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Part 10 · VIDEHA MITHILA MAITHILI DISCUSSION CRITICISM SERIES PART 10

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1. 0:02–0:07Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum,
2. 0:07–0:11but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory.
3. 0:11–0:18Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances
4. 0:18–0:21because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory,
5. 0:21–0:25although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference.
6. 0:25–0:33Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances.
7. 0:34–0:39In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect.
8. 0:40–0:48A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory.
9. 0:49–0:53Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
10. 0:54–1:0233. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction.
11. 1:02–1:07Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandom unless
12. 1:07–1:11co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known.
13. 1:11–1:17Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus
14. 1:17–1:22of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless
15. 1:22–1:26qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom.
16. 1:26–1:31Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom
17. 1:31–1:36and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandom.
18. 1:37–1:42To cognize the absence of the probandom, cognition of the pervasion of that absence by the reason
19. 1:42–1:46would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent.
20. 1:48–1:51With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends.
21. 1:53–1:56The established doctrine of the contradictory reason
22. 1:56–2:01The established doctrine is now stated.
23. 2:01–2:09Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom.
24. 2:09–2:19It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known.
25. 2:19–2:28The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of the reasons absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct.
26. 2:28–2:38Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear.
27. 2:38–2:41Alternative definitions
28. 2:41–2:4835. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing
29. 2:48–2:53a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom,
30. 2:53–2:57not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while
31. 2:57–3:02occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence
32. 3:02–3:06while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject.
33. 3:06–3:10These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood.
34. 3:10–3:15It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons.
35. 3:15–3:20In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established,
36. 3:20–3:25the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established.
37. 3:25–3:31A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason,
38. 3:31–3:36because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated.
39. 3:36–3:41from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition.
40. 3:41–3:4636, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance
41. 3:46–3:51possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating
42. 3:51–3:54occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible
43. 3:54–3:59without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom.
44. 3:59–4:02This objection is not sound.
45. 4:02–4:05Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely
46. 4:05–4:09distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing
47. 4:09–4:14the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed
48. 4:14–4:18with the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless,
49. 4:18–4:24the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone.
50. 4:24–4:27Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes
51. 4:27–4:32cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition
52. 4:32–4:38of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation
53. 4:38–4:43in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion.
54. 4:43–4:49Three types of contradictory reason. 37. An objection may be raised, although
55. 4:49–4:53a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks
56. 4:53–4:57semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom
57. 4:57–5:01prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings.
58. 5:01–5:04This argument is not sound.
59. 5:04–5:09Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction,
60. 5:09–5:13therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect.
61. 5:13–5:18Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason.
62. 5:18–5:21The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds.
63. 5:21–5:25First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom.
64. 5:25–5:30Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom, and
65. 5:30–5:36third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom.
66. 5:36–5:40Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended,
67. 5:40–5:46because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir.
68. 5:46–5:51Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons.
69. 5:51–5:5238.
70. 5:52–5:56It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what
71. 5:56–6:01pervades the probandum is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold.
72. 6:01–6:06Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum, or reason pervaded
73. 6:06–6:11by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces
74. 6:11–6:14the defective contradiction.
75. 6:14–6:17Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of
76. 6:17–6:22the absence of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason.
77. 6:22–6:27Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes
78. 6:27–6:31perversion by the probandom, such perversion is possible even without the absence of mutual
79. 6:31–6:34absence.
80. 6:34–6:37Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence
81. 6:37–6:42of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the
82. 6:42–6:46deviating or inconclusive reason.
83. 6:46–6:50In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of
84. 6:50–6:55three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the probandom,
85. 6:55–6:59direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the probandom, and direct cognition of something
86. 6:59–7:03opposed to what pervades the probandom.
87. 7:03–7:08Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire,
88. 7:08–7:13because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke.
89. 7:13–7:18All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers.
90. 7:18–7:23For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe, because it possesses
91. 7:23–7:26sharp, odorless, white smoke.
92. 7:26–7:32With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends.
93. 7:32–7:35Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter-reason.
94. 7:35–7:4039. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter-reason
95. 7:40–7:45of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason
96. 7:45–7:50and counter-reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its
97. 7:50–7:52absence.
98. 7:52–7:57Nor can the strength of reason and counter-reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence
99. 7:57–8:01in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there
100. 8:01–8:06is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance.
