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Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
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0:04–0:14The Saddhi section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge.
0:15–0:19It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers.
0:20–0:31It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention.
0:31–0:36In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate
0:36–0:41concerning the personal authorship of the Veda.
0:41–0:42Verbal Testimony and Objections
0:42–0:47What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayikas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how
0:47–0:51did the Nya-yakas refute them?
0:51–0:53The Four Pillars of Sentence Cognition
0:53–0:58What are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's
0:58–1:02and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them?
1:02–1:14The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
1:14–1:21To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy.
1:21–1:25Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation.
1:25–1:30The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge.
1:31–1:36An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect.
1:37–1:42They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal
1:42–1:45cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge.
1:46–1:51The Nayaikas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision.
1:51–1:57They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory.
1:57–2:01They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions,
2:01–2:06aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition.
2:06–2:10If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that
2:10–2:13is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate
2:13–2:16conditions are absent.
2:16–2:19The vayaka objection differed from this, the vayaka's subsumed verbal cognition
2:19–2:24under inference. Their position is discussed below.
2:24–2:29The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the
2:29–2:34sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established.
2:34–2:41If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words.
2:41–2:45When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates
2:45–2:50that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us
2:50–2:56with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge.
2:56–3:01Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves
3:01–3:07that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction.
3:07–3:10After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayayikas confront the objection of Vyayika
3:10–3:16philosophy. The vayikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions
3:16–3:19can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge.
3:21–3:24According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception,
3:24–3:29inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings
3:29–3:35of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition
3:35–3:39of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through
3:39–3:46inference. They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose
3:46–3:53relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an
3:53–3:58independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The Vayikhas
3:58–4:03argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features,
4:03–4:06from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker.
4:06–4:13The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vayakas and refute the position of the
4:13–4:20author of the Lilavadi. According to the Neayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually
4:20–4:24connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning,
4:24–4:27a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur.
4:29–4:34The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference
4:34–4:39underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot
4:39–4:45already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason
4:45–4:51and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not
4:51–4:55understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation
4:55–5:02is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the vayikas is invalid for inference.
5:02–5:08Following this refutation, the Vaikas modify their reason and make being intended to produce
5:08–5:13a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually
5:13–5:20connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing
5:20–5:26the unreliable utterance, Piasa Sinkati, he waters with liquid. How does the new Vaika
5:26–5:30reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail.
5:30–5:33The Neyayaka argument is very precise.
5:33–5:38In their revised reason, the Vyayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing
5:38–5:42cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose
5:42–5:46mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference.
5:46–5:52In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason.
5:52–5:57The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati,
5:57–6:03here interpreted as, He waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person.
6:03–6:09The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows.
6:09–6:14Suppose an untrustworthy person says Payasasankati, while actually intending to convey He
6:14–6:17waters with a coconut shell.
6:17–6:22of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation,
6:22–6:26thus the proposed reason is present.
6:26–6:30Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition?
6:30–6:35No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance
6:35–6:39comes from an untrustworthy person.
6:39–6:44The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandom, veridical
6:44–6:50cognition in this case must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while
6:50–6:57the probandom is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails.
6:57–7:02In this section the nayayakas offer another example, karmatbha-manayanam-ti objecthood,
7:02–7:07bringing, and effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety
7:07–7:15of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that karmatbamanayanimti is not a complete
7:15–7:21or meaningful sentence. It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely
7:21–7:27lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the vayika
7:27–7:30reason may be understood here as follows.
7:30–7:35Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their
7:35–7:39lack of expectancy, intending that the hero understand them as meaning, there is an effort
7:39–7:44to bring some object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of
7:44–7:48mutually connected meanings, is fully present.
7:48–7:52Absence of the probandom, can the hero obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning
7:52–7:58merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection,
7:58–8:04or expectancy, among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the
8:04–8:09The probandum, deritical verbal cognition, does not arise, the rule is broken and the
8:09–8:11reason is shown to deviate.
8:11–8:18This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition.
8:18–8:22To refute the Bayeika theory that meaning is understood through inference from the
8:22–8:26speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting
8:26–8:29argument, discussed next.
8:29–8:34The vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition.
8:34–8:39An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence,
8:39–8:42such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among
8:42–8:44those word meanings?
8:44–8:48If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the vayika theory, do we nevertheless
8:48–8:51understand the sentence?
8:51–8:54The vayikas offer an ingenious reply.
