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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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23:53

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1. 0:02–0:09Refutation of the view. 54. This view is unacceptable.
2. 0:09–0:20From collective cognition of the two reasons, while both provisions are recollected, cognitions in the form of substantive reflections on both reasons arise simultaneously.
3. 0:20–0:27Because causes producing two opposed results are present at the same time, neither reflection produces its result.
4. 0:27–0:40In inference for oneself, such two reflections arise from direct apprehension of the pervasions of the two reasons, in inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent.
5. 0:40–0:43The view of Suwadsa.
6. 0:43–0:4555.
7. 0:45–0:51Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference.
8. 0:51–0:57inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property
9. 0:57–1:02distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that
10. 1:02–1:07is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual
11. 1:07–1:14absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive
12. 1:14–1:19of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence,
13. 1:19–1:22like a mutual absence located in the jar.
14. 1:22–1:26Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of counterbalance.
15. 1:27–1:30When mere opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance,
16. 1:30–1:33an additional qualification of the cause is pointless.
17. 1:35–1:39With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends.
18. 1:40–1:43Prima-facive view of non-establishment.
19. 1:43–1:47Abstent Absence of perversion and absence of the reason
20. 1:47–1:52in the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in
21. 1:52–1:56separate fashion.
22. 1:56–2:02Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
23. 2:02–2:07The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring
24. 2:07–2:14successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject.
25. 2:14–2:19If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences, the definition
26. 2:19–2:25of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine.
27. 2:25–2:30If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely
28. 2:30–2:34an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession.
29. 2:34–2:39Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence
30. 2:39–2:46of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence.
31. 2:46–2:52This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain
32. 2:52–2:56because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely
33. 2:56–3:00through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject
34. 3:00–3:07propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition
35. 3:07–3:12of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood.
36. 3:13–3:18If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated
37. 3:18–3:24as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects
38. 3:24–3:30of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence. Individual
39. 3:30–3:35absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of non-
40. 3:35–3:41non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect.
41. 3:41–3:4858. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual
42. 3:48–3:54absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment,
43. 3:54–4:00positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier.
44. 4:00–4:05Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences
45. 4:05–4:07and is therefore dependent.
46. 4:07–4:11The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence.
47. 4:11–4:15There is no need to raise the qualified absence.
48. 4:15–4:19For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected.
49. 4:19–4:24The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification
50. 4:24–4:28is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the
51. 4:28–4:31individual absences.
52. 4:31–4:35such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary in their
53. 4:35–4:39own forms and defeat the proponent.
54. 4:39–4:43If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish
55. 4:43–4:48pervasion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised
56. 4:48–4:50through deviation itself.
57. 4:50–4:55If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although
58. 4:55–5:00non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition
59. 5:00–5:07arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier.
60. 5:07–5:11This reputation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of
61. 5:11–5:18subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment
62. 5:18–5:23even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the
63. 5:23–5:27two is pointless.
64. 5:27–5:32Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment.
65. 5:32–5:3759. Some scholars say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons
66. 5:37–5:42occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of
67. 5:42–5:48the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were
68. 5:48–5:52present, inferential cognition would arise.
69. 5:52–5:58This definition too is unacceptable, because veridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier.
70. 5:58–6:07Even when deritical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment.
71. 6:07–6:13Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason.
72. 6:13–6:21The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood and deritical cognition of them have not yet been established,
73. 6:21–6:27therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible.
74. 6:27–6:38Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless.
75. 6:38–6:49Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason.
76. 6:49–6:55It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the
77. 6:55–7:00perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical
78. 7:00–7:04cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended
79. 7:04–7:08solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the
80. 7:08–7:12absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment.
81. 7:12–7:16If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is
82. 7:16–7:22treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference,
83. 7:22–7:26inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of
84. 7:26–7:30a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such
85. 7:30–7:35an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason.
86. 7:35–7:40This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of perversion
87. 7:40–7:46or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence and the subject is non-establishment.
88. 7:46–7:52of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition
89. 7:52–7:56does not under extend.
90. 7:56–8:04Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted.
