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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Detected language: en (0.99754)
Duration: 23:48
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0:02–0:05Alternative Definitions
0:05–0:22Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the Qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence.
0:22–0:35Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid.
0:35–0:47Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid.
0:47–0:53In the illusion, this shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate.
0:53–1:00The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension.
1:00–1:06Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct.
1:06–1:12In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs.
1:12–1:15Both definitions apply properly.
1:15–1:22But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities.
1:22–1:30When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise.
1:30–1:34Nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not.
1:34–1:43Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended.
1:43–1:49Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather,
1:49–1:53it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition.
1:53–1:59Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition,
1:59–2:05a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not
2:05–2:11self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is
2:11–2:15known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended.
2:16–2:21Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity.
2:23–2:25The relation is itself the nature of cognition.
2:27–2:31Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition,
2:31–2:35how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to
2:35–2:40pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status
2:40–2:44or objecthood too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition.
2:45–2:48If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows.
2:49–2:54In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is
2:54–2:58inheritance of the pot in the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the
2:58–3:04pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once ground,
3:04–3:09half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific
3:09–3:14objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate
3:14–3:18and the nature of the absence or inherent unknown, one may still doubt, is the object
3:18–3:23of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot? This is
3:23–3:27because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition
3:27–3:31but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation
3:31–3:37is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood.
3:37–3:44Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition,
3:44–3:48these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificon cognition, there is
3:48–3:52pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object of pot-absence distinct from the
3:52–3:57ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificon cognition.
3:57–3:59This view is unsound.
3:59–4:03The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the object
4:03–4:06hood of pot-absence.
4:06–4:12If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, Qualifacan cognition,
4:12–4:14infinite regress follows.
4:14–4:18The difference between qualifier, qualificant cognition and collective cognition may arise
4:18–4:22sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes
4:22–4:25from a difference of qualifiers.
4:25–4:28It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself
4:28–4:32is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also
4:32–4:34takes that qualifier as its object.
4:34–4:40Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section.
4:40–4:46The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion.
4:46–4:51The theory of misapprehension.
4:51–4:57Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible.
4:57–5:00Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical.
5:00–5:05No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition.
5:05–5:15Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition.
5:15–5:27Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver.
5:27–5:31This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason.
5:31–5:38The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion.
5:38–5:47Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference, because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver.
5:47–5:57In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition, because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver.
5:57–6:01Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition.
6:01–6:06The defect of lacking an example in the inference.
6:06–6:11Objecthood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted.
6:11–6:19If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell-like cognition of a shell.
6:19–6:31Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished.
6:32–6:41Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference.
6:41–6:51One activity cannot be generalized here if one is removed even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established.
6:51–6:55Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition.
6:55–6:59The Neyayaka establishment of invalid cognition.
6:59–7:06The Niyayika replies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated
7:06–7:11by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant,
7:11–7:15because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell.
7:15–7:19Being activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because
7:19–7:22activityhood itself is a distinct reason here.
7:22–7:27Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualifcant of a cognition
7:27–7:33that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for
7:33–7:38silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell.
7:38–7:43An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition
7:43–7:50of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as deridical cognition of silver does.
7:50–7:55If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction
7:55–7:59or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will
7:59–8:02alone be the subject.
8:02–8:06Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted
8:06–8:11cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing
8:11–8:17objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained.
8:17–8:20Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness
8:20–8:25as qualifier and the shell as qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness
8:25–8:29a mode and the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness.
8:29–8:34Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced
8:34–8:39by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and
8:39–8:44the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its
8:44–8:49qualifacand regularly produces activity.
8:49–8:56The Prabhākara view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity.
8:56–9:03The Prabhākara says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary.
9:03–9:06Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference
9:06–9:11between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver.
9:11–9:16To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension
9:16–9:18of difference.
9:18–9:24Conferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veridical qualified cognition is needlessly
9:24–9:25complex.
9:25–9:30It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause
9:30–9:32of activity.
9:32–9:36The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive
9:36–9:41status of silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood
9:41–9:45of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode.
