MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode3_Part17_CartoonFilm.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.992612)
Duration: 28:55
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:33विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक
0:33–0:38is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition. Thus
0:38–0:42the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of
0:42–0:47certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason.
0:47–0:53Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference.
0:53–0:5881. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject
0:58–1:02did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with
1:02–1:07pervasion and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandum and
1:07–1:11establish the probandum, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain.
1:12–1:17But such cognition of the absence of the probandum, whose invalidity has not been apprehended
1:17–1:22separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason.
1:23–1:29Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known,
1:29–1:33cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise.
1:34–1:38The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the
1:38–1:45absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Near veridical cognition of the absence
1:45–1:52of the probandom in the subject is not the defect. 82. Objection. Veridical cognition. Here the
1:52–1:56reason is present and the probandom absent, that is, cognition of deviation, should be
1:56–2:02defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error
2:02–2:06would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference.
2:08–2:12It may again be said that the cognition there is veritical cognition of the absence of the
2:12–2:17probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own force,
2:17–2:21through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom.
2:21–2:27answer this is not sound cognition of the probandom in the subject is
2:27–2:30stopped by veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom therefore that
2:30–2:34very veridical cognition is defeat the same rule is observed in verbal
2:34–2:39cognition veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object
2:39–2:42being indirectly related to the reason obstructs inference therefore it is a
2:42–2:47fallacious reason in general known deviation constitutes the defect of
2:47–2:55deviation. Defeat is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here
2:55–3:02the reason is present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition
3:02–3:07of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence,
3:07–3:12the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom
3:12–3:18from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect.
3:18–3:22Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence
3:22–3:27of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater
3:27–3:29is needed.
3:29–3:34Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom
3:34–3:36could not establish that absence.
3:36–3:41Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference
3:41–3:47is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence. Thus defeat must
3:47–3:54be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason. The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted.
3:56–4:0184. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject,
4:01–4:05therefore, if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no
4:05–4:11cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doulap from cowwood, odor from
4:11–4:16earthhood, and qualities from substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties
4:16–4:22deviate from one another. The counter positive of an absence and the like, because of their
4:22–4:29delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious
4:29–4:33reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly
4:33–4:38establish either established or unestablished probanda.
4:38–4:42Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason.
4:42–4:4485.
4:44–4:50Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandom is not deviation.
4:50–4:53Otherwise inferences of order from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would
4:53–4:59fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction.
4:59–5:04In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom
5:04–5:07is deviation.
5:07–5:11But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a
5:11–5:15locus possessing prior absence or destruction.
5:15–5:20Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary.
5:20–5:22Defeat is foundational.
5:22–5:2386.
5:23–5:24Objection.
5:24–5:27If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom, there
5:27–5:32is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior absence
5:32–5:38is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior absence and
5:38–5:41possessing eternal absence is itself defeated.
5:41–5:47Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject,
5:47–5:51therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time.
5:51–5:55Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while
5:55–5:58prior absence or destruction exists.
5:58–6:04Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference.
6:04–6:10Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect.
6:10–6:1687, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason.
6:16–6:21Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference.
6:21–6:24cognition that the pro-bandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily
6:24–6:28prevent renewed cognition of the pro-bandom, successive cognitions are possible.
6:29–6:33Even after the pro-bandom has been established by perception,
6:33–6:37inference may arise if someone desires to know that pro-bandom through inference.
6:38–6:42A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard.
6:44–6:48A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has
6:48–6:53occurred, but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire
6:53–6:59for inference. Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect
6:59–7:05defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct defect of inference.
7:05–7:12Opposed cognition is an inhibitor. It may again be objected that cognition of absence
7:12–7:16in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general.
7:16–7:24certainty of silverhood and this is silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence,
7:24–7:30this is not silver. Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veridical cognition
7:30–7:35of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was
7:35–7:43already ascertained this conch is not yellow. This argument, however, is not sound. Only
7:43–7:49The opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception.
7:49–7:54Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness
7:54–7:56in a conch does not arise.
7:56–8:01But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum inhibits inference
8:01–8:03of the probandum.
8:03–8:08Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum is present, inference
8:08–8:12of the presence of the probandum cannot arise.
