therefore the definition is not under
174. 14:46–14:55extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative
175. 14:55–15:01and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the
176. 15:01–15:09ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end.
177. 15:10–15:18Prima-facy account of subsumptive reflection. Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified
178. 15:18–15:23cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandom, is present in the
179. 15:23–15:28subject is the extraordinary cause of inference.
180. 15:28–15:33Misaka Prima facei dhu, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood are
181. 15:33–15:38causes, not subsumptive reflection.
182. 15:38–15:42The Misaka say that recollection of pervasion and cognition that the reason is present in
183. 15:42–15:47the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference.
184. 15:47–15:52There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection.
185. 15:52–15:56The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the
186. 15:56–16:01combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain.
187. 16:02–16:07These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy,
188. 16:07–16:10subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause.
189. 16:12–16:16It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference,
190. 16:16–16:20if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise.
191. 16:22–16:25Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference.
192. 16:25–16:32It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition
193. 16:32–16:37arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition
194. 16:37–16:40becomes the cause of inference.
195. 16:40–16:43But this proposal is untenable.
196. 16:43–16:48The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference
197. 16:48–16:51arises, while recognition is not inevitable.
198. 16:51–16:55If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of pervasion would again
199. 16:55–16:58be required after it, leading to infinite regress.
200. 17:00–17:04Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference.
201. 17:07–17:11For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain,
202. 17:11–17:13is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference.
203. 17:14–17:18But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact,
204. 17:18–17:20whereas inference remains possible.
205. 17:21–17:25Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered,
206. 17:25–17:30mere cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference,
207. 17:30–17:33otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow.
208. 17:35–17:38The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects.
209. 17:39–17:43Five, it may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses,
210. 17:43–17:48produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or,
211. 17:48–17:52is an atom the substratum of color or not. Because recollection of opposing alternatives
212. 17:52–17:57and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes.
213. 17:57–18:01Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind,
214. 18:01–18:04it also produces dream experience of external objects.
215. 18:04–18:09Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection
216. 18:09–18:13of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the substantive
217. 18:13–18:18reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
218. 18:18–18:20But this objection is untenable.
219. 18:20–18:25generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the
220. 18:25–18:31mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials
221. 18:31–18:35of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be
222. 18:35–18:39available even in the absence of sense-contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind
223. 18:39–18:43as an independent means of external perception.
224. 18:43–18:47Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view.
225. 18:47–18:536. The objection arises when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application
226. 18:53–18:58of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible?
227. 18:58–19:01The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood,
228. 19:01–19:04is regarded as pervaded by fire.
229. 19:04–19:09According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire,
230. 19:09–19:13and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable.
231. 19:13–19:16Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion
232. 19:16–19:21in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition,
233. 19:21–19:24inference is impossible.
234. 19:24–19:29Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the
235. 19:29–19:33mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke
236. 19:33–19:39is pervaded by fire or not. How, then, does inference arise?
237. 19:39–19:43The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present,
238. 19:43–19:47The determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt.
239. 19:47–19:52Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of
240. 19:52–19:56inference, therefore inference is not impossible.
241. 19:56–20:00Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary.
242. 20:00–20:018.
243. 20:01–20:05It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the
244. 20:05–20:10universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is
245. 20:10–20:12pervaded by fire.
246. 20:12–20:17of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause
247. 20:17–20:20inference.
248. 20:20–20:23Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that
249. 20:23–20:27particular smoke is cognized.
250. 20:27–20:31Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain,
251. 20:31–20:33is required.
252. 20:33–20:39No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives.
253. 20:39–20:44Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists
254. 20:44–20:50or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together?
255. 20:50–20:56Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason.
256. 20:56–21:01For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence
257. 21:01–21:04of smoke or light is the reason.
258. 21:04–21:08Therefore two alternative no ability is not incoherent.
259. 21:08–21:13Another cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity
260. 21:13–21:15a cause.
261. 21:15–21:19It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the
262. 21:19–21:24mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition
263. 21:24–21:29of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference.
264. 21:29–21:32But this view is untenable.
265. 21:32–21:36Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of
266. 21:36–21:41inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of
267. 21:41–21:46difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent
268. 21:46–21:55cause. Qualified cognition is not a cause. It may be argued that after recollection of
269. 21:55–22:00pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between
270. 22:00–22:06the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified by smokehood, is necessary. But
271. 22:06–22:11But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's pervasion
272. 22:11–22:15by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary.
273. 22:15–22:22And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present.
274. 22:22–22:28Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden.
275. 22:28–22:31Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor.
276. 22:31–22:3612. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct
277. 22:36–22:41and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an abstractor.
278. 22:41–22:46The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference.
279. 22:47–22:54Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference,
280. 22:54–23:00rather, in order for the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise,
281. 23:00–23:04cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required.
282. 23:06–23:10Prima-Facey Conclusion, a universal as reason.