101. 8:06–8:11Recutation of alternative definitions
102. 8:11–8:16Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance.
103. 8:17–8:22Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of them.
104. 8:24–8:31Nearly knowing the counter reason is endowed with provision and subject propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced.
105. 8:32–8:38Cognitions of provision and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once,
106. 8:38–8:43hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility.
107. 8:45–8:49Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandum is present in
108. 8:49–8:54the subject, or that pervasion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject.
109. 8:55–9:00A reason encounter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be
110. 9:00–9:05simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence
111. 9:05–9:10and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded
112. 9:10–9:17by the absence of the probandum is established. Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection,
113. 9:17–9:21pervaded by the absence of the probandum, and possessing non-difference from pervasion by
114. 9:21–9:26the probandum be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both
115. 9:26–9:31establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence
116. 9:31–9:37or absence of perversion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the
117. 9:37–9:44equally strong counter-reason ends. The established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason.
118. 9:46–9:5241. The established doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection
119. 9:52–9:56capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandum because of the presence of an
120. 9:56–10:01equally strong counter-reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandum
121. 10:01–10:05is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
122. 10:05–10:09Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this
123. 10:09–10:15strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence.
124. 10:15–10:20Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning
125. 10:20–10:24the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a subsumptive reflection
126. 10:24–10:28belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom
127. 10:28–10:32is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason.
128. 10:32–10:36An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason
129. 10:36–10:41is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and perversion, and the opponent has not denied
130. 10:41–10:42either.
131. 10:42–10:45Yet the counter-reason subject, propertyhood and perversion are not established for both
132. 10:45–10:49parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance
133. 10:49–10:53would be a defect only in inference for oneself.
134. 10:53–10:56This argument is not sound.
135. 10:56–11:00When reason and counter reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and
136. 11:00–11:04subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter reasons.
137. 11:04–11:08When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one
138. 11:08–11:15self and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present.
139. 11:15–11:20Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary.
140. 11:20–11:2542, since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence,
141. 11:25–11:29either pervasion or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence
142. 11:29–11:32constitutes the defect of counterbalance.
143. 11:32–11:37It should not be said that the reasons pervasion by the absence of the probandum can be certain
144. 11:37–11:41even if there is no opposition between the probandum and its absence, and therefore the
145. 11:41–11:45rule requiring absence of pervasion is unnecessary.
146. 11:45–11:52If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandum.
147. 11:52–11:56Or should it be said that absence of the reasons pervasion is necessary in the opposition between
148. 11:56–12:01probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence of pervasion arises after cognition
149. 12:01–12:04of their opposition?
150. 12:04–12:08Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of pervasion, like cognition
151. 12:08–12:13of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance.
152. 12:13–12:18Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness.
153. 12:18–12:2443, an objection may be raised, reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded
154. 12:24–12:28by the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the
155. 12:28–12:31same subject only doubtfully.
156. 12:31–12:35Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their
157. 12:35–12:40pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance.
158. 12:40–12:43This argument is not sound.
159. 12:43–12:47The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence
160. 12:47–12:52of two opposed reasons and one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for
161. 12:52–12:56this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons.
162. 12:56–13:01Only the subsumptive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance,
163. 13:01–13:06by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons,
164. 13:06–13:10it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject.
165. 13:10–13:14Absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because
166. 13:14–13:18even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present.
167. 13:20–13:25The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defective counterbalance through
168. 13:25–13:31cognition of the absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood. Sense organs are not prevented
169. 13:31–13:36from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present,
170. 13:36–13:39a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater.
171. 13:39–13:43Objection, all inferences would be stopped.
172. 13:43–13:4844, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counterthesis each
173. 13:48–13:53obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented
174. 13:53–13:56by proponent and opponent would all be stopped.
175. 13:56–14:01It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponents counterthesis is weaker, it
176. 14:01–14:04will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and
177. 14:04–14:11counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated.
178. 14:11–14:24This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis.
179. 14:24–14:30Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference,
180. 14:30–14:34and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless.
181. 14:36–14:42Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound.
182. 14:43–14:48The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason.
183. 14:48–14:54It has already been stated that pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason.
184. 14:54–15:00A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence
185. 15:00–15:01of the probandom.
186. 15:01–15:06A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements.
