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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:10Hot Eye Examination of the Doctrine of Momentary Existence
0:10–0:16Verse of Praise Salutations to the Supreme Being, foremost among
0:16–0:24the ancient teachers, Lord of all worlds and Creator. This sovereignty over the worlds fashioned
0:24–0:33by Him belongs to His very nature. Having created the worlds, He sustains their existence,
0:33–0:39which is their being's the correct use of words and for their welfare establishes injunctions
0:39–0:47to perform beneficial acts and prohibitions against harmful ones. His teaching is authoritative,
0:47–0:53his compassion for living beings is natural, and his effort for the good of all is bound
0:53–1:02by no condition. The subject for examination and the purpose of this inquiry. Every person
1:02–1:06in this world naturally seeks freedom from suffering.
1:06–1:12The reality of suffering is established by everyone's experience and suffering is by
1:12–1:16its very nature adverse and unbearable.
1:16–1:23Even when a suffering being does not understand the means of removing it, that being continues
1:23–1:26to search for such a means.
1:26–1:32Ultimately, on the basis of the unanimous teaching of all accomplished authorities in
1:32–1:38In spiritual matters, one understands that knowledge of reality alone, that is, knowledge
1:38–1:44of the true nature of things, is the means to the cessation of suffering, there is no
1:44–1:46other means.
1:46–1:52What must be known, whether as the counter positive, whose negation is at issue, or
1:52–1:58as the substrate of the difference from that with which it is ordinarily confused, is
1:58–2:01nothing other than the self.
2:01–2:08Whether the self does not exist or truly exists, the spontaneous, natural or commonly accepted
2:08–2:14conception of the self is certainly not true as it stands.
2:14–2:18On this point all disputants are in definite agreement.
2:18–2:26A reasoned inquiry into the true nature of the self is therefore now begun.
2:26–2:31opposed to the Nya, Vaika view of the nature of the self.
2:31–2:37The principal views opposed to the reality of the self are these, everything endures
2:37–2:44for only a single moment, nothing apart from consciousness is real, there is no distinction
2:44–2:49between qualities and the thing qualified by them, and the entity called the self
2:49–2:54is never perceived or experienced.
2:54–3:02universal momentariness by inference and refuting it because invariable concomitance is unproved.
3:02–3:09Of the four doctrines stated above, the first cannot be accepted because it has no established
3:09–3:17proof. It may be said, whatever is real is momentary. For example, a pot is momentary,
3:17–3:23and words and other things whose momentariness is disputed are real.
3:23–3:28Does this inference not establish that all things are momentary?
3:28–3:29No.
3:29–3:38In this inference, the invariable concomitance between reason and probandum has not been established.
3:38–3:44A proof offered for invariable concomitance and its detailed examination.
3:44–3:52Should it be maintained that mutually contradictory properties, capacity and incapacity for production
3:52–3:58are found together in what appears to be one object that from this coexistence a difference
3:58–4:04of objects is inferred and that this difference in turn establishes the stated invariable
4:04–4:14concomitance? No. The coexistence of mutually contradictory properties is itself unproved.
4:14–4:20But is that coexistence not established by a negative inference in the form of a reversal
4:20–4:28of the consequence? No. In Buddhist logic, the consequence is the first conditional proposition
4:28–4:35of a negative inference, the reversal is the second proposition denying its consequence and
4:35–4:41the conclusion denies the antecedent of the first proposition. The question now arises,
4:41–4:48is this capacity the productive act itself or the fitness to produce? It cannot be the
4:48–4:54productive act itself, for then the reason of the inference would merge into the probandom
4:54–5:02and no inference would remain. Can this defect be removed by distinguishing the separate exclusions
5:02–5:11or exclusions of others that constitute the two terms? No. The basis for distinguishing
5:11–5:17exclusions is only the opposition or non-identity determined by the mutual difference of the
5:17–5:24things excluded by them. A difference between exclusions cannot be based on each excluding
5:24–5:32what the other excludes. The alleged difference between two exclusions cannot arise from each
5:32–5:39exclusion excluding what is excluded by the other, for example, as countless and hoarseness
5:39–5:47respectively exclude non-cows and non-horses. If the two exclusions were mutually opposed
5:47–5:53in this way, then whenever one were present in the subject, the other would necessarily
5:53–6:01be absent. The inference would consequently be vitiated either by the defect of a subject
6:01–6:08devoid of the probandom or by an unestablished reason. Partial mutual inclusion and partial
6:08–6:14Mutual mutual exclusion are impossible among exclusions.
6:14–6:20Nor can the stated difference arise because each exclusion includes some of the things
6:20–6:26excluded by the other and excludes others, as in the relation between treeness and
6:26–6:28a so-cut treeness.
6:28–6:35These exclusions cannot be accepted as mutually pervading and pervaded.
6:35–6:41If they were, a capable object could be proved non-productive or a non-productive object
6:41–6:43could be deemed capable.
6:43–6:50A difference between exclusions cannot arise from different advantageous qualities.
6:50–6:56Nor does this difference arise from different advantageous qualities as production and
6:56–7:00impermanence are treated as distinct properties.
7:00–7:06No such distinct advantageous property is available here.
7:06–7:10Could the words themselves be such advantageous properties?
7:10–7:11No.
7:11–7:17If that were so, synonymous words could not exist.
7:17–7:21Differences of cognition cannot make exclusions different.
7:21–7:26Nor is there a cognitive difference among exclusions.
7:26–7:34If merely having separate cognitions of exclusions made them different, then even the single exclusion
7:34–7:42of incapacity would differ from itself, because there may be many cognitions of that one exclusion.
7:42–7:48If it is maintained that differences among cognitions, determined by differences among
7:48–7:56their objects, produce differences among exclusions, the fault of mutual dependence results.
7:56–8:03Nor can this linguistic practice of distinguishing exclusions be regarded as costless, for then
8:03–8:09any object could be treated as different from itself.
8:09–8:14Examination of the view that capacity is fitness to produce.
8:14–8:20Capacity is not the second alternative stated above, namely fitness to produce.
8:20–8:26If capacity is fitness to produce, is it the aggregate of auxiliary causes or an individual
8:26–8:30property residing in a particular object?
8:30–8:34The first alternative is unacceptable.
8:34–8:40It would involve proving again what has already been established and the reason would
8:40–8:46also be unestablished because the opponent does not admit the conjunction of auxiliary
8:46–8:53causes in the non-productive seed kept in a storehouse, which serves as the counter instance.
8:53–9:00Who denies that an object joined with its auxiliary causes necessarily produces its effect?
9:00–9:04For whom, then, is this proof being offered?
9:04–9:11The Nya-Vaika position likewise does not maintain that the aggregate of auxiliary causes is
9:11–9:17present while production fails to occur, hence no contrary possibility of production in the
9:17–9:21absence of capacity arises here.
9:21–9:26Three possible forms of the capacity residing in a causal object.
9:26–9:33Capacity as a distinctive feature of a causal object may be understood in three ways.
9:33–9:40In the case of a seed as the cause of a sprout, this capacity may be, first, seedhood, whose
9:40–9:47positive and negative concomitance with its effect, the sprout, is known, second, a particular
9:47–9:54species within the universal property called seedhood, or third, the condition of remaining
9:54–9:59without the effect because the auxiliary causes are absent.