8:54–8:59They concede that in the case of a parrot, or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's
8:59–9:05deridical cognition or intention is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such
9:05–9:10a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness or the
9:10–9:15capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among
9:15–9:21the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the Viakas, the cognition
9:21–9:25here arises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's
9:25–9:28competence and intention.
9:28–9:33From the Neyayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as
9:33–9:38bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate
9:38–9:42to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion?
9:42–9:47How does this situation assist the Neyayakas in establishing words as an independent means
9:47–9:50of knowledge distinct from inference?
9:50–9:55The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether.
9:55–10:00Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original
10:00–10:05veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition.
10:05–10:10If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly
10:10–10:14understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts.
10:14–10:19This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge
10:19–10:22in the following manner.
10:22–10:26According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's
10:26–10:29veritical cognition.
10:29–10:34In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning
10:34–10:40nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible.
10:40–10:44If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when
10:44–10:48the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must
10:48–10:52arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words.
10:53–10:57This establishes that words are not included under inference,
10:57–11:01rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right.
11:02–11:07A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning to
11:07–11:12us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, enabling
11:12–11:18it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because
11:18–11:24certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas,
11:24–11:28the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence.
11:29–11:34A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars.
11:35–11:40Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to
11:40–11:44complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent.
11:45–11:50Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one
11:50–11:57another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity or contiguity,
11:57–12:02the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay.
12:03–12:09Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful
12:09–12:14in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words.
12:15–12:19A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features
12:19–12:24are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them.
12:25–12:29An example is now offered to clarify these three features.
12:30–12:34If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort,
12:34–12:39Gakkarmatbhamnianity, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning?
12:40–12:46The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or
12:46–12:53sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and
12:53–12:59effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a
12:59–13:04connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until
13:04–13:09expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning.
13:10–13:16The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation
13:16–13:21among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition.
13:22–13:29Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, venena sinkati. This sentence possesses grammatical
13:29–13:36expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy, semantic
13:36–13:43fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or another
13:43–13:49liquid, watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore,
13:49–13:55the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question when a
13:55–14:00The sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features,
14:00–14:06expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent.
14:06–14:10In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness.
14:10–14:14When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering
14:14–14:20with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another.
14:20–14:27We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity.
14:27–14:33Proximity means uttering the related words continuously without an improper delay.
14:33–14:37Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring.
14:37–14:41Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning?
14:41–14:47If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood.
14:47–14:52Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected
14:52–14:53in the mind.
14:53–14:59To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present
14:59–15:01without improper delay.
15:01–15:06Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition
15:06–15:08of the correct meaning.
15:08–15:14This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity.
15:14–15:19Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya.
15:19–15:23The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse.
15:23–15:28No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention,
15:28–15:30context, or purpose.
15:30–15:35The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt
15:35–15:37or for a horse.
15:37–15:41The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of Pali-Semus words and words used
15:41–15:46in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the
15:46–15:48speaker's intention.
15:48–15:52Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of
15:52–15:54one specific meaning.
15:54–16:00The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended.
16:00–16:05This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words, it also
16:05–16:09plays a crucial role in secondary signification.
16:09–16:14Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Matt cross anti.
16:14–16:19Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise?
16:19–16:23inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise.
16:23–16:27The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms.
16:27–16:32When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout,
16:32–16:37we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention.
16:37–16:42This process is called secondary signification or laka.
16:42–16:47Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and
16:47–16:52the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical
16:52–16:55and independent means of knowledge.
16:55–17:00This question lies at the root of a major and celebrated dispute between Nyaya and MMA
17:00–17:03with Macron essay with Macron philosophy.
17:03–17:08The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter.
17:08–17:13Mme with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds
17:13–17:15are eternal.
17:15–17:20It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether.
17:20–17:23The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as
17:23–17:28switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there.
17:28–17:33Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal.
17:33–17:42According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks.
17:42–17:51To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for Eternality, the Neayaka's cite examples from Direct Experience.
17:51–17:57There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being.
17:57–18:04If Kao were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed.
18:04–18:09This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds.
18:09–18:22The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed.
18:22–18:31If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere.
18:31–18:42Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort.
18:42–18:50And the Me with Macron essay with Macron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound Ka, as evidence of eternality.
18:50–19:00According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal kavad present in different sounds.
19:00–19:13The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them?
19:13–19:19According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions or pillars are indispensable
19:19–19:25for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning from a sentence.
19:25–19:30Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in
19:30–19:33order to complete its meaning.
19:33–19:41For example, after merely saying gam, a pot, the expression anaya, brain, is expected.
