MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part6_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.993867)
Duration: 23:23
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33विचार-विमर्चक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� �
0:33–0:39Sun being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition because it pervades darkness
0:40–0:42But this proposal is untenable
0:43–0:50Under this definition possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference air is perceptible
0:50–0:55Because it is the substratum of perceptible touch although it pervades the probandum
0:55–0:58perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject
0:58–1:03Likewise, in the inference water is knowable because it possesses taste,
1:03–1:07Earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by
1:07–1:14possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on
1:14–1:19the mountain because there is fire, the reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom
1:19–1:25smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading
1:25–1:30the probandum delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous
1:30–1:33condition.
1:33–1:37The defect of irrelevant diversion.
1:37–1:3821.
1:38–1:42Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem.
1:42–1:47Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum, or establishment of the unqualified
1:47–1:51absence of the probandum, would become possible only after deviation of the reason from
1:51–1:56a qualified probandum, or the qualified absence of the probandum, had been established
1:56–2:00through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition.
2:00–2:06Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would
2:06–2:08arise.
2:08–2:13The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or the unqualified
2:13–2:17absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified probandom or the qualified
2:17–2:20absence of the probandom.
2:20–2:24It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the
2:24–2:28reason from the unqualified probandum, deviation from the qualified probandum should first
2:28–2:34be established. But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely
2:34–2:39and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified probandum.
2:39–2:47Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation
2:47–2:52of the reason from the unqualified probandum must first be established. Thereafter,
2:52–2:57If deviation from the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a
2:57–3:01deviant extraneous condition is needed to establish it.
3:01–3:04This argument is untenable.
3:04–3:08In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark
3:08–3:13because it is Mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing
3:13–3:17cognition that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandom, because
3:17–3:23that condition does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandom.
3:23–3:27Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that pervades
3:27–3:33the probandom delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces the reasons
3:33–3:36deviation from the probandom.
3:36–3:43Therefore no separate description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required.
3:43–3:47The doctrine of the author of the Ratnokosa.
3:47–3:5323, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined
3:53–3:56probandom is a deviant extraneous condition.
3:56–4:01Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reasons
4:01–4:03presence in the subject.
4:03–4:07For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property
4:07–4:12of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is
4:12–4:17a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason knowability
4:17–4:22but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality.
4:22–4:26On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality
4:26–4:29alone becomes the extraneous condition.
4:29–4:33In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous
4:33–4:37condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the
4:37–4:41seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom,
4:41–4:44even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present
4:44–4:47in that extraneous condition.
4:47–4:51This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandum delimited
4:51–4:57by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandum ultimately
4:57–5:02becomes the finally determined probandum.
5:02–5:07Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition.
5:07–5:1324. This doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand.
5:13–5:17According to it, in the inference a dyad does not in here in a non-eternal substance because
5:17–5:22it is a produced substance lacking magnitude, inheritance in a substance devoid of touch
5:22–5:26would become an extraneous condition, because possession of parts has been established in
5:26–5:29the dyad.
5:29–5:35In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandom.
5:35–5:39Whatever property pervades this probandom but not the reason, being a produced substance
5:39–5:44lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result.
5:46–5:50Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain through the subject
5:50–5:56property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not
5:56–6:01established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous
6:01–6:07condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied
6:07–6:12by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject
6:12–6:17propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum.
6:19–6:23Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end.
6:24–6:3025, here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous
6:30–6:35condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandum is the
6:35–6:41extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but
6:41–6:48does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an extraneous condition. In the inference
6:48–6:53air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an extraneous
6:53–6:58condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility owing to the
6:58–7:03deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference, there is fire on the
7:03–7:08the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous
7:08–7:12condition because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandom fire owing to the
7:12–7:17deviation of the causal complex of fire.
7:17–7:21The reason deviates from the probandom.
7:21–7:2226.
7:22–7:26The probandom familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is
7:26–7:32regarded through the relation of collocation as the finally determined probandom delimited
7:32–7:34by that same property.
7:34–7:39This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood, and sometimes
7:39–7:42kitchenhood or the like.
7:42–7:46The reasons deviation from the probandom due to the deviation of an extraneous condition
7:46–7:48occurs as follows.
