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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:075 forms of controversy in the MMA with मैच्रन असे विच्मेच्रन दु।
0:08–0:15A mensaka may say that the validity of the first cognition is known intrinsically from the complete causal aggregate that produces the cognition.
0:15–0:18But 5 kinds of doubt arise concerning this view.
0:18–0:25First, does the complete causal aggregate producing cognition determine validity alone and not produce invalidity?
0:25–0:30Second, is validity known by that very cognition itself, and not by a distinct cognition taking
0:30–0:33validity as its object.
0:33–0:38If validity is said to be known extrinsically by another means, such as inference, it can
0:38–0:41be known only in a cognition already apprehended.
0:41–0:46If validity is known intrinsically from the complete set of the cognition's own causes,
0:46–0:50only cognition is qualified by validity will be established.
0:50–0:55The third doubt is whether validity is determined by the causes producing the cognition
0:55–1:00that is its substrate. The fourth is whether validity is known by the cognition that is
1:00–1:06its substrate or separately. Some say that validity is intrinsically known by its substrate,
1:06–1:12the first cognition, through an apprehension relation qualified by a universal property,
1:12–1:15thus the attempt to prove it inferentially would be partly vitiated by proving what
1:15–1:21is already established. Hence the probandom, validity, should be qualified as not arising
1:21–1:28from mental concentration. This is not correct. The validity of the first cognition cannot
1:28–1:34be established in any substrate other than the cognizer. Further, if validity alone,
1:34–1:39apart from its substrate, is made the subject of inference, validity will be known only
1:39–1:43through the first cognition that is its substrate, then the defect of an already established
1:43–1:48probandom does not arise, because the probandom has not previously been established at
1:48–1:58The fifth doubt is whether the validity of the first cognition, this is a pot, is known through the second, reflects of cognition, I know that this is a pot or not.
1:58–2:06Or is the validity of the first cognition known from the complete set of causes producing the second cognition or not?
2:06–2:15The prima facie theorist says, let its determination be through itself, that is, as soon as cognition arises, let its validity be known intrinsically.
2:15–2:21Thus the mutually opposed alternatives are these, a, is the validity of cognition necessarily
2:21–2:25apprehended by the causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the cognition but not apprehension
2:25–2:27of invalidity, or not.
2:27–2:31b, is the validity of that first cognition apprehended by a cognition not produced by
2:31–2:35the cognition that takes the first cognition as its object, or not.
2:35–2:39In the theory of extrinsic validity, validity is apprehended only when cognition itself
2:39–2:41has been apprehended.
2:41–2:46In the theory of intrinsic validity, cognition apprehends itself as qualified by validity.
2:46–2:53C. Is validity apprehended only by the cognition that apprehends its substrate, or not?
2:53–2:58D. Is validity apprehended only by its own substrate, or not?
2:58–3:01And does this occur in every case, or not?
3:01–3:06Objection, through an extraordinary relation consisting in yogically generated merit
3:06–3:10or in universal characteristic presentation, the validity of a cognition is sometimes
3:10–3:14apprehended in its own substrate and only by that very substrate, you Niaiikas yourselves
3:14–3:20say so. If this much is admitted, the Memsaka's attempt to prove his thesis will be partly
3:20–3:24subject to the defect of proving what is already established. The qualifier, not through
3:24–3:28yogically generated merit and the like, must therefore be added.
3:28–3:35Gangesa, this is mistaken. Such a point is not admitted with respect to the other
3:35–3:40themsakas. Moreover, the subject of themsaka thesis is validity in general,
3:40–3:44therefore what is to be proved that validity is apprehended only by its
3:44–3:49substrate is not something already admitted by all parties. Thus there is
3:49–3:54not even a partial defect of proving what is already established. The following
3:54–4:00questions also arise. E. Is the validity of the cognition this is a pot
4:00–4:06apprehended by that very cognition itself, or not? And is validity apprehended only by the
4:06–4:11apprehending cognition that apprehends the cognition serving as the substrate of validity, or not?
4:13–4:18Objection against the Memsaka Prima-Facei theorist. In this context no definition of validity
4:18–4:22compatible with intrinsic validity is possible on the basis of which it could be known intrinsically.
4:23–4:28Whether validity is defined as D to the power of 1, being a cognition that
4:28–4:32that does not present as a mode of its qualificant a mode absent from the qualificant, that is,
4:32–4:36one that does not present a known object in a form which in reality is absent from it.
4:37–4:41d squared, being a cognition that apprehends an object not previously apprehended.
