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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:05The Established Doctrine of Deviation.
0:05–0:1212. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated.
0:12–0:22Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum.
0:22–0:33Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandum.
0:33–0:38Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness.
0:38–0:43A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom,
0:43–0:48and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect.
0:48–0:53An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property
0:53–0:58residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar
0:58–1:02instances, and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence
1:02–1:08of the probandome. This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and
1:08–1:13includes the doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason.
1:13–1:16There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons.
1:16–1:2213. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated
1:22–1:26as separate fallacious reasons, Godamma's ancient five-fold division of fallacious
1:26–1:31reasons would collapse. Godamma includes these three natural forms of deviation within
1:31–1:37one recurrent class and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all.
1:37–1:41Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong
1:41–1:45counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the
1:45–1:49probandom, while placing the rest in another class.
1:49–1:54The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it
1:54–1:59is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them.
1:59–2:04With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends.
2:04–2:07Prima-facie view of the common reason.
2:07–2:0814.
2:08–2:12The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandum is
2:12–2:17not common reasonhood, because such a definition over extends to the non-exclusive reason,
2:17–2:21as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the
2:21–2:25uncommon reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also over
2:25–2:31extends to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance.
2:32–2:36For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the
2:36–2:40probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom,
2:40–2:44or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness.
2:45–2:49Mere currents in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice,
2:49–2:50making the remaining qualifiers pointless.
2:50–2:55A occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
2:55–3:0315. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance.
3:03–3:08The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers.
3:08–3:17Merely saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent.
3:17–3:22It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order
3:22–3:27to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one.
3:27–3:32Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness
3:32–3:37and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless.
3:37–3:41Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness,
3:41–3:45because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
3:45–3:50This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence and a counter-instance
3:50–3:56can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason.
3:56–4:01Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonous.
4:01–4:0216.
4:02–4:06It may be proposed that commonness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance
4:06–4:10distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter-instance
4:10–4:14distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom.
4:14–4:17This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are
4:17–4:22knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is
4:22–4:25either a jar or some other object.
4:25–4:29This proposal, however, is unacceptable.
4:29–4:33No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common,
4:33–4:37non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons.
4:37–4:41The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with
4:41–4:46the probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under
4:46–4:52extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance.
4:52–4:57With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends.
4:57–5:02The established doctrine of the common reason.
5:02–5:06The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common
5:06–5:08reasonhood.
5:08–5:11The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandum is
5:11–5:18ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown,
5:18–5:23or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present,
5:23–5:27if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises.
5:28–5:33Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons.
5:35–5:39Non-exclusive reasons such as no ability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood,
5:39–5:44and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects
5:44–5:49because in a state of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and
5:49–5:55uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends.
5:56–6:03Prima-facy view of the uncommon reason. 18, excluded from all similar and all counter-instances,
6:03–6:08is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object
6:08–6:12endowed with the probandum does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject,
6:12–6:17why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood,
6:17–6:22soundhood occurs only in the subject, sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be
6:22–6:26called an uncommon fallacious reason, because cognition of pervasion and of subject property
6:26–6:32hood are causes of inferential cognition. Some scholars say that occurrence only in
6:32–6:36the subject endowed with the probandum is not uncommonness, because a reason present in
6:36–6:41the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even without occurring in any similar
6:41–6:46instance where the probandom is certain. In the example, sound is impermanent because of
6:46–6:51soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once provision has been established.
6:53–7:00Recutation by the ancient scholars. 19. The foregoing argument is not sound.
7:01–7:06An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess
7:06–7:10the probandum and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandum.
7:11–7:16At the time of cognizing pervasion, when the probandum and the subject is regarded as certain,
7:16–7:21a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandum,
7:21–7:24but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless.
7:26–7:30In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless
7:30–7:35reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason
7:35–7:39unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from both
7:39–7:43similar and counter instances.
7:43–7:47Possession of odor may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound
7:47–7:52is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of
7:52–7:58soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion.
7:58–8:04A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance.
8:04–8:11from all similar instances is the defect. 20. It may be proposed that exclusion only
8:11–8:16from all similar instances is the uncommon defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a
8:16–8:21defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble
8:21–8:24a purely negative reason and could be useful in inference for another.
8:25–8:29Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is
8:29–8:33established only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and
8:33–8:34counter instances.
8:35–8:38Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion.
8:38–8:41The defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances.
8:43–8:46If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of
8:46–8:50soundhood and stops, the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the
8:50–8:53proponent can be defeated simply for incomplete use of the Naya statements.
8:54–8:57Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction
8:57–8:59of perversion must be made explicit.
8:59–9:05Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is nearly a deficiency in the use of Nyaya
9:05–9:07statements in inference for another.
9:07–9:12In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs
9:12–9:15cognition of perversion.
9:15–9:19Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances
9:19–9:22alone.
9:22–9:27With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends.
9:27–9:34established doctrine of the uncommon reason. 21, according to the established doctrine,
9:34–9:39in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes negative in relation to establishing both
9:39–9:44the probandum and its absence in the subject. In the inference sound is eternal because
9:44–9:49of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both similar instances possessing eternality
9:49–9:53and counter instances possessing the absence of eternality, it therefore produces doubt
9:53–9:57concerning both eternality and impermanence.