187. 15:06–15:09Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should
188. 15:09–15:12always be stopped.
189. 15:12–15:16Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect.
190. 15:16–15:20Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom
191. 15:20–15:25and its absence are uncommon reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandum
192. 15:25–15:33is the cause of the defective counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter-reason
193. 15:33–15:39become counterbalanced only when known separately, if the two are treated as a single reason bearing
194. 15:39–15:45a conjoined qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate
195. 15:45–15:50reason and counter-reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition
196. 15:50–15:55of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandum and its absence causes the defect
197. 15:55–15:57of counterbalance.
198. 15:57–16:00This view too is not sound.
199. 16:00–16:04The two inferences concerning probandum and absence of probandum are mutually opposed
200. 16:04–16:09and therefore cannot arise simultaneously.
201. 16:09–16:15Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors.
202. 16:15–16:2047, the authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate
203. 16:20–16:25inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt.
204. 16:25–16:30The complete causal complex is for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence
205. 16:30–16:36counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum.
206. 16:36–16:41An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt.
207. 16:41–16:44Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandum
208. 16:44–16:48is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence
209. 16:48–16:52the probandum arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the
210. 16:52–16:55probandum would have to be regarded as destroyed.
211. 16:55–17:0247, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the
212. 17:02–17:06probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum.
213. 17:06–17:09But two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength,
214. 17:09–17:13therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum must arise
215. 17:13–17:16from the completeness of their causal complexes.
216. 17:16–17:21It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition
217. 17:21–17:26concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which
218. 17:26–17:30can produce cognition of the absence of the probandum, is not itself the obstruction.
219. 17:31–17:36It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons
220. 17:36–17:40establishing the probandum and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandum.
221. 17:41–17:46The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the probandum,
222. 17:46–17:49although neither reason separately produces doubt.
223. 17:50–17:53Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view
224. 17:55–17:5848. This view of the Ratnikosa author's is unacceptable.
225. 17:59–18:03Probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one,
226. 18:03–18:07the probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the probandom.
227. 18:08–18:11Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom
228. 18:11–18:13opposes the presence of the probandom.
229. 18:13–18:21Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom.
230. 18:21–18:27Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition.
231. 18:27–18:31Definitions of the fallacious reasons
232. 18:31–18:3649. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results.
233. 18:36–18:42A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative
234. 18:42–18:49concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result.
235. 18:49–18:54A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom.
236. 18:54–18:59Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition
237. 18:59–19:02of the absence of the probandom.
238. 19:02–19:07In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of
239. 19:07–19:12knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself.
240. 19:12–19:17In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture of
241. 19:17–19:22the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect.
242. 19:22–19:27In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result
243. 19:27–19:33distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is the result.
244. 19:33–19:38In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial
245. 19:38–19:42of its subject propertyhood, is the result.
246. 19:42–19:45The result of a counterbalanced reason.
247. 19:45–19:4750.
248. 19:47–19:51Encounterbalance, as with audibility and producedness, neither absence of perversion nor absence
249. 19:51–19:56of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's perversion
250. 19:56–20:01and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result
251. 20:01–20:08either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result,
252. 20:08–20:14because reason and counter reason are not separately applied. Its result is merely the
253. 20:14–20:19inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of pervasion and cognition
254. 20:19–20:24of the presence of the reason in the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality
255. 20:24–20:30of the presented reason and probandom constitute the characteristic of counterbalance.
256. 20:30–20:34When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no
257. 20:34–20:39inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's
258. 20:39–20:43pervasion by the probandom is ascertained.
259. 20:43–20:46The prakharasama produces inquiry.
260. 20:46–20:4751.
261. 20:47–20:50An objection may be raised.
262. 20:50–20:53Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like.
263. 20:53–20:58This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning
264. 20:58–20:59the probandom.
265. 20:59–21:03How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing the absence
266. 21:03–21:07of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom?
267. 21:07–21:10This argument is not sound.
268. 21:10–21:15In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises,
269. 21:15–21:18it arises only when a counter-reason is present.
270. 21:18–21:24Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counterbalance produces inquiry.
271. 21:24–21:28This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason.
272. 21:28–21:32In deviation, doubt concerning the probandum produces a desire to know the probandum,
273. 21:32–21:38whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises.
274. 21:38–21:43The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously.
