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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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en (0.998049)

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23:14

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1. 0:02–0:08Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum.
2. 0:08–0:1740, it cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son.
3. 0:17–0:26If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise.
4. 0:26–0:32The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda.
5. 0:32–0:44In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire.
6. 0:45–0:57But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition.
7. 0:59–1:01Doubtful extraneous condition.
8. 1:03–1:06In the 21st century, some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition
9. 1:06–1:12or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason,
10. 1:12–1:16otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted
11. 1:16–1:17would arise.
12. 1:17–1:20But this objection is untenable.
13. 1:20–1:24Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that
14. 1:24–1:27the reason deviates from the pro-bandom, a certain extraneous condition produces
15. 1:27–1:31ascertainment of deviation.
16. 1:31–1:37Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition.
17. 1:37–1:4342, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered.
18. 1:43–1:47An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground
19. 1:47–1:51that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom,
20. 1:51–1:56otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended
21. 1:56–2:02by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons.
22. 2:02–2:06Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength.
23. 2:06–2:0743.
24. 2:07–2:12It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has
25. 2:12–2:14greater strength.
26. 2:14–2:18Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single
27. 2:18–2:22reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many
28. 2:22–2:26reasons free from such a condition.
29. 2:26–2:31and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength,
30. 2:31–2:37because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood.
31. 2:37–2:42Subject Otherness is not an extraneous condition.
32. 2:42–2:4344.
33. 2:43–2:47If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness
34. 2:47–2:51produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous
35. 2:51–2:55condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the
36. 2:55–3:02reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics
37. 3:02–3:08of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject,
38. 3:08–3:13an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation.
39. 3:13–3:19An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion.
40. 3:19–3:2445. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom,
41. 3:24–3:28It does not pervade what pervades the probandum, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible
42. 3:28–3:31without cognition of the extraneous condition?
43. 3:31–3:35The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from
44. 3:35–3:37the absence of what fails to pervade.
45. 3:37–3:41A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous
46. 3:41–3:43condition.
47. 3:43–3:46Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it
48. 3:46–3:52does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons.
49. 3:52–3:59of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the
50. 3:59–4:04reason's pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion
51. 4:04–4:09by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the
52. 4:09–4:14cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an
53. 4:14–4:19extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because
54. 4:19–4:23it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom.
55. 4:23–4:30Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason.
56. 4:30–4:3747, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation.
57. 4:37–4:41Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous
58. 4:41–4:46condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom.
59. 4:46–4:51The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same.
60. 4:51–4:55Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason
61. 4:55–5:00is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not
62. 5:00–5:02arise.
63. 5:02–5:09An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason.
64. 5:09–5:12Established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous
65. 5:12–5:16condition.
66. 5:16–5:21If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished
67. 5:21–5:27reason or a direct criticism, then its pervasion of the probandum must be accepted.
68. 5:27–5:31Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without pervasion
69. 5:31–5:33of the probandum.
70. 5:33–5:37Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that
71. 5:37–5:43it pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason.
72. 5:43–5:45Alternative View
73. 5:45–5:5149. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandom and a reason
74. 5:51–5:55accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a
75. 5:55–5:59locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent.
76. 5:59–6:03The objection is untenable that, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded
77. 6:03–6:08as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated.
78. 6:08–6:12If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded
79. 6:12–6:17an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions
80. 6:17–6:22although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons,
81. 6:22–6:26regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions,
82. 6:26–6:29because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason.
83. 6:30–6:34Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted
84. 6:34–6:39by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seat
85. 6:39–6:43of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end.
86. 6:45–6:52Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions. 50 apparent extraneous conditions are now described.
87. 6:53–6:57The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
88. 6:58–7:02In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness,
89. 7:02–7:06that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the
90. 7:06–7:11the probandom is an extraneous condition of a particular absence.
91. 7:11–7:15The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished
92. 7:15–7:18absence of the probandom.
93. 7:18–7:23In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous
94. 7:23–7:27conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom.
95. 7:27–7:32The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence
96. 7:32–7:34of the probandom.
97. 7:34–7:40For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is in a parent-extraneous
98. 7:40–7:44condition of a sublated absence of the probandom.