91. 8:04–8:09Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment,
92. 8:09–8:15and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason,
93. 8:15–8:20When a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises
94. 8:20–8:25through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood.
95. 8:25–8:30Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition
96. 8:30–8:36does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain.
97. 8:36–8:39It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious
98. 8:39–8:41reason valid.
99. 8:41–8:47Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason.
100. 8:47–8:51Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of
101. 8:51–8:53the reason.
102. 8:53–8:57Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion and
103. 8:57–9:02subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment.
104. 9:02–9:06Certainty of a property qualified by pervasion and subject propertyhood is the cause of
105. 9:06–9:13inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result.
106. 9:13–9:15Refutation.
107. 9:15–9:2362. No, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects
108. 9:23–9:30within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason,
109. 9:30–9:33demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing
110. 9:33–9:39non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment,
111. 9:39–9:44because certainty of pervasion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment
112. 9:44–9:48concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious
113. 9:48–9:53reasons, since certainty of pervasion is possible even when cognition of such non-establishment
114. 9:53–9:57is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference
115. 9:57–10:03for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment
116. 10:03–10:08concerning the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment and
117. 10:08–10:13inference for oneself and for its demonstration and inference for another.
118. 10:13–10:18The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If pervasion
119. 10:18–10:23and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent, both would
120. 10:23–10:29be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy
121. 10:29–10:36certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious.
122. 10:36–10:40Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious.
123. 10:40–10:44A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when perversion
124. 10:44–10:48and subject propertyhood actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not
125. 10:48–10:50certain.
126. 10:50–10:53This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production
127. 10:53–10:55of inference is observed in deviation.
128. 10:55–11:00Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown.
129. 11:00–11:04It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of perversion and the like
130. 11:04–11:08an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as
131. 11:08–11:13deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of
132. 11:13–11:18perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general.
133. 11:18–11:21This view is not sound.
134. 11:21–11:25If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become
135. 11:25–11:28nothing but non-establishment.
136. 11:28–11:33Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences in
137. 11:33–11:37causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated
138. 11:37–11:39as separate fallacious reasons.
139. 11:39–11:44In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because
140. 11:44–11:47of absence of a cause.
141. 11:47–11:51Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence
142. 11:51–11:55of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise
143. 11:55–12:00if fire itself is absent.
144. 12:00–12:05Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons.
145. 12:05–12:09It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious
146. 12:09–12:11reason.
147. 12:11–12:15But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be
148. 12:15–12:17causes of inference.
149. 12:17–12:22If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood occurred
150. 12:22–12:27only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious
151. 12:27–12:32reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the
152. 12:32–12:37cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause,
153. 12:37–12:43and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless.
154. 12:43–12:47Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
155. 12:47–12:50Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to
156. 12:50–12:56to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence is
157. 12:56–12:58fallacious reasonhood.
158. 12:58–13:02Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength
159. 13:02–13:04is counterbalance.
160. 13:04–13:08Absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment,
161. 13:08–13:14and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory.
162. 13:14–13:18It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into
163. 13:18–13:20non-establishment.
164. 13:20–13:24From the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason
165. 13:24–13:29is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of
166. 13:29–13:33difference functions separately in erroneous cognition.
167. 13:33–13:36But this view too is not sound.
168. 13:36–13:40Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of perversion and absence of subject
169. 13:40–13:45propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier.
170. 13:45–13:48Ganges' intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of perversion
171. 13:48–13:53and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object
172. 13:53–13:56of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like.
173. 13:56–14:00Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends.
174. 14:00–14:05The three divisions of non-establishment.
175. 14:05–14:09The established doctrine is now stated.
176. 14:09–14:13Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reason's nature, and non-establishment
177. 14:13–14:18of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration
178. 14:18–14:23of each separately obstructs inference in its own form.
179. 14:23–14:27Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion
180. 14:27–14:33qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, the
181. 14:33–14:36qualification is unnecessary.
182. 14:36–14:41Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form.
183. 14:41–14:46Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not meant to fit definitions.
184. 14:46–14:50The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object
185. 14:50–14:52of subsumptive reflection.
186. 14:52–14:56Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established fivefold
187. 14:56–15:01division of fallacious reasons is contradicted.
