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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:05CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW
0:06–0:13Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition.
0:13–0:19Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object.
0:19–0:24Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion.
0:24–0:30Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion.
0:30–0:35visionary non-vetic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating
0:35–0:39this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction.
0:39–0:43Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from
0:43–0:49illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity.
0:49–0:54It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
0:54–0:56This is not correct.
0:56–0:59Validity is qualified cognitionhood is a cognition that takes as its object a
0:59–1:03non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded
1:03–1:08from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent, this cannot be
1:08–1:13intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-luminosity illuminates only
1:13–1:17its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible even in
1:17–1:22the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely
1:22–1:25from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise
1:25–1:30have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion.
1:30–1:33The Neoprobacra view
1:33–1:40The Neoprobacramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent difference.
1:40–1:45Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known.
1:45–1:50Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition
1:50–1:55of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
1:55–2:01Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known
2:01–2:05in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence.
2:06–2:11Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising.
2:12–2:17Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation,
2:17–2:20therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect.
2:20–2:26Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes,
2:26–2:30non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference.
2:30–2:34The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object,
2:34–2:36it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate.
2:37–2:40In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect.
2:41–2:45Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two
2:45–2:49alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent
2:49–2:54difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity.
2:54–3:00Gangesa's conclusion Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is
3:00–3:01unsound.
3:01–3:06Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity,
3:06–3:09it is pointless to call something else validity.
3:09–3:14If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from
3:14–3:18the cognitive aggregate would be impossible.
3:18–3:22For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference
3:22–3:26is absent, nor was it remembered earlier.
3:26–3:31Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension
3:31–3:34of a non-existent difference.
3:34–3:39This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation
3:39–3:43and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation.
3:43–3:47If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate,
3:47–3:52about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even
3:52–3:58in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering
3:58–4:02activity is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its
4:02–4:07object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation.
4:07–4:11Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a
4:11–4:15non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate.
4:15–4:21Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing feature.
4:21–4:26Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established.
4:26–4:29Here ends the theory of the production of validity.
4:29–4:34The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge.
4:34–4:39The definition of Proma.
4:39–4:45Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Proma, validity is not a universal.
4:45–4:53What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive validity?
4:53–4:57It cannot be a universal or common property.
4:57–5:03If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen,
5:03–5:07doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible.
5:07–5:15But in the collective doubtful cognition, is this cognition valid or not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference.
5:15–5:22or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap
5:22–5:28with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are
5:28–5:34the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity.
5:35–5:39If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous and
5:39–5:44and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear
5:44–5:52and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal.
5:52–5:58The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component.
5:58–6:03If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another
6:03–6:08particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides
6:08–6:14in every part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and
6:14–6:19this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity
6:19–6:25and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive
6:25–6:31universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition
6:31–6:35is not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components.
6:35–6:41Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience,
6:41–6:44but that definition will be refuted below.
6:44–6:48Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish
6:48–6:52validity as a universal.
6:52–6:57Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurrent.
6:57–7:01It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence
7:01–7:05validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively-occurrent properties.
7:06–7:10By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively-occurrent is not pervasively-occurrent,
7:10–7:14and what is pervasively-occurrent is not non-pervasively-occurrent, as restricted,
7:14–7:19validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively-occurrent.
7:20–7:24This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed,
7:24–7:29they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top
7:29–7:34and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if
7:34–7:37different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them.
7:38–7:43Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem,
7:43–7:47because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present.
7:48–7:51Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively
7:51–7:53occurrent properties is incoherent.
7:53–8:00The absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter.
8:00–8:06The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a mode
8:06–8:12and making a property present in the qualificand a mode may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity.
8:12–8:19Answer, these conditions may explain the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity.
8:19–8:23validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate
8:23–8:27of validity or its absence.
8:27–8:31Recutation of the Prabhācāra view
8:31–8:35The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended,
8:35–8:41or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity. This view is
8:41–8:45unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an
8:45–8:50earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended,
8:50–8:55yet the later cognition can be veridical. The Prabhikara may say that perception apprehends
8:55–8:59a present object, since the post qualified by each present moment was not previously
8:59–9:05apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness,
9:05–9:09is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and
9:09–9:13actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning
9:13–9:19to a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously
9:19–9:25unapprehended is not cognitive validity. The radical experience and similar conditions
9:25–9:30are not Pramahud. Experientiality conforming to the object
9:30–9:36cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition
9:36–9:40without mentioning a specific property such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present
9:40–9:46in illusion too. Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity,
9:46–9:50because these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because
9:50–9:56they depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence.
