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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 19:50
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0:04–0:11Section 3. Debate on the difference between qualities and their substantial substrate.
0:11–0:24Let there then be no self, because qualities and their substrate are mutually identical, consequently, only momentary cognitions will remain in the world.
0:24–0:25No.
0:25–0:35In reply we say that the same object is certainly recognized through the distinct experiences of seeing and touching.
0:35–0:52The question now is whether the object of this cognition is a single quality such as color or touch, an aggregate of both, an entity distinct from both, a form corresponding to no real object, or an utterly non-existent thing.
0:52–1:00Refutation of the view that a single quality such as color or touch is the object of recognition.
1:00–1:03The first alternative is unacceptable.
1:03–1:08It is not the case that whatever is color is also touch.
1:08–1:17Nor is color apprehended by the sense of touch, otherwise a blind person would also experience color.
1:17–1:26Nor can it be said that one and the same thing appears in different forms because of different instruments of cognition.
1:26–1:39If this were admitted, no stable uniformity would remain in the supposed thing and the determinate distinction between difference and identity would also be endangered.
1:39–1:44Consideration of the second among the five alternatives above.
1:44–1:48The second alternative is also unacceptable.
1:48–1:53What is the basis of the proposed aggregate, coexistence,
1:53–1:57simultaneity, production of one and the same effect
1:57–2:00or production from one and the same cause?
2:00–2:05Refutation of the first of the four grounds for the second alternative,
2:05–2:07a common substrate.
2:07–2:11If the aggregate is grounded in a common substrate,
2:11–2:16it cannot be because the qualities have a common material cause,
2:16–2:20for each quality has its own distinct material cause,
2:20–2:25color is caused by color, touch by touch, and so on.
2:25–2:29If one common material cause of all is admitted,
2:29–2:35that will be substance itself, with the admission of substance the dispute ends.
2:35–2:40Nor can coexistence be established by taking some place,
2:40–2:45such as the ground as the common substrate of the qualities.
2:45–2:52According to the Buddhist view, the pot is identical with a particular color and is seen by the eye,
2:52–2:58the ground is likewise identical with another color and is seen by the eye.
2:58–3:06Thus in one determinate cognition the pot may be understood as dependent and the ground as substrate.
3:06–3:17But qualities such as touch located in the ground cannot be determined by any such means of cognition, because the eye does not apprehend touch.
3:17–3:25Nor will this substrate dependent relation be established through the mediation of the tactile sense.
3:25–3:34The tactile sense can yield only cognition of a substrate dependent relation between the touch of the ground and the touch of the pot.
3:34–3:41Nor is it possible to regard the aggregate of qualities itself as one substrate because
3:41–3:48mutual dependence arises, the qualities are regarded as an aggregate in order to establish
3:48–3:56their common substrate and a common substrate is sought in order to establish their aggregation.
3:56–4:00This view also produces an infinite rigorous.
4:00–4:07The ground accepted as substrate will itself be an aggregate of qualities only if it to
4:07–4:13has a common substrate, but the unity of that substrate will fall into the same difficulty
4:13–4:15again.
4:15–4:19Refutation of the second ground, Simultanity.
4:19–4:25Since color, touch, and the like are not apprehended by a single sense, their mere
4:25–4:31Other presents at the same time cannot make them an aggregate either.
4:31–4:34There is no valid reason for this.
4:34–4:41If simultaneity alone were sufficient, a donkey and a camel present at the same time would
4:41–4:44also become one aggregate.
4:44–4:49It cannot be said that cognition of their difference prevents the appearance of an
4:49–4:55aggregate because in the present case to ignorance of difference is impossible.
4:55–5:02Refutation of the third ground, production of one and the same effect.
5:02–5:09For the reason already stated namely that each quality has a distinct material cause
5:09–5:14the qualities cannot be made into an aggregate on the ground that they produce one and
5:14–5:20the same effect, no unitary effect is produced by the qualities.
5:20–5:27It is improper to say that the pot as an aggregate of qualities, such as color and touch produces
5:27–5:32the single action of holding or carrying water.
5:32–5:38In the Buddhist view, water itself is not one object but an aggregate of qualities,
5:38–5:41such as color and touch.
5:41–5:48Here is no proof that the aggregate of these qualities produces each of those qualities.