4:43–4:47Or, on accepting that all cognition presents objects as they are and is therefore vertical,
4:47–4:52and while rejecting a universal called, experientiality, d cubed, being a cognition
4:52–4:57distinct from memory. Or, d, being cognition of a qualified object.
4:58–5:03However it is defined among these alternatives, validity will not be intrinsically apprehensible,
5:03–5:08nor will it be apprehensible through the reflexive cognition admitted by some schools.
5:09–5:14For the cognition of the qualifier, qualificon relation implicit in the definitions beginning
5:14–5:20with D superscript 1 would be impossible. For example, the relation being a cognition that
5:20–5:25does not present a mode absent from its qualificon, cannot be known when its qualifier has not
5:25–5:31previously been presented. Even if cognition is held to be super sensible, the inference
5:31–5:37establishing the existence of that cognition would not apprehend its validity. For manifestation
5:37–5:42and the like, which serve as marks or probative reasons for cognition in general, would be
5:42–5:46deviant with respect to validity, the class of all cognitions is broader than the class
5:46–5:52of valid cognitions. Nor can the argument proceed through a special kind of knownness
5:52–5:57imagined as a basis for inferring the production of the target cognition.
5:57–6:02First, it is difficult to determine the existence of such a special knownness.
6:02–6:07Second, even if its existence is admitted, invalidity known through a knownness not confined
6:07–6:14to valid cognition would likewise be apprehended intrinsically, an undesirable consequence.
6:14–6:18Prima-Facey theorist, although the definitions considered above face those difficulties,
6:18–6:26Validity is nevertheless one of the following, d, being a cognition that presents our object as phi, or, d, being a cognition related as phi to our object.
6:26–6:32For in ordinary practice, unwavering effort and action follow merely from determining validity thus defined.
6:32–6:37This view has the merit of parsimony, any alternative would be comparatively cumbersome.
6:37–6:43In fact, validity is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the valid cognition.
6:43–6:59more specifically, in all three MMA with macron essay with macron theories, through a reflexive cognition of the target cognition, through inference, or through self-liminosity, both the presence of the property in the qualificon, the object, and the status of that property as the mode within the cognition are apprehended.
6:59–7:07For cognition is determined by its object. Consequently, when an apprehended cognition is cognized, its object too is known.
7:07–7:13Thus, just as the property and its possessor appear in the original or target cognition,
7:13–7:16the relation between them is also an object of cognition.
7:16–7:20For in the case of the target cognition, that relation too is known through the operative
7:20–7:24sense object contact in precisely the same manner as the qualificant and qualifier of
7:24–7:27the target cognition unknown.
7:27–7:32Unwavering human activity arises solely from determining validity of cognition in this
7:32–7:33sense.
7:33–7:38This definition is economical, it should not be given another, more complex form carrying
7:38–7:42the fault of needless complication.
7:42–7:48Validity is known from the causal aggregate of cognition, in validity extrinsically.
7:48–7:52The masakas hold that the validity of cognition is known solely from the complete causal
7:52–7:54aggregate producing the cognition.
7:54–7:58The validity in the first cognition, namely, the presence of a property in the object
7:58–8:02or cognition of an object with that property as its qualifier, is known, according to
8:02–8:06Guru's school, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra
8:06–8:10school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness,
8:10–8:14and according to the Ba school, from the causal aggregate of a self-luminous inference.
8:15–8:19Cognition is delimited by its object, and the object is known through apprehension of the
8:19–8:24cognitive occurrence. Therefore, as soon as the first cognition is apprehended, the property
8:24–8:29located in the object, its substrate, and the object qualified by that property all become
8:29–8:33objects of the first cognition. The apprehension relation of the first cognition applies equally
8:33–8:39to the property and to its status as qualifier. A first perceptual cognition such as, this is
8:39–8:43silver, presents the relata in relational form, one and the same thing is known as a
8:43–8:47relative endowed with the pre... It should not be said that, because validity was not
8:47–8:52known in the first cognition, and validity cannot subsequently be superimposed upon it.
8:53–8:57Validity is known through the complete set of causes producing cognition and
8:57–9:02becomes available through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence. This is just as
9:02–9:05correlateness and absences are known from their causal aggregates.
9:06–9:11The nature of cognitive invalidity is this, cognition arises with a property as qualifier
9:11–9:15where that qualifying property is absent. Invalidity is known extrinsically through
9:15–9:20another cause. For in error the substrate in which the qualifier is absent is not known
9:20–9:25and therefore cannot become an object of reflexive cognition. It should not be said that,
9:25–9:28since the second cognition apprehends all the objects of the first,
9:28–9:33error and cognition of error would become intermixed. Such intermixture is expected only
9:33–9:36in the absence of opposition and is automatically blocked when opposition is present.