188. 15:01–15:04Restatement of the Established Doctrine
189. 15:04–15:08For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms
190. 15:08–15:13of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment,
191. 15:13–15:18While defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context,
192. 15:18–15:21confirms our own position.
193. 15:21–15:24The objection that the recognized fivefold division would be disrupted if defeat and
194. 15:24–15:28counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction
195. 15:28–15:32are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound.
196. 15:32–15:36The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural
197. 15:36–15:39traditions would disappear.
198. 15:39–15:44Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its
199. 15:44–15:49fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends.
200. 15:49–15:57Dependent defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract.
201. 15:57–16:01Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment.
202. 16:01–16:06Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the
203. 16:06–16:09subject be raised?
204. 16:09–16:13It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and
205. 16:13–16:18denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake,
206. 16:18–16:23for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible.
207. 16:23–16:28Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower, the skyflower
208. 16:28–16:33is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference.
209. 16:33–16:38Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualifical
210. 16:38–16:43and the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent.
211. 16:44–16:47In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of
212. 16:47–16:50perversion 2 does not contract with another defect.
213. 16:51–16:57Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment
214. 16:57–17:02arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion.
215. 17:02–17:10It should be understood here that non-establishment of pervasion is not itself an extraneous condition
216. 17:10–17:12of the reason.
217. 17:12–17:17If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive
218. 17:17–17:21in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the
219. 17:21–17:24valid reason smoke.
220. 17:24–17:28In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those
221. 17:28–17:34loci deviating from the reason in the form of absence of an extraneous condition is pervasion.
222. 17:35–17:40A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous
223. 17:40–17:46condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition. What is pervaded by
224. 17:46–17:53absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of
225. 17:53–17:58inference but not independently it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends
226. 17:58–18:02on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason.
227. 18:04–18:10In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property,
228. 18:10–18:16is not an independent extraneous condition. In earth is different from water because it possesses
229. 18:16–18:21odor, earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable
230. 18:21–18:27mark of earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment
231. 18:27–18:33of perversion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise in inference of perversion and in
232. 18:33–18:39the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment
233. 18:39–18:46of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of
234. 18:46–18:51the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself
235. 18:51–18:57a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop
236. 18:57–19:02inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason.
237. 19:03–19:07Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is apprehended
238. 19:07–19:12only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the
239. 19:12–19:17like. Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference,
240. 19:17–19:19destroying the nature of veridical inference.
241. 19:20–19:23Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions.
242. 19:25–19:2975, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me,
243. 19:29–19:34then for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated,
244. 19:34–19:38because that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there,
245. 19:38–19:41by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference.
246. 19:42–19:46Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other
247. 19:46–19:50inhibitors applies here because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons.
248. 19:51–19:55Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor
249. 19:55–20:00is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason.
250. 20:02–20:06Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat.
251. 20:08–20:1276. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject,
252. 20:12–20:16cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should
253. 20:16–20:21also be fallacious because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons
254. 20:21–20:25concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation and collocation with something
255. 20:25–20:29pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, firehood and the light
256. 20:29–20:36may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition
257. 20:36–20:41of collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or
258. 20:41–20:46together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary.
259. 20:47–20:53If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of
260. 20:53–21:00the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition
261. 21:00–21:05of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom can occur even
262. 21:05–21:10without cognition of the absence of the probandom. Then, because the distinct
263. 21:10–21:15invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not clear,
264. 21:15–21:21only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength
265. 21:21–21:25and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of
266. 21:25–21:30all characteristics favorable to valid inference. It can occur in both. Counterbalance is
267. 21:30–21:34A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength.
268. 21:34–21:41Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength.
269. 21:41–21:47From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously.
270. 21:47–21:54On this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason.
271. 21:54–21:58Defeat is a separate fallacious reason.
272. 21:58–22:0578. Objection, deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment
273. 22:05–22:10of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence
274. 22:10–22:14would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation, and cognition of deviation from
275. 22:14–22:15uselessness.
276. 22:15–22:21Answer, absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom
277. 22:21–22:26is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of
278. 22:26–22:30concomitance with the known absence of the probandum.