5:48–5:53The very proposition that the aggregate, which is being established through the argument of
5:53–6:00producing one effect, produces each quality remains unestablished.
6:00–6:05Refutation of the fourth ground, having one and the same cause.
6:05–6:11For the same reason, the qualities cannot form and aggregate on the ground of having
6:11–6:19one cause. If qualities are regarded as connected without any basis, this usage would extend
6:19–6:24even to things that cannot be connected with one another.
6:24–6:33Acceptance of the third original alternative There is no dispute concerning the third alternative.
6:33–6:41of the fourth and fifth alternatives. The fourth alternative too is unacceptable. It
6:41–6:48may be maintained either on the basis of Vijannavada or by saying that cognition of unity is false
6:48–6:56like the illusion of seeing two moons. If the first alternative is accepted, why grant
6:56–7:03special favor to the qualities and regard them as real? According to Vijannavada,
7:03–7:08Cognition of unity and other cognitions are alike objectless.
7:08–7:12The second alternative too is unacceptable.
7:12–7:19Cognition of unity is true because it reaches its object and produces successful activity.
7:19–7:23Both are criteria of truth in the Buddhist view.
7:23–7:29Can it be said that these two criteria concern the separate qualities?
7:29–7:35Then why not say that they concern only the unitary substrate of the qualities and not
7:35–7:42the qualities themselves? Any reason offered against this would be neither the impossibility
7:42–7:49of acting simultaneously or successively nor the coexistence of the opposed red and non-red.
7:49–7:56Both reasons have already been refuted. Moreover, such a reason does not apply to
7:56–8:04momentary things and colored atoms, it is directed only against permanence and grossness.
8:04–8:12Do qualities not reside in anything at all? Then let them remain unrelated. But the question
8:12–8:20will arise, how does a thing appear as possessing qualities? The answer might be that just
8:20–8:27as, in your Buddhist view, the body appears conscious though it is not conscious, qualities,
8:27–8:34though not residing in anything, generate cognition that makes the thing appear qualified.
8:34–8:39But if every successful action produced by a substance can be explained through the
8:39–8:45casualty of qualities, why admit a substance distinct from the qualities?
8:45–8:51The same reply can be made if every relevant successful action can be explained solely
8:51–8:57through the casualty of the whole, why admit separate qualities?
8:57–9:03If the answer is that qualities are known and are therefore accepted, the question concerning
9:03–9:08substance can be answered in exactly the same way.
9:08–9:14This refutation also disposes of the fifth alternative, that the object of cognition
9:14–9:22of unity is an unreal thing. Objection to the proof of identity between qualities and
9:22–9:29their substrate and its refutation. But does not the proof that qualities and their substrate
9:29–9:37are identical oppose the reality of substance? It does, but what is that proof? Is it that
9:37–9:44qualities and substrate necessarily appear together? No. Their necessary
9:44–9:50co-appearance is not established. For example, in the cognition of a white conch,
9:50–9:56the conch is cognized even when its whiteness is not, as when it appears
9:56–10:02yellow because of a disorder of buying. Should it be said that the conch
10:02–10:08Conch appearing yellow is not the real conch but only a conch like object like the illusory
10:08–10:13hairs seen by a person afflicted with an eye disorder.
10:13–10:18What prejudice against the reality of qualified objects is this.
10:18–10:24The opponent of the substrate of qualities is so deluded that he regards illusory hairs
10:24–10:30as unreal because they can neither be touched nor perform successful action.
10:30–10:37Although the conch can be touched and performs useful action, he calls it an illusion merely
10:37–10:43because whiteness itself did not appear in the cognition of the white conch.
10:43–10:49Can it be said that whiteness pervades the conch throughout, so when cognition of whiteness
10:49–10:54disappears, cognition of the conch should also disappear?
10:54–11:00When it must be asked whether the pervader and pervaded are the objects themselves or
11:00–11:03their cognitions.
11:03–11:07If the objects themselves, there is no dispute.
11:07–11:13The mere disappearance of the pervader's appearance does not abolish either the pervading object
11:13–11:15or its appearance.