9:56–10:01Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition
10:01–10:06opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive.
10:06–10:11experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing
10:11–10:16successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and, success, must
10:16–10:22again be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition,
10:22–10:25because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise,
10:25–10:29while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion.
10:31–10:35Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence and the
10:35–10:39the qualificand is not promahood.
10:39–10:43It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as mode a property that
10:43–10:48is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand.
10:48–10:53But this definition does not apply to the ridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction
10:53–10:56is non-pervasively a current.
10:56–11:01If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current,
11:01–11:05It overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an
11:05–11:10illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current.
11:10–11:15A definition based on mutual absence also fails.
11:15–11:18Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively a current because they have
11:18–11:22distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top.
11:22–11:28The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former
11:28–11:33blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute
11:33–11:38or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters.
11:40–11:43Objecthood is a special mode of qualification.
11:45–11:50Experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not Pramahood.
11:51–11:56In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualifcand may occur as modes.
11:56–12:01nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several
12:01–12:07qualificans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualifican becomes pointless,
12:07–12:12and because all modes do not reside in a single qualifican the definition will not apply to collective cognition.
12:12–12:18The qualificant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition is the
12:18–12:23delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the
12:23–12:27shell is delimited by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver
12:27–12:33is delimited by favorable silverness. Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent
12:33–12:38in cognition of past and future objects. Objecthood is a special qualitative relation
12:38–12:42between cognition and object, a special relational property of its own.
12:42–12:46A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that,
12:46–12:52he knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes
12:52–12:57that a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted.
12:57–13:04Otherwise the sentence meaning of this object is known as a pot involving an instrumental relation through pothood would be impossible.
13:05–13:08Mode hood 2 is one kind of this special relation, not mere object hood.
13:10–13:14Experience whose mode is co-located with object hood is not valid cognition.
13:14–13:20It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is co-located with object hood,
13:20–13:23or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode.
13:23–13:27This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something,
13:27–13:32and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this,
13:32–13:35and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate.
13:35–13:39If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component,
13:39–13:45Mere experientiality must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless.
13:46–13:53A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude the illusory component.
13:54–13:58The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either.
14:00–14:07Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is not valid cognition.
14:07–14:17Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood.
14:17–14:27In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another.
14:27–14:35But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell.
14:35–14:43It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undilimited by that same property.
14:43–14:55Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes as moda property not residing where objecthood resides likewise over extends to an illusion containing a shellless component.
14:55–14:58component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively
14:58–15:04a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition.
15:06–15:09Avoidance of under extension or failure of application.
15:11–15:15Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed,
15:15–15:21and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory and non-illusory components are
15:21–15:26distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect
15:26–15:32to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid.
15:33–15:38The definition cognition that makes his motor property not co-located with objecthood is illusion,
15:38–15:45and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable
15:45–15:49no ability is imagined not to reside in objecthood, the definition will not apply.
15:50–15:54In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver,
15:54–15:59Therefore, merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would
15:59–16:05have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these
16:05–16:12attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not admissible.
16:14–16:18If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver,
16:18–16:23with silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition this shell is silver
16:23–16:29will not be valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component,
16:29–16:33for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component.
16:35–16:39If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in
16:39–16:45the qualitative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. Superimposed
16:45–16:49identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a
16:49–16:54mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifiers in
16:54–16:58the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be
16:58–17:01regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component.
17:03–17:05Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View
17:07–17:12The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a
17:12–17:17qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood
17:17–17:23also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode,
17:23–17:28imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition
17:28–17:34will not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified
17:34–17:38by no ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is
17:38–17:42unacceptable. Cognition of the counter positive of an absence is delimited by the property
17:42–17:47delimiting counterpositiveness, the condition, undelimited by any property, is found in
17:47–17:52ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the
17:52–17:57definition over extends to illusion and under extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends
17:57–18:04the prima facie discussion of the definition of prama in the perception section.
18:04–18:11The established definition of prama. An experience having a mode in what actually possesses
18:11–18:17it is valid. The proponent of the doctrine says, experience
18:17–18:21or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid.
18:22–18:27Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property.
18:29–18:33Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid,
18:33–18:38or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that
18:38–18:44property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity.
18:44–18:49Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate,
18:49–18:55cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode.
18:57–19:02Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition.
