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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:02–0:04The view of other teachers.
0:04–0:18Other scholars say that invocation brings a begun act to completion through the operation consisting in the relational absence of obstacles, because the absence of an impediment is a cause in the form of an enduring relational absence.
0:18–0:26This relational absence persists until completion either as the destruction of a present obstacle or as the non-production of a future obstacle.
0:26–0:33The prior absence of a future obstacle is an effect accomplished through destruction of the cause of that obstacle.
0:33–0:40To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the effect arises in the next moment,
0:40–0:46and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise, it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such.
0:46–0:54Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle has this character of being an effect.
0:54–1:06The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency as the operation.
1:06–1:14In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire. May the act I have begun be completed without obstruction.
1:14–1:24This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction would be invalid.
1:24–1:29Even in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation.
1:29–1:38There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the other deities.
1:38–1:44In beginningless Sassra, praise of Vinayaka must at some time have been performed by someone,
1:44–1:48hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of Vinayaka.
1:48–1:52If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason is the
1:52–1:56extreme strength of the obstacle.
1:56–2:02Reputation of the other view in summary of the Prima-Facey position
2:02–2:05This view of the other teachers is not correct.
2:05–2:10The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be the operation through which invocation
2:10–2:15produces completion, because, as an enduring relational absence, it is merely a cooperating
2:15–2:18cause of completion.
2:18–2:22It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational
2:22–2:25absence and that this form is also present in prior absence.
2:25–2:30This is not correct, for then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation.
2:30–2:34If an absolute absence established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal
2:34–2:39status, the same objection applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence
2:39–2:41of its cause.
2:41–2:46The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed,
2:46–2:50therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been established
2:50–2:53through destruction of its cause.
2:53–2:58Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from absence of its cause, invocation
2:58–3:02neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward completion.
3:02–3:08Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle, persisting
3:08–3:13until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation, there is no need to
3:13–3:17posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them.
3:17–3:23Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka, the regular
3:23–3:27practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established.
3:27–3:32If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot
3:32–3:37be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete
3:37–3:39despite its presence.
3:39–3:44It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs
3:44–3:46after little invocation.
3:46–3:51If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause
3:51–3:53and result.
3:53–3:57Nor can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking
3:57–4:02and little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant
4:02–4:07invocation does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without it
4:07–4:09or with only a little.
4:09–4:13On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle is
4:13–4:18suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slight obstacle is suspected, little
4:18–4:22invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference to
4:22–4:24such a Vedic statement.
4:24–4:28In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete an act, while at other times
4:28–4:31the act is completed in its absence.
4:31–4:36Even if much means three or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule
4:36–4:38can be framed.
4:38–4:41Therefore no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage.
4:41–4:46In conclusion, auspicious invocation is a subsidiary act, a principal act.
4:46–4:49This is the summary of the prima facie position.
4:49–4:55Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles.
4:55–5:04Gangesa's decisive view is this, auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun undertaking, a principal act, rather, like expiation.
5:04–5:09It is a principal act whose result is the destruction of obstacles.
5:09–5:15It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing an undertaking already begun.
5:15–5:21Learned people perform it both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known,
5:21–5:26an absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act.
5:26–5:30Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire, may the act I have begun be completed
5:30–5:32without obstruction.
5:32–5:35Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the
5:35–5:39obstacle, just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire,
5:39–5:41may I attain heaven.
5:41–5:45Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without apprehending
5:45–5:50its qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included in the desire for unobstructed
5:50–5:53completion of an act.
5:53–5:57Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness, because there is irregularity
5:57–6:02in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness, and sometimes fails
6:02–6:06to occur even after it has been performed.
6:06–6:10Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when
6:10–6:14the impediment capable of producing an obstacle is absent.
6:14–6:19The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness, whether accompanied by subsidiaries
6:19–6:23and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a deity.
6:23–6:29Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty, auspiciousness
6:29–6:35is performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty.
6:35–6:39The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining auspiciousness
6:39–6:41is not sound.
