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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
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ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996874)
Duration: 23:41
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33अबजेक्षिन, अग्डिन इन्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्�
0:33–0:38With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
0:39–0:46Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause.
0:46–0:5714. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises,
0:57–1:07Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form smoke or light is pervaded by fire and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form smoke or light is a property of the mountain.
1:07–1:13On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises.
1:13–1:21In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable,
1:21–1:30nevertheless, Gaugia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference.
1:30–1:33Otherness from that is not the reason.
1:33–1:3815. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason.
1:38–1:43But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary
1:43–1:46breadth and the possibility of deviation.
1:46–1:51Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood.
1:51–1:54Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire.
1:54–1:5516.
1:55–1:59The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by
1:59–2:00fire.
2:00–2:04In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire.
2:04–2:08Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless.
2:09–2:20The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smokehood or lighthood.
2:21–2:24Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual.
2:26–2:32Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference.
2:32–2:39Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension
2:39–2:43of subject propertyhood, can produce cognitions smoke or light pervaded by fire is present
2:43–2:45on the mountain.
2:45–2:50Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier,
2:50–2:54qualificon relation are decisive.
2:54–2:59Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception.
2:59–3:04It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless
3:04–3:09qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is
3:09–3:16pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or
3:16–3:20light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative
3:20–3:24and negative concomitance it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or
3:24–3:29light by fire. Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference,
3:29–3:33there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded
3:33–3:40by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition's smoke
3:40–3:44or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain because subsumptive
3:44–3:50reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference.
3:51–3:55Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire.
3:57–4:0219. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself
4:02–4:07the delimiter of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated
4:07–4:12in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes.
4:13–4:19But there is no evidence for this view. A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes
4:19–4:25is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of pervasion
4:25–4:31by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervations,
4:31–4:35subsumptive reflection concerning general perversion is impossible.
4:36–4:40Therefore, when smokehood and perversion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain,
4:40–4:45cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference.
4:47–4:52Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity.
4:54–4:5920. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce
4:59–5:05needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition.
5:06–5:12Whether or not an effect arises, a substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself
5:12–5:17a... Even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified subsumptive
5:17–5:21reflection with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of perversion.
5:22–5:27Just as, concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends perversion with the
5:27–5:31assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so subsumptive
5:31–5:38reflection concerning the mountain smoke's perversion by fire is possible. Application
5:38–5:45is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense,
5:45–5:51the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination,
5:51–5:54subsumptive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark
5:54–6:00and recollection of perversion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate
6:00–6:07means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent.
6:09–6:1422. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through
6:14–6:18the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular
6:18–6:24mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted,
6:24–6:29cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood,
6:29–6:32and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure.
6:34–6:39Recollection of the probandom fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt,
6:39–6:43treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex.
6:45–6:48Veridical perception of fire is impossible.
6:49–6:5523. In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual
6:55–7:01through a mental impression, as in this is that very dev dhattah. But fire on the mountain
7:01–7:06has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, therefore a veridical perception
7:06–7:12of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood,
7:12–7:18the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood
7:18–7:23may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the pervasion by fire in
7:23–7:28the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject,
7:28–7:32therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone.
7:34–7:38Provision is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and pro-bandom.
7:40–7:45Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, provision by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke
7:45–7:49through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is
7:49–7:57not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of perversion is impossible without direct
7:57–8:02awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived
8:02–8:06together, therefore the perversion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through
8:06–8:10sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection.
8:12–8:19Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension
8:19–8:25of the relation between qualifier and qualifacand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception
8:25–8:32of the qualifacand, and sense contact are all causes of veridical qualified perception.
8:32–8:37In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion
8:37–8:40and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain.
8:40–8:45The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular
8:45–8:50smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises.
8:51–8:55But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ,
8:55–8:58therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire.
9:00–9:04Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood.
9:07–9:1226. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through
9:12–9:16an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression, that same being pervaded by
9:16–9:22fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference,
9:22–9:27there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely
9:27–9:32through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses
9:32–9:38smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive
9:38–9:46reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark,
9:46–9:51The role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic
9:51–9:58character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand
9:58–10:02pervasion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke.
10:03–10:07Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark.
10:08–10:12Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, this mountain possesses smoke
10:12–10:17pervaded by fire, is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark
10:17–10:24and is the cause of inference. Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is
10:24–10:31subsumptive reflection, another view. 28. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is
10:31–10:37cognition that the probandom pervades the property of the subject. The probandom's pervadingness
10:37–10:42means not being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason,
10:42–10:46and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom.
