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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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Duration: 21:42
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0:02–0:07The Established Doctrine of Deviation
0:07–0:1212. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated.
0:12–0:22Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandom.
0:22–0:33Alternatively, Deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandom.
0:33–0:38Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness.
0:38–0:42A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom,
0:42–0:47and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect.
0:47–0:54An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances,
0:54–0:58distinct from a property residing only in similar instances,
0:58–1:03and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandom.
1:03–1:09This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing
1:09–1:15nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons.
1:15–1:23Thirteen, it should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated as separate fallacious reasons,
1:23–1:26Godama's ancient fivefold division of fallacious reasons would collapse.
1:27–1:32Godama includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and thus
1:32–1:38accepts five fallacious reasons in all. Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group
1:38–1:42the defeated reason and the equally strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons
1:42–1:47producing cognition of the absence of the probandom while placing the rest in another class.
1:47–1:52The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment.
1:52–1:55It is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them.
1:55–2:00With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends.
2:00–2:04Prima-facive view of the common reason.
2:04–2:1114. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom is not common reasonhood,
2:11–2:16reasonhood because such a definition overextends to the non-exclusive reason, as in all things
2:16–2:21are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the uncommon reason, as in
2:21–2:26earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also overextends to the contradictory reason,
2:26–2:29as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance.
2:31–2:35For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the
2:35–2:39probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom,
2:39–2:43or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness.
2:43–2:47Mere occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice,
2:47–2:49making the remaining qualifiers pointless.
2:51–2:53Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
2:55–2:5915. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state,
2:59–3:02this reason also occurs in a similar instance.
3:03–3:06The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers.
3:06–3:15merely saying it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent.
3:15–3:23It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one.
3:23–3:33Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless.
3:33–3:42Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary.
3:42–3:52This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence in a counter instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason.
3:52–3:58Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonness.
3:58–4:0416. It may be proposed that commoness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance
4:04–4:08distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter-instance
4:08–4:12distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude
4:12–4:16the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while
4:16–4:20including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either
4:20–4:23a jar or some other object.
4:23–4:26This proposal, however, is unacceptable.
4:26–4:31No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common,
4:31–4:35non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons.
4:35–4:39The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with
4:39–4:44the probandom is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under
4:44–4:49extends in certain defects where the probandom has only a single instance.
4:49–4:54this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends.
4:54–4:59The established doctrine of the common reason.
4:59–5:05The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood.
5:05–5:09The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandom is ascertained
5:09–5:13constitutes the common defect.
5:13–5:17Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning
5:17–5:22the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance,
5:22–5:29the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory
5:29–5:35and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as noability,
5:35–5:39uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally
5:39–5:44taught as distinct defects, because an estate of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate
5:44–5:50commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the
5:50–5:53common reason ends.
5:53–6:00Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason. 18, excluded from all similar and all counter-instances,
6:00–6:04is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an
6:04–6:08object endowed with a probandom does not occur in any similar instance outside the
6:08–6:13subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent
6:13–6:18Because of soundhood, soundhood occurs only in the subject sound yet at the time pervasion
6:18–6:22is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason because cognition of pervasion
6:22–6:26and of subject property had our causes of inferential cognition.
6:26–6:30Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandom is not
6:30–6:35uncommonness because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential
6:35–6:40cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandom is certain.
6:40–6:45In the example, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless
6:45–6:49reason once pervasion has been established.
6:49–6:51Recutation by the ancient scholars
6:51–7:0019. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded
7:00–7:04from all similar instances held to possess the probandum and from all counter instances
7:04–7:10possessing the absence of the probandum. At the time of cognizing pervasion, when
7:10–7:14When the probandum and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed
7:14–7:18seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandum, but such occurrence does not
7:18–7:22make the reason ordinarily faultless.
7:22–7:26In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless
7:26–7:28reason is a human defect.
7:28–7:32Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of
7:32–7:39doubt concerning the probandum, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter-instances.
7:39–7:44Even a boater may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound is impermanent,
7:44–7:49and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of soundhood,
7:49–7:53all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion.
7:53–8:00A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance.
8:00–8:03Exclusion from all similar instances is the defect.
8:03–8:0920. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect,
8:09–8:14exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion.
8:14–8:19On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful
8:19–8:21in inference for another.