11:15–11:23Otherwise, when fire is not cognized or seen, smoke and cognition of smoke would
11:23–11:30also disappear. Why do you not say there that what appears when fire is unseen is smoke like
11:30–11:38but not smoke? It is clear that the disappearance of cognition of the pervader does not abolish
11:38–11:44the pervaded itself, the pervaded is abolished when the pervading object is destroyed, and
11:44–11:51in the present example the pervading object has not been destroyed. The same applies
11:51–11:58here. If an invariable concomitance between the two cognitions is maintained, the present
11:58–12:04example itself breaks it because cognition of the conch occurs even without cognition
12:04–12:12of whiteness. Does a new yellow conch then arise at every moment? No, another person free
12:12–12:20from the biliary disorder sees only whiteness in that same conch. Another objection and
12:20–12:27and its refutation. Nor can unequal strength of co-cognitions be the ground for the identity
12:27–12:35of quality and substrate, because the reason over extends. For example, the faint whiteness
12:35–12:42of a pot is seen together with the intense whiteness of light, yet the two are distinct.
12:42–12:49Are they not identical because they occupy different places? No. If coexistence in
12:49–12:56In the same place is added as a condition to co-cognition, a quality itself will not stand
12:56–12:59in the same manner with its substrate.
12:59–13:07Moreover, body and self do not fail to coexist, and both are known as mind, yet they are not
13:07–13:08one.
13:08–13:13Thus the qualified reason to overextends.
13:13–13:19body and self not co-existent because the self remains even when the body does not?
13:19–13:27No, the same is true of quality and substrate. A substrate is known as qualified by another
13:27–13:35quality of the same kind even when one particular instance of a quality is absent. But the
13:35–13:41reverse never occurs. No quality is known when its substrate is not known, although
13:41–13:48the substrate can be known without the quality. The reply is that the same holds of body and
13:48–13:56self. According to the Buddhist's own view, if the self or consciousness is not knowable,
13:56–14:02cognition of the body is impossible, yet cognition of the self can occur without cognition
14:02–14:09of the body. In addition, even if the causal complexes of the cognition and production
14:09–14:16off to things are always connected, so that they always appear together and occupy the
14:16–14:23same place, they may still remain distinct because they appear endowed with opposed properties.
14:23–14:26Why should these two facts conflict?
14:26–14:30What is the opposition of properties?
14:30–14:37In the present context its examples are, when one is known, the other is not known,
14:37–14:45When one is mentioned, the other is not mentioned, when one is negated, the other is not negated,
14:45–14:47and so forth.
14:47–14:53In the sentence the blue lotus moves, what is intended is in fact the lotus qualified
14:53–14:58by blue color, not the negation of the non blue by the lotus.
14:58–15:04The arguments previously given against the doctrine of a poha should be applied.
15:04–15:11It should be noted that sometimes negation itself appears as a qualifier in cognition,
15:11–15:16as in this is neither a cow nor a horse, and so forth.
15:16–15:18Another refutation.
15:18–15:24If a substrate and the quality residing in it were identical, how could one and the
15:24–15:31same object appear clear when seen from nearby and indistinct when seen from afar?
15:31–15:38Does the same object arise qualified simultaneously by clarity and indistinctness in relation to
15:38–15:42observers situated at different distances?
15:42–15:48No, one thing cannot possess to distinct properties at once.
15:48–15:53Are there then two objects, one indistinct and the other clear?
15:53–16:01No, the object is recognized as having the same form and occupying the same place.
16:01–16:06This recognition of occupying the same place cannot be illusory.
16:06–16:12A person approaching the object from afar does not see it change its place.
16:12–16:18Nor is this cognition of the object objectless, otherwise the cognition would not be tied
16:18–16:25to a particular object, such as a particular tree in a particular place.
16:25–16:29Objection to the foregoing refutation and a partial answer.
16:29–16:36Can this specific object directedness of cognition be regarded as produced by a preceding non-conceptual
16:36–16:39cognition having the same object?
16:39–16:46It can, but non-conceptual cognition does not take the place of its object as an object.
16:46–16:54If it does take the place as its object, the place itself will be an object of cognition.
16:54–17:02For regarding a thing as the object of cognition, its mere occurrence in cognition is sufficient.
17:02–17:09It is improper to say that only the place is the object and not the tree situated there
17:09–17:14and that therefore the tree is not known clearly or indistinctly.