99. 7:44–7:48The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of
100. 7:48–7:52the probandom that does not pervade the subject.
101. 7:52–7:56In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated
102. 7:56–8:00in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does
103. 8:00–8:04not extend throughout the entire subject.
104. 8:04–8:08The fifth the parent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the
105. 8:08–8:11absence of the prior reason.
106. 8:11–8:15In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the
107. 8:15–8:20negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous
108. 8:20–8:25condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the
109. 8:25–8:30reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent.
110. 8:30–8:34The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the
111. 8:34–8:36prior reason.
112. 8:36–8:41In an inference of being without an agent, eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous
113. 8:41–8:44conditions of this kind.
114. 8:44–8:48The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in
115. 8:48–8:53difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance.
116. 8:53–8:56In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from
117. 8:56–9:01the mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition.
118. 9:01–9:06The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandom
119. 9:06–9:09and what is other than the subject.
120. 9:09–9:13In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus
121. 9:13–9:17distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind.
122. 9:17–9:22The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing
123. 9:22–9:26the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject.
124. 9:26–9:31In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct
125. 9:31–9:35from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition.
126. 9:35–9:40The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the
127. 9:40–9:41like.
128. 9:41–9:46In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition
129. 9:46–9:49obstruct inference.
130. 9:49–9:54With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions
131. 9:54–9:57comes to an end.
132. 9:57–10:03Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason and the subject.
133. 10:03–10:08Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in
134. 10:08–10:12the subject, subjecthood, is now described.
135. 10:12–10:18Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandom.
136. 10:18–10:24Possession of a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood.
137. 10:24–10:302. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood.
138. 10:30–10:35Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after
139. 10:35–10:40perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before substantive reflection
140. 10:40–10:45arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased.
141. 10:45–10:49If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal
142. 10:49–10:54existence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible
143. 10:54–10:59even when the probandom has already been ascertained.
144. 10:59–11:06The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood.
145. 11:06–11:11The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood.
146. 11:11–11:15The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined
147. 11:15–11:19absence is unnecessary.
148. 11:19–11:23the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such
149. 11:23–11:28as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment
150. 11:28–11:32of the reason themselves prevent inference.
151. 11:32–11:35Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood.
152. 11:35–11:39The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object
153. 11:39–11:43known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred.
154. 11:43–11:49The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another.
155. 11:49–11:54The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish
156. 11:54–11:59it is subjecthood, the earlier view.
157. 11:59–12:03The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to
158. 12:03–12:10establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood.
159. 12:10–12:14A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the
160. 12:14–12:18self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is
161. 12:18–12:19possible.
162. 12:19–12:23But Kasperty Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference
163. 12:23–12:27an object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from
164. 12:27–12:33its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire.
165. 12:33–12:39Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view.
166. 12:39–12:42This proposal is unacceptable.
167. 12:42–12:47out about the probandum, the desire to establish it need not remain present before the third
168. 12:47–12:52subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark.
169. 12:52–12:57The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred
170. 12:57–13:02from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object
171. 13:02–13:07too is inferred through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the
172. 13:07–13:10desire to establish is not a cause of inference.
173. 13:10–13:16With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end.
174. 13:16–13:17Establish Conclusion
175. 13:17–13:21The entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence
176. 13:21–13:26of the desire to establish is the subject.
177. 13:26–13:31The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent
178. 13:31–13:35together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is
179. 13:35–13:37the subject.
180. 13:37–13:41But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it
181. 13:41–13:44It is not the subject.
182. 13:44–13:48In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state
183. 13:48–13:53consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire
184. 13:53–13:55to establish it.
185. 13:55–14:01The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject.
186. 14:01–14:06Wherever desire to establish the probandum exists irrespective of the presence of establishing
187. 14:06–14:11evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through
188. 14:11–14:15a qualified absence.
189. 14:15–14:19Subjecthood through a qualified absence.
190. 14:19–14:23When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence
191. 14:23–14:28of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted
192. 14:28–14:32on the basis of a qualified absence.
