MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part11_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.996948)
Duration: 23:29
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33परस्व्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष
0:33–0:38silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of
0:38–0:43invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object,
0:43–0:47and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object.
0:48–0:52Reflexive awareness is veritable cognition taking an existent entity as object,
0:52–0:56otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth, would be
0:56–1:02required. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there
1:02–1:06is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition.
1:07–1:11Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended,
1:11–1:14reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises.
1:15–1:19One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time
1:19–1:23difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established by
1:23–1:28a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as
1:28–1:33silver, it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension
1:33–1:39of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness. Therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid
1:39–1:42qualified cognition the shell is silver can arise at all.
1:43–1:47The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver.
1:48–1:53The instrumental expression, a silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver,
1:53–1:56qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualifcant.
1:56–2:00The radical qualified cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as
2:00–2:05object, therefore invalid qualified cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object.
2:06–2:09In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present,
2:09–2:13and qualified cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:13–2:17therefore the Nayayika theory of misapprehension is not the Sautrantika Buddhist theory of an
2:17–2:23empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal. Explanation of the rule governing
2:23–2:28sublating and sublated cognitions.
2:28–2:32Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and
2:32–2:36sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain
2:36–2:37fixed.
2:37–2:39This objection is unsound.
2:39–2:43A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator.
2:43–2:47For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective and
2:47–2:51sound-sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has
2:51–2:53not yet arisen.
2:53–2:57When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously
2:57–3:01arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise
3:01–3:03at all.
3:03–3:07The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are
3:07–3:10mutually independent.
3:10–3:14If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the
3:14–3:18earlier because the earlier explains the later.
3:18–3:23How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate an earlier one?
3:23–3:30For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception.
3:30–3:34It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated.
3:34–3:39The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated.
3:39–3:43The qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as qualificon cannot
3:43–3:48be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred, future activity
3:48–3:52does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated.
3:52–3:58Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid
3:58–4:04cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition.
4:04–4:08Confidence in cognitive validity
4:08–4:12Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the Naya Yaka admits
4:12–4:14some cognitions to be invalid.
4:14–4:17This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been
4:17–4:20explained in the theory of validity.
4:20–4:24On the Prabhikara view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition
4:24–4:28when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended
4:28–4:32non-relations among things are observed in many cases?
4:32–4:35It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing
4:35–4:40is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing, is quickly recalled,
4:40–4:43therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an
4:43–4:45existent object.
4:45–4:50When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes it.
4:50–4:52But this proposal is unsound.
4:52–4:56Even though validity is a general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating
4:56–5:00cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained merely from absence of a
5:00–5:02sublating cognition.
5:02–5:06The men's arka cannot explain confidence in validity without another cognition of
5:06–5:08an existent object.
5:08–5:11The method by which distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference
5:11–5:14has already been explained.
5:14–5:19Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the naiyayika view.
5:19–5:24A third view concerning confidence in validity.
5:24–5:29Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary
5:29–5:33shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it.
5:33–5:38This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive validity is
5:38–5:39established.
5:39–5:44When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell, an incapable contrary
5:44–5:50substrate, confidence in validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference.
5:50–5:53This proposal is unsound.
5:53–5:57On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally
5:57–6:01arises through another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens
6:01–6:02the student.
6:02–6:07In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference,
6:07–6:10no cognition explicitly presents identity.
6:10–6:16How then will the MMSARC establish the state of cognition of an existent object?
6:16–6:20A defect causes illusion.
6:20–6:24others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition. This objection is
6:24–6:29unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its produced result,
6:29–6:31invalid cognition.
6:31–6:36It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell as silver invalid when both shell
6:36–6:41and silver are real and existent? Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell
6:41–6:46and silver is unreal, whatever is additional to shell and silver in their identity is
6:46–6:52unreal, but both shell and silver exist. If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension
6:52–6:58of the unreal follows. The superimposed relation need not be unreal here.
6:59–7:03The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the
7:03–7:07existent shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists
7:07–7:11in being a cognition that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier,
7:11–7:14or apprehends object herd opposed to the qualifier.
7:14–7:18This defect is clear in such cognition.
7:18–7:25The earlier Neayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal.
7:25–7:29The earlier Neayaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become
7:29–7:32objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver.
7:32–7:35Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the
7:35–7:39earlier Neayaka's regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an
7:39–7:44unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant.
7:44–7:48There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent
7:48–7:51qualifier and qualifcant.
7:51–7:55The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts
7:55–7:59MMA with MACON SA with MACON and NIA does not arise.