9:59–10:03The first form of capacity is unacceptable.
10:03–10:06The first form is untenable.
10:06–10:13Seeds possessing seedhood yet failing to produce sprouts are directly established.
10:13–10:19Even you Buddhists have no doubt about the reality of such things.
10:19–10:23Detailed refutation of the second form of capacity.
10:23–10:27The second form is also untenable.
10:27–10:33We do not accept, even in a productive cause, the presence of the special property that
10:33–10:39is supposed to produce the effect immediately, therefore, the example given in the inference
10:39–10:46lacks the reason. What discerning person would accept the reality of something not established
10:46–10:53by reasoning at all? This property is not known through non-conceptual cognition, because
10:53–11:00no self-aware recollection of it is available after such cognition. Nor is it known by
11:00–11:08inference because there is no reason from which such an inference could be made. It may be
11:08–11:16asked if there is no distinctive feature, how are some causes productive and others non-productive?
11:16–11:23But who said there is no distinctive feature? The question is only whether it is a particular
11:23–11:29universal property or the presence or absence of auxiliary causes in conjunction with the
11:29–11:37principle cause. Even after extensive enquiry, no decisive proof is found that determines
11:37–11:44between these alternatives. It may further be said, if an object's nature is to produce
11:44–11:51immediately, and that nature already exists in it, then even hundreds of curses by the
11:51–11:58gods could not forcibly prevent it from producing its effect at the very first moment. This
11:58–12:06would be reasonable only if immediate production as the object's nature had first been proved.
12:06–12:14But how that itself is established is unknown. Can it be established by negative inference?
12:14–12:21No, for that would involve mutual dependence. The inference can operate only after the
12:21–12:28The object has been established as possessing a nature of immediate production, while that
12:28–12:34nature would be established only after the inference had operated.
12:34–12:40A new proof proposed for the stated property and its refutation.
12:40–12:44Very well, let us examine the matter in this way.
12:44–12:50The very production of the effect proves that the cause is immediately productive.
12:50–12:58If the object had a nature of producing only after delay, its effect would never arise.
12:58–13:02No, this conclusion is improper.
13:02–13:10If a delayed cause never produced its effect, it would not be productive after delay either.
13:10–13:15Productive after delay must therefore mean non-productive until the auxiliary causes
13:15–13:17become available.
13:17–13:29Consequently, the production of the effect proves only that the causal complex had previously come together, it does not prove the existence of any new special property.
13:29–13:43Whether, according to ordinary experience, the auxiliary causes are not by nature immediately productive but produce the effect when assembled, or whether, as Buddhists imagine,
13:43–13:50They are by nature immediately productive, the occurrence of the effect settles nothing in this dispute.
13:51–13:54Refutation of the third form of capacity.
13:55–14:00The third form also creates a contradiction and is therefore untenable.
14:00–14:08To remain without an effect because the auxiliary causes are absent and yet to be related to
14:08–14:16or followed by the effect while those auxiliaries remain absent are mutually contradictory.
14:16–14:22What genuinely follows from this consideration and should be accepted is the rule that an
14:22–14:28object non-productive only in the absence of a particular thing must become productive
14:28–14:34when that thing is present. But this very rule establishes the persistence of the object.
14:35–14:42A new reason proposed for the inference and its refutation. The preceding refutation also
14:42–14:49disposes of the possible claim that the proper reason in the inference is being the subject
14:49–14:56of the word capable. For even a seed called capable is sometimes seen not to produce its
14:56–15:04effect, the sprout. It may be objected that the use of the word capable for a non-productive
15:04–15:12seed is not primary, its primary use is based on production. Otherwise linguistic usage
15:12–15:18would become irregular. But then the question is on what kind of production is the primary
15:18–15:27use of capable based. Not immediate production, for no proof establishes it. If the rule is
15:27–15:34stated thus, causes become productive only when auxiliaries are present and then necessarily
15:34–15:42produce their effect, it is entirely proper. The use of the word capable is therefore based
15:42–15:50simply on production. Consequently, the invariable concomitance between reality and momentariness
15:50–15:58still remains untrue. A question concerning the nature of an object. The question then
15:58–16:05is this, after so much discussion, what is the conclusion concerning an object's nature?
16:05–16:13One must occur either after delay or immediately, there is no third alternative.
16:13–16:15The answer is no.
16:15–16:22When exposing a defect in the opponent's view, the first stage of criticism requires only
16:22–16:28showing that, because the object's nature is not definitely known, the presence of
16:28–16:31the reason in the subject is doubtful.
16:31–16:39When the occasion arises to present our own position, its exposition will not be difficult.
16:39–16:44Clarification of the meanings of delay and non-delay.
16:44–16:47What does no delay in production mean?
16:47–16:54Does an object produce its effect immediately after it itself arises or immediately after
16:54–16:57it is joined by its auxiliary causes?
16:57–17:02Similarly, what does delay in production mean?
17:02–17:07Does it remain non-productive until the auxiliary causes become available
17:07–17:10or does it remain altogether non-productive?
17:10–17:16Of these four alternatives, there is no proof for the first or the fourth
17:16–17:21and they cannot therefore be accepted as true.
17:21–17:27The second and third, however, are established by perception itself.
17:27–17:36It is directly known that an object possessing seedhood produces its effect immediately upon being joined by the auxiliary causes.
17:36–17:45It is likewise established by perception that an object lacking auxiliary causes remains non-productive.
17:45–17:49Agreement on this point and its justification.
17:49–17:58Even you Buddhists have no doubt about this, because it is established by proof and the contrary view is contradictory.
17:58–18:09To understand this, if an object that is non-productive in the absence of auxiliary causes failed to produce its effect even when the auxiliaries were present,
18:09–18:13An object of that nature would be altogether non-productive,
18:13–18:19whether auxiliaries were present or absent, it would remain non-productive.
18:19–18:25Conversely, if an object were productive even in the absence of auxiliary causes,
18:25–18:31those auxiliaries are auxiliary causes available only to a capable cause.
18:31–18:36If so, does this mean that they never combine with an incapable cause,
18:36–18:42or that even after such combination an incapable cause does not produce the effect.
18:43–18:45The first is not true.
18:45–18:53Earth, water, heat and air are seen to combine even with an incapable piece of stone.
18:54–19:05The second is also untrue for on that assumption a seed joined with every auxiliary cause might still fail to produce a sprout just as a stone does.
19:05–19:09The satirical consequence of the stated possibility.
19:09–19:14Very well, let it be so, what defect is there?
19:14–19:19The answer is that such an event has never been observed.
19:19–19:26It may be said that although it has not been observed, it can still be doubted.
19:26–19:34But just as one doubts that a cause may remain non-productive despite the presence of auxiliaries,
19:34–19:41One may equally doubt that an effect may arise from a cause despite their absence.
19:41–19:49If even this is admitted, one may also doubt that a sprout can arise without the cause called a seed.
19:49–20:01In that event, the claim that the positive and negative concomitance between cause and effect can be carefully examined and established is plainly satirical.
20:01–20:09Introduction to a detailed examination of the proof opposing the assumption of immediate productivity.
20:09–20:17Let the following consideration be offered in support of the imagined property of immediate productivity.