9:37–9:41The error of silver is not located in the shell before one, therefore a knower who knows another
9:41–9:46person's error need not himself be in error. Consequently, the validity of cognition is
9:46–9:53known intrinsically and invalidity extrinsically. The Mzaka refutation of the objection that
9:53–9:58a special mode of qualification is not an object.
9:58–10:02The Nayayika object that the definition of validity requires not merely being the substrate
10:02–10:07of a qualifier, but acceptance of the qualifier's special qualificative status, for example,
10:07–10:12silverness. Such a special qualificative status appears only in the first cognition,
10:12–10:15not in the reflexive cognition, because the mind does not apprehend it independently
10:15–10:21of the first sensory perception. The Mensaka replies that the objection is unsound. The
10:21–10:25The special qualitative status is known by the first cognition, and therefore the reflexive
10:25–10:28cognition can also take it as an object.
10:28–10:33Besides, there is no need to posit any separate, specialness, of qualitative status, this will
10:33–10:35be refuted below.
10:35–10:40This reply also refutes the objection that validity is not intrinsically known in a non-self-luminous
10:40–10:44reflexive cognition, because unless the substrate of the qualificant is known, validity
10:44–10:47as qualifier will also not be known.
10:47–10:51Once the validity of a self-luminous first cognition, such as verbal cognition or olfactory
10:51–10:56cognition, has been known from its causal aggregate, a separate awareness, this cognition is valid,
10:56–10:58is unnecessary.
10:58–11:02The causes of a self-luminous reflexive cognition illuminate only the cognition, not its property
11:02–11:04of validity.
11:04–11:08If those causes were capable of apprehending validity as well, they would also apprehend
11:08–11:10invalidity.
11:10–11:14In an inferential cognition that is illuminated by another cognition, an inference produced
11:14–11:18through a reason or by the mind cannot determine validity except mistakenly, because deviation
11:18–11:21in the reason is possible.
11:21–11:24Nor should it be maintained that validity residing in cognition must be known intrinsically
11:24–11:28from the causal aggregate, otherwise, by the same reasoning, invalidity residing in
11:28–11:32cognition would also have to be intrinsically known.
11:32–11:35A reflexive cognition or inference is not produced from all the objects of the
11:35–11:38first cognition, therefore the objection that it intrinsically apprehends the
11:38–11:43first cognition's validity does not stand.
11:43–11:47of the Mpsaka Prima-Facey view.
11:47–11:51The Mpsaka concludes the Prima-Facey position as follows.
11:51–11:55The nature of the first cognition's validity can be understood in either of two ways.
11:55–11:561.
11:56–11:59Cognition arises with a property as qualifier when that property is present in the object,
11:59–12:00or, 2.
12:00–12:04Cognition arises taking as its object the qualificative status in the substrate
12:04–12:06of the qualifier.
12:06–12:09According to the guru's school this validity is intrinsically known from the complete
12:09–12:13causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra school, from the causal aggregate
12:13–12:17of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the Bahr school, from the
12:17–12:20causal aggregate of inference.
12:20–12:24Whether cognition takes validity as its object or arises with validity as its qualifier,
12:24–12:30in both cases validity is determined by the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition.
12:30–12:33If cognitive validity were held to be known extrinsically through another means, an
12:33–12:36infinite regress would arise.
12:36–12:40the validity of the cognition of validity and of the cognitions of the reason, subject,
12:40–12:43and pervasion proving validity would each have to be determined through another means, the
12:43–12:49validity of that means would require a third, and so on without end. Validity would consequently
12:49–12:54never be established. By elimination it follows that the validity of cognition is known intrinsically
12:54–13:01from the complete set of its own causes. This is the Memsaka Prima Facei view.
13:01–13:06The Neiakadoktrin, validity is known extrinsically.
13:06–13:12The Neiakadoktrin is that validity is known extrinsically, that is, through another means.
13:12–13:16If validity were intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of cognition,
13:16–13:20then in a state lacking habituation, when a cognition of the same kind has not repeatedly
13:20–13:25arisen, its validity would be automatically certain as soon as the cognition arose,
13:25–13:28and no doubt about validity could ever arise.
13:28–13:33Moreover, it is impossible to hold that the causal aggregate of cognition intrinsically
13:33–13:38makes its validity known when the cognition itself has not yet been apprehended.
13:38–13:43And if the cognition serving as the substrate of the first cognition were itself not known,
13:43–13:47no doubt about validity could arise either.