8:12–8:22types of defeated reason. Such a defeated reason is of ten kinds. A reason defeated by
8:22–8:30a means of knowledge or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A
8:30–8:35reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal
8:35–8:42substance. A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made
8:42–8:49of stone because it is a mountain. A reason defeated by perception establishing the
8:49–8:54counter-positive of the pro-bandom, for example, fire is not hot because it is produced.
8:57–9:02A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the pro-bandom, for example,
9:02–9:10sound is inaudible because it is equality. A reason defeated by comparison, for example,
9:10–9:14gavayahood is not the ground for using the word gavaya, because it is a universal.
9:17–9:22A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the pro-bandom, for example,
9:22–9:27The skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body.
9:29–9:34A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example,
9:34–9:38water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire.
9:40–9:44A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example,
9:44–9:48the mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a
9:48–9:55non-inherent cause of cognition. A reason defeated by verbal testimony
9:55–10:00In joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice
10:00–10:04because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni Elma sacrifice.
10:06–10:09Phalacious reasons establish incapacity to prove.
10:11–10:1590. Phalacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five
10:15–10:20kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the pro-bandham. By contrast,
10:20–10:24grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity of the
10:24–10:28proponents reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper replies.
10:29–10:33An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stopped merely by cognition of
10:33–10:37opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reasons in capacity through
10:37–10:42fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect
10:42–10:46raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should
10:46–10:52suffice. Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes.
10:52–10:55First, to stop inference for another.
10:55–11:00Second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponents' reason.
11:00–11:04The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second
11:04–11:10is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons' incapable nature as a fallacious reason.
11:10–11:14Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of
11:14–11:18showing that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions
11:18–11:23obstructing inference and establishing incapacity.
11:23–11:28Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible.
11:28–11:32It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaya statement
11:32–11:37would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would
11:37–11:41not be fully established as incapable.
11:41–11:44This objection is not sound.
11:44–11:48Debate proceeds on the accepted pervasion that every fallacious reason is incapable.
11:48–11:52It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular
11:52–11:53reason.
11:53–11:57Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect
11:57–12:00counts as a fallacious reason.
12:00–12:04It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced,
12:04–12:08the pervasion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent
12:08–12:11and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the pervasion of producedness
12:11–12:15by incapacity to establish impermanence.
12:15–12:18This argument too is not sound.
12:18–12:22debate, cognition of the perversion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable matter
12:22–12:28of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become disputable.
12:28–12:32Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere.
12:32–12:3792, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence
12:37–12:41of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the perversion of producedness
12:41–12:43by impermanence.
12:43–12:46Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially
12:46–12:51does not accept the perversion of a defect by incapacity.
12:51–12:54Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition,
12:54–12:58merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere,
12:58–13:02use of all five members is necessary.
13:02–13:09But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable.
13:09–13:12Definition of incapacity to prove.
13:12–13:1993. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject.
13:19–13:26A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the probandom in the subject.
13:26–13:34Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandom because the necessary causes are incomplete.
13:34–13:39It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject
13:39–13:43qualified by the probandom at the time the fallacious reason is known.
13:43–13:47For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandom
13:47–13:51arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the
13:51–13:55probandom arises from a valid reason.
13:55–13:58This view, however, is not sound.
13:58–14:03A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter-reason,
14:03–14:08may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject
14:08–14:16qualified by the probandom. Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason.
14:16–14:20Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandom.
14:20–14:2794, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom. A
14:27–14:32defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandom when it's defeated
14:32–14:36or contradictory status is unknown.
14:36–14:38But this view too is not sound.
14:38–14:43A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion
14:43–14:48of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status
14:48–14:52is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion.
14:52–14:56Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a
14:56–15:00reason, because a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason
15:00–15:07possesses no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason 2 may assume a defective form.
15:08–15:13Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the
15:13–15:18probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again.
15:19–15:24Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons.
15:25–15:28Inconclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof,
15:28–15:33In conclusiveness concerning the context-specific probandom would remain unestablished,
15:33–15:38and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established.
15:39–15:43The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom.
15:46–15:51One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom.
15:54–15:59Ninety-five, some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition
15:59–16:03of the context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking
16:03–16:08the capacity to produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related
16:08–16:11to that time and subject.
16:11–16:16It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established,
16:16–16:22because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness.
16:22–16:24But this view too is not sound.
16:24–16:30For a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced, it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition
16:30–16:36of the context-specific probandom, consequently it too would be incapable.
16:36–16:42Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason.
16:42–16:46In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all, and in counterbalanced or
16:46–16:53uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain.