275. 21:43–21:48Objection, subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time.
276. 21:48–21:51How, then, can one reason obstruct the other?
277. 21:51–21:56Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist.
278. 21:56–22:05Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases.
279. 22:05–22:15Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood.
280. 22:15–22:25It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections can arise.
281. 22:25–22:33Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods, is impossible.
282. 22:33–22:36Prakharasama is not admissible.
283. 22:36–22:3853.
284. 22:38–22:42Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of
285. 22:42–22:47two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible.
286. 22:47–22:53For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance.
287. 22:53–22:55This objection is unacceptable.
288. 22:55–22:59Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible
289. 22:59–23:02without recollection of both pervasions.
290. 23:02–23:05an opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

Plain text

Still other scholars say that a reason not known to be pervaded by the probandum, but known to be pervaded by the absence of the probandum, is contradictory. Under this definition, a reason such as noability in Earth is different from the other eight substances because it is knowable would improperly be contradictory, although noability is not pervaded by the absence of difference. Such a reason is at most merely common, because it does not occur in similar instances but occurs in counter instances. In fact, cognition of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance causes the common defect. A negative reason deviating from the probandom, that is, concomitant with the absence of the probandom, is only deviating, not contradictory. Establishing the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. 33. Nearly establishing the absence of the probandom or producing cognition of the absence of the probandom is not contradiction. Such cognition cannot obstruct cognition of the reasons pervasion by the probandom unless co-location of the reason with the absence of the probandom is known. Nor is being pervaded by a property distinct from the reason and situated in the locus of the probandom a characteristic of contradiction, because this definition introduces the pointless qualifier not situated in a subject possessing the probandom. Nor is contradiction the condition in which the reason itself possesses the probandom and is the counter positive of the absolute absence of the absence of the probandom. To cognize the absence of the probandom, cognition of the pervasion of that absence by the reason would first be required, the definition would therefore become mutually dependent. With this, the prima facie discussion of the contradictory reason ends. The established doctrine of the contradictory reason The established doctrine is now stated. Contradictory reasonhood consists in being the counter-positive of an absence of the reason that pervades the probandom. It should not be said that the pervasion of absences can be known only when the concomitance of the counter-positives of the absence of the reason and the absence of the probandom is known. The causal complex is producing cognition of the counter positive of the reasons absence and of the counter positive of the probandoms absence are mutually distinct. Otherwise, if negative perversion were known immediately from cognition of affirmative concomitance, the distinct nature of negative perversion would disappear. Alternative definitions 35. Alternatively, a contradictory reason may be defined in the following ways, possessing a property regulating occurrence while not occurring in a subject endowed with the probandom, not being the substratum of occurrence in a subject endowed with the probandom, while occurring in the subject, not being co-located with the probandom, or possessing occurrence while not being co-located with what occurs in the subject. These are all forms of contradictory reasonhood. It should not be objected that these definitions overextend to purely negative reasons. In purely negative inference, because the probandom has not previously been established, the absence of the reason from a subject endowed with the probandom is not established. A contradictory reason may, however, sometimes become intermixed with an uncommon reason, because the uncommon reason too is fallacious in the forms just stated. from a subject endowed with the probandom is the defect repetition. 36, an objection may be raised, cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom necessarily arises from cognition of a reason regulating occurrence, but cognition of the reasons occurrence in a counter instance is impossible without cognition that the reason is absent from a subject endowed with the probandom. This objection is not sound. Cognition of the reasons absence from a subject endowed with the probandom is entirely distinct from being the result of the reason's occurrence in a counter instance possessing the absence of the probandom. Sometimes cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom may cause cognition of its occurrence in a counter instance, nevertheless, the defect of a contradictory reason is not established by this cognition alone. Cognition of the reason's absence from a subject endowed with the probandom opposes cognition of the reason's pervasion by the probandom, it therefore prevents cognition of the reason is pervaded by the probandom. This cognition resembles cognition of deviation in the reason, because both oppose cognition of pervasion. Three types of contradictory reason. 