9:57–10:01In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum
10:01–10:06and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both
10:06–10:08sides.
10:08–10:13The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct.
10:13–10:18Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic.
10:18–10:22For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all
10:22–10:27similar instances is necessary.
10:27–10:31In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing
10:31–10:36cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances.
10:36–10:41Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable, because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing
10:41–10:47the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative provision.
10:47–10:52Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar
10:52–10:55instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the
10:55–10:59absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed
10:59–11:02by an example or counter example.
11:02–11:08In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar
11:08–11:09instances.
11:09–11:14Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier
11:14–11:15is pointless.
11:15–11:20A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition,
11:20–11:25but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason.
11:25–11:30With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends.
11:30–11:33Prima-facie view of the non-exclusive reason.
11:33–11:3523.
11:35–11:39A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar
11:39–11:42and counter instances.
11:42–11:47Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are
11:47–11:51held to be established or unestablished.
11:51–11:54Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and
11:54–12:00limited by a purely affirmative probandom. A reason such as no ability, pervaded by a purely
12:00–12:04affirmative probandom, is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is knowable.
12:05–12:09On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom,
12:09–12:12can take the form of the common defect in, earth is different from the other substances
12:12–12:18because it possesses odor. If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and
12:18–12:23counter instances, it becomes common, and if the probandom is regarded as established,
12:23–12:29A reason such as existence in all things are momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely common.
12:30–12:38If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom.
12:39–12:44Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness.
12:46–12:52Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom,
12:52–13:00nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter-instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness.
13:00–13:11In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory reason.
13:11–13:17A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative probandom, and making
13:17–13:23the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence is not a definition of the non-exclusive
13:23–13:24reason.
13:24–13:28In the inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom is
13:28–13:33not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not
13:33–13:36established merely from doubt.
13:36–13:40Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order
13:40–13:45to preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers
13:45–13:50make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well.
13:50–13:54This definition is therefore unacceptable.
13:54–13:59Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not
13:59–14:03non-exclusiveness.
14:03–14:07It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known, in the subject or
14:07–14:15and objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion.
14:15–14:19But this definition over extends to a faultless reason, because even when perversion has been
14:19–14:24ascertained in the subject, concomitants outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown.
14:24–14:28Where all objects constitute the subject, objects outside the subject are impossible,
14:28–14:31making the definition inapplicable.
14:31–14:36The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitants
14:36–14:41useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain both in the subject and outside it.
14:42–14:46Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary.
14:47–14:52The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual reasons
14:52–14:59being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness. The stated definition therefore
14:59–15:05contains pointless qualifiers. With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive
15:05–15:08reason ends.
15:08–15:12The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason.
15:12–15:1426.
15:14–15:18The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary
15:18–15:24properties that produce determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason.
15:24–15:28Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when
15:28–15:34all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited.
15:34–15:38In an inference such as a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and
15:38–15:43ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not
15:43–15:48known, becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion.
15:48–15:53Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely
15:53–15:57affirmative property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance
15:57–16:00useful for apprehending perversion.
16:00–16:04In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although
16:04–16:09no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandom, it does
16:09–16:15not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply.
16:15–16:19Example of a non-exclusive reason.
16:19–16:24Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability.
16:24–16:28Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability
16:28–16:32becomes a non-exclusive reason.
16:32–16:36In the context of a purely negative probandom, when the absence of a property useful for
16:36–16:40apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not
16:40–16:45known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises.
16:45–16:50Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed
16:50–16:53with the common reason.
16:53–16:57Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning provision, and its demonstration, are in
16:57–17:01In both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which
17:01–17:05that defect arises.
17:05–17:10With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends.
17:10–17:13Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason.
17:13–17:1428.
17:14–17:19A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence
17:19–17:24of the pro-bandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in
17:24–17:27this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree.
17:29–17:33Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute
17:33–17:38absence situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference,
17:38–17:42this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by
17:42–17:45qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition.
17:47–17:51A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the
17:51–17:56probandum, not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus
17:56–17:58of the probandum.
17:58–18:03The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum, because opposition to the
18:03–18:09probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda.
18:09–18:12Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and
18:12–18:17a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing.
18:17–18:25Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established.
18:25–18:30Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view.
18:30–18:3129.
18:31–18:33An objection may be raised.
18:33–18:37When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the
18:37–18:40subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory.
18:40–18:45Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason.
18:45–18:49It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest
18:49–18:53only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means
18:53–18:58of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction.
18:58–19:03Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandum
19:03–19:07may be established by another defective reason, but the contradiction defective the reason
19:07–19:11that first appeared as opposed to the probandum itself prevents the production of inferential
19:11–19:17cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason.
19:17–19:24of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that co-location of the reason with
19:24–19:30the absence of the probandom is only a defect involving deviation, the defect of contradiction
19:30–19:34should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier co-located with the absence of the
19:34–19:42probandom. In the case of an unestablished probandom 2, this qualifier is pointless.