16:53–16:57Or is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of
16:57–16:59the absence of the pro-bandom?
16:59–17:05Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference.
17:05–17:09Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits
17:09–17:10inference.
17:10–17:1796, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical
17:17–17:20cognition that inhibits inferential cognition.
17:20–17:23An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition
17:23–17:27produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the
17:27–17:32object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-reason inhibits inference.
17:32–17:39This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced
17:39–17:44or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference. And if a scholar does not accept
17:44–17:48equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor
17:48–17:50which is unacceptable.
17:51–17:54Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary
17:54–17:56of the probandom is an inhibitor.
17:58–18:0197, it should not be said that cognition of the capacity
18:01–18:03to produce the absence of the probandom,
18:03–18:06known from an equally strong counter reason,
18:06–18:07inhibits inferential cognition
18:07–18:11and that this cognition alone is veritical.
18:11–18:13In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself
18:13–18:16as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor,
18:16–18:18cognition that it produces the absence
18:18–18:24the probandom is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment.
18:25–18:30Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced
18:30–18:35reason, pervasion or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of
18:35–18:41that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Nor should it be said that mere
18:41–18:46veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect.
18:46–18:53When such a general property is known to deviate from the probandom, it would entail destruction of
18:53–18:59inference of the probandom in general. In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason
18:59–19:04and counter reason, which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject
19:04–19:10propertyhood of one of them, inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to
19:10–19:16be included merely under non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being
19:16–19:20an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition.
19:20–19:2698. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular
19:26–19:31probandom, subject, person, and time is not in capacity.
19:31–19:36For example, this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at
19:36–19:40this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because
19:40–19:44it is cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness.
19:46–19:50Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason,
19:50–19:55but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the
19:55–20:01same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the
20:01–20:08general characteristic of incapacity. Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference
20:08–20:15concerning the probandom and subject. 99. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct
20:15–20:22inferential cognition concerning the subject and probandom. Viridical cognition of a true probandom
20:22–20:26may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason.
20:27–20:32For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an
20:32–20:37inferential cognition of fire may arise, this cognition concerning fire is veridical even
20:37–20:44though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire
20:44–20:50occurs there. One in the same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in
20:50–20:56a single fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis
20:56–21:01of smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire
21:01–21:07from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion
21:07–21:10is veridical.
21:10–21:15Inference is also valid in, both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition.
21:15–21:19Presence and absence do not both occur in one lockers, nevertheless, the general property
21:19–21:23of no ability applies to both presence and absence.
21:23–21:27Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential
21:27–21:32cognition may arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely
21:32–21:35a pointless qualifier.
21:35–21:39Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor.
21:39–21:46100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom.
21:46–21:51If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines
21:51–21:56inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily
21:56–21:58present there.
21:58–22:03Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently
22:03–22:07identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in
22:07–22:09numerous reasons.
22:09–22:13Then inference of fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid.
22:13–22:16Answer, not so.
22:16–22:21Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms
22:21–22:25of the absence of incapacity are possible.
22:25–22:29with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore
22:29–22:33the stated overextension does not arise.
22:33–22:37The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition.
22:37–22:42101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition,
22:42–22:45because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object
22:45–22:49of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference,
22:49–22:53like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself.
22:53–22:58A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the
22:58–23:03other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier.
23:03–23:08Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus
23:08–23:13is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke.
23:13–23:17cessation of inferential cognition is possible.
23:17–23:22Objection, once the provision of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity
23:22–23:28for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate.
23:28–23:31Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the
23:31–23:35object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless
23:35–23:37prolixity.
23:37–23:40Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other than
23:40–23:45the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference.
23:45–23:48The causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and
23:48–23:51should therefore necessarily produce its result.
23:51–23:55Answer, this objection is not sound.
23:55–23:59Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow
23:59–24:04of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible.
24:04–24:06Validity of inferential cognition
24:06–24:12103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side
24:12–24:16of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the
24:16–24:18reason possess incapacity?
24:18–24:21Let incapacity be admitted.
24:21–24:24But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side
24:24–24:26of smoke?
24:26–24:30Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel, and not other fire, be held
24:30–24:33to pervade smoke?
24:33–24:37It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire
24:37–24:40produced by conjunction with moist fuel.
24:40–24:44Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known, but since
24:44–24:50smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid.
24:50–24:54smoke is said to be accidentally present there.
