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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:32गोल्डि आद अछि बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता
0:32–0:37Alternatively, in fire color and luminosity are not overwhelmed, only whiteness is overwhelmed.
0:37–0:42Therefore the color of fire illuminates fire and other objects.
0:42–0:47In gold color itself is overwhelmed, hence even if whiteness and luminosity remain unoverwhelmed,
0:47–0:52they cannot illuminate the individual gold, because the latter is not apprehended.
0:52–0:57Nor is it impossible to establish gold, the locus of yellowness and heaviness, as
0:57–0:59something distinct from earth.
0:59–1:04Gold, which remains undestroyed despite continuous conjunction with intense fire, is reasonably
1:04–1:08a fiery substance distinct from earth.
1:08–1:12If gold were earthy, intense conjunction with fire, in the absence of relation to a liquid
1:12–1:17substance inhibiting heterogeneous change of color, would produce in it a color different
1:17–1:22from its earlier one, because in an earthy substance conjunction with fire causes such
1:22–1:23change.
1:23–1:27Burning and non-burning of cloth and the like are observed according to conjunction
1:27–1:32with water and its absence. Hence the inference, if molten gold were an
1:32–1:36earthy substance conjoined with intense fire and unrelated to a liquid substance inhibiting
1:36–1:41heterogeneous change of color, it would be the locus of a color different from its previous
1:41–1:48yellow, like a pot conjoined with fire. But it is not so, therefore gold is not earthy.
1:48–1:52Nor can it be accepted merely as water or as an earthy substance conjoined with
1:52–1:55fire.
1:55–2:01of the inference establishing the fiery nature of gold. The inference establishing gold as
2:01–2:06fiery may be formulated thus, yellow gold conjoined with intense fire is conjoined with
2:06–2:10a liquid substance that inhibits heterogeneous change of color, because despite conjunction
2:10–2:14with intense fire it is non-earthly while not becoming the locus of a color different
2:14–2:20from its former color, like yellow cloth situated in water conjoined with fire.
2:20–2:24A second form, yellow gold is conjoined with a liquid substance inhibiting production
2:24–2:29of a color different from yellow, because despite being conjoined with fire day and night it
2:29–2:33is not the locus of a color different from yellow, like yellow cloth situated in water
2:33–2:37for a long time while conjoined with fire.
2:37–2:41Intense conjunction with fire cannot be called irrelevant.
2:41–2:46In the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance, intense conjunction with fire produces
2:46–2:50heterogeneous change of color in an earthy substance.
2:50–2:55The inhibiting liquid substance related to gold is not water, because water is a locus
2:55–3:01of natural fluidity, nor is its fluidity non-manifest, because non-manifest fluidity cannot inhibit
3:01–3:05burning, whereas the fluidity of gold is adventitious.
3:05–3:10If only being molten in earthy is regarded as the inhibitor of heterogeneous change
3:10–3:14of color, the same inhibition would have to be accepted in ghee and the like, and
3:14–3:17change of color would arise in gold.
3:17–3:21A supporting element can join with fire, if earthy, cannot itself inhibit heterogeneous
3:21–3:24change of color.
3:24–3:28Fire distinct from gold is neither the locus of adventitious fluidity nor an inhibitor
3:28–3:33of heterogeneous change of color, it is precisely what produces change of color.
3:33–3:39Gold, being a perceptible substance, possesses color, being different from earth and water,
3:39–3:41it is fiery.
3:41–3:46From this subject establishing proof, in molten fire, that is, liquefied gold, the
3:46–3:51property of inhibiting change of color is established. Therefore, even when conjoined
3:51–3:55with the intense heat of fire, the fluidity of the yellow part of gold is not destroyed,
3:55–4:01because the fiery fluidity of gold inhibits its destroyer, as does the fluidity of desituated
4:01–4:08in water conjoined with fire. View of Udaena Kariya, Molten fire inhibits change of color.
4:10–4:14Objection, if molten fire inhibits heterogeneous change of color, the color of cloth and the
4:14–4:19like situated in molten gold would also not change, just as that of cloth in water does
4:19–4:20not.
4:20–4:25Reply, in this world molten fire inhibits heterogeneous change of color only when the yellow substance
4:25–4:29is experienced as gold and when a supporting cause of fiery heat is present in partless
4:29–4:31molten gold, not elsewhere.
4:31–4:36Positive and negative concomitance is found only in this specific form.
4:36–4:39Therefore an inhibiting supporting nature should be accepted only in gold as established by
4:39–4:41experience.
4:41–4:46Or can it be said, let gold alone be accepted as the inhibitor, why imagine separate molten
4:46–4:48fire?
4:48–4:53Subject establishing proof establishes molten fire, when a general supporting factor is
4:53–4:58present, as inhibiting heterogeneous change of color, hence the inhibitory nature is established
4:58–5:01in the form of molten fire.
5:01–5:05The argument if molten fire were an inhibitor, it would also prevent change in the color
5:05–5:11of cloth and the like is based on an unestablished locus, the contrary reasoning is established.