37. An objection may be raised, although a contradictory reason is fallacious in inference for oneself, in inference for another it lacks semantic fitness, because cognition of the non-collocation of reason and probandom prevents establishment of the relation among the word meanings. This argument is not sound. Cognition of the non-colocation of reason and probandom depends on cognition of contradiction, therefore the contradictory reason itself is the defect. Its defect closely resembles that of a defeated fallacious reason. The defect of a contradictory reason is of three kinds. First, a reason directly pervaded by the absence of the probandom. Second, a reason pervaded by the absence of a property that pervades the probandom, and third, direct cognition of something opposed to a property that pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is smoke in this region because eligible smoke is not apprehended, because of the absence of fire, and because it is a reservoir. Justification of the threefold division of contradictory reasons. 38. It should not be said that in all three inferences only a reason opposed to what pervades the probandum is known, and therefore the contradictory reason is not threefold. Even if the reason is not known as opposed to what pervades the probandum, or reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum or by the absence of what pervades the probandum produces the defective contradiction. Nor should it be said that the example, there is smoke in this region because of the absence of smoke yields a fourth kind of contradictory reason. Not being the counter positive of an absolute absence co-located with the reason constitutes perversion by the probandom, such perversion is possible even without the absence of mutual absence. Reasons such as, there is smoke in this region because it appears to possess the absence of smoke, or because it does not appear to possess smoke, are merely divisions of the deviating or inconclusive reason. In an inference establishing a negation, the contradictory reason is likewise of three kinds, direct cognition of the counter positive of the absence of the probandom, direct cognition of the absence of what pervades the probandom, and direct cognition of something opposed to what pervades the probandom. Examples are, there is an absence of fire in this region because it possesses fire, because of the absence of the absence of smoke, and because it possesses smoke. All three kinds of contradiction may also be established through qualifiers. For example, there is fire in this region produced by the smoke of black aloe, because it possesses sharp, odorless, white smoke. With this, the established doctrine of the contradictory reason ends. Prima-facet view of the equally strong counter-reason. 39. A reason established as pervaded by the absence of the probandom through a counter-reason of equal strength cannot be called counterbalanced by an equally strong reason, because reason and counter-reason, being mutually obstructive, cannot establish either the probandom or its absence. Nor can the strength of reason and counter-reason be taken merely as their respective occurrence in the subject and in similar instances, because in a purely negative reason there is no occurrence of the reason in a similar instance. Recutation of alternative definitions Provision and subject propertyhood in two reasons of equal strength do not constitute counterbalance. Since reason and counter reason are mutually opposed, such strength must fail in one of them. Nearly knowing the counter reason is endowed with provision and subject propertyhood does not make the original reason counterbalanced. Cognitions of provision and subject propertyhood concerning two mutually opposed reasons cannot both be veritical at once, hence suitable subject propertyhood cannot be superimposed on a reason such as audibility. Nor should it be said that in such a condition a reason pervaded by the probandum is present in the subject, or that pervasion of the reason by the probandum is present in the subject. A reason encounter reason respectively pervaded by the probandum and its absence cannot be simultaneously present in the same locus. Therefore neither the qualified occurrence and the subject of a reason pervaded by the probandum nor that of a counter reason pervaded by the absence of the probandum is established. Nor can a reason qualified by subsumptive reflection, pervaded by the absence of the probandum, and possessing non-difference from pervasion by the probandum be called counterbalanced. Reason and counter reason cannot both establish the probandum and its absence, and their distinction cannot consist in the presence or absence of perversion by the probandum. With this, the prima facie discussion of the equally strong counter-reason ends. The established doctrine of the equally strong counter-reason. 41. The established doctrine is now stated. A reason deprived of the subsumptive reflection capable of producing inferential cognition of the probandum because of the presence of an equally strong counter-reason capable of establishing the absence of the probandum is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. Pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason, because through this strength the reason establishes the probandom and the counter reason establishes its absence. Alternatively, a reason deprived of the capacity to produce inferential cognition concerning the probandom by a counter reason endowed with the strength of a subsumptive reflection belonging to an opposing inference that establishes the absence of the probandom is counterbalanced by an equally strong reason. An objection may be raised, in the eyes of both proponent and opponent, the original reason is regarded as possessing subject, propertyhood and perversion, and the opponent has not denied either. Yet the counter-reason subject, propertyhood and perversion are not established for both parties, hence the counter-reason is defeated by the first reason, and counterbalance would be a defect only in inference for oneself. This argument is not sound. When reason and counter reason are both known continuously as possessing perversion and subject propertyhood, they become mutual counter reasons. When both are known together in this form, they are fallacious in both inference for one self and inference for another because the complete causal complexes are present. Failure of either perversion or subject propertyhood is necessary. 