19:03–19:08God's cognition is determinant cognition in qualifier-qualifican form,
19:08–19:12he knows the qualificon of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property
19:12–19:18separately as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from
19:18–19:24both valid and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling
19:24–19:29it inexpressible in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without
19:29–19:34association with name and universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid
19:34–19:39in the this component because thisness resides in the shell, an invalid in the silverness
19:39–19:43component because silverness is made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent.
19:44–19:48But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its
19:48–19:53qualifical components. Pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate
19:53–19:59of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition,
19:59–20:02only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both.
20:04–20:08Validity of cognition of non-pervasively occurent presence and absence.
20:09–20:14Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively occurant positive entity such as conjunction and of
20:14–20:18its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualificant,
20:18–20:23a single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the
20:23–20:24tree's top.
20:24–20:28Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different
20:28–20:30parts, the root and top.
20:30–20:34Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part
20:34–20:39which conjunction exists is not as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction.
20:41–20:45Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump.
20:46–20:51Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid,
20:51–20:55after it has been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid.
20:56–21:01Using this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in which
21:01–21:06is not a defect of failed generalization. Validity is not defined in one absolute form
21:06–21:12for all cognitions, but according to the specific substrate, time, and part of each particular
21:12–21:20cognition. The view of others. Other scholars say that experientiality or
21:20–21:25cognitionhood alone is validity. Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect
21:25–21:30to its corroborated component, nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning
21:30–21:36silver are specifically defined. Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate
21:36–21:41of silverness, is valid cognition concerning silver, while experience of silverness in
21:41–21:48a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness, is invalid cognition concerning silver.
21:48–21:52On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid
21:52–21:57cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific object
21:57–22:01belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may be defined as
22:01–22:05experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate of objecthood.
22:06–22:11Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode collocated with objecthood
22:11–22:16may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid. In the mixed cognition,
22:16–22:20this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid and invalid cognition
22:20–22:22is possible because the components differ.

Plain text

CONCLUSION OF THE PARTUAL MSAKHAVIEW Only a qualified cognition that destroys or sublates a cognition producing activity inhibits in the case of qualified cognition. Such a situation is absent in the present illusion, activity arises even without doubt about the object. Validity is only the condition of being a qualified cognition, because this excludes illusion. Validity is not determination of object validity, because that is equally present in illusion. visionary non-vetic examiners recognize validity in cognition excluded from illusion, violating this usage and positing a different validity would be merely a traditional fiction. Therefore validity is simply the condition of being a qualified cognition excluded from illusion, it causes unwavering activity and removes doubt about cognitive validity. It may be said that such validity is intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. This is not correct. Validity is qualified cognitionhood is a cognition that takes as its object a non-apprehended absence of relation between a property and its substrate and is excluded from illusion. Since the complete causal aggregate for non-relation is absent, this cannot be intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Cognition's self-luminosity illuminates only its object, not validity, otherwise doubt about validity would be impossible even in the unhabituated state. Therefore cognitive validity is not intrinsically produced merely from the cognitive aggregate, otherwise the validity of illusion would likewise have to be intrinsically produced from the aggregate of illusion. The Neoprobacra view The Neoprobacramsakas say that cognitive validity is non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. Such non-apprehension is an absolute absence, because it is never known. Since validity is an absolute absence, it is established intrinsically, hence cognition of it too is said to be intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. Invalidity is non-apprehension of an existent difference. Since the difference will be known in the future by another means, such non-apprehension is a prior absence. Though apprehension of the existent difference is possible, a defect prevents it from arising. Non-apprehension of the existent difference is maintained by the defect until the future relation, therefore invalidity is produced extrinsically by the defect. Corroborated and uncorroborated activity arise respectively from different causes, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference. The validity useful in activity is merely the validity of the object, it is intrinsically produced from the cognitive aggregate. In validity, however, is extrinsically produced by a defect. Doubt about the validity of cognition in an unhabituated state depends on the two alternatives, non-apprehension of a non-existent difference and apprehension of an existent difference, it therefore inhibits unwavering activity. Gangesa's