8:21–8:25Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is established
8:25–8:31only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances. Exclusion
8:31–8:37from counter instances produces perversion, the defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances.
8:38–8:41If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood,
8:41–8:46and stops, the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for
8:46–8:51incomplete use of the Nyaya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the
8:51–8:57contradiction of perversion must be made explicit. Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect
8:57–9:02defect is merely a deficiency in the use of Nyaya statements in inference for another.
9:02–9:07In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs
9:07–9:10cognition of perversion.
9:10–9:15Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances
9:15–9:17alone.
9:17–9:22With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends.
9:22–9:24The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason
9:24–9:3121. According to the established doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes
9:31–9:35negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject.
9:36–9:41In the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both
9:41–9:46similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence of
9:46–9:50eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence.
9:50–9:57In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and its absence,
9:57–10:01in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both sides.
10:01–10:05The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct.
10:05–10:10Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic.
10:10–10:16For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all
10:16–10:23similar instances is necessary. In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason
10:23–10:29consists solely in producing cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances.
10:29–10:35Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable, because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing
10:35–10:41the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative perversion.
10:41–10:45Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar
10:45–10:50instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence of the
10:50–10:54probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example or
10:54–11:00counter example. In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all
11:00–11:06similar instances. Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because
11:06–11:12that qualifier is pointless. A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing
11:12–11:17to this condition, but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason.
11:18–11:22With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends.
11:23–11:26Prima-facive view of the non-exclusive reason.
11:27–11:3323. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar and
11:33–11:39counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter
11:39–11:44instances are held to be established or unestablished.
11:44–11:48Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and delimited
11:48–11:50by a purely affirmative probandom.
11:50–11:55A reason such as noability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom, is faultless
11:55–11:58in, this object is nameable because it is knowable.
11:58–12:02On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take
12:02–12:06the form of the common defect in, earth is different from the other substances because
12:06–12:08it possesses odor.
12:08–12:14If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes common,
12:14–12:18and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence in all things are
12:18–12:24momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely common.
12:24–12:28If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless
12:28–12:33because it fails to establish the probandom.
12:33–12:39a delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness.
12:39–12:43Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject
12:43–12:47and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter-instance
12:47–12:53distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness.
12:53–12:58In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless,
12:58–13:03and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory
13:03–13:05reason.
13:05–13:10A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative pro-bandom and making
13:10–13:14the pro-bandom the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not a definition of the
13:14–13:17non-exclusive reason.
13:17–13:21In the inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the pro-bandom
13:21–13:25is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness
13:25–13:31is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning
13:31–13:35similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and
13:35–13:40non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes
13:40–13:46include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable.
13:46–13:52Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not
13:52–13:59non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known
13:59–14:03in the subject or in objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful
14:03–14:09for apprehending perversion. But this definition over extends to a faultless
14:09–14:13reason because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitance
14:13–14:18outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the
14:18–14:22objects outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable.
14:22–14:27The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because
14:27–14:31concomitance useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain
14:31–14:33both in the subject and outside it.
14:33–14:38Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary.
14:38–14:42The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist
14:42–14:45merely in the individual reasons being uncertain.
14:45–14:48the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness.
14:48–14:53The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers.
14:53–14:58With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends.
14:58–15:02The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason.
15:02–15:1026. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce
15:10–15:14a produced determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason.
15:14–15:19Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation,
15:19–15:23but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited.
15:23–15:30In an inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether,
15:30–15:34the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known,
15:34–15:38becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion.
15:38–15:44Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative
15:44–15:49property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for
15:49–15:51apprehending perversion.
15:51–15:55In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although
15:55–16:00no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandom,
16:00–16:06it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply.
16:06–16:10of a non-exclusive reason.
16:10–16:14Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability.
16:14–16:19Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes
16:19–16:22a non-exclusive reason.
16:22–16:27In the context of a purely negative probandom, when the absence of a property useful for
16:27–16:31apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is
16:31–16:35not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises.
16:35–16:40Since occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed
16:40–16:43with the common reason.
16:43–16:48Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning pervasion, and its demonstration, are in both
16:48–16:55cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises.
16:55–17:00With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends.
17:00–17:03Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason.
17:03–17:1728. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree.
17:17–17:35Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute absence situated in the locus of the probandum, because in the faultless inference, this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition.
