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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
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Detected language: en (0.994521)
Duration: 20:05
Source: Open preserved recording

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0:02–0:36इन्वरिंस अग्ड, कम्प्लिक मइथिली त्रान्श्लाषिन, इन्वरिंस अग्ड, तट्दवसिंप मैज्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श
0:36–0:40entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity
0:40–0:44such as Earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, Earth, and so forth.
0:44–0:48Nor can Earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single
0:48–0:52recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter.
0:52–0:56For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking
0:56–0:59an agent cannot be the subject of inference either.
0:59–1:03Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their
1:03–1:05delimiter cannot readily be apprehended.
1:05–1:10Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence,
1:10–1:13hence neither actually doubts God's existence.
1:13–1:15The problem of mutual dependence
1:15–1:163.
1:16–1:21It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong,
1:21–1:25doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge.
1:25–1:29In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from
1:29–1:33the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would
1:33–1:38be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences
1:38–1:43are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised
1:43–1:47by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would
1:47–1:51differ and the two inferences would concern different objects.
1:51–1:57Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor
1:57–2:02should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent
2:02–2:07on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to
2:07–2:13be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the
2:13–2:17beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would
2:17–2:23not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because
2:23–2:28embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and
2:28–2:33the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an
2:33–2:38agent's effort, or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both
2:38–2:42proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly
2:42–2:48generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by
2:48–2:53effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct
2:53–2:58human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit,
2:58–3:03therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in
3:03–3:09earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is
3:09–3:13already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form.
3:15–3:22Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference
3:22–3:27either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of
3:27–3:34doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises
3:34–3:39from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the
3:39–3:44reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandum is a defect of the reason.
3:45–3:50Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the
3:50–3:54the reason's presence in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom, or
3:54–3:59through doubt about the absence of the probandom and a locus possessing the reason.
3:59–4:03Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing
4:03–4:08the probandom. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference
4:08–4:13and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject.
4:13–4:16of God, tat the sint my.
4:16–4:19A sprout cannot be the subject.
4:19–4:206.
4:20–4:24It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful,
4:24–4:28therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout.
4:28–4:32But once a current of effected in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession
4:32–4:36of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes
4:36–4:40certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout
4:40–4:42just as in the subject earth.
4:42–4:46It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter-reason arises in that very
4:46–4:47sprout.
4:47–4:51This argument, however, is not sound.
4:51–4:55The sprout is not the subject, so effect head is not a property of the subject there,
4:55–4:59consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement.
4:59–5:02Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that
5:02–5:05statement would become a second thesis.
5:05–5:09If it is accepted that inference of one probandem in the subject arises only after an
5:09–5:12inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise
5:12–5:18because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness
5:18–5:23arises in Earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first
5:23–5:28inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises.
5:28–5:32By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established,
5:32–5:36but God will not be established. Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot
5:36–5:40be subjects of the inference of God because the creation of the world itself is not established
5:40–5:43for the opponent.
5:43–5:47Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition,
5:47–5:50desire to act, and effort.
5:50–5:55Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort
5:55–5:59nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference
5:59–6:04to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established
6:04–6:10arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person in
6:10–6:15doubt with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. If, concerning
6:15–6:20the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object, change
6:20–6:24of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and
6:24–6:30the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition
6:30–6:35of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element Earth.
6:35–6:39It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause
6:39–6:44of a jar cannot produce the element Earth, because there is deviation in their causal
6:44–6:47status.
6:47–6:50This argument, however, is not sound.
6:50–6:54Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element Earth
6:54–6:58are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the
6:58–7:02likened by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has
7:02–7:05already been established.
7:05–7:09Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort.
7:09–7:109.
7:10–7:14Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort.
7:14–7:18It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through
7:18–7:22effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment
7:22–7:25immediately after the productive effort.
7:25–7:28If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the
7:28–7:29jar.
7:29–7:34The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise.
7:34–7:38Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action
7:38–7:41there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar.