7:48–7:53A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandom because the extraneous
7:53–7:58condition pervading the probandom itself deviates from the probandom, this extraneous
7:58–8:04condition may be either co-extensive with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom.
8:04–8:09extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject
8:09–8:14or of the reason deviates from the probandum. Consequently, the reason accompanied by that
8:14–8:21extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum. For example, in the inference destruction is
8:21–8:26non-eternal existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality
8:26–8:31of destruction. In the inference air is perceptible possession of manifest color,
8:31–8:35serving as an extraneous condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air.
8:36–8:42Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandum.
8:43–8:48When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified
8:48–8:53probandum depends upon its deviation from the qualifacand, that is, from the unqualified probandum.
8:56–8:58No defective irrelevant diversion arises.
8:58–9:0627. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the
9:06–9:11qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the
9:11–9:16qualificand, therefore no defect of irrelevant diversion arises.
9:16–9:20For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible
9:20–9:25touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier
9:25–9:30perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts
9:30–9:35with the qualificon probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject.
9:36–9:41If the reasons deviation from the qualificon probandum were not held to depend upon its
9:41–9:46deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandum, cognition of deviation from the
9:46–9:52qualificon probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualificon
9:52–9:57Probandim depends upon deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandim or the original
9:57–10:02probandim, establishing deviation from the qualified probandim does not incur the defect
10:02–10:09of irrelevant diversion. Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion.
10:12–10:1728, alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous
10:17–10:22condition may be explained as follows. In the inference air is perceptible because it is
10:22–10:28the substratum of perceptible touch, the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates
10:28–10:32from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something, such as magnitude,
10:32–10:36that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood.
10:38–10:42Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's sun, the reason being
10:42–10:47Mitra's sun deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading
10:47–10:52the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun,
10:52–10:54just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar.
10:56–11:00Here the non-deviation of the reason being mitra's sun means that it is not the counter positive of
11:00–11:06an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being mitra's sun, and such non-deviation
11:06–11:10is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar.
11:11–11:16Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates from
11:16–11:21the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom.
11:21–11:26Such extraneous conditionhood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore,
11:26–11:30in the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant
11:30–11:35diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the
11:35–11:38extraneous condition.
11:38–11:41Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect.
11:41–11:46In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition.
11:46–11:52Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect.
11:52–11:56It may be objective that under this definition non-audibility would become an extraneous condition
11:56–12:00in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference,
12:00–12:03water is knowable because it possesses taste.
12:03–12:06But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative
12:06–12:10pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while non-audibility and earthhood do not
12:10–12:14pervade the qualified perbandom.
12:14–12:17Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition.
12:17–12:2029.
12:20–12:24It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the
12:24–12:27definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that
12:27–12:31is not an extraneous condition, because cognition of the vitiating power of an extraneous
12:31–12:35condition is destroyed, for subject otherness, although pervading a perbandom delimited
12:35–12:40by a property of the subject, is free from defect.
12:40–12:42This objection is untenable.
12:42–12:46In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions
12:46–12:51pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained.
12:51–12:55Mere observation of the reasons in variable relation with the probandom, without the assistance
12:55–12:59of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that
12:59–13:02the extraneous condition pervades it.
13:02–13:06Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous
13:06–13:09condition.
13:09–13:14of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs
13:14–13:18in parts of the mountain is not.
13:18–13:2330. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable
13:23–13:29hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom
13:29–13:30is present.
13:30–13:34But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is
13:34–13:38not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from
13:38–13:43being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the
13:43–13:47perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet
13:47–13:51fuel is an extraneous condition. In an inference concerning the darkness of
13:51–13:55mitreous sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and
13:55–13:58in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object,
13:58–14:03existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet
14:03–14:07fuel increases the intensity of the probandom smoke. Affirmative and
14:07–14:11negative concomitance not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility
14:11–14:16of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness
14:16–14:21of Mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced
14:21–14:25object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its
14:25–14:27respective pro-bandom.
14:27–14:34Objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition.
14:34–14:3931, it may be objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through
14:39–14:40evidence.
14:40–14:45If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible.
