MACHINE ASR ACCESSIBILITY AID

Episode2_Part11_RadioPlay.mp4

Not an editorially verified transcript. This text was generated automatically from the preserved recording and may contain recognition, language-detection, spelling, segmentation or name errors. Consult the source recording for authoritative content.

Collection: Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10
Status: asr-draft
Human verified: No
Editorial review: not-reviewed
ASR model: small
Detected language: en (0.99762)
Duration: 23:19
Source: Open preserved recording

Timestamped machine output

0:02–0:32परस्व्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष
0:32–0:38I knew this shell as silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing
0:38–0:43the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its
0:43–0:47object and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object.
0:48–0:53Reflexive awareness is veritical cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise even
0:53–0:56in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be required.
0:56–1:02Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is
1:02–1:06non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition.
1:07–1:11Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended,
1:11–1:14reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises.
1:15–1:19One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time
1:19–1:23difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established
1:23–1:29by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell is silver,
1:29–1:34it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of the non-relation
1:34–1:39of the qualifier silverness, therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid qualified
1:39–1:45cognition the shell is silver, can arise at all. The form of reflexive awareness is not
1:45–1:50merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver. The instrumental expression, as silver,
1:50–1:55means silderness, which is the qualifier of silver, qualifier cannot be apprehended without its
1:55–2:00qualificant. Veridical qualifier cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:00–2:04therefore invalid qualifier cognition 2 takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object.
2:05–2:09In inferential cognition of silver, silderness is not held to be present,
2:09–2:13and qualifier cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object,
2:13–2:17therefore the Nayayaka theory of misapprehension is not the sotrantika buddhist theory of an
2:17–2:21empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal.
2:21–2:27Explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions
2:27–2:31Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and
2:31–2:35sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain
2:35–2:37fixed.
2:37–2:39This objection is unsound.
2:39–2:42A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator.
2:42–2:46For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective
2:46–2:51sound sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen.
2:52–2:56When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously
2:56–3:00arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise at
3:00–3:07all. The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are
3:07–3:12mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in
3:12–3:17opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later.
3:17–3:22How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate in earlier one?
3:22–3:29For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception.
3:29–3:33It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated.
3:33–3:38The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated,
3:38–3:42the qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as qualifican
3:42–3:47cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred,
3:47–3:52future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated.
3:52–3:57Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid
3:57–4:03cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition.
4:03–4:06Confidence in cognitive validity
4:06–4:10Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika
4:10–4:13admit some cognitions to be invalid.
4:13–4:17When this objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been explained
4:17–4:19in the theory of validity.
4:19–4:23On the Prabhikara view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition
4:23–4:27when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended
4:27–4:31non-relations among things are observed in many cases?
4:31–4:34It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing
4:34–4:38is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing, is quickly recalled,
4:38–4:42therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an
4:42–4:47an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes
4:47–4:53it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own
4:53–4:58view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained
4:58–5:03merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arc cannot explain confidence
5:03–5:07in validity without another cognition of an existent object. The method by which
5:07–5:11distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference has already been explained.
5:11–5:16Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the Nairayaka view.
5:17–5:21A third view concerning confidence in validity.
5:21–5:27Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary
5:27–5:31shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it.
5:31–5:37This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive validity is established.
5:37–5:43When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell and incapable contrary substrate,
5:43–5:47confidence and validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference.
5:48–5:50This proposal is unsound.
5:50–5:57On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through another cognition of difference.
5:57–6:00This discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student.
6:00–6:05In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference.
6:05–6:08No cognition explicitly presents identity.
6:08–6:13How then will the Memsaka establish the state of cognition of an existent object?
6:13–6:17A defect causes illusion.
6:17–6:21Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition.
6:21–6:25This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established
6:25–6:29from its produced result, invalid cognition.
6:29–6:33It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell
6:33–6:37and silver are real and existent?
6:37–6:41Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is
6:41–6:47additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist.
6:47–6:52If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows.
6:52–6:57The superimposed relation need not be unreal here.
6:57–7:01The Nyayayika replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent
7:01–7:05shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition
7:05–7:10that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object
7:10–7:12had opposed to the qualifier.
7:12–7:16This defect is clear in such cognition.
7:16–7:22The earlier Nyayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal.