24:54–24:59In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire.
24:59–25:04Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, the
25:04–25:09probandum fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually
25:09–25:14present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true.
25:14–25:19According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference
25:19–25:29of the probandum fire will be true. Incapacity, the decisive view. 104, here we present our
25:29–25:35decisive view. The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs,
25:35–25:40does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing
25:40–25:45or proving the probandum and the subject. For example, at the time cognition of the reason's
25:45–25:50contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so
25:50–25:56fourth, does not produce cognition of the probandom and the subject.
25:56–26:00It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the
26:00–26:05like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom and the subject
26:05–26:10can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject.
26:10–26:14It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like,
26:14–26:18cognition of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid
26:18–26:19reason.
26:19–26:30Consequently, the defect of treating the probandom is unestablished or unproved because the counter positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided.
26:30–26:39Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition.
26:39–26:50105, alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject.
26:50–27:01For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason.
27:02–27:11It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition is in fact simply inconclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an object of cognition.
27:11–27:22But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous condition becomes an object of inference.
27:22–27:29For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as water.
27:29–27:34Incapacity incapacity to prove conclusion.
27:34–27:42106. The view of other scholars is as follows, in the case of inconclusive, defeated, and
27:42–27:46contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded, in the case of a reason whose
27:46–27:50pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in the case of
27:50–27:54a reason unestablished in nature, counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition
27:54–27:59of being, at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition,
27:59–28:04all these constitute the condition of not establishing or proving the pro-bandom in
28:04–28:06the subject.
28:06–28:10It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the
28:10–28:13probandom would be incoherent.
28:13–28:18The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the probandom.
28:18–28:23It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious
28:23–28:28reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential
28:28–28:30cognition is fallacious.
28:30–28:35Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tatbhah Sintmai composed by Sri
28:35–28:40Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or
28:40–28:45proving the probandum in capacity, ends.
28:45–28:50The inference division ends, through the section on defeat.
28:50–28:51Appendix 3
28:51–28:52.

Plain text

विचार-विमर्शक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक रेकॉर्डिंग नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक नाटक is ascertained, whether it is a direct inhibitor or the cause of a stronger cognition. Thus the validity of a prior cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject, as the cause of certainty of known deviation, is a fallacious reason. Certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom opposes inference. 81. If certainty of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom and the subject did not oppose inference of the probandom, cognition of a reason endowed with pervasion and subject propertyhood would invalidate cognition of the absence of the probandum and establish the probandum, just as smoke establishes fire on a mountain. But such cognition of the absence of the probandum, whose invalidity has not been apprehended separately, obstructs opposed cognition, it resembles an equally strong counter-reason. Even without the contradictory cognition this silver is not silver, if its invalidity is known, cognition of silverhood or of whiteness opposed to yellowness can arise. The non-production of inference after a statement by the proponent has produced cognition of the absence of the probandom occurs for this very reason. Near veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in the subject is not the defect. 82. Objection. Veridical cognition. Here the reason is present and the probandom absent, that is, cognition of deviation, should be defeat, validity of the cognition itself is not the defect. Otherwise inference arising from error would become impossible, while an erroneous cognition of validity would fail to inhibit inference. It may again be said that the cognition there is veritical cognition of the absence of the probandom here is certainly a cause, but does not obstruct inference through its own force, through deviation it produces certainty of the absence of the probandom. answer this is not sound cognition of the probandom in the subject is stopped by veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom therefore that very veridical cognition is defeat the same rule is observed in verbal cognition veridical cognition of the absence of the probandom in an object being indirectly related to the reason obstructs inference therefore it is a fallacious reason in general known deviation constitutes the defect of deviation. Defeat is a distinct defect. 