19:42–19:46The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandom, that is, lack of capacity to
19:46–19:52establish the probandom can be understood without a separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious
19:52–19:58reason that purports to establish the probandom. If occurrence of the reason in a counter instance
19:58–20:03is not added to the general definition of deviation, the uncommon reason is excluded.
20:03–20:07For this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect of a
20:07–20:13reason. But then mere occurrence in a counter instance constitutes the common defect,
20:13–20:15and the additional qualifier is pointless.
20:17–20:21The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason
20:21–20:28ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable.
20:30–20:37The view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the
20:37–20:42probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the
20:42–20:48common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose pro-bandom is unestablished.
20:49–20:55For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded
20:55–21:01by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for another,
21:01–21:06when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defect of super
21:06–21:12This view, however, is not sound.
21:12–21:16Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with
21:16–21:19the probandom burdens the inference.
21:19–21:24In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine
21:24–21:28the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect of superfluity in the reason is
21:28–21:32not automatically established.
21:32–21:36In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes
21:36–21:41the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses
21:41–21:47smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent.
21:47–21:50View that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the pro-bandom.

Plain text

The Established Doctrine of Deviation. 12. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated. Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandum. Alternatively, deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandum. Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness. A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom, and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect. An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar instances, and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandome. This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons. 13. It should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated as separate fallacious reasons, Godamma's ancient five-fold division of fallacious reasons would collapse. Godamma includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all. Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the probandom, while placing the rest in another class. The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment, it is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them. With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends. Prima-facie view of the common reason. 14. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandum is not common reasonhood, because such a definition over extends to the non-exclusive reason, as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the uncommon reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also over extends to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance. For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness. Mere currents in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice, making the remaining qualifiers pointless. A occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. 15. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance. The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers. Merely saying, it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance, demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent. It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one. Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless. Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence and a counter-instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason. Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonous. 16. It may be proposed that commonness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter-instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either a jar or some other object. This proposal, however, is unacceptable. No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common, non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons. The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandum is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under extends in certain defects where the probandum has only a single instance. With this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends. The established doctrine of the common reason. The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood. The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandum is ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as no ability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects because in a state of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends. Prima-facy view of the uncommon reason. 18, excluded from all similar and all counter-instances, is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with the probandum does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood occurs only in the subject, sound, yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason, because cognition of pervasion and of subject property hood are causes of inferential cognition. Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandum is not uncommonness, because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandom is certain. In the example, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once provision has been established. Recutation by the ancient scholars. 19. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess the probandum and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandum. At the time of cognizing pervasion, when the probandum and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandum, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless. In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandom, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter instances. Possession of odor may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion. A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance. from all similar instances is the defect. 20. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful in inference for another. Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is established only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances. Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion. The defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances. If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood and stops, the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for incomplete use of the Naya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction of perversion must be made explicit. Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect is nearly a deficiency in the use of Nyaya statements in inference for another. In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs cognition of perversion. Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances alone. With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends. established doctrine of the uncommon reason. 21, according to the established doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject. In the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence. In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both sides. The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct. Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic. For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all similar instances is necessary. In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances. Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable, because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative provision. Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example or counter example. In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar instances. Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier is pointless. A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason. With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends. Prima-facie view of the non-exclusive reason. 23. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar and counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are held to be established or unestablished. Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and limited by a purely affirmative probandom. A reason such as no ability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom, is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is knowable. On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take the form of the common defect in, earth is different from the other substances because it possesses odor. If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, A reason such as existence in all things are momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely common. If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom. Subjecthood delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness. Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter-instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness. In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory reason. A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative probandom, and making the probandom the counter positive of an absolute absence is not a definition of the non-exclusive reason. In the inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the probandom is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable. Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known, in the subject or and objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion. But this definition over extends to a faultless reason, because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitants outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the subject, objects outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable. The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitants useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain both in the subject and outside it. Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary. The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual reasons being uncertain, the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness. The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers. With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason. 26. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason. Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited. In an inference such as a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known, becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion. Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending perversion. In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandom, it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply. Example of a non-exclusive reason. Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability. Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason. In the context of a purely negative probandom, when the absence of a property useful for apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises. Once occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason. Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning provision, and its demonstration, are in In both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises. With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends. Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason. 28. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence of the pro-bandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree. Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute absence situated in the locus of the probandom, because in the faultless inference, this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition. A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandum, not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandum. The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum, because opposition to the probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda. Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, therefore an absence and a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing. Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established. Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view. 29. An objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory. Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason. It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction. Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandum may be established by another defective reason, but the contradiction defective the reason that first appeared as opposed to the probandum itself prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason. of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is only a defect involving deviation, the defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier co-located with the absence of the probandom. In the case of an unestablished probandom 2, this qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandom, that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandom can be understood without a separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandom. If occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition of deviation, the uncommon reason is excluded. For this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect of a reason. But then mere occurrence in a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional qualifier is pointless. The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable. The view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose pro-bandom is unestablished. For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defect of super This view, however, is not sound. Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with the probandom burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defect of superfluity in the reason is not automatically established. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent. View that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the pro-bandom.

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