20:17–20:22We do not doubt that auxiliaries combine with the principal cause,
20:22–20:30because we have already accepted that seed, soil, and the rest become productive only when assembled.
20:30–20:36There is no rule restricting this conjunction to one particular seed entity,
20:36–20:42every seed can combine with the auxiliaries and therefore all seeds appear alike.
20:43–20:50Nor do we doubt that the effect may arise whether cause or auxiliaries are present or absent,
20:50–20:54for if production were possible even in the absence of auxiliaries,
20:54–21:00the positive and negative concomitance between cause and effect would be destroyed.
21:00–21:04Objections to the property called immediate productivity.
21:04–21:11The real doubt is whether, once the principal cause and auxiliary causes have assembled,
21:11–21:17production of the effect should be regarded as determined by a special property called
21:17–21:21immediate productivity residing in the principal cause.
21:21–21:25But there is no ground for such doubt.
21:25–21:34If the effect is produced by the known group of causes alone, there is no proof for imagining an unknown property.
21:35–21:41Such an assumption also suffers from needless multiplication of entities.
21:41–21:49If this property were accepted, imperceptible things such as the senses would also become unacceptable.
21:49–21:54No possible account of the property's nature proves reasonable.
21:55–22:03Moreover, every particular quality residing in a cause determines a corresponding particular quality in the effect.
22:04–22:08Explanation of the first and second objections.
22:08–22:14From the moment a pot is produced until it is destroyed by the blow of a heavy staff,
22:14–22:20it is seen to possess no property other than pothood relevant to the point at issue.
22:20–22:27Yet, by successively combining with different auxiliary causes, it produces innumerable
22:27–22:31similar and dissimilar effects.
22:31–22:37If this fully explains the manifold productivity of a single thing, what ground or purpose
22:37–22:43is there for imagining hundreds of thousands of invisible universals?
22:43–22:46Is that not needless multiplication?
22:46–22:53You Buddhists yourselves say that when the entity imagined for a particular purpose is unnecessary
22:53–22:59for that very purpose, this amounts in reality to its absence.
22:59–23:02Explanation of the fourth objection.
23:02–23:09Regarding the property called immediate productivity, one may ask, does it pervade all rice grains,
23:09–23:12or does it exclude rice?
23:12–23:19If it pervades all rice, why is rice kept in a granary not immediately productive?
23:19–23:24If it excludes rice, how can productive rice be immediately productive?
23:24–23:31Similarly, one may ask, does ricehood pervade all immediately productive things or exclude
23:31–23:33them?
23:33–23:39If it pervades them, nothing other than rice can be immediately productive.
23:39–23:44If it excludes them, rice itself becomes non-productive.
23:44–23:49Counter-apply to the preceding objection and the answer.
23:49–23:55May it not be said that neither inclusion nor exclusion described above obtains?
23:55–24:02No, there is no third alternative apart from inclusion and exclusion.
24:02–24:09Would partial inclusion and exclusion not coherently apply to different individuals?
24:09–24:10No.
24:10–24:17On that assumption, the mutual opposition between belonging and not belonging to the same universal
24:17–24:20would disappear.
24:20–24:26Horse-ness and birdhood each exclude some individuals of the other, yet horse and bird would become
24:26–24:28non-different.
24:28–24:36detailed explanation of the preceding objection. If the specific universal of an object deviated
24:36–24:42from that object, then for the same reason a Soka-hood would deviate from treeness and
24:42–24:49an Soka would cease to be a tree. If this were accepted, inferences using essential
24:49–24:55nature as the reason would become meaningless. This causally determined nature of the
24:55–25:01The sprout is excluded from every substrate devoid of the probandom.
25:01–25:08Thus, by establishing a term pervaded by the pervading property, only this is established
25:08–25:13the form of the sprout is determined by the seed.
25:13–25:19In this way the invariable concomitance between sprout nature and determination by the
25:19–25:21seed is proved.
25:21–25:27an alternative proof of the conclusion that seedhood determines sprouthood.
25:27–25:31Set the sprout aside for the moment.
25:31–25:37The question is whether being an object of seed nature determines any effect.
25:37–25:44If not, a seed cannot possess that nature because as a seed it would be incapable of
25:44–25:47any meaningful activity.
25:47–25:54Seed nature or seedhood, which is established by perception, would be called unreal, while
25:54–26:01a property known by no means of valid cognition would be accepted as real, surely a sign of
26:01–26:05astonishingly acute intelligence.
26:05–26:12If one seed, as a seed, is capable of performing some activity, every seed will be capable
26:12–26:17in the same way because all have the same nature.
26:17–26:23Why then should only one particular seed produce the effect and another not?
26:23–26:30Not all things can be effects of a seed, for otherwise they would not arise from anything
26:30–26:32else.
26:32–26:38Nor can only a seed be the effect of a seed, for then a seed that produces a sprout would
26:38–26:42produce only another seed.
26:42–26:49seed, sprout, or cognition of them is not accepted as an effect of a seed, all these
26:49–26:54would arise even in the absence of auxiliary causes.
26:54–27:00Reply to the objection that a seed joined with auxiliary causes produces its effect.
27:00–27:06It may be objected that, after the causal object has arisen, when the auxiliary is
27:06–27:12necessary for producing a particular thing assemble around it, it determines only the
27:12–27:15production of that thing.
27:15–27:21Very well, but then we ask, does this production occur because of the imagined special property
27:21–27:24or because of seed hood?
27:24–27:29If because of the special property, that property alone will determine production
27:29–27:34of the sprout and seed hood will be entirely purposeless.
27:34–27:41If because of seedhood, it follows that seeds of the same nature remain non-productive when
27:41–27:47they do not obtain auxiliary causes, for the seed nature that determines production of
27:47–27:53a sprout when auxiliaries are present is the same in all seeds.
27:53–27:57The inferential form of the preceding reply.
27:57–28:03This may be proved as follows, whatever is incapable, in a definite form, of any
28:03–28:07Any meaningful activity does not possess that form.
28:07–28:14For example, a seed is incapable of activity in the form of an elephant and therefore does
28:14–28:17not possess elephant nature.
28:17–28:23Auxiliary things such as rice are incapable of any meaningful activity in the form of
28:23–28:24a seed.
28:24–28:30Hence in the negative inference there is non apprehension of the pervading property
28:30–28:32as the reason.
28:32–28:38Being of a certain nature is pervaded by the capacity to produce some meaningful activity
28:38–28:45in that nature, but rice performs no meaningful activity as a seed.
28:45–28:52Objection that the seed nature of all seeds cannot be denied and the reply is not the
28:52–28:59seed nature of all seeds, including ineffective ones, established by perception, so that
28:59–29:01its denial is impossible.
29:01–29:09Yes. Then, to establish the preceding point, accept this negative inference, whatever possesses
29:09–29:16a certain form is capable of some meaningful activity in that form, as is the immediately
29:16–29:21productive thing included among the auxiliary causes.
29:21–29:28Seeds kept in a storehouse, and the light genuinely poses the universal nature of seedhood.
29:28–29:35In this inference the object's essential nature is the reason, for productive capacity depends
29:35–29:41only on that definite nature of the object which determines its productivity.
29:41–29:44A brief question and its answer.
29:44–29:51It is therefore certain that there is some effect for which the seed, precisely as
29:51–29:53a seed, is necessary.