83. It should not be said that the cognition here the reason is present and the probandom absent produces only the defect of deviation. Cognition of the validity of cognition of the absence of the probandom causes certainty of that absence, the two need not arise in the same moment. Because of defeat, cognition of the probandom from the reason does not arise in the subject, therefore defeat is a distinct defect. Objection, deviation of the reason through its concomitance with the established absence of the probandom in the subject itself prevents cognition of the probandom, no separate defeater is needed. Answer, then deviation in a colocus possessing an unestablished absence of the probandom could not establish that absence. Further, in a subject where the absence of the probandom is established, inference is invalid precisely because deviation produces certainty of that absence. Thus defeat must be accepted as a distinct fallacious reason. The difficulty arising if defeat is not accepted. 84. Smoke occurring in a colocus is distinct from smoke occurring in the subject, therefore, if the smoke in the subject does not deviate from the probandom, there would be no cause to stop inference of fire. On this view, inferences of doulap from cowwood, odor from earthhood, and qualities from substancehood would become inexplicable because these properties deviate from one another. The counter positive of an absence and the like, because of their delimiters, do not arise in the locus of the absence. If defeat is not treated as a fallacious reason, reasons such as smoke and cowwood, because they lack deviation, would needlessly establish either established or unestablished probanda. Defeat must be accepted as a defect of the reason. 85. Near presence of the reason in a subject possessing the absence of the probandom is not deviation. Otherwise inferences of order from earthhood and of qualities from substancehood would fail because the reason also occurs in loci possessing prior absence or destruction. In fact, occurrence of the reason in a subject possessing an eternal absence of the probandom is deviation. But then no deviation would arise in inference of the counter positive of an absence in a locus possessing prior absence or destruction. Therefore separate acceptance of defeat is necessary. Defeat is foundational. 86. Objection. If the probandom is already certain in a subject delimited by the probandom, there is the defect of establishing what is already established. If the delimiter of prior absence is apprehended, the reason will not be established. And a subject qualified by prior absence and possessing eternal absence is itself defeated. Answer, the counter positives of prior absence and destruction occur in the same subject, therefore both must be regarded as occurring at the same time. Objection, the counter positive of eternal absence cannot occur in the subject while prior absence or destruction exists. Answer, the defeat present in the subject at that time itself obstructs inference. Establishing what is already established is not an independent defect. 87, like defeat, re-establishing an already established object is not an independent fallacious reason. Although it interferes with the intended result, it does not directly obstruct inference. cognition that the pro-bandom is already present in the subject does not ordinarily prevent renewed cognition of the pro-bandom, successive cognitions are possible. Even after the pro-bandom has been established by perception, inference may arise if someone desires to know that pro-bandom through inference. A person who delights in reasoning reflects again on a matter previously heard. A person who desires establishment in general abandons the desire once establishment has occurred, but one who desires establishment through a particular means retains the desire for inference. Therefore establishing what is already established is only an indirect defect obstructing the desired result, not a direct defect of inference. Opposed cognition is an inhibitor. It may again be objected that cognition of absence in general does not obstruct cognition of presence in general. certainty of silverhood and this is silver arises even after the erroneous cognition of absence, this is not silver. Likewise, an error concerning absence does not obstruct veridical cognition of presence, because the error at this conch is yellow is observed even in a person who was already ascertained this conch is not yellow. This argument, however, is not sound. Only The opposed cognition is an inhibitor, and veridical perception inhibits erroneous perception. Because of a defect in a sense organ such as the eye, veridical perception of whiteness in a conch does not arise. But in general, veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum inhibits inference of the probandum. Therefore, when veridical cognition of the absence of the probandum is present, inference of the presence of the probandum cannot arise. types of defeated reason. Such a defeated reason is of ten kinds. A reason defeated by a means of knowledge or perception, for example, a jar is omnipresent because it exists. A reason defeated by inference, for example, an atom has parts because it is a corporeal substance. A reason defeated by verbal testimony, for example, the golden mountain is made of stone because it is a mountain. A reason defeated by perception establishing the counter-positive of the pro-bandom, for example, fire is not hot because it is produced. A reason defeated by inference establishing the counter-positive of the pro-bandom, for example, sound is inaudible because it is equality. A reason defeated by comparison, for example, gavayahood is not the ground for using the word gavaya, because it is a universal. A reason defeated by verbal testimony establishing the pro-bandom, for example, The skull of a dead human being is pure because, like a conch, it was a part of a living body. A reason defeated by the perception that apprehends the reason, for example, water and air are hot because, unlike earth, they possess touch, like fire. A reason defeated by an inference establishing the subject, for example, the mind is omnipresent because it is the substratum of the conjunction that is a non-inherent cause of cognition. A reason defeated by verbal testimony In joining the Rajasuya sacrifice, for example, a Brahma should perform the Rajasuya sacrifice because it is a means to heaven, like the Agni Elma sacrifice. Phalacious reasons establish incapacity to prove. 