9:45–9:49Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object
9:49–9:54cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise
9:54–9:58cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference.
9:58–10:02Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell
10:02–10:05before one as mutually unrelated objects.
10:05–10:10Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition
10:10–10:14of identity with unknown silver is impossible.
10:14–10:18non-apprehension of difference as the cause.
10:18–10:23Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow,
10:23–10:27not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he
10:27–10:31stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch
10:31–10:36and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should
10:36–10:38be made the cause of activity.
10:38–10:42Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because
10:42–10:47of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore the Nyayayika 2 must accept mere
10:47–10:51non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition
10:51–10:55of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference
10:55–10:59apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both
10:59–11:04MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views.
11:04–11:08Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object
11:08–11:12as its object is the cause.
11:12–11:16An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from
11:16–11:19the desired silver as its object causes activity.
11:19–11:24Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity.
11:24–11:27For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between
11:27–11:31a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not
11:31–11:35different from the east, does not take that difference as its object.
11:35–11:39Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity.
11:39–11:49Objection. On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell.
11:49–12:00Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of silver's non-relation.
12:00–12:04Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises
12:04–12:08because that very silver was not previously known.
12:08–12:12Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal
12:12–12:15silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate.
12:15–12:20Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier
12:20–12:23and its substrate as object is admitted.
12:23–12:27In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object,
12:27–12:31contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness.
12:33–12:36Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition.
12:38–12:42Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately
12:42–12:46remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together.
12:47–12:52Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different
12:52–12:57times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of a post alternatives
12:57–13:03remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises
13:03–13:09after the doubt, is this a post or a person? Doubt occurs because the difference of post
13:09–13:14in person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives.
13:14–13:19Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because
13:19–13:24through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence.
13:24–13:28After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire
13:28–13:33does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion,
13:33–13:38however, activity also does not arise.
13:38–13:41Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may
13:41–13:45have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in
13:45–13:47the lake.
13:47–13:53The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently
13:53–13:58remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity.
13:58–14:03Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required.
14:03–14:08If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the
14:08–14:14perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ.
14:14–14:18In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means,
14:18–14:22in the latter there is such recollection.
14:22–14:28The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object.
14:28–14:33Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired
14:33–14:37shell causes withdrawal from silver.
14:37–14:40Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual
14:40–14:45absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise
14:45–14:50the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, an invalid
14:50–14:53cognition would again become unavoidable.
14:53–14:57If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then
14:57–15:02after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not
15:02–15:04withdraw from silver.
15:04–15:06Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted.
15:06–15:11With mere non-apprehension of different causes withdrawal, in the case, this is not silver,
15:11–15:15neither activity nor invalid cognition is required.
15:15–15:20In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal
15:20–15:23from the shell need not occur together.
15:23–15:27There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion.
15:27–15:31The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension
15:31–15:36and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended.
15:36–15:41Otherwise the doubt is the silver or shell would have to be admitted.
15:41–15:47Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects.
15:47–15:55The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand.
15:55–15:59Some partial MSAK is say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which
15:59–16:05negates false superimposition as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension.
16:05–16:10Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being
16:10–16:13sublated is not established.
16:13–16:18A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension
16:18–16:22of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference.
16:22–16:27In an illusion met within difference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted.
16:27–16:30The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making
16:30–16:36silverness its mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell.
16:36–16:41If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a
16:41–16:46collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition. When the
16:46–16:51shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant. Cognition making silverness its
16:51–16:56mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant.
16:56–17:01And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes
17:01–17:06impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity.
17:06–17:10Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced
17:10–17:12by a sensory defect.
17:12–17:16Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free
17:16–17:20cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition
17:20–17:21hood.
17:21–17:26Thus the learned Nyi-Yiika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition.
17:26–17:31When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means?
17:33–17:36Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension.
17:38–17:42If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established?
17:43–17:48If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamaka theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted.
17:49–17:52No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available.
17:52–17:59The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition.
17:59–18:04They produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively.
18:04–18:11Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or mark hood is absent.
18:11–18:17Only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there.