193. 14:32–14:37In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is
194. 14:37–14:41absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of
195. 14:41–14:46ascertainment of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not
196. 14:46–14:48under extended.
197. 14:48–14:56Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot
198. 14:56–15:01be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as
199. 15:01–15:07the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of
200. 15:07–15:11subjecthood comes to an end.
201. 15:11–15:16Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection
202. 15:16–15:21Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason,
203. 15:21–15:25pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of
204. 15:25–15:29inference.
205. 15:29–15:33Mtsaka-prima-facie view, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood
206. 15:33–15:38are causes, not subsumptive reflection.
207. 15:38–15:42Tsumsakas say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in
208. 15:42–15:47the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference.
209. 15:47–15:52There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection.
210. 15:52–15:56The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the
211. 15:56–16:00combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire perversion and cognizing smoke
212. 16:00–16:02on the mountain.
213. 16:02–16:06These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of
214. 16:06–16:10economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause.
215. 16:12–16:17It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference,
216. 16:17–16:20if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise.
217. 16:22–16:29Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect
218. 16:29–16:33to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that
219. 16:33–16:38very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference.
220. 16:40–16:46But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of
221. 16:46–16:52perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition
222. 16:52–16:57is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it,
223. 16:57–16:59leading to infinite regress.
224. 17:00–17:04Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference.
225. 17:07–17:11For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain,
226. 17:11–17:13is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference.
227. 17:14–17:18But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact,
228. 17:18–17:20whereas inference remains possible.
229. 17:21–17:25Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered,
230. 17:25–17:30Near cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference,
231. 17:30–17:35otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow.
232. 17:35–17:39The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects.
233. 17:39–17:43Five, it may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses,
234. 17:43–17:47produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not,
235. 17:47–17:51or, is an atom the substratum of color or not.
236. 17:51–17:53Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a
237. 17:53–17:59differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep
238. 17:59–18:03and contact with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of
239. 18:03–18:08external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind,
240. 18:08–18:13aided by recollection of pavasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces
241. 18:13–18:18the substantive reflection, smoke pavaded by fire is present on the mountain.
242. 18:18–18:22But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition concerning an external
243. 18:22–18:28object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or
244. 18:28–18:33dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and
245. 18:33–18:37cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense-contact, but
246. 18:37–18:43this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception.
247. 18:43–18:48Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view.
248. 18:48–18:536. The objection arises when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application
249. 18:53–18:58of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible?
250. 18:58–19:01The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood,
251. 19:01–19:04is regarded as pervaded by fire.
252. 19:04–19:09According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire,
253. 19:09–19:13and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable.
254. 19:13–19:16Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion
255. 19:16–19:21in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition,
256. 19:21–19:24inference is impossible.
257. 19:24–19:27Inference is possible despite doubt.
258. 19:27–19:31It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through
259. 19:31–19:36smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not, how, then,
260. 19:36–19:39does inference arise?
261. 19:39–19:43The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the
262. 19:43–19:48The determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt.
263. 19:48–19:52Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of
264. 19:52–19:57inference, therefore inference is not impossible.
265. 19:57–20:00Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary.
266. 20:00–20:018.
267. 20:01–20:05It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the
268. 20:05–20:10universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is
269. 20:10–20:12pervaded by fire.
270. 20:12–20:17of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause
271. 20:17–20:20inference.
272. 20:20–20:23Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that
273. 20:23–20:27particular smoke is cognized.
274. 20:27–20:31Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain,
275. 20:31–20:33is required.
276. 20:33–20:38No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives.
277. 20:38–20:44Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists
278. 20:44–20:49or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together?
279. 20:49–20:57Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason.
280. 20:57–21:01For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence
281. 21:01–21:04of smoke or light is the reason.
282. 21:04–21:08Therefore two alternative no ability is not incoherent.
283. 21:08–21:13Another cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity
284. 21:13–21:15a cause.
285. 21:15–21:19It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the
286. 21:19–21:24mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition
287. 21:24–21:29of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference.
288. 21:29–21:32But this view is untenable.
289. 21:32–21:37Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference
290. 21:37–21:42produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of difference
291. 21:42–21:47from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent
292. 21:47–21:49cause.