42, since no object can be the substratum of both the probandom and its absence, either pervasion or subject propertyhood must be absent in the counter reason, this absence constitutes the defect of counterbalance. It should not be said that the reasons pervasion by the absence of the probandum can be certain even if there is no opposition between the probandum and its absence, and therefore the rule requiring absence of pervasion is unnecessary. If probandum and its absence were not opposed, the reason could not oppose the probandum. Or should it be said that absence of the reasons pervasion is necessary in the opposition between probandum and its absence, because cognition of absence of pervasion arises after cognition of their opposition? Being dependent cognition, this cognition of the absence of pervasion, like cognition of deviation, causes the defect of counterbalance. Recutation of the possibility of non-establishment of pervadedness. 43, an objection may be raised, reason and counter-reason cannot both be certainly pervaded by the probandom and its absence and simultaneously present in one subject, they can occur in the same subject only doubtfully. Even if the occurrence of both in one subject is certain, doubt will arise concerning their pervasion, hence the defect would be non-establishment of pervadedness, not counterbalance. This argument is not sound. The doubt concerning their pervasion that arises after certainty of the occurrence of two opposed reasons and one subject causes the defect of counterbalance, precisely for this reason it is distinct from the other fallacious reasons. Only the subsumptive reflection on the counter reason causes the defect of counterbalance, by obstructing the complete causal complex of equal strength belonging to both reasons, it prevents certainty concerning the reason in the subject. Absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood is not the nature of the defect, because even a faultless reason can become counterbalanced when a counter reason is present. The subsumptive reflection on the counter reason produces the defective counterbalance through cognition of the absence of pervasion or subject propertyhood. Sense organs are not prevented from producing the result merely because inference is a cause, even when inference is present, a sense organ produces its result if its force is greater. Objection, all inferences would be stopped. 44, an objection may be raised, the proponents thesis and the opponents counterthesis each obstruct what is contrary to their own thesis, consequently the ordinary inferences presented by proponent and opponent would all be stopped. It may also be said, if the property obstructing the opponents counterthesis is weaker, it will be ineffective, if it is of equal strength, the inferences of both thesis and counter-thesis will be stopped, and if the counter-thesis is stronger, the inference of the thesis will be completely defeated. This argument is not sound. On this view, even when a reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom is not directly cognized, an inference of the thesis possessing its complete causal complex would have to be obstructed by the opponent's counter-thesis. Whether the original inference is weaker or stronger is not established by another inference either before or after the original inference, and if it were established, the original inference would become pointless. Refutation of the objection. No, this objection is not sound. The opponent's counter-thesis is not invariably supported by an equally strong reason. It has already been stated that pervasion and subject propertyhood constitute the strength of a reason. A sense organ such as the eye obstructs an infir only when it is pervaded by the absence of the probandom. A sense organ itself cannot be described as a member of the Naya statements. Therefore it is not necessary that ordinary inferences presented by an opponent should always be stopped. Production of doubt is not the seed of the defect. Some scholars say that a reason and counter reason respectively pervaded by the probandom and its absence are uncommon reasons, therefore production of doubt concerning the probandum is the cause of the defective counterbalance. This view is not sound. A reason and counter-reason become counterbalanced only when known separately, if the two are treated as a single reason bearing a conjoined qualification, there is no counterbalance. Still other scholars say that separate reason and counter-reason do not themselves produced out, the failure to produce cognition of the veridicality of the two inferences concerning the probandum and its absence causes the defect of counterbalance. This view too is not sound. The two inferences concerning probandum and absence of probandum are mutually opposed and therefore cannot arise simultaneously. Doubt concerning the probandum is the result, the view of the Ratnikosa authors. 47, the authors of the Ratnikosa say that two counterbalanced reasons produce separate inferences of their respective probanda, which together take the form of doubt. The complete causal complex is for cognitions of the opposed alternatives produced out, hence counterbalanced reasons are fallacious because they produced out concerning the probandum. An objection may be raised, inference cannot take the form of doubt. Cognition of the counter-reasons occurrence as a substratum of the absence of the probandum is certain as a cause of inference, otherwise, even at the time cognition of the absence the probandum arises, the complete causal complex for inference concerning the probandum would have to be regarded as destroyed. 