90. Phalacious reasons are proper replies by an opponent because they prove that the five kinds of defective reasons are incapable of establishing the pro-bandham. By contrast, grounds of defeat such as futile rejoinders do not establish the incapacity of the proponents reasoning but destroy the opponent's own position, hence they are improper replies. An objection may be raised, when inference for another is stopped merely by cognition of opposition to the reason, what purpose is served by establishing the reasons in capacity through fallaciousness. The rule of debate says only that an opponent is defeated when the defect raised by the proponent becomes known to him, therefore merely raising the defect should suffice. Answer, debate concerning a fallacious reason has two purposes. First, to stop inference for another. Second, to establish the incapable nature of the proponents' reason. The first purpose can be fulfilled merely by cognition of the defect, but the second is fulfilled only by expressing the reasons' incapable nature as a fallacious reason. Alternatively, the five fallacious reasons may be established with the intention of showing that the proponents' reasoning is defective, thus they perform both functions obstructing inference and establishing incapacity. Pervasion of incapacity in a defect is admissible. It may again be objected that on this view the use of a five-membered Nyaya statement would be necessary to explain every defect, otherwise the proponents' reasoning would not be fully established as incapable. This objection is not sound. Debate proceeds on the accepted pervasion that every fallacious reason is incapable. It is therefore necessary only to show the presence of the stated defect in this particular reason. Otherwise an unnecessary additional cause would have to be added to explain why a defect counts as a fallacious reason. It may again be said that in the inference, sound is impermanent because it is produced, the pervasion of producedness by impermanence is well known in the doctrines of both proponent and opponent, there is therefore no need separately to show the pervasion of producedness by incapacity to establish impermanence. This argument too is not sound. debate, cognition of the perversion of the defect by incapacity is an indispensable matter of debating convention, otherwise the opponent's statement itself would become disputable. Use of all five members is not necessary everywhere. 92, an objection may be raised, debate concerning the inference establishing the impermanence of sound from producedness is possible even without accepting the perversion of producedness by impermanence. Hence use of all five members would be necessary only for an opponent who initially does not accept the perversion of a defect by incapacity. Some scholars say that where proponent and opponent accept the same debating tradition, merely showing the presence of a defective reason in the subject is sufficient, elsewhere, use of all five members is necessary. But such restricted use conflicts with established debating tradition and is therefore unacceptable. Definition of incapacity to prove. 93. Incapacity cannot be defined as failure to produce cognition of the probandom in the subject. A defective reason not known as fallacious may sometimes produce an illusion of the probandom in the subject. Conversely, a valid reason may sometimes fail to produce cognition of the probandom because the necessary causes are incomplete. It may be proposed that incapacity consists in failure to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom at the time the fallacious reason is known. For when a defective reason is cognized, no erroneous inferential cognition of the probandom arises from it, whereas at the same time cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom arises from a valid reason. This view, however, is not sound. A valid reason too, because it previously had the form of an equally strong counter-reason, may fail at the time cognition of the defect arises to produce cognition of the subject qualified by the probandom. Thus incapacity would apply even to a valid reason. Incapacity is not the capacity to produce an illusion of the probandom. 94, nor can incapacity be defined as producing erroneous cognition of the probandom. A defeated or contradictory reason may produce an illusion of the probandom when it's defeated or contradictory status is unknown. But this view too is not sound. A valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason may also produce an illusion of the probandom when known in that form, and when its counterbalanced or uncommon status is unknown, it may fail to produce such an illusion. Nor is incapacity the absence of either perversion or subject propertyhood in a reason, because a valid reason in the form of a counterbalanced or uncommon reason possesses no such absence. At a particular time a valid reason 2 may assume a defective form. Provision by the context-specific probandom may sometimes be unestablished, or, because the probandom has already been established, there may be no purpose in establishing it again. Nor can incapacity be defined as being one among numerous inconclusive reasons. Inconclusiveness would overextend to purely affirmative proof, In conclusiveness concerning the context-specific probandom would remain unestablished, and in the case of a partially established probandom, the doubt would again have to be established. The probandom to be established would thereby also become distinct from the probandom. One view, incapacity is absence of causal capacity for veridical cognition of this probandom. Ninety-five, some scholars say that incapacity is not being a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom related to a particular time and subject, or lacking the capacity to produce veridical cognition of a probandom such as impermanence related to that time and subject. It should not be objected that the counter-positive of such an absence cannot be established, because relation to time and subject can delimit the counter-positiveness. But this view too is not sound. For a valid reason comes to be known as counterbalanced, it may fail to be a means of veridical cognition of the context-specific probandom, consequently it too would be incapable. Nor is incapacity the invalidity of the subsumptive reflection on the reason. In contradictory and other reasons, no reflection arises at all, and in counterbalanced or uncommon valid reasons, the validity of the reflection sometimes remains uncertain. Or is incapacity being the object of a counter reason that produces veridical cognition of the absence of the pro-bandom? Cognition of a counterbalanced or deviating reason itself inhibits inference. Alternative view, incapacity is being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inference. 