293. 21:49–21:53Qualified cognition is not a cause.
294. 21:53–21:58It may be argued that after recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood,
295. 21:58–22:03a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire,
296. 22:03–22:09by smokehood, is necessary. But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning
297. 22:09–22:14the particular smoke's pervasion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary.
298. 22:15–22:20And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present.
299. 22:21–22:26Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden.
300. 22:27–22:30Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor.
301. 22:30–22:3612. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct
302. 22:36–22:39inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and
303. 22:39–22:44the subject property is not an obstructor. The fact is that such cognition of difference
304. 22:44–22:48does not destroy the causal complex of inference.
305. 22:48–22:51Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke
306. 22:51–22:56pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive
307. 22:56–23:01reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the
308. 23:01–23:06relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required.
309. 23:06–23:09Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason.

Plain text

Being produced by vegetable cooking is not the probandum. 40, it cannot be said that in that very inference being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a probandum to be established by the reason being Mitra's son. If this were admitted, both darkness and being produced by vegetable cooking would be probanda, and the defect of irrelevant diversion would arise. The dispute concerns only the establishment of darkness, not treating both as probanda. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition, because the reason smoke is certainly non-deviant from the causal complex of fire. But in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, it is not certain that the causal complex of darkness pervades being Mitra's son, therefore being produced by vegetable cooking becomes a doubtful extraneous condition. Doubtful extraneous condition. In the 21st century, some scholars object that mere doubt about an extraneous condition or a doubtful extraneous condition can neither be an extraneous condition nor a separate pseudo-reason, otherwise, an undesirable consequence comparable to permitting what should not be permitted would arise. But this objection is untenable. Like the inconclusive pseudo-reason, a doubtful extraneous condition produces doubt that the reason deviates from the pro-bandom, a certain extraneous condition produces ascertainment of deviation. Prima-facy account of the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. 42, the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is now considered. An extraneous condition cannot be called a defect of the reason merely on the ground that, as a counter reason, it produces an inference of the absence of the probandom, otherwise, raising an extraneous condition against an inference with a reason attended by one would generate an endless series of further counter-reasons. Pervasion and subject propertyhood are not strength. 43. It cannot be said that the raising of an extraneous condition is accepted because the reason has greater strength. Many weak non-causal reasons cannot produce inference of the probandom, whereas a single reason attended by an extraneous condition can prevent an inference produced by many reasons free from such a condition. and subject propertyhood are equal in both reasons, greater number is also not strength, because inference arises from a single pervasion and a single subject propertyhood. Subject Otherness is not an extraneous condition. 44. If an extraneous condition is defective as a counter reason, then subject otherness produced by cognition of the absence of the probandum would not remain an extraneous condition, because the absence of subject otherness is only a qualification of the reasons presence in the subject. Nevertheless, even without subject otherness, all the characteristics of an extraneous condition occur in other examples. Though not present in the subject, an extraneous condition produces cognition of deviation. An extraneous condition cannot be included under non-establishment of perversion. 45. It may be objected that although an extraneous condition pervades the probandom, It does not pervade what pervades the probandum, how, then, can a counter-reason be possible without cognition of the extraneous condition? The answer is that cognition of the absence of what is pervaded does not arise solely from the absence of what fails to pervade. A counter-reason does not arise from the absence of a reason free from an extraneous condition. Although an extraneous condition destroys the cause of cognition of pervasion, it does not on that ground alone fall within the class of unestablished pseudo-reasons. of the defect of having a different subject. 46. It is not the case that cognition of the reason's pervasion cannot arise while there is cognition of the absence of its pervasion by something that pervades the probandom. Cognition of pervasion itself is not the cause of cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Therefore, although an extraneous condition has a different subject, it obstructs cognition of pervasion because it produces cognition that the reason deviates from the probandom. Conclusion, an extraneous condition is a separate pseudo-reason. 