29:53–30:00Would the cognition of a seed produced by every seed itself be such a distinctive effect?
30:00–30:04What is improper in this assumption?
30:04–30:11The answer is that a yogine's cognition of a seed may arise even without a seed.
30:11–30:18Nor is ordinary cognition of a seed necessarily produced by every seed, because the required
30:18–30:24contact between sense and object is not available at every place and time.
30:24–30:29A second brief question and its answer.
30:29–30:34This discussion itself proves that even a capable cause remains non-productive in the
30:34–30:37absence of auxiliaries.
30:37–30:43Can some other unseen effect be supposed to be related to every seed?
30:43–30:50If so, it cannot be an effect inhering in the seed, because a subtle entity cannot be the
30:50–30:53inherent cause of a gross effect.
30:53–31:00Nor can the effect be gross, because the seed is already related to a gross effect such
31:00–31:07as the visible sprout, and a second gross effect cannot occupy the same substrate.
31:07–31:12How can that effect be produced by the seed as an efficient cause?
31:12–31:18Because separate efficient causes need not invariably occur together.
31:18–31:21A satirical statement of the conclusion.
31:21–31:27If the preceding view were true, the so-called immediate productivity alleged to determine
31:27–31:33production would have no known positive and negative concomitance with the effect, while
31:33–31:40what disposes such known concomitance would not be accepted as determining it.
31:40–31:47Every visible effect would be held to arise from an object's invisible nature of immediate
31:47–31:54productivity, while the object's visible natures would produce invisible effects.
31:54–32:00All this exemplifies the proverb, one who abandons the certain and runs after the
32:00–32:07The Uncertain loses even the Certain, while the Uncertain had already slipped from his grasp.
32:07–32:11The negative form of the preceding argument.
32:11–32:15The preceding argument may also be stated thus,
32:15–32:20the seed under dispute, because it is not joined with auxiliary causes,
32:20–32:24is deprived of its effect, the sprout and the like,
32:24–32:28for it possesses the universal nature of seedhood,
32:28–32:34which is the object of a determinate cognition of casualty toward its effect, the sprout.
32:35–32:42What is not deprived of its effect because auxiliaries are absent does not possess such
32:42–32:48seed nature as in the case of a piece of stone. A brief doubt and its resolution.
32:50–32:54Can it not be doubted here whether the absence of the reason in the example
32:54–33:01is due to the absence of the probandom, or to the causes lacking even an indirect capacity
33:01–33:07for production? Would this doubt not also render doubtful the negative concomitance
33:07–33:15between absence of the probandom and absence of the reason? No. This doubt has already
33:15–33:22been cut off at the root. Proposal of the argument that one and the same individual
33:22–33:31think cannot be both productive and non-productive. Then let the argument be stated thus. It does
33:31–33:39not matter if mutually contradictory qualities do not coexist. Let seedhood itself determine
33:39–33:45casualty, let the object become productive by nature when joined with auxiliaries, and
33:45–33:52let its non-productivity in their absence likewise be explained by that absence.
33:52–33:58But all this can apply only to many objects belonging to one universal, not to a single
33:58–34:01individual thing.
34:01–34:08For it is perceptually evident that production and non-production cannot coexist in one individual,
34:08–34:12therefore this cannot be denied in the case of an individual.
34:12–34:20Answer No. The objector has not properly understood the true nature of opposition.
34:20–34:25Different kinds of opposition and their examples.
34:25–34:28Opposition may be of three kinds.
34:28–34:36First, two properties mutually exclude one another as eternality and non-eternality do.
34:36–34:44Second, in certain substrates each property indicates the absence of the other as coldness
34:44–34:45and heat do.
34:45–34:52Third, two properties are merely different from one another as the properties of bearing
34:52–34:56a staff and wearing an earring.
34:56–35:00Refutation of the first form of opposition.
35:00–35:04The first form is not applicable.
35:04–35:11Non-productivity of an object is not established, because as long as an object exists it continues
35:11–35:18to produce something or other. Productivity and non-productivity qualified by a definite
35:18–35:25object or time are indeed known to be mutually opposed, but they are not seen to coexist
35:25–35:32in the same respect. Non-production at a particular time is the absence of production at that
35:32–35:38At time, it is not the same as absence of production at another time.
35:38–35:43We do not accept the coexistence of these two states.
35:43–35:47Refutation of the second form of opposition.
35:47–35:51The second form is also inapplicable.
35:51–35:58No production or non-production is known apart from the affirmation and denial of production.
35:58–36:05In reality, production and non-production are simply the presence and absence of auxiliary
36:05–36:06causes.
36:06–36:11These are otherwise called operation or instrumentality.
36:11–36:17Alternatively, they are the presence and absence of the effect.
36:17–36:22Even if production and non-production were taken to be different from the presence
36:22–36:28and absence of auxiliaries or effect, production would indicate the absence of non-production
36:28–36:37only at its own time, just as an object excludes its own absence only when it is present.
36:37–36:43Production would never indicate the absence of non-production at a time when production
36:43–36:51was not occurring. An object does not remove its absence while it is itself absent, nor
36:51–36:58does it establish the absence of its opposite. If it did, there could never be a time
36:58–37:03when the object was absent or its opposite present.
37:03–37:10Then the unreal could never become real and the real could never become unreal, consequently,
37:10–37:15even the opposition between real and unreal would disappear.
37:15–37:20Can different magnitudes reside in one substance at different times?
37:20–37:28If the preceding claim is accepted, may different magnitudes likewise be regarded as non-opposed,
37:28–37:33so that they may inherit in one substance at different times?
37:33–37:40Here too it might be said that one magnetode excludes another only while it is present,
37:40–37:42not at another time.
37:42–37:44Answer No.
37:44–37:50Because contrary proof is available, difference of time must be regarded as irrelevant to
37:50–37:56the opposition between magnetodes, different magnetodes remain mutually opposed even
37:56–38:03when they occur at different times. Parts that have already produced one whole substance
38:03–38:11cannot produce another whole substance. Grossness is incompatible with the coexistence of two
38:11–38:19or more substances in the same place. If a new object is produced from those same parts,
38:19–38:25the previously produced whole must first be destroyed. If it is not destroyed, no
38:25–38:28No new object can arise.
38:28–38:35Once it is destroyed, however, the old parts do not remain as before, the new object possesses
38:35–38:41a new magnitude because it's parts to have acquired a new magnitude.
38:41–38:47If the old parts are not destroyed and no external composite matter is added to the
38:47–38:52existing group of parts, how can cognition of a different magnitude arise in the
38:52–38:59original parts and generate the contradiction of cognizing to magnitudes in one object.
38:59–39:06Even if external matter is added, if no new substrate for the new magnitude has risen,
39:06–39:12where would the new magnitude arise? For this reason even the cognition that the size
39:12–39:20has greatly increased would have to be regarded as erroneous. Thus one and the same object
39:20–39:27cannot be accepted as possessing different magnitudes even at different times.
39:27–39:33Those Nya-Vayaka philosophers who delight in investigating the nature of reality should
39:33–39:38consider this and related matters in detail.
39:38–39:45Objection concerning the opposition involved in the coexistence of capacity and incapacity.
39:45–39:51In the present context as well, let contrary proof be accepted to establish the opposition
39:51–39:57involved in the coexistence of productivity and non-productivity.