10:46–10:52According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason,
10:52–10:57separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandom's pervadingness are not required.
10:58–11:02In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire,
11:02–11:08conveys the probandom's pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex,
11:08–11:12it needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the
11:12–11:17the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandum.
11:19–11:21Definition of pervadingness.
11:23–11:2829. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of
11:28–11:32inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection. Since the collocation
11:32–11:36of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred.
11:36–11:43Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the
11:43–11:47co-location of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject.
11:48–11:54If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness.
11:55–12:00In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter-positive of the absence
12:00–12:06of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its
12:06–12:09specific co-location with fire.
12:09–12:13The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the
12:13–12:18subject, only the relation of provision is known.
12:18–12:24A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact with a sense organ,
12:24–12:26subsumptive reflection is mental.
12:26–12:30The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative
12:30–12:34and negative concomitance.
12:34–12:40concerning the subject as qualifacand. 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain,
12:40–12:45known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke
12:45–12:49situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualifacand in the inferential cognition,
12:49–12:53there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal
12:53–12:57cognition is not seen to become the principal qualifacand in the resulting cognition.
12:58–13:02It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal
13:02–13:07qualificand in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificands
13:07–13:14of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs
13:14–13:20to the man produces the cognition the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established
13:20–13:25conclusion says, in the substantive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain,
13:25–13:30fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand.
13:30–13:38There is no rule that the qualificon of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificon of the resulting cognition.
13:38–13:49Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificon.
13:49–13:56Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference.
13:56–14:02only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference the reason
14:02–14:09regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause objection not mere
14:09–14:12subsumptive reflection of perversion but subsumptive reflection including the
14:12–14:16reasons perversion is the cause therefore the reason to becomes a
14:16–14:21cause reply the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection but
14:21–14:25it has no independent causality if every qualifier were regarded as an
14:25–14:28independent cause every qualifier known through sense contact in perception
14:28–14:32would have to be regarded as an independent cause.
14:32–14:36The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition
14:36–14:42of smoke but from the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain.
14:42–14:47The simultaneity of mountain and smoke in causal cognition produces cognition of fire
14:47–14:51qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time
14:51–14:55of substantive reflection is unnecessary.
14:55–14:59The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive
14:59–15:01reflection its operation.
15:01–15:05But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final
15:05–15:10cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause.
15:10–15:13The proponent of the established conclusion replies that extraordinary causality belongs
15:13–15:18precisely to subsumptive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause.
15:18–15:22The inferential mark is not the cause of inference.
15:22–15:2832. The proponent of the established conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even
15:28–15:33when past and future individual smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual
15:33–15:38smoke itself is not the extraordinary cause of inference. The prior presence or operation
15:38–15:44of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were
15:44–15:50the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible.
15:50–15:55cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of perversion, rather than the individual
15:55–15:59itself, are decisive.
15:59–16:03Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark.
16:03–16:0833. The proposal cannot be accepted that the prior absence of future smoke or destruction
16:08–16:13of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful
16:13–16:19whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction
16:19–16:22will also be doubtful.
16:22–16:27In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited
16:27–16:31by any particular past, future, or present time.
16:31–16:35Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke is the reason encouraged the defect
16:35–16:38of a pointless qualifier.
16:38–16:43The general cause of inference is not smoke but substantive reflection concerning smoke's
16:43–16:44pervasion.
16:44–16:49The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity
16:49–16:52of the particular subsumptive reflection.
16:52–16:57Subsumptive reflection in general is the cause of inference in general.
16:57–17:02Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference.
17:02–17:07Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of
17:07–17:13a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference.
17:13–17:19Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke.
17:19–17:24Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause.
17:24–17:28From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire,
17:28–17:33the subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises,
17:33–17:36this subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference.
17:36–17:44Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation.
17:44–17:51Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate
17:51–17:57operation. Cognition of pervasion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation.
17:59–18:04But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of pervasion arises as
18:04–18:08the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter.
18:08–18:12Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference.
18:12–18:22The hypothetical reasoning if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion. It is not an operation of subsumptive reflection.
18:23–18:27With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end.
18:30–18:32Purely Affirmative Inference.
18:34–18:36Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference.
18:38–18:43Inferences of three kinds, Purely Affirmative, Purely Negative, and Affirmative Negative.
18:43–18:48An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative.
18:48–18:54Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable.