5:11–5:18No subject establishing or other proof establishes an inhibiting supporting nature in experienced solid gold.
5:18–5:30Therefore the causal status of conjunction with fire and producing change of color, established by positive and negative concomitance when there is no relation to an opposed liquid earthy substance, is not defeated.
5:30–5:33This is Udayanakarya's view.
5:33–5:37Modern view, gold is not water.
5:37–5:51Modern Neacose, molten gold, the locus of perceptible fluidity undestroyed even by conjunction with intense fire, is fiery, because while possessing color it differs from water and earth, like fire.
5:51–6:00There is no unestablished reason here, because gold's possession of color is established from its being the locus of perceptible fluidity.
6:00–6:09Gold is not water, because it is not the locus of natural fluidity, like lag, it is the locus of adventitious fluidity and lags viscosity.
6:09–6:17If viscosity were accepted in gold, gold would have to be an aggregate of substances dependent on viscosity and fluidity.
6:17–6:25Nor is gold earthy, because its fluidity is not destroyed even by conjunction with intense fire, like that of water atoms.
6:25–6:36The qualification in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance should be included in the definition, so there is no overextension to be situated in boiling water.
6:36–6:46The qualification is not purposeless because earth fluidityhood is what causes destruction of fluidity in earthy substances such as lac and geethru intense conjunction with fire.
6:46–6:53In the absence of a defeater, it is improper to abandon the causal relevance of a recurrent property.
6:53–7:03The non-recurrent fluidity of D is not the cause, neither general fluidity nor adventitious fluidity is the cause, otherwise the fluidity of GOLD II would be destroyed.
7:04–7:16Objection, non-earthly natural fluidity present in oil, water, and the like is also destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, therefore, on the analogy of grass, fire sticks, and gems, some recurrent property must destroy fluidity.
7:16–7:21fluidity. Reply, through economy, earth fluidity hood, water fluidity hood, and other fluidity
7:21–7:25hood produced by taste and the like respectively destroy earthy fluidity, watery fluidity,
7:25–7:28and commonly produced fluidity.
7:28–7:32For this reason the counter-inference, the disputed gold is earthy because, like
7:32–7:38Guy, it is the locus of adventitious fluidity is weak. There is no favorable reasoning
7:38–7:43for it, rather there is contrary reasoning that, if it were earthy, its fluidity would
7:43–7:50be destroyed by intense conjunction with fire in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid.
7:50–7:53Fire has no natural fluidity.
7:53–7:57Objection, Earth-Head is the delimiter of the Inhering Causal status of Adventitious
7:57–8:01fluidity, no property's delimitorship should be abandoned without a defeater.
8:01–8:06Reply, then all earthy substances such as pots would become locky of Adventitious
8:06–8:07fluidity.
8:07–8:11Nor is it possible to accept any subordinate property of Earth-Head as one recurrent
8:11–8:15limiter of the inhering causal status of adventitious fluidity in G, Lac, and the like.
8:16–8:21If a subordinate property delimited by earthhood is accepted in both horizontally moving earth
8:21–8:27and upward flaming earth, it is absent in pots and the like. If a special subordinate
8:27–8:32property of earthhood is accepted, it must also be present in Lac and other things distinct from
8:32–8:39G. Therefore no such recurrent delimiter is established. A further objection in earthy gold,
8:39–8:44the locus of yellowness and heaviness, being the locus of fluidity undestroyed by intense fiery
8:44–8:48heat even without supporting conjunction with fire is a deviant reason, because there is the
8:48–8:55experience, yellow gold is molten. Reply, yellow gold has no natural fluidity. Since earthy fluidity
8:55–9:00is destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, the cognition, yellow gold is molten, is a defeated
9:00–9:07illusion. Nor should one ask why yellow gold is not then seen merely as hard. Like the parts
9:07–9:12of ink, honey, and the like in water, the parts of gold, through relation to a liquid substance,
9:12–9:17are loci of loose in conjunction, the parts of gold themselves do not possess fluidity.
9:17–9:23There is no contradiction with the example of D and the like, whose parts can possess fluidity.
9:24–9:27Another view, fluidity is produced in gold.
9:29–9:34Other Neayakas say, in the presence of support in the form of fiery heat, fluidity is certainly
9:34–9:40produced in fiery substances such as gold, the experience of fluidity cannot readily be denied.
9:41–9:46Fluidity is not destroyed in gold because the molten fiery substance itself is an inhibitor
9:46–9:53of the destroyer of fluidity. Molten fire is not unsupported. Affirmative inference,
9:53–9:58yellow gold, the locus of fluidity, is conjoined with a liquid substance inhibiting destruction
9:58–10:03of fluidity because it is an earthy locus of fluidity whose fluidity is not destroyed even
10:03–10:07by intense conjunction with fire, like geese situated in boiling water.