39:57–40:01The negative inferences have already been given.
40:01–40:03Answer No.
40:03–40:11Those inferences concerned capacity and incapacity and have already been refuted.
40:11–40:17Other inferences concerning productivity and non-productivity may be possible, but they
40:17–40:24will not establish absolute opposition unqualified by time, because the absolute attribution of
40:24–40:29both properties to one object is itself impossible.
40:29–40:36Can one not disregard the qualification of time and infer, whatever is capable is necessarily
40:36–40:37productive?
40:37–40:39No.
40:39–40:46If no qualification of time is intended, the inference means, whatever is capable necessarily
40:46–40:50produces at some time or other.
40:50–40:56The emphasis here falls on the occurrence of productivity, it therefore excludes only
40:56–41:02complete non-production, not non-production at a particular time in general, just as
41:02–41:09In the statement, a blue lotus certainly exists, emphasis falls on existence.
41:09–41:16Refutation of the suggestion that a momentary object can be productive at all times.
41:16–41:24Can a momentary object, which remains for only one moment and is destroyed as soon as it arises,
41:24–41:27not produce its effect at all times?
41:27–41:34Just as a sense organ, though located in one place, produces cognition in the self, or the
41:34–41:41stroke of a bow on an instrument occurs in one place while sound arises in space, so the
41:41–41:47nature of a cause might be to produce an effect at another time.
41:47–41:53We ask, is the causes being at one, and the same time relative to itself, or relative
41:53–41:57to the aggregate of auxiliary causes?
41:57–42:01If it is relative to itself, there is no defect.
42:01–42:07An eternal object too is present at the time of its own presence.
42:07–42:14The only difference is that the existence of some things is limited while that of others
42:14–42:15is not.
42:15–42:22Even among causes of limited duration, there are differences according as the process and
42:22–42:28productive extension issuing from the initial cause are short or long.
42:28–42:34The second alternative would be possible only if all the auxiliaries were present at the same
42:34–42:36time.
42:36–42:41But it has already been stated that the auxiliaries arrive successively.
42:41–42:48Therefore, when we said that a cause joined with its auxiliaries is productive by nature,
42:48–42:55The Buddhist reply that a momentary cause itself must be productive at all times is nothing
42:55–42:58but unrestrained childish obstinacy.
42:58–43:01Enough of this.
43:01–43:05Conclusion and a counter argument against momentariness.
43:05–43:11The time of an effect is its own time, but the time of a cause includes both its own
43:11–43:15time and the time of its effect.
43:15–43:22Some causes do not persist until the effect is produced, while others remain even after
43:22–43:25the causal complex has ceased.
43:25–43:31Thus the usage concerning the causes priority is relative to the time at which the effect
43:31–43:33is produced.
43:33–43:36Let us leave this question aside.
43:36–43:42If the conditional inference is reconstructed by replacing whenever, then with wherever
43:42–43:48there, so that mutually contradictory properties are proved to coexist in a momentary object
43:48–43:56itself, what defect is there in the argument? If there is none, the inevitable conclusion
43:56–44:03will be either that all places where a cause performs its function are one and the same,
44:03–44:10or that every cause, including a momentary cause, is divided into many forms. Very
44:10–44:16Very well, by accepting this conclusion we may enter the camp of Yokra.
44:16–44:17No.
44:17–44:23Entry into the Yokra position is impossible without destroying the enemy called the causal
44:23–44:25relation.
44:25–44:32Yet if casuality is abandoned, you Buddhists, who have also surrendered the weapon of reality,
44:32–44:39need fear nothing on the battlefield concerning the reality of external objects.
44:39–44:45refutation of the alternative that a separate cause must be posited for every production
44:45–44:52in a different place. Suppose a separate causal object is posited for every productive operation
44:52–44:57occurring in a different place, what inconsistency follows?
44:57–45:04Answer, if so, each of these alleged different causes must again be regarded as different
45:04–45:12in turn. For example, the seed placed in soil does not produce in the granary, the seed
45:12–45:19in the granary does not produce elsewhere, and so on. The spatial conditional inference
45:19–45:26still remains unbroken, and the division will therefore continue without end. If no unitary
45:26–45:34object remains anywhere in the world, momentariness will indeed have been excellently established,
45:34–45:37This is plainly sarcastic.
45:37–45:40Possible defects in the opponent's reasoning.
45:40–45:47Then some defect must be admitted in these inferences concerning production and non-production
45:47–45:49at different places.
45:49–45:55But if there is a defect, what is the probandom of these inferences?
45:55–46:02Is it capacity, incapacity, difference arising from the coexistence of two opposed properties
46:02–46:06or the opposition between productivity and non-productivity.

Plain text

Hot Eye Examination of the Doctrine of Momentary Existence Verse of Praise Salutations to the Supreme Being, foremost among the ancient teachers, Lord of all worlds and Creator. This sovereignty over the worlds fashioned by Him belongs to His very nature. Having created the worlds, He sustains their existence, which is their being's the correct use of words and for their welfare establishes injunctions to perform beneficial acts and prohibitions against harmful ones. His teaching is authoritative, his compassion for living beings is natural, and his effort for the good of all is bound by no condition. The subject for examination and the purpose of this inquiry. Every person in this world naturally seeks freedom from suffering. The reality of suffering is established by everyone's experience and suffering is by its very nature adverse and unbearable. Even when a suffering being does not understand the means of removing it, that being continues to search for such a means. Ultimately, on the basis of the unanimous teaching of all accomplished authorities in In spiritual matters, one understands that knowledge of reality alone, that is, knowledge of the true nature of things, is the means to the cessation of suffering, there is no other means. What must be known, whether as the counter positive, whose negation is at issue, or as the substrate of the difference from that with which it is ordinarily confused, is nothing other than the self. Whether the self does not exist or truly exists, the spontaneous, natural or commonly accepted conception of the self is certainly not true as it stands. On this point all disputants are in definite agreement. A reasoned inquiry into the true nature of the self is therefore now begun. opposed to the Nya, Vaika view of the nature of the self. The principal views opposed to the reality of the self are these, everything endures for only a single moment, nothing apart from consciousness is real, there is no distinction between qualities and the thing qualified by them, and the entity called the self is never perceived or experienced. universal momentariness by inference and refuting it because invariable concomitance is unproved. Of the four doctrines stated above, the first cannot be accepted because it has no established proof. It may be said, whatever is real is momentary. For example, a pot is momentary, and words and other things whose momentariness is disputed are real. Does this inference not establish that all things are momentary? No. In this inference, the invariable concomitance between reason and probandum has not been established. A proof offered for invariable concomitance and its detailed examination. Should it be maintained that mutually contradictory properties, capacity and incapacity for production are found together in what appears to be one object that from this coexistence a difference of objects is inferred and that this difference in turn establishes the stated invariable concomitance? No. The coexistence of mutually contradictory properties is itself unproved. But is that coexistence not established by a negative inference in the form of a reversal of the consequence? No. In Buddhist logic, the consequence is the first conditional proposition of a negative inference, the reversal is the second proposition denying its consequence and the conclusion denies the antecedent of the first proposition. The question now arises, is this capacity the productive act itself or the fitness to produce? It cannot be the productive act itself, for then the reason of the inference would merge into the probandom and no inference would remain. Can this defect be removed by distinguishing the separate exclusions or exclusions of others that constitute the two terms? No. The basis for distinguishing exclusions is only the opposition or non-identity determined by the mutual difference of the things excluded by them. A difference between exclusions cannot be based on each excluding what the other excludes. The alleged difference between two exclusions cannot arise from each exclusion excluding what is excluded by the other, for example, as countless and hoarseness respectively exclude non-cows and non-horses. If the two exclusions were mutually opposed in this way, then whenever one were present in the subject, the other would necessarily be absent. The inference would consequently be vitiated either by the defect of a subject devoid of the probandom or by an unestablished reason. Partial mutual inclusion and partial Mutual mutual exclusion are impossible among exclusions. Nor can