279. 22:30–22:34Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum in the subject causes
280. 22:34–22:38deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason.
281. 22:38–22:45Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently.
282. 22:45–22:51Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject,
283. 22:51–22:56it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation.
284. 22:56–23:02For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason.
285. 23:03–23:09Derritical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect.
286. 23:10–23:23Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference.
287. 23:23–23:30Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason.
288. 23:30–23:34Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near-absence of the probandom and the
289. 23:34–23:38subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference.
290. 23:38–23:42Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other
291. 23:42–23:48means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference.
292. 23:48–23:50the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

Plain text

Refutation of the view. 54. This view is unacceptable. From collective cognition of the two reasons, while both provisions are recollected, cognitions in the form of substantive reflections on both reasons arise simultaneously. Because causes producing two opposed results are present at the same time, neither reflection produces its result. In inference for oneself, such two reflections arise from direct apprehension of the pervasions of the two reasons, in inference for another, from the means of cognition produced by the Nyaya statements employed by the proponent. The view of Suwadsa. 55. Suwadsa says that a subsumptive reflection on a counter reason is possible even in purely affirmative inference. inference. For example, in a jar is nameable because it is knowable, nameability is a property distinct from a property residing only in the jar and also distinct from a general property that is the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar, this resembles the mutual absence of jar and cloth. But this is possible only in cognition of identity, the counter positive of an eternal absence located in the jar is nameability, because it is an eternal absence, like a mutual absence located in the jar. Identity of the subject does not cause the defect of counterbalance. When mere opposition of two reasons can cause counterbalance, an additional qualification of the cause is pointless. With this, the established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason ends. Prima-facive view of non-establishment. Abstent Absence of perversion and absence of the reason in the subject are not jointly non-establishment, because the two cannot occur successively in separate fashion. Absence qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. The prima facie opponent may say that non-establishment is an absence qualified by both, occurring successively in the individual absences of perversion and of the reason in the subject. If the qualified absence is held to differ from the individual absences, the definition of non-establishment under extends to those individual absences and violates the doctrine. If the qualified absence is non-different from the individual absences, it becomes merely an individual absence and does not solve the problem of succession. Nevertheless, the absence of what is qualified and delimited by qualifiers, or the absence of the qualifier-qualifican relation, may constitute a successive qualified absence. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the inference, there is fire on a golden mountain because of smoke, obstruction of the inference and defeat of the proponent are possible merely through cognition or demonstration of the individual absence of perversion or subject propertyhood, cognition of a qualified absence is unnecessary. Thus the stated definition of non-establishment under extends to the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood. If qualified absence is a distinct entity, the individual absences would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. Nor is it sound to say that individual absences become defects of non-establishment only indirectly through cognition of the qualified absence. Individual absences such as absence of perversion can independently constitute the defect of non- non-establishment. Qualified absence is not the defect. 58. In fact, qualified absence is not the defect of non-establishment. Since the individual absences of perversion and subject propertyhood themselves can constitute non-establishment, positing a qualified absence is pointless and thus introduces an unnecessary qualifier. Cognition of qualified absence is impossible without cognition of the individual absences and is therefore dependent. The proponent can be defeated merely by raising an individual absence. There is no need to raise the qualified absence. For the same reason, the following argument is also rejected. The character of absence belonging to those absences concerning which cognition of qualification is related to perversion and subject propertyhood is the common non-establishment of the individual absences. such as deviation do not independently cause non-establishment, they are primary in their own forms and defeat the proponent. If an extraneous condition is raised to show that a deviating reason does not establish pervasion, non-establishment does not arise from the extraneous condition, it is raised through deviation itself. If cognition of non-establishment arises without cognition of deviation, then although non-establishment and deviation may intermix, no intermixture with the extraneous condition arises. Hence qualified absence contains an unnecessary qualifier. This reputation also rejects the view that either absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood is non-establishment. An individual absence constitutes non-establishment even when the other absence is unknown. The qualification absence of either one of the two is pointless. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is non-establishment. 59. Some scholars say that absence of veridical cognition of perversion and of the reasons occurrence in the subject is the common non-establishment in all forms such as non-establishment of the substratum. If veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood were present, inferential cognition would arise. This definition too is unacceptable, because veridical cognition is an unnecessary qualifier. Even when deritical cognition itself is unknown, cognition of an individual absence can establish the defect of non-establishment. Absence of perversion and subject propertyhood is equally present in a valid reason. The qualifiers of the presented reason, perversion and subject propertyhood and deritical cognition of them have not yet been established, therefore cognition or demonstration of the absence of these qualifiers or of their cognition is impossible. Absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some other reason is equally present in a valid reason and is therefore pointless. Absence of one's own such veridical cognition, or absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of some reason, is likewise common to a valid reason. It is impossible to demonstrate absence of veridical cognition qualified by the perversion and subject propertyhood of every reason. If absence of veridical cognition qualified by perversion and subject propertyhood is apprehended solely on the basis of absence of perversion, then by causal economy the absence of perversion itself would be the defect of non-establishment. If absence of veridical cognition of perversion and subject propertyhood is treated in its own form as the defect of non-establishment because it is the absence of a cause of inference, inference based on error would become impossible. In that case the general characteristic of a fallacious reason, being the object of veridical cognition, would not occur in such an absence of veridical cognition, therefore it could not be a fallacious reason. This refutation also rejects the definition either absence of veridical cognition of perversion or absence of veridical cognition of the reasons occurrence and the subject is non-establishment. of the two is an unnecessary qualifier, even when both absences coexist, the definition does not under extend. Certainty through perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment. Let it be granted. Certainty of the reason on the basis of perversion and subject propertyhood is establishment, and uncertainty of the reason on that basis is non-establishment. For this reason, When a reason is in fact unpervaded and absent from the subject, inferential cognition arises through superimposed certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood. Conversely, when a reason is in fact pervaded and present in the subject, inferential cognition does not arise if perversion and subject propertyhood remain uncertain. It should not be said that this would make a valid reason fallacious and a fallacious reason valid. Such a possibility is desirable in a particular condition of a reason. Non-establishment of this kind, being absence of a cause, is in its own nature a defect of the reason. Nor need the absence of certainty concerning individual properties such as pervasion and subject propertyhood be treated as non-establishment. Certainty of a property qualified by pervasion and subject propertyhood is the cause of inference, hence only absence of that qualified certainty obstructs the inferential result. Refutation. 62. No, this view is not sound. It would entail inclusion of deviation and the other defects within non-establishment. If non-establishment is in its own nature a defect of the reason, demonstration of deviation and the other defects would be unnecessary for cognizing non-establishment. And if deviation and the like are treated as causes of non-establishment, because certainty of pervasion is said to be possible even in their presence, then non-establishment concerning the subject and the like would have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons, since certainty of pervasion is possible even when cognition of such non-establishment is present. To demonstrate non-establishment in inference for another, cognition of it must first be present. Hence cognition of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like is necessary both for cognition of non-establishment and inference for oneself and for its demonstration and inference for another. The distinction between valid and fallacious reasons would not be preserved. If pervasion and subject propertyhood are present, both would be valid reasons, if absent, both would be fallacious. If a deviating or other reason were merely valid because it did not destroy certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, it could no longer be fallacious. Even unknown non-establishment is fallacious. A prima facie position may be stated here, in sleep or waking, even when perversion and subject propertyhood actually exist, inference does not arise when they are not certain. This non-production occurs because of a fallacious reason, since the same non-production of inference is observed in deviation. Therefore non-establishment is fallacious even when unknown. It cannot be said here that this would make non-establishment of perversion and the like an additional fallacious reason, or require inclusion of the recognized defects such as deviation within non-establishment of perversion and the like, because non-establishment of perversion and the like can be included under non-establishment in general. This view is not sound. If accepted, deviation, contradiction, and the other defects would ultimately become nothing but non-establishment. Further, if divisions of fallacious reasons are accepted on the basis of differences in causation, non-establishment of the subject and the like would also have to be treated as separate fallacious reasons. In states such as sleep, absence of