6:41–6:45an undertaking remains incomplete because a previously accumulated obstacle is excessively
6:45–6:50powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises after auspiciousness has been performed, and sometimes
6:50–6:55the actual causes known from ordinary practice are absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an
6:55–6:58obstacle present in the desired undertaking is impossible without auspiciousness,
6:58–7:02therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with respect to destruction of obstacles is
7:02–7:11established. Auspiciousness destroys obstacles. It cannot be said that a suspected
7:11–7:15obstacle is removed through expiation, because expiation is not enjoined where there is merely
7:15–7:21a suspicion of sin. Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness
7:21–7:26is conditional on desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible.
7:27–7:31Auspiciousness is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment
7:31–7:36among the causes of a begun act, when the obstacle destroying absence is lacking,
7:36–7:38completion of the act does not arise.
7:38–7:44Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles, it
7:44–7:49cannot be performed when no obstacle exists. Revelation inferred from the regular conduct
7:49–7:52of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at the commencement of a desired act, just as the
7:52–7:57rambayet is performed at the beginning of the dharsapramsa sacrifice. The relational absence
7:57–8:02of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion. Sometimes this absence is established
8:02–8:07automatically by the axon causes, and sometimes it is produced by auspiciousness.
8:07–8:12The completion without auspiciousness of an act undertaken by an inattentive person or an atheist
8:12–8:15may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles continuing from a previous birth.
8:17–8:22It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is sometimes established automatically
8:22–8:26by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness becomes impossible.
8:26–8:28Obstacle.
8:28–8:33Obstitiousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is performed so long
8:33–8:36as suspicion of an obstacle remains.
8:36–8:40For this reason it is performed even in the middle of an act if suspicion of an obstacle
8:40–8:42arises.
8:42–8:46At the beginning of a great undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful
8:46–8:50obstacle is suspected, and it has already been explained how auspiciousness is performed
8:50–8:54when an obstacle is suspected.
8:54–8:58The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers.
8:58–9:03Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction, one should
9:03–9:05perform auspiciousness.
9:05–9:09It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity, because this definition has neither
9:09–9:12universal perversion nor necessary sequence.
9:12–9:16Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing
9:16–9:20as its uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic
9:20–9:24knowledge of the act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become
9:24–9:27an object of practical engagement.
9:27–9:31Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned people with
9:31–9:34the desire, maybe act be completed without obstruction.
9:34–9:38The Veda is not an effect of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice
9:38–9:42would produce mutual dependence between scripture and such practice.
9:42–9:46Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a Veda-enjoined act performed with the desire
9:46–9:50for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes the desired undertaking,
9:50–9:54because no separate Vedic sentence in joining auspiciousness is available.
9:54–9:59Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called auspicious in SMTI.
9:59–10:03The Veda is not produced from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an
10:03–10:06act enjoined by the Veda.
10:06–10:10The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not merely one should perform
10:10–10:15auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an
10:15–10:17act should praise a deity.
10:17–10:22The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context.
10:22–10:26The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity, obeisance, and the
10:26–10:30like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic enjoined act destroys obstacles
10:30–10:35or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction, from the desire to
10:35–10:38complete an act without obstruction.
10:38–10:43The word auspiciousness has many meanings.
10:43–10:47Therefore bathing in the Ganges in similar acts, though destructive of obstacles,
10:47–10:52They're not auspiciousness in the strict sense, because no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance
10:52–10:54as auspiciousness.
10:54–10:58Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as, those
10:58–11:03engaged in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence, and performers
11:03–11:07of sacrifices that ward off sin should look into a mirror at dawn, are called auspicious
11:07–11:12in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act.
11:12–11:16Thus the word auspiciousness has many meanings.
11:16–11:21otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance, and all such acts would have to be performed
11:21–11:25obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book.
11:25–11:29The word Atha is itself auspicious because it destroys obstacles.
11:29–11:33Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds O and Atha first emerged after
11:33–11:38breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious.