the stated difference arise because each exclusion includes some of the things excluded by the other and excludes others, as in the relation between treeness and a so-cut treeness. These exclusions cannot be accepted as mutually pervading and pervaded. If they were, a capable object could be proved non-productive or a non-productive object could be deemed capable. A difference between exclusions cannot arise from different advantageous qualities. Nor does this difference arise from different advantageous qualities as production and impermanence are treated as distinct properties. No such distinct advantageous property is available here. Could the words themselves be such advantageous properties? No. If that were so, synonymous words could not exist. Differences of cognition cannot make exclusions different. Nor is there a cognitive difference among exclusions. If merely having separate cognitions of exclusions made them different, then even the single exclusion of incapacity would differ from itself, because there may be many cognitions of that one exclusion. If it is maintained that differences among cognitions, determined by differences among their objects, produce differences among exclusions, the fault of mutual dependence results. Nor can this linguistic practice of distinguishing exclusions be regarded as costless, for then any object could be treated as different from itself. Examination of the view that capacity is fitness to produce. Capacity is not the second alternative stated above, namely fitness to produce. If capacity is fitness to produce, is it the aggregate of auxiliary causes or an individual property residing in a particular object? The first alternative is unacceptable. It would involve proving again what has already been established and the reason would also be unestablished because the opponent does not admit the conjunction of auxiliary causes in the non-productive seed kept in a storehouse, which serves as the counter instance. Who denies that an object joined with its auxiliary causes necessarily produces its effect? For whom, then, is this proof being offered? The Nya-Vaika position likewise does not maintain that the aggregate of auxiliary causes is present while production fails to occur, hence no contrary possibility of production in the absence of capacity arises here. Three possible forms of the capacity residing in a causal object. Capacity as a distinctive feature of a causal object may be understood in three ways. In the case of a seed as the cause of a sprout, this capacity may be, first, seedhood, whose positive and negative concomitance with its effect, the sprout, is known, second, a particular species within the universal property called seedhood, or third, the condition of remaining without the effect because the auxiliary causes are absent. The first form of capacity is unacceptable. The first form is untenable. Seeds possessing seedhood yet failing to produce sprouts are directly established. Even you Buddhists have no doubt about the reality of such things. Detailed refutation of the second form of capacity. The second form is also untenable. We do not accept, even in a productive cause, the presence of the special property that is supposed to produce the effect immediately, therefore, the example given in the inference lacks the reason. What discerning person would accept the reality of something not established by reasoning at all? This property is not known through non-conceptual cognition, because no self-aware recollection of it is available after such cognition. Nor is it known by inference because there is no reason from which such an inference could be made. It may be asked if there is no distinctive feature, how are some causes productive and others non-productive? But who said there is no distinctive feature? The question is only whether it is a particular universal property or the presence or absence of auxiliary causes in conjunction with the principle cause. Even after extensive enquiry, no decisive proof is found that determines between these alternatives. It may further be said, if an object's nature is to produce immediately, and that nature already exists in it, then even hundreds of curses by the gods could not forcibly prevent it from producing its effect at the very first moment. This would be reasonable only if immediate production as the object's nature had first been proved. But how that itself is established is unknown. Can it be established by negative inference? No, for that would involve mutual dependence. The inference can operate only after the The object has been established as possessing a nature of immediate production, while that nature would be established only after the inference had operated. A new proof proposed for the stated property and its refutation. Very well, let us examine the matter in this way. The very production of the effect proves that the cause is immediately productive. If the object had a nature of producing only after delay, its effect would never arise. No, this conclusion is improper. If a delayed cause never produced its effect, it would not be productive after delay either. Productive after delay must therefore mean non-productive until the auxiliary causes become available. Consequently, the production of the effect proves only that the causal complex had previously come together, it does not prove the existence of any new special property. Whether, according to ordinary experience, the auxiliary causes are not by nature immediately productive but produce the effect when assembled, or whether, as Buddhists imagine, They are by nature immediately productive, the occurrence of the effect settles nothing in this dispute. Refutation of the third form of capacity. The third form also creates a contradiction and is therefore untenable. To remain without an effect because the auxiliary causes are absent and yet to be related to or followed by the effect while those auxiliaries remain absent are mutually contradictory. What genuinely follows from this consideration and should be accepted is the rule that an object non-productive only in the absence of a particular thing must become productive when that thing is present. But this very rule establishes the persistence of the object. A new reason proposed for the inference and its refutation. The preceding refutation also disposes of the possible claim that the proper reason in the inference is being the subject of the word capable. For even a seed called capable is sometimes seen not to produce its effect, the sprout. It may be objected that the use of the word capable for a non-productive seed is not primary, its primary use is based on production. Otherwise linguistic usage would become irregular. But then the question is on what kind of production is the primary use of capable based. Not immediate production, for no proof establishes it. If the rule is stated thus, causes become productive only when auxiliaries are present and then necessarily produce their effect, it is entirely proper. The use of the word capable is therefore based simply on production. Consequently, the invariable concomitance between reality and momentariness still remains untrue. A question concerning the nature of an object. The question then is this, after so much discussion, what is the conclusion concerning an object's nature? One must occur either after delay or immediately, there is no third alternative. The answer is no. When exposing a defect in the opponent's view, the first stage of criticism requires only showing that, because the object's nature is not definitely known, the presence of the reason in the subject is doubtful. When the occasion arises to present our own position, its exposition will not be difficult. Clarification of the meanings of delay and non-delay. What does no delay in production mean? Does an object produce its effect immediately after it itself arises or immediately after it is joined by its auxiliary causes? Similarly, what does delay in production mean? Does it remain non-productive until the auxiliary causes become available or does it remain altogether non-productive? Of these four alternatives, there is no proof for the first or the fourth and they cannot therefore be accepted as true. The second and third, however, are established by perception itself. It is directly known that an object possessing seedhood produces its effect immediately upon being joined by the auxiliary causes. It is likewise established by perception that an object lacking auxiliary causes remains non-productive. Agreement on this point and its justification. Even you Buddhists have no doubt about this, because it is established by proof and the contrary view is contradictory. To understand this, if an object that is non-productive in the absence of auxiliary causes failed to produce its effect even when the auxiliaries were present, An object of that nature would be altogether non-productive, whether auxiliaries were present or absent, it would remain non-productive. Conversely, if an object were productive even in the absence of auxiliary causes, those auxiliaries are auxiliary causes available only to a capable cause. If so, does this mean that they never combine with an incapable cause, or that even after such combination an incapable cause does not produce the effect. The first is not true. Earth, water, heat and air are seen to combine even with an incapable piece of stone. The second is also untrue for on that assumption a seed joined with every auxiliary cause might still fail to produce a sprout just as a stone does. The satirical consequence of the stated possibility. Very well, let it be so, what defect is there? The answer is that such an event has never been observed. It may be said that although it has not been observed, it can still be doubted. But just as one doubts that a cause may remain non-productive