10:08–10:13Destruction and non-destruction of earthy fluidity depend upon relation or non-relation to
10:13–10:18an opposed liquid substance along with intense conjunction with fire, therefore the inference
10:18–10:24is not purposeless. Negative inference, the disputed gold, a locus of fluidity about which
10:24–10:29fiery or earthy nature is in doubt while it possesses color and differs from water, is fiery,
10:29–10:34because it is the locus of non-eternal fluidity not destroyed even by intense conjunction with fire
10:34–10:39in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance, whatever is not so is not fiery,
10:39–10:46like water and ghee. Uncommonness is not a fault, because an uncommon reason produces doubt
10:46–10:51only in the absence of a special observation. Just as a reason excluded from a negative
10:51–10:56instance possessing absence of the probandum establishes the probandum, so a reason excluded
10:56–11:00from a subject possessing the probandum establishes absence of the probandum.
11:01–11:07Uncommonness yields inconclusiveness by generating an equally strong counter-reason only when special
11:07–11:13observation is absent. Here a negative reason accompanied by favorable reasoning and special
11:13–11:18observation establishes the probandum. The statement sound is non-eternal because it is
11:18–11:23sound may likewise possess a valid reason when a special observation is present,
11:23–11:24Only this much is intended here.
11:26–11:30The counterposition that establishes gold as earthy is not equally strong.
11:31–11:35It has no favorable reasoning but contrary reasoning, if molten gold were earthy,
11:35–11:40its fluidity would be destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, like oil, in the
11:40–11:45absence of relation to an opposed liquid. Conversely, the reason establishing gold as
11:45–11:51fiery has favorable reasoning, if molten gold, which possesses color and differs from water,
11:51–11:55were not fiery but earthy, it would be the locus of destruction of fluidity through intense
11:55–12:02conjunction with fire. There is also no contrary reasoning. Hence the inference establishing fiery
12:02–12:12nature is stronger. Final establishment of the fiery nature of gold. Other teachers establish
12:12–12:17fiery nature thus, fiery nature does not occur only in colored non-fluid substances,
12:17–12:22because it is a universal directly pervaded by fluidity occurring in colored substances,
12:22–12:28like earthhood. Or, fiery nature occurs in molten gold, because it is a universal directly pervaded
12:28–12:35by substancehood occurring in colored substances, like waterhood. A occurrence in a locus of fluidity
12:35–12:41is not an extraneous condition. First molten fire is established by the inference,
12:41–12:46possession of fluidity is the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with fluidity,
12:46–12:51because it is a property pervaded by substancehood occurring in non-fluid substances.
12:52–12:59Then, through a commonly observed inference based on the absence of non-provision of the probandom, fluidity is established in fire.
13:00–13:05Finally, the fiery nature of gold is established by the inference, the disputed molten gold is fiery,
13:05–13:13because it is the locus of eternal fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction with fire, whatever is not so is not fiery, like water.
13:15–13:17Removal of the extraneous condition
13:17–13:25Objection, a currency in fire in general, is an extraneous condition in the first inference.
13:25–13:29Nor can fiery nature be called what is outside the subject, because the fiery nature of
13:29–13:32lamps and the light would have to be excluded from the subject.
13:32–13:37Reply, molten fiery nature in disputed gold is established by a stronger reason defeating
13:37–13:41the negative instance, therefore the stated extraneous condition does not pervade the
13:41–13:42pro-bandom.
13:42–13:46Many inferences establishing both eartheness and fireiness in gold are possible, but
13:46–13:51because reasoning defeats earthhood as a counter-instance, the inference establishing fiery nature is stronger.
13:52–13:54The reason is not unestablished.
13:56–14:01Objection, gold is cognized successively as molten, more molten, and so forth, therefore,
14:01–14:06when gold is destroyed by the intense heat of fire, its fluidity too is destroyed,
14:06–14:10and the reason, fluidity undistroyed by conjunction with fire, is unestablished.
14:10–14:15Nor may it be said that after earlier fluidity is destroyed later fluidity arises,
14:15–14:19and therefore destruction of fluidity co-located with prior absence does not occur in gold,
14:19–14:24even if later fluidity were not produced after the former gold substrate was destroyed,
14:24–14:28destruction of the earlier fluidity would still be possible, as in G.
14:28–14:32Reply, the fluidity of gold can be destroyed by destruction of its substrate,
14:32–14:35but not by conjunction with fire.
14:35–14:38If conjunction with fire itself destroyed fluidity,
14:38–14:41later fluidity would not arise, as in G,
14:41–14:45because the fire conjunction that destroys fluidity would inhibit new fluidity.
14:46–14:55Thus the meaning of the reason is being the locus of fluidity whose counter positive destruction produced by fire conjunction is absent even while fire conjunction is present.
14:56–15:05Alternatively, at the time fluidity is destroyed in D, the totality of causes of fluidity co-located with fire is absent, while in gold it is present.
15:05–15:11Thus the meaning of the reason is being the locus of fluidity possessing a subordinate
15:11–15:15universal of a distinct fluidity, produced by causal conditions of fluidity co-located
15:15–15:20with fire and absent from the counter positive of destruction of fluidity produced by fire
15:20–15:22conjunction.
15:22–15:27In this way the reason is not unestablished.
15:27–15:30Negative and affirmative negative inferences.