7:59–8:03The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established
8:03–8:07here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the MEMSARC of you.
8:07–8:11The Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when
8:11–8:17the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object.
8:17–8:21Thus ends the theory of misapprehension and the perception section of the Tatthasint
8:21–8:27Mayafsri Gangesapadhyaya.
8:27–8:32The theory of the definition of perception.
8:32–8:36Four kinds of valid cognition.
8:36–8:42Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition.
8:42–8:47Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly for, perceptual
8:47–8:52means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means.
8:52–8:58Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures.
8:58–9:02This will be explained further below.
9:02–9:08Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception.
9:08–9:13The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant,
9:13–9:18That is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense faculty and object.
9:18–9:23Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition,
9:23–9:26because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as
9:26–9:28object.
9:28–9:33It under extends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced by any relation.
9:33–9:38Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized.
9:38–9:43If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing
9:43–9:47it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness.
9:47–9:51The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty
9:51–9:55or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one
9:55–9:59of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced by either
9:59–10:01the mind or self.
10:01–10:04Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense
10:04–10:09faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence.
10:09–10:13Nor can perception be defined as veridical experience not produced by a previously known
10:13–10:16specific instrument.
10:16–10:21Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception, if an unknown cognition
10:21–10:27is made the specific instrument, the definition over extends to inferential cognition.
10:27–10:32Nor is it veridical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under-extends
10:32–10:37to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier.
10:37–10:43Directness is not a definition of perception because directness lacks a regular manifestor.
10:43–10:48If a regular manifestor is admitted that very feature can serve as the definition of perception
10:48–10:56and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness.
10:56–11:00Directness is the definition of perception.
11:00–11:04The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition.
11:04–11:08In perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor
11:08–11:13is present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness.
11:14–11:18Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception,
11:18–11:22otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent,
11:22–11:24and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible.
11:26–11:30The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifest is unsound.
11:31–11:35Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the
11:35–11:40universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cowhoad.
11:40–11:44A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestors
11:44–11:49are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain.
11:49–11:54Conversely, presence of a regular manifestor may itself obstruct establishing a universal,
11:54–11:59because the manifestor can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate
11:59–12:03perception, the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing
12:03–12:06cognition of its substrate.
12:06–12:11Produced Directness is the definition of produced perception.
12:11–12:16The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced
12:16–12:21from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition
12:21–12:25concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation,
12:25–12:29and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future
12:29–12:31objects.
12:31–12:36cognition is produced direct cognition. Some others say that cognition of a universal and
12:36–12:41perceptual cognition produced through universal characteristic presentation must also be included
12:41–12:46under qualification related to an object generated by a sense faculty. Another alternative is that
12:46–12:51produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its own object. In inference,
12:51–12:55verbal cognition, and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant,
12:55–13:00because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only as in
13:00–13:02hearing cause.
13:02–13:08Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty.
13:08–13:13A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore
13:13–13:18the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity.
13:18–13:23The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood,
13:23–13:28otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions.
13:28–13:33sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition
13:33–13:37whose cause is cognition.
13:37–13:42sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but
13:42–13:44not memory.
13:44–13:48vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind
13:48–13:51of which they are substrates produces memory.
13:51–13:56alternatively, sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces
13:56–14:01cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound.
14:03–14:07The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another
14:07–14:14cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument
14:14–14:19because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes
14:19–14:24qualified perception concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is
14:24–14:30not an instrument of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this.
14:30–14:35In recognition, this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is
14:35–14:39not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would
14:39–14:41be memory.
14:41–14:46For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating
14:46–14:51memory, a mental impression causes memory alone.
14:51–14:56The Prabhupākara view, direct cognition is perception.
14:56–15:01The Prabhupāda says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition.
15:01–15:04Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor.
15:04–15:08Nor is, cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because
15:08–15:13it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition.
15:13–15:17A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition
15:17–15:20is direct cognition concerning that object.
15:20–15:24In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual,
15:24–15:30it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal
15:30–15:35is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual.
15:35–15:40Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified
15:40–15:43cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a
15:43–15:48qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long
15:48–15:52object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object. Inference and
15:52–15:56and recognition are indirect in the probandom and thatness components, but both are perceptual
15:56–16:01in their cognition and cognizer components.
16:01–16:07Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view.
16:07–16:11A partial msaka says that recognition I know that this is that manifests thatness only
16:11–16:16as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness,
16:16–16:20therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component.
16:20–16:25But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom
16:25–16:30as cognition of the mark.
16:30–16:33Recutation of the Prabhācāra view.