96, an alternative proposal is that incapacity consists in being the object of veridical cognition that inhibits inferential cognition. An erroneous cognition of deviation and the like inhibits inferential cognition produced by a valid reason, and in cases of counterbalance and the like, being the object of veridical cognition of an equally strong counter-reason inhibits inference. This view, however, is not sound. An erroneous cognition of an equally strong counter-balanced or contradictory reason does not inhibit inference. And if a scholar does not accept equal strength, then on his view that error would have to be treated as an inhibitor which is unacceptable. Cognition of the capacity to produce the contrary of the probandom is an inhibitor. 97, it should not be said that cognition of the capacity to produce the absence of the probandom, known from an equally strong counter reason, inhibits inferential cognition and that this cognition alone is veritical. In fact, cognition of the counter reason itself as an equally strong counterbalance is the inhibitor, cognition that it produces the absence the probandom is not itself the inhibitor, because this introduces prolixity and non-establishment. Nor can mere veridical cognition of a defect in either of the two components of a counterbalanced reason, pervasion or subject propertyhood, be called the inhibitor, because occurrence of that component is observed in both reasons and non-reasons. Nor should it be said that mere veridical cognition of a property co-located in both a reason and a non-reason is the defect. When such a general property is known to deviate from the probandom, it would entail destruction of inference of the probandom in general. In fact, cognition of the equal strength of both reason and counter reason, which depends on cognition of a defect in the pervasion or subject propertyhood of one of them, inhibits inference. Otherwise all fallacious reasons would have to be included merely under non-establishment of pervasion. Incapacity is not being an inhibitor of that particular inferential cognition. 98. The condition of obstructing a particular inferential cognition concerning a particular probandom, subject, person, and time is not in capacity. For example, this particular cognition of inconclusiveness is, for this person, at this time, in this subject, an inhibitor of inference of this probandom, because it is cognition of inconclusiveness, like another cognition of inconclusiveness. Such an inference may sometimes be established because of an illusion concerning the reason, but an inference concerning that same subject and probandom, for the same person and at the same time, cannot arise later. Thus such person-specific inhibiting status is not the general characteristic of incapacity. Incapacity is not failure to produce a proper inference concerning the probandom and subject. 99. Incapacity is not failure to produce a correct inferential cognition concerning the subject and probandom. Viridical cognition of a true probandom may sometimes arise even from a defeated, contradictory, or inconclusive reason. For example, on a mountain that actually has fire, vapor may be mistaken for smoke and an inferential cognition of fire may arise, this cognition concerning fire is veridical even though the reason employed is defective. It should not be said that cognition of a different fire occurs there. One in the same fire in one locus is cognized, and illusion of a different fire in a single fire is impossible. Nor should it be said that such inference of fire on the basis of smoke superimposed on vapor is merely erroneous, because no means of knowledge establishes fire from that smoke. Nevertheless, since fire actually exists on the mountain, the conclusion is veridical. Inference is also valid in, both presence and absence are objects of veridical cognition. Presence and absence do not both occur in one lockers, nevertheless, the general property of no ability applies to both presence and absence. Being either presence or absence is not itself the reason, because inferential cognition may arise even without cognition of its perversion, it is therefore merely a pointless qualifier. Being pervaded by the probandom is the decisive factor. 100, the decisive factor in being a valid reason is simply being pervaded by the probandom. If there is no defeat in a context, possessing some property pervaded by fire determines inference of fire for many reasons, some property or other pervaded by fire is necessarily present there. Objection, identity with a property pervasive of fire is always cognized in fire, consequently identity with a property pervasive of fire would also be known as pervaded by fire in numerous reasons. Then inference of fire from many reasons would become wholly invalid. Answer, not so. Where inference of fire arises through superimposition of smoke on light, numerous forms of the absence of incapacity are possible. with a property pervasive of smoke is known in a property pervasive of light, therefore the stated overextension does not arise. The inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition. 