14:45–14:49But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favorable
14:49–14:54hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect.
14:54–14:57Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and probandom relation and the
14:57–15:02reason of probandom relation is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only
15:02–15:07doubtful extraneous condition, because an equal means generates doubt about perversion.
15:08–15:14Where favorable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation either extraneous condition
15:14–15:19and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions perversion of the
15:19–15:25probandum is ascertained. Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity of an
15:25–15:30extraneous condition, therefore it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that produces
15:30–15:37doubt about the reason's deviation from the probandom. Reply, subject otherness is a defect.
15:39–15:4432. Some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades the
15:44–15:50absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject otherness
15:50–15:55and the means producing cognition, through subject otherness, that the reason deviates
15:55–16:00from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its
16:00–16:05absence would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandum
16:05–16:10and something pervading its absence would occur there. But this is impossible.
16:11–16:18Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandum and its absence. How, then,
16:18–16:22could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys pervasion and
16:22–16:27produces the reasons deviation from the probandum merely because there is doubt that it
16:27–16:32pervades the probandum? This view is untenable.
16:32–16:37On the basis of being a pervader of the probandum, subject-otherness certainly becomes the defect
16:37–16:44of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandum.
16:44–16:49Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect.
16:49–16:5533, it may again be objected that where an extraneous condition is present and deviates
16:55–16:59from the reason's probandum, but favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing perversion
16:59–17:04is absent, non-experience of perversion is appropriate.
17:04–17:08On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning
17:08–17:13are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because
17:13–17:15it fails to pervade the reason.
17:15–17:20Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition
17:20–17:24that the reason deviates from the probandum.
17:24–17:28The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence
17:28–17:33of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion by
17:33–17:38the probandom, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing cognition
17:38–17:41of the absence of pervasion.
17:41–17:44But this rejoinder is untenable.
17:44–17:48To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence
17:48–17:54of favorable hypothetical reasoning, consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical
17:54–18:01reasoning would be the defect, not the extraneous condition.
18:01–18:09Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued. Resolution of the objection that an extraneous
18:09–18:12condition is not a defect.
18:12–18:1834. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous
18:18–18:22condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts,
18:22–18:26in one and the same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore
18:26–18:29its relations with the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted
18:29–18:34in different substratas. Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter
18:34–18:39of the relation to the probandom, must necessarily be accepted in the reason.
18:39–18:43Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of
18:43–18:49pervasion, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition. Therefore
18:49–18:54both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be
18:54–19:04regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars
19:04–19:08say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the
19:08–19:14subject is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose
19:14–19:19absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom
19:19–19:24and reason is called an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is
19:24–19:29smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction with what fuel is an extraneous condition of
19:29–19:34the reason fire, because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the
19:34–19:38subject lake the absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke.
19:39–19:44Similarly, in the inference, destruction is non-eternal because it is produced,
19:44–19:48exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of
19:48–19:54the relation between the reasoned producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air
19:54–19:59is perceptible by an external sense because it is the substratum of perceptible touch,
19:59–20:03exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject air the absence
20:03–20:09of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch and perceptibility.
20:09–20:13But subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness
20:13–20:20cannot be an extraneous condition. The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous
20:20–20:28condition. 36. Some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property
20:28–20:33delimiting counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the
20:33–20:39counter-positive of an absence. Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition.
20:40–20:45A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual of
20:45–20:50the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom.
20:51–20:56But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition
20:56–21:00in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would
21:00–21:04arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of
21:04–21:11smoke's perversion by fire. Refutation of the YATU author's definition.
21:13–21:1837. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as
21:18–21:21the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference.
21:21–21:26But the delimiter indicated by the absence of a non-locker's possessing the property delimiting
21:26–21:30the counter-positives counter-positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended.
21:31–21:34Even if the definition of a special extraneous condition is accepted,
21:34–21:38what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition
21:38–21:43in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yatu authors definitions are unacceptable.
21:45–21:49Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars and conclusion.
21:49–21:5838. Some scholars say that either what pervades the probandum or what does not pervade the reason is an extraneous condition.
21:58–22:12For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition.