17:35–17:42A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandum,
17:42–17:47not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandum.
17:48–17:52The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum,
17:52–17:56because opposition to the probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda.
17:58–18:01Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed,
18:01–18:06Therefore an absence and a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing.
18:07–18:12Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established.
18:14–18:17Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view.
18:19–18:2429. An objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed,
18:24–18:28but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory.
18:28–18:32Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason.
18:33–18:45It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction.
18:46–18:48Traditional scholars reject this objection.
18:49–18:53According to them, the absence of the probandum may be established by another defective reason,
18:53–18:57reason, but the contradiction defect of the reason that first appeared as opposed to the
18:57–19:02probandom itself prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore
19:02–19:06an independent fallacious reason.
19:06–19:12Refutation of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that collocation
19:12–19:17of the reason with the absence of the probandom is only a defect involving deviation. The
19:17–19:22defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier collocated
19:22–19:28with the absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished probandum 2, this qualifier
19:28–19:34is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandum, that is, lack
19:34–19:39of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a separate qualifier
19:39–19:45in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandum. If occurrence
19:45–19:49of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition of deviation,
19:49–19:54The uncommon reason is excluded, for this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter
19:54–19:57instance to the general defect of a reason.
19:57–20:02But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional
20:02–20:05qualifier is pointless.
20:05–20:10The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason
20:10–20:13ultimately produces class intermixture.
20:13–20:18The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable.
20:18–20:25view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the
20:25–20:30probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes
20:30–20:37the common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose probandom is unestablished.
20:37–20:42For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded
20:42–20:48by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself.
20:48–20:52In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason
20:52–20:56creates the defective superfluity.
20:56–20:59This view, however, is not sound.
20:59–21:04Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with
21:04–21:07the probandom burdens the inference.
21:07–21:12In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine
21:12–21:17the meaning of contradiction, hence the defective superfluity in the reason is not automatically
21:17–21:23established. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no
21:23–21:28other reason establishes the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement
21:28–21:34because it possesses smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent.
21:34–21:38that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

Plain text

The Established Doctrine of Deviation 12. The Doctrine of the Deviating or Inconclusive Reason is now stated. Deviation consists in being the delimiter of a property that causes recollection of two mutually opposed alternatives which produced doubt concerning the probandom. Alternatively, Deviation is non-exclusion from a relation opposed to inference, when the reason is present in the subject and there is no contradiction with collocation with the probandom. Deviation actually resides in each distinct defect of a reason, such as commoness. A reason known specifically as common or the like obstructs inference of the probandom, and the opponent defeats the proponent precisely by demonstrating that individual defect. An alternative conclusion is this, a reason is deviating if it is distinct from a property residing only in counter instances, distinct from a property residing only in similar instances, and distinct from a property residing only in subjects possessing the absence of the probandom. This characteristic avoids under extension to an uncommon reason and includes the doubt-producing nature of a non-exclusive reason. There are only five kinds of fallacious reasons. Thirteen, it should not be said that if common, uncommon, and non-exclusive reasons are treated as separate fallacious reasons, Godama's ancient fivefold division of fallacious reasons would collapse. Godama includes these three natural forms of deviation within one recurrent class and thus accepts five fallacious reasons in all. Nor should it be asked why Godama did not group the defeated reason and the equally strong counter reason together as fallacious reasons producing cognition of the absence of the probandom while placing the rest in another class. The sage makes scriptural classifications according to his independent judgment. It is not proper to prescribe to him how he must classify them. With this, the established doctrine of deviation ends. Prima-facive view of the common reason. 14. The property occurring in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom is not common reasonhood, reasonhood because such a definition overextends to the non-exclusive reason, as in all things are impermanent because they are knowable, under extends to the uncommon reason, as in earth is eternal because it possesses odor, and also overextends to the contradictory reason, as in this earth possesses conjunction because it is a substance. For this reason, even adding the qualifiers, occurring in the subject together with the probandom, occurring in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, or occurring in a similar instance, does not yield a proper definition of commoness. Mere occurrence in a counter instance distinct from the similar instance would suffice, making the remaining qualifiers pointless. Occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. 