13:47–13:51It may be said that, as soon as the opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition
13:51–13:55perishes immediately before doubt arises, hence there need be no mental doubt of the
13:55–13:58is this cognition valid or not, with the first cognition as its
13:58–14:03qualificant. This is unsound. Doubt must arise about the validity of a first
14:03–14:07cognition presented through another cognition. Therefore the validity of
14:07–14:11cognition is known only extrinsically.
14:11–14:16Continuation of the Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically.
14:16–14:21On the remaining sake of you, if the validity of the first cognition is not
14:21–14:25determined after that cognition has perished, doubt about validity would
14:25–14:30become impossible because the cognition that is its substrate is no longer known.
14:30–14:35The msaka may say that as soon as the two opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition
14:35–14:40parishes immediately before doubt, hence there is no need for a mental doubt of the form,
14:40–14:46is this cognition valid or not, taking the first cognition as its qualificand?
14:46–14:48The Neyayaka rejects this.
14:48–14:54Doubt about the validity of the first cognition presented by another cognition requires apprehension
14:54–15:01of that cognition as the substrate. The reason in an inference produces certainty, not doubt.
15:01–15:06And if the first cognition is regarded as merely a mental perception, the causal conditions
15:06–15:10producing knowledge of validity would inhibit doubt about validity, because those conditions
15:10–15:16cause certainty. Thus the Mzaka claim that doubt about validity is possible even though
15:16–15:22validity is intrinsically known as not established. The validity of cognition is determined
15:22–15:31only extrinsically. Refutation of the Misaka argument that doubt about validity is impossible.
15:31–15:35It may be objected that knowledge of the substrate of a property is not the actual cause of doubt
15:35–15:39about that property. A first cognition in the form of the doubt, is this cognition
15:39–15:44valid or not, can arise merely from cognition of two opposing alternatives, non-perception
15:44–15:48of a distinguishing feature, and sense contact with the property bearer.
15:48–15:51This objection is unsound.
15:51–15:55If cognition is super sensible, mental doubt about validity taking the first cognition as
15:55–15:58the property bearer cannot arise without knowledge of that property bearer, namely the first
15:58–16:00cognition.
16:00–16:04The inferential reason proving validity likewise does not generate doubt, it is a cause of
16:04–16:05certainty.
16:05–16:09And if the first cognition is taken to be mentally perceptible, the causal conditions
16:09–16:13of knowledge of validity would themselves inhibit doubt about validity, because they
16:13–16:16are the conditions of certainty about validity.
16:16–16:20doubt about validity could arise even when one of the opposing alternatives is directly perceived.
16:22–16:27It may again be said that, when one alternative is remembered and the other specific alternative
16:27–16:31is not perceived, the one alternative is superimposed upon the property bearer,
16:31–16:37but when both alternatives are remembered, doubt about validity arises. Thus the conditions of
16:37–16:41doubt are stronger than the conditions of certainty, when both opposing alternatives are
16:41–16:46remembered, not certainty but only doubt will arise.
16:46–16:50This argument too is unsound.
16:50–16:55Superimposition of both mutually opposed alternatives on one property bearer results from the conjunction
16:55–16:59of two distinct sets of superimposition conditions, and that dual superimposition is
16:59–17:01what is called doubt.
17:01–17:06The conditions superimposing one alternative do not prevent those superimposing the
17:06–17:11other, because the two sets of conditions are not mutually opposed.
17:11–17:15Or can it be said that the combined conditions superimposing both alternatives block the
17:15–17:20conditions determining one alternative, because there is no distinct set of conditions for
17:20–17:25dual superimposition apart from the conditions for superimposing each alternative.
17:25–17:30Two different causal sets can simultaneously produce two different results, as is observed
17:30–17:32in collective cognition.
17:32–17:37Therefore, when the conditions determining validity are present, doubt about validity
17:37–17:39cannot arise.
17:39–17:44In doubt, cognition of the property-bearer and prominence of both opposed alternatives
17:44–17:49are indispensable, hence cognition of the first cognition as property-bearer must be accepted
17:49–17:53as a cause of doubt.
17:53–17:59Refutation of the argument that doubt about validity arises from another defect.
17:59–18:03The Mtsaka may say that, when there is an ocular defect such as jaundice, an illusion
18:03–18:07such as this conch is yellow or the appearance of a face in a mirror arises even though
18:07–18:13a particular property is perceived. Likewise, when some other defect is present among the causes
18:13–18:18of cognition, doubt about validity may arise even after validity has been determined.