inference occurs not because of an inhibitor, but because of absence of a cause. Non-production of a result occurs not only from an inhibitor but also from absence of a cause, even when no fire inhibiting jewel is present, burning does not arise if fire itself is absent. Non-production of inference is not due only to fallacious reasons. It may again be said that non-production of inference occurs solely because of a fallacious reason. But on this view conjunction of mind and self and the other factors would cease to be causes of inference. If non-production of inference due to uncertainty of pervasion and subject propertyhood occurred only because of a fallacious reason, non-production would be impossible in the absence of a fallacious reason. And if certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood alone is treated as the cause of inference, then only the final cause, subsumptive reflection, would be a cause, and the causal status of the remaining factors would become pointless. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View Some other scholars say that the occurrence of either absence of perversion opposed to to inference or absence of subject propertyhood, and the defect delimited by that absence is fallacious reasonhood. Among fallacious reasons, a stronger opponent is defeat and an opponent of equal strength is counterbalance. Absence of pervasion and absence of subject propertyhood constitute non-establishment, and a reason in which these absences are pervaded is respectively deviating or contradictory. It should not be said that deviating and contradictory reasons would be absorbed into non-establishment. From the perversion of absence of perversion or absence of subject propertyhood in a reason is known, that reason is fallacious through its own force, just as direct cognition of difference functions separately in erroneous cognition. But this view too is not sound. Here non-establishment again becomes merely absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood, while saying, either of the two, becomes an unnecessary qualifier. Ganges' intention is that a reason possessing a form opposed to certainty of perversion and subject propertyhood, distinct from the other fallacious reasons, becomes the object of non-establishment concerning the subject and the like. Here the prima facie discussion of non-establishment ends. The three divisions of non-establishment. The established doctrine is now stated. Non-establishment of the substratum, non-establishment of the reason's nature, and non-establishment of perversion are three distinct fallacious reasons, because cognition or demonstration of each separately obstructs inference in its own form. Absence of subject propertyhood qualified by absence of perversion, or absence of perversion qualified by absence of subject propertyhood, is not a separate non-establishment, the qualification is unnecessary. Inference can be stopped even without cognition of such a complex form. Definitions are fashioned according to experience, experience is not meant to fit definitions. The sage described all three generally as, non-establishment that becomes the object of subsumptive reflection. Therefore neither the threefold division of non-establishment nor the established fivefold division of fallacious reasons is contradicted. Restatement of the Established Doctrine For this reason, the well-known doctrinal statement, non-establishment in the forms of absence of perversion and absence of subject propertyhood are divisions of non-establishment, While defects distinct from these are called deviation and so forth according to context, confirms our own position. The objection that the recognized fivefold division would be disrupted if defeat and counterbalance are treated as direct inhibitors of inference, while deviation and contradiction are treated as causes of absence of pervasion, is not sound. The independent usage of certain scholars cannot be annulled, otherwise distinct scriptural traditions would disappear. Although the stated form of non-establishment is also found in deviation and the like, its fallacious status is distinct because of the supporting basis on which it depends. Dependent defects may overlap, but their supporting bases do not mutually contract. Non-establishment of the substratum is an independent non-establishment. Objection, when the subject itself is unestablished, how can non-establishment concerning the subject be raised? It should not be said that just as a hare's horn may be treated as related to a hare and denied in a cow, so a skyflower may be treated as related to the sky and denied in a lake, for it has already been stated that such denial of a hare's horn and a cow is impossible. Answer, in the inference, a skyflower is fragrant because it is a flower, the skyflower is cognized as an unrelated object, this cognition obstructs the intended inference. Because non-establishment of the substratum arising from non-establishment of the qualifical and the subject does not mutually contract with other fallacious reasons, it is independent. In an example containing a pointless qualifier, non-establishment of perversion 2 does not contract with another defect. Hence it is said, after the first non-establishment is removed, occasion for the second non-establishment arises. An extraneous condition is not absence of perversion. It should be understood here that non-establishment of pervasion is not itself an extraneous condition of the reason. If the property called an extraneous condition, pervasive in the probandum fire but not pervasive in the reason smoke, is itself unestablished, its absence too cannot be established in the valid reason smoke. In fact, collocation of the reason with the probandum that deviates from all those loci deviating from the reason in the form of absence of an extraneous condition is pervasion. A property pervasive in the probandom but not pervasive in the reason is the distinct extraneous condition. Absence of pervasion itself is not an extraneous condition. What is pervaded by absence of pervasion