19:41–19:47fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering
19:47–19:54with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or contiguity,
19:54–19:58there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions,
19:58–20:02so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously.
20:03–20:08The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines
20:08–20:13the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively.
20:14–20:20Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements,
20:20–20:27such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely
20:27–20:33a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvamnayanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can
20:33–20:39arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness
20:39–20:44in Nyaya philosophy as the absence of veritical cognition of a defeating relation.
20:45–20:50The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how,
20:50–20:55according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin?
20:57–21:01According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows.
21:01–21:07The non-eternality of words, the Neayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal
21:07–21:12because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air
21:12–21:15and cease after a time, like a pot.
21:15–21:20Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal.
21:20–21:24The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakhas hold
21:24–21:29the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established.
21:29–21:34The Neayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God.
21:34–21:40At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation,
21:40–21:44the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God.
21:44–21:49The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition.
21:49–21:54If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued
21:54–21:58from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do
21:58–22:02Neither the Neyayakas insist that it was composed by God.
22:02–22:06The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author
22:06–22:11is remembered, but the Neyayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical
22:11–22:13standards.
22:13–22:19The Neyayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons.
22:19–22:24The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes
22:24–22:29great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed.
22:30–22:34If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved.
22:36–22:42Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without
22:42–22:47a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source
22:47–22:53of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the
22:53–22:58reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its
22:58–23:03authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God.
23:05–23:09The Masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution.
23:10–23:14Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless
23:14–23:18and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction.
23:18–23:24According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings is eternal.
23:25–23:29Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the
23:29–23:33current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new
23:33–23:41creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The masakas regard the Veda and words as eternal,
23:41–23:46whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production,
23:46–23:49destruction, and individual variation of sounds.
23:50–23:53In establishing the non-eternality of sound,
23:53–23:57Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence.
23:58–24:01The main Neayaka arguments are as follows.
24:02–24:07Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of
24:07–24:13the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot.
24:13–24:20Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end.
24:21–24:27Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility
24:27–24:34that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not
24:34–24:40an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical
24:40–24:45juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition,
24:45–24:52this is the very soundcaw that I heard before. According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition
24:52–24:57does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal
24:57–25:04or common property, such as GA hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows,
25:04–25:09we recognize the universal cowwood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at
25:09–25:14different times, recognition in the form this is that very G.A arises from apprehending the common
25:14–25:20universal G.A. hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the
25:20–25:26universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further,
25:26–25:31if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing
25:31–25:38the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed,
25:38–25:44bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay,
25:44–25:48the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal.
25:49–25:52Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words.
25:54–26:00Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort in parish.
26:01–26:06Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes
26:06–26:09is likewise non-eternal.
26:09–26:14Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed
26:14–26:19as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal.
26:19–26:24On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal
26:24–26:28and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having
26:28–26:31God as its author.
26:31–26:35At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal
26:35–26:40phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim, neither
26:40–26:45a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative
26:45–26:49weakened before this Nyaya doctrine.
26:49–26:53The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim that the Veda is authorless, non-human,
26:53–26:58and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons.
26:58–27:03The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort
27:03–27:10and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal.
27:10–27:15The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence
27:15–27:18by itself without a conscious author.
27:18–27:23Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind
27:23–27:27the composition of the Veda is logically necessary.
27:27–27:31The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the
27:31–27:36great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without
27:36–27:39an omniscient author.
27:39–27:43These Nyaya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M. M. A. with Macron
27:43–27:48essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless.
27:48–27:54A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution,
27:54–27:58How does the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between the word
27:58–28:05and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution?
28:05–28:09According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire
28:09–28:15physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed.
28:15–28:20In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation
28:20–28:25between word and meaning is eternal, generates a logical contradiction.
28:25–28:29The principal points of contradiction are these.
28:29–28:33Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and
28:33–28:39meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
28:39–28:44The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
28:44–28:50the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
28:50–28:55According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution,
28:55–29:01it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine
29:01–29:08of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
29:08–29:12According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic Dissolution, at the end of creation the
29:12–29:17entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely d-
29:17–29:21The principal points of contradiction are these.
29:21–29:25utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and
29:25–29:32meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist.
29:32–29:36The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during
29:36–29:43the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation.
29:43–29:48According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution,
29:48–29:54it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine
29:54–30:01of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution.
30:01–30:05According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches
30:05–30:09humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows.
30:10–30:15The role of God at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless
30:15–30:22God reveals or composes the Veda Anu. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other
30:22–30:26authors of the Sintis, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and
30:26–30:30convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons.