15:30–15:36Alternatively, after the first fluidity in an atom of G is destroyed by conjunction with fire,
15:36–15:42a second fluidity does not arise because fluidity is absent in the ash of D produced by fire conjunction.
15:42–15:50Similarly, if fluidity of gold atoms were destroyed by fire conjunction, gold produced from those atoms would be non-fluid.
15:50–16:00Hence the negative inference, the atoms that originate gold are not earthy because they are loci of fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction with fire,
16:00–16:07like water atoms. Therefore they are fiery, whatever atoms are not so are not fiery, like atoms of Ghee.
16:08–16:14Affirmative negative inference, gold produced from non-earth-y or fiery atoms is non-earth-y or fiery,
16:14–16:19because it is produced from atoms that are loci of fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction
16:19–16:24with fire. By this inference the fiery nature of gold is established.
16:24–16:32Partial view gold is a distinct substance different from earth, water, and fire.
16:32–16:39A partial theorist says, gold, the locus of fluidity, is not fiery, because it is yellow.
16:39–16:44The reason is not unestablished, because the cognition yellow gold is molten establishes
16:44–16:46fluidity in gold.
16:46–16:50Nor is cognition of yellow color illusory merely because one might thereby have to
16:50–16:53regard gold as earthy.
16:53–16:57Even if white color were accepted, there would be no obstacle to golds being non-earthy.
16:57–17:02Similarly, even with yellow color, non-earthiness is possible.
17:02–17:07Just as earthhood is not an indispensable cause of adventitious fluidity, invariability
17:07–17:11with smell is not an indispensable cause of yellowness.
17:11–17:15The Neayaka inference, gold, while possessing yellow color and differing from earth and
17:15–17:19water, is fiery, is inconclusive.
17:19–17:23Otherwise one would also have to accept air, while possessing touch and differing from water
17:23–17:26and fire, is earthy.
17:26–17:32It cannot be replied that air has no color, fluidity, or smell and therefore is not earthy.
17:32–17:37If these qualities are taken as non-manifest, the pervasion earth is the locus of at least
17:37–17:41one among manifest color, taste, and smell is defeated.
17:41–17:46Yet many pervasions on the fiery side are also defeated in gold, non-fluid fire
17:46–17:51Fire is perceptible, in perceptible fire either manifest color or manifest touches necessarily
17:51–17:57present, and fire illuminates both itself and other things, do not apply to gold.
17:57–18:01The Neayaka himself accepts that a substance which is the locus of adventitious fluidity
18:01–18:08is not necessarily earthy. Therefore yellow gold, as the locus of adventitious fluidity,
18:08–18:12differs not only from water and earth but from all three, earth, water, and fire,
18:12–18:19is an independent additional substance. This is the partial view.
18:19–18:23Conclusion of the theory of the causes of perception
18:23–18:28Thus ends the theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tapasint
18:28–18:39mai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the theory of the atomicity of mind.
18:39–18:44Mind as the sixth sense organ. Persexual cognition of the self-special
18:44–18:49qualities, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, and the like, is not produced by the
18:49–18:55five external sense organs. Nevertheless such cognition is a produced perception. Therefore
18:55–19:01a separate sixth sense organ must be accepted. This organ is the mind. Pleasure and the like
19:01–19:05are not objects of the external senses such as touch, so the unwanted consequence of
19:05–19:10treating the tactile sense as their cause does not arise. Thus the status of mind
19:10–19:12as the sixth sense organ is established.
19:13–19:16Mtsaka view, mind is all-pervasive.
19:18–19:22The Mtsaka says, mind is an eternal, partless, touchless substance
19:22–19:24distinct from earth and the other substances.
19:25–19:28It is the locus of conjunction between self and mind,
19:28–19:31which serves as a non-inhering cause of cognition,
19:31–19:32and is an eternal sense organ.
19:33–19:37Since, though eternal, it does not originate in other substance,
19:37–19:39it is all-pervasive like the self.
19:39–19:47Magnitude is not an extraneous condition of this inference because it is pervaded only in the instrument.
19:47–19:53Objection concerning subordinate universals in pleasure and the like
19:53–19:58Objection, pleasure and the like are non-eternal special qualities occurring in the eternal self,
19:58–20:02conjunction of the five mobile elemental substances is their non-inhering cause.
20:02–20:08Therefore a subordinate universal of qualityhood should be accepted in pleasure and the like, as in cooked color.
20:08–20:12Reply, on the BHA view sound is a substance.
20:12–20:16Not occurring in the self, not being produced by a sense organ that apprehends special qualities
20:16–20:21other than sound, and qualityhood occurring in the five corporeal substances, all become
20:21–20:24extraneous conditions and obstruct the inference.
20:24–20:28Pleasure and the light may also be accepted as produced by conjunction of the body and
20:28–20:31self as a cause.
20:31–20:36Atomicity of mind is not required for spatial restriction.
20:36–20:40The Nayaika objects, spatial restriction of the effect of an all-pervasive cause would
20:40–20:44depend upon conjunction of self and mind as the non-inhering cause.
20:44–20:48If mind were all-pervasive, pleasure, and the light would arise in every self, therefore
20:48–20:50mind must be atomic.