Plain text

Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the pro-bandom. 40. It cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a pro-bandom to be established by the reason being Mitra's son. If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be pro-banda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise. The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as pro-banda. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire. But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition. Doubtful extraneous condition 41. Some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandom, a certain extraneous condition produces acetamin of deviation. Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom, Otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons. Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free from such a condition. Provision and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength, because inference arises from a single perversion and a single subject propertyhood. Subject otherness is not an extraneous condition. 44. If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness produced by cognition of the absence of the probandom would not remain an extraneous condition because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reason's presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion. 45. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, it does not pervade what pervades the probandom, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it does not on that ground alone for within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons. Avoidance of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the reasons pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of perversion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation. Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous This condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandum. The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandum, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not arise. An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason. conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason or a direct criticism, then its perversion of the probandom must be accepted. Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without perversion of the probandom. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it pervades the probandom and fails to pervade the reason. Alternative view. 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandom and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable but, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded as an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end. Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions 50. Apparent extraneous conditions are now described. The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness, is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the probandom, is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness, and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandum. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is an apparent extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandum. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandum that does not pervade the subject. In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth apparent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent. The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent, eternality and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind. The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is in apparent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire in a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing the absence of the probandum and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason in the subject. Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood, is now described. Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandum. Probandom. Possession of a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood. 2. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood. Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before subsumptive reflection arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased. If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal coexistence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood. The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary. Adding the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference. Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the Self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another. The bearer of a probandam desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish it is subjecthood, the earlier view. The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandam one wishes to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandom is subjecthood. A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible. But Kasperty Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an object already known, and, one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire. Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is unacceptable. Like doubt about the probandom, the desire to establish it need not remain present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark. The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. unfavorable object 2 is inferred through the force of the third substantive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end. Established conclusion, the entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it is not the subject. In there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established is not the subject. Wherever desire to establish the probandom exists irrespective of the presence of establishing evidence or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through a qualified absence. Subjecthood through a qualified absence. When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence of establishing evidence or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of ascertainment of the probandom is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subsumptive reflection. Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject is the extraordinary cause of inference. Misaka Prima facei dhu, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection. The Misaka say that recollection of pervasion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference. There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire pervasion and cognizing smoke on the mountain. These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of the economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause. It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise. Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference. But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of pervasion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered, mere cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects. Five, it may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not. Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pervasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the substantive reflection, smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense-contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception. Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view. 6. The objection arises when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible? The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire. According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible. Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not. How, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, The determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt. Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible. Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary. 8. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause inference. Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required. No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives. Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together? Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason. For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke or light is the reason. Therefore two alternative no ability is not incoherent. Another cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference. But this view is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent cause. Qualified cognition is not a cause. It may be argued that after recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, qualified by smokehood, is necessary. But But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's pervasion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary. And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present. Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden. Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor. 12. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an abstractor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required. Prima-Facey Conclusion, a universal as reason.

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