30:30–30:38Nyaia philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error or defect, as
30:38–30:41the original source of the Veda.
30:41–30:46If Nyaia philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in
30:46–30:50authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the
30:50–30:54Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative?
30:54–30:59The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine
30:59–31:03composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects.
31:05–31:10Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error,
31:10–31:17and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human
31:17–31:24being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya
31:24–31:29philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect.
31:31–31:34Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God,
31:34–31:39it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative.
31:40–31:45At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda,
31:45–31:49what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient?
31:51–31:51Chapter 2

Plain text

The Saddhi section of the Tathasintmai, composed by Sri Gangesa Upadyaya, principally establishes word, or verbal cognition, as an independent means of knowledge. It refutes the objections raised by Buddhist and Vyika philosophers. It also offers a subtle analysis of the four principal conditions required for understanding the meaning of a sentence, expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention. In addition, it presents the Nya-ya account of the non-eternality of words and the debate concerning the personal authorship of the Veda. Verbal Testimony and Objections What objections did the Buddhists and Vyayikas raise concerning verbal testimony, and how did the Nya-yakas refute them? The Four Pillars of Sentence Cognition What are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? To consider the objections of Buddhist and Vyayaka philosophy is, in fact, to understand the subtlety of Nyaya philosophy. Let us begin with the Buddhist objection and its refutation. The Buddhists argued that only an extraordinary causal factor could be a means of knowledge. An extraordinary causal factor is one whose presence necessarily produces the relevant effect. They maintained that the mere presence of words does not necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition, therefore, words are not a means of knowledge. The Nayaikas, however, refuted this objection with great logical precision. They argued that the Buddhist statement, words are not a means of knowledge, is self-contradictory. They also explained that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions, aided by the appropriate linguistic operation, necessarily produce veridical verbal cognition. If words lacking expectancy and the other conditions fail to produce knowledge, that is analogous to perception and the other means of knowledge failing when their appropriate conditions are absent. The vayaka objection differed from this, the vayaka's subsumed verbal cognition under inference. Their position is discussed below. The Buddhist statement words are not a means of knowledge is self-contradictory. If the sentence provides veridical knowledge, the validity of words is thereby established. If it does not provide veridical knowledge, it fails to establish the invalidity of words. When Buddhist philosophy says, words are not a means of knowledge, it communicates that claim through words, namely through a sentence. If the claim is understood and provides us with veridical knowledge, then those very words have become a means of veridical knowledge. Thus, using words to establish that words are not a means of knowledge itself proves that words are a means of knowledge. This is the self-contradiction. After refuting this Buddhist objection, the Nayayikas confront the objection of Vyayika philosophy. The vayikas accept that words endowed with expectancy and the other required conditions can produce cognition, but deny that words constitute a separate means of knowledge. According to the vayikas, which of the means of knowledge, perception, inference, or comparison is used to obtain cognition of the relation among the meanings of the different words, that is, the sentence meaning? According to the vayikas, cognition of the sentential relation among the meanings of different words is obtained solely through inference. They hold that, in this inference, the words or their meanings form the subject whose relevant property is to be established. Consequently, Vayikha philosophy does not recognize words as an independent means of knowledge, but includes verbal cognition under inference. The Vayikhas argue that sentences are groups of words possessing expectancy and the other required features, from them one infers the relation intended by the speaker. The Neayakas do not accept this inferential theory of the Vayakas and refute the position of the author of the Lilavadi. According to the Neayakas, if the intention to produce cognition of mutually connected word meanings is treated as the reason for inferring sentence meaning, a major logical problem arises before that inference can even occur. The principal difficulty, according to the Neayakas, is that before the alleged inference underlying verbal cognition, cognition of the relation among the sentences meanings cannot already be available. An inferential process requires an example in which both the reason and the probandom are already established. But if the intended semantic relation is not understood before the inference, it is impossible to offer an example in which that relation is already established. Therefore, the reason proposed by the vayikas is invalid for inference. Following this refutation, the Vaikas modify their reason and make being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, that is, the purpose of producing cognition of mutually connected meanings, the basis of inference. Why does Nyaya philosophy refute this by citing the unreliable utterance, Piasa Sinkati, he