18:54–19:03Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus of the absence of nameability is impossible.
19:03–19:06Objection to the definition.
19:06–19:15Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible.
19:15–19:22Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative.
19:22–19:29Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative,
19:29–19:35and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be indeterminate.
19:35–19:41Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative.
19:41–19:48An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject.
19:48–19:53Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative.
19:53–20:02Defect in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter positive of
20:02–20:06an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative
20:06–20:14is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the pervasion of
20:14–20:18a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the
20:18–20:24subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus
20:24–20:30of the counter positive of their own absolute absence are not purely affirmative.
20:30–20:35The absolute absence that destroys a quality is not purely affirmative.
20:35–20:414. It should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction
20:41–20:45of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere.
20:45–20:50In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence
20:50–20:56destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only
20:56–21:01the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus
21:01–21:07of the quality no longer exists. Therefore the absolute absence destroying equality is
21:07–21:16not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative.
21:16–21:21Here is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative.
21:21–21:27If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive,
21:27–21:32requires a locus of the destruction of ether.
21:32–21:36Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence
21:36–21:40of mutual absence is a separate property.
21:40–21:44Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it, the absence of an
21:44–21:46absence.
21:46–21:52this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end.
21:52–21:59Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property
21:59–22:06that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence is purely affirmative. The
22:06–22:12sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination
22:12–22:18or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence.
22:18–22:23the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative.
22:23–22:28In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability
22:28–22:33are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated absolute
22:33–22:36absences.
22:36–22:39Knowability is purely affirmative.
22:39–22:44Objection, knowability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be
22:44–22:45generalized.
22:45–22:52Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, objecthood
22:52–22:57of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies
22:57–23:01to many individuals and can be generalized.
23:01–23:05A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual.
23:05–23:10In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive
23:10–23:13cognition such as inheritance.
23:13–23:18At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting
23:18–23:22the individual must also be admitted.
23:22–23:27Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word.
23:27–23:32Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual,
23:32–23:37Therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

Plain text

अबजेक्षिन, अग्डिन इन्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्विश्विल च्� With this, the prima facie examination of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Established conclusion concerning subsumptive reflection, cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is the cause. 14. The established conclusion is this, according to the first, earlier view, a cognition involving doubt about smoke or light being pervaded by fire arises, Thereafter there is ascertainment of perversion and the form smoke or light is pervaded by fire and cognition of subject propertyhood and the form smoke or light is a property of the mountain. On the basis of these two, the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In the opposing view, separate ascertainment of perversion and cognition of subject propertyhood before inference are not regarded as indispensable, nevertheless, Gaugia, as proponent of the established conclusion, regards substantive reflection as the extraordinary cause of inference. Otherness from that is not the reason. 15. It may be proposed that difference from smoke or light is itself the reason. But such, otherness from that, is not a delimiter of pervasion, because it creates unnecessary breadth and the possibility of deviation. Only inappropriate property such as smokehood or lighthood delimits reasonhood. Otherness from that is not pervaded by fire. 16. The objection is untenable that difference from smoke or light is pervaded only by fire. In fact, many things distinct from smoke or light are not pervaded by fire. Therefore adopting such an additional qualifier is pointless. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light arises solely from cognition of smoke or light delimited by the appropriate property delimiting pervasion by fire, smokehood or lighthood. Cognition of being pervaded is perceptual. Objection, cognition that smoke or light is pervaded by fire arises from perception, not inference. Reply, perception of smoke or light, assisted by recollection of perversion and apprehension of subject propertyhood, can produce cognitions smoke or light pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. Here perception of the difference of smokehood or lighthood and apprehension of the qualifier, qualificon relation are decisive. Cognition of otherness from that is a cooperative cause of perception. It may be objected that cognition of difference from smoke or light rests upon a pointless qualifier and therefore cannot be a cooperative cause of direct apprehension that smoke or light is pervaded by fire. But this objection is untenable. Although cognition of difference from smoke