7:22–7:26The earlier Nyayayikas say that identity and every other unreal relation become
7:26–7:30Some objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver.
7:30–7:34Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard
7:34–7:38invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by
7:38–7:41existent qualifier and qualifcant.
7:41–7:44There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified
7:44–7:48by existent qualifier and qualifcant.
7:48–7:52The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally
7:52–7:57afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and Naya does not arise. The complete causal aggregate
7:57–8:01of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability therefore
8:01–8:07applies only to the Memsaka view. But Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends
8:07–8:11an object in one form when the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting
8:11–8:14on an unreal object.
8:14–8:18Thus ends the theory of misapprehension and the perception section of the Tatva
8:18–8:28the Sintlaya of Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the theory of the definition of perception.
8:28–8:32Four kinds of valid cognition.
8:32–8:38Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition.
8:38–8:43Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly four, perceptual
8:43–8:48means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means.
8:48–8:54Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures.
8:54–8:58This will be explained further below.
8:58–9:04Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception.
9:04–9:09The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant,
9:09–9:14that is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense-faculty and object.
9:14–9:19Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition,
9:19–9:22because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the
9:22–9:24self as object.
9:24–9:29It underextends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced by any relation.
9:29–9:34Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized.
9:34–9:38If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing
9:38–9:42it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness.
9:42–9:46The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty
9:46–9:51or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one
9:51–9:55of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced by either
9:55–9:57the mind or self.
9:57–10:00Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense
10:00–10:04faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence.
10:04–10:09Nor can perception be defined as veridical experience not produced by a previously known
10:09–10:11specific instrument.
10:11–10:16Some instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception, if an unknown cognition
10:16–10:22is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to inferential cognition.
10:22–10:27Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under extends
10:27–10:32to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier.
10:32–10:39Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular manifestor.
10:39–10:43If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition of
10:43–10:48perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called
10:48–10:51directness.
10:51–10:55Directness is the definition of perception.
10:55–11:00The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition.
11:00–11:04Imperceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is
11:04–11:08present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal
11:08–11:13directness. Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception,
11:13–11:17otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent,
11:17–11:20and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible.
11:21–11:26The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifesto is unsound.
11:26–11:30Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the
11:30–11:34universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad.
11:34–11:39A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal.
11:39–11:43Recurrent manifestors are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort,
11:43–11:44pleasure, and pain.
11:44–11:49Conversely, presence of a regular manifestor may itself obstruct establishing a universal,
11:49–11:52because the manifestor can produce recurrent cognition.
11:52–11:57In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established
11:57–12:01through the means producing cognition of its substrate.
12:01–12:06Directness is the definition of produced perception.
12:06–12:11The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced
12:11–12:15from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition
12:15–12:20concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation,
12:20–12:24and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future
12:24–12:25objects.
12:25–12:29Such cognition is produced direct cognition.
12:29–12:32Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through
12:32–12:37universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related
12:37–12:40to an object generated by a sense faculty.
12:40–12:43Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its
12:43–12:45own object.
12:45–12:49In inference, verbal cognition and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause
12:49–12:53as qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the
12:53–12:57self is a cause only as in hearing cause.
12:57–13:02Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty.
13:02–13:07A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore
13:07–13:13the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity.
13:13–13:18The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood,
13:18–13:23otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions.
13:23–13:27Since facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition
13:27–13:31whose cause is cognition.
13:31–13:36Since facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition
13:36–13:38but not memory.
13:38–13:42Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind
13:42–13:46of which they are substrates produces memory.
13:46–13:50Alternatively, since facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces
13:50–13:55cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound.
13:57–14:02The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition is
14:02–14:08perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it
14:08–14:14has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception
14:14–14:19concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument
14:19–14:22of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this.
14:24–14:29In recognition, this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the
14:29–14:36instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony,
14:36–14:41the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental
14:41–14:48impression causes memory alone. The Prabhuprā view, direct cognition is perception.
14:49–14:54The Prabhukara says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition.
14:54–14:57Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor.
14:57–15:02Nor is, cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because
15:02–15:07it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition.
15:07–15:11A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition
15:11–15:14is direct cognition concerning that object.
15:14–15:18In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual,
15:18–15:23it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal
15:23–15:29is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual.