conclusion Gangesa says that this neoprabhakra view is unsound. Only that which produces unwavering activity should be regarded as cognitive validity, it is pointless to call something else validity. If validity were non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, intrinsic cognition of it from the cognitive aggregate would be impossible. For the counter positive of such non-apprehension apprehension of a non-existent difference is absent, nor was it remembered earlier. Even when cognition is known in an unhabituated state, doubt arises about non-apprehension of a non-existent difference. This also refutes the alternative view that validity is apprehension of a general relation and invalidity is non-apprehension of the relation. If apprehension of the relation were intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate, about cognitive validity would be impossible because the relation can be apprehended even in an unhabituated state. Therefore validity, excluded from illusion and causing unwavering activity is a specific cognition hood in the form of a single cognition taking as its object the substrate of a property consisting in a previously unapprehended non-existent relation. Alternatively, validity may be cognition of a relation or non-apprehension of a non-existent difference, but it is not intrinsically known from the cognitive aggregate. Validity is determined extrinsically through cognition of difference produced by perception of a distinguishing feature. Thus the extrinsic knowability of cognitive validity is firmly established. Here ends the theory of the production of validity. The theory of the definition of a means of knowledge. The definition of Proma. Prima-facie discussion of the definition of Proma, validity is not a universal. What delimits the capacity of valid cognition to produce its result, that is, what is cognitive validity? It cannot be a universal or common property. If validity were a universal, as soon as its presence in a perceptible individual were seen, doubt about the validity of perceptual cognition would be impossible. But in the collective doubtful cognition, is this cognition valid or not, and is this a pot, validity must be determined through reflexive awareness or inference. or inference, therefore it is not a universal. If validity were a universal, it would overlap with perceptuality. The defect of overlapping universals is admitted where their causes are the same, here the causes of valid perceptual cognition cause both perceptuality and validity. If validity were taken as a common property like high and low pitch, then, just as heinous and and lowness differ, validity too would have to be many, its recurrent unity would disappear and the defect of non-recurrence would arise. Therefore validity is not a universal. The possibility that invalid cognition is valid in a particular component. If validity were an all-pervasive universal, validity in the this component or another particular component of invalid cognition could not be denied, since a universal resides in every part of its substrates. In the collective cognition, this is both shell and silver, and this is silver, the shell component is corroborated while the silver component is not, validity and invalidity are experienced according to the difference of components. A single all-pervasive universal of validity cannot explain this difference. It may be objected that erroneous cognition is not valid in any component, like memory, it should have the same status in both components. Answer, if some validity is admitted in error, validity will mean, veridical experience, but that definition will be refuted below. Therefore, even admitting validity in a particular component of invalid cognition does not establish validity as a universal. Validity and its absence cannot be non-pervasively occurrent. It may be said that, like conjunction and absence of conjunction, validity and absence validity reside in different parts of one substrate as non-pervasively-occurrent properties. By treating the rule, what is non-pervasively-occurrent is not pervasively-occurrent, and what is pervasively-occurrent is not non-pervasively-occurrent, as restricted, validity and its absence may be accepted on experimental grounds as non-pervasively-occurrent. This view is unsound. Conjunction and its absence are mutually opposed, they cannot coexist in the same place without distinct spatial delimiters such as the top and root of a tree. Likewise, validity and its absence can coexist in one cognition only if different objects or components of cognition clearly delimit them. Merely taking the objects called, shell, and, silver, as delimiters does not solve the problem, because in the illusion, this shell is silver, objecthood with respect to silver is also present. Therefore treating validity and its absence as ordinary non-pervasively occurrent properties is incoherent. The absence of modehood with respect to a property residing in the qualificand is not a delimiter. The prima facie theorist says that not making a property absent from the qualificand a mode and making a property present in the qualificand a mode may respectively delimit the occurrence of validity and absence of validity. Answer, these conditions may explain the use of valid and invalid, but they provide no need to posit a universal called validity. validity. It will also be shown below that such conditions are unfit to delimit the substrate of validity or its absence. Recutation of the Prabhācāra view The Prabhācāras hold that valid cognition apprehending an object not previously apprehended, or the condition of being valid cognition established by ordinary usage, is validity. This view is unacceptable. In the immediately repeated cognition, this is a post, following an earlier cognition, this is a post, there is no apprehension of something previously unapprehended, yet the later cognition can be veridical. The Prabhikara may say that perception apprehends a present object, since the post qualified by each present moment was not previously apprehended, the cognition is new. But temporal instants are super sensible, presentness, is apprehended on the basis of gross temporal adjuncts such as an hour. Qualities and actions are not newly produced at every instant, and in successive cognitions of Vedic meaning to a new object is not apprehended at every moment. Therefore, apprehending what was previously unapprehended