18:20–18:25This analogy is inappropriate. If doubt arose in that way even after validity had been determined,
18:25–18:30the undesirable consequence would follow that, as in illusion, one would act toward the object
18:30–18:35even while in a state of doubt. Direct determination of the genuine distinguishing property inhibits
18:35–18:39a presentational illusion. It may again be said that doubt about the validity of the
18:39–18:43original cognition arises from doubt about the validity of the cognition of validity,
18:43–18:47just as doubt about an object arises from doubt about the validity of the first cognition
18:47–18:52concerning it. This argument too fails. If the validity of the cognition of validity
18:52–18:56is not intrinsically determined by its own causal aggregate, there is no basis for
18:56–19:00doubting that validity, and if it is intrinsically determined, there is no room
19:00–19:03for doubt.
19:03–19:08of further arguments for doubt about validity.
19:08–19:12The mensaka says that cognition as such does not eliminate a contrary cognition, because
19:12–19:15a sublating cognition arises even after an illusion.
19:15–19:20Only a cognition that is not otherwise established, that is, one not apprehended as erroneous,
19:20–19:22eliminates contrary cognition.
19:22–19:26Therefore, even when cognition of an object is generally possible, doubt about the object
19:26–19:30arises if there is no determination that, this cognition is neither erroneous nor
19:30–19:31needless repetition.
19:31–19:36Likewise, when the cognition of validity is suspected of being erroneous or otherwise established,
19:36–19:41doubt about validity may arise in place of certainty about validity.
19:41–19:45An objection may be made, the first cognition concerning a pot becomes the object of reflexive
19:45–19:49awareness, therefore there is no doubt that, this is cognition of a pot.
19:49–19:53Likewise, because reflexive awareness is certainly valid, there should be no doubt
19:53–19:56about the validity of the first cognition.
19:56–20:00The Mensaka replies that even if reflexive awareness is itself invalid, it can apprehend
20:00–20:05first cognition as cognition and the pot as its object. Likewise, though itself invalid,
20:05–20:10reflexive awareness can take as its object the validity of the first cognition as not otherwise
20:10–20:13established, hence doubt about the first cognition's validity is possible.
20:14–20:19The Nayaika replies that being erroneous means absence of being not otherwise established,
20:19–20:24namely being otherwise established. Thus doubt about the validity of the first cognition can
20:24–20:28arise only when there is doubt whether the determination of its validity is itself erroneous.
20:28–20:32But no doubt about the erroneousness of reflexive awareness arises merely according as its
20:32–20:35validity is determined or undetermined.
20:35–20:39Likewise, doubt about the erroneousness of the first cognition will not generate doubt
20:39–20:42about the validity of its object.
20:42–20:45And if the validity of the first cognition is held to be intrinsically determined by
20:45–20:49its own causal aggregate, doubt about its erroneousness is impossible.
20:49–20:53Therefore the Mem Saka cannot properly admit doubt about validity on this basis.
20:53–20:55you

Plain text

5 forms of controversy in the MMA with मैच्रन असे विच्मेच्रन दु। A mensaka may say that the validity of the first cognition is known intrinsically from the complete causal aggregate that produces the cognition. But 5 kinds of doubt arise concerning this view. First, does the complete causal aggregate producing cognition determine validity alone and not produce invalidity? Second, is validity known by that very cognition itself, and not by a distinct cognition taking validity as its object. If validity is said to be known extrinsically by another means, such as inference, it can be known only in a cognition already apprehended. If validity is known intrinsically from the complete set of the cognition's own causes, only cognition is qualified by validity will be established. The third doubt is whether validity is determined by the causes producing the cognition that is its substrate. The fourth is whether validity is known by the cognition that is its substrate or separately. Some say that validity is intrinsically known by its substrate, the first cognition, through an apprehension relation qualified by a universal property, thus the attempt to prove it inferentially would be partly vitiated by proving what is already established. Hence the probandom, validity, should be qualified as not arising from mental concentration. This is not correct. The validity of the first cognition cannot be established in any substrate other than the cognizer. Further, if validity alone, apart from its substrate, is made the subject of inference, validity will be known only through the first cognition that is its substrate, then the defect of an already established probandom does not arise, because the probandom has not previously been established at The fifth doubt is whether the validity of the first cognition, this is a pot, is known through the second, reflects of cognition, I know that this is a pot or not. Or is the validity of the first cognition known from the complete set of causes producing the second cognition or not? The prima facie theorist says, let its determination be through itself, that is, as soon as cognition arises, let its validity be known intrinsically. Thus the mutually opposed alternatives are these, a, is the validity of cognition necessarily apprehended by the causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the cognition but not apprehension of invalidity, or not. b, is the validity of that first cognition apprehended by a cognition not produced by the cognition that takes the first cognition as its object, or not. In the theory of extrinsic validity, validity is apprehended only when cognition itself has been apprehended. In the theory of intrinsic validity, cognition apprehends itself as qualified by validity. C. Is validity apprehended only by the cognition that apprehends its substrate, or not? D. Is validity apprehended only by its own substrate, or not? And does this occur in every case, or