15:29–15:33Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified
15:33–15:39cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier.
15:39–15:42Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long object, though
15:42–15:46it is required for activity concerning the long object. Influence and recognition
15:46–15:50are indirect in the probandom and thatness components, but both are perceptual in their
15:50–15:54cognition and cognizer components.
15:54–16:00Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view.
16:00–16:04A partial msaka says that recognition, I know that this is that manifests thatness only
16:04–16:09as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness,
16:09–16:13therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component.
16:13–16:18But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom
16:18–16:22as cognition of the mark.
16:22–16:26Recutation of the Prabhupācāra view.
16:26–16:31The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component,
16:31–16:35it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent.
16:35–16:41If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause,
16:41–16:46and the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense-generated. It is needlessly
16:46–16:51complex to hold that sense-production independent of cognition of thatness regulates the directness
16:51–16:56of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the thisness component, because
16:56–17:01it arises from a sense-faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible
17:01–17:08to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition.
17:08–17:11It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct
17:11–17:14components business and thatness.
17:14–17:18But both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced
17:18–17:20by the sense faculty.
17:20–17:23Inferential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer
17:23–17:27components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes
17:27–17:30only direct cognition.
17:30–17:33If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference,
17:33–17:36the probandom component too must be mind generated.
17:36–17:42Making the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate regulate perceptuality is excessively complex.
17:42–17:50Cognition in general is not cognition hood because cognition hood is unproduced and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established.
17:51–17:54Refutation of the Prima-Face definition.
17:56–18:01Cognition has no parts therefore only its components are objects of cognition not constituents.
18:01–18:13Another determinate cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and atness objects, because those objects are not produced from another determinate cognition.
18:13–18:29It may be said that in recognition cognition of thatness taking thatness as object is a cause, in inference cognition of the probandom taking the probandom as object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate.
18:29–18:32while the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause.
18:32–18:34This proposal is unsound.
18:34–18:38Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes,
18:38–18:42another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition.
18:42–18:46This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer,
18:46–18:51because cognition of the staff as qualifier causes qualify cognition concerning the staff bearer.
18:51–18:55Indirect cognitionhood is not an extraneous condition in recognition,
18:55–18:57because it does not pervade the probandom.
18:57–19:02Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing in a previously
19:02–19:07experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes a qualifier
19:07–19:10and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence.
19:10–19:14Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal.
19:14–19:18Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is
19:18–19:22not an instrument, is impossible.
19:22–19:25Gangesa's Conclusion
19:25–19:30For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual cognition is cognition
19:30–19:35not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is only an
19:35–19:39impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an
19:39–19:46impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive.
19:46–19:50This definition does not apply to cognition of a staffbearer, because perception concerning
19:50–19:55the staffbearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff.
19:55–20:01nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience
20:01–20:05as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition.
20:05–20:10A mental impression produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an
20:10–20:14impression would become mere memory.
20:14–20:21Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition.
20:21–20:26Via the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation.
20:26–20:31A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception.
20:31–20:36Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object.
20:36–20:40Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color
20:40–20:43and action arises through conjunction come in hereance.
20:43–20:46Since universals such as colorness in here in color and the like in hereing in the
20:46–20:50conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come in hereance in the
20:50–20:52inherent.
20:52–20:55Sound is perceived through its inherent in the auditory sense, and sound is through
20:55–21:00its inherent in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is perceived through qualitative
21:00–21:04or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through
21:04–21:09qualitative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from
21:09–21:14relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object is never
21:14–21:20a cause. Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause.
21:20–21:27Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minotomic
21:27–21:31parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object
21:31–21:35as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause.
21:35–21:39In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the
21:39–21:41cause.
21:41–21:44The argument that, conjunction with the apprehensible object, is more economical
21:44–21:48than, conjunction with the parts, and therefore should alone be accepted as the
21:48–21:50cause, is unsound.
21:50–21:54with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the object
21:54–21:59alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also refuted.
22:00–22:04Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction
22:04–22:09delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established
22:09–22:13through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would
22:13–22:18remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest
22:18–22:24part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable.
22:24–22:29Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause.
22:29–22:31This view is unsound.
22:31–22:34Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in
22:34–22:39general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the self, dust particles
22:39–22:42dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles.