7:41–7:47Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition.
7:47–7:52Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause.
7:52–7:57of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning
7:57–8:02the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished.
8:04–8:08Nor should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and,
8:08–8:11when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar,
8:11–8:17conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in Kyhtra is devoted to his own mother,
8:17–8:22like migra. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition.
8:23–8:28Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy.
8:29–8:33In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established generally only when the general
8:33–8:38pervasiveness of the probandom is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandom
8:38–8:42is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no
8:42–8:44additional distinct object be established.
8:44–9:0411. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the pervasion as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause.
9:04–9:08material cause. That same perversion of the probandom is nowhere known in a general form,
9:08–9:14therefore a general apprehension of perversion in the inference of God is wholly impossible.
9:14–9:18It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause
9:18–9:22incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons
9:22–9:28like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material
9:28–9:32causes, and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character
9:32–9:37contact or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect.
9:38–9:42Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the
9:42–9:47moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the
9:47–9:54like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something
9:54–9:59is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been
9:59–10:04refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom.
10:04–10:1012. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced,
10:10–10:15but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort
10:15–10:20concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact,
10:20–10:24is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated
10:24–10:30by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by
10:30–10:35a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause,
10:35–10:41but not being produced through generic character contact, determinant cognition, or effort generated
10:41–10:47by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person
10:47–10:51endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not
10:51–10:57not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced,
10:57–11:02but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being
11:02–11:07produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future.
11:07–11:11It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and
11:11–11:15effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other
11:15–11:17entities.
11:17–11:23Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended.
11:23–11:28Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment
11:28–11:33of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises.
11:33–11:36Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom
11:36–11:3813.
11:38–11:42No, this proposal is not sound.
11:42–11:46Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the
11:46–11:51future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently,
11:51–11:55direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either.
11:56–12:00Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the
12:00–12:05opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the
12:05–12:09opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference.
12:10–12:15Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce
12:15–12:20unseen merit or demerit which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the
12:20–12:24unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already
12:24–12:27established arises.
12:27–12:31Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition
12:31–12:37is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations
12:37–12:42of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandom
12:42–12:47becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that
12:47–12:52inference would have to be held to arise only from determinant cognition of perversion produced
12:52–12:59in that way. The probandom would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect
12:59–13:06of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14. It may now be argued that the
13:06–13:12probandom is established because of the reasons perversion. The reasons perversion has the
13:12–13:16following specific form, wherever there is affected, there is being produced by a knower
13:16–13:22of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced
13:22–13:28by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific provision,
13:28–13:32the reason effecthood establishes in earth and the other subjects the probandom that
13:32–13:36being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all
13:36–13:42loci in which effecthood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already
13:42–13:44established does not arise in the inference of God.
13:46–13:55Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound. The question is,
13:55–14:00in what form does cognition of the perversion of the reason effecthood arise in loci such as jars
14:00–14:04and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of the material cause of that
14:04–14:10particular jar is being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect
14:10–14:16or is being produced by a knower of effects in general? Under the first alternative, the reason
14:16–14:20effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a
14:20–14:27jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible?
14:28–14:33The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could
14:33–14:39be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is
14:39–14:45non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted
14:45–14:50meanings in general, thereby removing the defective absence of perversion by the probandom.
14:51–14:54A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference.
14:55–15:00For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive,
15:00–15:02he is not inside the house.
15:02–15:08Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself,
15:08–15:13while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it.
15:13–15:17In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational
15:17–15:21relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only
15:21–15:24negative provision.
15:24–15:28Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established
15:28–15:31arises.
15:31–15:35Inference of God, Tat Vesant Mai
15:35–15:36The form of the inference of God
15:36–15:3916.
15:39–15:44The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form, the conjunction
15:44–15:48of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by
15:48–15:53the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because
15:53–15:56it is an effect, like a jar.
15:56–16:01Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen,
16:01–16:06the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor.