18:17–18:21The recognition-like view that the Ayaprahen's remembered silverness in a shell has already
18:21–18:26been refuted, latent impression and Ayaprahen distinct objects.
18:26–18:30Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory
18:30–18:34defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect.
18:34–18:37A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is
18:37–18:42not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been
18:42–18:46digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned
18:46–18:51by forest fire is destroyed. Ash may possess a capacity to produce the
18:51–18:58root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility
18:58–19:03of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause,
19:03–19:09and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition
19:09–19:15should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of
19:15–19:22non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver,
19:22–19:27silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veridical
19:27–19:33cognition. In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference.
19:34–19:39The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and,
19:39–19:43because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward
19:43–19:48the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational
19:48–19:53property describing objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness. Cognitionhood
19:53–19:59resides only in cognition, like veridical cognitionhood. The counter-inference, the
19:59–20:03eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical
20:03–20:08visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual
20:08–20:13cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is
20:13–20:18veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell.
20:18–20:22On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form
20:22–20:26of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either
20:26–20:31nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension
20:31–20:35expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through
20:35–20:39non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver,
20:39–20:43concerning real silver before one.
20:43–20:47Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence
20:47–20:51of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition.
20:51–20:55The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within different
20:55–20:59produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical.
20:59–21:06Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section.
21:06–21:11view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition.
21:11–21:13The decisive doctrine is this.
21:13–21:18In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver,
21:18–21:22is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity.
21:22–21:26Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the object heard
21:26–21:30of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition,
21:30–21:34this avoids overextension in the cause of activity.
21:34–21:38When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because
21:38–21:41it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition.
21:41–21:47Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too.
21:47–21:51Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is
21:51–21:54the cause.
21:54–21:57It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired
21:57–22:02silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended,
22:02–22:07limits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition
22:07–22:11to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may
22:11–22:16be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since
22:16–22:19its causality is required in both.
22:19–22:25But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition
22:25–22:31can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore,
22:31–22:36When the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality
22:36–22:42of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection.
22:42–22:47Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition.
22:47–22:51It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces
22:51–22:54needless complexity.
22:54–22:58Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that
22:58–23:03But complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered
23:03–23:06a defect when admitting a means.
23:06–23:12That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof.
23:12–23:16Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because
23:16–23:20it too is activity, like corroborated activity.
23:20–23:25An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition
23:25–23:30is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable.
23:30–23:34Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too
23:34–23:38becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition.
23:38–23:43To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest
23:43–23:44proof of the doctrine.

Plain text