11:38–11:43It should not be said that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great
11:43–11:47sage goddama's use of this word if the opening of the science of nyaya would be needless repetition.
11:49–11:53Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as endowed with qualities.
11:54–11:58Obasance is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself.
11:59–12:05The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an experienced
12:05–12:11common property. Therefore the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the
12:11–12:16hands against the head but also for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you.
12:17–12:22On an alternative view, distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and verbal
12:22–12:28obeisance. The word obeisance would then have several meanings. Some Prabhakras say that the
12:28–12:33word cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition that they are preceded by a
12:33–12:38particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only the mental resolve, while the other
12:38–12:44three acts are understood by secondary implication. This view is unsound, because one cannot know
12:44–12:49that an act is preceded by a mental resolve without first understanding the specific bodily
12:49–12:52or other act.
12:52–12:58The nature of a learned person and of learned practice. A person who accepts the authority
12:58–13:04of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received tradition. In defining learned
13:04–13:09practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by the Veda, that is,
13:09–13:13that it possesses the condition of not being censured.
13:13–13:18Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces super-sensible
13:18–13:25merit brings a begun act to completion. Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error.
13:25–13:30The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes
13:30–13:35a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced,
13:35–13:40such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result.
13:41–13:46In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed
13:46–13:50to heretical or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority.
13:51–13:56Other uses of learned and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of
13:56–13:59agency in acts prohibited by the Veda.
13:59–14:04Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda prohibited
14:04–14:09acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited
14:09–14:11act is unlearned.
14:11–14:16Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda prohibited act, is not learned, because
14:16–14:19he does not accept the authority of the Veda.
14:19–14:23But it is not proper to regard as learned merely someone free from performing prohibited
14:23–14:28acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Vedas'
14:28–14:35authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin.
14:35–14:39Conclusion of the Discussion of Auspicious Invocation
14:39–14:43Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar
14:43–14:46of the received tradition.
14:46–14:50Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him, because omniscience is
14:50–14:52required in them.
14:52–14:58The Veda is inferred from the un-centered conduct of such traditionally learned persons.
14:58–15:03This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars, who have not directly observed the conduct
15:03–15:08of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage in auspicious invocation.
15:08–15:12It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and others from that
15:12–15:15of modern learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu and others
15:15–15:18before engaging in auspiciousness.
15:18–15:22But then the conduct of modern scholars itself, by assisting the inference of man as conduct,
15:22–15:26may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the Veda, what need is there for a separate
15:26–15:29inference from modern conduct to man as conduct.
15:29–15:33Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition.
15:33–15:38SMTI states that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age, provided
15:38–15:42it is not contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper
15:42–15:44conduct.
15:44–15:49is no proof that only the omniscient man have first performed auspicious invocation.
15:49–15:55Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in Sintis composed by Manu and others,
15:55–16:00only omniscient persons perform it. An author of Sinti need not be omniscient,
16:00–16:04he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a Sinti text.
16:04–16:08Some may further say that conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference
16:08–16:13that invocation is obligatory, why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it?
16:13–16:19The answer is that, in the case of a lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary,
16:19–16:21as I'll admit.
16:21–16:26With this the discussion of auspicious invocation in the perception section ends.
16:26–16:33The discussion of auspicious invocation in the perception section ends.
16:33–16:38The theory of epistemic validity.
16:38–16:44The doctrine of determining validity slash theory of apprehension.
16:44–16:47Statement of purpose.
16:47–16:52Under the auspicious invocation, the supremely compassionate sage Godama, desiring to rescue
16:52–16:57the world submerged in the mire of suffering, composed in kik, the science of Nyaya, the
16:57–17:00most cherished among the eighteen branches of learning.
17:00–17:04At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the true nature
17:04–17:09of the sixteen categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest
17:09–17:13human good, liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct
17:13–17:17a discerning person toward the supreme goal.
17:17–17:22But the ordered division of the sixteen categories depends on knowledge of the first category,
17:22–17:24the means of knowledge.