15. To demonstrate a common reason, it is unnecessary to state, this reason also occurs in a similar instance. The other components of the definition are needless qualifiers. merely saying it is inconclusive because it occurs in a counter instance demonstrates the defect of the common reason and defeats the proponent. It should not be said that occurrence in a similar instance must be mentioned in order to distinguish a common reason from a non-exclusive one. Non-exclusiveness is a different kind of defect, treating it as a separate subdivision of commonness and then adding a qualifier is scripturally pointless. Nor is it sound to call occurrence in both similar and counter instances commonness, because occurrence in a similar instance is unnecessary. This qualifier does not help exclude a contradictory reason, since mere occurrence in a counter instance can demonstrate the common defect even in a contradictory reason. Occurrence in an object distinct from the subject and endowed with a probandom is not commonness. 16. It may be proposed that commoness consists in the reasons occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, and also in a counter-instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom. This would exclude the non-exclusive example, all things are impermanent because they are knowable, while including a defective inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is either a jar or some other object. This proposal, however, is unacceptable. No such conjunctive definition is possible without first clearly distinguishing common, non-exclusive, and contradictory reasons. The qualifier occurring in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom is unnecessary for excluding uncommon and contradictory reasons and under extends in certain defects where the probandom has only a single instance. this, the prima facie discussion of the common reason ends. The established doctrine of the common reason. The established doctrine is that near occurrence in a counter instance constitutes common reasonhood. The presence of the reason in a locus in which the absence of the probandom is ascertained constitutes the common defect. Even when the contradictory reason is unknown, or even at the time cognition concerning the probandom and the subject is present, if the reason is known to occur in a counter instance, the defect of a common reason arises. Otherwise this defect would become intermixed with contradictory and other fallacious reasons. Non-exclusive reasons such as noability, uncommon reasons such as soundhood, and common reasons such as possession of odor are conventionally taught as distinct defects, because an estate of doubt it is not possible to demonstrate commonness in non-exclusive and uncommon reasons. With this, the established doctrine of the common reason ends. Prima-facie view of the uncommon reason. 18, excluded from all similar and all counter-instances, is called uncommon reasonhood. But the question arises, if a reason occurring only in an object endowed with a probandom does not occur in any similar instance outside the subject, why should it be regarded as uncommon? In the inference, sound is impermanent Because of soundhood, soundhood occurs only in the subject sound yet at the time pervasion is cognized it cannot be called an uncommon fallacious reason because cognition of pervasion and of subject property had our causes of inferential cognition. Some scholars say that occurrence only in the subject endowed with the probandom is not uncommonness because a reason present in the subject may become a cause of inferential cognition even without occurring in any similar instance where the probandom is certain. In the example, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, soundhood can become a faultless reason once pervasion has been established. Recutation by the ancient scholars 19. The foregoing argument is not sound. An uncommon reason is precisely one excluded from all similar instances held to possess the probandum and from all counter instances possessing the absence of the probandum. At the time of cognizing pervasion, when When the probandum and the subject is regarded as certain, a reason such as soundhood is indeed seen as present in the subject endowed with the probandum, but such occurrence does not make the reason ordinarily faultless. In contexts such as, this is a jar because it is this object, mere ignorance of a faultless reason is a human defect. Uncommonness itself does not become a separate defect of a reason unless, at the time of doubt concerning the probandum, the reason is excluded from both similar and counter-instances. Even a boater may be common and earth is eternal, soundhood contradictory and sound is impermanent, and soundhood sometimes a faultless reason and sound is impermanent because of soundhood, all these contexts depend on differing conditions of cognition of pervasion. A faultless reason cannot be treated as a separate fallacy merely because of ignorance. Exclusion from all similar instances is the defect. 