is not cognitive validity. The radical experience and similar conditions are not Pramahud. Experientiality conforming to the object cannot be called validity. Conformity, expressed by, as, cannot be established in cognition without mentioning a specific property such as Pothood, while mere similarity is present in illusion too. Nor is experientiality produced from merit or from absence of defect validity, because these conditions do not recur alike in both valid and invalid cognition, and because they depend on prior definitions of valid and invalid cognition, creating mutual dependence. Unsubrated experientiality is not a definition either, sublation, is itself valid cognition opposed to invalid cognition, so including it in the definition is unproductive. experientiality can occur in illusion too. If validity is defined as experientiality producing successful activity, cognitions met within difference are excluded, and, success, must again be defined through valid cognition. Nor is experientiality of a real object a definition, because if an unreal object is wholly unmanifest no such cognition could arise, while if it is manifest its experience would equally occur in illusion. Experience of a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence and the the qualificand is not promahood. It may also be said that an experience is valid when it makes as mode a property that is not the counter positive of an absolute absence residing in the qualificand. But this definition does not apply to the ridical cognition of conjunction, since conjunction is non-pervasively a current. If the definition is saved by qualifying absolute absence as pervasively a current, It overextends to an illusion of conjunction, because the absolute absence involved in an illusion of absence of conjunction may be pervasively a current. A definition based on mutual absence also fails. Conjunction and absence of conjunction are non-pervasively a current because they have distinct spatial delimiters such as a trees root and top. The cognition this pot is not black now, concerning a pot baked red, does not oppose its former blackness because the times differ. Therefore no definition of Pramahood based on absolute or mutual absence remains stable without differentiation of spatial or temporal delimiters. Objecthood is a special mode of qualification. Experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the qualifcand is not Pramahood. In a collective cognition, many properties absent from one qualifcand may occur as modes. nor is it correct to say that every mode must reside in at least one among several qualificans, then the condition that the property be absent from the qualifican becomes pointless, and because all modes do not reside in a single qualifican the definition will not apply to collective cognition. The qualificant of cognition is in fact the substrate of objecthood, and cognition is the delimiter of objecthood. In the illusion, this shell is silver, the objecthood residing in the shell is delimited by the sublated silverness, while the objecthood residing in real silver is delimited by favorable silverness. Objecthood is not knownness, since knownness may be absent in cognition of past and future objects. Objecthood is a special qualitative relation between cognition and object, a special relational property of its own. A person who understands generally that, he has cognition, and specifically that, he knows a pot, may still doubt, does this person know the pot or not? This establishes that a special object relation distinct from mere presence or absence of cognition in a substrate must be admitted. Otherwise the sentence meaning of this object is known as a pot involving an instrumental relation through pothood would be impossible. Mode hood 2 is one kind of this special relation, not mere object hood. Experience whose mode is co-located with object hood is not valid cognition. It may be proposed that an experience is valid when its mode is co-located with object hood, or when it delimits object hood together with such a mode. This definition does not apply to the indeterminate cognition, this is something, and it applies to the illusion, this shell is silver, because object hood with respect to, this, and the mode may be regarded as residing in the same substrate. If it is said that the illusion is valid in the this component, Mere experientiality must be made the definition of validity and the additional qualifiers become pointless. A cognition can be valid in one component and invalid in another, but this definition does not exclude the illusory component. The previously stated definitions are not free from this defect either. Experience as the counter positive of objecthood delimited by a property located elsewhere is not valid cognition. Another proposal is that an experience is valid when it delimits objecthood as undilimited by a property not co-located with objecthood. In collective cognition, objecthood differs in each qualificand, hence objecthood residing in one qualificand is not delimited by a property residing in another. But for this very reason the definition also applies to the illusory component of mixed cognition such as, this is both silver and shell. It is contradictory to say that objecthood delimited by a sublating property is also undilimited by that same property. Defining validity is experience that does not delimit objecthood or experience that makes as moda property not residing where objecthood resides likewise over extends to an illusion containing a shellless component. component. Because mutual absence is non-pervasively a current, formulations based on it also fail to apply to all examples of veridical cognition. Avoidance of under extension or failure of application. Some scholars say that validity and invalidity are mutually opposed, and therefore an illusion cannot be valid. But if the illusory and non-illusory components are distinguished, validity and invalidity are experienced in the same cognition with respect to different components. Hence opposition alone cannot make mixed cognition wholly invalid. The definition cognition that makes his motor property not co-located with objecthood is illusion, and experience distinct from it is valid also fails. If in the valid cognition this is knowable no ability is imagined not to reside in objecthood, the definition will not apply. In illusion, objecthood together with silverness