17:24–17:29Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first examines the true nature of a means of knowledge,
17:29–17:32that is, the validity of cognition.
17:32–17:37The Objection of the Madhyamaka Buddhists
17:37–17:41The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold that Nyaya teaches
17:41–17:44the real nature of the sixteen categories beginning with means of knowledge and
17:44–17:49is indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means
17:49–17:52of knowledge is impossible.
17:52–17:56Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining the nature of Prama,
17:56–17:58veritical cognition.
17:58–18:02But the nature of Prama is established neither intrinsically by the complete set of causes
18:02–18:07of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another means of knowledge, because, as
18:07–18:13will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives.
18:13–18:18An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition?
18:18–18:22Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination
18:22–18:26of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs
18:26–18:31only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained.
18:31–18:35Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or doubt
18:35–18:40about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity causes activity.
18:40–18:44The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity
18:44–18:48of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful.
18:48–18:52Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no
18:52–18:57need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment.
18:57–19:00But this argument is unsound.
19:00–19:04The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise,
19:04–19:08which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity
19:08–19:12of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

Plain text

The view of other teachers. Other scholars say that invocation brings a begun act to completion through the operation consisting in the relational absence of obstacles, because the absence of an impediment is a cause in the form of an enduring relational absence. This relational absence persists until completion either as the destruction of a present obstacle or as the non-production of a future obstacle. The prior absence of a future obstacle is an effect accomplished through destruction of the cause of that obstacle. To say that an effect is produced by a cause means that, when the cause is present, the effect arises in the next moment, and when the cause is absent, the effect does not arise, it does not mean producing a non-existent entity as such. Once the cause of an obstacle has been destroyed, the prior absence of the future obstacle has this character of being an effect. The non-production of an obstacle during the intervening period is not directly established by invocation, therefore it is held to be established indirectly through an unseen potency as the operation. In this way the performance of invocation is justified by the desire. May the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. This view removes the objection that, where the absence of a cause of obstruction already establishes the absence of obstruction, invocation would not produce that absence and its injunction would be invalid. Even in such a case, the absence of future obstruction is produced by invocation. There is a revelatory statement, through praise of Vinayaka all obstacles are pacified, and even an inattentive persons act may be completed merely through praise of Vinayaka and the other deities. In beginningless Sassra, praise of Vinayaka must at some time have been performed by someone, hence auspicious invocation is merely an alternative to praise of Vinayaka. If completion does not occur despite invocation with all its subsidiaries, the reason is the extreme strength of the obstacle. Reputation of the other view in summary of the Prima-Facey position This view of the other teachers is not correct. The non-production or prior absence of an obstacle cannot be the operation through which invocation produces completion, because, as an enduring relational absence, it is merely a cooperating cause of completion. It may be said that the absence of obstruction is an operation in the form of relational absence and that this form is also present in prior absence. This is not correct, for then absolute absence too would have to be regarded as an operation. If an absolute absence established automatically by the causal complex is denied causal status, the same objection applies to a prior absence established automatically by the absence of its cause. The cause of an obstacle need not invariably be present when invocation is performed, therefore the prior absence of the obstacle cannot invariably be said to have been established through destruction of its cause. Where non-production of an obstacle follows automatically from absence of its cause, invocation neither destroys an obstacle nor contributes anything toward completion. Further, if destruction of a present obstacle and non-production of a future obstacle, persisting until completion of the begun act, can be directly produced by invocation, there is no need to posit an unseen potency as the operation producing them. Thus, if invocation is regarded merely as an alternative to praise of Vinayaka, the regular practice of