or light contains an additional qualifier, through perception of the difference between affirmative and negative concomitance it assists direct apprehension of the pervasion of smoke or light by fire. Yet this cognition is not itself a cause of inference, because of the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of smoke or light, is cognition that smoke or light pervaded by fire occurs in the subject. In verbally generated subsumptive reflection too, the cognition's smoke or light is pervaded by fire and there is smoke or light on the mountain because subsumptive reflection, therefore cognition of smoke or light as pervaded is admissible as a cause of inference. Being pervaded by fire is not the delimiter of pervasion by fire. 19. It may be held that the being pervaded by fire of smoke pervaded by fire is itself the delimiter of the smokehood pervaded by fire, that is, the being pervaded by fire instantiated in each individual smoke delimits the general pervasion instantiated in all smokes. But there is no evidence for this view. A general pervasion instantiated in all individual smokes is not separately established, in perceptual or verbal cognition, only the presence of pervasion by fire in each individual smoke is apprehended. Without cognition of these individual pervations, subsumptive reflection concerning general perversion is impossible. Therefore, when smokehood and perversion are jointly apprehended in the smoke on the mountain, cognition of perversion together with determination of the subject is the cause of inference. Accepting the causality of qualified cognition does not incur unnecessary complexity. 20. Accepting the causal efficacy of qualified subsumptive cognition does not introduce needless complexity into inference. Its causality is supported by evidence concerning causal cognition. Whether or not an effect arises, a substantial commitment concerning causality is not itself a... Even with smoke not in sense contact, the mind can produce qualified subsumptive reflection with the assistance of cognition of smokehood and recollection of perversion. Just as, concerning the partlessness of an atom, the mind apprehends perversion with the assistance of cognition obtained by a prior inference and recollection, so subsumptive reflection concerning the mountain smoke's perversion by fire is possible. Application is not a separate means of knowledge. Even without the operation of an external sense, the mind produces cognition of association generated by thought, like poetic imagination, subsumptive reflection is possible on the basis of resemblance of an inferential mark and recollection of perversion. Therefore application need not be accepted as a separate means of knowledge. The view of apprehending identity with the pervaded is incoherent. 22. The view is unacceptable that the pervasion of all individual smokes by fire is known through the universal smokehood and that the mind apprehends the identity of the particular mountain smoke with that pervaded smoke. For if such apprehension of identity is admitted, cognition of the probandom fire would itself arise from cognition of subject propertyhood, and the necessity of subsumptive reflection would become obscure. Recollection of the probandom fire may arise independently at the prompting of doubt, treating it as a component of cognition of smoke's pervasion is unnecessarily complex. Veridical perception of fire is impossible. 23. In recognition, a qualifier previously known is apprehended again in the same individual through a mental impression, as in this is that very dev dhattah. But fire on the mountain has not previously been perceptually known as a qualifier, therefore a veridical perception of fire cannot arise merely from an impression. In an example such as the fragrance of sandalwood, the fragrance was previously perceptually known, hence cognition of fragrance in visible sandalwood may be said to be possible with the assistance of an impression. But the pervasion by fire in the mountain smoke has not previously been known as a property of that particular subject, therefore direct subsumptive reflection is not established by an impression alone. Provision is not apprehended without direct awareness of reason and pro-bandom. Objection, just as in kitchen smoke, provision by fire may be apprehended in mountain smoke through the cooperation of a sense organ and an impression, even though the mountain fire is not directly perceived. Reply, direct perception of perversion is impossible without direct awareness of both reason and probandom. The mountain smoke and fire are not both perceived together, therefore the perversion by fire and mountain smoke is known not through sense-generated perception but through subsumptive reflection based on recollection. Reply, causes of qualified perception. Cognition of the qualifier, apprehension of the relation between qualifier and qualifacand, non-apprehension of their non-relation, perception of the qualifacand, and sense contact are all causes of veridical qualified perception. In inferring fire on the mountain, there is recollection of the smoke of fire pervasion and cognition of smoke's presence on the mountain. The smoke of fire pervasion is one in general, with the assistance of perception of a particular smokehood and sense contact, subsumptive reflection concerning smoke pervaded by fire arises. But fire on the mountain is not itself in contact with a sense organ, therefore there is no perception of the mountain as qualified by fire. Inference through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire in smokehood. 