not? Objection, through an extraordinary relation consisting in yogically generated merit or in universal characteristic presentation, the validity of a cognition is sometimes apprehended in its own substrate and only by that very substrate, you Niaiikas yourselves say so. If this much is admitted, the Memsaka's attempt to prove his thesis will be partly subject to the defect of proving what is already established. The qualifier, not through yogically generated merit and the like, must therefore be added. Gangesa, this is mistaken. Such a point is not admitted with respect to the other themsakas. Moreover, the subject of themsaka thesis is validity in general, therefore what is to be proved that validity is apprehended only by its substrate is not something already admitted by all parties. Thus there is not even a partial defect of proving what is already established. The following questions also arise. E. Is the validity of the cognition this is a pot apprehended by that very cognition itself, or not? And is validity apprehended only by the apprehending cognition that apprehends the cognition serving as the substrate of validity, or not? Objection against the Memsaka Prima-Facei theorist. In this context no definition of validity compatible with intrinsic validity is possible on the basis of which it could be known intrinsically. Whether validity is defined as D to the power of 1, being a cognition that that does not present as a mode of its qualificant a mode absent from the qualificant, that is, one that does not present a known object in a form which in reality is absent from it. d squared, being a cognition that apprehends an object not previously apprehended. Or, on accepting that all cognition presents objects as they are and is therefore vertical, and while rejecting a universal called, experientiality, d cubed, being a cognition distinct from memory. Or, d, being cognition of a qualified object. However it is defined among these alternatives, validity will not be intrinsically apprehensible, nor will it be apprehensible through the reflexive cognition admitted by some schools. For the cognition of the qualifier, qualificon relation implicit in the definitions beginning with D superscript 1 would be impossible. For example, the relation being a cognition that does not present a mode absent from its qualificon, cannot be known when its qualifier has not previously been presented. Even if cognition is held to be super sensible, the inference establishing the existence of that cognition would not apprehend its validity. For manifestation and the like, which serve as marks or probative reasons for cognition in general, would be deviant with respect to validity, the class of all cognitions is broader than the class of valid cognitions. Nor can the argument proceed through a special kind of knownness imagined as a basis for inferring the production of the target cognition. First, it is difficult to determine the existence of such a special knownness. Second, even if its existence is admitted, invalidity known through a knownness not confined to valid cognition would likewise be apprehended intrinsically, an undesirable consequence. Prima-Facey theorist, although the definitions considered above face those difficulties, Validity is nevertheless one of the following, d, being a cognition that presents our object as phi, or, d, being a cognition related as phi to our object. For in ordinary practice, unwavering effort and action follow merely from determining validity thus defined. This view has the merit of parsimony, any alternative would be comparatively cumbersome. In fact, validity is apprehended by the same causal aggregate that produces apprehension of the valid cognition. more specifically, in all three MMA with macron essay with macron theories, through a reflexive cognition of the target cognition, through inference, or through self-liminosity, both the presence of the property in the qualificon, the object, and the status of that property as the mode within the cognition are apprehended. For cognition is determined by its object. Consequently, when an apprehended cognition is cognized, its object too is known. Thus, just as the property and its possessor appear in the original or target cognition, the relation between them is also an object of cognition. For in the case of the target cognition, that relation too is known through the operative sense object contact in precisely the same manner as the qualificant and qualifier of the target cognition unknown. Unwavering human activity arises solely from determining validity of cognition in this sense. This definition is economical, it should not be given another, more complex form carrying the fault of needless complication. Validity is known from the causal aggregate of cognition, in validity extrinsically. The masakas hold that the validity of cognition is known solely from the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition. The validity in the first cognition, namely, the presence of a property in the object or cognition of an object with that property as its qualifier, is known, according to Guru's school, from the causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the Ba school, from the causal aggregate of a self-luminous inference. Cognition is delimited by its object, and the object is known through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence. Therefore, as soon as the first cognition is apprehended, the property located in the object, its substrate, and the object qualified by that property all become objects of the first cognition. The apprehension relation of the first cognition applies equally to the property and to its status as qualifier. A first perceptual cognition such as, this is silver, presents the relata in relational form, one and the same thing is known as a relative endowed with the pre... It should not be said that, because validity was not known in the first cognition, and validity cannot subsequently be superimposed upon it. Validity is known through the complete set of causes producing cognition and becomes available through apprehension of the cognitive occurrence. This is just as correlateness and absences are known from their causal aggregates. The nature of cognitive invalidity