17:14–17:21If the tree cannot be both indistinct and clear at once, neither can the place.
17:21–17:28Can it be said that all qualities of a distant object are clearly apprehended in non-conceptual
17:28–17:34cognition, but conceptual cognition fails to apprehend some of them and therefore is not
17:34–17:35clear?
17:35–17:37No.
17:37–17:43Except for a yogine whose sight has been purified by the collirium of yoga, an ordinary
17:43–17:50person cannot be said to see clearly the distant motions of the constellations.
17:50–17:57refutation of the objection. Moreover, there is no reason why conceptual cognition should
17:57–18:05not arise concerning every object supposedly apprehended by non-conceptual cognition. Some
18:05–18:11cause is required to explain why what was known non-conceptually is not apprehended
18:11–18:17conceptually. Is the cause the failure of a desire for such cognition to arise after
18:17–18:24the non-conceptual cognition? No. After knowing an object non-conceptually
18:24–18:31together with all its qualities, when the observer moves away from that object, he
18:31–18:37no longer has immediate perceptual cognition of it even though memory of the first cognition
18:37–18:45remains. A minor objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer. If non-conceptual
18:45–18:51Cognition of an object together with all its properties is possible even without conceptual
18:51–18:59cognition of them, why not suppose that every person knows everything at all times non-conceptually,
18:59–19:00though not conceptually?
19:00–19:07If, because of a defect, an object is mistaken for its opposite or for something different
19:07–19:12from itself, is its real nature not known conceptually?
19:12–19:13No.
19:13–19:20conceptual cognition were inconsistent with the non-conceptual cognition preceding it,
19:20–19:27no conceptual cognition would be trustworthy. Yet in the case of a distant object, even
19:27–19:33in the absence of any opposed non-conceptual cognition, the conjunction or disjunction
19:33–19:40of its front part with its rear part is not known conceptually. Why, then, is this
19:40–19:44conjunction or disjunction not known non conceptually.

Plain text

Section 3. Debate on the difference between qualities and their substantial substrate. Let there then be no self, because qualities and their substrate are mutually identical, consequently, only momentary cognitions will remain in the world. No. In reply we say that the same object is certainly recognized through the distinct experiences of seeing and touching. The question now is whether the object of this cognition is a single quality such as color or touch, an aggregate of both, an entity distinct from both, a form corresponding to no real object, or an utterly non-existent thing. Refutation of the view that a single quality such as color or touch is the object of recognition. The first alternative is unacceptable. It is not the case that whatever is color is also touch. Nor is color apprehended by the sense of touch, otherwise a blind person would also experience color. Nor can it be said that one and the same thing appears in different forms because of different instruments of cognition. If this were admitted, no stable uniformity would remain in the supposed thing and the determinate distinction between difference and identity would also be endangered. Consideration of the second among the five alternatives above. The second alternative is also unacceptable. What is the basis of the proposed aggregate, coexistence, simultaneity, production of one and the same effect or production from one and the same cause? Refutation of the first of the four grounds for the second alternative, a common substrate. If the aggregate is grounded in a common substrate, it cannot be because the qualities have a common material cause, for each quality has its own distinct material cause, color is caused by color, touch by touch, and so on. If one common material cause of all is admitted, that will be substance itself, with the admission of substance the dispute ends. Nor can coexistence be established by taking some place, such as the ground as the common substrate of the qualities. According to the Buddhist view, the pot is identical with a particular color and is seen by the eye, the ground is likewise identical with another color and is seen by the eye. Thus in one determinate cognition the pot may be understood as dependent and the ground as substrate. But qualities such as touch located in the ground cannot be determined by any such means of cognition, because the eye does not apprehend touch. Nor will this substrate dependent relation be established through the mediation of the tactile sense. The tactile sense can yield only cognition of a substrate dependent relation between the touch of the ground and the touch of the pot. Nor is it possible to regard the aggregate of qualities itself as one substrate because mutual dependence arises, the qualities are regarded as an aggregate in order to establish their common substrate and a common substrate is sought in order to establish their aggregation. This view also produces an infinite rigorous. The ground accepted as substrate will itself be an aggregate of qualities only if it to has a common substrate, but the unity of that substrate will fall into the same difficulty again. Refutation of the second ground, Simultanity. Since color, touch, and the like are not apprehended by a single sense, their mere Other presents at the same time cannot make them an aggregate either. There is no valid reason for this. If simultaneity alone were sufficient, a donkey and a camel present at