16:06–16:10This proposal, however, is not sound.
16:10–16:14The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent.
16:14–16:18Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by
16:18–16:21those very cognitions and the like is not established.
16:21–16:25Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not
16:25–16:28become instrumental in producing diads.
16:28–16:33This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation
16:33–16:38is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is
16:38–16:39an effect.
16:39–16:44Mirror efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does not
16:44–16:51produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality.
16:51–16:55The nature of the reason cannot be determined.
16:55–17:07Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effect hood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent.
17:08–17:20Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established.
17:20–17:30Nor can the reason effected be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property.
17:30–17:39Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because this property deviates in the condition of destruction.
17:39–17:44Nor can effected be the counterpositiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing
17:44–17:49existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent,
17:49–17:53while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction.
17:53–17:56An Alternative Form of the Inference of God
17:56–17:5918.
17:59–18:03Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows, this
18:03–18:07jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition,
18:07–18:14desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a cloth.
18:14–18:19This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter-
18:19–18:25instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise the establishment of an eternal
18:25–18:29substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also
18:29–18:34arise from the following inferences, this jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen
18:34–18:39merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar because it is an
18:39–18:44effect like a cloth and this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by
18:44–18:50pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this direct cognition
18:50–18:57because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain the proposed alternative inference is also
18:57–19:02defective because of a counter inference this jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition
19:02–19:06and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar,
19:06–19:09because it possesses jarhood, like another jar.
19:11–19:13A second alternative form of the inference.
19:15–19:2019. Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable
19:20–19:24to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object.
19:25–19:29It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind,
19:29–19:33that conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the
19:33–19:37substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation.
19:37–19:42On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that
19:42–19:46proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other
19:46–19:50causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort,
19:50–19:54because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action.
19:54–19:59Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent,
19:59–20:01time that is the substratum of mental effort.

Plain text

इन्वरिंस अग्ड, कम्प्लिक मइथिली त्रान्श्लाषिन, इन्वरिंस अग्ड, तट्दवसिंप मैज्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श्विमर्श entities cannot separately be subjects of the inference, because each individual entity such as Earth cannot be denoted merely by the word, Earth, and so forth. Nor can Earth and the others collectively be the subject, because they have no single recurrent common form, that is, no unitary delimiter. For this reason, the object of doubt or dispute in the controversy about having or lacking an agent cannot be the subject of inference either. Because the objects of doubt and dispute have no single recurrent common form, their delimiter cannot readily be apprehended. Moreover, the proponent is certain of God's existence and the opponent of God's non-existence, hence neither actually doubts God's existence. The problem of mutual dependence 3. It should not be said that because the inferences of proponent and opponent are equally strong, doubt concerning God's existence will arise in the mind of a neutral judge. In that case there would be mutual dependence, the neutral judge's doubt would arise from the mutually opposed inferences of proponent and opponent, while those inferences would be presented only after the neutral judge had raised the question. Mutually opposed inferences are possible even concerning an illustration such as a jar. Further, if doubt is raised by treating each entity such as earth as a separate subject, the topics of dispute would differ and the two inferences would concern different objects. Not made by a human being and not produced by a body are not the subject. For, nor should it be said that the subject is whatever has not been produced by a human agent dependent on a body, or whatever has not been produced by a body. Then produced entities held to be created only by God, produced special qualities of the self, sound, blowing, the Vedas at the beginning of creation, jars and the like, and conventional signs such as writing, would not be included in the subject. Such a subject would also incur absence of evidence, because embodied living beings too may, through unseen merit and demerit, the agents of earth and the other entities. Nor should it be said that the subject is what is not produced by an agent's effort, or a