waters with liquid. How does the new Vaika reason deviate in this sentence and thereby fail. The Neyayaka argument is very precise. In their revised reason, the Vyayikas say that words uttered with the intention of producing cognition of mutually connected word meanings, being intended to produce a cognition whose mode is connectedness, form the basis of inference. In other words, they take the speaker's intention as the inferential reason. The Neayakas refute this through the example of the unreliable utterance, Payasasankati, here interpreted as, He waters with coconut water, spoken by an untrustworthy person. The resulting deviation, or fallacy, may be explained as follows. Suppose an untrustworthy person says Payasasankati, while actually intending to convey He waters with a coconut shell. of the reason, the speaker fully possesses the intention to communicate a relation, thus the proposed reason is present. Absence of the probandom, does this produce veridical verbal cognition? No, because the meaning watering with a coconut shell is semantically blocked and the utterance comes from an untrustworthy person. The rule of inference requires that wherever the reason is present, the probandom, veridical cognition in this case must also be present. Here, however, the reason is present while the probandom is absent. The new vayika reason therefore deviates and fails. In this section the nayayakas offer another example, karmatbha-manayanam-ti objecthood, bringing, and effort. This example clarifies the logical subtlety of Nyaya philosophy even more distinctly. Observe that karmatbamanayanimti is not a complete or meaningful sentence. It is merely a collection of independent nominal expressions, entirely lacking syntactic expectancy or grammatical connection. The deviation of the vayika reason may be understood here as follows. Presence of the reason, suppose a speaker utters these expressions, despite their lack of expectancy, intending that the hero understand them as meaning, there is an effort to bring some object. The vahika reason, the speaker's intention to produce cognition of mutually connected meanings, is fully present. Absence of the probandom, can the hero obtain a veridical cognition of sentence meaning merely from this group of expressions? No, because there is no grammatical connection, or expectancy, among them. Thus, wherever the proposed reason is present but the The probandum, deritical verbal cognition, does not arise, the rule is broken and the reason is shown to deviate. This proves that merely inferring the speaker's intention is insufficient for verbal cognition. To refute the Bayeika theory that meaning is understood through inference from the speaker's knowledge or intention, the Neayakas also present a highly practical and interesting argument, discussed next. The vayikas hold that a hearer understands meaning by inferring the speaker's veridical cognition. An objection follows, if a parrot repeats a perfectly correct and meaningful sentence, such as, bring water, does the parrot possess veridical cognition of the relation among those word meanings? If the parrot has no such cognition, how, on the vayika theory, do we nevertheless understand the sentence? The vayikas offer an ingenious reply. They concede that in the case of a parrot, or of a deceiver, the reason, the speaker's deridical cognition or intention is in fact absent. They nevertheless argue that in such a situation the hearer has an illusion that the words possess sentential fitness or the capacity to convey meaning. Because of this illusion, the hearer infers a relation among the word meanings and understands the meaning. Thus, according to the Viakas, the cognition here arises not from a genuine inference but from an illusion concerning the speaker's competence and intention. From the Neyayaka standpoint, however, if the sentence uttered by the parrot, such as bring water, is grammatically impeccable and gives us veridical cognition, is it appropriate to regard that cognition is based merely upon illusion? How does this situation assist the Neyayakas in establishing words as an independent means of knowledge distinct from inference? The Neayakas reject the Vayika appeal to illusion altogether. Their clear argument is that if a sentence uttered by a parrot conforms to an original veridical sentence, it certainly becomes an instrument of veridical cognition. If the cognition obtained from the sentence is correct and the intended meaning is correctly understood, calling it a mere illusion contradicts the facts. This situation supports the establishment of words as an independent means of knowledge in the following manner. According to the Viakas, verbal cognition arises through inference from the speaker's veritical cognition. In the case of the parrot, however, the speaker, the parrot, has neither cognition of the meaning nor an intention to communicate it, therefore, the proposed inference is impossible. If the hearer nevertheless understands the correct meaning from the sentence when the alleged inferential basis, the speaker's cognition is absent, the knowledge must arise not from the speaker's mind through inference, but directly from the words. This establishes that words are not included under inference, rather, verbal testimony is an independent means of knowledge in its own right. A question now arises, if the parrot has no intention, yet its sentence conveys meaning to us, what special properties are present in that sentence, or among its words, enabling it to produce veridical cognition. Meaning is understood from the parrot's sentence because certain special properties are inherently present among its words. According to the Neayakas, the parrot's utterance conforms to an original veridical sentence. A meaningful sentence principally possesses three special features or pillars. Expectancy, the grammatical need or expectation by which one word requires another in order to complete its meaning, for example, a verb may require an object or an agent. Semantic fitness, the logical capacity of the meanings of the words