20:50–20:54The men'saka replies that, spatial restriction, can have three meanings, the non-inhering
20:54–20:58cause produces its effect in the place delimited by itself, it produces it definitely
20:58–21:01there, or it produces it only there.
21:01–21:06On the first meaning, a regulator of production throughout all places is absent.
21:06–21:09On the second, conjunction with an atomic mind would produce the effect both in the place
21:09–21:12delimited by it and elsewhere.
21:12–21:15On the third, pleasure would arise only in the atomic location.
21:15–21:20Therefore the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind is not defeated.
21:20–21:25The non-inhering cause depends upon an efficient cause.
21:25–21:29The Neayaka says, pleasure's occurrence in a greater or smaller region depends upon
21:29–21:34efficient causes such as sandalwood, just as spatial occurrence of sound depends upon
21:34–21:40conjunction with air. Conjunction with mine does not cause this spatial division. The
21:40–21:46MSACA replies, in our doctrine of an all-pervasive mine too, efficient causes such as sandal would
21:46–21:51establish this regulation. There is no rule that an all-pervasive non-inhering cause must
21:51–21:56produce its effect everywhere, delimitation by the complete causal complex including an
21:56–22:02efficient cause is required. Simultaneous production of many pleasures
22:02–22:05and pains in oneself.
22:05–22:10Memsaka Prima Facy View, when distinct efficient causes such as sandalwood, fire, and wounds
22:10–22:14are present in different parts of the body, many particular states of pleasure and pain
22:14–22:17can arise simultaneously in oneself.
22:17–22:21Even if mind is all-pervasive, there is no contradiction in this production, difference
22:21–22:26of efficient causes determines difference of place in the effects.
22:26–22:30Conclusion of the Prima Facy View
22:30–22:35This mind is an all-pervasive, eternal, partless, touchless substance.
22:35–22:39Its status as a sense organ is established from its production of perception of special
22:39–22:41qualities.
22:41–22:45The mere fact that many cognitions do not arise at one time is not proof that mind is
22:45–22:51atomic, because desire, purpose, concentration, merit and demerit, and particular efficient
22:51–22:56causes may regulate the sequence of cognitions.
22:56–23:00of many cognitions at one time.
23:00–23:05The memsaka says, although many sense organs are related to their different objects, tension,
23:05–23:08or desire to know makes one cognition predominant.
23:08–23:13Yet on some occasions many cognitions simultaneously occur as established by direct experience,
23:13–23:18for example, eating while watching a dance, hearing a song, and apprehending fragrance.
23:18–23:23Therefore impossibility of simultaneous cognition is not decisive proof of the atomicity of mind.

Plain text

गोल्डि आद अछि बाषाक साहित्य, समालोचना, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता, कविता Alternatively, in fire color and luminosity are not overwhelmed, only whiteness is overwhelmed. Therefore the color of fire illuminates fire and other objects. In gold color itself is overwhelmed, hence even if whiteness and luminosity remain unoverwhelmed, they cannot illuminate the individual gold, because the latter is not apprehended. Nor is it impossible to establish gold, the locus of yellowness and heaviness, as something distinct from earth. Gold, which remains undestroyed despite continuous conjunction with intense fire, is reasonably a fiery substance distinct from earth. If gold were earthy, intense conjunction with fire, in the absence of relation to a liquid substance inhibiting heterogeneous change of color, would produce in it a color different from its earlier one, because in an earthy substance conjunction with fire causes such change. Burning and non-burning of cloth and the like are observed according to conjunction with water and its absence. Hence the inference, if molten gold were an earthy substance conjoined with intense fire and unrelated to a liquid substance inhibiting heterogeneous change of color, it would be the locus of a color different from its previous yellow, like a pot conjoined with fire. But it is not so, therefore gold is not earthy. Nor can it be accepted merely as water or as an earthy substance conjoined with fire. of the inference establishing the fiery nature of gold. The inference establishing gold as fiery may be formulated thus, yellow gold conjoined with intense fire is conjoined with a liquid substance that inhibits heterogeneous change of color, because despite conjunction with intense fire it is non-earthly while not becoming the locus of a color different from its former color, like yellow cloth situated in water conjoined with fire. A second form, yellow gold is conjoined with a liquid substance inhibiting production of a color different from yellow, because despite being conjoined with fire day and night it is not the locus of a color different from yellow, like yellow cloth situated in water for a long time while conjoined with fire. Intense conjunction with fire cannot be called irrelevant. In the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance, intense conjunction with fire produces heterogeneous change of color in an earthy substance. The inhibiting liquid substance related to gold is not water, because water is a locus of natural fluidity, nor is its fluidity non-manifest, because non-manifest fluidity cannot inhibit burning, whereas the fluidity of gold is adventitious. If only being molten in earthy is regarded as the inhibitor of heterogeneous change of color, the same inhibition would have to be accepted in ghee and the like, and change of color would arise in gold. A supporting element can join with fire, if earthy, cannot itself inhibit heterogeneous change of color. Fire distinct from gold is neither the locus of adventitious fluidity nor an inhibitor of heterogeneous change of color, it is precisely what produces change of color. Gold, being a perceptible substance, possesses color, being different from earth and water, it is fiery. From this subject establishing proof, in molten fire, that is, liquefied gold, the property of inhibiting change of color is established. Therefore, even when conjoined