22:42–22:46Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular
22:46–22:52substances such as pots. Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of
22:52–22:56the sense with the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be
22:56–23:00held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object. If it is
23:00–23:04objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction
23:04–23:09with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating
23:09–23:14cause. Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with
23:14–23:16what is apprehensible by that sense.

Plain text

परस्व्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष्ष I knew this shell as silver. Apart from reflexive awareness there is no other means establishing the objecthood of invalid cognition. What is not an object of cognition is never apprehended as its object and a cognition that does not take an object cannot be known as cognition of that object. Reflexive awareness is veritical cognition taking an existent entity as object, otherwise even in the case of pot cognition reflexive awareness, I knew cloth would be required. Nor is it proper to say that at the time of non-apprehension of difference there is non-apprehension of non-relation of the objecthood delimited by silver cognition. Even after the difference between shell and silver has been apprehended, reflexive awareness, I knew the shell as silver arises. One should not hold that non-apprehension of non-relation remains even at the time difference is apprehended, claiming that apprehension of non-relation established by a contrary inference sublates it. In the reflexive awareness, I knew the shell is silver, it is impossible to place in oneself both cognition of the shell and non-apprehension of the non-relation of the qualifier silverness, therefore, on Lemsaka view, no example of invalid qualified cognition the shell is silver, can arise at all. The form of reflexive awareness is not merely, I knew this shell and I knew silver. The instrumental expression, as silver, means silderness, which is the qualifier of silver, qualifier cannot be apprehended without its qualificant. Veridical qualifier cognition everywhere takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore invalid qualifier cognition 2 takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object. In inferential cognition of silver, silderness is not held to be present, and qualifier cognition necessarily takes the qualificant of the qualifier as object, therefore the Nayayaka theory of misapprehension is not the sotrantika buddhist theory of an empty qualifier or apprehension of the unreal. Explanation of the rule governing sublating and sublated cognitions Some others object that if some cognition is admitted invalid, the rule of sublating and sublated cognitions becomes impossible because differences among cognitions will not remain fixed. This objection is unsound. A cognition not otherwise established is the sublator. For example, among two mutually opposed cognitions produced independently by defective sound sense faculties, the first does not sublate the later because the later has not yet arisen. When the later cognition arises from its cause, it cannot arise without destroying the previously arisen contrary form of the earlier cognition, otherwise the later cognition would not arise at all. The rule a later cognition is stronger than an earlier one applies only when both are mutually independent. If the later cognition depends on the earlier, it does not arise in opposition to the earlier because the earlier explains the later. How could a later cognition not yet produced sublate in earlier one? For instance, an inferential sublating cognition not yet arisen cannot sublate a prior perception. It may further be asked which component of illusion is sublated. The nature of invalid cognition always exists and therefore cannot be sublated, the qualificative status of silverness and the status of shellhood as qualifican cannot be removed, past activity produced by invalid cognition has already occurred, future activity does not occur because its cause is absent and therefore is not sublated. Answer, the cognition that the illusion is illusory, that is, the invalidity of the invalid cognition, is sublated by the sublating cognition. Confidence in cognitive validity Some others ask how confidence in cognitive validity is possible when the naiyayika admit some cognitions to be invalid. When this objection is unsound, the method of determining validity has already been explained in the theory of validity. On the Prabhikara view too, how can there be confidence in the validity of all cognition when non-apprehension of the non-relation of existent objects and cognition of unapprehended non-relations among things are observed in many cases? It may be said that recollection of non-apprehension of the non-relation of an existent thing is delayed, whereas the condition, this is an existent thing, is quickly recalled, therefore confidence in validity generally arises on the basis of cognition of an an existent object. When doubt about validity sometimes arises, a sublating cognition removes it. But this proposal is unsound. Even though validity is a general property, on your own view it is removed by a sublating cognition, therefore confidence in validity can be explained merely from absence of a sublating cognition. The men's arc cannot explain confidence in validity without another cognition of an existent object. The method by which distrust is removed on the basis of cognition of difference has already been explained. Therefore confidence in cognitive validity is not impossible on the Nairayaka view. A third view concerning confidence in validity. Some others say that in silver directly seen, absence of the remembered incapable contrary shellhood itself becomes the substrate or cognition of it. This absence is apprehended by perception, hence confidence in cognitive validity is established. When there is doubt about the