to be connected with one another, their combined meaning must not be contradicted or impossible. Proximity or contiguity, the words must be uttered together or continuously, without an improper delay. Nyaya philosophy explains that expectancy, semantic fitness, and proximity become useful in producing verbal cognition of a relation only when they are apprehended as present in the words. A parrot merely repeats a fixed order of words, nevertheless, because these three features are present among those words, the hearer obtains deridical cognition on hearing them. An example is now offered to clarify these three features. If a person merely says, pot, objecthood, the act of bringing, effort, Gakkarmatbhamnianity, does this group of words convey a complete sentence meaning? The question deserves careful thought. This group of words does not convey a complete meaning or sentence meaning. It principally lacks syntactic expectancy. Part, objecthood, bringing, and effort, merely independent expressions. There is no grammatical relation among them, such as a connection between a verb and its object, by which one word may be joined to another. Until expressions possess mutual expectancy, they cannot form a complete sentence or convey a sentence meaning. The second important pillar of sentence cognition is semantic fitness. The relation among the meanings of the expressions must be logically possible and free from a defeating cognition. Suppose someone says, he waters with fire, venena sinkati. This sentence possesses grammatical expectancy and proximity among its words, but which principle feature expectancy, semantic fitness or proximity is absent from this sentence. Watering is possible with water or another liquid, watering a plant or tree with fire is impossible because fire burns. Therefore, the sentence he waters with fire lacks semantic fitness. This raises the question when a The sentence's meaning is contradicted or logically impossible, which of the three features, expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is deemed absent. In such a case the sentence lacks semantic fitness. When the meaning of a sentence is logically contradicted or impossible, as in watering with fire, the meanings of its words lack the capacity to be connected with one another. We now consider the third important pillar of a sentence, proximity or contiguity. Proximity means uttering the related words continuously without an improper delay. Suppose a person says pot today and only tomorrow says bring. Can this yield cognition of a complete sentence meaning? If someone says pot today and bring tomorrow, no complete sentence meaning can be understood. Because of the long interval, the memory of the first word becomes faint or disconnected in the mind. To understand a sentence, the memories of all related words must be simultaneously present without improper delay. Continuous utterance activates the impressions of all the words together and produces cognition of the correct meaning. This rule of continuous utterance is called proximity or contiguity. Suppose someone is eating and says, bring sain dhaba, sain haba manaya. The word sain dhaba has two meanings, salt and horse. No definite meaning can be understood in the absence of knowledge of the speaker's intention, context, or purpose. The hearer cannot determine whether, during the meal, the speaker is asking for salt or for a horse. The Neyayakas clearly state that in the case of Pali-Semus words and words used in a secondary sense, cognition of the particular intended meaning requires knowledge of the speaker's intention. Knowledge of that intention frees the hearer from doubt and enables the apprehension of one specific meaning. The context of a meal indicates that salt, not a horse, is intended. This doctrine of the speaker's intention is not confined to polysemos words, it also plays a crucial role in secondary signification. Suppose someone says, the platforms are shouting, Matt cross anti. Can inanimate platforms themselves shout or make a noise? inanimate platforms can never shout or make a noise. The speaker actually intends the people seated on the platforms. When the primary meaning of a word is logically blocked, as when a platform is said to shout, we apprehend a secondary meaning on the basis of the speaker's intention. This process is called secondary signification or laka. Nyaya philosophy therefore establishes that expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention jointly make a sentence meaningful and establish words as a veridical and independent means of knowledge. This question lies at the root of a major and celebrated dispute between Nyaya and MMA with Macron essay with Macron philosophy. The two schools offered their respective arguments on this matter. Mme with Macron essay with Macron philosophy, the prima facie view, holds that words or sounds are eternal. It argues that sounds such as, Ka, and, Ka, are always present in Ether. The throat or palate does not newly produce them, it merely manifests them, just as switching on a torch in a dark room reveals a pot that was already there. Nyaya philosophy, the established conclusion, refutes this and holds that words are non-eternal. According to the Neayakas, sound is produced by our effort in parishes after a time, just as a pot is made by a potter and eventually breaks. To refute the MMA with Makron essay with Makron argument for Eternality, the Neayaka's cite examples from Direct Experience. There is an audible difference between the sound ka uttered by a parrot and by a human being. If Kao were one and the same eternal entity everywhere, its character would not vary when the speaker changed. This variation establishes the non-eternality of individual sounds. The differences heard when the speaker changes, for example, differences among the pronunciations of a man, a woman, and a parrot, clearly established that individual sounds are not eternal but are produced and destroyed. If the sounds Ka or GA were single eternal entities residing in Ether, their forms would have to be identical