with the intense heat of fire, the fluidity of the yellow part of gold is not destroyed, because the fiery fluidity of gold inhibits its destroyer, as does the fluidity of desituated in water conjoined with fire. View of Udaena Kariya, Molten fire inhibits change of color. Objection, if molten fire inhibits heterogeneous change of color, the color of cloth and the like situated in molten gold would also not change, just as that of cloth in water does not. Reply, in this world molten fire inhibits heterogeneous change of color only when the yellow substance is experienced as gold and when a supporting cause of fiery heat is present in partless molten gold, not elsewhere. Positive and negative concomitance is found only in this specific form. Therefore an inhibiting supporting nature should be accepted only in gold as established by experience. Or can it be said, let gold alone be accepted as the inhibitor, why imagine separate molten fire? Subject establishing proof establishes molten fire, when a general supporting factor is present, as inhibiting heterogeneous change of color, hence the inhibitory nature is established in the form of molten fire. The argument if molten fire were an inhibitor, it would also prevent change in the color of cloth and the like is based on an unestablished locus, the contrary reasoning is established. No subject establishing or other proof establishes an inhibiting supporting nature in experienced solid gold. Therefore the causal status of conjunction with fire and producing change of color, established by positive and negative concomitance when there is no relation to an opposed liquid earthy substance, is not defeated. This is Udayanakarya's view. Modern view, gold is not water. Modern Neacose, molten gold, the locus of perceptible fluidity undestroyed even by conjunction with intense fire, is fiery, because while possessing color it differs from water and earth, like fire. There is no unestablished reason here, because gold's possession of color is established from its being the locus of perceptible fluidity. Gold is not water, because it is not the locus of natural fluidity, like lag, it is the locus of adventitious fluidity and lags viscosity. If viscosity were accepted in gold, gold would have to be an aggregate of substances dependent on viscosity and fluidity. Nor is gold earthy, because its fluidity is not destroyed even by conjunction with intense fire, like that of water atoms. The qualification in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance should be included in the definition, so there is no overextension to be situated in boiling water. The qualification is not purposeless because earth fluidityhood is what causes destruction of fluidity in earthy substances such as lac and geethru intense conjunction with fire. In the absence of a defeater, it is improper to abandon the causal relevance of a recurrent property. The non-recurrent fluidity of D is not the cause, neither general fluidity nor adventitious fluidity is the cause, otherwise the fluidity of GOLD II would be destroyed. Objection, non-earthly natural fluidity present in oil, water, and the like is also destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, therefore, on the analogy of grass, fire sticks, and gems, some recurrent property must destroy fluidity. fluidity. Reply, through economy, earth fluidity hood, water fluidity hood, and other fluidity hood produced by taste and the like respectively destroy earthy fluidity, watery fluidity, and commonly produced fluidity. For this reason the counter-inference, the disputed gold is earthy because, like Guy, it is the locus of adventitious fluidity is weak. There is no favorable reasoning for it, rather there is contrary reasoning that, if it were earthy, its fluidity would be destroyed by intense conjunction with fire in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid. Fire has no natural fluidity. Objection, Earth-Head is the delimiter of the Inhering Causal status of Adventitious fluidity, no property's delimitorship should be abandoned without a defeater. Reply, then all earthy substances such as pots would become locky of Adventitious fluidity. Nor is it possible to accept any subordinate property of Earth-Head as one recurrent limiter of the inhering causal status of adventitious fluidity in G, Lac, and the like. If a subordinate property delimited by earthhood is accepted in both horizontally moving earth and upward flaming earth, it is absent in pots and the like. If a special subordinate property of earthhood is accepted, it must also be present in Lac and other things distinct from G. Therefore no such recurrent delimiter is established. A further objection in earthy gold, the locus of yellowness and heaviness, being the locus of fluidity undestroyed by intense fiery heat even without supporting conjunction with fire is a deviant reason, because there is the experience, yellow gold is molten. Reply, yellow gold has no natural fluidity. Since earthy fluidity is destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, the cognition, yellow gold is molten, is a defeated illusion. Nor should one ask why yellow gold is not then seen merely as hard. Like the parts of ink, honey, and the like in water, the parts of gold, through relation to a liquid substance, are loci of loose in conjunction, the parts of gold themselves do not possess fluidity. There is no contradiction with the example of D and the like, whose parts can possess fluidity. Another view, fluidity is produced in gold. Other Neayakas say, in the presence of support in the form of fiery heat, fluidity is certainly produced in fiery substances such as gold, the experience of fluidity cannot readily be denied. Fluidity is not destroyed in gold because the molten fiery substance itself is an inhibitor of the destroyer of fluidity. Molten fire is not unsupported. Affirmative inference, yellow gold, the locus of fluidity, is conjoined with a liquid substance inhibiting destruction of fluidity because it is an earthy locus of fluidity whose fluidity is not destroyed even by intense conjunction with fire, like geese situated in boiling water. Destruction and non-destruction of earthy fluidity depend upon relation or non-relation to an opposed liquid substance along with intense conjunction