the same time would also become one aggregate. It cannot be said that cognition of their difference prevents the appearance of an aggregate because in the present case to ignorance of difference is impossible. Refutation of the third ground, production of one and the same effect. For the reason already stated namely that each quality has a distinct material cause the qualities cannot be made into an aggregate on the ground that they produce one and the same effect, no unitary effect is produced by the qualities. It is improper to say that the pot as an aggregate of qualities, such as color and touch produces the single action of holding or carrying water. In the Buddhist view, water itself is not one object but an aggregate of qualities, such as color and touch. Here is no proof that the aggregate of these qualities produces each of those qualities. The very proposition that the aggregate, which is being established through the argument of producing one effect, produces each quality remains unestablished. Refutation of the fourth ground, having one and the same cause. For the same reason, the qualities cannot form and aggregate on the ground of having one cause. If qualities are regarded as connected without any basis, this usage would extend even to things that cannot be connected with one another. Acceptance of the third original alternative There is no dispute concerning the third alternative. of the fourth and fifth alternatives. The fourth alternative too is unacceptable. It may be maintained either on the basis of Vijannavada or by saying that cognition of unity is false like the illusion of seeing two moons. If the first alternative is accepted, why grant special favor to the qualities and regard them as real? According to Vijannavada, Cognition of unity and other cognitions are alike objectless. The second alternative too is unacceptable. Cognition of unity is true because it reaches its object and produces successful activity. Both are criteria of truth in the Buddhist view. Can it be said that these two criteria concern the separate qualities? Then why not say that they concern only the unitary substrate of the qualities and not the qualities themselves? Any reason offered against this would be neither the impossibility of acting simultaneously or successively nor the coexistence of the opposed red and non-red. Both reasons have already been refuted. Moreover, such a reason does not apply to momentary things and colored atoms, it is directed only against permanence and grossness. Do qualities not reside in anything at all? Then let them remain unrelated. But the question will arise, how does a thing appear as possessing qualities? The answer might be that just as, in your Buddhist view, the body appears conscious though it is not conscious, qualities, though not residing in anything, generate cognition that makes the thing appear qualified. But if every successful action produced by a substance can be explained through the casualty of qualities, why admit a substance distinct from the qualities? The same reply can be made if every relevant successful action can be explained solely through the casualty of the whole, why admit separate qualities? If the answer is that qualities are known and are therefore accepted, the question concerning substance can be answered in exactly the same way. This refutation also disposes of the fifth alternative, that the object of cognition of unity is an unreal thing. Objection to the proof of identity between qualities and their substrate and its refutation. But does not the proof that qualities and their substrate are identical oppose the reality of substance? It does, but what is that proof? Is it that qualities and substrate necessarily appear together? No. Their necessary co-appearance is not established. For example, in the cognition of a white conch, the conch is cognized even when its whiteness is not, as when it appears yellow because of a disorder of buying. Should it be said that the conch Conch appearing yellow is not the real conch but only a conch like object like the illusory hairs seen by a person afflicted with an eye disorder. What prejudice against the reality of qualified objects is this. The opponent of the substrate of qualities is so deluded that he regards illusory hairs as unreal because they can neither be touched nor perform successful action. Although the conch can be touched and performs useful action, he calls it an illusion merely because whiteness itself did not appear in the cognition of the white conch. Can it be said that whiteness pervades the conch throughout, so when cognition of whiteness disappears, cognition of the conch should also disappear? When it must be asked whether the pervader and pervaded are the objects themselves or their cognitions. If the objects themselves, there is no dispute. The mere disappearance of the pervader's appearance does not abolish either the pervading object or its appearance. Otherwise, when fire is not cognized or seen, smoke and cognition of smoke would also disappear. Why do you not say there that what appears when fire is unseen is smoke like but not smoke? It is clear that the disappearance of cognition of the pervader does not abolish the pervaded itself, the pervaded is abolished when the pervading object is destroyed, and in the present example the pervading object has not been destroyed. The same applies here. If an invariable concomitance between the two cognitions is maintained, the present example itself breaks it because cognition of the conch occurs even without cognition of whiteness. Does a new yellow conch then arise at every moment? No, another person