invocation among the learned cannot be established. If invocation is a principal act, even invocation performed with all its subsidiaries cannot be a sufficient cause of completion, because sometimes the begun act remains incomplete despite its presence. It cannot be said that abundant invocation causes completion, for completion also occurs after little invocation. If both more and less are accepted as causes, there will be no regular order between cause and result. Nor can it be said that much invocation causes the completion of a large undertaking and little invocation that of a small undertaking, for sometimes even sufficiently abundant invocation does not produce the result, while at other times completion occurs without it or with only a little. On the same basis the following objection is also refuted, when a powerful obstacle is suspected, much invocation is the cause, and when a slight obstacle is suspected, little invocation is the cause, corresponding conduct by the learned licenses and inference to such a Vedic statement. In practice, even much invocation sometimes fails to complete an act, while at other times the act is completed in its absence. Even if much means three or four performances and, little, one or two, no universal rule can be framed. Therefore no such revelation can be inferred from learned usage. In conclusion, auspicious invocation is a subsidiary act, a principal act. This is the summary of the prima facie position. Gangesa's doctrine, auspiciousness causes the destruction of obstacles. Gangesa's decisive view is this, auspiciousness is a subsidiary act that completes a begun undertaking, a principal act, rather, like expiation. It is a principal act whose result is the destruction of obstacles. It is performed with the desire that no obstacle arise in completing an undertaking already begun. Learned people perform it both when an obstacle is suspected and when an obstacle is known, an absence of obstruction is necessary for completing the act. Suppose auspiciousness is performed with the desire, may the act I have begun be completed without obstruction. Even then its result is only the absence of obstruction, that is, destruction of the obstacle, just as heaven is the result when a sacrifice is performed with the desire, may I attain heaven. Under the principle that a qualified object cannot be cognized without apprehending its qualifier, cognition of the absence of obstruction is necessarily included in the desire for unobstructed completion of an act. Completion of the begun act cannot be the result of auspiciousness, because there is irregularity in both directions, completion sometimes occurs without auspiciousness, and sometimes fails to occur even after it has been performed. Completion arises directly from its own causes known through worldly practice when the impediment capable of producing an obstacle is absent. The destruction of obstacles is produced separately by auspiciousness, whether accompanied by subsidiaries and whether consisting in brief or elaborate praise of a deity. Thus, just as a Vedic act is performed once its result is known with certainty, auspiciousness is performed once its result, the destruction of obstacles is known with certainty. The objection that this account would invalidate the Vedic statement in joining auspiciousness is not sound. an undertaking remains incomplete because a previously accumulated obstacle is excessively powerful, sometimes a new obstacle arises after auspiciousness has been performed, and sometimes the actual causes known from ordinary practice are absent. Nevertheless, destruction of an obstacle present in the desired undertaking is impossible without auspiciousness, therefore the causal efficacy of auspiciousness with respect to destruction of obstacles is established. Auspiciousness destroys obstacles. It cannot be said that a suspected obstacle is removed through expiation, because expiation is not enjoined where there is merely a suspicion of sin. Nor should it be said that the obligation to perform auspiciousness is conditional on desire, for then its regular observance among the learned would become impossible. Auspiciousness is a necessary means that produces the absence of an impediment among the causes of a begun act, when the obstacle destroying absence is lacking, completion of the act does not arise. Nor is there an objection that, if auspiciousness is a principal act destroying obstacles, it cannot be performed when no obstacle exists. Revelation inferred from the regular conduct of the learned enjoins auspiciousness at the commencement of a desired act, just as the rambayet is performed at the beginning of the dharsapramsa sacrifice. The relational absence of obstacles is a cause or operation of completion. Sometimes this absence is established automatically by the axon causes, and sometimes it is produced by auspiciousness. The completion without auspiciousness of an act undertaken by an inattentive person or an atheist may be due to an enduring absence of obstacles continuing from a previous birth. It should not be said that, if the absence of obstacles is sometimes established automatically by the axon causes, a determination to perform auspiciousness becomes impossible. Obstacle. Obstitiousness is required to remove a suspected obstacle, therefore it is performed so long as suspicion of an obstacle remains. For this reason it is performed