despite the presence of auxiliaries, One may equally doubt that an effect may arise from a cause despite their absence. If even this is admitted, one may also doubt that a sprout can arise without the cause called a seed. In that event, the claim that the positive and negative concomitance between cause and effect can be carefully examined and established is plainly satirical. Introduction to a detailed examination of the proof opposing the assumption of immediate productivity. Let the following consideration be offered in support of the imagined property of immediate productivity. We do not doubt that auxiliaries combine with the principal cause, because we have already accepted that seed, soil, and the rest become productive only when assembled. There is no rule restricting this conjunction to one particular seed entity, every seed can combine with the auxiliaries and therefore all seeds appear alike. Nor do we doubt that the effect may arise whether cause or auxiliaries are present or absent, for if production were possible even in the absence of auxiliaries, the positive and negative concomitance between cause and effect would be destroyed. Objections to the property called immediate productivity. The real doubt is whether, once the principal cause and auxiliary causes have assembled, production of the effect should be regarded as determined by a special property called immediate productivity residing in the principal cause. But there is no ground for such doubt. If the effect is produced by the known group of causes alone, there is no proof for imagining an unknown property. Such an assumption also suffers from needless multiplication of entities. If this property were accepted, imperceptible things such as the senses would also become unacceptable. No possible account of the property's nature proves reasonable. Moreover, every particular quality residing in a cause determines a corresponding particular quality in the effect. Explanation of the first and second objections. From the moment a pot is produced until it is destroyed by the blow of a heavy staff, it is seen to possess no property other than pothood relevant to the point at issue. Yet, by successively combining with different auxiliary causes, it produces innumerable similar and dissimilar effects. If this fully explains the manifold productivity of a single thing, what ground or purpose is there for imagining hundreds of thousands of invisible universals? Is that not needless multiplication? You Buddhists yourselves say that when the entity imagined for a particular purpose is unnecessary for that very purpose, this amounts in reality to its absence. Explanation of the fourth objection. Regarding the property called immediate productivity, one may ask, does it pervade all rice grains, or does it exclude rice? If it pervades all rice, why is rice kept in a granary not immediately productive? If it excludes rice, how can productive rice be immediately productive? Similarly, one may ask, does ricehood pervade all immediately productive things or exclude them? If it pervades them, nothing other than rice can be immediately productive. If it excludes them, rice itself becomes non-productive. Counter-apply to the preceding objection and the answer. May it not be said that neither inclusion nor exclusion described above obtains? No, there is no third alternative apart from inclusion and exclusion. Would partial inclusion and exclusion not coherently apply to different individuals? No. On that assumption, the mutual opposition between belonging and not belonging to the same universal would disappear. Horse-ness and birdhood each exclude some individuals of the other, yet horse and bird would become non-different. detailed explanation of the preceding objection. If the specific universal of an object deviated from that object, then for the same reason a Soka-hood would deviate from treeness and an Soka would cease to be a tree. If this were accepted, inferences using essential nature as the reason would become meaningless. This causally determined nature of the The sprout is excluded from every substrate devoid of the probandom. Thus, by establishing a term pervaded by the pervading property, only this is established the form of the sprout is determined by the seed. In this way the invariable concomitance between sprout nature and determination by the seed is proved. an alternative proof of the conclusion that seedhood determines sprouthood. Set the sprout aside for the moment. The question is whether being an object of seed nature determines any effect. If not, a seed cannot possess that nature because as a seed it would be incapable of any meaningful activity. Seed nature or seedhood, which is established by perception, would be called unreal, while a property known by no means of valid cognition would be accepted as real, surely a sign of astonishingly acute intelligence. If one seed, as a seed, is capable of performing some activity, every seed will be capable in the same way because all have the same nature. Why then should only one particular seed produce the effect and another not? Not all things can be effects of a seed, for otherwise they would not arise from anything else. Nor can only a seed be the effect of a seed, for then a seed that produces a sprout would produce only another seed. seed, sprout, or cognition of them is not accepted as an effect of a seed, all these would arise even in the absence of auxiliary causes. Reply to the objection that a seed joined with auxiliary causes produces its effect. It may be objected that, after the causal object has arisen, when the auxiliary is necessary for producing a particular thing assemble around it, it determines only the production of that thing. Very well, but then we ask, does this production occur because of the imagined special property or because of seed hood? If because of the special property, that property alone will determine production of the sprout and seed hood will be entirely purposeless. If because of seedhood, it follows that seeds of the same nature remain non-productive when they do not obtain auxiliary causes, for the seed nature that determines production of a sprout when auxiliaries are present is the same in all seeds. The inferential form of the preceding reply. This may be proved as follows, whatever is incapable, in a definite form, of any Any meaningful activity does not possess that form. For example, a seed is incapable of activity in the form of an elephant and therefore does not possess elephant nature. Auxiliary things such as rice are incapable of any meaningful activity in the form of a seed. Hence in the negative inference there is non apprehension of the pervading property as the reason. Being of a certain nature is pervaded by the capacity to produce some meaningful activity in that nature, but rice performs no meaningful activity as a seed. Objection that the seed nature of all seeds cannot be denied and the reply is not the seed nature of all seeds, including ineffective ones, established by perception, so that its denial is impossible. Yes. Then, to establish the preceding point, accept this negative inference, whatever possesses a certain form is capable of some meaningful activity in that form, as is the immediately productive thing included among the auxiliary causes. Seeds kept in a storehouse, and the light genuinely poses the universal nature of seedhood. In this inference the object's essential nature is the reason, for productive capacity depends only on that definite nature of the object which determines its productivity. A brief question and its answer. It is therefore certain that there is some effect for which the seed, precisely as a seed, is necessary. Would the cognition of a seed produced by every seed itself be such a distinctive effect? What is improper in this assumption? The answer is that a yogine's cognition of a seed may arise even without a seed. Nor is ordinary cognition of a seed necessarily produced by every seed, because the required contact between sense and object is not available at every place and time. A second brief question and its answer. This discussion itself proves that even a capable cause remains non-productive in the absence of auxiliaries. Can some other unseen effect be supposed to be related to every seed? If so, it cannot be an effect inhering in the seed, because a subtle entity cannot be the inherent cause of a gross effect. Nor can the effect be gross, because the seed is already related to a gross effect such as the visible sprout, and a second gross effect cannot occupy the same substrate. How can that effect be produced by the seed as an efficient cause? Because separate efficient causes need not invariably occur together. A satirical statement of the conclusion. If the preceding view were true, the so-called immediate productivity alleged to determine production would have no known positive and negative concomitance with the effect, while what disposes such known concomitance would not be accepted as determining it. Every visible effect would be held to arise from an object's invisible nature of immediate productivity, while the object's visible natures would produce invisible effects. All this exemplifies the proverb, one who abandons the certain and runs after the The Uncertain loses even the Certain, while the Uncertain had already slipped from his grasp. The negative form of the preceding argument. The preceding argument may also be stated thus, the seed under dispute, because it is not joined with auxiliary causes, is deprived of its effect, the sprout and the like, for it possesses the universal nature of seedhood, which is the object of a determinate cognition of casualty toward its effect, the sprout. What is not deprived of its effect because auxiliaries are absent does not possess such seed nature as in the case of a piece of stone. A