for every speaker and everywhere. Yet the real differences caused by variations in throat, palate, and articulatory air show that sounds are not eternally manifested entities, they are produced through physical effort. And the Me with Macron essay with Macron takes recognition upon hearing a sound, this is that very sound Ka, as evidence of eternality. According to the Neayakas, however, this cognition of identity concerns not an individual sound but the shared universal kavad present in different sounds. The four pillars of sentence cognition, what are the true natures of expectancy, semantic fitness, proximity, and the speaker's intention, and why is veridical verbal cognition impossible without them? According to Nyaya philosophy, for principal auxiliary conditions or pillars are indispensable for veridical verbal cognition, the correct understanding of meaning from a sentence. Expectancy, the grammatical expectation by which one expression requires another in order to complete its meaning. For example, after merely saying gam, a pot, the expression anaya, brain, is expected. fitness, the capacity of the meanings of the expressions to fit together logically. Watering with fire is impossible, therefore, semantic fitness is absent there. Proximity or contiguity, there must be no improper or prolonged delay in the utterance of the expressions, so that the mind can retain the memory of all of them simultaneously. The speaker's intention, the speaker's actual purport or purpose, which determines the correct meaning when a word is polysemos, as with sainthava, or is used figuratively. Why is verbal cognition impossible without these conditions? If even one of these four elements, such as expectancy, semantic fitness, or proximity, is absent, the group of expressions remains merely a list of disconnected words, as in gukkarmatvamnayanati, and no meaningful sentence cognition can arise from it. At this point the author raises a subtle logical issue and defines semantic fitness in Nyaya philosophy as the absence of veritical cognition of a defeating relation. The non-eternality of sound and the Veda is sound eternal or non-eternal, and how, according to Nyaya philosophy, is the Veda authored by God and therefore personal in origin? According to Nyaya philosophy, the nature of words and the Veda is as follows. The non-eternality of words, the Neayaka conclusion is that phonemes or sounds are non-eternal because they are produced by the operation of the throat, palate, and articulatory air and cease after a time, like a pot. Themsakhas, by contrast, regard them as eternal. The personal authorship of the Veda, that is, its composition by God, themsakhas hold the Veda to be authorless, beginningless, and intrinsically established. The Neayakas, however, established that the Veda is authored by God. At cosmic dissolution every tradition is destroyed, therefore, at the beginning of a new creation, the Veda is composed by the omniscient and faultless God. The authority of the Veda rests upon God's direct and independent cognition. If, at this point, the Msaakas argue that the teacher-disciple tradition has continued from beginningless time and that no human author of the Veda is remembered, why do Neither the Neyayakas insist that it was composed by God. The Msaakas argue that the Vedic tradition is beginningless and that no human author is remembered, but the Neyayakas test this claim of a beginningless tradition by logical standards. The Neyayakas principally insist upon divine authorship for the following reasons. The doctrine of cosmic dissolution, according to Naya philosophy, the cosmic cycle includes great dissolution during which all material objects, living beings, and oral traditions are destroyed. If the tradition ends at dissolution, its purported beginningless continuity cannot be preserved. Intelligent composition, a complex, systematic, and authoritative work cannot arise by itself without a conscious and omniscient author. Just as an ordinary book has an author, God is the source of the foundational knowledge of the cosmos. Consequently, in order to account for the reappearance of the Veda at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution and to secure its authority, it is considered logically necessary to accept an omniscient author, namely God. The Masakas do not accept such a conception of a great cosmic dissolution. Their fundamental position is that the Veda and the teacher-disciple tradition are beginningless and eternal and therefore unaffected by any universal destruction. According to the masakas, the relation between words, or phonemes, and their meanings is eternal. Even if physical objects are dissolved during cosmic dissolution, the power of words and the current of knowledge remain in a latent form and awaken automatically at the beginning of a new creation. Hence no divine composition is required. The masakas regard the Veda and words as eternal, whereas Nyaya philosophy refutes this doctrine of eternality on the basis of the production, destruction, and individual variation of sounds. In establishing the non-eternality of sound, Nyaya philosophy principally treats production and destruction as evidence. The main Neayaka arguments are as follows. Production through effort, when a person speaks, sound is produced through the conjunction of the throat, palate, and air. Whatever is produced by effort cannot be eternal, like a pot. Destruction, immediately after it is uttered, the sound ceases and its existence comes to an end. Limitation, a sound is produced only at a particular place in time, which excludes the possibility that it is eternal and omnipresent. Nyaya philosophy thus establishes that sound is not an eternal entity in ether but a non-eternal quality produced by effort. At this logical juncture, the msaka's attempt to answer the refutation by appealing to recognition, the cognition, this is the very soundcaw that I heard before. According to Gaya philosophy, this recognition does not disclose the eternality of an individual sound, rather, it apprehends the shared