difference of silver from the shell and incapable contrary substrate, confidence and validity becomes possible through another cognition of difference. This proposal is unsound. On both MMA with Macron essay with Macron and Naya views, confidence in validity equally arises through another cognition of difference. This discussion therefore needlessly burdens the student. In fact, conduct based on identity is possible merely from non-apprehension of difference. No cognition explicitly presents identity. How then will the Memsaka establish the state of cognition of an existent object? A defect causes illusion. Some others object that a sensory defect cannot cause invalid cognition. This objection is unsound, the causal efficacy of a sensory defect is established from its produced result, invalid cognition. It may again be said, how is the cognition the shell is silver invalid when both shell and silver are real and existent? Nor is it correct to say that the identity of shell and silver is unreal, whatever is additional to shell and silver in their identity is unreal, but both shell and silver exist. If both are held unreal, the Buddhist theory of apprehension of the unreal follows. The superimposed relation need not be unreal here. The Nyayayika replies that the cognition, this shell is silver, takes only the existent shell and silver as objects, nevertheless its invalidity consists in being a cognition that places a qualifier in a substrate possessing absence of that qualifier, or apprehends object had opposed to the qualifier. This defect is clear in such cognition. The earlier Nyayaka view, misapprehension is apprehension of the unreal. The earlier Nyayayikas say that identity and every other unreal relation become Some objects of invalid cognition such as, this shell is silver. Yet this is not the Buddhist theory of apprehending the unreal, because the earlier Nayaikas regard invalid cognition only as cognition of an unreal entity adventitiously qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. There is no reason to admit cognition of something wholly unreal and not even qualified by existent qualifier and qualifcant. The objection that the causal inexplicability of cognition of an unreal object equally afflicts MMA with Makon SA with Makon and Naya does not arise. The complete causal aggregate of invalid qualified cognition has already been established here, inexplicability therefore applies only to the Memsaka view. But Kasperti Mishra likewise says, a cognition that apprehends an object in one form when the object exists in another is unsupported cognition resting on an unreal object. Thus ends the theory of misapprehension and the perception section of the Tatva the Sintlaya of Sri Gangesapadhyaya, the theory of the definition of perception. Four kinds of valid cognition. Valid cognition is of four kinds, perception, inference, comparison, and verbal cognition. Their distinctive instruments, called means of knowledge, are correspondingly four, perceptual means, inferential means, comparative means, and verbal means. Other cognitive instruments fall under these four means according to their respective natures. This will be explained further below. Cognition produced by sense-object contact is not the definition of perception. The prima facie theorist junta objects that perception cannot be defined as, non-deviant, that is, veridical cognition produced by contact between sense-faculty and object. Such a definition overextends to inference of the self, memory, and universal cognition, because inference of the self arises from relation between the mental sense and the self as object. It underextends to God's perceptual cognition, which is not produced by any relation. Since contact consists in conjunction and other relations, it cannot be generalized. If some unspecified relation among conjunction and the rest is called contact, distinguishing it from other individual relations incurs partial unestablishedness. The Nyasutra statement that perception is, cognition produced by either the sense faculty or the object, would contain a pointless qualifier, and the condition, produced by either one of the two, would overextend to universal cognition, which too is produced by either the mind or self. Since the sense faculty is known through perceptual cognition, including the sense faculty in the definition creates mutual dependence. Nor can perception be defined as veridical experience not produced by a previously known specific instrument. Some instruments such as an inferential reason do not produce perception, if an unknown cognition is made the specific instrument, the definition overextends to inferential cognition. Nor is it veritical experience not produced by another cognition, because that under extends to qualified perception produced from cognition of a qualifier. Direct cognition is not a definition of perception, because directness lacks a regular manifestor. If a regular manifestor is admitted, that very feature can serve as the definition of perception and cause of activity, then there is no need to posit a separate universal called directness. Directness is the definition of perception. The earlier view replies that directness is the definition of perceptual cognition. Imperceptual cognition produced by the eye and other senses, when no inhibitor is present, reflexive awareness, I know this object directly, apprehends the universal directness. Cognition produced by a sense faculty is not the definition of perception, otherwise the sensory origin of cognition and perceptuality would be mutually dependent, and the sense faculty itself would become super sensible. The objection that directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifesto is unsound. Experientiality produced by instruments such as the I may irregularly manifest the universal directness, just as hump and the like irregularly manifest cow-hoad. A recurrent manifestor is not required to establish a universal. Recurrent manifestors are also absent for the universals