brief doubt and its resolution. Can it not be doubted here whether the absence of the reason in the example is due to the absence of the probandom, or to the causes lacking even an indirect capacity for production? Would this doubt not also render doubtful the negative concomitance between absence of the probandom and absence of the reason? No. This doubt has already been cut off at the root. Proposal of the argument that one and the same individual think cannot be both productive and non-productive. Then let the argument be stated thus. It does not matter if mutually contradictory qualities do not coexist. Let seedhood itself determine casualty, let the object become productive by nature when joined with auxiliaries, and let its non-productivity in their absence likewise be explained by that absence. But all this can apply only to many objects belonging to one universal, not to a single individual thing. For it is perceptually evident that production and non-production cannot coexist in one individual, therefore this cannot be denied in the case of an individual. Answer No. The objector has not properly understood the true nature of opposition. Different kinds of opposition and their examples. Opposition may be of three kinds. First, two properties mutually exclude one another as eternality and non-eternality do. Second, in certain substrates each property indicates the absence of the other as coldness and heat do. Third, two properties are merely different from one another as the properties of bearing a staff and wearing an earring. Refutation of the first form of opposition. The first form is not applicable. Non-productivity of an object is not established, because as long as an object exists it continues to produce something or other. Productivity and non-productivity qualified by a definite object or time are indeed known to be mutually opposed, but they are not seen to coexist in the same respect. Non-production at a particular time is the absence of production at that At time, it is not the same as absence of production at another time. We do not accept the coexistence of these two states. Refutation of the second form of opposition. The second form is also inapplicable. No production or non-production is known apart from the affirmation and denial of production. In reality, production and non-production are simply the presence and absence of auxiliary causes. These are otherwise called operation or instrumentality. Alternatively, they are the presence and absence of the effect. Even if production and non-production were taken to be different from the presence and absence of auxiliaries or effect, production would indicate the absence of non-production only at its own time, just as an object excludes its own absence only when it is present. Production would never indicate the absence of non-production at a time when production was not occurring. An object does not remove its absence while it is itself absent, nor does it establish the absence of its opposite. If it did, there could never be a time when the object was absent or its opposite present. Then the unreal could never become real and the real could never become unreal, consequently, even the opposition between real and unreal would disappear. Can different magnitudes reside in one substance at different times? If the preceding claim is accepted, may different magnitudes likewise be regarded as non-opposed, so that they may inherit in one substance at different times? Here too it might be said that one magnetode excludes another only while it is present, not at another time. Answer No. Because contrary proof is available, difference of time must be regarded as irrelevant to the opposition between magnetodes, different magnetodes remain mutually opposed even when they occur at different times. Parts that have already produced one whole substance cannot produce another whole substance. Grossness is incompatible with the coexistence of two or more substances in the same place. If a new object is produced from those same parts, the previously produced whole must first be destroyed. If it is not destroyed, no No new object can arise. Once it is destroyed, however, the old parts do not remain as before, the new object possesses a new magnitude because it's parts to have acquired a new magnitude. If the old parts are not destroyed and no external composite matter is added to the existing group of parts, how can cognition of a different magnitude arise in the original parts and generate the contradiction of cognizing to magnitudes in one object. Even if external matter is added, if no new substrate for the new magnitude has risen, where would the new magnitude arise? For this reason even the cognition that the size has greatly increased would have to be regarded as erroneous. Thus one and the same object cannot be accepted as possessing different magnitudes even at different times. Those Nya-Vayaka philosophers who delight in investigating the nature of reality should consider this and related matters in detail. Objection concerning the opposition involved in the coexistence of capacity and incapacity. In the present context as well, let contrary proof be accepted to establish the opposition involved in the coexistence of productivity and non-productivity. The negative inferences have already been given. Answer No. Those inferences concerned capacity and incapacity and have already been refuted. Other inferences concerning productivity and non-productivity may be possible, but they will not establish absolute opposition unqualified by time, because the absolute attribution of both properties to one object is itself impossible. Can one not disregard the qualification of time and infer, whatever is capable is necessarily productive? No. If no qualification of time is intended, the inference means, whatever is capable necessarily produces at some time or other. The emphasis here falls on the occurrence of productivity, it therefore excludes only complete non-production, not non-production at a particular time in general, just as In the statement, a blue lotus certainly exists, emphasis falls on existence. Refutation of the suggestion that a momentary object can be productive at all times. Can a momentary object, which remains for only one moment and is destroyed as soon as it arises, not produce its effect at all times? Just as a sense organ, though located in one place, produces cognition in the self, or the stroke of a bow on an instrument occurs in one place while sound arises in space, so the nature of a cause might be to produce an effect at another time. We ask, is the causes being at one, and the same time relative to itself, or relative to the aggregate of auxiliary causes? If it is relative to itself, there is no defect. An eternal object too is present at the time of its own presence. The only difference is that the existence of some things is limited while that of others is not. Even among causes of limited duration, there are differences according as the process and productive extension issuing from the initial cause are short or long. The second alternative would be possible only if all the auxiliaries were present at the same time. But it has already been stated that the auxiliaries arrive successively. Therefore, when we said that a cause joined with its auxiliaries is productive by nature, The Buddhist reply that a momentary cause itself must be productive at all times is nothing but unrestrained childish obstinacy. Enough of this. Conclusion and a counter argument against momentariness. The time of an effect is its own time, but the time of a cause includes both its own time and the time of its effect. Some causes do not persist until the effect is produced, while others remain even after the causal complex has ceased. Thus the usage concerning the causes priority is relative to the time at which the effect is produced. Let us leave this question aside. If the conditional inference is reconstructed by replacing whenever, then with wherever there, so that mutually contradictory properties are proved to coexist in a momentary object itself, what defect is there in the argument? If there is none, the inevitable conclusion will be either that all places where a cause performs its function are one and the same, or that every cause, including a momentary cause, is divided into many forms. Very Very well, by accepting this conclusion we may enter the camp of Yokra. No. Entry into the Yokra position is impossible without destroying the enemy called the causal relation. Yet if casuality is abandoned, you Buddhists, who have also surrendered the weapon of reality, need fear nothing on the battlefield concerning the reality of external objects. refutation of the alternative that a separate cause must be posited for every production in a different place. Suppose a separate causal object is posited for every productive operation occurring in a different place, what inconsistency follows? Answer, if so, each of these alleged different causes must again be regarded as different in turn. For example, the seed placed in soil does not produce in the granary, the seed in the granary does not produce elsewhere, and so on. The spatial conditional inference still remains unbroken, and the division will therefore continue without end. If no unitary object remains anywhere in the world, momentariness will indeed have been excellently established, This is plainly sarcastic. Possible defects in the opponent's reasoning. Then some defect must be admitted in these inferences concerning production and non-production at different places. But if there is a defect, what is the probandom of these inferences? Is it capacity, incapacity, difference arising from the coexistence of two opposed properties or the opposition between productivity and non-productivity.

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