20. It may be proposed that exclusion only from all similar instances is the uncommon defect, exclusion from all counter instances is not a defect, because it assists cognition of pervasion. On this view, an uncommon reason would resemble a purely negative reason and could be useful in inference for another. Nor should it be said that reasonhood producing doubt concerning the pro-bandom is established only through knowledge of exclusion from both similar and counter instances. Exclusion from counter instances produces perversion, the defect lies only in exclusion from similar instances. If the proponent merely says, sound is impermanent because of soundhood, and stops, the opponent need not raise the uncommon defect, the proponent can be defeated simply for incomplete use of the Nyaya statements. Stating the uncommon defect is necessary only where the contradiction of perversion must be made explicit. Nor should it be said that the uncommon defect defect is merely a deficiency in the use of Nyaya statements in inference for another. In inference for oneself too, exclusion of the reason from similar instances obstructs cognition of perversion. Therefore the true characteristic of the uncommon defect is exclusion from similar instances alone. With this, the prima facie discussion of the uncommon reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Uncommon Reason 21. According to the established doctrine, in an uncommon reason the same reason becomes negative in relation to establishing both the probandum and its absence in the subject. In the inference sound is eternal because of soundhood, soundhood is excluded from both similar instances possessing eternality and counter instances possessing the absence of eternality, it therefore produces doubt concerning both eternality and impermanence. In an equally strong counter reason there are two distinct reasons for the probandum and its absence, in the uncommon reason one and the same reason prevents certainty on both sides. The natures of the two defects are therefore distinct. Exclusion from all similar instances is the characteristic. For an uncommon reason in purely negative inference, cognition of exclusion from all similar instances is necessary. In inference for another, the defect of an uncommon reason consists solely in producing cognition that the reason is excluded from all similar instances. Exclusion from counter instances is not indispensable, because it is not opposed to the aim of establishing the absence of the probandom but rather assists the apprehension of negative perversion. Alternatively, it may be said that although the uncommon reason is excluded from similar instances, through exclusion from counter instances it produces cognition of the absence of the probandom, but in inference for another such cognition can be expressed by an example or counter example. In fact, the characteristic of an uncommon reason is simply absence from all similar instances. Absence from all counter instances is not its characteristic, because that qualifier is pointless. A contradictory reason too can sometimes appear uncommon owing to this condition, but once contradiction is known it is a distinct fallacious reason. With this, the established doctrine of the uncommon reason ends. Prima-facive view of the non-exclusive reason. 23. A non-exclusive reason cannot be defined as a fallacious reason devoid of both similar and counter instances. Such a definition produces mutual contradiction whether similar and counter instances are held to be established or unestablished. Nor can a non-exclusive reason be defined as a reason present in the subject and delimited by a purely affirmative probandom. A reason such as noability, pervaded by a purely affirmative probandom, is faultless in, this object is nameable because it is knowable. On the other hand, possession of odor, pervaded by a purely negative probandom, can take the form of the common defect in, earth is different from the other substances because it possesses odor. If the reason is regarded as occurring in both similar and counter instances, it becomes common, and if the probandom is regarded as established, a reason such as existence in all things are momentary because they exist would not be non-exclusive but merely common. If the probandom is unestablished, the reason existence would be unestablished or pointless because it fails to establish the probandom. a delimited by a purely affirmative property is not non-exclusiveness. Neither the condition of the reason's occurrence in a similar instance distinct from the subject and endowed with the probandom, nor the condition of its occurrence in a counter-instance distinct from the subject and possessing the absence of the probandom, is non-exclusiveness. In such a definition, qualifiers such as distinct from the subject are pointless, and further unnecessary qualifiers are added merely in the name of excluding the contradictory reason. A reason present in the subject, delimited by a purely affirmative pro-bandom and making the pro-bandom the counter-positive of an absolute absence is not a definition of the non-exclusive reason. In the inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, since the pro-bandom is not certain at the time the reason is present in the subject, non-exclusiveness is not established merely from doubt. Some scholars add special conditions concerning similar and counter instances in order to preserve the distinction between common and non-exclusive reasons, but those qualifiers make the definition cumbersome and sometimes include a contradictory reason as well. This definition is therefore unacceptable. Ignorance, outside the subject, of concomitance useful for apprehending perversion is not non-exclusiveness. It may be proposed that a reason is non-exclusive when it is not known in the subject or in objects distinct from the subject as concomitant in a manner useful for apprehending perversion. But this definition over extends to a faultless reason because even when perversion has been ascertained in the subject, concomitance outside the subject may sometimes remain unknown. Where all objects constitute the objects outside the subject are impossible, making the definition inapplicable. The definition also includes uncommon and contradictory reasons, because concomitance useful for apprehending their provision may remain uncertain both in the subject and outside it. Adding qualifiers such as present in the subject is unnecessary. The fallacious status of a non-exclusive reason does not consist merely in the individual reasons being uncertain. the actual defect is its non-exclusiveness. The stated definition therefore contains pointless qualifiers. With this, the prima facie discussion of the non-exclusive reason ends. The Established Doctrine of the Non-Exclusive Reason. 