produced entity distinct from those products of effort accepted by both proponent and opponent. Earth and the other entities too are produced through humanly generated effort and unseen merit or demerit. Likewise, neither what is not produced by effort that produces unseen merit or demerit, nor a produced entity not produced by direct human effort, can be the subject. God's effort produces unseen merit or demerit, therefore the property of not being produced by effort that produces the unseen cannot occur in earth and the other entities. Such a subject would also involve partial establishment of what is already established, because jars and the like too could become subjects in this form. Earth alone is not the subject. Earth alone cannot be treated as the subject of the inference either, because doubt concerning deviation of the reason in a sprout would introduce the defect of doubtful inconclusiveness. Nor should it be said that doubt concerning deviation of the reason arises from doubt about the reason in a certain counter instance. Near doubt about occurrence of the reason in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandum is a defect of the reason. Such doubt about the reasons occurrence becomes defective in two ways, through doubt about the the reason's presence in a counter-instance possessing the absence of the probandom, or through doubt about the absence of the probandom and a locus possessing the reason. Nor should it be said that such a defect of deviation would also occur in a subject possessing the probandom. This type of doubt concerning deviation of the reason invalidates inference and constitutes a defect only in an object distinct from the subject. of God, tat the sint my. A sprout cannot be the subject. 6. It may now be said, in the case of a sprout, a current of the reason affected is doubtful, therefore effected becomes doubtfully inconclusive in that sprout. But once a current of effected in the sprout is certain, inference of the probandom possession of an agent in that object, which is subject to doubt concerning the probandom, becomes certain, because all the causal materials of inference are present in the sprout just as in the subject earth. It may therefore also be said that an equally strong counter-reason arises in that very sprout. This argument, however, is not sound. The sprout is not the subject, so effect head is not a property of the subject there, consequently the sprout cannot be the object of that inferential statement. Even if the sprout were treated as the subject in the inferential statement, that statement would become a second thesis. If it is accepted that inference of one probandem in the subject arises only after an inference of another probandom depending on another inference, neither inference would arise because of mutual dependence. Earth becomes the topic of dispute because doubtful inconclusiveness arises in Earth and the other things as subjects. Therefore, if possession of an agent is first inferred in the sprout, the defect of changing the subject matter arises. By this method, cognition of various causes of the world may perhaps be established, but God will not be established. Even the diads at the beginning of creation cannot be subjects of the inference of God because the creation of the world itself is not established for the opponent. Possession of an agent is not being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, and effort. Further, possession of an agent is neither copresence with a person who exerts effort nor being produced by such a person, because if this form is understood with reference to striving persons like ourselves, the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor can possession of an agent be understood as being produced by a person in doubt with direct cognition of the material cause, desire to act, and effort. If, concerning the material cause, means merely having some material cause or other as its object, change of subject matter would result on the basis of our cognitions and the like. Earth and the other subjects are also held to be produced by cognition and the like. Direct cognition of the material cause of a jar does not produce the element Earth. It may also be said that direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause of a jar cannot produce the element Earth, because there is deviation in their causal status. This argument, however, is not sound. Cognition and the like that produce the unseen factor producing the element Earth are held to concern the material cause, therefore, through that cognition and the likened by means of the unseen, there would be the defect of re-establishing what has already been established. Possession of an agent is not being produced by effort. 9. Nor is possession of an agent accepted as being directly produced by effort. It is neither being produced by effort while not being produced by an object produced through effort, nor the state of being present in the produced entity itself in the moment immediately after the productive effort. If such a form were accepted, the probandom would be absent from the illustration of the jar. The absence of being produced by a potter and others in jars would then also arise. Nor should bodily action be offered as the illustration, because in that bodily action there is doubt about deviation of the reason in relation to a jar. Furthermore, being made by a person would become an extraneous condition. Possession of an agent is not being an object of cognition of the material cause. of an agent is not accepted as being the object of cognition, effort, and the like concerning the material cause of earth and the other entities, because such a property is unestablished. Nor should it be said that material cause is a relational expression and, when connected with special expressions such as the element earth and jar, conveys the respective specific material cause, just as in Kyhtra is devoted to his own mother, like migra. Such a rule of expression applies only to verbal cognition. Here verbal testimony is not a means of knowledge, because neither proponent nor opponent is trustworthy. In inference, however, a pervasive probandom is established generally only when the general pervasiveness of the probandom is apprehended. This general pervasiveness of the probandom is merely being produced by cognition of the material cause, how then could no additional distinct object be established. 