47, an extraneous condition is not merely a defect that causes cognition of deviation. Just as the reason deviates from something that pervades the probandom, so the extraneous condition also deviates from something that pervades the probandom. The causal complexes for cognizing the pervasion of both are the same. Through its own deviation, the extraneous condition prevents cognition that the reason is pervaded by the probandom, therefore the defect of having a different subject does not arise. An extraneous condition is not merely a criticism but a separate pseudo-reason. Established conclusion concerning the seed of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition. If an extraneous condition is regarded as a counter-reason, the ground of an unestablished reason or a direct criticism, then its pervasion of the probandum must be accepted. Neither being a counter-reason nor being unestablished is possible without pervasion of the probandum. Therefore the vitiating power of an extraneous condition rests upon ascertainment that it pervades the probandum and fails to pervade the reason. Alternative View 49. Alternatively, it may be held that cognition of deviation from the probandom and a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition arises on the ground that the reason occurs in a locus where something that pervades the probandom is absent. The objection is untenable that, if the mere occurrence of the reason in a locus is regarded as the extraneous condition, the universal of extraneous conditions would be eliminated. If, in the context of a counter-reason, the absence of the prior reason is regarded an extraneous condition, nonexistence, and the like would also become extraneous conditions although they do not pervade the probandom. Moreover, if conjunction and the like are reasons, regarding occurrence in a locus as the extraneous condition would eliminate extraneous conditions, because conjunction and the like themselves pervade the reason. Therefore the characteristic of an extraneous condition is occurring in a locus not uninterrupted by the absence of the reason. Thus the established conclusion concerning the seat of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition comes to an end. Exposition of apparent extraneous conditions. 50 apparent extraneous conditions are now described. The first apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. In an inference possessing both affirmative and negative concomitance, subject otherness, that is, being distinct from an object in the subject possessing the absence of the the probandom is an extraneous condition of a particular absence. The second apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an unestablished absence of the probandom. In an inference with a purely affirmative probandom, subject otherness and the like are extraneous conditions of an unestablished absence of the probandom. The third apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. For example, in fire is hot because it is luminous, being non-artificial is in a parent-extraneous condition of a sublated absence of the probandom. The fourth apparent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not pervade the subject. In earth has a beginning because it is an effect, being other than earth is instantiated in atoms is an extraneous condition of an absence of the probandom that does not extend throughout the entire subject. The fifth the parent extraneous condition is the extraneous condition consisting in the absence of the prior reason. In an inference possessing an equally strong counter reason, it is improper to regard the negative concomitance of the prior reason as an extraneous condition, because an extraneous condition is an enduring defect, whereas according to the rule of alternatives sometimes the reason on one side and sometimes the reason on the other is absent. The sixth the parent extraneous condition is the absence of something pervaded by the prior reason. In an inference of being without an agent, eternality, and the like are apparent extraneous conditions of this kind. The seventh the parent extraneous condition is an extraneous condition consisting in difference from what occurs in the subject or in a counter instance. In the well-known inference of fire from smoke, the state of being distinct from the mountain or a reservoir is an apparent extraneous condition. The eighth apparent extraneous condition is the presence of the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, the presence of the absence of fire and a locus distinct from the mountain is a defect of this kind. The ninth apparent extraneous condition is a property similar to a property possessing the absence of the probandom and what is other than the subject. In the inference of fire from smoke, a property similar to absence of fuel in a locus distinct from the mountain is an apparent extraneous condition. The tenth apparent extraneous condition is the entire causal complex of fire and the like. In the theory of extraneous conditions, these ten kinds of apparent extraneous condition obstruct inference. With this, the account of apparent extraneous conditions in the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. Prima-facy account of subjecthood, the presence of the reason and the subject. Having expounded pervasion, the condition in which the pervaded reason is present in the subject, subjecthood, is now described. Cognition of subjecthood is necessary for inference of a probandom. Possession of a doubtful probandom or doubt about the probandom is not subjecthood. 2. The mere presence in the subject of a property whose probandom is doubtful is not subjecthood. Doubt about the probandom cannot be a qualifier serving as a cause of inference, because after perception of the reason and recollection of perversion, but before substantive reflection arises, doubt about the probandom may already have ceased. If doubt about the probandom is called a cause of inference merely on the basis of temporal existence, it becomes a general occasion rather than a qualifier, and inference is possible even when the probandom has already been ascertained. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is not subjecthood. The absence of both establishing and sublating evidence is also not subjecthood. The absence of either may occur where the other is present, therefore their conjoined absence is unnecessary. the absence of sublating evidence to the definition is pointless, in inferences such as, there is smoke in the pond because there is fire, the ineligibility and non-establishment of the reason themselves prevent inference. Nor is the absence of establishing evidence subjecthood. The Vedic statement, the self is to be heard and reflected upon, shows that even an object known through perception or verbal testimony may again be inferred. The same object may first be known through one reason and later inferred through another. The bearer of a probandum desire to be established is the subject, and the desire to establish it is subjecthood, the earlier view. The earlier scholars alternatively say that the entity whose probandum one wishes to establish is the subject, and the desire to establish the probandum is subjecthood. A person desiring liberation infers the special nature of the self even after knowing the self through verbal testimony, thus a desire to infer an already established object is possible. But Kasperty Mishra's statements, a lover of inquiry wishes to know through inference an object already known, and one who has seen an elephant does not again infer it from its trumpet, a reconcile through the presence or absence of desire. Desire to establish is not subjecthood, reputation of the earlier view. This proposal is unacceptable. out about the probandum, the desire to establish it need not remain present before the third subsumptive reflection concerning the inferential mark. The intrinsic eligibility of desire cannot be clearly defined. A cloud may be inferred from thunder even when there is no desire to establish the cloud. An unfavorable object too is inferred through the force of the third subsumptive reflection. Therefore the desire to establish is not a cause of inference. With this, the prima facie account of subjecthood comes to an end. Establish Conclusion The entity possessing absence of establishing evidence together with absence of the absence of the desire to establish is the subject. The established conclusion is this, that object in which establishing evidence is absent together with the absence of the absence of a desire to establish the probandom is the subject. But if establishing evidence is present and there is no desire to establish, it It is not the subject. In There is Fire on the Mountain because there is smoke, subjecthood is the conjoined state consisting in the absence of evidence establishing fire and the absence of the absence of a desire to establish it. The mere mountain, on which fire has already been established, is not the subject. Wherever desire to establish the probandum exists irrespective of the presence of establishing evidence, or where both desire and establishing evidence are absent, subjecthood arises through a qualified absence. Subjecthood through a qualified absence. When the desire to establish the probandom is indifferent to the presence or absence of establishing evidence, or when both desire and evidence are absent, subjecthood is admitted on the basis of a qualified absence. In inference of the self prescribed by Scripture, the qualifier in the form of desire is absent, in inference of a cloud from thunder, the qualificand in the form of ascertainment of the probandum is absent. Therefore the definition is not under extended. Final doctrine of subjecthood. Subjecthood itself is purely affirmative and cannot be distinguished from another state. Nevertheless, subjecthood is accepted as the ground for use of the word subject. With this, the examination of subjecthood comes to an end. Prima-facie account of subsumptive reflection Subsumptive reflection, that is, the qualified cognition the property serving is the reason, pervaded by the probandom, is present in the subject, is the extraordinary cause of inference. Mtsaka-prima-facie view, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood are causes, not subsumptive reflection. Tsumsakas say that recollection of perversion and cognition that the reason is present in the subject jointly constitute the extraordinary causes of inference. There is no need to admit a separate subsumptive reflection. The inference, there is fire on the mountain because there is smoke arises through the combined effect of recollecting the smoke of fire perversion and cognizing smoke on the mountain. These two cognitions also cause subsumptive reflection, therefore, for the sake of economy, subsumptive reflection should not be accepted as a separate cause. It is not invariably established that subsumptive reflection actually precedes inference, if it is held to be simultaneous with inference, defects arise. Recognition of identity is not a cause of inference. It may be said that with respect to smoke and contact with a sense organ, recognition arises in the form, this is that very smoke which is pervaded by fire, and this recognition becomes the cause of inference. But this proposal is untenable. The causal complex of inference is stronger than that of perception, therefore inference arises, while recognition is not inevitable. If recognition is made a cause, a further consideration of perversion would again be required after it, leading to infinite regress. Cognition of the perversion of the subject property is not a cause of inference. For, it may also be said that cognition that smoke, a property of the mountain, is pervaded by fire is the cause of