even in the middle of an act if suspicion of an obstacle arises. At the beginning of a great undertaking much auspiciousness is performed when a powerful obstacle is suspected, and it has already been explained how auspiciousness is performed when an obstacle is suspected. The nature of auspiciousness, the view of the earlier teachers. Granted this, but what is the true nature of auspiciousness in the injunction, one should perform auspiciousness. It cannot be the state of being praise of a deity, because this definition has neither universal perversion nor necessary sequence. Nor can it be the state of being an act that destroys obstacles, or an act possessing as its uncommon cause the destruction of obstacles, because in the absence of Vedic knowledge of the act or of the qualifier belonging to its uncommon cause, it cannot become an object of practical engagement. Auspiciousness cannot be defined as the object of conduct performed by learned people with the desire, maybe act be completed without obstruction. The Veda is not an effect of learned practice, and establishing the first learned practice would produce mutual dependence between scripture and such practice. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being a Veda-enjoined act performed with the desire for completion, or an act enjoined at the beginning that completes the desired undertaking, because no separate Vedic sentence in joining auspiciousness is available. Nor is auspiciousness the state of being an act called auspicious in SMTI. The Veda is not produced from SMTI, and authors of SMTI cannot independently institute an act enjoined by the Veda. The earlier teachers answered that the actual injunction is not merely one should perform auspiciousness, its specific form is, one who desires unobstructed completion of an act should praise a deity. The conduct of the learned is observed only in such a context. The conventional use of the word auspiciousness for praise of a deity, obeisance, and the like rests on the understanding either that this Vedic enjoined act destroys obstacles or that it is performed, with the support of Vedic injunction, from the desire to complete an act without obstruction. The word auspiciousness has many meanings. Therefore bathing in the Ganges in similar acts, though destructive of obstacles, They're not auspiciousness in the strict sense, because no Vedic sentence enjoins their performance as auspiciousness. Acts such as looking into a mirror at dawn, conveyed by an injunction such as, those engaged in auspicious rites, devoted to the gods, observant of silence, and performers of sacrifices that ward off sin should look into a mirror at dawn, are called auspicious in another sense, but not in the strict sense of an obstacle-destroying act. Thus the word auspiciousness has many meanings. otherwise looking into a mirror, making obeisance, and all such acts would have to be performed obligatorily at the beginning of writing a book. The word Atha is itself auspicious because it destroys obstacles. Sinti says that at the beginning of creation the sounds O and Atha first emerged after breaking forth from Brahma's throat, therefore both are auspicious. It should not be said that Atha merely indicates an auspicious beginning, for then the great sage goddama's use of this word if the opening of the science of nyaya would be needless repetition. Praise of a deity means presenting the deity as endowed with qualities. Obasance is a special act indicating the deity's superiority relative to oneself. The distinguishing feature of obeisance in bodily, verbal, or mental action is an experienced common property. Therefore the word obeisance is used not only for the bodily act of placing the hands against the head but also for a verbal expression of respect such as, I am inferior to you. On an alternative view, distinct injunctions must be posited for bodily, mental, and verbal obeisance. The word obeisance would then have several meanings. Some Prabhakras say that the word cannot be applied to bodily and other acts without cognition that they are preceded by a particular mental resolve, hence its primary meaning is only the mental resolve, while the other three acts are understood by secondary implication. This view is unsound, because one cannot know that an act is preceded by a mental resolve without first understanding the specific bodily or other act. The nature of a learned person and of learned practice. A person who accepts the authority of the Veda is a learned person belonging to the received tradition. In defining learned practice, the qualification must be added that it is not prohibited by the Veda, that is, that it possesses the condition of not being censured. Alternatively, it may be held that only the conduct of the learned which produces super-sensible merit brings a begun act to completion. Conduct of the learned means conduct not produced by error. The practical cognition by which a theistic believer or an atheistic unbeliever undertakes a journey to an unseen sacred place or Bose before a kaitya or stupa is error produced, such conduct is not a means to the desired result but to a more powerful evil result. In ordinary non-Vedic linguistic usage, application of the word learned as opposed to heretical or uncultivated depends on acceptance of the Vedas' authority. Other uses of learned and unlearned are based respectively on absence and