22:12–22:18The probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because
22:18–22:24the probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the probandom.
22:24–22:27Otherwise every inference would be destroyed.
22:27–22:33Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect.
22:33–22:37Division of extraneous conditions.
22:37–22:4239, extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful.
22:42–22:47A condition that certainly pervades the probandum but not the reason, and assists ascertainment
22:47–22:53that the reason deviates from the probandum, is a certain extraneous condition.
22:53–22:57In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire
22:57–23:01produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition.
23:01–23:05Where there is doubt concerning the reason's non-pervasion of the probandum or the
23:05–23:10conditions' pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition.
23:10–23:15In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable
23:15–23:19cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्चक रेकॉर्डिंग आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आप आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� आ� � Sun being produced by vegetable cooking would become an extraneous condition because it pervades darkness But this proposal is untenable Under this definition possession of manifest color would not qualify as an extraneous condition in the inference air is perceptible Because it is the substratum of perceptible touch although it pervades the probandum perceptibility delimited by the property of the subject Likewise, in the inference water is knowable because it possesses taste, Earthhood would become an extraneous condition because it pervades no ability delimited by possession of taste and undesirable result. Moreover, in the inference, there is smoke on the mountain because there is fire, the reason fire is incapable of establishing the probandom smoke because it is accompanied by an extraneous condition. Therefore the qualification pervading the probandum delimited by the reason proves pointless in the definition of a deviant extraneous condition. The defect of irrelevant diversion. 21. Both foregoing alternative definitions face a problem. Deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum, or establishment of the unqualified absence of the probandum, would become possible only after deviation of the reason from a qualified probandum, or the qualified absence of the probandum, had been established through a deviant extraneous condition or the absence of such a condition. Consequently, instead of the defect under discussion, a defect concerning a different matter would arise. The dispute concerns deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandom or the unqualified absence of the probandom, not deviation from a qualified probandom or the qualified absence of the probandom. It may be said that, in order to establish the contextually relevant deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum, deviation from the qualified probandum should first be established. But this answer too is unacceptable, because it would incur the defect of prematurely and unnecessarily establishing deviation from the qualified probandum. Prabhakara Upadyaya's argument 22. Prabhakara Upadyaya may say that deviation of the reason from the unqualified probandum must first be established. Thereafter, If deviation from the qualified probandom has not been established automatically, a deviant extraneous condition is needed to establish it. This argument is untenable. In the present examples, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, the alleged extraneous condition is not a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the contextually relevant probandom, because that condition does not establish the reasons deviation from the probandom. Here it is proper merely to establish the reasons deviation through something that pervades the probandom delimited by a property of the subject, because that alone produces the reasons deviation from the probandom. Therefore no separate description or establishment of a deviant extraneous condition is required. The doctrine of the author of the Ratnokosa. 23, granted, but that which does not pervade the reason while pervading the finally determined probandom is a deviant extraneous condition. Cognition of the finally determined probandom is obtained through the force of the reasons presence in the subject. For example, in the inference sound possesses some property distinct from the property of sound and also distinct from non-eternality because it is knowable, producedness is a deviant extraneous condition, because producedness does not pervade the reason knowability but does pervade the finally determined probandom non-eternality. On the other hand, if producedness is taken as the probandom in sound, non-eternality alone becomes the extraneous condition. In support of this view, the following rule is given, an opponent should raise an extraneous condition that pervades the finally determined probandom, because primacy belongs to the seed of the defect that produces cognition of the reasons deviation from the probandom, even if the restriction of the probandom stated by the proponent is not present in that extraneous condition. This doctrine also clarifies the view that the property pervading a probandum delimited by a property of the reason is a deviant extraneous condition, because that probandum ultimately becomes the finally determined probandum. Refutation of the author of the Ratnikosa's theory of the extraneous condition. 