47, this argument, however, is not sound. Because cognition of the absence of the probandum is stronger, it obstructs inference of the probandum. But two counterbalanced reasons are of equal strength, therefore separate inferences concerning their respective probandum must arise from the completeness of their causal complexes. It should also be noted that cognition of the absence of the probandum obstructs cognition concerning the probandum, that is, inference, whereas a sense organ such as the eye, which can produce cognition of the absence of the probandum, is not itself the obstruction. It should not be said that two separate and certain counterbalanced or opposing reasons establishing the probandum and its absence cannot produce doubt concerning the probandum. The cognitions produced by these two reasons combined to become doubt concerning the probandum, although neither reason separately produces doubt. Qualification of the Ratnikosa author's view 48. This view of the Ratnikosa author's is unacceptable. Probandom and absence of probandom are mutually opposed, hence cognition of one, the probandom, opposes cognition of the other, the absence of the probandom. Likewise, the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom opposes the presence of the probandom. Consequently, cognition of the presence of a counter-reason pervaded by the absence of the probandom also opposes cognition of the presence of the probandom. Cognition of an opposed object is regarded as a necessary characteristic of obstruction to the contrary cognition. Definitions of the fallacious reasons 49. In this work the fallacious reasons are explained through their results. A deviating or inconclusive reason, by presenting both alternatives through affirmative or negative concomitance, produces doubt concerning the probandom, this doubt is its result. A contradictory reason produces cognition of the absence of the probandom. Even if it is not a property of the subject, it possesses the capacity to produce cognition of the absence of the probandom. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of the probandom is produced by a means of knowledge distinct from the reason being treated as defeated, not by that reason itself. In the contradictory example, a jar is eternal because it is produced, the intermixture of the defeated defect does not constitute a separate defect. In a non-established reason, cognition of a property opposed to the reason, a result distinct from cognitions of the other four fallacious reasons such as deviation, is the result. In a defeated reason, cognition of the absence of perversion of the reason, that is, denial of its subject propertyhood, is the result. The result of a counterbalanced reason. 50. Encounterbalance, as with audibility and producedness, neither absence of perversion nor absence of the reason in the subject is the result, because cognition of the reason's perversion and the like remain present. Cognition of the absence of the probandom is not the result either, because it does not invariably arise. Nor is doubt concerning the probandom the result, because reason and counter reason are not separately applied. Its result is merely the inquiry, how is the reality to be ascertained? Thus cognition of pervasion and cognition of the presence of the reason in the subject, which generate an inquiry into the reality of the presented reason and probandom constitute the characteristic of counterbalance. When the counter reason is not regarded as pervaded by the absence of the probandom, no inquiry into the truth of the presented reason and probandom arises, then only the reason's pervasion by the probandom is ascertained. The prakharasama produces inquiry. 51. An objection may be raised. Inquiry is the desire to know the reality of the reason and the like. This desire arises from cognition of a means to the desired cognition or from doubt concerning the probandom. How, then, can this desire arise from cognition of a counter-reason establishing the absence of the probandom without doubt concerning the probandom? This argument is not sound. In the absence of a counter-reason, no desire to know the reality of the reason arises, it arises only when a counter-reason is present. Through this affirmative and negative concomitance, counterbalance produces inquiry. This characteristic does not overextend to a deviating reason. In deviation, doubt concerning the probandum produces a desire to know the probandum, whereas in counterbalance only a desire to know the credibility of the reason arises. The two subsumptive reflections do not arise simultaneously. Objection, subsumptive reflections on two reasons do not arise at the same time. How, then, can one reason obstruct the other? Two subsumptive reflections arising successively cannot coexist. Answer, after the subsumptive reflection on the first reason, when the reflection on the second reason arises, the first reflection ceases. Cognition that the second reason, endowed with perversion, is present in the subject arises from cognition of its perversion and its subject propertyhood. It should not be said that the cognitions of perversion and subject propertyhood belonging to the two reasons are not mutually opposed, and therefore both subsumptive reflections can arise. Simultaneous production of all four cognitions, two pervasions and two subject propertyhoods, is impossible. Prakharasama is not admissible. 53. Some scholars object that cognition of the two reasons, which produces impressions of two pervasions, is mutually opposed, therefore recollection of both pervasions is impossible. For this reason, failure to recollect the two pervasions causes the defect of counterbalance. This objection is unacceptable. Two counterbalanced reasons, one reason, and the other counter reason, are impossible without recollection of both pervasions. an opponent each present the pervasion of their own reason.

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