Alternative Definitions Another alternative definition is that valid cognition is experienced to limiting objecthood that makes as mode a property not counter positive to an absolute absence present in the Qualificand, or experienced to limiting objecthood undilimited by a property counter positive to an absolute absence. Experience that does not make as mode the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with objecthood, or experience of objecthood undilimited by such a counter positive property, may likewise be called valid. Conversely, cognition delimiting objecthood undilimited by a property co-located with objecthood, or cognition delimiting objecthood by a property absent where objecthood resides, is invalid. In the illusion, this shell is silver, because the thisness component and silverness component are separate. The first definition of valid cognition and the third definition of invalid cognition incur neither under extension nor over extension. Objecthood with respect to the shell and objecthood with respect to silver are mutually distinct. In the collective cognition, this is a pot and cloth too, because objecthood with respect to pot and cloth differs. Both definitions apply properly. But there is no proof for treating specific objecthood as an independent category separate from accepted entities. When a general cognition of a pot arises, cognition of the pot's qualitative status or objecthood may also arise. Nevertheless doubt can remain whether this person knows the pot or not. Even when both the pot's nature and the general nature of pot cognition are known, the pot objecthood delimited by the cognition cannot be separately apprehended. Being related to cognition is not an additional relation between pot and cognition, rather, it is a condition consisting in the pot's intrinsic relation to cognition. Udayanakarya too says that objecthood is merely belonging to it, with respect to cognition, a special nature of being related to that cognition. This specific objecthood is not self-evident merely from general cognition of the thing. Even when the nature of cognition is known, its specific objecthood with respect to the pot is not thereby apprehended. Therefore there is no basis for admitting such specific objecthood as a separate entity. The relation is itself the nature of cognition. Objection, without admitting an additional relation of the pot to cognition, how can the pot be the object of cognition? Answer, the relation that the pot bears to pot cognition is the very nature of the cognition. In the case of qualitative status or objecthood too, the mere relation of the thing to cognition constitutes the nature of cognition. If an additional relation is admitted, infinite regress follows. In relational cognitions such as, there is absence of a pot on the ground, and there is inheritance of the pot in the pot's part, the relation of the ground to pot absence and of the pot part to the pot's inheritance is the very nature of the cognition. Otherwise, once ground, half pot, pot absence, or inheritance were generally known, doubt about each specific objecthood would become impossible. In such general cognition, although the substrate and the nature of the absence or inherent unknown, one may still doubt, is the object of this cognition precisely this absence or an inference concerning a pot? This is because the specific objecthood of the relation is determined not by general cognition but by the nature of that specific cognition. Therefore Udayanakarya says that relation is not a separate entity, the very nature of cognition becomes objecthood. Some other teachers say that a clear difference is experience between the collective cognition, these two are pot-absence and ground, and the qualifier qualificon cognition, there is pot-absence on the ground, therefore a specific object of pot-absence distinct from the ground should be accepted as the object of qualifier qualificon cognition. This view is unsound. The collective cognition, these are pot-absence and ground, can also apprehend the object hood of pot-absence. If another objecthood over and above this objecthood is posited in qualifier, Qualifacan cognition, infinite regress follows. The difference between qualifier, qualificant cognition and collective cognition may arise sometimes from a difference of causes, sometimes from a difference of effects, and sometimes from a difference of qualifiers. It is not proper to posit a separate entity according to which the qualifier itself is a specific objecthood residing in the object, because collective cognition also takes that qualifier as its object. Thus ends the established doctrine concerning the definition of a means of knowledge in the perception section. The doctrine of invalid cognition or illusion. The theory of misapprehension. Objection, invalid cognition is not admissible. Objection, every kind of cognition is veridical. No example exists of the thing to be excluded by the definition of invalid cognition. Mentioning a qualifier, that is, a property residing in the qualificant, in the definition of valid cognition is also pointless, because no means of knowledge establishes invalid cognition. Suppose one infers, the property consisting in being the object of activity produced by desire for silver is pervaded by the objecthood of cognition having silverness as mode, because it resides only in activity of a person seeking silver. This inference suffers from the defect of an untimely or inapposite reason. The status of being an object of activity residing only in real silver is an extraneous condition of this pervasion. Presence in silver is an inhibiting extraneous condition in this inference, because the object head of silver cognition arising in a shell does not reside in real silver. In the second inference, absence from silver becomes an extraneous condition, because in cognition prompting activity toward a non-silver object, silverness may be a mode though the object is not silver. Therefore such inferences do not establish invalid cognition. The defect of lacking an example in the inference. Objecthood of silver delimited by silver cognition has already been refuted. If the cognition, this shell is silver, is made the subject, it takes the shell as its object and produces activity toward the shell-like cognition of a shell. Since the distinction of the shell from the desired silver has not been apprehended in cognition, the property delimiting the causality of silver cognition cannot produce activity, therefore no example of the probandom is found and the inference is unestablished. Both the conditions, the shell