24. This doctrine of the author of the Ratnikosa does not stand. According to it, in the inference a dyad does not in here in a non-eternal substance because it is a produced substance lacking magnitude, inheritance in a substance devoid of touch would become an extraneous condition, because possession of parts has been established in the dyad. In this inference, inheritance in an eternal substance is the finally determined probandom. Whatever property pervades this probandom but not the reason, being a produced substance lacking magnitude, would qualify as an extraneous condition and undesirable result. Moreover, when the sound probandum fire is established on the mountain through the subject property smoke, the extraneous condition becomes fruitless. And when the probandum smoke is not established because the reason fire is not a property of the subject mountain, the extraneous condition cannot pervade that probandum smoke either. Even when the reason is accompanied by an extraneous condition, the probandum is not established because of the absence of subject propertyhood, consequently, the extraneous condition cannot qualify as pervading the probandum. Here the prima facie account of the theory of extraneous conditions comes to an end. 25, here we proponents of the established conclusion state the final view of an extraneous condition. That whose deviation causes the reason to deviate from the probandum is the extraneous condition. In other words, the condition of that which does not pervade the reason but does pervade the finally determined probandom is called an extraneous condition. In the inference air is perceptible because it is knowable, possession of manifest color is an extraneous condition, because the reason no ability deviates from the probandom perceptibility owing to the deviation of possession of manifest color. But in the inference, there is fire on the the mountain because there is smoke, the entire causal complex of fire is not an extraneous condition because the reason smoke does not deviate from the probandom fire owing to the deviation of the causal complex of fire. The reason deviates from the probandom. 26. The probandom familiar in the subject and delimited by a property of the subject is regarded through the relation of collocation as the finally determined probandom delimited by that same property. This property of the subject is sometimes the reason, sometimes substancehood, and sometimes kitchenhood or the like. The reasons deviation from the probandom due to the deviation of an extraneous condition occurs as follows. A reason accompanied by an extraneous condition deviates from the probandom because the extraneous condition pervading the probandom itself deviates from the probandom, this extraneous condition may be either co-extensive with or asymmetrically pervaded by the probandom. extraneous condition that pervades the probandum while being delimited by a property of the subject or of the reason deviates from the probandum. Consequently, the reason accompanied by that extraneous condition also deviates from the probandum. For example, in the inference destruction is non-eternal existence, serving as an extraneous condition deviates from the non-eternality of destruction. In the inference air is perceptible possession of manifest color, serving as an extraneous condition, deviates from the perceptibility of air. Therefore a reason possessing existence or manifest color deviates from the respective probandum. When the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandum depends upon its deviation from the qualifacand, that is, from the unqualified probandum. No defective irrelevant diversion arises. 27. Thus, when the reason does not deviate from the qualifier, its deviation from the qualified probandom depends upon its deviation from the unqualified probandom serving as the qualificand, therefore no defect of irrelevant diversion arises. For example, in the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, being the substratum of perceptible touch does not deviate from the qualifier perceptibility, its deviation from qualified perceptibility is established because it conflicts with the qualificon probandum air, that is, with the property of the subject. If the reasons deviation from the qualificon probandum were not held to depend upon its deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandum, cognition of deviation from the qualificon probandum would not be decisive. Therefore, when deviation from the qualificon Probandim depends upon deviation from the unqualified qualificon probandim or the original probandim, establishing deviation from the qualified probandim does not incur the defect of irrelevant diversion. Alternative doctrine of the extraneous condition, no irrelevant diversion. 28, alternatively, cognition of the deviation of a reason accompanied by an extraneous condition may be explained as follows. In the inference air is perceptible because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, the reason being the substratum of perceptible touch deviates from the probandum perceptibility because it deviates from something, such as magnitude, that pervades substancehood, but it does not deviate from substancehood. Similarly, in the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's sun, the reason being Mitra's sun deviates from the probandum darkness because it deviates from a property pervading the status of being Mitra's dark sun, but it does not deviate from being Mitra's sun, just as non-jarhood deviates from a jar. Here the non-deviation of the reason being mitra's sun means that it is not the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with that very reason, being mitra's sun, and such non-deviation is also present in the non-deviation consisting in difference from a jar. Or, in this context, an extraneous condition may be described as something that deviates from the reason and causes the reason to deviate from the probandom. Such extraneous conditionhood operates either directly or through a succession, therefore, in the inference, destruction is destructible because it is produced, no defect of irrelevant diversion arises even though existence, which pervades the qualified probandom, is the extraneous condition. Such irrelevant diversion is merely a human defect. In this inference there is no pseudo-reason other than the extraneous condition. Therefore only the extraneous condition is recognized as the defect. It may be objective that under this definition non-audibility would become an extraneous condition in the inference, sound is nameable because it is knowable, and earthhood in the inference, water is knowable because it possesses taste. But this is untenable, because the means of knowledge establishing a purely affirmative pro-bandom establishes the pro-bandom, while non-audibility and earthhood do not pervade the qualified perbandom. Subject otherness too can be an extraneous condition. 