is this, cognition arises with a property as qualifier where that qualifying property is absent. Invalidity is known extrinsically through another cause. For in error the substrate in which the qualifier is absent is not known and therefore cannot become an object of reflexive cognition. It should not be said that, since the second cognition apprehends all the objects of the first, error and cognition of error would become intermixed. Such intermixture is expected only in the absence of opposition and is automatically blocked when opposition is present. The error of silver is not located in the shell before one, therefore a knower who knows another person's error need not himself be in error. Consequently, the validity of cognition is known intrinsically and invalidity extrinsically. The Mzaka refutation of the objection that a special mode of qualification is not an object. The Nayayika object that the definition of validity requires not merely being the substrate of a qualifier, but acceptance of the qualifier's special qualificative status, for example, silverness. Such a special qualificative status appears only in the first cognition, not in the reflexive cognition, because the mind does not apprehend it independently of the first sensory perception. The Mensaka replies that the objection is unsound. The The special qualitative status is known by the first cognition, and therefore the reflexive cognition can also take it as an object. Besides, there is no need to posit any separate, specialness, of qualitative status, this will be refuted below. This reply also refutes the objection that validity is not intrinsically known in a non-self-luminous reflexive cognition, because unless the substrate of the qualificant is known, validity as qualifier will also not be known. Once the validity of a self-luminous first cognition, such as verbal cognition or olfactory cognition, has been known from its causal aggregate, a separate awareness, this cognition is valid, is unnecessary. The causes of a self-luminous reflexive cognition illuminate only the cognition, not its property of validity. If those causes were capable of apprehending validity as well, they would also apprehend invalidity. In an inferential cognition that is illuminated by another cognition, an inference produced through a reason or by the mind cannot determine validity except mistakenly, because deviation in the reason is possible. Nor should it be maintained that validity residing in cognition must be known intrinsically from the causal aggregate, otherwise, by the same reasoning, invalidity residing in cognition would also have to be intrinsically known. A reflexive cognition or inference is not produced from all the objects of the first cognition, therefore the objection that it intrinsically apprehends the first cognition's validity does not stand. of the Mpsaka Prima-Facey view. The Mpsaka concludes the Prima-Facey position as follows. The nature of the first cognition's validity can be understood in either of two ways. 1. Cognition arises with a property as qualifier when that property is present in the object, or, 2. Cognition arises taking as its object the qualificative status in the substrate of the qualifier. According to the guru's school this validity is intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of the first cognition, according to the Mishra school, from the causal aggregate of the second cognition, the reflexive awareness, and according to the Bahr school, from the causal aggregate of inference. Whether cognition takes validity as its object or arises with validity as its qualifier, in both cases validity is determined by the complete causal aggregate producing the cognition. If cognitive validity were held to be known extrinsically through another means, an infinite regress would arise. the validity of the cognition of validity and of the cognitions of the reason, subject, and pervasion proving validity would each have to be determined through another means, the validity of that means would require a third, and so on without end. Validity would consequently never be established. By elimination it follows that the validity of cognition is known intrinsically from the complete set of its own causes. This is the Memsaka Prima Facei view. The Neiakadoktrin, validity is known extrinsically. The Neiakadoktrin is that validity is known extrinsically, that is, through another means. If validity were intrinsically known from the complete causal aggregate of cognition, then in a state lacking habituation, when a cognition of the same kind has not repeatedly arisen, its validity would be automatically certain as soon as the cognition arose, and no doubt about validity could ever arise. Moreover, it is impossible to hold that the causal aggregate of cognition intrinsically makes its validity known when the cognition itself has not yet been apprehended. And if the cognition serving as the substrate of the first cognition were itself not known, no doubt about validity could arise either. It may be said that, as soon as the opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition perishes immediately before doubt arises, hence there need be no mental doubt of the is this cognition valid or not, with the first cognition as its qualificant. This is unsound. Doubt must arise about the validity of a first cognition presented through another cognition. Therefore the validity of cognition is known only extrinsically. Continuation of the Neayaka doctrine, validity is known extrinsically. On the remaining sake of you, if the validity of the first cognition is not determined after that cognition has perished, doubt about validity would become impossible because the cognition that is its substrate is no longer known. The msaka may say that as soon as the two opposing alternatives are remembered, the first cognition parishes immediately before doubt, hence there is no need for a mental doubt of the form, is this cognition valid or not, taking the first cognition as its qualificand? The Neyayaka rejects this. Doubt about the validity of the first cognition presented by another cognition requires apprehension of that cognition as the substrate. The reason in an inference produces certainty, not doubt. And if the first