universal or common property, such as GA hood. Just as, on seeing different white or black cows, we recognize the universal cowwood, so, despite the individuality of sounds uttered at different times, recognition in the form this is that very G.A arises from apprehending the common universal G.A. hood. An individual sound perishes immediately after its utterance, while the universal remains common to every member of that class. Taking the argument one step further, if individual sounds are non-eternal, how does this assist Nyaya philosophy in establishing the non-eternality of complete words, sentences, and the Veda? When a house is constructed, bricks are made first. If the bricks themselves are non-eternal and perishable products of clay, the whole house built by combining those bricks must also be non-eternal. Nyaya philosophy applies the same reasoning to words. Sounds, or phonemes, individual phonemes such as ka, and ta are produced by effort in parish. Words, or expressions, a word formed as a collection of those non-eternal phonemes is likewise non-eternal. Sentences and the Veda, sentences formed by combining many words, and the Veda formed as a collection of sentences, are consequently also non-eternal. On this logical basis, Nyaya philosophy establishes that the Veda is not an eternal and self-established entity, but a composition formed from non-eternal phonemes and having God as its author. At this stage, if the Veda is a personally authored composition made from non-eternal phonemes and composed by God, how is the MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim, neither a human being nor God composed the Veda, it is beginningless and intrinsically authoritative weakened before this Nyaya doctrine. The MMA with Macron essay with Macron claim that the Veda is authorless, non-human, and beginningless is weakened by the Nyaya arguments for the following reasons. The non-eternality of phonemes, if words and phonemes are non-eternal, produced by effort and subject to destruction, the Veda composed of those non-eternal phonemes cannot be eternal. The necessity of an author, a complex, systematic, and logical work cannot come into existence by itself without a conscious author. Just as every composition has a composer, the existence of the omniscient God behind the composition of the Veda is logically necessary. The doctrine of dissolution, when every world and oral tradition is destroyed during the great cosmic dissolution, preservation of the Vedic tradition becomes impossible without an omniscient author. These Nyaya arguments therefore weaken the foundations of the M. M. A. with Macron essay with Macron claimed that the Veda is intrinsically authoritative and authorless. A further question arises, if every tradition is destroyed in the great cosmic dissolution, How does the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between the word and its meaning is eternal become contradictory in relation to the doctrine of dissolution? According to the doctrine of great cosmic dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely destroyed or absorbed. In this situation the MMA with Macron essay with Macron assertion that the relation between word and meaning is eternal, generates a logical contradiction. The principal points of contradiction are these. Utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Macron essay with Macron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to the doctrine of Great Cosmic Dissolution, at the end of creation the entire physical world, living beings, and worldly traditions are completely d- The principal points of contradiction are these. utterance and manifestation, the practical operation of a relation between word and meaning is possible only while a speaker, a hearer, and a human society exist. The condition of dissolution, when no human being or other living creature exists during the Great Dissolution, no medium remains to preserve or utter that eternal relation. According to Nyaya philosophy, therefore, if the Veda is to exist after the Great Dissolution, it must have some creator or author. Otherwise, the MMA with Makron essay with Makron doctrine of an intrinsically eternal relation is weakened by the very conception of cosmic dissolution. According to Nyaya philosophy, the process by which knowledge of the Veda again reaches humanity at the beginning of a new creation after the great dissolution is as follows. The role of God at the beginning of a new creation after dissolution, the omniscient and faultless God reveals or composes the Veda Anu. The tradition of the sages, Manu and the other authors of the Sintis, together with the sages, receive this knowledge from God and convey it to society through remembered tradition and the practices of cultivated persons. Nyaia philosophy thus regards God, who is considered entirely free of human error or defect, as the original source of the Veda. If Nyaia philosophy regards the Veda as authored by God, what is the principal difference in authority between an ordinary human composition and a divine composition that allows the Veda always to remain faultless and authoritative? The fundamental difference between the authority of a human composition and that of a divine composition rests upon the competence of the author and the author's freedom from defects. Human composition, an ordinary human being is by nature limited in knowledge, liable to error, and affected by defects such as attachment and aversion. Consequently, a work written by a human being always remains liable to error or falsity. Divine composition, the Veda, according to Nyaya philosophy, the author of the Veda is omniscient and entirely free of every human defect. Because the Veda was composed by an omniscient and faultless God, it is therefore regarded as permanently faultless, irrefutable, and authoritative. At this point, since Nyaya philosophy considers God to be the author of the Veda, what proof or inference does it use to establish logically that God is omniscient? Chapter 2

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