26. Some scholars say that being pervaded by fire is first apprehended in smokehood through an indirect relation, through the resulting mental impression, that same being pervaded by fire is recognized in the mountain smoke. From this subsumptive reflection the inference, there is fire on the mountain arises. In other words, inference arises merely through subsumptive reflection of being pervaded by fire and smokehood, the mountain possesses smokehood pervaded by fire. The individual inferential mark and the third subsumptive reflection are causes. But if only the universal smokehood is regarded as the inferential mark, The role of the individual smoke disappears and collection of all individuals through generic character contact becomes unnecessary. In practice, even one who does not understand pervasion at the level of the universal infers fire from an individual smoke. Therefore the individual smoke must be regarded as the inferential mark. Smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, or, this mountain possesses smoke pervaded by fire, is the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark and is the cause of inference. Cognition that the probandom pervades the subject property is subsumptive reflection, another view. 28. Other scholars hold that subsumptive reflection is cognition that the probandom pervades the property of the subject. The probandom's pervadingness means not being the counter positive of an absence of the probandom co-located with the reason, and the reasons being pervaded means its co-location with the probandom. According to this view, inference arises from cognition that the probandom pervades the reason, separate cognitions of subject propertyhood and the probandom's pervadingness are not required. In the example, the sentence wherever there is smoke, there is fire, conveys the probandom's pervadingness. But this view is unnecessarily complex, it needlessly multiplies the requirement for joint cognition of pervasion by the the probandum, subject propertyhood, or a subject possessing something pervaded by the probandum. Definition of pervadingness. 29. Objection. If the subsumptive reflection, fire pervades the mountain smoke, is the cause of inference, then fire alone will be the object of subsumptive reflection. Since the collocation of smoke and mountain has not previously been admitted, nothing will remain to be inferred. Reply, cognition of pervadingness, that is, cognition of fire's invariable relation to the co-location of the mountain smoke, depends upon cognition that smoke occurs in the subject. If remembered pervasion is admitted, the same rule applies to cognition of fire's pervadingness. In fact, fire's pervadingness consists in not being the counter-positive of the absence of the probandom, it is not co-location with smoke. Smokes being pervaded resides in its specific co-location with fire. The inference is not fruitless here, because fire has not already been established in the subject, only the relation of provision is known. A visible subsumptive reflection is not indispensable, when fire is not in contact with a sense organ, subsumptive reflection is mental. The fact that smoke is in sense contact does not weaken the regulation of affirmative and negative concomitance. concerning the subject as qualifacand. 30. It may be objected that the subject mountain, known in subsumptive cognition as subordinate or as a qualifier, as in, fire pervades the smoke situated on the mountain, cannot become the principal qualifacand in the inferential cognition, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, since what is subordinate in causal cognition is not seen to become the principal qualifacand in the resulting cognition. It cannot be said that the mountain has already been established as the principal qualificand in the experiential inference, there is fire on the mountain, because the qualificands of causal cognition and resulting cognition may differ. For example, the cognition the staff belongs to the man produces the cognition the man is staff-bearing. The proponent of the established conclusion says, in the substantive reflection fire pervades smoke situated on the mountain, fire is the qualificand, but in the resulting inference the mountain is the qualificand. There is no rule that the qualificon of causal cognition must necessarily remain the qualificon of the resulting cognition. Therefore subsumptive reflection concerning the reasons presence in the subject produces an inference in which the subject, the locus of the probandom, becomes the principal qualificon. Subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark, not the mark itself, is the cause of inference. only subsumptive reflection of perversion is the cause of inference the reason regarded as qualified by perversion is not itself the cause objection not mere subsumptive reflection of perversion but subsumptive reflection including the reasons perversion is the cause therefore the reason to becomes a cause reply the reason is present as a qualifier in subsumptive reflection but it has no independent causality if every qualifier were regarded as an independent cause every qualifier known through sense contact in perception would have to be regarded as an independent cause. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises not from cognition of smoke but from the substantive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain. The simultaneity of mountain and smoke in causal cognition produces cognition of fire qualified by the mountain and the resulting cognition, apprehension of a particular time of substantive reflection is unnecessary. The prima facie opponent says that the reason is the extraordinary cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. But no separate operation follows subsumptive reflection, therefore, although the final cause, subsumptive reflection would not be the extraordinary cause. The proponent of the established conclusion replies that extraordinary causality belongs precisely to subsumptive reflection, smoke alone is not the cause. The inferential mark is not the cause of inference. 32. The proponent of the established conclusion says that inference of fire is possible even when past and future individual smokes are cognized, therefore the present individual smoke itself is not the extraordinary cause of inference. The prior presence or operation of smoke is not always required. If only the present individual smoke were the cause, inference from cognition of future or past smoke would be impossible. cognition of the individual reason and subsumptive reflection of perversion, rather than the individual itself, are decisive. Prior absence or destruction is not the inferential mark. 33. The proposal cannot be accepted that the prior absence of future smoke or destruction of past smoke is presently existent and is therefore the reason. When it is doubtful whether an individual smoke is past, future, or present, its prior absence or destruction will also be doubtful. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, cognition is not delimited by any particular past, future, or present time. Treating the prior absence or destruction of smoke is the reason encouraged the defect of a pointless qualifier. The general cause of inference is not smoke but substantive reflection concerning smoke's pervasion. The validity or invalidity of a particular inference depends upon the validity or invalidity of the particular subsumptive reflection. Subsumptive reflection in general is the cause of inference in general. Cognition of the individual is the extraordinary cause of inference. Proposal, the validity of subsumptive reflection is connected with the actual presence of a present reason, therefore present smoke is the extraordinary cause of inference. Reply, subsumptive reflection may be valid concerning past, future, or present smoke. Therefore the temporal presence of the individual smoke is not the cause. From the cognition of perversion wherever there is smoke, there is fire, the subsumptive reflection smoke situated on the mountain is pervaded by fire arises, this subsumptive reflection alone is the cause of inference. Alternative view, cognition of perversion is the cause and subsumptive reflection its operation. Some scholars say that subsumptive reflection is not the extraordinary cause because it has no separate operation. Cognition of pervasion is the extraordinary cause, and subsumptive reflection is its operation. But the proponent of the established conclusion says that recollection of pervasion arises as the result of an imonic impression and subsumptive reflection arises thereafter. Subsumptive reflection itself, as the final cause, produces inference. The hypothetical reasoning if smoke were not pervaded by fire, it would not be an effective fire apprehends pervasion. It is not an operation of subsumptive reflection. With this, the doctrine of subsumptive reflection comes to an end. Purely Affirmative Inference. Definition of Purely Affirmative Inference. Inferences of three kinds, Purely Affirmative, Purely Negative, and Affirmative Negative. An inference in which the probandom has no counter instance is purely affirmative. Example, a jar is nameable because it is knowable. Nameability has no counter instance, because in both manifest and unmanifest states a locus of the absence of nameability is impossible. Objection to the definition. Objection, an unnameable object can be referred to by the word ether, therefore a counter instance of nameability is possible. Then the inference nameability is devoid of the unnameable because it is a property would not remain purely affirmative. Reply, if unnameability is not distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be purely affirmative, and if unnameability is regarded as distinct from the unnameable, the probandom will be indeterminate. Therefore this inference does not establish that nameability is purely affirmative. An inference is purely affirmative when the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject. Only a probandom possessing no counter-instance is called purely affirmative. Defect in the alternative definition. It cannot be said that being the counter positive of an absolute absence and being excluded are of many kinds and therefore the purely affirmative is a separate type. Both are knowable in a generalized form. Only the pervasion of a property whose counter positive of an absolute absence is not present in the subject becomes purely affirmative. Conjunction and the like, which also occur in the locus of the counter positive of their own absolute absence are not purely affirmative. The absolute absence that destroys a quality is not purely affirmative. 4. It should not be held that the absolute absence destroying a quality, produced by destruction of its substratum, is purely affirmative because it occurs everywhere. In the locus where the prior absence destroying the quality exists, the absolute absence destroying the quality cannot coexist. Before destruction of the substratum there is only the prior absence destroying the quality, after destruction of the substratum, the very locus of the quality no longer exists. Therefore the absolute absence destroying equality is not purely affirmative. The absolute absence destroying ether is not purely affirmative. Here is the absolute absence destroying ether purely affirmative. If destruction of ether is taken as its counter positive, its absolute absence, as counter positive, requires a locus of the destruction of ether. Absolute absence is generally in the form of a counter positive, the absolute absence of mutual absence is a separate property. Therefore it cannot be regarded as purely affirmative merely by calling it, the absence of an absence. this, the prima facie account of purely affirmative inference comes to an end. Purely affirmative inference, established conclusion. Established conclusion, a property that is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence is purely affirmative. The sole counter positive of the absolute absence of ether is ether, but ether is without origination or destruction and therefore is not the counter positive of an instantiated absolute absence. the absolute absence of ether can be purely affirmative. In inferences such as, a jar is knowable because it is nameable, both nameability and knowability are purely affirmative because they are not the counter positives of instantiated absolute absences. Knowability is purely affirmative. Objection, knowability, meaning being the object of veridical cognition, cannot be generalized. Reply, through an indirect relation to the character of being a means of knowledge, objecthood of veridical cognition is realized in jars and the like, in this way no ability applies to many individuals and can be generalized. A word assists apprehension of the delimiter of an individual. In cognition of an individual, the relation of a universal is quickly known through pervasive cognition such as inheritance. At the time of cognizing a word's power in an individual, cognition of the property delimiting the individual must also be admitted. Cognition of the individual is the denotatum of a word. Some scholars say that in linguistic usage a word first produces cognition of an individual, Therefore a word denotes cognition of an individual, not cognition of a universal.

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