26. The Established Doctrine is this, what is intended as a reason but lacks the necessary properties that produce a produced determinant cognition of perversion is called a non-exclusive reason. Cognition of perversion occurs through either affirmation or negation, but when all things alone constitute the subject, no example can be exhibited. In an inference such as, a jar is impermanent because it is the substratum of both jar and ether, the reason of being the substratum of two things, when its contradiction is not known, becomes non-exclusive owing to absence of cognition of perversion. Alternatively, a non-exclusive reason is one whose subject is delimited by a purely affirmative property and in which there is no single property-based limiting instance useful for apprehending perversion. In the faultless inference all things are nameable because they are knowable, although no ability lacks an extension of similar instances for the purely affirmative probandom, it does not delimit subjecthood, hence this defect does not apply. of a non-exclusive reason. Suppose all things are the single subject in a doubt concerning nameability. Then in the statement, all things are nameable because they are knowable, no ability becomes a non-exclusive reason. In the context of a purely negative probandom, when the absence of a property useful for apprehending provision arises because occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not known, the defect of non-exclusiveness also arises. Since occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is known, this defect becomes intermixed with the common reason. Cognition of the absence of evidence concerning pervasion, and its demonstration, are in both cases not themselves the defect of non-exclusiveness, but causes through which that defect arises. With this, the established doctrine of the non-exclusive reason ends. Prima-facie view of the contradictory reason. 28. A contradictory reason cannot be defined merely as a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom, because such a definition over extends to a faultless reason, as in this tree possesses conjunction with a monkey because it is a tree. Nor can contradiction be defined as being pervaded by a counter positive of an absolute absence situated in the locus of the probandum, because in the faultless inference, this substance possesses qualities because it is a substance, substancehood, pervaded by qualityhood and the like, would also enter the definition. A contradictory reason may be described as one pervaded by the absence of the probandum, not co-located with the probandum, or pervaded by mutual absence from the locus of the probandum. The definition is not obstructed when an absence is the probandum, because opposition to the probandum is common to both positive and negative probanda. Cognition of the absence of an absence is unobstructed, Therefore an absence and a positive entity should not be regarded as entirely the same thing. Otherwise the distinction between absolute absence and mutual absence could not be established. Contradiction is a distinct fallacious reason, the traditional view. 29. An objection may be raised. When reason and probandom are mutually opposed, but only the probandom is present in the subject, the reason is unestablished, not contradictory. Hence there is no need to accept contradiction as a separate fallacious reason. It may also be said that the obstructive status of the reason becomes manifest only after the absence of the probandum and the subject is established by another means of knowledge, therefore this is defeat, not contradiction. Traditional scholars reject this objection. According to them, the absence of the probandum may be established by another defective reason, reason, but the contradiction defect of the reason that first appeared as opposed to the probandom itself prevents the production of inferential cognition. Contradiction is therefore an independent fallacious reason. Refutation of the traditional view. 30. The traditionalists may say that collocation of the reason with the absence of the probandom is only a defect involving deviation. The defect of contradiction should not be delimited by the cumbersome qualifier collocated with the absence of the probandum. In the case of an unestablished probandum 2, this qualifier is pointless. The lack of power with respect to the contradictory probandum, that is, lack of capacity to establish the probandum, can be understood without a separate qualifier in the case of a fallacious reason that purports to establish the probandum. If occurrence of the reason in a counter instance is not added to the general definition of deviation, The uncommon reason is excluded, for this reason some scholars add occurrence and a counter instance to the general defect of a reason. But then mere occurrence and a counter instance constitutes the common defect, and the additional qualifier is pointless. The special inclusion made to distinguish the contradictory reason from the common reason ultimately produces class intermixture. The traditional definition is therefore unacceptable. view of other scholars. 31. Other scholars say that the qualifier not co-located with the probandom is not pointless in the definition of a contradictory reason, because it excludes the common reason. It is useful even in an inference whose probandom is unestablished. For example, in There is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, blue smoke may be pervaded by fire, but the qualifier blue is pointless in inference for oneself. In inference for another, when two separate reason statements are given, the second reason creates the defective superfluity. This view, however, is not sound. Only opposition is the defect of the reason, the additional qualifier not co-located with the probandom burdens the inference. In the expression, because of a contradictory reason, analysis would be required to determine the meaning of contradiction, hence the defective superfluity in the reason is not automatically established. In the inference, there is fire on the mountain because of blue smoke, no other reason establishes the qualified reason blue smoke, therefore, if the second statement because it possesses smoke is added, the relation of sentence meanings becomes incoherent. that contradiction is unknown concomitance with the probandom.

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