cognition is regarded as merely a mental perception, the causal conditions producing knowledge of validity would inhibit doubt about validity, because those conditions cause certainty. Thus the Mzaka claim that doubt about validity is possible even though validity is intrinsically known as not established. The validity of cognition is determined only extrinsically. Refutation of the Misaka argument that doubt about validity is impossible. It may be objected that knowledge of the substrate of a property is not the actual cause of doubt about that property. A first cognition in the form of the doubt, is this cognition valid or not, can arise merely from cognition of two opposing alternatives, non-perception of a distinguishing feature, and sense contact with the property bearer. This objection is unsound. If cognition is super sensible, mental doubt about validity taking the first cognition as the property bearer cannot arise without knowledge of that property bearer, namely the first cognition. The inferential reason proving validity likewise does not generate doubt, it is a cause of certainty. And if the first cognition is taken to be mentally perceptible, the causal conditions of knowledge of validity would themselves inhibit doubt about validity, because they are the conditions of certainty about validity. doubt about validity could arise even when one of the opposing alternatives is directly perceived. It may again be said that, when one alternative is remembered and the other specific alternative is not perceived, the one alternative is superimposed upon the property bearer, but when both alternatives are remembered, doubt about validity arises. Thus the conditions of doubt are stronger than the conditions of certainty, when both opposing alternatives are remembered, not certainty but only doubt will arise. This argument too is unsound. Superimposition of both mutually opposed alternatives on one property bearer results from the conjunction of two distinct sets of superimposition conditions, and that dual superimposition is what is called doubt. The conditions superimposing one alternative do not prevent those superimposing the other, because the two sets of conditions are not mutually opposed. Or can it be said that the combined conditions superimposing both alternatives block the conditions determining one alternative, because there is no distinct set of conditions for dual superimposition apart from the conditions for superimposing each alternative. Two different causal sets can simultaneously produce two different results, as is observed in collective cognition. Therefore, when the conditions determining validity are present, doubt about validity cannot arise. In doubt, cognition of the property-bearer and prominence of both opposed alternatives are indispensable, hence cognition of the first cognition as property-bearer must be accepted as a cause of doubt. Refutation of the argument that doubt about validity arises from another defect. The Mtsaka may say that, when there is an ocular defect such as jaundice, an illusion such as this conch is yellow or the appearance of a face in a mirror arises even though a particular property is perceived. Likewise, when some other defect is present among the causes of cognition, doubt about validity may arise even after validity has been determined. This analogy is inappropriate. If doubt arose in that way even after validity had been determined, the undesirable consequence would follow that, as in illusion, one would act toward the object even while in a state of doubt. Direct determination of the genuine distinguishing property inhibits a presentational illusion. It may again be said that doubt about the validity of the original cognition arises from doubt about the validity of the cognition of validity, just as doubt about an object arises from doubt about the validity of the first cognition concerning it. This argument too fails. If the validity of the cognition of validity is not intrinsically determined by its own causal aggregate, there is no basis for doubting that validity, and if it is intrinsically determined, there is no room for doubt. of further arguments for doubt about validity. The mensaka says that cognition as such does not eliminate a contrary cognition, because a sublating cognition arises even after an illusion. Only a cognition that is not otherwise established, that is, one not apprehended as erroneous, eliminates contrary cognition. Therefore, even when cognition of an object is generally possible, doubt about the object arises if there is no determination that, this cognition is neither erroneous nor needless repetition. Likewise, when the cognition of validity is suspected of being erroneous or otherwise established, doubt about validity may arise in place of certainty about validity. An objection may be made, the first cognition concerning a pot becomes the object of reflexive awareness, therefore there is no doubt that, this is cognition of a pot. Likewise, because reflexive awareness is certainly valid, there should be no doubt about the validity of the first cognition. The Mensaka replies that even if reflexive awareness is itself invalid, it can apprehend first cognition as cognition and the pot as its object. Likewise, though itself invalid, reflexive awareness can take as its object the validity of the first cognition as not otherwise established, hence doubt about the first cognition's validity is possible. The Nayaika replies that being erroneous means absence of being not otherwise established, namely being otherwise established. Thus doubt about the validity of the first cognition can arise only when there is doubt whether the determination of its validity is itself erroneous. But no doubt about the erroneousness of reflexive awareness arises merely according as its validity is determined or undetermined. Likewise, doubt about the erroneousness of the first cognition will not generate doubt about the validity of its object. And if the validity of the first cognition is held to be intrinsically determined by its own causal aggregate, doubt about its erroneousness is impossible. Therefore the Mem Saka cannot properly admit doubt about validity on this basis. you

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