is the substrate of the objecthood of silver cognition, and it is the object of activity by one seeking silver, become extraneous conditions of the inference. One activity cannot be generalized here if one is removed even an irrelevant object caused by recollection of silver produced from cognition having silverness as mode would be established. Therefore inference does not establish invalid cognition. The Neyayaka establishment of invalid cognition. The Niyayika replies that activity toward a shell produced by desire for silver is generated by a qualified cognition taking the desired object of activity, silver, as qualifcant, because it is activity, like activity toward a shell from desire for a shell. Being activity toward the desired object, is not an extraneous condition, because activityhood itself is a distinct reason here. Alternatively, the inference may be stated, the shell is the qualifcant of a cognition that makes silverness its mode, produces activity toward the shell, and arises from desire for silver, because that cognition produces activity toward the shell like cognition of a shell. An illusory cognition such as this shell is silver, or a specifically invalid cognition of silver, causes the subsequent activity, just as deridical cognition of silver does. If making the cognition this shell is silver, the subject is alleged to create contradiction or unestablishness, cognition admitted by both parties is causing the activity will alone be the subject. Making the cognition to be proved the subject would beg the inference, but in the admitted cognition that causes activity, a specifically invalid cognition is established as possessing objecthood with respect to a property whose relation is not obtained. Thus what is established is not merely cognition apprehending both silverness as qualifier and the shell as qualifacand, but an invalid cognition making silverness a mode and the shell, the substrate of absence of silverness. Not producing contrary activity is not an extraneous condition, nor is not being produced by a sensory defect, because cognition in general arises from a sense faculty and the like. An illusion making desired silverness its mode and the shell before one its qualifacand regularly produces activity. The Prabhākara view, non-apprehension of difference from the desired object causes activity. The Prabhākara says that a specifically invalid cognition of silver is unnecessary. Uncorroborated activity toward the shell is produced by non-apprehension of the difference between the shell and the independently remembered desired silver. To explain the rule of superimposition, even the Nāyāyaka himself accepts non-apprehension of difference. Conferring an invalid qualified cognition from a veridical qualified cognition is needlessly complex. It is more economical to make cognition accompanied by non-apprehension of difference the cause of activity. The reason may be stated is not apprehending in the shell before one the counter positive status of silver objecthood, or not apprehending in the shell before one the objecthood of a cognition that makes difference from the desired silver its mode. Objection, cognition of identity between silver and shell should arise from an object cognition such as, this shell is silver, not from non-apprehension of difference, otherwise cognition of difference too would have to arise from non-apprehension of difference. Answer, desire and cognition respectively take previously known silver and the shell before one as mutually unrelated objects. Since their difference is then not apprehended, conduct based on identity occurs, cognition of identity with unknown silver is impossible. non-apprehension of difference as the cause. Objection, even when there is the defective cognition of difference, the conch is yellow, not white, a person desiring a white conch does not move toward the yellow object, he stops only after a subsequent veridical inference of the difference between the white conch and the yellow object. Therefore cognition of identity, the conch is white, should be made the cause of activity. Answer, a person desiring a yellow object does not move toward the white conch because of a subsequent veridical inference of difference. Therefore the Nyayayika 2 must accept mere non-apprehension of difference as the cause of activity. If it is said that cognition of identity apprehended as illusory does not prompt activity, cognition of difference apprehended as illusory likewise does not prompt it, this defect is common to both MMA with Macron SA with Macron and Nyaya views. Alternative view, a subsequent cognition not taking difference from the desired object as its object is the cause. An alternative view is that only a subsequent cognition that does not take difference from the desired silver as its object causes activity. Difference from the desired silver is not an object of the inference of identity. For example, even when there is an earlier veridical cognition of the difference between a western and eastern place, a subsequent defect produced cognition, the west is not different from the east, does not take that difference as its object. Therefore subsequent illusion or recollection assists activity. Objection. On this view a qualified cognition of identity with silver cannot be made the cause, because activity is possible merely from failure to apprehend the difference of silver from the shell. Reflexive awareness such as, I know this shell as silver, or, this is known as silver, also takes the shell as its object, it cannot be described merely as non-apprehension of silver's non-relation. Answer, in the case of veridical cognition of silver, no subsequent cognition arises because that very silver was not previously known. Apprehension of silverness takes as object a suitable substrate of silverness, the universal