16:33–16:38The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component,
16:38–16:43it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent.
16:43–16:48If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause,
16:48–16:53recognition in the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated.
16:53–16:57It is needlessly complex to hold that sense production independent of cognition of thatness
16:57–17:02regulates the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the
17:02–17:08business component, because it arises from a sense faculty together with another cognition.
17:08–17:12It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition
17:12–17:15within one recognition.
17:15–17:19It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct
17:19–17:21components business and thatness.
17:21–17:25Both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced
17:25–17:28by the sense faculty.
17:28–17:31Influential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer
17:31–17:35components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes
17:35–17:37only direct cognition.
17:37–17:41If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the
17:41–17:44probandom component 2 must be mind generated.
17:44–17:48Making, the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate, regulate perceptuality
17:48–17:51is excessively complex.
17:51–17:56in general is not cognitionhood, because cognitionhood is unproduced, and no single combined causal
17:56–18:05aggregate for all cognition is established. Recutation of the Prima-Facey definition.
18:05–18:09Cognition has no parts, therefore only its components are objects of cognition, not
18:09–18:14constituents. Another determinant cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition,
18:14–18:17otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and
18:17–18:23object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of
18:23–18:27objecthood concerning cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate, while the complete
18:27–18:30causal aggregate of cognition is the cause.
18:30–18:32This proposal is unsound.
18:32–18:36Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes,
18:36–18:39another cognizance of the object's own nature, and another cognizance of the
18:39–18:41object's own nature.
18:41–18:46is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's
18:46–18:50own causes, another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition.
18:51–18:55This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff
18:55–19:01has qualified causes qualify cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognitionhood is not
19:01–19:05an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the pro-bandom.
19:06–19:09Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal
19:09–19:14residing in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual
19:14–19:19becomes a qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition
19:19–19:23of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the
19:23–19:27prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is not an instrument,
19:27–19:29is impossible.
19:29–19:37Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual
19:37–19:41cognition is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of
19:41–19:47recognition is only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced
19:47–19:52only from an impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the
19:52–19:57counter positive. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer,
19:57–20:02because perception concerning the staff bearer is produced from experience of the qualifier
20:02–20:09staff. Nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified
20:09–20:15experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression
20:15–20:20produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would
20:20–20:26become mere memory. Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition.
20:26–20:36Be the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation.
20:36–20:41A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception.
20:41–20:45Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object.
20:45–20:49Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color
20:49–20:52and action arises through conjunction come in hereance.
20:52–20:56Since universals such as colonists in here in color and the like in hearing in the
20:56–20:59conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come
20:59–21:02inheritance in the inherent. Sound is perceived through its
21:02–21:04inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through its
21:04–21:08inheritance in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is
21:08–21:10perceived through qualificative or intrinsic
21:10–21:13relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are
21:13–21:15perceived through qualificative relation in a substrate
21:15–21:19conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from
21:19–21:21relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to
21:21–21:26an imperceptible object is never a cause.
21:26–21:32Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause.
21:32–21:36Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited
21:36–21:40by minutomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of
21:40–21:45the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause.
21:45–21:48In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is
21:48–21:50the cause.
21:50–21:55The argument that conjunction with the apprehensible object is more economical than conjunction
21:55–22:00with the parts and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause is unsound.
22:00–22:03Conjunction with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction
22:03–22:07with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with
22:07–22:10its parts is also refuted.
22:10–22:14Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction
22:14–22:18delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn
22:18–22:23be established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction
22:23–22:28would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by
22:28–22:34the minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable.
22:34–22:39Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause.
22:39–22:44This view is unsound. Since conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception
22:44–22:48of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the
22:48–22:51dust particles dancing in sunbeams and the parts of particles.
22:51–22:58Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular substances such as pots.
22:58–23:04Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible object,
23:04–23:10perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object.
23:10–23:14If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts,
23:14–23:18parts, conjunction with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an
23:18–23:20additional co-operating cause.
23:20–23:25Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible
23:25–23:26by that sense.