29. It may be objected that if subject otherness is regarded as an extraneous condition, the definition of an extraneous condition would be overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition, because cognition of the vitiating power of an extraneous condition is destroyed, for subject otherness, although pervading a perbandom delimited by a property of the subject, is free from defect. This objection is untenable. In such an inference, favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing the extraneous conditions pervasion of the probandom is absent, consequently, that pervasion cannot be ascertained. Mere observation of the reasons in variable relation with the probandom, without the assistance of hypothetical reasoning, produces doubt about the probandom, not ascertainment that the extraneous condition pervades it. Therefore the definition is not overextended to subject otherness that is not an extraneous condition. of fire produced from wet fuel is an extraneous condition, but being distinct from what occurs in parts of the mountain is not. 30. When subject otherness is cognized on the basis of the absence of the probandom, favorable hypothetical reasoning that necessarily establishes subject otherness is deviating from the probandom is present. But the state of being distinct from what occurs in the parts of the mountain is not an extraneous condition, because it excludes the subject and its parts from being extraneous conditions. Therefore, in an inference whose probandom is the perceptibility of a substance, possession of fire produced from conjunction with wet fuel is an extraneous condition. In an inference concerning the darkness of mitreous sun, being produced by vegetable cooking is an extraneous condition, and in an inference concerning the non-eternality of a produced object, existence is an extraneous condition. The intensity of conjunction with wet fuel increases the intensity of the probandom smoke. Affirmative and negative concomitance not otherwise established proves causality with respect to the perceptibility of a substance, medical treatises explain causality through vegetable cooking in the darkness of Mitra's sun, and the impossibility of reproducing a jar proves the non-eternality of a produced object. Therefore each of the foregoing extraneous conditions is ascertained to pervade its respective pro-bandom. Objection, subject-otherness is not an extraneous condition. 31, it may be objected, is pervasion directly cognized only in causal relations known through evidence. If so, inference of substancehood from waterhood would become impossible. But this objection is untenable, because pervasion can also be apprehended through favorable hypothetical reasoning in other objects dependent upon cause and effect. Where the pervasion of both the extraneous condition and probandom relation and the reason of probandom relation is not ascertained by the same kind of means, there is only doubtful extraneous condition, because an equal means generates doubt about perversion. Where favorable hypothetical reasoning belongs to only one relation either extraneous condition and probandum or reason and probandum, only causality or the extraneous conditions perversion of the probandum is ascertained. Subject otherness destroys the defect producing capacity of an extraneous condition, therefore it is not even a doubtful extraneous condition that produces doubt about the reason's deviation from the probandom. Reply, subject otherness is a defect. 32. Some scholars say that subject otherness pervades the probandom just as it pervades the absence of the probandom. The means establishing the affirmative concomitance of subject otherness and the means producing cognition, through subject otherness, that the reason deviates from the probandom would have equal force. Consequently, both the probandom and its absence would have to be admitted in the subject, because both something pervading the probandum and something pervading its absence would occur there. But this is impossible. Subject otherness cannot simultaneously pervade both the probandum and its absence. How, then, could subject otherness become a doubtful extraneous condition that destroys pervasion and produces the reasons deviation from the probandum merely because there is doubt that it pervades the probandum? This view is untenable. On the basis of being a pervader of the probandum, subject-otherness certainly becomes the defect of an extraneous condition and produces doubt that the reason deviates from the probandum. Objection, an extraneous condition is not a defect. 