silverness is apprehended only as related to a suitable substrate. Therefore, by presumption, one qualified cognition taking both silverness as qualifier and its substrate as object is admitted. In cognition of a shell, there is no means of knowledge for taking silverness as object, contact and latent impression respectively apprehend the distinct objects shell and silverness. Use of the word doubt without invalid cognition. Doubt is cognition of the substrate of many properties in a condition where separately remembered mutually opposed differences are not independently apprehended together. Collective non-apprehension of many mutually opposed differences remembered at different times is not doubt, otherwise doubt would be merely successive cognition of a post alternatives remembered at two different times. It is not the case that cognition of the substrate arises after the doubt, is this a post or a person? Doubt occurs because the difference of post in person is not apprehended together at the time of cognition of both alternatives. Near failure to apprehend the post's difference from a person does not cause doubt, because through defect the post is remembered as a qualifier of absence. After the doubt is there fire in the lake or not, activity by a person desiring fire does not arise merely from the illusion of an unrelated smoke, without the smoke illusion, however, activity also does not arise. Non-apprehension of the non-relation between independently remembered fire and smoke may have existed earlier too, the operative cognition is an inference of fire in the lake. The smoke illusion prevents independent recollection of the condition, there is no fire, fire independently remembered through pervasion becomes the inference that prompts activity. Therefore neither doubt nor a separate invalid cognition of fire is required. If the mountain is perceived in fire is remembered after cognition of the inferential mark, the perceptual illusion I see fire and the inferential illusion I infer fire differ. In the former there is no recollection of having arisen after cognition of a means, in the latter there is such recollection. The cause of withdrawal through non-apprehension of difference from an undesired object. Similarly, mere non-apprehension of difference from an independently remembered undesired shell causes withdrawal from silver. Non-apprehension of the remembered shell difference is the counter positive of mutual absence in the cognition this is silver, not shell does not cause withdrawal, otherwise the meaning of the negative expression would be non-apprehension of non-relation, an invalid cognition would again become unavoidable. If apprehension of identity with an undesired object is made the cause of withdrawal, then after the false determination concerning silver, this is not silver, a person would not withdraw from silver. Invalid cognition would then have to be admitted. With mere non-apprehension of different causes withdrawal, in the case, this is not silver, neither activity nor invalid cognition is required. In the collective illusion, this is both shell and silver, activity towards silver and withdrawal from the shell need not occur together. There is no proof establishing one such collective illusion. The property inferred from the effect treats two successively arisen cognitions, apprehension and recollection, as one because their difference is not apprehended. Otherwise the doubt is the silver or shell would have to be admitted. Activity and withdrawal arise from contrary qualified cognitions produced by defects. The partial MSAK of you that invalid cognition would become cognition with an empty qualifficand. Some partial MSAK is say that the Neayakas treatment of a sublating cognition, which negates false superimposition as valid is not proper under the theory of non-apprehension. Unless the distinct natures of the sublating and sublated cognitions are established, being sublated is not established. A later cognition can sublate an earlier cognition, thus conductor rising from non-apprehension of difference is sublated by apprehension of difference. In an illusion met within difference, usage calling a shell silver is contradicted. The nature of a cognition, silver is the qualificant, is simply cognition making silverness its mode, then invalid cognition of silver alone cannot be cognition of the non-silver shell. If an invalid cognition taking both silver and shell as objects is admitted, it becomes a collective cognition. Knowing one as another is impossible by the nature of cognition. When the shell is the qualifcant, silver cannot be the qualifcant. Cognition making silverness its mode without a silver object culminates in the doctrine of cognition with an empty qualifcant. And if any cognition is admitted to be invalid, unwavering activity toward objects becomes impossible because every cognition will remain liable to doubt about invalidity. Nor is it correct that, confidence in veridical cognition is possible because it is not produced by a sensory defect. Once confidence in a defective cognition arises, action follows, and even in defect-free cognition lack of confidence may arise because of the common property cognition hood. Thus the learned Nyi-Yiika commits a great error in accepting invalid cognition. When cognition takes deviant silverness as its object, how can confidence in it be possible through any means? Further difficulties in the theory of misapprehension. If illusion takes only existent things as its objects, how is its invalidity established? If it takes a nonexistent thing as object, the Madhyamaka theory of apprehension of the unreal must be accepted. No sound reason establishing invalid cognition is available. The speech of a faultless trustworthy person and a faultless inferential mark do not cause invalid cognition. They