with fire, therefore the inference is not purposeless. Negative inference, the disputed gold, a locus of fluidity about which fiery or earthy nature is in doubt while it possesses color and differs from water, is fiery, because it is the locus of non-eternal fluidity not destroyed even by intense conjunction with fire in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid substance, whatever is not so is not fiery, like water and ghee. Uncommonness is not a fault, because an uncommon reason produces doubt only in the absence of a special observation. Just as a reason excluded from a negative instance possessing absence of the probandum establishes the probandum, so a reason excluded from a subject possessing the probandum establishes absence of the probandum. Uncommonness yields inconclusiveness by generating an equally strong counter-reason only when special observation is absent. Here a negative reason accompanied by favorable reasoning and special observation establishes the probandum. The statement sound is non-eternal because it is sound may likewise possess a valid reason when a special observation is present, Only this much is intended here. The counterposition that establishes gold as earthy is not equally strong. It has no favorable reasoning but contrary reasoning, if molten gold were earthy, its fluidity would be destroyed by intense conjunction with fire, like oil, in the absence of relation to an opposed liquid. Conversely, the reason establishing gold as fiery has favorable reasoning, if molten gold, which possesses color and differs from water, were not fiery but earthy, it would be the locus of destruction of fluidity through intense conjunction with fire. There is also no contrary reasoning. Hence the inference establishing fiery nature is stronger. Final establishment of the fiery nature of gold. Other teachers establish fiery nature thus, fiery nature does not occur only in colored non-fluid substances, because it is a universal directly pervaded by fluidity occurring in colored substances, like earthhood. Or, fiery nature occurs in molten gold, because it is a universal directly pervaded by substancehood occurring in colored substances, like waterhood. A occurrence in a locus of fluidity is not an extraneous condition. First molten fire is established by the inference, possession of fluidity is the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with fluidity, because it is a property pervaded by substancehood occurring in non-fluid substances. Then, through a commonly observed inference based on the absence of non-provision of the probandom, fluidity is established in fire. Finally, the fiery nature of gold is established by the inference, the disputed molten gold is fiery, because it is the locus of eternal fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction with fire, whatever is not so is not fiery, like water. Removal of the extraneous condition Objection, a currency in fire in general, is an extraneous condition in the first inference. Nor can fiery nature be called what is outside the subject, because the fiery nature of lamps and the light would have to be excluded from the subject. Reply, molten fiery nature in disputed gold is established by a stronger reason defeating the negative instance, therefore the stated extraneous condition does not pervade the pro-bandom. Many inferences establishing both eartheness and fireiness in gold are possible, but because reasoning defeats earthhood as a counter-instance, the inference establishing fiery nature is stronger. The reason is not unestablished. Objection, gold is cognized successively as molten, more molten, and so forth, therefore, when gold is destroyed by the intense heat of fire, its fluidity too is destroyed, and the reason, fluidity undistroyed by conjunction with fire, is unestablished. Nor may it be said that after earlier fluidity is destroyed later fluidity arises, and therefore destruction of fluidity co-located with prior absence does not occur in gold, even if later fluidity were not produced after the former gold substrate was destroyed, destruction of the earlier fluidity would still be possible, as in G. Reply, the fluidity of gold can be destroyed by destruction of its substrate, but not by conjunction with fire. If conjunction with fire itself destroyed fluidity, later fluidity would not arise, as in G, because the fire conjunction that destroys fluidity would inhibit new fluidity. Thus the meaning of the reason is being the locus of fluidity whose counter positive destruction produced by fire conjunction is absent even while fire conjunction is present. Alternatively, at the time fluidity is destroyed in D, the totality of causes of fluidity co-located with fire is absent, while in gold it is present. Thus the meaning of the reason is being the locus of fluidity possessing a subordinate universal of a distinct fluidity, produced by causal conditions of fluidity co-located with fire and absent from the counter positive of destruction of fluidity produced by fire conjunction. In this way the reason is not unestablished. Negative and affirmative negative inferences. Alternatively, after the first fluidity in an atom of G is destroyed by conjunction with fire, a second fluidity does not arise because fluidity is absent in the ash of D produced by fire conjunction. Similarly, if fluidity of gold atoms were destroyed by fire conjunction, gold produced from those atoms would be non-fluid. Hence the negative inference, the atoms that originate gold are not earthy because they are loci of fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction with fire, like water atoms. Therefore they are fiery, whatever atoms are not so are not fiery, like atoms of Ghee. Affirmative negative inference, gold produced from non-earth-y or fiery atoms is non-earth-y or fiery, because it is produced from atoms that are loci of fluidity undestroyed even by intense conjunction with fire. By this inference the fiery nature of gold is established. Partial view gold is a distinct substance different from earth, water, and fire. A partial theorist says, gold, the locus of fluidity, is not fiery, because it is yellow. The reason is not unestablished, because the cognition yellow gold is molten establishes fluidity in gold. Nor is cognition of yellow