33, it may again be objected that where an extraneous condition is present and deviates from the reason's probandum, but favorable hypothetical reasoning establishing perversion is absent, non-experience of perversion is appropriate. On the other hand, if both the extraneous condition and favorable hypothetical reasoning are present, the condition is defective because it pervades the probandum, not because it fails to pervade the reason. Thus, in neither case does the extraneous condition become a defect producing cognition that the reason deviates from the probandum. The following rejoinder may also be made, both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning are pervaded by the absence of the reasons pervasion by the probandom, therefore the extraneous condition may become defective by producing cognition of the absence of pervasion. But this rejoinder is untenable. To establish its own defectiveness, the extraneous condition depends upon the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, consequently, only the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning would be the defect, not the extraneous condition. Doctrine of extraneous conditions, continued. Resolution of the objection that an extraneous condition is not a defect. 34. This objection is untenable. In an inference possessing a reason attended by an extraneous condition, the relation of the reason accompanied by that condition conflicts, in one and the same substratum, with both the probandom and its absence, therefore its relations with the probandom and the absence of the probandom must be admitted in different substratas. Consequently, an extraneous condition, which is the very delimiter of the relation to the probandom, must necessarily be accepted in the reason. Thus the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning, which produces the absence of pervasion, must also be admitted in a reason attended by an extraneous condition. Therefore both the extraneous condition and the absence of favorable hypothetical reasoning must be regarded as defects. Another definition of an extraneous condition. 35. Other scholars say that the property by whose exclusion the reason is deprived of the probandom and the subject is the extraneous condition of that reason. In other words, the property whose absence produces, in the subject, the absence of the relation of perversion between probandom and reason is called an extraneous condition. For example, in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, conjunction with what fuel is an extraneous condition of the reason fire, because smoke is absent in a heated iron ball, thereby establishing in the subject lake the absence of the relation of perversion between fire and smoke. Similarly, in the inference, destruction is non-eternal because it is produced, exclusion of positive entityhood establishes in the subject destruction the absence of the relation between the reasoned producedness and non-eternality. In the inference air is perceptible by an external sense because it is the substratum of perceptible touch, exclusion of possession of manifest color establishes in the subject air the absence of pervasion between being the substratum of perceptible touch and perceptibility. But subject otherness excludes its own absence from the subject, therefore subject otherness cannot be an extraneous condition. The Yatu author's definition of an extraneous condition. 36. Some other scholars hold that, in general, an extraneous condition is a property delimiting counter-positiveness that occurs by its own relation in what is not a locus of the counter-positive of an absence. Subject otherness may sometimes also be an extraneous condition. A special extraneous condition exists when a property does not pervade every individual of the probandom but is pervaded by something that does pervade every individual of the probandom. But under this definition, subject otherness would undesirably become an extraneous condition in the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, for the occasion would arise to regard subject otherness as an extraneous condition in the relation of smoke's perversion by fire. Refutation of the YATU author's definition. 37. This definition is untenable. In inference, extraneous conditionhood should be stated as the delimiter of being the object of cognition that obstructs inference. But the delimiter indicated by the absence of a non-locker's possessing the property delimiting the counter-positives counter-positiveness is not such, the definition is overextended. Even if the definition of a special extraneous condition is accepted, what is other than the mountain subject would unnecessarily become an extraneous condition in the smoke-fire relation. Therefore the Yatu authors definitions are unacceptable. Extraneous condition according to the view of some scholars and conclusion. 38. Some scholars say that either what pervades the probandum or what does not pervade the reason is an extraneous condition. For example, where the reason is not present in the subject, the pseudo-reason of non-causality is intrinsically a defect, nevertheless, its mixture with another pseudo-reason does not destroy the defective character of an extraneous condition. The probandom does not become an extraneous condition by pervading the reason, because the probandom has no separate role in establishing the reason's deviation from the probandom. Otherwise every inference would be destroyed. Therefore an extraneous condition is a distinct pseudo-reason or defect. Division of extraneous conditions. 39, extraneous conditions are of two kinds, certain and doubtful. A condition that certainly pervades the probandum but not the reason, and assists ascertainment that the reason deviates from the probandum, is a certain extraneous condition. In the inference, there is smoke in the lake because there is fire, possession of fire produced from wet fuel is a certain extraneous condition. Where there is doubt concerning the reason's non-pervasion of the probandum or the conditions' pervasion of the probandum, there is a doubtful extraneous condition. In the inference, the crow is dark because it is Mitra's son, being produced by vegetable cooking is a doubtful extraneous condition relative to the probandum darkness.

← Transcript index