of cognition, desire, effort, pleasure, and pain. Conversely, presence of a regular manifestor may itself obstruct establishing a universal, because the manifestor can produce recurrent cognition. In God's extraordinary indeterminate perception, the universal perceptuality is established through the means producing cognition of its substrate. Directness is the definition of produced perception. The definition of produced, that is, ordinary perceptual cognition is this, it is not produced from yogically generated merit, nor is that yogic merit produced from determinate cognition concerning its own object, it is not produced through universal characteristic presentation, and it is not produced through a presentation that generates direct cognition of future objects. Such cognition is produced direct cognition. Some others say that cognition of a universal and perceptual cognition produced through universal characteristic presentation must also be included under qualification related to an object generated by a sense faculty. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition taking its qualificant as its own object. In inference, verbal cognition and memory concerning the self, the self is not a cause as qualificant, because such cognitions arise even without the qualificant, the self is a cause only as in hearing cause. Another alternative is that produced perception is cognition produced by a sense faculty. A sense faculty produces cognition only in the capacity of sense facultyhood, therefore the I and the other senses produce universal cognition in that capacity. The mind causes memory and inference only in the capacity of mindhood, not sense facultyhood, otherwise memory and the rest would also be perceptions. Since facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction, and perception is cognition whose cause is cognition. Since facultyhood is being a substrate of conjunction with the mind that produces cognition but not memory. Vital breath, body, and self are not sense faculties because the conjunction of mind of which they are substrates produces memory. Alternatively, since facultyhood is being a substrate of mental conjunction that produces cognition but is not the substrate of a specific quality other than clearly manifested sound. The Neayaka's general definition is that cognition whose instrument is not another cognition is perception. In qualified perception, cognition of the qualifier is not an instrument because it has no operation there. Cognition of a qualifier certainly causes qualified perception concerning that qualifier, but cognition of the qualifier's qualifier is not an instrument of qualified perception, because there is no proof for this. In recognition, this is that very thing, memory of thatness is a cause, but experience is not the instrument through the operation of an impression, otherwise recognition would be memory. For parsimony, the condition produced from an impression alone is regarded as regulating memory, a mental impression causes memory alone. The Prabhuprā view, direct cognition is perception. The Prabhukara says that perceptual cognition is direct cognition. Directness is not a universal because it lacks a regular manifestor. Nor is, cognition arising independently of determinate cognition, a definition, because it fails to apply to perception of similarity, duality, and recognition. A cognition that, concerning its object, is not produced from determinate cognition is direct cognition concerning that object. In manifesting cognition and cognizer, every cognition is direct or perceptual, it is not produced by another cognition. Recurrent qualified cognition concerning a universal is perceptual because it is produced from indeterminate cognition of universal and individual. Cognition of a qualified does not cause qualified perception of similarity and the like, qualified cognition of an object in sense contact arises immediately without cognition of a qualifier. Cognition of a short object is not required for perception of a long object, though it is required for activity concerning the long object. Influence and recognition are indirect in the probandom and thatness components, but both are perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components. Recognition is perceptual, refutation of the partial msaka view. A partial msaka says that recognition, I know that this is that manifests thatness only as reflexive awareness of thatness, not as determinant reflexive awareness of thatness, therefore recognition is perceptual in the thatness component. But this is unsound, inference would then also become perceptual by manifesting the probandom as cognition of the mark. Recutation of the Prabhupācāra view. The Neyayaka replies that if recognition this is that we're indirect in the thatness component, it could not arise because necessary causes such as a mark are absent. If the sense faculty together with cognition of thatness alone is accepted as the cause, and the thatness component becomes perceptual because it is sense-generated. It is needlessly complex to hold that sense-production independent of cognition of thatness regulates the directness of recognition, then recognition would also be indirect in the thisness component, because it arises from a sense-faculty together with another cognition. It is impossible to accept both dependence and independence from another cognition within one recognition. It may be said that there is independence and dependence respectively in the distinct components business and thatness. But both components are objects of one cognition, and therefore recognition would not be produced by the sense faculty. Inferential and other cognitions are not perceptual in their cognition and cognizer components, because they are not produced by a sense faculty, the sense faculty causes only direct cognition. If the mind is made the cause of the cognition and cognizer components in inference, the probandom component too must be mind generated. Making the condition produced