Plain text

परस्व्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object, and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object. Reflexive awareness is veritable cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth, would be required. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition. Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended, reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises. One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver, it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness. Therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid qualified cognition the shell is silver can arise at all. The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver. The instrumental expression, a silver, means silverness, which is the qualifier of silver, qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualifcant. The radical qualified cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore invalid qualified cognition too takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object. In inferential cognition of silver, silverness is not held to be present, and qualified cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore the Nayayika theory of misapprehension is not the Sautrantika Buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal. Explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions. Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain fixed. This objection is unsound. A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator. For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective and sound-sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen. When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise at all. The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate an earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated. The qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as qualificon cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred, future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated. Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition. Confidence in cognitive validity Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the Naya Yaka admits some cognitions to be invalid. This objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhikara view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things are observed in many cases? It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing, is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arka cannot explain confidence in validity without another cognition of an existent object. The method by which distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference has already been explained. Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the naiyayika view. A third view concerning confidence in validity. Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it. This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive validity is established. When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell, an incapable contrary substrate, confidence in validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference. This proposal is unsound. On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through another cognition of difference, this discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student. In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference, no cognition explicitly presents identity. How then will the MMSARC establish the state of cognition of an existent object? A defect causes illusion. others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition. This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its produced result, invalid cognition. It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell as silver invalid when both shell and silver are real and existent? Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist. If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows. The superimposed relation need not be unreal here. The Naya Yaka replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object herd opposed to the qualifier. This defect is clear in such cognition. The earlier Neayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal. The earlier Neayaka say that identity and every other unreal relation become objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Neayaka's regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts MMA with MACON SA with MACON and NIA does not arise. The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the MEMSARC of you. The Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object. Thus ends the theory of misapprehension and the perception section of the Tatthasint Mayafsri Gangesapadhyaya. The theory of the definition of perception. Four kinds of valid cognition. Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition. Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly for, perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means. Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures. This will be explained further below. Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception. The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant, That is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense faculty and object. Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition, because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as object. It under extends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced by any relation. Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized. If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness. The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced by either the mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence. Nor can perception be defined as veridical experience not produced by a previously known specific instrument. Known instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception, if an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition over extends to inferential cognition. Nor is it veridical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under-extends to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier. Directness is not a definition of perception because directness lacks a regular manifestor. If a regular manifestor is admitted that very feature can serve as the definition of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness. Directness is the definition of perception. The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition. In perceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness. Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible. The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifest is unsound. Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cowhoad. A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal, recurrent manifestors are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain. Conversely, presence of a regular manifestor may itself obstruct establishing a universal, because the manifestor can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing cognition of its substrate. Produced Directness is the definition of produced perception. The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation, and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects. cognition is produced direct cognition. Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related to an object generated by a sense faculty. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its own object. In inference, verbal cognition, and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only as in hearing cause. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty. A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity. The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood, otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions. sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition whose cause is cognition. sense facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but not memory. vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind of which they are substrates produces memory. alternatively, sense facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound. The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this. In recognition, this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental impression causes memory alone. The Prabhupākara view, direct cognition is perception. The Prabhupāda says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition. Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor. Nor is, cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition. A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning that object. In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual, it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual. Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object. Inference and and recognition are indirect in the probandom and thatness components, but both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components. Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view. A partial msaka says that recognition I know that this is that manifests thatness only as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness, therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component. But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom as cognition of the mark. Recutation of the Prabhācāra view. The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component, it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent. If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause, recognition in the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense generated. It is needlessly complex to hold that sense production independent of cognition of thatness regulates the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the business component, because it arises from a sense faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition. It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct components business and thatness. Both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced by the sense faculty. Influential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes only direct cognition. If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the probandom component 2 must be mind generated. Making, the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate, regulate perceptuality is excessively complex. in general is not cognitionhood, because cognitionhood is unproduced, and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established. Recutation of the Prima-Facey definition. Cognition has no parts, therefore only its components are objects of cognition, not constituents. Another determinant cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate, while the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause. This proposal is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognizance of the object's own nature, and another cognizance of the object's own nature. is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff has qualified causes qualify cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognitionhood is not an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the pro-bandom. Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes a qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is not an instrument, is impossible. Gangesa's conclusion. For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual cognition is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter positive. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because perception concerning the staff bearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff. Nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory. Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition. Be the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation. A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception. Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object. Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color and action arises through conjunction come in hereance. Since universals such as colonists in here in color and the like in hearing in the conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come inheritance in the inherent. Sound is perceived through its inheritance in the auditory sense, and sound is through its inheritance in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is perceived through qualificative or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through qualificative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object is never a cause. Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause. Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minutomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause. In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the cause. The argument that conjunction with the apprehensible object is more economical than conjunction with the parts and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause is unsound. Conjunction with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also refuted. Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable. Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause. This view is unsound. Since conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the dust particles dancing in sunbeams and the parts of particles. Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular substances such as pots. Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object. If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, parts, conjunction with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional co-operating cause. Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense.

← Transcript index