color illusory merely because one might thereby have to regard gold as earthy. Even if white color were accepted, there would be no obstacle to golds being non-earthy. Similarly, even with yellow color, non-earthiness is possible. Just as earthhood is not an indispensable cause of adventitious fluidity, invariability with smell is not an indispensable cause of yellowness. The Neayaka inference, gold, while possessing yellow color and differing from earth and water, is fiery, is inconclusive. Otherwise one would also have to accept air, while possessing touch and differing from water and fire, is earthy. It cannot be replied that air has no color, fluidity, or smell and therefore is not earthy. If these qualities are taken as non-manifest, the pervasion earth is the locus of at least one among manifest color, taste, and smell is defeated. Yet many pervasions on the fiery side are also defeated in gold, non-fluid fire Fire is perceptible, in perceptible fire either manifest color or manifest touches necessarily present, and fire illuminates both itself and other things, do not apply to gold. The Neayaka himself accepts that a substance which is the locus of adventitious fluidity is not necessarily earthy. Therefore yellow gold, as the locus of adventitious fluidity, differs not only from water and earth but from all three, earth, water, and fire, is an independent additional substance. This is the partial view. Conclusion of the theory of the causes of perception Thus ends the theory of the causes of perception and the perception section of the tapasint mai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the theory of the atomicity of mind. Mind as the sixth sense organ. Persexual cognition of the self-special qualities, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, and the like, is not produced by the five external sense organs. Nevertheless such cognition is a produced perception. Therefore a separate sixth sense organ must be accepted. This organ is the mind. Pleasure and the like are not objects of the external senses such as touch, so the unwanted consequence of treating the tactile sense as their cause does not arise. Thus the status of mind as the sixth sense organ is established. Mtsaka view, mind is all-pervasive. The Mtsaka says, mind is an eternal, partless, touchless substance distinct from earth and the other substances. It is the locus of conjunction between self and mind, which serves as a non-inhering cause of cognition, and is an eternal sense organ. Since, though eternal, it does not originate in other substance, it is all-pervasive like the self. Magnitude is not an extraneous condition of this inference because it is pervaded only in the instrument. Objection concerning subordinate universals in pleasure and the like Objection, pleasure and the like are non-eternal special qualities occurring in the eternal self, conjunction of the five mobile elemental substances is their non-inhering cause. Therefore a subordinate universal of qualityhood should be accepted in pleasure and the like, as in cooked color. Reply, on the BHA view sound is a substance. Not occurring in the self, not being produced by a sense organ that apprehends special qualities other than sound, and qualityhood occurring in the five corporeal substances, all become extraneous conditions and obstruct the inference. Pleasure and the light may also be accepted as produced by conjunction of the body and self as a cause. Atomicity of mind is not required for spatial restriction. The Nayaika objects, spatial restriction of the effect of an all-pervasive cause would depend upon conjunction of self and mind as the non-inhering cause. If mind were all-pervasive, pleasure, and the light would arise in every self, therefore mind must be atomic. The men'saka replies that, spatial restriction, can have three meanings, the non-inhering cause produces its effect in the place delimited by itself, it produces it definitely there, or it produces it only there. On the first meaning, a regulator of production throughout all places is absent. On the second, conjunction with an atomic mind would produce the effect both in the place delimited by it and elsewhere. On the third, pleasure would arise only in the atomic location. Therefore the doctrine of an all-pervasive mind is not defeated. The non-inhering cause depends upon an efficient cause. The Neayaka says, pleasure's occurrence in a greater or smaller region depends upon efficient causes such as sandalwood, just as spatial occurrence of sound depends upon conjunction with air. Conjunction with mine does not cause this spatial division. The MSACA replies, in our doctrine of an all-pervasive mine too, efficient causes such as sandal would establish this regulation. There is no rule that an all-pervasive non-inhering cause must produce its effect everywhere, delimitation by the complete causal complex including an efficient cause is required. Simultaneous production of many pleasures and pains in oneself. Memsaka Prima Facy View, when distinct efficient causes such as sandalwood, fire, and wounds are present in different parts of the body, many particular states of pleasure and pain can arise simultaneously in oneself. Even if mind is all-pervasive, there is no contradiction in this production, difference of efficient causes determines difference of place in the effects. Conclusion of the Prima Facy View This mind is an all-pervasive, eternal, partless, touchless substance. Its status as a sense organ is established from its production of perception of special qualities. The mere fact that many cognitions do not arise at one time is not proof that mind is atomic, because desire, purpose, concentration, merit and demerit, and particular efficient causes may regulate the sequence of cognitions. of many cognitions at one time. The memsaka says, although many sense organs are related to their different objects, tension, or desire to know makes one cognition predominant. Yet on some occasions many cognitions simultaneously occur as established by direct experience, for example, eating while watching a dance, hearing a song, and apprehending fragrance. Therefore impossibility of simultaneous cognition is not decisive proof of the atomicity of mind.

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