produce only deridical verbal cognition and deridical inference respectively. Assemblance of testimony or mark also does not produce invalid cognition, because the required fitness or mark hood is absent. Only deridical cognition together with ignorance of an unapprehended non-relation arises there. The recognition-like view that the Ayaprahen's remembered silverness in a shell has already been refuted, latent impression and Ayaprahen distinct objects. Nor is invalid cognition produced as a specific effect despite lacking relation to a sensory defect, a defect by itself does not produce an effect. A seed opposed to rice does not produce a barley sprout, burning in the stomach is not a defect, nor is production of digestive fire an effect, after eaten food has been digested, it does not again produce kyle and the rest, a sugarcane seed burned by forest fire is destroyed. Ash may possess a capacity to produce the root of a plantain. Therefore, because of cognition with an empty qualificand, the impossibility of cognition of the unreal, contradiction by veridical cognition, absence of a cause, and fear of distrust in cognition, the theory of misapprehension is unacceptable. Cognition should be regarded as veridical alone. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey theory of non-apprehension. Therefore, in the disputed cognition the shell is silver, silverness is not present as a sublated qualifier, because that cognition is cognition like veridical cognition. In reality this is nearly non-apprehension, ignorance of difference. The cognition preceding activity from desire for silver makes silverness its mode and, because the difference between shell and silver is not apprehended, produces activity toward the shell. Cognitionhood does not reside in the relational property describing objecthood delimited by the contrary qualifier silverness. Cognitionhood resides only in cognition, like veridical cognitionhood. The counter-inference, the eye, being a sense faculty like the tongue, produces cognition different from veridical visual cognition is pointless, being the producer of cognition different from visual cognition is its extraneous condition. Even the cognition called invalid is veridical with respect to its substrate, the shell. On this view only two cognitions are admitted, veridical cognition and ignorance in the form of difference. Because their mutual difference is not apprehended with respect to either nature or object, these two become the cause of uncorroborated activity. Non-apprehension expressed as, this shell is silver, appears to produce activity toward the shell through non-apprehension of difference, just like the veridical cognition, this is silver, concerning real silver before one. Cognition is called, veridical, or, non-veridical, on the basis of the correspondence or non-correspondence of activity, not on the basis of the nature of cognition. The cognition, water is hot, is not called non-veridical, but cognition met within different produces unfavorable conduct and is therefore called non-veridical. Thus ends the prima facie view in the theory of misapprehension in the perception section. view, invalid cognition is qualified cognition. The decisive doctrine is this. In the case of veridical cognition, cognition of the desired object directly present, silver, is generally accepted by both schools as causing corroborated activity. Therefore, for parsimony, only the qualification of cognition that describes the object heard of the immediately present object, the shell, should delimit the causality of cognition, this avoids overextension in the cause of activity. When the causality of cognition is apprehended, this qualification is quickly remembered because it is knowable through a relation residing in cognition. Thus there is no obstacle to admitting qualification in invalid cognition too. Refutation of the objection that non-apprehension of difference from the desired object is the cause. It may be said that non-apprehension of difference from independently remembered desired silver causes activity, and that the condition, such a difference from silver was not apprehended, limits causality. But this is needlessly complex because recollection must be admitted in addition to non-apprehension of difference. Further, a general non-apprehension of difference may be regarded as causing both corroborated and uncorroborated qualified cognition, since its causality is required in both. But this is unsound. Causality of non-apprehension of difference in both kinds of qualified cognition can be admitted only after invalid qualified cognition has been accepted. Therefore, When the causality of qualified cognition is apprehended at the time of activity, causality of non-apprehension of difference cannot enter recollection. Uncorroborated activity arises from qualified cognition. It should not be said that making illusory invalid cognition the cause of activity introduces needless complexity. Once the causality of non-apprehension of difference has not been established, that But complexity disappears automatically, complexity on the side of the result is not considered a defect when admitting a means. That qualified cognition causes activity is established by proof. Therefore uncorroborated activity arises from invalid qualified cognition, because it too is activity, like corroborated activity. An effect is impossible without an established cause, thus invalid qualified cognition is established as a cause of activity not otherwise explainable. Since the causality of cognition is established from activity, a defective sense faculty too becomes the cause of invalid qualified cognition. To maintain the opposite of this view is wholly impossible, this itself is the strongest proof of the doctrine.

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