is an extraneous condition. An extraneous condition causes the absence of inference but not independently it indicates non-establishment of pervasion and depends on it. Therefore it is not counted as a separate sixth fallacious reason. In smoke is not fire because it is a substance, substancehood, being merely a general property, is not an independent extraneous condition. In earth is different from water because it possesses odor, earthhood is not an extraneous condition of odor, because odor itself is an invariable mark of earthhood. If an extraneous condition were regarded as distinct from non-establishment of perversion, unnecessary extraneous conditions would arise in inference of perversion and in the defect of self-dependence. Therefore an extraneous condition is not distinct from non-establishment of perversion and is not an independent fallacious reason. Equal invalidity depends on a defect of the reason, because the rule is that a defect whose cognition stops or obstructs inference is itself a fallacious reason. The absence of the probandom and the subject, that is, defeat, does not stop inference when unknown, therefore in that condition the same defeat is not a fallacious reason. Gangesa says, there is no evidence that the gold-hood of superimposed fire is apprehended only at the time of inference. It may also be apprehended at the time of recognition and the like. Otherwise all previously known objects would have to be treated as subjects of inference, destroying the nature of veridical inference. Defeat is a defect only in certain conditions. 75, if the proponent says, only the superimposed defeating object is known to me, then for another person the inference concerning the superimposed object is not defeated, because that person does not know it. There is therefore no defect of defeat there, by the same reasoning, neither is there one in one's own inference. Nor is it correct to say that the general rule of fallaciousness established in other inhibitors applies here because the defeater has no necessary relation to other fallacious reasons. Cognition of a particular thesis does not render general doubt defective if no other inhibitor is present. Thus, when defeat does not stop inference, it is not a fallacious reason. Colocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not defeat. 76. Objection, just like cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, cognition of the reasons collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom should also be fallacious because the obstruction to inference is the same in both. The reasons concomitance with the absence of the probandom is deviation and collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom is defeat, for example, firehood and the light may be pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Answer, this is not sound. When cognition of collocation with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom arises after or together with cognition of the absence of the probandom, deviation alone is necessary. If apprehension of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is a defect, apprehension of the absence of the probandom and the subject is not defeat. 77. It may again be said that cognition of the reasons co-location with something pervaded by the absence of the probandom can occur even without cognition of the absence of the probandom. Then, because the distinct invalidity of the reason and of what is pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not clear, only counterbalance would remain. If it is said that counterbalance is an opponent of equal strength and defeat an opponent of greater strength, the answer is that strength is the aggregate of all characteristics favorable to valid inference. It can occur in both. Counterbalance is A characteristic not favorable to inference is not strength. Nor is the position established by treating cognition of the reasons validity without excess as strength. From absence of validity in the subsumptive reflection, only deviation arises adventitiously. On this basis cognition of the absence of the probandom cannot be made an independent defect or a new fallacious reason. Defeat is a separate fallacious reason. 78. Objection, deviation is established from the uselessness produced by defeat, but establishment of deviation would depend on the reasons establishment of the probandom. Otherwise mutual dependence would result, cognition of uselessness from deviation, and cognition of deviation from uselessness. Answer, absence of cognition that the reason is favorable to establishment of the probandom is not itself a fallacious reason. Deviation of the reason is known in the form of concomitance with the known absence of the probandum. Further objection, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum in the subject causes deviation, therefore that itself should be the fallacious reason. Answer, this is accepted only in the sense that it is the basis of known deviation, not independently. Thus veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum does not stop inference merely by mentioning the subject, it stops inference by becoming the basis of known deviation. For economy, there is no need to regard the mere absence of the probandom as a separate fallacious reason. Derritical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not an independent defect. Objection, in perception and other means of knowledge, cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject independently prevents cognition of the probandom, therefore it should be regarded as the same defect in inference. Answer, only a defect that obstructs inference is called a defect of the reason. Like absence of conjunction between mind and self, near-absence of the probandom and the subject, not cognition of it, obstructs inference. Such absences do not occur in the intended subject, and in perception and the other means they have not been treated as a separate defect of inference. the prima facie discussion of defeat ends.

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