101, it may be proposed that the inferential mark is an object of inferential cognition, because it is invariably the object of cognition of occurrence in the subject, the object of cognition of pervasion, and an object serving as qualifier of the cause of inference, like mountainhood and the pro-bandom itself. A qualitative cognition arises only when the complete causal complex for cognition of the other qualifier is present and the locus known is endowed with the qualifier. Therefore inferential cognition of a subject qualified by fire arises only where the locus is known as qualified by the inferential mark smoke. cessation of inferential cognition is possible. Objection, once the provision of the probandom is known in inference, there is no necessity for inferential cognition of the probandum fire to terminate. Nor can it be accepted that only a subsumptive reflection whose object is narrower than the object of cognition of the probandum causes inference, because this would introduce needless prolixity. Nor is it sound to say that inference does not arise because of an object other than the probandum, since subsumptive reflection is the final cause of inference. The causal complex of inference is stronger than the causal complex of perception and should therefore necessarily produce its result. Answer, this objection is not sound. Cognition that a previously established probandom has been established or proved stops the flow of inferential cognition, cessation of inference is therefore possible. Validity of inferential cognition 103, an objection may be raised, in this way, even if invalidity occurs on the side of the reason, validity may remain on the side of the probandom, how then can the reason possess incapacity? Let incapacity be admitted. But if smoke happens accidentally to be present there, how would invalidity occur on the side of smoke? Why should only fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel, and not other fire, be held to pervade smoke? It should not be said that fire in general pervades smoke even if distinct from fire produced by conjunction with moist fuel. Because of the illusion of smoke in vapor, pervasion by fire would be known, but since smoke is absent in vapor, inference of fire from that smoke would be invalid. smoke is said to be accidentally present there. In general, the reason smoke may occur even in the absence of fire. Gangesa also refutes the following view, because smoke is mistakenly cognized in vapor, the probandum fire appears as pervasive of the reason smoke, but such smoke is not actually present in vapor, and therefore inference of fire from the reason smoke is not true. According to Gangesa, if by chance the reason smoke actually occurs there, inference of the probandum fire will be true. Incapacity, the decisive view. 104, here we present our decisive view. The condition in which a reason, at the time cognition of its presence occurs, does not produce cognition of the probandum and the subject is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandum and the subject. For example, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, this reason, because it is contradictory and so fourth, does not produce cognition of the probandom and the subject. It must be noted that, at the time cognition of the reason's contradictory status and the like is present, the reason's failure to produce cognition of the probandom and the subject can be established on account of its capacity to qualify the subject. It must also be noted that even in the case of an irrelevant reason and the like, cognition of the probandom and the subject may arise through an illusion of a valid reason. Consequently, the defect of treating the probandom is unestablished or unproved because the counter positive is unestablished or incapable of proving can be avoided. Alternative view, incapacity consists in possessing the form that delimits inhibition of inferential cognition. 105, alternatively, it may be stated as follows, possessing the form that delimits being the object of cognition which inhibits inferential cognition is the condition of not establishing or proving the probandom in the subject. For example, it may be said, this fallacious reason possesses a form delimiting its being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because it is an inconclusive or other defective reason, like another fallacious reason. It must be noted here that the form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition is in fact simply inconclusiveness and the like, in the mode of being an object of cognition. But identity with the probandom in the subject is not a form delimiting being the object of cognition that inhibits inferential cognition, because only difference from an extraneous condition becomes an object of inference. For example, an inference is made with the intention of establishing the property delimiting water capable of quenching thirst as water. Incapacity incapacity to prove conclusion. 106. The view of other scholars is as follows, in the case of inconclusive, defeated, and contradictory reasons, the condition of not being pervaded, in the case of a reason whose pervadedness is unestablished, the condition of being inconclusive, and in the case of a reason unestablished in nature, counterbalanced reason, or an uncommon reason, the condition of being, at a specific time, the object of cognition inhibiting inferential cognition, all these constitute the condition of not establishing or proving the pro-bandom in the subject. It should not be objected that the collocation and inconclusive reason does not prove the probandom would be incoherent. The condition of not being pervaded is the meaning of, does not prove the probandom. It should also be noted that although incapacity lacks a single recurrent form, fallacious reasonhood alone has such a recurrent form, a reason whose cognition inhibits inferential cognition is fallacious. Thus, in the second chapter of the inference division of Tatbhah Sintmai composed by Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the explanation of the fallacious reason's condition of not establishing or proving the probandum in capacity, ends. The inference division ends, through the section on defeat. Appendix 3 .

← Transcript index