presence of agency in acts prohibited by the Veda. Or, a person who accepts the authority of the Veda and does not perform Veda prohibited acts is at that time learned, while one who accepts its authority but performs a prohibited act is unlearned. Hence a Buddhist, though not an agent of a Veda prohibited act, is not learned, because he does not accept the authority of the Veda. But it is not proper to regard as learned merely someone free from performing prohibited acts and lacking cognition that they generate sin, for even a scholar who accepts the Vedas' authority may sometimes perform a prohibited act without knowing that it produces sin. Conclusion of the Discussion of Auspicious Invocation Some teachers say that a person free from attachment and aversion is a learned scholar of the received tradition. Such a learned person can only be Manu and others like him, because omniscience is required in them. The Veda is inferred from the un-centered conduct of such traditionally learned persons. This view is unsound, otherwise modern scholars, who have not directly observed the conduct of Manu and others, would not be entitled to engage in auspicious invocation. It may be said that ordinary people infer the conduct of Manu and others from that of modern learned persons and then infer the Veda from the conduct of Manu and others before engaging in auspiciousness. But then the conduct of modern scholars itself, by assisting the inference of man as conduct, may be accepted as the cause of the inference to the Veda, what need is there for a separate inference from modern conduct to man as conduct. Modern scholars too are in fact called, learned persons of the received tradition. SMTI states that a local custom handed down in succession through age after age, provided it is not contrary to Sruti and SMTI but accords with them, is regarded as proper conduct. is no proof that only the omniscient man have first performed auspicious invocation. Nor is it sound to argue that, because invocation is found in Sintis composed by Manu and others, only omniscient persons perform it. An author of Sinti need not be omniscient, he may understand a matter from the Veda and compose a Sinti text. Some may further say that conduct of the learned directly supports only an inference that invocation is obligatory, why infer the authority of a Veda in joining it? The answer is that, in the case of a lost Vedic branch, an inference to the Veda is necessary, as I'll admit. With this the discussion of auspicious invocation in the perception section ends. The discussion of auspicious invocation in the perception section ends. The theory of epistemic validity. The doctrine of determining validity slash theory of apprehension. Statement of purpose. Under the auspicious invocation, the supremely compassionate sage Godama, desiring to rescue the world submerged in the mire of suffering, composed in kik, the science of Nyaya, the most cherished among the eighteen branches of learning. At the beginning of that science he established the sutra that knowledge of the true nature of the sixteen categories, beginning with means of knowledge, leads to the highest human good, liberation, for correct knowledge of these categories is necessary to direct a discerning person toward the supreme goal. But the ordered division of the sixteen categories depends on knowledge of the first category, the means of knowledge. Therefore in the Tathasintmai Gangesa first examines the true nature of a means of knowledge, that is, the validity of cognition. The Objection of the Madhyamaka Buddhists The Madhyamaka Buddhists say that it is not correct to hold that Nyaya teaches the real nature of the sixteen categories beginning with means of knowledge and is indirectly a means to liberation, because determination of the true nature of a means of knowledge is impossible. Determining the nature of a means of knowledge depends on determining the nature of Prama, veritical cognition. But the nature of Prama is established neither intrinsically by the complete set of causes of cognition itself nor extrinsically by another means of knowledge, because, as will be explained, numerous defects arise on both alternatives. An opponent may ask, what purpose is served by knowing the validity of the first cognition? Human activity of every kind does not necessarily follow even after cognition or a determination of validity, and undertaking involving great wealth and effort, such as sacrifice, occurs only when the necessarily desired result of heaven has been ascertained. Nor is it correct that absence of a determination of the first cognition's validity, or doubt about it, inhibits activity toward a means, while determination of validity causes activity. The case may look analogous to determining provision in inference, but when the validity of the first cognition is doubted, its object too becomes doubtful. Near absence of certainty about the object may inhibit activity, there is therefore no need separately to regard doubt about validity or cognition of invalidity as an impediment. But this argument is unsound. The certainty about the object expressed as, the thing is precisely thus and not otherwise, which is a cooperating cause of unwavering activity, depends on determining the validity of the first cognition. Hence determination of that validity is necessary.

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