inference. But in many cases such cognition cannot arise without sense contact, whereas inference remains possible. Even when perversion and subject propertyhood are remembered, Near cognition that the subject property is pervaded is not a universal cause of inference, otherwise unnecessary repetition and infinite regress would follow. The mind can produce perceptual cognition of external objects. Five, it may be objected that the mind, independently of external senses, produces doubt about external objects, such as, is devadatta fair or not, or, is an atom the substratum of color or not. Because recollection of opposing alternatives and non-apprehension of a differentiating property are its cooperative causes. Through cooperative causes such as sleep and contact with substances that affect the mind, it also produces dream experience of external objects. Similarly, regarding a subject remote from sense contact, the mind, aided by recollection of pavasion and cognition of the reasons present in the subject, produces the substantive reflection, smoke pavaded by fire is present on the mountain. But this objection is untenable. Sense generated cognition concerning an external object is assisted by an external sense, the mind alone cannot take its place. Sleep or dream is not a means of knowledge. The materials of inference, recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, may be available even in the absence of sense-contact, but this does not justify regarding the mind as an independent means of external perception. Inference of fires pervasion in remembered smoke, the msaka view. 6. The objection arises when smoke is not in contact with a sense organ, how is an application of pervasion such as, this smoke is pervaded by fire, possible? The answer given is that remembered smoke on the mountain, delimited by smokehood, is regarded as pervaded by fire. According to the Memsaka view, separate experiences of smoke is pervaded by fire, and there is smoke on the mountain, are not indispensable. Inference is possible only for a person who possesses a cognition of pervasion in the form, whatever is smoke is pervaded by fire. For one who lacks such cognition, inference is impossible. Inference is possible despite doubt. It may be objected that even when the smoke on the mountain is ascertained as smoke through smokehood, doubt remains whether the smoke is pervaded by fire or not, how, then, does inference arise? The answer is that when the recollection smoke is pervaded by fire is present, the The determinant perception of smokehood prevents the doubt. Even if doubt arises, it may be removed through subsumptive reflection or the operation of inference, therefore inference is not impossible. Separate ascertainment of pervasion is unnecessary. 8. It is unnecessary first to ascertain separately the presence of smoke delimited by the universal smokehood and then separately to ascertain that the particular smoke is pervaded by fire. of smoke's presence on the mountain and recollection that smoke is pervaded by fire, jointly cause inference. Doubt about the absence of a particular smoke does not arise where the presence of that particular smoke is cognized. Therefore no separate ascertainment smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain, is required. No ability is possible in both the positive and negative alternatives. Objection, how is no ability possible in a two alternative statements such as this exists or does not exist, since existence and non-existence are not apprehended together? Reply, a property distinct from both existence and non-existence may serve as the reason. For example, in There is Fire on the Mountain because of smoke or light, the presence of smoke or light is the reason. Therefore two alternative no ability is not incoherent. Another cognition of difference from the pervaded is an obstructor nor cognition of identity a cause. It may be said that cognition of the difference between the smoke that is a property of the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire obstructs inference, while the absence of that cognition of difference, or cognition of identity, causes inference. But this view is untenable. Even while difference from smokehood is perceived, the complete causal complex of inference produces the inference, there is fire on the mountain. Therefore cognition of difference from the pervaded is not an obstructor, and cognition of identity is not an independent cause. Qualified cognition is not a cause. It may be argued that after recollection of pervasion and cognition of subject propertyhood, a qualified cognition of the relation between the mountain and smoke pervaded by fire, by smokehood, is necessary. But if perception of difference does not generate doubt concerning the particular smoke's pervasion by fire, such qualified cognition is unnecessary. And even if it does, inference remains possible whenever the materials of inference are present. Therefore treating qualified cognition as a cause is an unnecessary burden. Apprehension of difference is not an obstructor. 12. The objection is untenable that cognition not opposed to causal cognition cannot obstruct inference, and therefore cognition of the difference between the pervaded object and the subject property is not an obstructor. The fact is that such cognition of difference does not destroy the causal complex of inference. Cognition that the smoke serving as a property of the mountain is identical with smoke pervaded by fire does not by itself produce inference, rather, in order for the subsumptive reflections smoke pervaded by fire is present on the mountain to arise, cognition of the relevant pervasion and subject propertyhood is required. Prima-Facey conclusion, a universal as reason.

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