11. Further, in this way, even in jars and the other objects, the pervasion, that is, the status of the pervasion as pervasive, is known only in the form of being produced by cognition of the particular material cause. material cause. That same perversion of the probandom is nowhere known in a general form, therefore a general apprehension of perversion in the inference of God is wholly impossible. It should also be noted that accepting cognition and the like concerning the material cause incurs the defect of establishing what is already established with respect to persons like ourselves. In us there are effort, desire, and cognition concerning material causes, and through a relation in the form of yogically produced merit, generic character contact or cognition itself, those cognitions and the like may become causes of an effect. Although cognition and the like concerning the material cause are not present in the moment immediately preceding the element earth, a person endowed with such cognition and the like is present. That person too may be productive through the unseen. The view that something is directly produced by cognition and the like concerning its material cause has already been refuted. The form of the subject and the probandom. 12. It may now be proposed that the subject of the inference of God is whatever is produced, but is not produced by a person endowed with direct cognition, desire to act, an effort concerning a produced material cause, is not produced through generic character contact, is not produced through determinate cognition, and is not produced through effort generated by yogic merit. Likewise, the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with effort, desire to act, and cognition concerning the material cause, but not being produced through generic character contact, determinant cognition, or effort generated by yogic merit. Or the probandom of the inference of God is being produced by a person endowed with direct cognition and the like concerning the material cause, but not not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future, or being produced, but not being produced by a person who possesses humanly generated cognition, and also not being produced through a contact that produces direct awareness of the future. It should be understood here that only desire arising immediately after cognition and effort arising immediately after desire are regarded as producing earth and the other entities. Simultaneity or immediate succession among cognition, desire, and effort is not intended. Therefore, with respect to the element earth and the other subjects, neither non-establishment of the probandom nor defeat of the probandom arises. Recutation of the proposed forms of the subject and probandom 13. No, this proposal is not sound. Contact in the form of generic cognition produced by yogic merit, direct awareness of the future, and contact producing such awareness are not established for the opponent. Consequently, direct awareness produced by those contacts is not established for the opponent either. Thus the qualifiers of the subject and pro-bandam in the inference of God would be unfamiliar to the opponent. Even if those contacts and direct awareness were accepted as established for the opponent, being produced by them would remain unestablished in the subject of the inference. Effort, desire, and direct cognition not produced by effort arising from yogic merit produce unseen merit or demerit which in turn produces the element earth. In this way, through the unseen, they can produce the element earth, hence the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Nor should it be said that direct production from effort, desire, and direct cognition is intended in earth and the other entities. This property is absent from the illustrations of jars and the like. Cognition of being a desired result that produces the probandom becomes a cause of inference only concerning illustrations such as jars, consequently that inference would have to be held to arise only from determinant cognition of perversion produced in that way. The probandom would therefore be unestablished. Argument that the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise. 14. It may now be argued that the probandom is established because of the reasons perversion. The reasons perversion has the following specific form, wherever there is affected, there is being produced by a knower of that affects material cause. Its general form is not effects in general are produced by a knower of their material causes. Therefore, through this specific provision, the reason effecthood establishes in earth and the other subjects the probandom that being produced by a knower of the material cause of the element earth occurs in all loci in which effecthood occurs. Consequently, the defect of establishing what is already established does not arise in the inference of God. Refutation of the argument. 