resides in real silver, Therefore, merely on the basis of occurrence in objecthood, cognition of silver in a shell would have to be called valid in the silver component. Thus no stable definition results from these attempts to avoid under extension or non-application. A single objecthood is not admissible. If an illusion only one objecthood is admitted for both shell and silver, with silverness absent from the shell as its delimiter, the cognition this shell is silver will not be valid even in the shell component. If it is regarded as valid in the shell component, for the same reason it must also be regarded as valid in the silver component. If it is said that the cognition is valid in both the silver and shell components but invalid in the qualitative component, the shell is identical with silver, that too is unsound. Superimposed identity was not an object of an antecedent valid cognition and therefore cannot become a mode of the illusory cognition. Both silver and the shell before one are present as qualifiers in the objecthood of the superimposed identity, consequently the cognition would have to be regarded as simultaneously valid and invalid in that very qualitative component. Conclusion of the Prima-Facey View The definition and experience is valid when it delimits objecthood is undilimited by a qualifier that resides in another substrate of objecthood and opposes that very objecthood also fails. In a non-sublated cognition such as this is knowable, no ability is the mode, imagining something that is not a substrate of objecthood is unreal, so the definition will not apply to that valid cognition. The objection that absence of objecthood qualified by no ability can be established in pots and the like through a sublating relation is unacceptable. Cognition of the counter positive of an absence is delimited by the property delimiting counterpositiveness, the condition, undelimited by any property, is found in ordinary illusion too and is absent in every form from indeterminate cognition. Thus the definition over extends to illusion and under extends to indeterminate cognition. Here ends the prima facie discussion of the definition of prama in the perception section. The established definition of prama. An experience having a mode in what actually possesses it is valid. The proponent of the doctrine says, experience or cognition of an entity in the substrate where that entity actually exists is valid. Alternatively, cognition is valid when it makes a property its mode in the substrate of that property. Conversely, cognition of an entity in a non-substrate where it is absent is invalid, or cognition that makes a property its mode in a non-substrate possessing absence of that property is invalid. Experientiality distinct from invalid cognition is validity. Validity may thus be understood as cognition that makes a property a mode in its substrate, cognition delimiting that kind of qualitative status, or cognition produced from cognition of the mode. Indeterminate cognition is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition. God's cognition is determinant cognition in qualifier-qualifican form, he knows the qualificon of a qualifier, though he does not apprehend every property separately as a mode. An indeterminate cognition such as this is something is excluded from both valid and invalid cognition because it does not assist any practical conduct. Calling it inexpressible in the Nyaya Sutra means only that perception is possible even without association with name and universal. The illusion this shell is silvered is valid in the this component because thisness resides in the shell, an invalid in the silverness component because silverness is made a mode in the shell where silverness is absent. But a collective cognition such as this is a pot and cloth is not invalid in its qualifical components. Pothood or clothhood is not manifested as a mode in the substrate of its own absence. God's cognition is not outside valid and invalid cognition, only indeterminate cognition is excluded from both. Validity of cognition of non-pervasively occurent presence and absence. Objection, cognition of a non-pervasively occurant positive entity such as conjunction and of its absence would both be respectively valid and invalid with regard to the same qualificant, a single tree, because conjunction and absence of conjunction may both be made modes in the tree's top. Answer, conjunction and its absence do not reside in the whole tree but in different parts, the root and top. Where conjunction exists, its absence does not, and the tree delimited by the part which conjunction exists is not as delimited by that part, qualified by absence of conjunction. Cowwood too resides in a cow as delimited by specific parts such as the hump. Before firing, a pot was black, so the cognition the pot was black can be valid, after it has been fired red, the cognition this pot is now black is invalid. Using this definition of relational expressions such as in the manner and at the time in which is not a defect of failed generalization. Validity is not defined in one absolute form for all cognitions, but according to the specific substrate, time, and part of each particular cognition. The view of others. Other scholars say that experientiality or cognitionhood alone is validity. Illusory cognition too is called valid with respect to its corroborated component, nevertheless valid and invalid cognitions concerning silver are specifically defined. Experience of silverness and real silver, the substrate of silverness, is valid cognition concerning silver, while experience of silverness in a shell, the substrate of absence of silverness, is invalid cognition concerning silver. On this view, although general experientiality is common to both cognitions, only valid cognition with its specific object causes unwavering activity. If specific object belonging to the object is not accepted as a separate entity, valid cognition may be defined as experience that does not make as mode a property absent from the substrate of objecthood. Alternatively, cognition delimiting objecthood together with a mode collocated with objecthood may be taken as valid, and cognition of the opposite kind as invalid. In the mixed cognition, this is silver and shell, coexistence of the definitions of valid and invalid cognition is possible because the components differ.

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