by a general cognitive aggregate regulate perceptuality is excessively complex. Cognition in general is not cognition hood because cognition hood is unproduced and no single combined causal aggregate for all cognition is established. Refutation of the Prima-Face definition. Cognition has no parts therefore only its components are objects of cognition not constituents. Another determinate cognition cannot cause the objects of perceptual cognition, otherwise inference and recognition would be perceptual regarding their probandom and atness objects, because those objects are not produced from another determinate cognition. It may be said that in recognition cognition of thatness taking thatness as object is a cause, in inference cognition of the probandom taking the probandom as object is a cause, but in perception cognition of a particular object is not the cause of objecthood concerning cognition, cognizer, business, and substrate. while the complete causal aggregate of cognition is the cause. This proposal is unsound. Objecthood is the cognition's own nature and depends on the cognition's own causes, another cognition cannot produce this specific nature of cognition. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staff bearer, because cognition of the staff as qualifier causes qualify cognition concerning the staff bearer. Indirect cognitionhood is not an extraneous condition in recognition, because it does not pervade the probandom. Recurrence means the presence, in a later experienced individual, of a universal residing in a previously experienced individual, then the previously experienced individual becomes a qualifier and cognition of it causes perception of recurrence. Otherwise cognition of recurrence would arise without a first cognition of the universal. Therefore the prima facie definition of perception as that for which, another cognition is not an instrument, is impossible. Gangesa's Conclusion For the same reason the following view is refuted, perceptual cognition is cognition not directly produced from another cognition, the direct cause of recognition is only an impression, recurrent cognition concerning a universal is also produced only from an impression, perception of similarity is caused only by an impression concerning the counter-positive. This definition does not apply to cognition of a staffbearer, because perception concerning the staffbearer is produced from experience of the qualifier staff. nor does it apply to a succession of perceptual cognitions, because an earlier qualified experience as cognition of a qualifier causes a later qualified cognition. A mental impression produces nothing except memory, otherwise recognition produced by an impression would become mere memory. Thus ends the section on the definition of perceptual cognition. Via the theory of contact, six kinds of apprehensive relation. A specific contact is the recurrent, non-deviant cause of a specific perception. Perception of a substance arises from conjunction between sense-faculty and object. Since color and action in here in the object conjoined with the sense, perception of color and action arises through conjunction come in hereance. Since universals such as colorness in here in color and the like in hereing in the conjoined object, their perception arises through conjunction come in hereance in the inherent. Sound is perceived through its inherent in the auditory sense, and sound is through its inherent in sound in hearing in that sense. Absence of sound is perceived through qualitative or intrinsic relation. Inherence of the pot and absence of the pot are perceived through qualitative relation in a substrate conjoined with the sense. Perception arises only from relation to a specifically perceptible object, relation to an imperceptible object is never a cause. Prima-facie view that conjunction delimited by a major part is the cause. Prima-facie view, even when the sense is conjoined with a whole object as delimited by minotomic parts, the whole object is not perceived, therefore only conjunction of the whole object as delimited by a large part should be regarded as the cause. In perception of a whole object, conjunction of the sense with its large parts is the cause. The argument that, conjunction with the apprehensible object, is more economical than, conjunction with the parts, and therefore should alone be accepted as the cause, is unsound. with the apprehensible object is over-inclusive, thus the view that conjunction with the object alone causes perception because it is more economical than conjunction with its parts is also refuted. Nor can it be said that if conjunction delimited by the object is established through conjunction delimited by a large part, conjunction delimited by the large part will in turn be established through conjunction delimited by a subtler part. In that sequence no conjunction would remain a cause of perception of the whole object. If conjunction delimited by the minutest part is made the cause, overextension is unavoidable. Conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense is the cause. This view is unsound. Sense conjunction delimited by a large part does not cause perception of substance in general or of every whole object, it deviates in perception of the self, dust particles dancing in sunbeams, and the parts of particles. Therefore sense conjunction delimited by a large part causes only perception of particular substances such as pots. Perception of substances such as the self arises from conjunction of the sense with the apprehensible object, perception of pots and the like should similarly be held to arise from conjunction of the sense with its own apprehensible object. If it is objected that a pot is not perceived without conjunction with minute parts, conjunction with a large part may be regarded as delimiting causality or as an additional cooperating cause. Even so, there is no need to abandon the established cause, conjunction with what is apprehensible by that sense.

← Transcript index