free from the biliary disorder sees only whiteness in that same conch. Another objection and and its refutation. Nor can unequal strength of co-cognitions be the ground for the identity of quality and substrate, because the reason over extends. For example, the faint whiteness of a pot is seen together with the intense whiteness of light, yet the two are distinct. Are they not identical because they occupy different places? No. If coexistence in In the same place is added as a condition to co-cognition, a quality itself will not stand in the same manner with its substrate. Moreover, body and self do not fail to coexist, and both are known as mind, yet they are not one. Thus the qualified reason to overextends. body and self not co-existent because the self remains even when the body does not? No, the same is true of quality and substrate. A substrate is known as qualified by another quality of the same kind even when one particular instance of a quality is absent. But the reverse never occurs. No quality is known when its substrate is not known, although the substrate can be known without the quality. The reply is that the same holds of body and self. According to the Buddhist's own view, if the self or consciousness is not knowable, cognition of the body is impossible, yet cognition of the self can occur without cognition of the body. In addition, even if the causal complexes of the cognition and production off to things are always connected, so that they always appear together and occupy the same place, they may still remain distinct because they appear endowed with opposed properties. Why should these two facts conflict? What is the opposition of properties? In the present context its examples are, when one is known, the other is not known, When one is mentioned, the other is not mentioned, when one is negated, the other is not negated, and so forth. In the sentence the blue lotus moves, what is intended is in fact the lotus qualified by blue color, not the negation of the non blue by the lotus. The arguments previously given against the doctrine of a poha should be applied. It should be noted that sometimes negation itself appears as a qualifier in cognition, as in this is neither a cow nor a horse, and so forth. Another refutation. If a substrate and the quality residing in it were identical, how could one and the same object appear clear when seen from nearby and indistinct when seen from afar? Does the same object arise qualified simultaneously by clarity and indistinctness in relation to observers situated at different distances? No, one thing cannot possess to distinct properties at once. Are there then two objects, one indistinct and the other clear? No, the object is recognized as having the same form and occupying the same place. This recognition of occupying the same place cannot be illusory. A person approaching the object from afar does not see it change its place. Nor is this cognition of the object objectless, otherwise the cognition would not be tied to a particular object, such as a particular tree in a particular place. Objection to the foregoing refutation and a partial answer. Can this specific object directedness of cognition be regarded as produced by a preceding non-conceptual cognition having the same object? It can, but non-conceptual cognition does not take the place of its object as an object. If it does take the place as its object, the place itself will be an object of cognition. For regarding a thing as the object of cognition, its mere occurrence in cognition is sufficient. It is improper to say that only the place is the object and not the tree situated there and that therefore the tree is not known clearly or indistinctly. If the tree cannot be both indistinct and clear at once, neither can the place. Can it be said that all qualities of a distant object are clearly apprehended in non-conceptual cognition, but conceptual cognition fails to apprehend some of them and therefore is not clear? No. Except for a yogine whose sight has been purified by the collirium of yoga, an ordinary person cannot be said to see clearly the distant motions of the constellations. refutation of the objection. Moreover, there is no reason why conceptual cognition should not arise concerning every object supposedly apprehended by non-conceptual cognition. Some cause is required to explain why what was known non-conceptually is not apprehended conceptually. Is the cause the failure of a desire for such cognition to arise after the non-conceptual cognition? No. After knowing an object non-conceptually together with all its qualities, when the observer moves away from that object, he no longer has immediate perceptual cognition of it even though memory of the first cognition remains. A minor objection to the foregoing refutation and its answer. If non-conceptual Cognition of an object together with all its properties is possible even without conceptual cognition of them, why not suppose that every person knows everything at all times non-conceptually, though not conceptually? If, because of a defect, an object is mistaken for its opposite or for something different from itself, is its real nature not known conceptually? No. conceptual cognition were inconsistent with the non-conceptual cognition preceding it, no conceptual cognition would be trustworthy. Yet in the case of a distant object, even in the absence of any opposed non-conceptual cognition, the conjunction or disjunction of its front part with its rear part is not known conceptually. Why, then, is this conjunction or disjunction not known non conceptually.

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