15. This argument, however, is not sound. The question is, in what form does cognition of the perversion of the reason effecthood arise in loci such as jars and cloths separately in each as being produced by a knower of the material cause of that particular jar is being produced by a knower of the material cause of each particular effect or is being produced by a knower of effects in general? Under the first alternative, the reason effect hood deviates from the property of being produced by a knower of the material cause of a jar. Under the second alternative, how is cognition of the probandoms pervasiveness possible? The material causes of particular jars and the like have no recurrent common form that could be conveyed by non-recurrent special words such as jar. The very nature of a special word is non-recurrence. Nor can it be said that special words such as jar merely indicate their denoted meanings in general, thereby removing the defective absence of perversion by the probandom. A statement about the nature of words has no use in inference. For this reason it is said, Devdatta is now outside the house because, while alive, he is not inside the house. Whoever, while alive, is not in one particular place is in some other place, just as I myself, while alive, am not outside the house and therefore am inside it. In this inference there is no affirmative provision of the reason because the same relational relative correlative pronouns are absent for subject and illustration, there is only negative provision. Under the third alternative, only the defect of establishing what is already established arises. Inference of God, Tat Vesant Mai The form of the inference of God 16. The adherent of the ancient view may now propose the inference of God in this form, the conjunction of two atoms at the beginning of creation, that is, a dyad is fit to be produced by the complete causal complex simultaneous with cognition, desire, and effort, because it is an effect, like a jar. Further, if the dyad is held to be produced by the complete causal complex of the unseen, the problem arises that the dyad itself would become an unseen factor. This proposal, however, is not sound. The production of dyads and the liking creation is not established for the opponent. Although cognition and the like may be established for the opponent, production of dyads by those very cognitions and the like is not established. Even if neutral or indifferent causes are established for the opponent, they do not become instrumental in producing diads. This refutation also rejects the following view, a dyad at the beginning of creation is fit to be produced by effort simultaneous with its non-inherent cause, because it is an effect. Mirror efforthood, in the form of effort simultaneous with the dyad's non-inherent cause, does not produce the dyad because of the defects of prolixity and lack of instrumentality. The nature of the reason cannot be determined. Further, the prima facie opponent says that the reason-effect hood is not a property in the form of fitness to be produced by effort arising from meditation, because such a property cannot be established for the opponent. Nor can the reason-effect hood be regarded as relation to future time while not existing in pastime, because the pastimes of individual objects have no single recurrent form, and the totality of pastime cannot be established. Nor can the reason effected be regarded as the state of manifesting in the present from time to time, because prior absence produces deviation in this property. Nor is the reason effected the state of being the counter positive of prior absence, because this property deviates in the condition of destruction. Nor can effected be the counterpositiveness delimited by prior absence while possessing existence, because existence as a universal property is not established for the opponent, while existence in its own nature also remains in destruction. An Alternative Form of the Inference of God 18. Some scholars present an alternative form of the inference of God as follows, this jar is fit to be produced by cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition, desire, and effort that produce this jar, because it is in effect, like a cloth. This proposal, however, is not sound. In the absence of a means excluding the counter- instance, such an inference is not instrumental. Otherwise the establishment of an eternal substratum of merit and demerit and an eternal substratum of pleasure and pain would also arise from the following inferences, this jar is fit to be produced by eternal unseen merit or demerit distinct from the impermanent unseen factor producing this jar because it is an effect like a cloth and this direct cognition of pleasure and pain is fit to be produced by pleasure and pain distinct from the impermanent pleasure and pain producing this direct cognition because it is a direct cognition of pleasure and pain the proposed alternative inference is also defective because of a counter inference this jar is not fit to be produced by eternal cognition and the like distinct from the impermanent cognition and the like producing this jar, because it possesses jarhood, like another jar. A second alternative form of the inference. 19. Some scholars propose as follows, effort toward a mental action is observed to be favorable to a person's directing the mind toward the senses apprehending the desired object. It may therefore be accepted that mental action produces conjunction of self and mind, that conjunction produces cognition, and that cognition occurs at a time which is not the substratum of the destruction of body-produced cognition at the beginning of creation. On this basis, the inference of God would take this form, mental action does not occur in that proceeding, or subsequent, time which is the substratum of mental effort and of all other causes pervaded by mental effort, but is not the substratum of every mental effort, because it is mental action, like a previously accepted particular mental action. Consequently, the existence of mental action is established in the preceding, or subsequent, time that is the substratum of mental effort.

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